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LABOR MARKET POLARIZATION OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

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**ABSTRACT**

Job losses during the Great Recession were concentrated among middle-skill workers, the same group that over the long run has suffered the most from automation and international trade. How might long-run occupational polarization be related to cyclical changes in middle-skill employment? We find that middle-skill occupations have traditionally been more cyclical than other occupations, in part because of the volatile industries that tend to employ middle-skill workers. Unemployed middle-skill workers also appear to have few attractive or feasible employment alternatives outside of their skill class, and the drop in male participation rates during the past several decades can be explained in part by an erosion of middle-skill job opportunities. Taken together, these results imply that a formal labor market model relating polarization to middle-skill employment fluctuations should include industry-level employment effects and a labor force participation margin as well as pure job-search considerations. The results thus provide encouragement for a growing literature that integrates "macro-labor" search models with "macro-macro" models featuring differential industry cyclicalities and convex preferences over consumption and leisure.

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A data appendix is available at:  
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## 1 Introduction

A recurring question for macroeconomists and policymakers is how low-frequency employment trends affect cyclical employment fluctuations for different groups of workers. In the U.S. labor market, a fundamental long-run trend is *polarization*, which describes the relative growth of high- and low-skill job opportunities and the decline of middle-skill jobs.<sup>1</sup> As seen in the decadal Census data at the top of Figure 1, after 1960 the share of nonagricultural middle-skill jobs began a protracted decline that mimicked the drop in agricultural jobs in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> Polarization stems from two complementary forces. One is automation, which occurs when machines or computers replace workers in occupations performing routine tasks, like assembly-line work or clerical jobs. A second polarizing force is international trade, which allows firms to offshore jobs involving routine tasks to countries where wages are lower. Jobs in the middle part of the skill distribution are thought to be particularly vulnerable to automation and trade, for the reason that these jobs tend to involve more routinized tasks than high- or low-skill jobs.

A possible link between long-run polarization and recent cyclical job losses is evident in Figure 1, Panel B, which plots indexed employment levels by skill during and after the Great Recession. Employment growth for high-, middle-, and low-skill workers slowed markedly during the recent recession, but only the middle-skill group experienced a sharp and lasting employment decline. It is reasonable to speculate that middle-skill job matches, which have the least encouraging long-run prospects, would be the most quickly dissolved when a recession occurs. As the *New York Times* put it in 2010:

“For the last two years, the weak economy has provided an opportunity for employers to do what they would have done anyway: dismiss millions of people—like file clerks, ticket agents and autoworkers—who were displaced by technological advances and international trade. The phasing out of these positions might have been accomplished through less painful means like attrition, buyouts or more incremental layoffs. But because of the recession, winter came early.”<sup>3</sup>

Modern models of the labor market can formally incorporate the idea that workers with poor long-run prospects will be the first to be let go when a recession occurs. In these

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<sup>1</sup>Examples of empirical and theoretical work on polarization include Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009), Autor (2010), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and Autor and Dorn (2013). Recent papers on the cyclical aspects of polarization include Faberman and Mazumder (2012), Jaimovich and Siu (2013), Smith (2013), Tüzemen and Willis (2013), and Cortes et al. (2014).

<sup>2</sup>The Census data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010) and make use of its 1950 occupational classification code (OCC1950). We provide more details of the classification of nonagricultural employment into high-, middle-, and low-skill jobs in the next section.

<sup>3</sup>Catherine Rampell, “In Job Market Shift, Some Workers Are Left Behind,” *New York Times*, May 12, 2010, p. A1. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/economy/13obsolete.html>.

models, workers and firms maintain job matches as long as doing so is in the best interests of both parties (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). A long-term decline in the productivity of a match reduces the value of preserving the match, so a productivity decline moves the match closer to the margin of being dissolved. Even a small negative shock can then cause the joint surplus accruing from the match to fall to zero and the match to be destroyed. After this occurs, the worker can either begin a new job search or use his time in some other way.

Although a standard search model augmented with long-run employment trends can potentially explain the large middle-skill job losses experienced during more recent recessions, such a model may not be consistent with other relevant facts. In this paper, we generate three sets of empirical findings that can help guide the development of formal models of occupational employment fluctuations. We start by asking a basic question: how do recessions typically affect employment in various occupations? Because the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does not maintain consistent occupational data before the early 1980s, we use contemporary BLS publications to construct a new dataset of occupational employment that begins in the late 1940s.<sup>4</sup> We find that the cyclical employment for those middle-skill workers engaged in manual tasks has been both high and stable throughout the postwar era. Because these manual middle-skill workers are disproportionately employed in manufacturing and construction—two highly cyclical industries—their high and stable cyclical employment suggests that industry designations matter at least as much as occupational ones for cyclical employment movements.<sup>5</sup> For the other group of middle-skill workers, who tend to perform sales and clerical tasks rather than manual ones, employment has become more sensitive to the business cycle over time. Although it is possible that this increase in cyclical employment is related to worsening long-run prospects for this middle-skill group, the employment of high-skill workers, who have been favored by long-run trends, has also become more cyclical over time.

Our second set of facts concerns the relevant alternatives for middle-skill workers who become unemployed. These alternatives are crucial inputs into formal search-based models of the labor market because these alternatives help determine the joint surplus that can be achieved from continued employment and thus the likelihood that any given match will be destroyed. Using individual-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we measure the probability that an unemployed middle-skill worker will transition to a new job or to labor market nonparticipation, holding constant a number of relevant covariates such

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<sup>4</sup>As we discuss below, the occupational classifications in this dataset are based on those suggested by Jaimovich and Siu (2013), who created a historical dataset of occupational employment that begins in the 1960s.

<sup>5</sup>As discussed below, the importance of industry designations for job stability is borne out by separate worker-level evidence on job separations from the Current Population Survey. Flows of middle-skill manufacturing and construction workers into unemployment “spike” much more in recessions than they do for middle-skill workers employed outside of those two sectors.

education, age, and the state of the business cycle. We find that middle-skill workers who lack college degrees rarely end their unemployment spells by taking either high- or low-skill jobs. Leaving unemployment for nonparticipation is thus a common outcome for those middle-skill workers who do not return to middle-skill jobs.<sup>6</sup> Of course, using matched worker-level CPS data to study movements from unemployment into nonparticipation has some disadvantages. In particular, transitions from unemployment to nonparticipation in one month are often reversed in the following month, when the nonparticipating worker resumes her job search and is counted as unemployed once again. Consequently, because we do not follow workers across three successive months, we do not know how many movements from unemployment to nonparticipation will turn out to be persistent.

Some suggestive evidence for a link between polarization and persistent nonparticipation appears in Panel C of Figure 1. The participation rate for prime-age males has declined steadily since the early 1960s, about the time that polarization began. Our third strand of analysis examines polarization and nonparticipation from a different perspective—by asking whether groups that have traditionally specialized in middle-skill work are disproportionately responsible for subsequent declines in participation rates. Our empirical model is based on one that Acemoglu and Autor (2011) used to study wages; we show that this model can easily be adapted to study polarization and participation. Estimating the model on males, we find that the demographic groups specializing in middle-skill work in the late 1970s have much lower participation rates today. In fact, the model implies that the ongoing decline in middle-skill job opportunities goes a long way in explaining the decades-long drop in participation rates among prime-age males.<sup>7</sup> In any event, the empirical relationship between polarization and nonparticipation points to a lack of employment alternatives for a nontrivial share of middle-skill workers, and thus a lower probability that these workers optimally separate from their jobs in recessions to search for alternative employment.

All in all, the data suggest that models capable of explaining occupational employment cyclicalities must extend beyond the standard search framework. To understand why middle-skill employment is so cyclical, one first must understand why manufacturing and construction output moves so much over the business cycle. Incorporating a volatile investment sector into a labor market model could be helpful here, given the importance of manufacturing and construction to the output of investment goods. Additionally, because exits to nonparticipation appear at least as important to unemployed middle-skill workers as exits to high- or low-skill jobs, a formal model of middle-skill job matches should encompass this margin, per-

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<sup>6</sup>We are unable to tell whether the workers in our dataset who do return to middle-skill jobs resume their previous jobs. Below we discuss work by Fujita and Moscarini (2013), who show that unemployed workers often return to their former employers. Such returns might be especially frequent for middle-skill workers in volatile industries.

