A THEORY OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES IN THE PRESENCE OF NOMINAL RIGIDITIES

Emmanuel Farhi
Iván Werning

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ABSTRACT

We provide a unifying foundation for macroprudential policies in financial markets for economies with nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets. Interventions are beneficial because of an aggregate demand externality. Ex post, the distribution of wealth across agents affect aggregate demand and the efficiency of equilibrium through Keynesian channels. However, ex ante, these effects are not privately internalized in the financial decisions agents make. We obtain a formula that characterizes the size and direction for optimal financial market interventions. We provide a number of applications of our general theory, including macroprudential policies guarding against deleveraging and liquidity traps, capital controls due to fixed exchange rates or liquidity traps and fiscal transfers within a currency union. Finally, we show how our results are also relevant for redistributive or social insurance policies, such as income taxes or unemployment benefits, allowing one to incorporate the macroeconomic benefits associated with these policies.

Emmanuel Farhi
Harvard University
Department of Economics
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
efarhi@harvard.edu

Iván Werning
MIT Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive, E51-251a
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
and NBER
iwerning@mit.edu
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1 Introduction

During the Great Moderation, a soft consensus emerged that macroeconomic stabilization should be handled first and foremost by monetary policy. This consensus has been shattered by the Great Recession. In particular, a new set of so-called macroprudential policies aimed at supplementing monetary policy is gaining traction in policy circles. These policies involve direct interventions in financial markets, in the form of tax or quantity

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restrictions. But economists are still searching for a comprehensive theoretical framework encompassing both monetary and macroprudential policies in order to formulate a proper intervention doctrine.

One of the dominant existing theoretical justifications for macroprudential policies is “pecuniary externalities”, which arise when a simple friction, market incompleteness, is introduced into the Arrow-Debreu construct. Indeed when asset markets are incomplete and there is more than one commodity then redistributions of asset holdings induce relative price changes in each state of the world. These relative price changes, in turn, affect the spanning properties of the limited existing set of assets. This pecuniary externality is not internalized by competitive agents and as a result, financial market equilibria are constrained inefficient. A planner can improve the equilibrium outcome by intervening in financial markets (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1982; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1985; Geanakoplos et al., 1990). Similar results are obtained in economies with private information or borrowing constraints (see e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). A large literature has leveraged these theoretical insights to justify macroprudential interventions.

In this paper, we offer an alternative theory for macroprudential policies based on different set of frictions. We assume that financial markets are complete but that there are nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets of the kind often assumed in macroeconomics together with constraints on monetary policy such as the zero lower bound or a fixed exchange rate. We establish that financial market equilibria are in general constrained inefficient.

Although we share the focus on constrained inefficiency with the pecuniary externality literature, as well as the effort to provide a general theory that encompasses many applications, the source of our results is completely different. The key friction is their framework is market incompleteness; we assume complete markets. Their results rely on price movements inducing pecuniary externalities; in our framework price rigidities negate such effects. Our results are instead driven by Keynesian aggregate demand ex-

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1See e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Lorenzoni (2008); Farhi et al. (2009); Bianchi and Mendoza (2010); Jeanne and Korinek (2010); Bianchi (2011); Korinek (2011); Davilla (2011); Stein (2012); Korinek (2012a,b); Jeanne and Korinek (2013). Woodford (2011) studies a model with nominal rigidities and pecuniary externalities, and characterizes optimal monetary policy and optimal macroprudential policy. Importantly, and in contrast to our theory, the justification for macroprudential interventions in his model is entirely driven by the presence of pecuniary externalities.

2By constrained inefficiency we mean, in both cases, that the planner does not necessarily have the tools necessary to entirely overcome the frictions leading to inefficiencies. For example, in our applications the policy instruments can be interpreted as taxes or regulation on borrowing or portfolio decisions. It is also important that monetary policy be constrained and unable to overcome the nominal rigidities. In some applications it is also important that tax instruments be somewhat constrained, to avoid being able to control all relative prices and effectively undo the price rigidities.
ternalities.

We provide a useful formula for the optimal policy that offers insight into the size and direction of the best intervention. The formula delivers the implicit taxes needed in financial markets as a function of primitives and sufficient statistics. In particular, within each state of the world there is a sub-equilibrium in goods and labor markets affected by nominal rigidities. One can define wedges that measure the departure of these allocations from the first best outcome. In simple cases, a positive wedge for a particular good indicates the under-provision of this good. Our formula shows that wedges and income elasticities play a key role determining the optimal direction of financial market interventions. In particular, state contingent payments should be encouraged for agents and states that tend to expand the consumption of goods that feature a larger wedge. This is because their additional demand helps to mitigate the prevailing market inefficiency in that state. These macroeconomic stabilization benefits take the form of aggregate demand externalities that are not internalized by private agents, leading to a market failure and a justification for government intervention in financial markets using Pigouvian corrective taxes or quantity restrictions.3

We show that our results are also relevant to analyze redistribution. With nominal rigidities and constraints on monetary policy, redistributing towards agents that tend to expand the consumption of goods that feature a larger wedge has macroeconomic stabilization benefits. We characterize precisely how this affects optimal redistribution for any given redistributive objective, captured by a set of Pareto weights.

We illustrate our result by drawing on a number of important applications. We provide four example applications, two novel ones and two that have appeared earlier in our own work. All these applications can be seen as particular cases of our general model.

Our first application is motivated by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). These authors emphasize that episodes with household deleveraging can throw the economy into a liquidity trap. In Eggertsson and Krugman’s model, a fraction of households are indebted and are suddenly required to pay down their debts. The effect of this deleveraging shock acts similarly to the introduction of forced savings and pushes equilibrium real interest rates down. If the effect is strong enough then, in a monetary economy, it triggers hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, leading to a liquidity trap with depressed consumption and output.

To capture this situation we extend the original Eggertsson and Krugman model to in-

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3Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) isolate a different form of aggregate demand externality. In their framework, for a given level of nominal money balances, individual firms’ price setting decisions influence aggregate demand through the level of real money balances, an effect which they fail to internalize.
clude earlier periods before the deleveraging shock, where initial borrowing and savings decisions are made. This captures the credit boom phase, building up debt towards the crisis. Our main result in this context emphasizes *ex ante* macroprudential policies. The optimal intervention lowers the build up in debt during the credit boom. Lower debt mitigates, or potentially avoids altogether, the problem generated by the liquidity trap. Intuitively, individual borrowers do not internalize the harm that their debt have in the ensuing crisis. Debt creates a Keynesian aggregate demand externality. Optimal policy seeks to correct this externality by either imposing Pigouvian taxes that help agents internalize their debt decisions, or by imposing quantity restrictions on borrowing. Similar ideas are also presented in parallel and independent work by Korinek and Simsek (2013).

Our second application also involves the zero lower bound on interest rates, but does so in an international context that allows us to focus on exchange rate policy and the use of capital controls on inflows. Imagine a country or region that borrows, knowing that it may be latter hit by a sudden stop. A sudden stop in this context amounts to a deleveraging shock at the country level, requiring a dramatic fall in total debt against the rest of the world. In our model, there are traded and non traded goods, so that we may speak of a real exchange rate associated with their relative price. The government controls the nominal exchange rate and may also impose capital controls.

During the credit boom consumption and output rise and the real exchange rate is appreciated; during the sudden stop phase the reverse is true; after the sudden stop, the exchange rate is expected to recover and appreciate. In other words, during the sudden stop there is a need for a temporary depreciation. Given that prices are rigid, these movements in the real exchange rate are best accomplished by movements in the nominal exchange rate. By the interest rate parity condition with the rest of the world, during the sudden stop the expected nominal appreciation pushes the domestic nominal interest rate down.

As long as these effects are small, so that the nominal interest rate remains positive, optimal policy involves fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate and no capital controls. Thus, in dealing with this sudden stop shock, the exchange rate is the first line of response, echoing the importance of exchange rates adjustments advocated by Friedman (1953).

However, when these effects are large enough, the nominal interest rate is pushed to zero and monetary policy becomes constrained. We show that in these cases *ex ante* capital controls on inflows which mitigate the country’s borrowing are optimal.

Our other two example applications draw on our previous work in Farhi and Werning (2012a) and Farhi and Werning (2012b). To avoid overextending ourselves, we stop short of developing and explaining these two applications.
but focus on situations where monetary policy is constrained at the outset by a fixed ex-
change rate, the main motivation being for countries that form part of a currency union.
The first of these examples draws on Farhi and Werning (2012a) and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012) to capture Mundell’s Trilemma. We find that it is optimal to use capital con-
trols in a context with fixed exchange rates to regain autonomy of monetary policy. Taxes
on inflows are deployed when the economy is booming to cool it down; conversely, taxes
on outflows help mitigate recessions. Our final example application draws on Farhi and
Werning (2012b) to address the design of a fiscal union within a currency union. Our
results indicate that transfers across countries must be designed taking into account the
impact of these risk sharing arrangements on the macroeconomy. Private agents will not
internalize aggregate demand externalities. Thus, even with integrated complete financial
markets the competitive equilibrium is not optimal and government intervention is
required. This forms the basis for a case for fiscal unions within a currency union.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model and char-
acterizes competitive equilibria. Section 3 derives the ex-ante constrained efficient Pareto
frontier and the optimal macroprudential interventions. Section 4 derives the ex-post
constrained efficient Pareto frontier and shows how to factor in the macroeconomic sta-
bilization benefits of redistribution. Section 5 presents our four concrete applications,
explains how to exactly map these applications into the general model and how to apply
the results of the general model. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model Framework

In this section we lay out our general model framework. We seek to strike a balance
between generality and tractability. As we shall see, the framework is abstract enough
to capture a wide set of applications, at least in their simplest versions. Its tractability
allows us to obtain our main results very easily in way that transparently conveys the
mechanisms at work.

