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ARE WOMEN MORE ATTRACTED TO COOPERATION THAN MEN?

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ABSTRACT

We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In contrast to tournaments, which are often avoided by women, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as men in all our treatments and conditions, and significantly more often than men in a well-defined subset of those cases. Key factors explaining gender patterns in attraction to co-operative incentives across experimental conditions include women's more optimistic assessments of their prospective teammate's ability and men's greater responsiveness to efficiency gains associated with team production. Women also respond differently to alternative rules for team formation in a manner that is consistent with stronger inequity aversion

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1. Introduction

A considerable body of recent research has shown that women tend to shy away from competitive work environments, and tend to perform worse than men when placed in those environments (see for example Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; and Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In most of this research, women's avoidance of competition is attributed to a combination of distastes for competition and lower levels of confidence in their relative abilities. This avoidance of competition has been offered as an explanation for the continuing underrepresentation of women in top economic or political positions in modern societies.

If indeed women's talents are sometimes wasted because they avoid competitive environments, it seems important to know which types of work environments do attract women, and how women fare relative to men in those environments. In this paper we study women's choices to enter a work environment characterized by team incentives, and the role of women's perceived relative abilities in those choices. In our real-effort laboratory experiment, participants can choose to receive either an individual piece rate or an equal share of a group's output, after experiencing each compensation scheme successively. In many respects, the design of our experiment is similar to Niederle and Vesterlund's (2007) study of selection into competitive environments. The main contrast is that, instead of choosing between individual pay and a situation where workers' rewards depend negatively on their co-workers' performance, in our experiment the participants choose between individual pay and an environment where workers' pay depends positively on their co-workers' performance.

In addition to addressing a gap in the literature on self-selection into pay schemes –which has focused almost exclusively on selection into tournaments--, our focus on selection into team pay is motivated in part by the increasing use of explicit team-based incentives in the workplace. For example, Lawler *et al.* (2003) report that the share of Fortune 1000 companies using workgroup or team incentives for more than a fifth of their workers more than doubled, from 21 to 51 percent, between 1990 and 2002. Well known studies of this transition towards team pay at the firm- and industry level include Boning *et al.* (2007) for U.S. steel minimills, and Berg *et al.* (1996) and Hamilton *et al.* (2003) for the apparel industry. More broadly, though, our objective is to understand gender differences in selection into work environments where incentives for cooperation versus competition can be implicit features of the employment contract, or are

¹ Interestingly, teams also play an increasingly dominant role in the production of scientific information (Wuchty *et al.*, 2007).

deeply ingrained in corporate cultures. We hope thereby to shed light on the causes of gender differences in occupational choice and wages, and on how changes in human resource management policy and corporate culture might make work environments more female-friendly.

While it might be tempting to imagine that women are disproportionately attracted to cooperative environments because they have more other-regarding preferences (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund 2007), our results are more complex than this. On the one hand, we do find that women are significantly more likely than men to select team-based compensation in our baseline condition, where team production offers no efficiency advantages over individual production. Statistically, this gap can be explained by gender differences in confidence: essentially, the same confidence deficit that pushes women out of competitions pulls women into teams, where it is beneficial to have an abler teammate. On the other hand, men become much more likely to join teams and the gender gap vanishes when we introduce an instrumental reason for joining teams, in particular an efficiency advantage to team production. We also find that women's relative propensities to join a team are strongly affected by the experimental 'rules' for team formation. Specifically, when we replace Niederle-Vesterlund's group formation procedure by an arguably more realistic one where teams are formed by mutual consent, women's team formation rates increase dramatically. We show that this phenomenon is consistent with a model in which women are more inequity-averse than men.

Other findings include the following. In contrast to a number of tournament studies, we find a zero causal effect of the team environment on women's absolute and relative task performance. This is true both for the pure treatment effect of teams, i.e. when participants are randomly assigned to different pay schemes, and for the treatment-on-the-treated (ToT) effect of teams, i.e. the causal effect of team compensation for the subset of workers who self-select into teams when choice is voluntary. At the same time, consistent with simple payoff-maximizing behavior, we find strong and consistent evidence of adverse selection into teams: taking experimental conditions as given, abler participants of both genders tend to avoid teams, and participants who thought their partner was able tend to join teams. As a result, self-selected teams perform worse than randomly-assigned teams, and worse than subjects who choose to avoid teams. Also, since adverse selection is stronger among men, voluntarily-formed female teams outperform self-selected male teams. Notably, this is not because women respond better (or less adversely) to the team environment; it is purely a selection effect. Taken together, these findings may be useful information for the design of work environments that are attractive to workers of both genders.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 develops the experimental design and procedures. Sections 4 to 7 present the results. Section 8 discusses these results and concludes.