<sup>7</sup>Our finding that rising nonparticipation is related to polarization is consistent with Cortes et al. (2014) and Aaronson et al. (2014), which are discussed in the conclusion.

haps by allowing nonparticipating middle-skill workers to enjoy leisure or by characterizing their decisions to get new training. Our empirical results therefore encourage the further development of a new literature that blends “macro-labor” search frictions with components of “macro-macro” models, such as nominal frictions and convex preferences over consumption and leisure.<sup>8</sup>

## 2 The Historical Cyclicity of Occupational Employment and Unemployment

### 2.1 Data

Official occupational data on employment levels and unemployment rates are available from the BLS only after January 1983 and January 2000, respectively. Earlier data are not available because the government’s occupational designations change every 10 years or so, and BLS officials are not comfortable extending the series corresponding to current occupations further back in time. Yet it is possible to construct longer time series by using contemporary labor market reports published by the BLS and the Census Bureau. Soon after World War II, regular Census reports on the labor force included occupational employment levels for the first month of each quarter. Monthly data become available in January 1958. Because occupational data are available only for January, April, July, and October before January 1958, the seasonal properties of a quarterly employment dataset will change when all 12 months become available. We therefore take account of the 1958 break when seasonally adjusting the data, as explained in the online appendix. Our dataset runs from 1947:Q3 to 2013:Q4.

As pointed out by Jaimovich and Siu (2013), who previously conducted a similar exercise, the early occupational data can be aggregated into four broad groups based on routine versus nonroutine and cognitive versus manual distinctions.<sup>9</sup> Table 1 shows that the *nonroutine cognitive* group consists of high-skill workers performing managerial, technical, or professional tasks. At the other end of the skill spectrum are low-skill service occupations, such as cooks and waiters, security guards, groundskeepers, and janitors. The nonroutine nature of tasks performed by both of these groups means that their jobs are difficult to automate or offshore. More susceptible to displacement are the two routine categories in the middle of the skill distribution. *Routine cognitive* workers generally perform sales and clerical tasks. Like high-skill workers, routine cognitive workers use brains rather than brawn, but the routine nature of sales and clerical jobs makes these workers more vulnerable to displacement. The

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<sup>8</sup>Blanchard and Galí (2010) provide an example of such a model as well as an excellent summary of the literature. See also Krause and Lubik (2007) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) for papers that integrate macro-labor models with macro-macro models.

<sup>9</sup>The theoretical section of Jaimovich and Siu (2013) includes a search-and-matching model that links polarization to the recent phenomena of jobless recoveries. We discuss this model below.

other middle-skill group consists of *routine manual* workers who operate machines on factory assembly lines, work on construction sites, or perform other types of production work.

In Table 1, the columns list the official major occupational groups in selected decades. Individually, these major occupational groups undergo significant changes. A factory worker might be classified as an “operative or kindred worker” using the 1940 designations but a “production” worker using the 2010 designations. Yet the table shows that over the entire postwar era, the shifting subgroups can still be aggregated consistently into the four broad skill groups. Unfortunately, “seams” in the data sometimes arise when the official classifications change. The two most important seams occur in 1971 and 1983 with the introduction of the 1970 and 1980 classification systems, respectively. The online appendix describes our method for dealing with these seams and our checks to ensure that the resulting data series are consistent.

The published data do not allow us to disaggregate occupational employment along other dimensions, such as industry. However, decadal Census data can shed light on the composition of the four main occupational groups over time. The IPUMS data (Ruggles et al. 2010) include an occupational variable, OCC1950, that aggregates occupational categories used in various census years into a single classification system based on the 1950 major occupational groups. Using this occupation variable, we aggregate individual records from decadal IPUMS data into the four broad groups shown in Table 1.<sup>10</sup> We are also able to use a consistent industry code in IPUMS (IND1950) to determine the industry composition of the four groups in census years, and the manufacturing and construction employment shares for the four groups are graphed in Figure 2. The two panels show that routine manual workers are disproportionately employed in manufacturing and construction. After 1960, the share of manufacturing employment in the routine manual group declines, as it does for all groups. But after 1980 the manufacturing decline in the routine manual group is partially offset by an increase in the share of employment in construction, another cyclical industry.

Figure 3 plots log employment levels for the four broad groups beginning in 1947:Q3, along with Hodrick–Prescott (HP) trends ( $\lambda = 100,000$ ). The series include the two seam adjustments in 1987 and 1983, but the series are not seasonally adjusted and the panels have different vertical scales. As we might expect from its significant representation in manufacturing and construction, routine manual employment traditionally has been far more cyclical over both the seasonal and business cycles than employment in the other three groups.<sup>11</sup> Another takeaway from Figure 3 is that we must be careful when using HP filters

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<sup>10</sup>The major occupational groups in 1950 are essentially the same as the 1940 groups in the first column of Table 1. We also use OCC1950 to construct the top panel of Figure 1.

<sup>11</sup>Note that the seasonal properties of the nonroutine manual workers in Panel D appear to have changed in 1983, when the 1980 occupation codes were introduced. Whenever we seasonally adjust the data, we therefore allow a different seasonal cycle to begin at that point.

to detrend these data. It is well known that HP trends have “endpoint problems;” that is, they are unduly influenced by movements at the end of the sample period. The big declines in employment for routine cognitive workers (Panel B) and routine manual workers (Panel C) that occurred during the Great Recession appear to have pulled down their HP trends in recent years, even with a relatively high smoothing parameter (100,000). Figure 4 graphs the employment shares for the four groups, which are consistent with the implied shares generated from Census data and displayed in Figure 1. As noted by Goldin and Katz (2008), a progressively higher share of employment is accounted for by high-skill occupations as the technological demands of the postwar U.S. economy grew. The share of routine manual employment has declined steadily over the same period, even though in Figure 3, Panel C shows that routine manual employment has generally trended higher in absolute terms. The share of employment for the other middle-skill group, routine cognitive workers, rose along with the high-skill share in the early postwar era but leveled off after 1970 and more recently has begun to decline.

Starting in 1957, we are able to obtain unemployment levels disaggregated by the last job held by the unemployed person, an approach that remains the standard convention for BLS measurement of unemployment by occupation. Consistent published data are available on a quarterly, seasonally adjusted basis through the end of 1981, and the online appendix explains how we code the OCC1950 variable into our CPS microdata to calculate unemployment rates for the four groups after that point. The resulting unemployment rates appear in Figure 5. The top panel shows that while the four occupational unemployment rates have different average levels, these rates move together strongly over time. This pattern is also true for the post-2000 occupational unemployment rates that the BLS publishes today, as well as for unemployment rates disaggregated along other dimensions (for example, by education). The lower panel of Figure 5 graphs the ratios of the four individual rates relative to the aggregate unemployment rate. As implied by the top panel, unemployment for routine manual workers is typically higher than for other groups and becomes more so in recessions, though its usual cyclical increase was muted in the mild recessions of 1990–1991 and 2001.

Relative unemployment for routine cognitive workers, the other middle-skill group, rises smoothly from about 1980 until the early 2000s, a pattern that lines up well with the low-frequency decline in the share of employment for this particular middle-skill group as depicted in Figure 4. However, relative unemployment for the routine cognitive group does not display the same cyclical pattern as it does for the routine manual skill group. Relative unemployment for the groups at the two ends of the skill distribution also display interesting patterns. Unemployment rates for high-skill nonroutine cognitive workers are typically much lower than for other workers, but relative unemployment for this group has trended higher for most of the sample period and underwent a noticeable increase during the 2001 recession.



Unemployment rates for the low-skill nonroutine manual group are generally high, but these rates tend to fall in relative terms during recessions. This pattern indicates that recessionary increases in unemployment for low-skill workers are relatively mild.