2.1 Model Elements

The main elements we want to capture in our model are as a follows. We need an econ-
omy populated by heterogenous agents to generate meaningful financial transactions. In

in full. We provide stylized versions of the basic models and results that are enough to appreciate the
unifying aspects emphasized by the general approach taken in the present paper. However, Farhi and
Werning (2012a) and Farhi and Werning (2012b) address a number of specific issues that arise in these
applications using a richer model.
addition to financial markets, these agents transact in goods and labor markets. Financial markets are assumed to be either perfect or suffer from very simple frictions such as borrowing limits. In contrast, goods and labor markets suffer from nominal rigidities that create inefficiencies of a Keynesian nature. Proper monetary policy can help mitigate these inefficiencies, but we are interested in situations where monetary policy is unable restore the first best. This may be because the shocks and rigidities outnumber the monetary policy instruments or because of outright constraints on monetary policy, such as fixed exchange rates, the zero lower bound on interest rates, etc.

Our formalism adopts a vector notation similar to that in the general equilibrium tradition. Agents are indexed by $i \in I$. The preferences of agent $i$ are given by

$$\sum_{s \in S} U^i(\{X^i_{j,s}\}; s) \pi(s).$$

The production possibility set is described by a production function

$$F(\{Y_{j,s}\}) \leq 0.$$ 

We use two indices to index goods $(j, s)$ with $j \in J_s$ and $s \in S$. In some of our applications, $s \in S$ will denote a state of the world, and goods $j \in J_s$ will denote goods and labor in different periods. In other applications, states $s \in S$ will denote periods and goods $j \in J_s$ will denote different commodities. We introduce this distinction between $j$ and $s$ for the following reason. We will assume that the government has the ability to use tax instruments (or equivalently to impose quantity restrictions) to affect spending decisions along the $s \in S$ dimension but not along the $j \in J_s$ dimension. In other words, financial transactions allow agents to trade across $s$ and the government can intervene in these transactions.

We confront agent $i$ with the following budget constraints

$$\sum_{s \in S} D^i_s Q_s \leq \Pi^i,$$

where for all $s \in S$

$$\sum_{j \in J_s} P^i_{j,s} X^i_{j,s} \leq -T^i_s + (1 + \tau^i_{D,s}) D^i_s.$$

The first budget constraint encodes how the agent can transfer wealth along the $s \in S$
dimension, according to state prices $Q_s$. The second budget constraint then determines the income available to the agent to spend on goods $j \in J_s$ for each $s$. Importantly, we allow for a tax $\tau_{D,s}$ on state $s$ to influence these financial decisions, as well as a lump-sum tax $T_s^i$. Finally, $\Pi^i$ denotes the share of profits for the agent.

For some of our applications, it will be convenient to allow for further restrictions on the consumption bundles available to the agent for a given $s$

$$\{X_{j,s}^i\} \in B_{s,s}^i$$

for some set $B_{s,s}^i$. We take these restrictions to be features of the environment. For example, in our applications, they allow us to capture borrowing constraints. Of course we can take $B_{s,s}^i$ to be the domain of the utility function, in which case there are no further restrictions on consumption.

It will be useful to introduce the indirect utility function of agent $i$ for a given $s$ as

$$V_{s,s}^i(I_{s,s}, P_s) = \max U^i(\{X_{j,s}^i\}; s)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} X_{j,s}^i \leq I_{s,s}^i$$

$$\{X_{j,s}^i\} \in B_{s,s}^i.$$  

We denote by

$$X_{j,s}^i = X_{j,s}^i(I_{s,s}, P_s)$$

the associated Marshallian demand functions and by

$$S_{k,j,s}^i = X_{k,j,s}^i + X_{j,s}^i X_{I,j,s}^i$$

the associated Slutsky matrix.

Our goal is to characterize the implications of price rigidities in goods markets for the efficiency of private risk sharing decisions in asset markets. Monetary policy may mitigate these rigidities, but monetary policy may be constrained. We capture both of these features by introducing a general constraints on the feasible price set

$$\Gamma(\{P_{j,s}\}) \leq 0,$$  

where $\Gamma$ is a vector. This formulation allows us to capture very general forms of nominal
rigidities and constraints on monetary policy (the zero lower bound, or a fixed exchange
rate). It also allows us to capture situations where certain prices are given, e.g. the terms
of trade for a small open economy. We refer the reader to Section 5 for concrete appli-
cations where such constraints are explicitly spelled out and mapped exactly into the
general framework.

We postpone the precise description of the market structure that leads to these prices.
For now, we proceed in a way similar to the seminal analysis of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) and assume that the all production possibilities can be controlled by the govern-
ment. Their goal was to characterize arrangements where agents interact in decentralized
markets and the government seeks to achieve some redistributive objective or to raise
some revenues. They were led to a second best problem because they assumed that the
government could only use a restricted set of instruments, linear commodity taxes. They
ruled out poll taxes which would allow the government to achieve its objectives without
imposing any distortion, thereby reaching the first best. We are interested in a different
set of constraints, namely nominal rigidities in the prices faced by consumers. We also in-
corporate restrictions on instruments, but of a different kind. In particular, we allow poll
taxes, but rule out a complete set of commodity taxes that would allow the government
to get around the nominal rigidities and reach the first best.

In our applications in Section 5, we propose explicit decentralizations where produc-
tion is undertaken by firms who post prices subject to nominal rigidities. More precisely,
in all our applications, we assume that goods are produced under monopolistic competi-
tion from labor. Firms post prices, and accommodate demand at these prices. The prices
posted by firms cannot be fully adjusted across time periods or states of the world. Some-
times, we will interpret states s as periods, or different goods j within a state s as the same
underlying good but in different periods. Our formulation of nominal rigidities allows
us to capture all these different cases. Importantly, we assume that the government can
influence the prices set by these firms with appropriate labor taxes.

The government must balance its budget

$$\sum_{s \in S} D^g_s Q_s \leq 0,$$

where for all s ∈ S,

$$\sum_{i \in I} (T^i_s - \tau^i_{D,s} D^i_s) + D^g_s = 0.$$
2.2 Equilibrium

An equilibrium is an allocation for consumption \( \{X^i_{j,s}\} \), output \( \{Y_{j,s}\} \), state contingent debt \( \{D^i_s, D^g_s\} \) as well as prices \( \{Q_s\} \) and \( \{P_{j,s}\} \) such that agents optimize, price satisfy the nominal rigidity restrictions, the government balances its budget and markets clear so that for all \( s \in S \) and \( j \in J_s \),

\[
Y_{j,s} = \sum_{i \in I} X^i_{j,s} \tag{4}
\]

and,

\[
\sum_{i \in I} \Pi^i = \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{j \in J_s} Q_s P_{j,s} Y_{j,s}. \tag{5}
\]

This implies that bond markets clear so that for all \( s \in S \)

\[
D^g_s + \sum_{i \in I} D^i_s = 0.
\]

**Proposition 1** (Implementability). An allocation for consumption \( \{X^i_{j,s}\} \) and output \( \{Y_{j,s}\} \) together with prices \( \{P_{j,s}\} \) form part of an equilibrium if and only if there are incomes \( \{I^i_s\} \) such that (1), (2), (3) and (4) hold.

3 Optimal Macroprudential Interventions

We now solve the Ramsey problem of choosing the equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, computed as a weighted average of agents utilities with Pareto weights \( \lambda^i \). We are led to the following planning problem which maximizes a weighted average of utility across agents

\[
\max \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{s \in S} \lambda^i V^i_s(I^i_s, P_s), \tag{6}
\]

subject to the resource constraints that,

\[
F(\{\sum_{i \in I} X^i_{j,s}(I^i_s, P_s)\}) \leq 0,
\]

and the price constraint that

\[
\Gamma(\{P_{j,s}\}) \leq 0.
\]
The first order conditions are that for all $i \in I$ and $s \in S$,

$$
\lambda^i V_{I,s}^i = \mu \sum_{j \in J_s} F_{j,s} X_{I,s}^i,
$$

and that for all $s \in S$ and $k \in J_s$,

$$
\sum_{i \in I} \lambda^i V_{P_k,s}^i = \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J_s} \mu F_{j,s} X_{P_k,s}^i \tau_{j,s} + \nu \cdot \Gamma_{k,s},
$$

where $\mu$ is the multiplier on the resource constraint and $\nu$ is the (vector) multiplier on the price constraint.

We define the wedges $\tau_{j,s}$ as

$$
\frac{P_{j^*(s),s} X_{j,s}^i}{P_{j,s} X_{j,s}^i} = 1 - \tau_{j,s},
$$

for each $s \in S$ given some reference good $j^*(s) \in J_s$. For each These wedges would be equal to zero at the first best.

Using these wedges we can rearrange the first order conditions to derive the following two key equations. For all $i$ and $s$, we must have

$$
\frac{\lambda^i V_{I,s}^i}{1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{P_{j,s} X_{j,s}^i}{P_{j^*(s),s} X_{j,s}^i} \tau_{j,s}} = \mu \frac{F_{j^*(s),s}}{P_{j^*(s),s}},
$$

(7)

and for all $\omega \in \Omega$, we must have

$$
\nu \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = \sum_{i \in I} \frac{\mu F_{j^*(s),s}}{P_{j^*(s),s}} \sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} \tau_{j,s} S_{k,j,s}^i.
$$

(8)

The left hand side of equation (7) defines the right notion of social marginal utility of income and is to be compared with the private marginal utility of income $\lambda^i V_{I,s}^i$. The wedge between the social and the private marginal utility of income is higher when the spending share of consumer $i$ in sectors that have a high wedge, and similarly when the income elasticity of spending consumer $i$ in sectors that have a high wedge is high.

Equation (8) characterizes optimal prices $P_s$ (subject to the nominal rigidity constraints) and constrains different weighted averages of the wedge $\tau_{j,s}$. If prices $P_{j,s}$ were flexible and could depend on the state of the world, then it would be possible to achieve $\tau_{j,s} = 0$ for all $j \in J$ and $s \in S$. With nominal rigidities, this outcome cannot be reached in general.
The next proposition computes the financial taxes that are required to implement the solution of the social planning problem (6). Financial taxes are required because private financial decisions are based on the private marginal utility of income instead of the social marginal utility of income. The wedge between private and social marginal utilities justifies government intervention. Intuitively, financial decisions reallocate spending along the $s \in S$ dimension. When making financial decisions, agents do not internalize the macroeconomic stabilization benefits of these spending reallocations. Corrective taxes are required to align private and social incentives.