2. Related Literature

As we have noted, the literature on gender and methods of pay has been dominated by a comparison between piece rates --where compensation depends only on one's own performance-- and tournaments, where an individual's reward depends negatively on her co-workers' performance. In a well known early study, Gneezy et al. (2003) found that women were less effective than men in competitive environments, despite the fact that their performance was similar to men's in a noncompetitive environment. This result has been confirmed for a variety of tasks and subject populations, including schoolchildren (Gneezy and Rustichini 2004). Concerning selection into competitive environments, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) provide evidence that women "shy away" from competition in a task involving adding up sets of twodigit numbers. Men are much more likely to enter a payoff-equivalent tournament than women in their study, and the authors attribute this both to gender differences in overconfidence and tastes for competition. This result has also been replicated in a variety of contexts and populations, including children as young as three years old (Sutter and Rützler, 2010), but the effect varies with factors such as school type (Booth and Nolen, 2012a and b) and runners' ages (Garratt et al., 2013), suggesting a possible role for culture.² Villeval (2012) provides a survey of this literature.

Compared to the literature on gender and tournaments, the economics literature on gender and teams is relatively sparse.³ Turning first to studies of gender and performance in teams, most existing work focuses on a different question from ours: Rather than comparing an individual's performance in a team versus a non-team environment, the typical approach is to take the team environment as given and ask how a team's gender mix affects its performance. Thus, for example, Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2011) find that compared to a single-sex environment,

² Additional evidence of cultural influences is provided by Gneezy *et al.* (2009) who show that this gender difference is reversed in experiments performed in a matrilineal society. Also, no gender difference in competitiveness between boys and girls is found in Sweden (Dreber *et al.*, 2012) nor in Columbia (Cardenas *et al.*, 2013).

³ While there is a large literature in psychology and management science on gender and team performance, most of it is based on observational studies of behavior in existing teams (not self-selection into teams), and teams are rarely incentivized (see Graves and Powell, 2007, for a review).

gender diversity raises the gender performance gap in a team pay setting. Perhaps surprisinigly, this effect is reversed when competition *between* teams ("team competition") is introduced. Interestingly, other studies of gender mix and team performance, including Bornstein *et al.* (2002), Hoogedoorn *et al.* (2011), Apesteguia *et al.* (2012) and Delfgaauw *et al.* (2013) also focus their attention on the case of team competition, an environment that is strategically much more complex than pure team-based pay. There is also a literature on gender differences in public goods games, which share important features with the team incentives problem. A recent survey is provided in Table 4 of Croson and Gneezy (2009) (see also Eckel and Grossman, 2008). The results do not show systematic gender differences, though we note that the context is very different from ours: 'Teams' have 4 or 5 members, the individually rational contribution level is zero, and there is no real-effort task.

Two additional related papers pose the following question: How does grouping workers into teams affect the gender gap in willingness to compete? Specifically, Dargnies (2012) first lets her subjects choose between an individual piece rate and a two-person individual tournament, then lets the same subjects choose between an individual piece rate and a tournament between two two-person teams. She finds that the gender gap in tournament entry is lower under team competition than individual competition. Healy and Pate (2011) allow one group of subjects to choose between an individual piece rate and competing against four others in a tournament. A second group of subjects choose between a two-person group piece rate and a tournament composed of four two-person groups. They found a smaller gender gap in tournament entry in the second case. Thus, in both cases, making subjects compete as teams mitigates women's aversion to competition. Neither paper, however, allows subjects to choose a pure group pay option (without competition attached), so subjects' preferences for this simpler option cannot be elicited.⁵

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⁴ In the linear revenue-sharing scheme that characterizes most team pay experiments, an individual's marginal financial return from producing an extra unit of output is just the price of a unit divided by the number of team members. Computing the marginal return in a tournament requires estimating the derivative of the probability of winning with respect to own output, which depends on the distribution of output levels and abilities of all the competitors. Combining tournaments and teams extends this complexity even further, making it difficult to infer subjects' underlying preferences from experimental behavior, which is a key objective of our paper.

⁵ It is interesting to ask whether team competition or pure team pay describes a larger share of real-world jobs that women might consider taking. In that regard it is hard to see that group competition, either between or within firms, plays a large role in the many 'helping' occupations where women remain highly overrepresented. That said, converting individual tournaments into group tournaments might be a useful tool for making situations that are *inherently* competitive more attractive to women, as suggested by Dargnies and Healy and Pate.