## 2.2 Cyclical Patterns in Employment and Unemployment

We now provide some basic evidence on the high-frequency relationship between occupation-level employment and unemployment with real GDP. To do so, we detrend all the series with HP filters that share the same smoothing parameter ( $\lambda = 100,000$ ).<sup>12</sup> We then construct rolling 10-year correlations of detrended GDP with detrended employment and detrended unemployment. The results are shown in Figure 6. First considering the GDP–unemployment correlations, the common pattern among unemployment rates we saw in the top panel of Figure 5 suggests that all four unemployment rates should be negatively correlated with GDP, and the rolling correlations shown in Figure 6 confirms this expectation. For each group, the GDP–unemployment correlation is strongly negative and near  $-1$  throughout the sample period. On the other hand, the GDP–employment correlations vary widely. As shown in Panel C, for middle-skill routine manual workers this correlation is uniformly large and positive, consistent with the strong cyclical pattern for routine manual employment shown in Figure 3. By contrast, for the low-skill nonroutine manual workers depicted in Panel D, the GDP–employment correlation hovers near zero, indicating acyclical employment levels. The cognitive workers shown in Panels A and B lie between these two extremes, as their GDP–employment correlations rise over time. The increase occurs somewhat earlier for the middle-skill routine cognitive group shown in Panel B than it does for the high-skill nonroutine cognitive group shown in Panel A.<sup>13</sup>

The moving correlations paint a broad picture of labor market cyclicity, but a regression model is required to investigate specific recessions. Our first regression is a type of dynamic factor model (DFM), which is often used to measure the impact of a single cyclical factor on individual time series. Our DFM is based on detrended log levels data and has the following form:

$$F_t = \rho F_{t-1} + \theta GDP_t + \nu_t \tag{1}$$

$$E_{it} = \alpha_i + \phi_i F_t + \beta_{1i} Mfg_t + \beta_{2i} ResConstr_t + e_{it}. \tag{2}$$

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<sup>12</sup>Recall that this parameter is also used for the employment trends graphed in Figure 3.

<sup>13</sup>In an accounting sense, the disparate correlations of GDP with employment levels may appear hard to reconcile with the negative and stable unemployment GDP–correlations. In a world with no population growth, one type of occupation, and no labor force participation margin, the size of the labor force cannot change, so increases in unemployment must result in employment declines. Yet more complicated models could admit changes in unemployment that coincide with intensified movements of workers across occupations, or changes in movements in and out of the labor force. These extensions would allow the correlations of GDP with occupation-specific employment and unemployment to differ.

Here  $F_t$  is a single unobserved common factor that depends on GDP and is constrained to be an AR(1) process with error term  $\nu_t$ .<sup>14</sup> The four employment series  $E_{it}$  depend on the common business-cycle factor  $F_t$ , group-specific constants  $\alpha_i$ , manufacturing output  $Mfg_t$ , real residential construction  $ResConstr_t$ , and an error term  $e_{it}$ .<sup>15</sup> To estimate this model, we assume that the disturbance terms  $\nu_t$  and  $e_{it}$  are normally distributed, which allows for joint estimation of the system as a state-space model via maximum likelihood and the Kalman filter.<sup>16</sup> To assess any potential changes in the cyclical nature of detrended employment over time, the DFM is estimated over three sample periods: an early sample that runs from 1947:Q3 to 1985:Q4, a later sample that extends from 1986:Q1 to 2013:Q4, and a third full sample that uses all the data from 1947:Q3 through 2013:Q4.

Figure 7 shows how employment in different occupational groups would be expected to have changed during and after the three most recent U.S. recessions. Each panel begins one year before the start of the recession, denoted with a vertical line, and ends four years after the recession began. The lines in the panels correspond to either actual data (a black dashed line) or to the dynamic predictions from one of the three models distinguished by their estimation periods. The dynamic predictions begin with the onset of each recession and are carried through the subsequent four years.<sup>17</sup> Turning first to the panels in the third column showing routine manual employment, we see that the DFM generates very similar predictions no matter what sample period generates their coefficients. By and large, the predictions for the routine manual group not only track one another closely, they also track the actual data well. Thus, the stability of the GDP–employment relationship apparent in the rolling correlations for routine manual workers carries over to more specific predictions for routine manual employment around recessions.

Other panels in Figure 7 also corroborate the correlational patterns. The first column shows high-skill workers, and during the 1990–1991 recession there is a significant miss for the predictions generated by the earlier data or the full sample. This finding highlights the absence of much high-skill cyclical nature in the early sample period. Estimating the DFM on the later period improves matters somewhat, but the gap between the predicted values and the actual data remains large. The same pattern appears to a lesser extent during the 1990–1991

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<sup>14</sup>The variance of  $\nu_t$  is normalized to equal one.

<sup>15</sup>The data on manufacturing output comes from the Federal Reserve Board’s industrial production release and the data on residential construction comes from the national income and product accounts. Both series are residuals from HP trends with  $\lambda = 100,000$ , as are the other variables in the model.

<sup>16</sup>The individual errors  $\epsilon_{it}$  are allowed to follow AR(1) processes. Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is feasible here because the number of employment series in the system is small. ML estimation is infeasible in the large systems that are now common in empirical macroeconomics. The abundance of information in these systems means that it is usually appropriate to estimate the factors by principal components analysis, then treat these factors as data for further analysis (Stock and Watson 2011). For an application of this approach, see Stock and Watson (2012).

<sup>17</sup>The predictions are dynamic because they use no actual employment data once begun, only actual real-side data such as GDP.

recession for the routine cognitive workers shown in the second column. The earlier models predict more of an employment response for this group, consistent with the earlier rise in cyclical employment for routine cognitive workers. Finally, the fourth column shows that there is never much movement in employment for the low-skill workers in the nonroutine manual group, either in the DFM's predictions or in the actual data.

As noted above, potential endpoint problems are an issue with any model estimated on HP-detrended data; Figure 3 showed that these problems might apply to our model because the Great Recession occurred near the end of our sample period. We therefore estimate a model of occupational employment that uses log differences rather than detrended log levels in order to evaluate middle-skill employment behavior during and after this downturn. As before, we specify early, late, and full-sample periods over which to estimate the differenced models. Unlike the levels-based DFM, the differenced model simply folds the GDP data into the observed equations, so that it consists of four independent regressions rather than four observed equations linked by a common factor.<sup>18</sup> We also end the full and later sample periods in 2007:Q3 rather than 2013:Q4, so that the resulting dynamic forecasts are also out-of-sample forecasts. Finally, in order to generate comparisons with log levels data, the predicted log levels of employment are constructed by summing the dynamically forecasted log differences.<sup>19</sup>

Figure 8 presents the results of the differenced model. These findings are generally consistent with the main lessons of the levels-based DFM, although Figure 8 shows that the HP-endpoint problem could be an issue for the middle-skill routine cognitive workers depicted in Panel B. The levels-based DFM did a passable job of explaining routine cognitive employment after the Great Recession, but this recession pulled the HP trend much lower for routine cognitive workers.<sup>20</sup> In the differenced model, which does not include a time-varying trend, Panel B shows that even a regression estimated on the most recent sample misses the large employment drop for routine cognitive workers during the Great Recession. The misses for the other groups are less substantial.

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<sup>18</sup>The differenced model therefore consists of four independent regressions without a state equation.

<sup>19</sup>Each regression projects the log difference of an employment series on the contemporaneous difference and two lags of log GDP, log manufacturing output, and log residential construction. Lags of the dependent variable are not included. We were concerned about seasonally adjusting the data before entering it into the differenced model, so we left the model in nonseasonally-adjusted form. To account for seasonality, we included seasonal dummies in the regressions with interactions allowing for changes in the seasonal cycle in 1958 (when the quarterly data can be constructed by averaging monthly data) and in 1983 (because the use of the 1980 occupation codes appears to affect seasonality in the low-skill nonroutine manual group).

<sup>20</sup>See the bottom panel in the second column of Figure 7 for the routine manual results from the levels-based DFM.

### 2.3 Summing Up the Historical Results

Perhaps the most interesting takeaway from this section concerns the two manual groups, which are at opposite ends of the spectrum as far as employment cyclicality is concerned. Employment for the middle-skill routine manual group has always varied strongly over the business cycle, while employment for the low-skill nonroutine manual group never shows much cyclical variance. Indeed, though unemployment rates for the low-skill group are high on average, the *relative* unemployment rate for low-skill workers improves in recessions. These patterns are consistent with expected fluctuations in labor demand for the two manual groups. Routine manual workers tend to work in factories and construction sites, where labor demand changes greatly over the business cycle. Nonroutine manual occupations include many “maintenance” or “overhead” occupations such as janitors and security guards, as well as occupations associated with nondurable consumption, such as cooks and waiters. For these service jobs labor demand is more stable over the business cycle.