**Proposition 2.** The solution to the planning problem (6) can be implemented with taxes given by

$$1 + \tau_{D,s}^i = \frac{1}{1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{p_{I_s}X_{I_s}^j}{l_s^i} \frac{p_{I_{I,s}}X_{I_{I,s}}^j}{X_{I_{I,s}}^j} \tau_{j,s}}.$$

where the wedges $\tau_{j,s}$ must satisfy the weighted average conditions (8).

This proposition shows that constrained Pareto efficient outcomes—solutions of the planning problem (6) for some set of Pareto weights $\{\lambda^i\}$—can be implemented with taxes on state contingent debt. There are of course equivalent implementations with quantity restrictions (caps and floors on portfolio holdings) instead of taxes, and we use both in our applications, depending on the specific context. Our theory is silent on the relative desirability of one form of intervention over another. We refer the reader to the classic treatment of Weitzman (1974) for some insights into this issue.

Note that there is a dimension of indeterminacy in our implementation. Indeed $1 + \tau_{D,s}^i$ and $Q_s$ enter the equilibrium conditions only through $(1 + \tau_{D,s}^i)Q_s$. Hence we can change the financial taxes so that $1 + \tau_{D,s}^i$ is multiplied by a factor of $\lambda$ and change the state prices so that $Q_s$ is multiplied by a factor of $1/\lambda$ and still implement the same allocation. However, the relative financial taxes $(1 + \tau_{D,s}^i)/(1 + \tau_{D,s}^{i'})$ faced by two agents $i$ and $i'$ are invariant to such changes. They represent the meaningful economic distortion introduced by policy in borrowing, lending and risk-sharing decisions among agents. Relative financial taxes must satisfy

$$\frac{1 + \tau_{D,s}^i}{1 + \tau_{D,s}^{i'}} = \frac{1}{1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{p_{I_s}X_{I_s}^j}{l_s^i} \frac{p_{I_{I,s}}X_{I_{I,s}}^j}{X_{I_{I,s}}^j} \tau_{j,s}}.$$

Except in knife-edge cases, such as for example when the wedges $\tau_{j,s}$ are all zero or all agents have identical spending shares and income elasticities of demand, constrained
efficient allocations cannot be implemented without government intervention in financial markets.

4 Optimal Redistribution

Our analysis has focused on influencing financial decisions before the realization of the state of the world. From this ex-ante perspective, our results show that macroprudential interventions can lead to Pareto improvements in expected utility. The key mechanism at play is that the distribution of wealth $I^s_i$ across agents in each state $s$ affects demand and hence economic activity ex post.

In some cases it may also be interesting to take an ex-post redistribution perspective, after the realization of the state of the world. We thus ignore any ex ante financial decision stage and take as our objective realized utility, instead of ex-ante expected utility.

This may be relevant for a number of reasons. First, both economic agents and the social planner may find themselves surprised in a situation they had not contemplated. As a result, the distribution of wealth will not be the outcome of a carefully ex ante planning by agents, but mostly accidental. For example, if housing prices drop unexpectedly, then this produces a redistribution in wealth with real economic consequences. Macroprudential policies are useless after the unforeseeable. A related situation arises if markets are incomplete, so that even if agents can anticipate shocks they lack the state contingent contracts to adapt. Second, if the social planner lacks commitment then an ex-post perspective more accurately describes the interventions it will implement. Finally, redistribution is a crucial policy goal in its own right and at the heart of much research in public finance on optimal taxation and social insurance. It is of interest to complement these lines of work by incorporating the macroeconomic effects of such policies.

To proceed focusing on redistribution, we assume for simplicity that the production function $F$ is separable across states. Thus, we can write the feasibility constraint as the requirement that for all $s \in S$,

$$F_s(\{Y_{j,s}\}_{j \in J_s}) \leq 0.$$ 

Assume also that the function $\Gamma$ is separable across states, so that we can write the price constraint as the requirement that for all $s \in S$,

$$\Gamma_s(\{P_{j,s}\}_{j \in J_s}) \leq 0.$$
We can then write the ex-post redistribution planning problem in state $s$

$$\max \sum_{i \in I} \lambda^s_i V^i_s(I^i_s, P_s),$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

subject to the resource constraints that

$$F^s_s(\{\sum_{i \in I} X^i_{j,s}(I^i_s, P_s)\}) \leq 0,$$

and the price constraint that

$$\Gamma^s_s(\{P_{j,s}\}) \leq 0.$$

Here the Pareto weights $\lambda^s_i$ parametrize the social redistributive objective. Note that, in line with an ex-post redistributional perspective, we need not assume that these weights are invariant across states of the world. 6 The first-order conditions for this planning problem are just as before, given by (7) and (8). This leads us to the following result.

**Proposition 3.** For given state $s$, consider the ex-post redistribution planning problem (9) for given $s$.

$$\frac{\lambda^i_s V^i_{1,s}}{1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{p^i_{j,s}X^i_{j,s}}{I^i_s} \frac{X^i_{j,s}}{X^i_{j,s}} \tau^i_{j,s}} = \frac{\lambda^{i'}_s V^{i'}_{1,s}}{1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{p^{i'}_{j,s}X^{i'}_{j,s}}{I^{i'}_s} \frac{X^{i'}_{j,s}}{X^{i'}_{j,s}} \tau^{i'}_{j,s}},$$

where the wedges $\tau^i_{j,s}$ must satisfy the weighted average conditions (8).

In particular, we see that the planner equalizes the social marginal utility of income across agents rather than the private marginal utility of income $\lambda^i_s V^i_{1,s}$. Redistributing towards agents that have a high propensity to spend and a high income elasticity of demand for depressed goods (goods with high $\tau^i_{j,s}$) increases demand for these goods. Taking into account the associate macroeconomic stabilization benefits requires the planner to depart from the objective of private marginal utility of income equalization and to adopt an objective of social marginal of income equalization instead. We present an application of this result in our deleveraging in a liquidity trap interpretation in Section 5.1. 7

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6Pareto weights simply ensure that we pick a point on the ex-post Pareto frontier. Different weights pick different points on the Pareto frontier. There is no reason to assume the choice on this frontier across two states would correspond to the same Pareto weights. In fact, Pareto weights depend on the cardinality of utility, which is irrelevant from an ex post perspective (without evaluating expected utility). For example, it is common to postulate we a social welfare function that takes the sum of utility $\sum_{i \in I} G(V^i_s(I^i_s, P_s))$ for some increasing function $G$. This will correspond to our planning problem with Pareto weights $\lambda^i_s$ that vary with the state of the world $s$.

7Monetary policy itself may have redistributive effects. For example, lower interest rates may benefit
5 Applications

In this section, we propose a number of natural applications of the general principle that we have isolated in Section 3. In all these applications, there are nominal rigidities and some constraints on macroeconomic stabilization, either because of the zero lower bound or because of fixed exchange rates. These constraints result in aggregate demand externalities in financial decisions (borrowing and saving, risk sharing) that must be corrected through government intervention. We also use our first application in Section 5.1 to illustrate our results about redistribution derived in Section 4.

5.1 Liquidity Trap and Deleveraging

In this section we show how our insights apply to a liquidity trap model with deleveraging in the spirit of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). They studied an economy where indebted households were unexpectedly required to pay down their debt. This shock amounts to a form of forced savings that depresses the equilibrium interest rate. If this effect is strong enough it may push the real interest rate that would be prevail with flexible prices to be negative. However, when prices are rigid and the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero, monetary policy will find itself constrained at this zero bound. A recession ensues, with output and employment below their flexible price levels.

We extend this analysis by considering the pre-crisis determination of indebtedness and policies. In other words, we suppose that the shock is not completely unexpected and consider prudential measures to mitigate the crisis. Indeed, we show that optimal policy limits borrowing ahead of the crisis. Later, we also consider the macroeconomic stabilization benefits of ex-post redistributive policies at the zero lower bound.

Households. There are three periods \( t \in \{0, 1, 2\} \) and two types of agents \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) with relative fractions \( \phi^i \) in a population of mass 1. For concreteness it is useful to think of type 1 agents as “savers” and type 2 agents as “borrowers”. Periods 1 and 2 are meant to borrow, especially home buyers, and hurt savers, such as pensioners. However, with the appropriate redistributive instrument in place, these effects can be undone. Conditions (7) and (8) implicitly characterize the jointly optimal monetary policy and redistributive policy. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the optimum redistributive policy will depend on the monetary policy choice. An interesting possibility, not explored here, is to restrict redistributive transfers. In the extreme case, they may be completely absent. In this case, monetary policy faces a tradeoff between its redistributive effect and its more standard substitution effect. In such a case, the mechanisms and concerns we describe here regarding redistribution become relevant in setting monetary policy instruments. In particular, monetary policy may be considered more (less) potent if it redistributes wealth towards agents with a higher propensity to consume in markets that are depressed (feature high wedges).
capture in the economy in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012): in period 1 borrowers must delever, lowering the debt they carry into the last period 2 below their preferred level. The additional period 0, is when borrowers contract their initial debt with savers. To keep things simple, we abstract from uncertainty. A more elaborate version of the model, which would yield the same conclusions, would posit that deleveraging is a shock that occurs only with some positive probability.

Agents of type 1 work and consume in every period with preferences

\[ V_1^s = \sum_{s=t}^2 \beta^s [u(C_1^s) - v(N_1^s)]. \]

Agents of type 2 consume in every period but do not work with preferences

\[ V_2^s = \sum_{s=t}^2 \beta^s u(C_2^s). \]

They have an endowment \( E_2^s \) of goods in period \( s \).