Finally, to our knowledge only two papers allow subjects to choose between (pure) team pay and some alternative incentive scheme. Wozniak et al. (2010) include team-based pay as the least 'competitive' of five options available to subjects; they find that men are more likely than men to choose tournaments, and women are (insignificantly) more likely to choose team pay. An unusual feature of Wozniak et al.'s design, however, is that participants knew they would be randomly grouped with others who could be working under different pay schemes than their own; it is not clear how realistically this represents team or tournament compensation in action. Dohmen and Falk (2011) study agents' choices between fixed and variable pay; in different treatments the variable pay option was either an individual piece rate, a tournament, or a group piece rate. They find that men choose the variable pay option more frequently than women, with an especially strong preference in the case of tournaments. While informative on a number of questions, both Wozniak et al. and Dohmen and Falk's designs make it difficult to infer a subject's preferences between a situation where she is rewarded for her own efforts (i.e. an individual piece rate) and a situation where she is rewarded for the performance of her group (i.e. a group piece rate), which is the question at the heart of our paper.⁶

Two additional unique features of our study are the fact that we explore the effects of adding an efficiency advantage to team production, and the consequences of alternative team-formation processes. Allowing for efficiency advantages seems important, since otherwise it is difficult to understand why many firms use group-based compensation even when good measures of individual performance are available. And as it turns out, we find that even small efficiency advantages can generate large changes in behavior, especially for men. Similarly, a common issue that arises in experimental studies of selection into both teams and tournaments is how to allocate all the individuals who choose to join (say) a team to one or more partners. Approaches include matching each team chooser with the past output of a random 'mandated' team player

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⁶ Wozniak *et al.*'s design only lets us see subjects' top choice from a menu; thus it does not provide a ranking of preferences for team versus individual pay for the large share of subjects who chose a tournament. Dohmen and Falk's design never allows subjects to choose between individual and group piece rates; this can generate very different selection patterns. For example, in their design it is a dominant strategy for high-ability individuals to pick group pay over fixed pay (because they can do better under team pay even if their teammate does nothing); this is consistent with their finding of strong positive selection into teams based on ability. In contrast, we find negative selection into teams because abler subjects have the option of receiving variable individual pay, which is not available when the team option is present in Dohmen-Falk. Thus, it is not straightforward to translate selection patterns from one context to the other.

⁷ Hamilton *et al.* (2003) is one well known example, and the increasing proliferation of group incentives during a period when the availability and usability of electronic information on individual workers' performance expanded dramatically suggests that lack of information about individual performance is not firms' main motivation for using group incentives.

(e.g. Niederle-Vesterlund); randomly pairing all team choosers, with various 'fixes' for solitary choosers and odd numbers of choosers (Dargnies, Dohmen-Falk); and randomly implementing the decision of one prospective team member (Healy-Pate). We implement the first of these plus a new approach --requiring mutual consent for team formation—, which strikes us as more representative of real-world team- and partnership formation processes. Again, we find surprisingly large differences that also vary by gender. We argue that these differences actually shed useful light on the types of social preferences that might explain some gender differences in team choices.

Finally, we note that a handful of other studies have examined the team-formation process in both the lab and the field without focusing on gender differences. For example, Hamilton *et al.* 's (2003) well-known field study of a textile plant argues that neither free riding nor adverse selection were significant factors in voluntarily-formed teams, which is consistent with our results for free riding but not for adverse selection. In a field experiment involving farmworkers, however, Bandiera *et al.* (2013) did find that when the incentives facing an entire team are strengthened, assortative matching of team members by ability is increased. Cooper and Jabs (2010) studied the determinants of selection into teams in a sample of entrepreneurs; in their experiment there is a large (50%) efficiency advantage to team production. Consistent with our results in the presence of efficiency advantages, they find no gender difference.

In sum, to our knowledge ours is the first experiment that directly presents subjects with a choice between two simple options: working under an individual piece rate (where your reward depends on your performance only) and working under a group piece rate (where your pay depends on your team's performance). We argue that subjects' decisions between these two strategically simple options shed new light on gender differences in the tendency to gravitate into situations where co-operation rather than competition is rewarded, and on the role of underlying beliefs and preferences in accounting for those gender gaps.

⁸ This finding may be related to the fact that the firm was in the process of converting its entire production process to a team-based one. Workers may have perceived that early adoption of the team process would help them keep their jobs during the transition.