Employment cyclicality for the two cognitive skill groups is harder to summarize because it rises over time. For both high-skill nonroutine cognitive workers and the middle-skill routine cognitive workers, rising cyclicality shows up in both simple rolling correlations of employment with GDP and in underpredictions of employment levels around recent recessions when the models are estimated over early sample periods. For the sales and clerical workers in the routine cognitive group, rising cyclicality could be theoretically related to a downward trend in the employment share during the past several decades. However, a careful look at the data shows that the timing is not quite right. Figure 6 shows that the rolling correlation of employment and GDP for routine cognitive workers reaches something close to its current positive value by the early 1970s, before the routine cognitive share begins to fall. The timing is better for a relationship between the declining routine cognitive employment share and the *low-frequency* rise in relative unemployment for routine cognitive workers depicted in the lower panel of Figure 5. In any case, the rising cyclicality for high-skill workers complicates any explanation for the routine cognitive group that relies solely on polarization forces.

Finally, the historical results discussed above also bear on whether recent recoveries should be considered “jobless.” Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012), among other studies, have noted that the lackluster employment growth in recent recoveries is not surprising in light of the weak recoveries in GDP. These papers contend that a better label for recent recoveries is “slow,” not jobless. With the possible exception of the routine cognitive workers in the Great Recession, the two sets of regression results indicate that this reasoning remains valid when we consider employment movements for individual occupational groups as well for the entire economy.

### 3 Middle-Skill Flows into Unemployment: The Importance of Industry

CPS microdata only became available in January 1976, but these data are critical to any cyclical study of labor market polarization because they allow disaggregation by industry as well as the measurement of flows in and out of unemployment.<sup>21</sup> The importance of industry in determining occupational employment levels is evident in Figure 9, which depicts the quarterly averages of monthly employment levels for two occupational categories: all the high- and low-skill workers (the solid line) and all the routine middle-skill workers (the dashed line). Panel A shows that polarization has occurred within manufacturing since at least the early 1980s, though high-skill manufacturing employment began to decline shortly before the 2001 recession.<sup>22</sup> By contrast, within-industry polarization is not a feature of construction employment. Panel B shows that middle-skill construction employment grew in lockstep with employment at the two ends of the skill distribution until the Great Recession. In the historical analysis, construction workers were placed in the middle-skill category by necessity; Table 1 shows that the government did not include a major occupational group for “Construction and Extraction Occupations” until recently. But construction workers are harder to replace with robots than are assembly-line workers, and the buildings, roads, and bridges that construction workers produce cannot be fabricated abroad and shipped to the United States. It is therefore reasonable to find a lack of polarization within the construction sector. The third panel of Figure 9 displays employment data for industries other than manufacturing and construction. A slowdown in middle-skill employment growth is apparent from the mid-1980s onward, and there were large middle-skill employment losses during the Great Recession. Both time-series patterns are consistent with the earlier results regarding routine cognitive workers, who comprise about 70 percent of middle-skill workers employed outside of the two goods-producing industries.<sup>23</sup>

How do these trends correlate with flows into unemployment during recessions? Figure 10 graphs the transition rates from employment to unemployment (EU) for middle-skill workers disaggregated by industry. These rates are adjusted for both the changing demographic composition within each industry group over the sample period and for time aggregation.<sup>24</sup> The figure reveals sharp cyclical differences in EU flows by industry, as job separations among

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<sup>21</sup>The CPS microdata contain more detailed occupational classifications than those used in the historical analysis. We make use of this detail, which is also used in Autor (2010) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). See the online appendix for details.

<sup>22</sup>The solid line in the manufacturing panel consists almost entirely of high-skill workers, since low-skill service workers rarely work in the manufacturing sector. The same is true for the construction data in Panel B.

<sup>23</sup>By contrast, about 80 percent of middle-skill manufacturing workers and 90 percent of middle-skill construction workers are in the routine manual group.

<sup>24</sup>A time-aggregation correction is needed because the point-in-time nature of the CPS complicates the estimation of continuous transition rates through employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation. See the data appendix for details of both the demographic adjustment and the time-aggregation correction.

middle-construction and middle-manufacturing workers spike in recessions to a greater degree than for middle-skill workers in other industries. Could these spikes reflect a higher willingness of middle-skill workers in construction and manufacturing to separate into unemployment due to unfavorable long-run industry trends? Such a story might be reasonable for middle-manufacturing workers, where employment has long been declining. But Figure 9 also showed that middle-skill employment in construction has been rising over time, making it hard to interpret the middle-construction spikes as short-run reactions to long-run trends. These spikes instead support a story based on volatile labor demand in the two goods-producing industries. Additionally, EU flows for middle-other employment appear to have a common recessionary pattern over the sample period, even though Figure 9 showed a change in trend employment growth from the beginning of the sample period to its end.

Before concluding this section, we note another potential advantage of disaggregating EU flows by industry. A long literature has studied the degree to which unemployment rises in recessions due to higher inflows into the unemployment pool versus lower outflows out of it (Shimer 2005; Elsby, Michaels, and Solon 2009; Shimer 2012). The results above show that EU flows have a strong industry component, so taking the industry into account may help labor market models match these flows. In other words, matching the true time-series pattern of EU flows in a standard search model with 1 percent fluctuations in aggregate productivity may be difficult. Matching those flows with a model in which manufacturing and/or construction output gyrates on the order of 10–30 percent during recessions – perhaps due to nominal frictions or rapid changes in demand for durable goods – may be easier.

#### 4 Employment Alternatives for Unemployed Middle-Skill Workers

We next get a sense of the alternative employment opportunities that are open to middle-skill workers after they enter the unemployment pool. To provide some context for this analysis, the top panel of Figure 11 plots the destinations of middle-skill workers who move to new employers *without* experiencing a (measured) spell of unemployment. These so-called EE flows became available starting in 1994 after the major redesign of the CPS and are smoothed in the figure with a four-quarter trailing moving average. For all three types of middle-skill workers, the most common destination after an EE flow is to the same type of job that the worker held before. Even movements to other middle-skill categories are rare, though middle-manufacturing workers transition to middle-other jobs about 25 percent of the time while middle-construction workers do so somewhat less often. For all types of middle-skill workers, transitions to high-skill jobs are uncommon, though middle-other workers are able to accomplish this feat more frequently than the other two groups.

The bottom panel of Figure 11 plots employment destinations for middle-skill UE flows, which can be generated from 1976 onward and are presented as four-quarter moving averages.



As with the EE flows in the top panel, middle-skill UE flows usually end with the worker in the same middle-skill category that he left. But there are some interesting differences between the EU and EE flows. First, for unemployed middle-manufacturing workers, the probability of transitioning back to a middle-manufacturing job declines throughout the sample, consistent with the declining trend in middle-manufacturing employment shown in Figure 9. Because the UE probabilities must sum to one, this negative trend must be offset in some way, and rising transitions from middle-manufacturing to middle-other group employment is largely responsible for this offset. A second lesson is that UE flows from middle-skill to high-skill jobs are smaller than the corresponding EE movements. In particular, the share of middle-other flows to high-skill work via an EE flow averages 13.8 percent during 1994Q:1–2013Q:4, the period of data availability. Over the same period, the share of middle-other UE flows ending in a high-skill job is 9.7 percent.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4.1 A Discrete-Choice Model of Unemployment Transitions

The probabilities plotted in Figure 11 show that after entering unemployment, a large majority of middle-skill reallocation is to other middle-skill jobs, and that the likelihood of getting a high-skill job is not necessarily enhanced by moving through the unemployment pool. As descriptions of the outside alternatives available to middle-skill workers, however, the raw means in Figure 11 are incomplete. The probabilities take no account of worker characteristics such as age or education. These characteristics vary at low frequencies (because of the aging of the labor force) and perhaps over the business cycle as well. Additionally, the UE probabilities are calculated *conditional* on exiting unemployment for another job, yet many unemployment spells end in transitions to nonparticipation rather than to employment.