Agents of type 1 can borrow and lend subject to the budget constraints

\[ P_t C_1^t + \frac{1}{1 + i_t} B_{t+1}^1 \leq W_t N_1^t + \Pi_t^1 + B_t^1, \]  

(10)

where \( B_t^1 \) represent the nominal bond holdings and of type-1 agents, \( \Pi_t \) are profits, \( i_t \) is the period-\( t \) nominal interest rate, and \( W_t \) is the nominal wage, and we must have \( B_3^1 = 0 \). Similarly, the budget constraint of type-2 agents is

\[ P_t C_2^t + \frac{1}{1 + i_t} B_{t+1}^2 \leq E_2^t + B_t^2, \]  

(11)

where we must have \( B_3^2 = 0 \). In period 1, type-2 agents face a borrowing constraint: they can only pledge a part \( \bar{B}_2 < E_2^2 \) of their period-2 endowment in period 1. The borrowing constraint imposes the extra requirement that

\[ B_2^2 \leq \bar{B}_2. \]  

(12)

We will be interested in cases where this constraint is binding. This inequality is meant to capture the deleveraging shock. It is best thought as a financial friction arising from contracting imperfections in the economic environment. Absent policy interventions, there is no analogous friction or borrowing constraint for period 0.

Although there is no borrowing constraint in period 0 inherent to the environment, we
consider prudential policy interventions that limit borrowing in the initial period. Thus, we suppose that the government selects a maximum debt level $\bar{B}_1$ and imposes $B_2^1 \leq \bar{B}_1$. (13)

This inequality captures regulations that affect the amount of credit extended to borrowers. Finally, to avoid redistribution issues we assume that the government can also, by way of lump sum taxes, control the initial debt levels of both agents, $B_0^1$ and $B_0^2$.

The households’ first order conditions can be written as

$$\frac{1}{1 + i_t} = \frac{\beta u'(C_{t+1}^1)}{u'(C_t^1)},$$

(14)

$$\frac{1}{1 + i_t} \geq \frac{\beta u'(C_{t+1}^2)}{u'(C_t^2)},$$

(15)

where each inequality holds with equality if the borrowing constraint in period $t$ is slack and

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{v'(N_t^1)}{u'(C_t^1)}.$$ (16)

**Firms.** The final good is produced by competitive firms that combine a continuum of varieties indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$ using a constant returns to scale CES technology

$$Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_t^{1-\epsilon} (j) dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}},$$

where $\epsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.

Each variety is produced monopolistically from labor by a firm with a productivity $A_t$ in period $t$

$$Y_t(j) = A_t N_t(j).$$

Each monopolist hires labor in a competitive market with wage $W_t$, but pays $W_t (1 + \tau_L)$ net of tax on labor. Firms post prices. We assume an extreme form of price rigidity: prices posted in period 0 remain in effect in all periods. The demand for each variety is given by $C_t(P(j)/P)^{-\epsilon}$ where $P = (\int (P(j))^{1-\epsilon} dj)^{1/(1-\epsilon)}$ is the (constant) price index and

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8We could have also imposed a lower bound on debt, but this will not be relevant in the cases that we are interested in. The borrowing constraint effectively allows us to control the equilibrium level of debt $B_2^1$.

9An alternative formulation that leads to the same results is to tax borrowing to affect the interest rate faced by borrowers.
\( C_t = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \phi^i C_t^i \) is aggregate consumption.

Firms seek to maximize the discounted value of profits

\[
\max_{P(j)} \sum_{t=0}^{t-1} \prod_{s=0}^{t-1} \frac{1}{1 + i_s} \Pi_t(j),
\]

where

\[
\Pi_t(j) = \left( P(j) - \frac{1 + \tau_L}{A_t} W_t \right) C_t \left( \frac{P(j)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon}.
\]

Aggregate profits are given by \( \Pi_t = \int \Pi_t(j) dj \). In a symmetric equilibrium, all monopolists set the same profit maximizing price \( P \), which is a markup over a weighted average across states of the marginal cost across time periods.

\[
P = (1 + \tau_L) \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \sum_{t=0}^{t-1} \prod_{s=0}^{t-1} \frac{1}{1 + i_s} A_t \frac{W_t}{C_t}.
\]

And we have \( P_t = P \) at every date \( t \).

**Government.** The government sets the tax on labor \( \tau_L \), the borrowing limit \( \bar{B}_1 \) in period 0, and the nominal interest rate \( i_t \) in every period. In addition, it levies lump sum taxes in period 0. Lump sum taxes \( T^1 \) and \( T^2 \) can differ for agents of type 1 and agents of type 2. The budget constraint of the government is

\[
\frac{1}{1 + i_t} B_{t+1}^g = B_t^g + \tau_L W_t N_t^1.
\]

The lump sum taxes \( T^1 \) and \( T^2 \) allow the government to achieve any distributive objective between the government \( B_0^g \), type-1 agents \( B_0^1 \) and type-2 agents \( B_0^2 \), subject to the adding-up constraint

\[
B_0^g + B_0^1 + B_0^2 = 0.
\]

**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium specifies consumption \( \{C_t^i\} \), labor supply \( \{N_t^i\} \), bond holding \( \{B_t^i, B_t^g\} \), prices \( P \) and wages \( \{W_t\} \), nominal interest rates \( \{i_t\} \), the borrowing limit \( \bar{B}_t \), the labor taxes \( \tau_L \) such that households and firms maximize, the government’s budget constraint is satisfied, and markets clear:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{2} \phi^i C_t^i = A_t N_t^1.
\]
These conditions imply that the bond market is cleared, i.e. \( B_1 + B_2 + B_3 = 0 \) for all \( t \). A key constraint is that nominal interest rates must be positive \( i_t \geq 0 \) at all dates \( t \).

The conditions for an equilibrium (10)–(19) act as constraints on the planning problem we study next. However, in a spirit similar to Lucas and Stokey (1983), we seek to drop variables and constraints as follows. Given quantities, equations (14), (16) and (17) can be used to back out certain prices, wages and taxes. Since these variables do not affect welfare they can be dispensed with from our planning problem, along with all the equations except the market clearing condition (19), the borrowing constraint

\[
C_2^t \geq E_2^t - B_2,
\]

and the requirement that nominal interest rates be positive

\[
u'(C_1^t) = \beta(1 + i_t)u'(C_{i+1}^t) \quad \text{with} \quad i_t \geq 0.
\]

We summarize these arguments in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** (Implementability). *An allocation \( \{C_i^t\} \) and \( \{N_1^t\} \) together with nominal interest rates \( \{E_t\} \) forms part of an equilibrium if and only if equations (19), (20) and (21) hold.*

**Optimal macroprudential interventions.** We now solve the Ramsey problem of choosing the competitive equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, computed as a weighted average of agents utilities, with arbitrary Pareto weights \( \lambda^i \). We only study configurations where it is optimal to put type-2 agents against their borrowing constraint in period 1 (which will always be the case for high enough values of \( E_2^t \)). We also only concern ourselves with the possibility that the zero lower bound might be binding in periods 1, and ignore that possibility in period 0 (which will always be the case for low enough values of \( E_0^2 \) and \( A_0 \)).

We are led to the following planning problem

\[
\max \sum \lambda^i \phi^i V_0^i
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{i=1}^2 \phi^i \frac{C_i^t}{A_t} = \phi^1 N_1^t + E_2^t, \quad (23)
\]

\[
u'(C_1^t) = \beta(1 + i_1)u'(C_2^t), \quad (24)
\]

\[i_1 \geq 0, \quad (25)\]
\[ C_2^2 = E_2^2 - B_2. \] (26)

The first-order conditions of this planning problem deliver a number of useful insights. First, we can derive a set of equations that characterize the labor wedge

\[
\tau_t = 1 - \frac{\nu'(N_1^t)}{A_t u'(C_1^t)}
\]

in every period \( t \). This characterization involves the multiplier \( \nu \leq 0 \) on the constraint \( u'(C_1^1) = \beta(1 + i_1)u'(C_2^1) \). This multiplier \( \nu \) is zero when the zero bound constraint \( i_1 \geq 0 \) is slack, and is negative otherwise. We have

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_0 & = 0, \\
\tau_1 & = \lambda^1 \phi^1 u'(C_0^1) = 0, \\
\tau_2 & = \lambda^1 \phi^2 u'(C_2^1) + \nu \beta(1 + i_1)u''(C_1^1) = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Taken together, these equations imply that \( \tau_0 = 0, \tau_1 \geq 0 \) and \( \tau_2 \leq 0 \) with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds. In other words, as long as the zero lower bound constraint doesn’t bind, we achieve perfect macroeconomic stabilization. This ceases to be true when the zero lower bound binds. Then the economy is in a recession in period 1, in a boom in period 2, and is balanced in period 0. The zero lower bound precludes the reduction in nominal interest rates \( i_1 \) that would be required to stimulate the economy in period 1 by causing type-1 agents to reallocate consumption intertemporally, substituting away from period 2 and towards period 1. The boom in period 2 is designed to stimulate spending by type-1 agents through a wealth effect.

We can also derive a condition that shows that the borrowing of type-2 agents in period 0 should be restricted by the imposition of a binding borrowing constraint \( B_1^2 \leq \bar{B}_1 \). Indeed we have the following characterization of the relative ratios of intertemporal rates of substitution for agents of type 1 and 2:

\[
\frac{1 - \tau_1}{1 + i_0} = \frac{\beta u'(C_2^2)}{\beta u'(C_0^2)} \quad \text{where} \quad \frac{1}{1 + i_0} = \frac{\beta u'(C_1^1)}{\beta u'(C_0^1)}.
\]

Here \( \tau_1 \geq 0 \) with a strict inequality if the zero lower bound constraint binds. In this case, the borrowing of type-2 agents in period 0 should be restricted by imposing a borrowing constraint on type-2 agents—or an equivalent tax on borrowing (subsidy on saving) so that the interest rate faced by type-2 agents is \((1 + \tau_0^B)(1 + i_0)\) where \( \tau_0^B = \tau_1 / (1 - \tau_1) \). Doing so stimulates spending by type-1 agents in period 1, when the economy is in a
recession. Intuitively, restricting borrowing by type-2 agents in period 0 reshuffles date-1 wealth away from type-1 agents with a low propensity to spend and towards type-2 agents with a high propensity to spend. The resulting increase in spending at date 1 helps stabilize the economy. And these stabilization benefits are not internalized by private agents—hence the need for government intervention.