3. Experimental Design

The design is partly inspired by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). At the beginning of each session, we elicit the participants' risk attitudes using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure.

Then, each participant enters his/her first name on the computer before being paired with another participant who is located in another room; in essentially all cases this revealed the participant's gender.

Participants remain paired with the same co-participant for the entire session. The physical location and timing of participants' arrival and departure from the two rooms were arranged to make it extremely unlikely they would ever see any individual participant from the other room.

In a session, participants have to perform a task during sequences of 4 minutes. This task consists of decoding numbers into letters according to a code which changes repeatedly (see instructions in the online Appendix). Two features of this task made it well suited for the current experiment. First, the task is gender neutral: unlike, for example, some sports activities, it is not commonly associated with any particular gender. Second, previous experiments with this task show no evidence of learning-by-doing after a short practice period (Charness *et al.*, 2013). Although our main results are based on between-subject comparisons, this lack of learning simplifies the interpretation of the within-subject comparisons we make.

Before the experiment begins, participants are given three minutes to practice the task. At any time, they have the option to read magazines that are available in their cubicle or to surf the Internet instead of performing the task (this was made common information in the instructions but only one participant used this opportunity). Each session consists of six parts, always in the same order. One of these six parts is randomly selected for payment at the end of the session. Participants observe their own outputs in all parts but do not learn their co-participant's actual output in *any* part until the very end of the session. Immediately below, we describe the entire experimental design for the *Baseline* (B) treatment. Aspects that were changed for our *Efficiency Advantages* (EA) treatment are described after that.

⁹ The participants have to make 10 successive choices between two paired lotteries, "option A" and "option B". The payoffs for option A are either €2 or €1.60, whereas the riskier option B pays either €3.85 or €0.10. In the first decision, the probability of the high payoff for both options is 1/10. In the second decision the probability increases to 2/10. Similarly, the chance of receiving the high payoff for each decision increases as the number of the decision increases. A risk neutral participant should cross over from option A to option B at the fifth decision.

¹⁰ Because we expected team-formation decisions to depend on the teammate's gender as well as the participant's, we were careful not to invite people with gender-neutral names. All participants, except four (all men), reported their true name (this could be checked with the list of participants registered in each session). Three participants changed their name but kept a male name. One participant chose a pseudo that was not a name; identification of the gender could have been more difficult.

The Baseline (B) Treatment

Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment are designed to measure the gender gap in participants' task performance in the individual and team environments respectively, in a situation where subjects are assigned to each pay scheme by the experimenter. Specifically, in Part 1 participants are paid a piece rate: each participant's pay for this part (if this part is selected for actual payment) is given by $Y_i^I = r^I Q_i^I$, where Q_i^I is his own output. We set $r^I = 20$ Euro-cents. In Part 2, participants are teamed with their co-participant to perform the task; they share the output of the team equally. In other words, individual i is paid $Y_i^T = r^T (Q_i^I + Q_i^2)/2$ for her work during this part, where Q_i^2 is her co-participant's output. Throughout the baseline treatment, we set $r^T = r^I = 20$ Euro-cents; thus there is no efficiency advantage to team production. For any convex disutility-of-effort function, individually rational behavior implies that participants should exert less effort in the team setting than the individual piece rate.

Part 3 is the first of two key elements in our experiment. Its goal is to study participants' revealed preference for teamwork in the simplest possible environment. To this end, in Part 3 participants choose between being paid an individual piece-rate (as in Part 1) or according to a team-based payment scheme (as in Part 2). Then, they perform the task. If they have chosen teamwork, their performance in this part is added to the output of their co-participant in part 2; this approach follows Niederle-Vesterlund (2007) and provides a guaranteed 'co-worker' for all participants who choose the team environment. This is clearly explained to the participants, and comprehension tests indicate it is well understood. Thus, Part 3 measures participants' responses to an important feature of team production: the fact that their pay will depend on their partner's performance while that partner is working under team incentives. At the same time, Part 3 does not tell us about participants' responses to another typical feature of team production: the fact that choosing to join a team could also affect *other* workers' monetary payoffs. This is because, by construction, neither subjects' team-formation nor their effort decisions in Part 3 have any effect on their partners' payoffs. ¹¹

In **Part 4**, participants do not perform the task; instead they simply choose the payment scheme that will apply to their Part 1 performance: individual pay versus team pay based on