A multinomial logit model for middle-skill transitions out of unemployment accounts for these issues. Consider an unemployed middle-skill worker  $j$  from industry  $i$  who can either stay unemployed (U), exit to employment (E), or exit to nonparticipation (N). With the baseline choice normalized as remaining in U, the unconditional probabilities of transitioning from unemployment to either E or N are:

$$\Pr(E_{ij,t+1}|U_{ijt}) = \frac{\exp(\Gamma'_{iE}X_{ijt})}{1 + \exp(\Gamma'_{iE}X_{ijt}) + \exp(\Gamma'_{iN}X_{ijt})} \quad (3)$$

and

$$\Pr(N_{ij,t+1}|U_{ijt}) = \frac{\exp(\Gamma'_{iN}X_{ijt})}{1 + \exp(\Gamma'_{iE}X_{ijt}) + \exp(\Gamma'_{iN}X_{ijt})}, \quad (4)$$

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<sup>25</sup>For middle-manufacturing and middle-other workers, the probabilities of transitioning to a high-skill job in the 1994:Q1–2013:Q4 period are 9.4 percent via an EE flow and 5.3 percent via a UE flow. Over this same period the corresponding probabilities for middle-construction workers are 6.9 and 4.1 percent, respectively.

where  $X_{ijt}$  is a vector of regressors and the  $\Gamma$ s are the parameters. For notational convenience, this representation does not distinguish between exits to high-skill, middle-skill, or low-skill employment, though we do allow for different types of employment exits in the actual model. The unemployed workers’ demographic characteristics are included in the  $X$  vector, as the CPS data can generate controls for educational attainment, gender, marital status, and age. Because the CPS also measures unemployment duration, this variable can also be entered in the model.<sup>26</sup> To capture the business cycle effects, we specify an “average” job-finding rate for all workers in the economy. This rate is generated from a system of unemployment-to-employment probabilities (UE rates) corresponding to five industry–skill groups: the three middle-skill groups disaggregated by industry plus high- and low-skill workers. The cyclical indicator is the common factor generated by a dynamic factor model applied to this system with no covariates, other than quarterly dummies in the individual observation equations.<sup>27</sup> With this cyclical indicator, the model measures how the destinations of unemployed middle-skill workers change as jobs become easier or more difficult to find.

Figure 12 displays the resulting transition probabilities for a baseline male worker who is 35 years-old, unmarried, and white. The probabilities on the left side of each panel are applicable when the baseline worker has a high school diploma but no further education, while those on the right are for an otherwise identical worker with a four-year college degree. Each panel corresponds to a separate logit estimated for a specific type of middle-skill worker (manufacturing, construction, or other). The duration dummies are zeroed out when calculating the probabilities, so the bars depict transition probabilities for unemployed workers with zero to one week of duration. The darker bars are the relevant probabilities when the common finding factor is one standard deviation above its mean, while the lighter bars depict probabilities when the finding factor is a standard deviation below.

Two key takeaways emerge from Figure 12. First, the panels reinforce the message taken from Figure 11: unemployed middle-skill workers tend to stay in middle-skill jobs. Baseline workers with college degrees transition to high-skill jobs more often than less-educated workers, but the effect of higher education is modest. A second lesson is that the business cycle does not have much effect on transition probabilities other than those for moving to a middle-

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<sup>26</sup>Age is specified as a cubic polynomial of the worker’s true age minus 35 years, so that all three age terms equal zero when the worker is 35-years old. Dummy variables are entered for nonwhite, female, and married. The three education categories included are less-than-high-school, some college, and college graduate, as high-school graduate is the omitted educational category. The female dummy is interacted with the nonwhite and married dummy as well as the cubic in age less 35 years. The duration dummies correspond to 2, 3, 4, 5–8, 9–13, 14–17, 18–21, 22–26, 27–51, 52, 53–78, 79–98, 99, and > 99 weeks of duration (zero duration is omitted). We also exclude workers who are more than 70 years-old from the estimation sample and include quarterly dummies (the first quarter is omitted).

<sup>27</sup>This common factor is constrained to follow an AR(1) process, but it is essentially identical to what emerges from a simple principal components analysis of the UE rates for the five industry-skill groups. Like the finding rates disaggregated by education in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010), these UE rates move closely together, as a single principal factor explains more than 90 percent of their time-series variation.



skill job or staying unemployed. An increase in the economywide job-finding rate makes it more likely that a baseline middle-skill worker will be able to return to middle-skill work. But because no other transitions are significantly affected, the only other effect of a tighter labor market is to reduce the probability that the worker remains in the unemployment pool.

The transition probabilities in Figure 12 assume that unemployment duration equals one week or less. In some unreported work, we calculated implied transition probabilities for workers with varying levels of unemployment duration, assuming that the overall job finding-rate factor is fixed at its mean. We found that transitions to high- or low-skill jobs did not become noticeably higher the longer that the worker remained unemployed. Indeed, the only duration dependence that we found in this analysis was a negative duration dependence for the unemployed worker returning back to the same skill class. This finding is consistent with recent work on unemployment and recalls by Fujita and Moscarini (2013), who use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP data can reveal whether an unemployed worker is eventually recalled to his previous employer. Fujita and Moscarini (2013) find that recalls are common, and that negative duration dependence in re-employment exists only for recalls to the same firm. In any event, the logits do not support the idea that middle-skill workers find searching for other types of jobs more or less attractive during recessions.<sup>28</sup>

## 5 Polarization and Labor Force Participation

If employment alternatives for middle-skill workers are limited, then the negative long-run trends in labor demand that they face could encourage them to leave the labor force. A potential relationship between polarization and labor force participation is not just a matter of academic interest. After the Great Recession, much of the decline in the unemployment rate was due to a decline in the labor force participation rate—because workers without jobs are not counted as being in the labor force unless they are looking for work.<sup>29</sup> To be sure,

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<sup>28</sup>The empirical work here can be viewed in the context of a broader literature on occupational mobility over the business cycle. Moscarini and Vella (2008) use three-digit occupational codes in the CPS to show that occupational mobility is “noisier,” or less consistent with regular demographic patterns, during recessions. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) show that the finding of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)—that jobs formed in recessions pay relatively low wages for a long time—is likely due to the poor quality of matches made in recessions rather than implicit contracts. To the extent that these papers show that recessions are unpromising periods to switch to new positions, they support our contention that middle-skill workers are probably not separating from their jobs in recessions purely for search reasons. But if reallocation patterns during recessions are poor guides for understanding the true employment alternatives for workers with different skill levels, these patterns undermine our use of unemployment exits as measures of outside opportunities for middle-skill workers. See also Manovskii and Kambourov (2008) for evidence on long-run patterns in occupational and industry mobility in the 1980s and early 1990s.

<sup>29</sup>The labor force participation rate was 65.7 percent when the Great Recession ended in June 2009. By April 2014, participation had fallen almost three percentage points, to 62.8 percent. The postwar high for participation is 67.3 percent, reached in each of the first four months of 2000.

much of the post-recession decline in participation is an expected consequence of population aging, as the leading edge of the baby boom has now reached traditional retirement ages. But as we saw for prime-age males in Figure 1, labor force participation rates have declined for younger groups as well.

In this section, we further our study of polarization and participation by adapting an empirical model appropriate for a labor market with a formal occupational structure. This model is grounded in a theoretical framework that Acemoglu and Autor (2011, henceforth AA) offer as a richer alternative to a model traditionally used in labor studies. In what AA call the canonical labor market model, workers with different skills (for example, high and low) are combined with capital in a production function to produce output. In AA’s alternative “task-based” model, workers with either high, medium, or low skill levels produce output by performing tasks, or equivalently by working in specific occupations. A worker’s skill level is exogenous and fixed, but a worker’s skills could potentially be assigned to one of many occupations, which vary by complexity. Comparative advantage arguments imply that workers with the highest innate skill levels perform the most complex tasks, workers with middle-level skills work in middle-level occupations, and workers with the lowest innate skill levels perform the least complex tasks. AA contend that compared to the canonical model, their task- or occupation-based model is better suited to capture a variety of labor market phenomena, of which occupational polarization is but one example.