We summarize these results in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5.** Consider the planning problem (22). Then at the optimum, the labor wedges are such that $\tau_0 = 0$, $\tau_1 \geq 0$ and $\tau_2 \leq 0$ with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds in period 1. When it is the case, it is optimal to impose a binding borrowing $B^2_1 \leq \bar{B}_1$ constraint on type-2 agents in period 0. The equivalent implicit tax on borrowing is given by $\tau^B_0 = \tau_1 / (1 - \tau_1)$.

**Optimal redistribution.** We can also consider ex-post redistribution in period 1 as in Section 4. The corresponding planning problem which we indexed by the Pareto weights $\lambda^i_1$ is

$$\sum_i \lambda^i_1 \phi^i \max V^i_1$$

subject to (23), (24), (25) and (26). The first order conditions are identical to those of planning problem (22). In particular, we get

$$\tau_1 \lambda^1_1 \phi^1 \beta u'(C^1_1) - \nu u''(C^1_1) = 0,$$

$$\tau_2 \lambda^1_1 \phi^1 \beta^2 u'(C^1_2) + \nu \beta (1 + i_1) u''(C^1_2) = 0.$$

Taken together, these equations imply that $\tau_1 \geq 0$ and $\tau_2 \leq 0$ with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds. Second we now get the following optimality condition

$$\frac{\lambda^1_1 u'(C^1_1)}{1 + \frac{\nu A_i}{\mu_1 \phi_i} u''(C^1_1)} = \lambda^2_1 u'(C^2_1).$$

This condition states that the planner equalizes the social marginal utility of income of both agents. This is different than equalizing the private marginal utility of income $\lambda^i u'(C^i_1)$ of both agents. In particular, when the zero bound binds so that $\nu < 0$, we have $\lambda^1 u'(C^1_1) > \lambda^2 u'(C^2_1)$, which indicates that the planner then seeks to redistribute towards type-2 agents. This is because type-2 agents are borrowing constrained in period 1 and hence have a higher marginal propensity to consume in period 1 (100%) than type-1 agents. Redistributing towards type-2 agents then increases demand and stimulates the economy in period 1 when the economy is depressed.
Proposition 6. Consider the planning problem (27). Then at the optimum, the labor wedges are such that \( \tau_1 \geq 0 \) and \( \tau_2 \leq 0 \) with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds in period 1. When it is the case, it is optimal for the planner to redistribute towards type-2 agents \( \lambda^1 u'(C^1_t) > \lambda^2 u'(C^2_t) \).

Mapping to the general model. The planning problems (22) and (27) can be seen as a particular case of the one studied in Section 3 and 4. The mapping is as follows. There are two states. The first state corresponds to period 0, and the second state to periods 1 and 2. In the first state, the commodities are the different varieties of the consumption good and labor in period 0. In the second state, the commodities are the different varieties of the consumption good and labor in periods 1 and 2. The constraint on prices is that the price of each variety must be the same in all periods in the numeraire, and that the period-1 price of a unit of the period-2 numeraire \( 1/(1 + i_t) \) be lower than one. Propositions 5 and 6 can then be seen as an applications of Propositions 2 and 3.

5.2 International Liquidity Traps and Sudden Stops

In this section, we consider a small open economy subject to a liquidity trap induced by a sudden stop. There are three periods. Domestic agents consume both traded and non-traded goods, and the price of non-traded goods is sticky. The sudden stop is modeled as a borrowing constraint in the intermediate period. It can push the economy into a liquidity trap. We show that it is optimal to restrict the amount of domestic borrowing in the initial period through the imposition of a borrowing constraint or via capital controls.

Households. There is a representative domestic agent with preferences over non-traded goods, traded goods and labor given by the expected utility

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{2} \beta^t U(C_{NT,t}, C_{T,t}, N_t).
\]

Below we make some further assumptions on preferences.

Households are subject to the following budget constraints

\[
P_{NT}C_{NT,t} + E_t P^*_{T,t} C_{T,t} + \frac{1}{1 + i^*_t} \frac{1}{E_{t+1}} B_{t+1} \leq W_t N_t + E_t P^*_{T,t} E_{T,t} + \Pi_t - T_t + \frac{1}{E_t} B_t,
\]

where we impose \( B_3 = 0 \). Here \( P_{NT} \) is the price of non-traded goods which as we will see shortly, does not depend on \( t \) due to the assumed price stickiness; \( E_t \) is the nominal
exchange rate, $P_{T,t}^*$ is the foreign currency price of the traded good, $E_t P_{T,t}^*$ is the domestic currency price of traded goods in period $t$; $W_t$ is the nominal wage in period $t$; $E_{T,t}$ is the endowment of traded goods in period $t$; $\Pi_t$ represents aggregate profits in period $t$; $T_t$ is a lump sum tax (that balances the government budget); $B_t$ is short-term bond holdings in the foreign currency; and $i_t^*$ is the foreign nominal interest rate.

We assume that in period 1, households face a borrowing constraint of the form

$$B_2 \leq P_{T,2}^* \bar{B}_2$$

where $\bar{B}_2 < \bar{E}_{T,2}$.

Although there is no borrowing constraint in period 0 inherent to the environment, we consider prudential policy interventions that limit borrowing in the initial period. Thus, we suppose that the government selects a maximum debt level $\bar{B}_1$ and imposes

$$B_1 \leq P_{T,1}^* \bar{B}_1.$$  

This inequality captures regulations that affect the inflow of capital into the country in the initial period.\footnote{We could have also imposed a lower bound on debt, but this will not be relevant in the cases that we are interested in. The borrowing constraint effectively allows us to control the equilibrium level of debt $B_1$.}

The households’ first order conditions can be written as

$$\frac{E_t}{E_{t+1}} \frac{1}{1 + i_t^*} \geq \frac{\beta U_{C_{T,t+1}}}{U_{C_{T,t}}},$$

with equality if the borrowing constraint in period $t$ is slack,

$$\frac{U_{C_{T,t}}}{E_t P_{T,t}^*} = \frac{U_{C_{NT,t}}}{P_{NT}},$$

and

$$\frac{W_t}{P_{NT}} = -\frac{U_{N,t}}{U_{C_{NT,t}}}.$$  

**Firms.** The traded goods are traded competitively in international markets. The domestic agents have an endowment $\bar{E}_t$ of these traded goods.

Non-traded goods are produced in each country by competitive firms that combine a continuum of non-traded varieties indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$ using the constant returns to scale

$^{11}$An alternative formulation that leads to the same results is to use a tax instrument (capital controls in the form of a tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows) to increase the interest rate faced by domestic agents in period 0.
CES technology

\[ Y_{NT,t} = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{NT,t}(j)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} dj \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}}, \]

with elasticity \( \epsilon > 1 \).

Each variety is produced by a monopolist using a linear technology:

\[ Y_{NT,t}(j) = A_t N_t(j). \]

Each monopolist hires labor in a competitive market with wage \( W_t \), but pays \( W_t(1 + \tau_L) \) net of a tax on labor. Monopolists must set prices once and for all in period 0 and cannot change them afterwards. The demand for each variety is given by \( C_{NT,t}(j) = (\int (P_{NT}(j))^{1-\epsilon} dj)^{1/(1-\epsilon)} \) is the price of non traded goods. We assume that each firm \( j \) is owned by a household who sets the price \( P_{NT}(j) \) in addition to making its consumption and labor supply decisions.\(^{12}\) The corresponding price setting conditions are symmetric across \( j \) and given by

\[ P_{NT} = (1 + \tau_L) \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \sum_{l=0}^2 \frac{\beta^l U_C_{T,t}}{A_t} \frac{W_t}{A_t} C_{NT,t}. \] (34)

**Government.** The government sets the tax on labor \( \tau_L \), the borrowing limit \( \bar{B}_1 \) in period 0, and the nominal interest rate \( i_t \) which determines the exchange rate \( E_t \) in every period through the no arbitrage Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition

\[ 1 + i_t = (1 + i_t^*) \frac{E_{t+1}}{E_t}. \] (35)

In addition, it levies lump sum taxes \( T_t \) in period \( t \) to balance its budget

\[ T_t + \tau_L W_t N_t = 0. \] (36)

**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium takes as given the price of traded goods \( P_{T,t}^* \) and the foreign nominal interest rate \( \{i_t^*\} \). It specifies consumption of traded and non-traded goods \( \{C_{T,t}, C_{NT,t}\} \), labor supply \( \{N_t\} \), bond holdings \( \{B_t\} \), the price of non-traded goods \( P_{NT} \), wages \( \{W_t\} \), nominal interest rates \( \{i_t\} \) and exchange rates \( \{E_t\} \), the borrowing limit \( B_1 \), the labor taxes \( \tau_L \) such that households and firms maximize, the government’s budget

\(^{12}\)The reason for this assumption is a form of market incompleteness due to the presence of borrowing constraints.
constraint is satisfied, and markets clear:

\[ C_{NT,t} = A_t N_t. \]  

(37)

These conditions imply that the market for traded goods clears. A key constraint is that nominal interest rates must be positive \( i_t \geq 0 \) at all dates \( t \).

The conditions for an equilibrium (28)–(37) act as constraints on the planning problem we study next. However, exactly as in Section 5.1 we can drop variables and constraints. Given quantities, equations (31), (33) and (34) can be used to back out certain prices, wages and taxes. Since these variables do not affect welfare they can be dispensed with from our planning problem, along with all the equations except the condition that determines agents’ relative consumption of traded and non traded goods (32), the market clearing condition (37), the country budget constraint for traded goods

\[
P_{T,0}^* [C_{T,0} - E_0] + \frac{1}{1+i_0^*} P_{T,1}^* [C_{T,1} - E_1] + \frac{1}{1+i_0^*} \frac{1}{1+i_1^*} [C_{T,2} - E_2] \leq 0 \]  

(38)

and the borrowing constraint

\[ C_{T,2} \geq E_2 - B_2. \]  

(39)

and the requirement that nominal interest rates be positive

\[ 1 + i_t = (1 + i_t^*) \frac{E_{t+1}}{E_t} \quad \text{with} \quad i_t \geq 0. \]  

(40)

We summarize these arguments in the following proposition.