¹¹ This follows directly from the fact that every subject is paired with their partner's pervious-period actions, and applies also to Niederle-Vesterlund's experiment. In their context, it has the (perhaps surprising) implication that all four contestants can win the tournament if they enter: To win, each player simply has to beat the highest output achieved by others in their group in the previous period.

their partner's *Part 1* performance. Our motivation was to test for subjects' expectations of free-riding by their partner: If they expected their partner to free-ride when on a team, they should be more willing to choose team production based on their partner's Part 1 output (when he is paid individually) than on his Part 2 output. Since expectations about relative ability are crucial in decision-making, between Parts 4 and 5 we administer a short interim questionnaire. Participants are asked to estimate the number of problems they believe their co-participant solved correctly in Parts 1 and 2. They are rewarded 50 Euro-cents for each correct answer (plus or minus one unit).

Part 5 is the second key element of our experimental design. Its purpose is to study participants' team preferences in a richer context that more closely mimics real-world processes of team formation. Here, in contrast with Part 3, participants in a team are paid based on their teammate's actual output in the current period; since this requires an active teammate, teams are formed only when both partners agree to form a team. If a team is formed, subjects are informed of this, then both subjects work and are paid equally according to the team formula. If no team is formed, participants are informed of that, then both partners work and are paid on an individual basis. As one might expect, a cost of Part 5's greater realism is greater complexity. In addition to the factors affecting team choice explored in Part 3, subjects' team choices can now depend on their social preferences, since their actions now affect their partner's payoffs. Later in the paper, we sketch out a simple model of social preferences and show how a comparison of Part 3 and Part 5 behavior sheds light on the nature and strength of those preferences, by gender.

Finally, **Part 6** is the same as Part 5, except that after teams are formed (but before production occurs), participants who have agreed to form teams are given two minutes of unstructured time during which to exchange instant messages.¹⁴ Its goal was to test whether the opportunity to socialize affects team membership and performance.¹⁵ In fact we found no significant differences between subjects' rates of team choice in Parts 5 and 6. Accordingly, after

¹² Of course, if preferences for the team environment also depend on whether the work is actually performed, Part 4 behavior could differ from Part 3 for that reason as well.

¹³ If compensation is to be based on current performance of all team members, some team-formation rule is required. While it might be interesting to explore the effects of other rules (such as a rule that makes teams the default unless both parties exit, or majority rule in the case of larger teams), the mutual-consent rule seems the most realistic to us for the formation of two-person partnerships. Note that analogous rules are also required to form "real" tournaments, where payoffs are based on the current performance of those who have agreed to join.

¹⁴ Participants are informed of this opportunity before they choose their compensation mode. Communication occurs after the payment scheme has been chosen because we wanted to create a more social team environment, but we were not interested in how the participants' choices to join the team could be directly influenced by communication. ¹⁵ In order to keep participants' choices confidential within rooms, we gave all participants an option to type text on their computer during this period. All participants had to wait till the communication period was ended before beginning Part 6 production: choosing individual compensation did not allow individuals to finish earlier.

presenting descriptive results for all Parts of the experiment, we focus most of our detailed analysis of team choice on Parts 3 and 5.¹⁶

Table 1 summarizes the time structure of the game.

(*Insert Table 1 about here*)

The Efficiency Advantage (EA) treatment

This treatment is identical to the Baseline (B) treatment, with the exception that team production has a 10 percent productivity advantage over individual production. Specifically, the individual piece rate remains the same at $r^I = 20$ Euro-cents, but the team piece rate is raised to $r^T = 22$ Euro-cents. The purpose of the Efficiency Advantage (EA) treatment is to study selection into teams in a setting where technological factors favor production in groups (Lazear, 1999).

Procedures

The experiment consisted of 10 sessions conducted at the laboratory of the GATE (Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique) institute in Lyon, France. We invited undergraduate students from the local engineering and business schools via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Due to no-shows, between 14 and 20 individuals actually took part in each session, for a total of 174 participants. The B treatment was implemented in 5 sessions involving 86 participants and the EA treatment in 5 sessions with a total of 88 participants. The unmber of participants of each gender-mixed sessions. To guarantee a balance between genders, the number of participants of each gender in each session could not deviate by more than 2 from the other gender. In the B treatment, we have collected 16 individual observations of women paired with women, 14 individual observations of men paired with men, and 56 observations of persons in mixed pairs. In the EA treatment, the corresponding values are 22, 24, and 42, respectively.