Unfortunately, because workers with different skill levels can move to different occupations along the task-complexity distribution, the occupation-level effects of exogenous forces such as polarization or skill-biased technical change are difficult to examine empirically. To see why, consider a single occupation—office administrator—and assume that this job is traditionally performed by workers with mid-level skills. Now assume that high-skill workers become more productive at any given task because of skill-biased technical change. This change may arise because computers become more powerful and because high-skill workers are better able to use computers than people with mid-level skills. When this technical change occurs, high-skill workers using advanced technologies may displace mid-level workers who currently hold office administration jobs. The displacement occurs because high-skill workers are now much more productive as office administrators than middle-skill workers were; in fact, the high productivity of high-skill workers causes the average wage of office administrators to rise over time. Of course, this wage increase does not mean that workers *previously* working as office administrators are better off. In fact, these workers are worse off because they have been displaced into lower-paying jobs. A series of cross-sectional wage regressions on occupation dummies have no way of determining this outcome, however, because workers’ innate skill levels are unobservable. Workers can only be categorized by basic demographic information and by the occupations that they currently hold or held most recently.

Some of these empirical problems can be solved if individual workers can be followed over time. In theory, we could then determine what happens to workers who move across occupations in response to various labor market phenomena. Indeed, this longitudinal approach is the motivation behind our earlier empirical work on unemployment exits. By measuring the destinations of unemployed workers who formerly held middle-skill jobs, we can get a sense of the employment alternatives available to workers who have intermediate skill levels. However, we must be careful because some workers with very high or very low innate skill levels will hold middle-skill jobs at some point in their careers. Disproportionate movements of these workers to occupations at either end of the task-complexity spectrum will then bias our estimates of the employment alternatives available to unemployed workers with mid-level skills. However, even when we include these high- and low-skill individuals as middle-skill workers in our data, we find that unemployed workers who formerly held middle-skill jobs rarely move out of the middle-skill category. This finding suggests that when studying unemployment exits to new jobs, the potential bias is small. The same may not be true when studying nonparticipation, however, because many movements into nonparticipation are likely to be temporary. As pointed out most recently by Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2013), many workers cycle through unemployment and nonparticipation from month to month in the CPS data. Although we could potentially follow these workers by matching more than two months at a time, losses in the sample size become severe as the number of matched months increases.

## 5.1 A Potential Regression Specification

We borrow from AA’s handbook chapter and relate polarization to nonparticipation in a different way. AA assume that a worker’s innate skill level can be proxied by the occupational distribution of that worker’s demographic group in some base year. For example, if most 25–30 year-old males who have high-school diplomas and live in Michigan work in middle-skill jobs during the base year, then AA assume that the comparative advantage for this group throughout the sample period lies in middle-skill tasks. If we later find that 25–30 year-old men with the same education level and living in the same part of the country were paid low wages, or had higher rates of nonparticipation, we would attribute these changes to polarization. Importantly, this method does not require us to follow individual workers from demographic groups into lower paying jobs or out of the labor force.

In their handbook chapter AA study wage changes for various demographic groups using decadal Census data and 1959 as a base year. This model can easily be adapted to study nonparticipation. For our analysis we use quarterly data for males in the CPS. Let  $P_i^H$  be the baseline share of high-skill employment for demographic group  $i$ , where the baseline period is defined to extend from 1976:Q1, when microlevel CPS data become available, through 1981:Q4. The shares for middle- and low-skill employment,  $P_i^M$  and  $P_i^L$ , are defined analo-

gously. By construction,  $P_i^H + P_i^M + P_i^L = 1$ . Following AA, we demarcate our demographic groups on the basis of gender, education, age, and geographic area. We differ from AA in that we include only men, we use five-year age groups rather than 10-year groups, and we use the Census division rather than the region for the geographic classification.<sup>30</sup> Finally, we estimate separate equations for prime-age men (ages 25–54 years) and older men (55+ years).

A possible regression specification is:

$$N_{it} = \beta_t^H \cdot (P_i^H \times \phi_t) + \beta_t^M \cdot (P_i^M \times \phi_t) + \beta_t^L \cdot (P_i^L \times \phi_t) + \gamma^e \cdot \phi_e + \gamma^a \cdot \phi^a + \gamma^g \cdot \phi_g + e_{it}, \quad (5)$$

where  $N_{it}$  is the nonparticipation share for demographic group  $i$  in time quarter  $t$ ;  $\phi_e$ ,  $\phi_a$ , and  $\phi_g$  are the respective dummies for education, age, and geographic groups; and  $\phi_t$  are time dummies. The  $\beta$ s are the coefficients on the interactions of the time dummies  $\phi_t$  with the baseline occupational probabilities (the  $P$ s) that will trace out the combined effects of anything that changes the opportunities available to workers with different baseline comparative advantages.

## 5.2 Preliminary Analysis and Long-Difference Regressions

Estimating the nonparticipation model from 1982:Q1–2013:Q4, we expect that the sequence of  $\beta_t^M$ s will be increasing. In other words, the demographic groups with a baseline comparative advantage in mid-level tasks are likely to experience falling participation rates over time, because middle-skill workers have relatively limited employment alternatives as the demand for mid-level tasks declines over time. To get a better sense of how movements in participation rates for various demographic groups could identify such a pattern, in Figure 15 the top panel graphs the baseline 1976–1981 occupational shares by age and education for a selected Census division (New England).<sup>31</sup> The upper left graph in this panel shows that male college graduates tended to work in high-skill jobs during the baseline period, as we expect. The next panel to the right shows that male workers with some college were about equally likely to work in high- and middle-skill jobs once they reached their mid-30s. The lower two graphs show that the middle-skill shares continue to rise as education declines, at least for men in their prime working years. We might have expected that male workers without high-school diplomas would work in the lowest skill category. The preponderance of these workers in middle-skill jobs instead indicates that the traditional designation of high-, middle-, and low-

<sup>30</sup>Both our estimation samples and the ones AA use exclude workers under 25 years of age. The wage equation in AA excludes workers older than 64 years; our participation equation includes these older workers.

<sup>31</sup>Other Census divisions display patterns that are similar, but not quite identical. Thus there is some cross-division variation available to help identify the model.

skill occupations does not line up monotonically with the observed education levels, at least for men in the baseline period.

The figure’s lower panel graphs labor force participation rates for prime-age males, disaggregated by education. Workers with the lowest education levels have the lowest participation rates. More relevant for our purposes, however, is that *changes* in participation are also related to education. When the CPS microdata sample begins in 1976, the participation rates for the three most-educated groups are bunched together above 95 percent. Over time, the rate for workers with a high school diploma falls by more than 10 percentage points, the participation rate for workers with some college education falls by a little more than 5 percentage points, and the participation rate for college graduates barely declines at all.<sup>32</sup>

Because educational attainment is negatively related to baseline middle-skill shares, the panel regression will attribute some of the decline in the average participation rate over the sample period to initial occupational shares. While the degree of this attribution will also depend on participation patterns by age and Census division, the education analysis highlights both the underlying logic of the panel regression and a potential problem with it. The regression assumes that *any* change over time in a group’s participation rate is a function of its initial occupational shares. The regression includes dummies for education, age, and Census division—but these variables enter as simple level effects and are not interacted with any time-varying variable. If the pattern of falling participation rates by education in Panel B of Figure 15 reflects the direct effects of education, rather than the effects of education working on the initial occupational assignment, then the results from the panel regression will be misleading.

To check whether a correlation between occupation and participation behavior is reasonable, we run a preliminary cross-sectional regression in which this problem does not arise. For each demographic group, we calculate the average rates of participation from 1976Q:1 to 1979Q:4 and from 2010Q:1 to 2013Q:4. We then run population-weighted regressions of this long-difference in participation averages on initial occupational shares as well as dummies for age, education, and Census division. If factors like age and education, not baseline occupational shares, are the true drivers of participation rates over time, then this cross-sectional regression can tell us so.

Table 2 presents the results. In Panel A, column 1 runs the long-difference regression for prime-age men with only the age, education, and Census division dummies included. The constant in this regression (−4.05) is therefore the expected long-run change in the participation rate for the group for which all demographic dummies are omitted (25–29 year-old college graduates in New England). Column 2 adds the baseline share of high-skill workers. The coefficient is strongly positive (27.25), indicating that a 10-percentage-

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<sup>32</sup>Autor (2010) points out a similar correlation between education levels and participation rates.

point increase in a group’s high-skill share increases the long-run change in participation by about 2.7 percentage points. Because the occupational shares must add up to one, however, groups with large high-skill shares must have either small middle-skill shares or small low-skill shares, or both. In practice, the negative correlation, between high- and middle-skill shares is strongest, so entering the middle-skill baseline share in column 3 generates a large and negative coefficient, while the low-skill coefficient in column 4 is small in absolute value.