**Proposition 7 (Implementability).** An allocation \( \{C_{T,t}, C_{NT,t}\} \) and \( \{N_t\} \) together with prices for non-traded goods \( \{P_{NT}\} \), nominal interest rates \( \{i_t\} \) and exchange rates \( \{E_t\} \) forms part of an equilibrium if and only if equations (32), (37), (38), (39) and (40) hold.

**Homothetic Preferences.** Next, we characterize the key condition (32) further by making some weak assumptions on preferences. We make two assumptions on preferences: (i) preferences over consumption goods are weakly separable from labor; and (ii) preferences over consumption goods are homothetic. These assumptions imply that

\[ C_{NT,t} = \alpha \left( \frac{E_t P_{T,t}^*}{P_{NT,t}} \right) C_{T,t}, \]

for some function \( \alpha \) that is increasing and differentiable. This conveniently encapsulates the restriction implied by the first order condition (32).
Define the indirect utility function, which encodes utility in period $t$ when the consumption of traded goods is $C_{T,t}$ and the relative price of traded vs. non-traded goods is $p_t = \frac{E_t P_{T,t}}{P_{NT,t}}$ as

$$V(C_{T,t}, p_t) = U\left(\alpha(p_t)C_{T,t}, C_{T,t}, \frac{\alpha(p_t)}{A_t}C_{T,t}\right).$$

The derivatives of the indirect utility function will prove useful for our analysis. To describe these derivatives, it is useful to first introduce the labor wedge

$$\tau_t = 1 + \frac{1}{A_t} \frac{U_{NT,t}}{U_{C_{NT,t}}}.$$

The following proposition is borrowed from Farhi and Werning (2012b).

**Proposition 8.** The derivatives of the value function are

$$V_p(C_{T,t}, p_t) = \frac{\alpha(p_t)}{p_t} C_{T,t} U_{C_{T,t}} \tau_t,$$

$$V_{C_T}(C_{T,t}, p_t) = U_{C_{T,t}} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha_t}{p_t} \tau_t\right).$$

These observations about the derivatives and their connection to the labor wedge will be key to our results. A private agent values traded goods according to its marginal utility $U_{C_{T,t}}$, but the actual marginal value in equilibrium is $V_{C_{T,t}}$. The wedge between the two equals $\frac{\alpha_t}{p_t} \tau_t = \frac{P_{NT,t} C_{NT,t}}{P_{T,t} C_{T,t}} \tau_t$, the labor wedge weighted by the relative expenditure share of non-traded goods relative to traded goods. We will sometimes refer to it as the weighted labor wedge for short.

In particular, a private agent undervalues traded goods $V_{C_{T,t}} > U_{C_{T,t}}$ whenever the economy is experiencing a recession, in the sense of having a positive labor wedge $\tau_t > 0$. Conversely, private agents overvalue traded goods $V_{C_{T,t}} < U_{C_{T,t}}$ whenever the economy is booming, in the sense of having a negative labor wedge $\tau_t < 0$. These effects are magnified when the economy is relatively closed, so that the relative expenditure share of non-traded goods is large.

**Optimal macroprudential interventions.** We now solve the Ramsey problem of choosing the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the utility of domestic agents. We only study configurations where it is optimal to put domestic agents against their borrowing constraint in period 1 (which will always be the case for high enough values of $E_2$). We also only concern ourselves with the possibility that the zero lower bound might be binding in periods 1, and ignore that possibility in period 0 (which will always be the case for
low enough values of $A_0$).

We have the following planning problem

$$
\max \sum_{t=0}^{2} \beta^t V(C_{T,t}, E_t P_{T,t}^*) \frac{E_t P_{T,t}^*}{P_{NT}}
$$

subject to

$$
(1 + i_1^*) E_2 \geq E_1, \\
P_{T,0}^* [C_{T,0} - E_0] + \frac{1}{1 + i_0^*} P_{T,1}^* [C_{T,1} - E_1] = \frac{1}{1 + i_0^*} \frac{1}{1 + i_1^*} B_2, \\
C_{T,2} = \bar{E}_2 - \bar{B}_2,
$$

where the second and third constraints are the country budget constraint and the borrowing constraint. The first constraint is the zero lower bound constraint. It builds on the UIP condition $(1 + i_1^*) E_2 = (1 + i_1) E_1$ and captures the requirement that the domestic nominal interest rate $i_1$ be positive period 1. It is the key constraint that hampers macroeconomic stability. If the domestic nominal interest rate $i_1$ could be negative, then the exchange rates $E_1$ and $E_2$ would become free variables. The zero lower bound constraint puts a lower bound on the rate of the depreciation $E_2/E_1$ of the domestic currency, which can conflict with macroeconomic stability.

We have

$$
V_{p,0} = 0, \\
\beta V_{p,1} P_{T,1}^* = \nu, \\
\beta^2 V_{p,2} P_{T,2}^* = -\nu (1 + i_1^*),
$$

where $\nu \geq 0$ is the multiplier on the zero lower bound constraint (the first constraint). Taken together, these equations imply that $\tau_0 = 0$, $\tau_1 \geq 0$ and $\tau_2 \leq 0$ with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds. In other words, as long as the zero lower bound constraint doesn’t bind, we achieve perfect macroeconomic stabilization. This ceases to be true when the zero lower bound binds. Then the economy is in a recession in period 1, in a boom in period 2, and is balanced in period 0. The zero lower bound precludes the reduction in nominal interest rates $i_1$ that would be required to depreciate the value of the period-1 exchange rate and stimulate the economy in period 1 by causing domestic agents to reallocate consumption intertemporally from period 2 to period 1, and intratemporally from traded goods to non-traded goods. A depreciation of the exchange
rate in period 2 allows for a more depreciated exchange rate in period 1, but causes a boom in period 2.

We can also derive a condition that shows that the borrowing of domestic agents in period 0 should be restricted by the imposition of a binding borrowing constraint \( B_1 \leq \bar{B}_1 \). Indeed we have the following characterization

\[
\frac{\beta(1+i_0^*)p_{T,0}}{p_{T,1}} \frac{V_{C_{T,1}}}{V_{C_{T,0}}} = 1,
\]

or equivalently

\[
\frac{\beta(1+i_0^*)p_{T,0}^* U_{C_{T,1}}}{p_{T,1}^* U_{C_{T,0}}} \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1 \right) = 1,
\]

Here \( \tau_0 = 0 \) and \( \tau_1 \geq 0 \) with a strict inequality if the zero lower bound constraint binds. In this case, the borrowing of domestic agents in period 0 should be restricted by imposing a borrowing constraint—or an equivalent tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows so that the interest rate faced by domestic agents is \((1 + \tau_0^B)(1+i_0)\) where \( \tau_0^B = \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1 \). Doing so stimulates spending on non-traded goods by domestic agents in period 1, when the economy is in a recession. These stabilization benefits are not internalized by private agents—hence the need for government intervention.

We summarize these results in the following proposition.

Proposition 9. Consider the planning problem (41). Then at the optimum, the labor wedges are such that \( \tau_0 = 0, \tau_1 \geq 0 \) and \( \tau_2 \leq 0 \) with strict inequalities if the zero lower bound constraint binds in period 1. When it is the case, it is optimal to impose a binding borrowing \( B_1 \leq \bar{B}_1 \) constraint on domestic agents in period 0. The equivalent implicit tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows is given by \( \tau_0^B = \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1 \).

Mapping to the general model. The planning problem (41) can be seen as a particular case of the one studied in Section 3. The mapping is as follows. There are two states. The first state corresponds to period 0, and the second state to periods 1 and 2. In the first state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in period 0. In the second state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in periods 1 and 2. The possibility of trading the traded good intertemporally at given international prices is modeled as part of the technological constraint. The constraint on prices is that the price of each variety of non-traded good must be the same in all periods (in the domestic numeraire),
the requirement that price of the traded good $P_{T,t} = E_t P^*_T$ (in the domestic numeraire) must grow at rate $\frac{1+i_1}{1+i_t} \frac{P^*_{T,2}}{P^*_{T,1}}$ between periods 1 and 2, where the period-1 price of a unit of period-2 domestic numeraire $1/(1+i_t)$ must be lower than one. Proposition 9 can then be seen as an application of Proposition 2.

5.3 Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates

In Section 5.2, the domestic economy has a flexible exchange rate but faces a zero lower bound constraint. In this section, we use a similar model to focus on another constraint on macroeconomic stabilization in environments with nominal rigidities: a fixed exchange rate $E_t = E$. We consider a two period model of a small open economy that either chooses to fix its exchange rate vis a vis that of the foreign economy, or has lost this potential margin of adjustment because it is part of a currency union. Therefore the domestic economy loses all monetary autonomy: the domestic nominal interest rate must be equal to the foreign interest rate $i_t = i^*_t$. We show that this creates a role for capital controls to regain monetary autonomy. We refer the reader to Farhi and Werning (2012a) for a full-fledged analysis of capital controls with fixed exchange rates.

Households. There are two periods $t \in \{0, 1\}$. There is a representative domestic agent with preferences over non-traded goods, traded goods and labor given by the expected utility

$$\sum_{t=0}^{1} \beta^t U(C_{NT,t}, C_{T,t}, N_t).$$

Below we make some further assumptions on preferences.

Households are subject to the following budget constraints

$$P_{NT} C_{NT,t} + EP^*_{T,t} C_{T,t} + \frac{1}{(1+i_t^*) (1+i_t^*)} \frac{1}{E} B_{t+1} \leq W_t N_t + EP^*_{T,t} E_{T,t} + \Pi_t - T_t + \frac{1}{E} B_t,$$

where we impose $B_2 = 0$. Here $P_{NT}$ is the price of non-traded goods which as we will see shortly, does not depend on $t$ due to the assumed price stickiness; $E$ is the nominal exchange rate, $P^*_{T,t}$ is the foreign currency price of the traded good, $EP^*_{T,t}$ is the domestic currency price of traded goods in period $t$; $W_t$ is the nominal wage in period $t$; $E_{T,t}$ is the endowment of traded goods in period $t$; $\Pi_t$ represents aggregate profits in period $t$; $T_t$ is a lump sum tax (that balances the government budget); $B_t$ is short-term bond holdings in the foreign currency; $i_t^*$ is the foreign nominal interest rate and $\tau_t^B$ is the capital control tax (a tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows) which introduces a wedge.
between the domestic nominal interest rate \( i_t = (1 + i_t^*) (1 + \tau_t^B) - 1 \) and the foreign nominal interest rate \( i_t^* \).

The households’ first order conditions can be written as

\[
\frac{1}{(1 + i_t^*) (1 + \tau_t^B)} = \frac{\beta U_{C_{T,t}+1}}{U_{C_{T,t}}}, \quad (43)
\]

\[
\frac{U_{C_{T,t}}}{EP_{T,t}^*} = \frac{U_{C_{NT,t}}}{P_{NT}}, \quad (44)
\]

and

\[
\frac{W_t}{P_{NT}} = -\frac{U_{N,t}}{U_{C_{NT,t}}}, \quad (45)
\]

**Firms.** Firms are modeled exactly as in Section 5.2. The traded goods are traded competitively in international markets. The domestic agents have an endowment \( \bar{E}_t \) of these traded goods. Non-traded goods are produced in each country by competitive firms that combine a continuum of non-traded varieties indexed by using a constant returns to scale CES technology with elasticity of substitution \( \epsilon \). Each variety is produced from labor by a monopolist using a linear technology with productivity \( A_t \).

Each monopolist hires labor in a competitive market with wage \( W_t \), but pays \( W_t (1 + \tau_L) \) net of a tax on labor. Monopolists must set prices once and for all in period 0 and cannot change them afterwards. The associated price setting conditions are symmetric across firms and given by

\[
P_{NT} = (1 + \tau_L) \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \prod_{s=0}^{t-1-i} \frac{1}{(1 + i_s^*) (1 + \tau_s^B)} \frac{W_t}{A_t} C_{NT,t}.
\]

**Government.** The government sets the tax on labor \( \tau_L \), capital controls \( \tau_t^B \), and in addition, it levies lump sum taxes \( T_t \) in period \( t \) to balance its budget

\[
T_t + \tau_L W_t N_t - \frac{\tau_t^B}{1 + \tau_t^B} B_t = 0. \quad (47)
\]

**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium takes as given the price of traded goods \( P_{T,t}^* \), the foreign nominal interest rate \( \{ i_t^* \} \) and the exchange rate \( E \). It specifies consumption of traded and non-traded goods \( \{ C_{T,t}, C_{NT,t} \} \), labor supply \( \{ N_t \} \), bond holdings \( \{ B_t \} \), the price of non-traded goods \( P_{NT} \), wages \( \{ W_t \} \), the labor taxes \( \tau_L \), capital controls \( \{ \tau_t^B \} \) such that households and firms maximize, the government’s budget constraint is satisfied, and markets
clear:

\[ C_{NT,t} = A_t N_t. \]  \hspace{1cm} (48)

These conditions imply that the market for traded goods clears.

The conditions for an equilibrium (42)–(48) act as constraints on the planning problem we study next. However, exactly as in Section 5.1 we can drop variables and constraints. Given quantities, equations (43), (45) and (46) can be used to back out certain prices, wages and taxes. Since these variables do not affect welfare they can be dispensed with from our planning problem, along with all the equations except the condition that determines agents’ relative consumption of traded and non traded goods (44), the market clearing condition (48), and the country budget constraint for traded goods

\[ P^*_{T,0} [C_{T,0} - E_0] + \frac{1}{1 + i^*_0} P^*_{T,1} [C_{T,1} - E_1] \leq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (49)

We summarize these arguments in the following proposition.

**Proposition 10 (Implementability).** An allocation \( \{C_{T,t}, C_{NT,t}\} \) and \( \{N_t\} \) together with prices for non-traded goods \( \{P_{NT}\} \) and capital controls \( \{\tau^B_t\} \), forms part of an equilibrium if and only if equations (44), (48), (49) hold.

As in Section 5.2, we assume that preferences over consumption goods are weakly separable from labor; and that preferences over consumption goods are homothetic.

**Optimal macroprudential capital controls.** We now solve the Ramsey problem of choosing the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the utility of domestic agents. We have the following planning problem

\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{2} \beta^t V(C_{T,t}, \frac{E P^*_{T,t}}{P_{NT}})
\]

subject to

\[ P^*_{T,0} [C_{T,0} - E_0] + \frac{1}{1 + i^*_0} P^*_{T,1} [C_{T,1} - E_1] \leq 0. \]

We have

\[ V_{P,0} \frac{E P^*_{T,0}}{P_{NT}} + \beta V_{P,1} \frac{E P^*_{T,1}}{P_{NT}} = 0, \]

which can be rewritten using Proposition 8 as

\[ \alpha_{p,0} C_{T,0} U_{C_{T,0}} \tau_0 + \beta \alpha_{p,1} C_{T,1} U_{C_{T,1}} \tau_1 = 0, \]
where \( \tau_t \) is the labor wedge in period \( t \). Taken together, these equations imply that \( \tau_0 \) and \( \tau_1 \) are of opposite signs, so that if the economy is experiencing a recession in period 0, then it is experiencing a boom in period 1 and vice versa.

We can also derive a condition that characterizes the optimal capital controls. Indeed, we have

\[
\beta(1 + i^*_0) \frac{P_{T,0}^e V_{CT,1}}{V_{CT,0}} = 1,
\]

or equivalently

\[
\frac{\beta(1 + i^*_0) P_{T,0}^e U_{CT,1} \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1 \right)}{U_{CT,0} \left( 1 + \frac{\alpha_0}{p_0} \tau_0 \right)} = 1,
\]

implying that capital controls should be given by

\[
1 + \tau_B^0 = \frac{1 + \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1}{1 + \frac{\alpha_0}{p_0} \tau_0}.
\]

Suppose for example that the economy is in a boom in period 0 (\( \tau_0 < 0 \)) and a recession in period 1 (\( \tau_1 > 0 \)). Then the optimal tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows is positive \( \tau_B^0 > 0 \). Doing so reduces spending on non-traded goods by domestic agents in period 0, when the economy is in a boom, and increases it in period 1, when the economy is in a recession. These stabilization benefits are not internalized by private agents—hence the need for government intervention.

We summarize these results in the following proposition.

**Proposition 11.** Consider the planning problem (50). Then at the optimum, the labor wedges are such that \( \tau_0 \) and \( \tau_1 \) are of opposite signs. The optimal tax on capital inflows / subsidy on capital outflows is given by

\[
1 + \tau_B^0 = \frac{1 + \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} \tau_1}{1 + \frac{\alpha_0}{p_0} \tau_0}.
\]

**Mapping to the general model.** The planning problem (50) can be seen as a particular case of the one studied in Section 3. The mapping is as follows. There are two states. The first state corresponds to period 0, and the second state to period 1. In the first state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in period 0. In the second state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in period 2. The possibility of trading the traded good intertemporally at given international prices is modeled as part of the technological
constraint. The constraint on prices is that the price of each variety of non-traded good must be the same in all periods (in the domestic numeraire), and the requirement that price of the traded good (in the domestic numeraire) be given by $P_{T,t} = EP^*_{T,t}$ in every period. Proposition 9 can then be seen as an application of Proposition 2.

### 5.4 Fiscal Unions

In Section 5.3, we showed that in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate, it may be desirable to use capital controls to affect private saving and borrowing decisions. In this section, we consider the related issue of risk-sharing decisions. We consider a model similar to that in Section 5.3. There are two important differences. First, we consider an economy with two states of the world but only one period. Second, we assume that private markets for risk sharing across states are inexistent. We think this difference captures a realistic feature of the world: that financial markets offer better opportunities for shifting wealth over time than across states of the world. In this context, governments can improve risk-sharing by arranging for state-contingent transfers from and towards their foreign counterparts and passing them through to domestic agents using lump-sum taxes and rebates. Importantly, we show that with a fixed exchange rates, these transfers should go beyond replicating the complete-markets solution. This leads to a theory of fiscal unions with a special role for currency unions. We refer the reader to Farhi and Werning (2012b) for a full-fledged analysis.

**Households and firms.** There are two periods $s \in \{H, L\}$ with respective probabilities $\pi(s)$. Goods are modeled exactly as in Section 5.2. The traded goods are traded competitively in international markets. The domestic agents have an endowment $E_s$ of these traded goods in each state $s$. Non-traded goods are produced in each country by competitive firms that combine a continuum of non-traded varieties indexed by using a constant returns to scale CES technology with elasticity of substitution $\epsilon$. Each variety is produced from labor by a monopolist using a linear technology with productivity $A_s$. Each monopolist hires labor in a competitive market with wage $W_s$, but pays $W_s(1 + \tau_L)$ net of a tax on labor. Monopolists must set prices once and for all before the realization of the state $s$ and cannot change them afterwards. We split the representative agent into a continuum of households $j \in [0, 1]$. Household $j$ is assumed to own the firm of variety $j$.