These results indicate that occupational shares matter for participation even after allowing for the direct effect of the demographic variables. Yet entering the occupational variables one-by-one does not really tell us which share matters. Column 5 enters all the baseline skill shares at the same time and drops the constant, which is required since the shares sum to one.<sup>33</sup> Essentially, this column conducts a horse race to determine the type of occupation that is most closely correlated with changes in participation over time. The middle-skill share emerges as the most robust predictor. The implication is that the high-skill share is positively correlated with participation changes in column 2 because the high-skill share is strongly and negatively correlated with the middle-skill share. In Table 2, Panel B repeats the analysis with men aged 55 years of age and older, and a similar pattern emerges. We see a significant decline in labor force participation for those older men who are likely to specialize in mid-level tasks, the same pattern we found for prime-age men.<sup>34</sup>

### 5.3 Panel Regressions

With the long-difference regressions providing initial evidence that baseline occupational shares help determine participation rates, we now turn to the panel regression. Even here, however, the empirical framework can be adapted so that participation rates are not forced to depend on baseline shares. This is done by replacing the high-skill/time-dummy interactions in the previous equation with a quadratic trend to get

$$N_{it} = \varphi_1 \text{Trend}_t + \varphi_2 \text{Trend}_t^2 + \beta_t^M \cdot (P_i^M \times \phi_t) + \beta_t^L \cdot (P_i^L \times \phi_t) + \gamma^e \cdot \phi_e + \gamma^a \cdot \phi^a + \gamma^g \cdot \phi_g + e_{it}. \quad (6)$$

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<sup>33</sup>The loss of the constant means that the skill-share coefficients in the table’s last column are not strictly comparable to estimates from the previous three regressions.

<sup>34</sup>The standard errors in the last column do not account for the fact that the occupational shares must sum to one. We therefore ran simulations for prime-age males in which the baseline occupational shares of the groups were drawn randomly as a three-element vector from the empirical distribution of these shares. Doing so generates distributions of the coefficients and t-statistics under a null hypothesis that the baseline occupational shares do not determine subsequent changes in participation. In these simulations, each of the occupational coefficients clusters near  $-4$ , which is the value of the constant term in the regression run without occupational shares (Column 1). Sampling without replacement across 999 repetitions, the p-values of the the actual prime-age middle-skill t-statistic was 0.028. Sampling with replacement, the p-value of the prime-age t-statistic was 0.045.



The omission of high-skill interactions to make room for the quadratic trend is informed by the results of the previous section, which indicated that baseline high-skill shares have a small quantitative effect on participation changes.<sup>35</sup>

Estimating the panel regressions allows us to construct counterfactual labor force participation rates to see how the trends in coefficients matter for overall participation rates. These results are shown in Figure 13. The heavy black line in each panel is the actual participation rate for either prime-age men (Panel A) or older men (Panel B). The thinner solid blue line in each panel fixes the influence of baseline middle-skill shares as constant throughout the sample, with this constant equal to the average of the  $\beta_t^M$  interactions from 1982:Q1 through 1985:Q4. Holding constant the labor market’s ability to match skills to tasks, this blue line therefore measures what the participation rate for prime-age men would have been if the demand for middle-skill tasks had not declined. The red dashed line is constructed in a similar way by holding the effect of low-skill participation opportunities constant at the 1982–1985 average. Finally, the green dash–dot line is the predicted participation rate when both the baseline middle-skill and low-skill job opportunities are fixed. For this prediction, the only time-varying influence on the participation rate comes through the quadratic trend and seasonal dummies, which are also included in the regression. The striking message taken from Panel A is that falling demand for middle-skill tasks appears to completely explain the overall decline in labor force participation among prime-age males. The thin solid blue line in this graph has no downward trend, indicating that participation would have remained stable had the coefficients on the middle-skill interactions not changed. The green dash–dot line holds both the low- and middle-skill opportunities constant. Again, the implied participation rate does not decline much.

These results present the strongest evidence that polarization is related to labor force participation among men. Because the regression includes a quadratic trend, a general decline among all age groups could have been reflected by large coefficients on the trend terms and small coefficients on the skill interactions. Instead, participation declines are concentrated among the groups with large baseline middle-skill shares, so the coefficients on the middle-skill interactions become increasingly large in absolute value over time. The coefficients on the trend terms are smaller, indicated by the modest bend in the green dash–dot line when both the middle- and low-skill coefficients are fixed.

The lower panel of Figure 13 performs the analogous experiment for older men. Declining job opportunities for middle-skill workers again have a quantitatively significant effect on male participation rates. A comparison of the thick solid black line, which depicts the actual

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<sup>35</sup>We also performed a robustness check in which we left the high-skill interactions in the panel regression and dropped the trend. Our results below regarding the effects of baseline middle- and low-skill shares on participation changes are not altered when this is done. Including a trend also allows the inclusion of seasonal dummies.

data, and the thinner solid blue line, which holds middle-skill effects constant, suggests that the participation rate of older males would be around 8 percentage points higher had middle-skill job opportunities not declined. This effect is even larger than the one registered for prime-age males.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper makes a number of empirical contributions to the cyclical study of labor market polarization. By and large, these contributions argue against the idea that the cyclical consequences of polarization can be easily explained by a standard job search model augmented with long-run employment trends. To start, the cyclical employment for the most volatile middle-skill group, routine manual workers, has changed little over the past six decades, suggesting that the tendency of these workers to be employed in volatile industries is likely to be a more important determinant of these workers' business-cycle experiences than is their optimal reallocation responses to long-run employment trends. One potential avenue for capturing the high volatility of middle-skill employment is to include an investment sector in a model with search frictions—because investment is both highly volatile and closely related to the manufacturing and construction sectors. Such a model would represent yet another entry in a growing class of labor market models that blend traditional macroeconomic features with search frictions (Blanchard and Galí 2010).

We also found that nonparticipation is a quantitatively important response to polarization, using both an individual-level model of unemployment transitions and a more theoretically grounded model based on demographic groups. An empirical link between polarization and nonparticipation is consistent with some other recent research. Cortes et al. (2014) use matched CPS data to explore all of the labor market flows that determine the stock of middle-skill employment, rather than just the unemployment-to-employment flows we analyzed above. The authors find that the overall decline in middle-skill employment stems in large part from higher flows of middle-skill workers into nonparticipation as well as lower flows in the other direction.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, in their study of the aggregate participation rate, Aaronson et al. (2014) provide state-level evidence linking changes in middle-skill employment to changes in participation for various demographic groups. Although the authors concede that this evidence is indirect, they write that “polarization in labor demand is one of the most striking developments in the labor market over the last few decades, and it would be surprising if such a pervasive change has not left a noticeable imprint on aspects of labor supply, including participation rate trends” (p. 29).

Figure 14 provides an intuitive explanation for why polarization appears related to non-

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<sup>36</sup>The level of middle-skill employment has also been significantly reduced by a lower flow of unemployed workers into middle-skill jobs.



participation in the empirical data. The figure presents education and wage data disaggregated into five industry–skill groups, including the three middle-skill groups disaggregated by industry. Consider a middle-skill worker contemplating a transition to another type of job (perhaps because he just became unemployed). To get a high-skill job, the middle-skill worker probably needs more education. The chart on the left shows that since 1990, about 85 percent of high-skill workers had taken at least some college courses.<sup>37</sup> Unfortunately, only about half of middle-other workers and one-third of middle-manufacturing and middle-construction workers have done so. What about moving down to a low-skill job that does not require additional schooling? The panel on the right graphs the average real wages for the same five groups, using the wage data from the outgoing rotation groups of the CPS.<sup>38</sup> The three middle-skill groups earn significantly more than low-skill workers, so taking a low-skill job likely entails a significant pay cut. Putting these two facts together, it is not difficult to imagine that polarization has caused a nontrivial number of former middle-skill workers to drop out of the labor force.