Households $j$ maximizes utility

$$
\sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} U(C_{NT,s}, C_{T,s}, N_s)\pi_s.
$$

32
by choosing \( \{C_{T,s}, C_{NT,s}, N_s\} \) and the prices set by its own firm \( p^j_{NT} \), taking aggregate prices and wages \( \{P_{T,s}, P_{NT}, W_s\} \) and aggregate demand \( \{ar{C}_{NT,s}\} \) as given, subject to

\[
P_{NT}C_{NT,s} + EP^*_T, C_{T,s} \leq W_s N_s + EP^*_T, \bar{E}_{T,s} + \Pi^j_s + T_s,
\]

where

\[
\Pi^j_s = \left( p^j_{NT} - \frac{1 + \tau_L}{A_s} W_s \right) \bar{C}_{NT,s} \left( \frac{p^j_{NT}}{P_{NT}} \right)^{-\epsilon},
\]

are the profits of the firm producing variety \( j \). The corresponding first-order conditions are symmetric across \( j \) and given by

\[
\frac{U_{CT,s}}{EP^*_{T,s}} = \frac{U_{CNT,s}}{P_{NT}},
\]

\[
- \frac{U_{N,s}}{W_s} = \frac{U_{CNT,s}}{P_{NT}},
\]

and the price setting condition

\[
P_{NT} = (1 + \tau_L) \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\sum_{s \in \{H,L\}} U_{CT,s} W_s \bar{C}_{NT,s} \pi_s}{\sum_{s \in \{H,L\}} U_{CT,s} \bar{C}_{NT,s} \pi_s}.
\]

Of course, in equilibrium we impose the consistency condition that \( \bar{C}_{NT,s} = C_{NT,s} \) for all \( s \).

**Government.** The government budget constraint is

\[
T_s = \tau_L W_s N_s + \hat{T}_s,
\]

with

\[
\sum \pi_s Q_s \hat{T}_s \leq 0,
\]

where \( Q_s \) are the state prices encoding the terms at which the government can transfer wealth from one state to the other by trading with their foreign counterparts.

**Equilibrium.** We can now define an equilibrium with incomplete markets. An equilibrium specifies quantities \( \{C_{T,s}, C_{NT,s}, N_s\} \), prices and wages \( \{EP^*_T, P_{NT}, W_s\} \), taxes \( \{\tau_L, T_s\} \) and international fiscal transfers \( \{\hat{T}_s\} \) such that households and firms maximize,
the government’s budget constraint is satisfied, and markets clear

\[ C_{NT,s} = A_s N_s. \]  \hfill (57)

More formally, the conditions for an equilibrium are given by (52), (53), (51), (54) with \( \bar{C}_s = C_s, (55), (56), \) and (57).

As in the complete markets implementation, we can drop variables and constraints as follows. Given quantities, equations (53) and (54) can be used to back out certain prices, wages and taxes. Since these variables do not enter the welfare function they can be dispensed with from our planning problem, along with equations (53), (51), (54), (55), (56) as long as we impose the country budget constraint

\[ \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \pi_s Q_s E P_{T,s}^* C_{T,s} \leq \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \pi_s Q_s E P_{T,s}^* \bar{E}_s. \]  \hfill (58)

We summarize these arguments in the following proposition.

**Proposition 12** (Implementability). An allocation \( \{C_{T,s}, C_{NT,s}, N_s\} \) together with prices \( \{EP_{T,s}^*, P_{NT}\} \) form part of an equilibrium with incomplete markets if and only if equations (52), (57) and (58) hold.

As in Section 5.2, we assume that preferences over consumption goods are weakly separable from labor; and that preferences over consumption goods are homothetic.

**Optimal fiscal transfers.** We now solve the Ramsey problem of choosing the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the utility of domestic agents. We have the following planning problem

\[ \max \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \pi_s V \left( C_{T,s}, \frac{P_{T,s}}{P_{NT}} \right) \]  \hfill (59)

subject to

\[ \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \pi_s Q_s E P_{T,s}^* C_{T,s} \leq \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \pi_s Q_s E P_{T,s}^* \bar{E}_s. \]

Using Proposition 8, we can transform the first order conditions as follows. First, we get a condition

\[ \sum_{s \in \{H, L\}} \alpha_{p,s} C_{T,s} U_{C_{T,0}} \tau_0 = 0, \]

where \( \tau_s \) is the labor wedge in state \( s \). Taken together, these equations imply that \( \tau_H \) and \( \tau_L \) are of opposite signs, so that if the economy is experiencing a recession in state \( L \), then it is experiencing a boom in state \( H \) and vice versa.
We can also derive a condition that characterizes the optimal capital controls. Indeed, we have
\[
\frac{Q_L P_{T,L}^*}{Q_H P_{T,H}^*} \frac{V_{C,T,H}}{V_{C,T,L}} = 1,
\]
or equivalently
\[
\frac{Q_L P_{T,L}^*}{Q_H P_{T,H}^*} \frac{U_{C,T,H}}{U_{C,T,L}} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha_H}{P_H} \tau_H \right) = 1.
\]
International transfers are then simply given by \( \hat{T}_s = P_{T,s} (C_{T,s} - E_{T,s}) \). Suppose for example that the economy is in a boom in state \( H (\tau_H < 0) \) and a recession in state \( L (\tau_L > 0) \). Then international fiscal transfers from foreign should be tilted towards state \( L \). Doing so reduces spending on non-traded goods by domestic agents in state \( H \), when the economy is in a boom, and increases it in state \( L \), when the economy is in a recession. These stabilization benefits are not internalized by private agents—hence the need for the government to go beyond replicating the complete markets solution (if agents had access to complete markets to share risk with state prices \( Q_s \) in state \( s \)), which would entail
\[
\frac{Q_L P_{T,L}^*}{Q_H P_{T,H}^*} \frac{U_{C,T,H}}{U_{C,T,L}} = 1.
\]
Indeed, there exists an alternative implementation where agents have access to complete markets but states prices \( \frac{Q_s}{1 + \tau_s} \) are distorted by financial taxes
\[
\tau_s^D = \frac{\alpha_s}{P_s} \tau_s.
\]
We summarize these results in the following proposition.

**Proposition 13.** Consider the planning problem (59). Then at the optimum, the labor wedges are such that \( \tau_H \) and \( \tau_L \) are of opposite signs. International fiscal transfers impose implicit financial taxes given by
\[
\tau_s^D = \frac{\alpha_s}{P_s} \tau_s.
\]

**Mapping to the general model.** The planning problem (59) can be seen as a particular case of the one studied in Section 3. The mapping is as follows. There are two states. The first state corresponds to state \( L \), and the second state to state \( H \). In the first state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in state \( L \). In the second state, the commodities are the different varieties of the non-traded good, the traded good and labor in state \( H \). The possibility of trading the traded
good intertemporally at given international prices is modeled as part of the technological constraint. The constraint on prices is that the price of each variety of non-traded good must be the same in all periods (in the domestic numeraire), and the requirement that price of the traded good (in the domestic numeraire) be given by \(P_{T,t} = EP^{*}_{T,t}\) in every period. Proposition 9 can then be seen as an application of Proposition 2.

6 Conclusion

We have proposed new theoretical foundations for macroprudential regulation. Our theory introduces two key frictions in the Arrow-Debreu model, nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets, and constraints on monetary policy such as the zero lower bound or fixed exchange rates. We have shown that in general, competitive equilibria are constrained inefficient. The market failure is imputable to aggregate demand externalities. Government intervention in financial markets in the form of financial taxes or quantity restrictions can generate Pareto improvements. We have given simple and interpretable formulas for optimal interventions. We have also provided a number of concrete and relevant applications. And finally we have shown that these insights are also important to appropriately take into account the macroeconomic stabilization benefits of redistribution policies.

We view our results as an alternative to the apparatus of the pecuniary externalities literature, which is the most common theoretical justification for macroprudential policies. Of course these two theories are not mutually exclusive. In fact, we think that studying their interactions is a highly promising research avenue which we plan to pursue in future work.

A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

We use

\[
\sum_{j \in J} P_{j,s} X_{i,j,s} = 1,
\]

to get for any \(\lambda_s\)

\[
\lambda^i V^{i}_{s} = \left[ \sum_{j \in J} \left( \mu F_{j,s} - \lambda_s P_{j,s} \right) X_{i,j,s} + \lambda_s \right],
\]
and in particular for \( \lambda_s = \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} \), we get

\[
\lambda^i V^i_{I,s} = \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} \left[ \sum_{j \in J_s} \left( P_j(s) \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} - P_j(s) \right) X^i_{I,j,s} + 1 \right].
\]

We can re-express this as

\[
\lambda^i V^i_{I,s} = \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} \left[ 1 - \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{P_j(s)X^i_{I,j,s}}{\mu F_j(s)} \frac{I^i_{s,j,s} \tau_{j,s}}{X^i_{I,j,s}} \right].
\]

We use

\[
V^i_{P_k,s} = -X^i_{k,s} V^i_{I,s},
\]

\[
S^i_{k,j,s} = X^i_{P_k,j,s} + X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s},
\]

\[
\sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} X^i_{P_k,j,s} + X^i_{k,s} = 0,
\]

\[
\sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} X^i_{I,j,s} = 1,
\]

to get

\[
-v \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J_s} \mu F_j(s) \left[ X^i_{P_k,j,s} + X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s} \right],
\]

\[
-v \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J_s} (\mu F_j(s) - \lambda_s P_{j,s}) \left[ X^i_{P_k,j,s} + X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s} \right]
\]

\[
- \sum_{i \in I} \lambda_s X^i_{k,s} + \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J_s} \lambda_s P_{j,s} X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s},
\]

\[
-v \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = \sum_{i \in I} \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} \sum_{j \in J_s} \left( P_j(s) \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} - P_j(s) \right) \left[ X^i_{P_k,j,s} + X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s} \right]
\]

\[
- \sum_{i \in I} \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} X^i_{k,s} + \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J_s} \frac{\mu F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} P_{j,s} X^i_{k,s} X^i_{I,j,s},
\]

and finally

\[
-v \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = - \sum_{i \in I} \frac{F_j(s)}{P_j(s)} \sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} \tau_{j,s} S^i_{k,j,s}.
\]
Summing up, we have

\[ \lambda_i V_{i,s} = \frac{\mu F_j(s),s}{P_j(s),s} \left[ 1 - \sum_{j \in J} \frac{P_{j,s} X_i^j}{I_i^s} X_i^j, \tau_{j,s} \right], \]

\[ \nu \cdot \Gamma_{k,s} = \sum_{i \in I} \frac{\mu F_j(s),s}{P_j(s),s} \sum_{j \in J} P_{j,s} \tau_{j,s} S_{i,k,j,s}. \]

**References**