The educational requirement of high-skill work also bears on some recent work that connects the polarization to the joblessness of recent recoveries. Jaimovich and Siu (2013) argue that large numbers of middle-skill workers, aware of long-run polarization trends, have efficiently separated during recent recessions in hopes of obtaining a high-skill job. Consistent with both the previous figure and our data on middle-skill exits from unemployment, the Jaimovich-Siu model does not permit middle-skill workers to transition directly to high-skill jobs. Middle-skill workers separating from their employers must enter a so-called switching market, which operates much like any other market in a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) search model. Vacancies are posted in this market, matches are made, and soon after a switching match is formed the worker obtains the skills necessary to hold a high-skill job. To reflect the long stretches of joblessness that middle-skill workers have to endure, Jaimovich and Siu (2013) posit that the exogenous vacancy-creation costs in the switching market are high. These high costs reduce the number of posted vacancies and consequently the number of switching matches, thereby forcing middle-skill workers who have left their jobs to wait a long time before upgrading their skills—hence the joblessness of the recent recoveries. A critical question for this type of model is how well is the real-world education sector approximated by a standard DMP job market with high vacancy-posting costs. The results of this paper suggest that understanding precisely what middle-skill workers do

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<sup>37</sup>That is, using the standard classifications, most high-skill workers were listed as either “some college” or “college graduates.”

<sup>38</sup>Wages are defined as the usual weekly earnings divided by the usual weekly hours. The price deflator is the BLS’s implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector. We have also performed a demographic adjustment so that changes in real wages for a specific group are not affected by changes in the demographic makeup of that group. Elsbey, Shin, and Solon (2013) use CPS wages to construct a similar plot that is not disaggregated by occupation but shows a similar time-series pattern.




when they leave the labor market, even temporarily, is fundamental to understanding why recessions cause so many middle-skill workers to lose their jobs.

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
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
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**Figure 1.** LONG-RUN OCCUPATIONAL SHARES, SHORT-RUN EMPLOYMENT MOVEMENTS, AND LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION  
*Note:* Occupational shares are from IPUMS in Panel A are from (Ruggles et al. 2010).




**Figure 2.** MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION SHARES IN FOUR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS  
*Source:* Ruggles et al. (2010).




**Figure 3.** EMPLOYMENT FOR FOUR OCCUPATIONS: LOG LEVELS AND HP TRENDS ( $\lambda = 100,000$ )  
*Source:* Authors' calculations.






**Figure 4.** SHARES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR FOUR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS  
 Source: Authors' calculations.




**Figure 5.** CONSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATES  
*Source:* Authors' calculations.




**Figure 6.** ROLLING CORRELATIONS AMONG OCCUPATION-SPECIFIC EMPLOYMENT LEVELS AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND REAL GDP  
 Source: Authors' calculations.


Panel A: 1990–91 Recession



Panel B: 2001 Recession



Panel C: 2008–09 Recession



--- Actual


— Dynamic Forecast: Later Model (1986q1–2013q4)

— Dynamic Forecast: Early Model (1947q3–1985q4)


— Dynamic Forecast: Full-Sample Model

**Figure 7.** DYNAMIC FORECASTS FROM LEVELS-BASED DYNAMIC FACTOR MODELS


Source: Authors' calculations.




**Figure 8.** DYNAMIC FORECASTS FROM DIFFERENCED MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  
*Source:* Authors' calculations.



**Figure 9.** EMPLOYMENT GROWTH BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AND INDUSTRY  
 Source: Authors' calculations.




**Figure 10.** FLOWS FROM EMPLOYMENT TO UNEMPLOYMENT (EU) FOR MIDDLE-SKILL WORKERS IN THREE INDUSTRY GROUPS  
*Source:* Authors' calculations. *Note:* Flows hold constant the demographic makeup of the occupational group and also correct for time-aggregation.




**Figure 11.** DESTINATIONS FOR FLOWS FROM EMPLOYMENT-TO-EMPLOYMENT (EE) AND UNEMPLOYMENT-TO-EMPLOYMENT (UE) FOR MIDDLE-SKILL WORKERS IN THREE INDUSTRY GROUPS  
*Source:* Authors’ calculations.




Panel A: Middle–Other Unemployed



Panel B: Middle–Manufacturing Unemployed




Panel C: Middle–Construction Unemployed




High Job-Finding Rate (One Std. Dev. Above Mean)
  Low Job-Finding Rate (One Std. Dev. Below Mean)

**Figure 12.** TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FOR BASELINE UNEMPLOYED MIDDLE-SKILL WORKERS. *Source:* Authors’ calculations. *Note:* Each panel represents the predicted probabilities from a separate multinomial logit model of unemployment transitions. The regressors include demographic and duration dummies defined so that the baseline worker is an unmarried white 35-year-old male with zero to one weeks of unemployment duration and either a high-school diploma (left graphs) or a college degree (right graphs). Regressors also include an aggregate “job-finding” rate. This rate is the common factor generated by a system of five average unemployment-to-employment (UE) rates generated by the three middle-skill groups and high- and low-skill workers. Confidence bands are 95 percent intervals based on standard errors clustered by quarter.




**Figure 13.** COUNTERFACTUAL LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MEN

*Source:* Authors' calculations. *Note:* For counterfactual participation rates, coefficient estimates on skill-time interactions in the regression model are held constant at their average 1982–1985 values.




**Figure 14.** EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND REAL WAGES FOR FIVE INDUSTRY–OCCUPATION GROUPS  
*Source:* Authors' calculations.

Panel A: 1976–81 Occupational Shares by Educational Attainment and Age, New England Males



Panel B: Labor Force Participation Rates: Prime Age Males



**Figure 15.** BASELINE OCCUPATIONAL SHARES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MEN  
 Source: Authors' calculations.

Theory-Based Occupational Classification	Selected Census-Based Major Occupation Groups Used in Current Population Survey			
	1940 Groups	1970 Groups	1980 Groups	2010 Groups
Nonroutine Cognitive (High Skill)	Professional & Semi-Professional Workers Proprietors, Managers & Officials, excluding Farm	Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers Managers & Administrators, excluding Farm	Professional Specialty Technicians & Related Support Executive, Administrative & Managerial	Professional & Related Occupations Management, Business & Financial Operations Occupations
Routine Cognitive (Middle Skill)	Clerical & Kindred Workers Salesmen and Saleswomen	Clerical & Kindred Workers Sales Workers	Administrative Support, including Clerical Sales Occupations	Office & Administrative Support Occupations Sales & Related Occupations
Routine Manual (Middle Skill)	Craftsmen, Foremen & Kindred Workers Operatives & Kindred Workers Laborers, excluding Farm & Mine	Craftsmen & Kindred Workers Operatives, excluding Transport Transportation Equipment Operatives Laborers, excluding Farm	Precision Production, Craft & Repair Operators, Fabricators & Laborers	Production Occupations Transportation & Material Moving Occupations Installation, Maintenance & Repair Occupations Construction & Extraction Occupations
Nonroutine Manual (Low Skill)	Domestic Service Workers Service Workers, excluding Domestic	Service Workers	Service Occupations	Service Occupations

**Table 1.** CONSISTENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

*Note:* The four theory-based occupational classifications were originally suggested by Jaimovich and Siu (2013).

<b>Panel A: Prime-Age Males (Ages 25-54 years)</b>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
High-Skill Share		27.25*** (6.89)			3.76 (2.07)
Middle-Skill Share			-26.16*** (6.58)		-25.10*** (5.25)
Low-Skill Share				4.63 (15.31)	-10.50 (14.42)
Constant	-4.05*** (0.81)	-23.31*** (5.10)	2.45 (1.69)	-4.26*** (1.04)	
Observations	216	216	216	216	216
<b>Panel B: Older Males (Ages 55+ years)</b>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
High-Skill Share		36.89*** (10.10)			2.94 (2.59)
Middle-Skill Share			-34.36*** (7.51)		-25.65*** (7.61)
Low-Skill Share				47.04*** (13.69)	14.96 (16.02)
Constant	-4.60*** (1.35)	-32.08*** (7.89)	4.37* (1.96)	-4.31*** (1.10)	
Observations	144	144	144	144	144

**Table 2.** LONG-DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS OF LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MALE DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS, 2010Q1–2013Q4 AVERAGE RELATIVE TO 1976Q1–1979Q4 AVERAGE

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Robust (White) standard errors in parentheses. Occupational shares correspond to average employment by skill class from the 1976q1-1981q4 period. Age, education, and Census division dummies are included in all regressions. The constant is dropped in column 5.