We used our two contiguous laboratories. To preserve anonymity, upon arrival the first 9 participants were assigned to a room and the next ones were directed to the other room and we

¹⁶ An additional consideration which complicates the interpretation of Part 6 is that this is the only part of the experiment where participants have received information about *any* of their partner's decisions: specifically, those participants who picked 'team' in Part 5 will know whether their partner picked 'team' in Part 5. Thus, participants could, in principle, use their Part 6 team-choice decisions either to reward or punish their partner's Part 5 team-choice decision (recall that partners' *effort* levels are not revealed till the very end of the experiment).

¹⁷ Due to a technical breakdown in one B session, we had to stop the session after Part 4. In our results, we include data from Parts 1-4 of that session, which results in 10 more observations for Parts 1-4 than for Parts 5 and 6 of the B treatment. We have replicated all our results excluding *all* the data from this session; the results are virtually identical.

proceeded to the necessary adjustments before distributing the instructions.¹⁸ As such, since each participant was paired with someone from the opposite room, two or more friends showing up at the same time could not be paired together.

The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000). The participants first participated in the Holt and Laury (2002) test to elicit their risk preferences, as the uncertainty regarding the potential partner's ability could affect the choice of the team payment scheme. Then, the instructions for the main task were distributed. They specified that there would be six parts and that one of these parts would be selected for payment at the end of the session, but only the instructions for the Part 1 were included. A quiz was used to check the understanding of the instructions and answers were checked individually. Participants practiced during three minutes to familiarize themselves with the task. Then, they were required to type their first name and after being randomly paired with a participant located in the other room, they were informed of the first name of this co-participant; they knew that they would be paired with the same participant throughout the session. The instructions for each new part were distributed after completion of the previous part. At the end of Part 6 and after completion of an exit questionnaire, the participants of the first lab were allowed to proceed to the payment room. Once these were paid, the participants located in the other lab were invited to move to the payment room.

On average a session lasted 75 minutes and participants earned €16.66 in the Baseline and €17.23 in the Efficiency Advantage treatment, including a €3 show up fee and the payment of correct predictions.

4. Gender and Performance in Exogenously-Assigned Teams

In this Section, we present results from Parts 1 and 2, where all participants were assigned to work first under an individual piece rate, then under team compensation.

Result 1: a) When individuals cannot choose their compensation scheme, there is no gender difference in performance in any scheme and in any treatment. b) Individuals of both genders do not free ride.

¹⁸ After 18 participants had shown up, we directed the 19th participant to the first room and the 20th to the second room. If fewer than 18 participants showed-up, we moved participants from the first to the second room to make sure that we had the same number of participants in both rooms. An alternative option would have been to put all the females in one lab and all the males in the other lab, but this might have made gender highly salient to the participants. Aside from asking participants to use their real first names, all of our instructions and procedures were carefully designed to draw as little attention to the participants' genders as possible.

Support for Result 1.

Table 2 shows participants' mean output levels in Parts 1 and 2 by gender and treatment. It also displays the p-values from t- tests for differences between the means.¹⁹

(*Insert Table 2 about here*)

Table 2 confirms, first of all, that our experimental task is gender neutral: there is no significant difference in output between men and women when they receive individual piece rates. This gender neutrality extends to performance in teams, irrespective of whether team production has efficiency advantages over individual production. Taken together, these two features of our task are useful because they eliminate gender differences in workers' actual performance under the two incentive schemes as possible explanations of any gender gaps in team choices. Put a different way, it is conceivable that one gender might respond better to the team incentive environment than the other, which could help explain the gender gap in decisions to join teams. But that is not the case in our experiment.

The other key finding from Table 2 is that, despite the anonymous nature of interactions and the fact that participants do not learn their partner's performance in any part until the conclusion of the experiment, participants do not appear to free ride on their partners when teams are formed. In fact, if anything the data show an increase in task performance between Parts 1 and 2, though the increase is not significant at conventional levels.²⁰ In our view, the most likely explanation of the lack of free riding (aside from the fact that we use smaller groups than typical public goods experiments) is the nature of the task. Essentially, all of our results are consistent with a scenario in which effort costs are low and the time available to work in each part is short. In such situations, participants' individually rational decisions can be simply to exert the maximum possible effort for a wide range of marginal financial incentives.²¹ Fortuitously, focusing on a low moral-hazard scenario such as ours not only dramatically simplifies the

¹⁹ Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions were also done, with similar outcomes. In all these tests, each participant is considered as one independent observation.

²⁰ This increase could reflect a small amount of residual task learning between Parts 1 and 2. We think this is unlikely, however, based on Charness *et al.*'s (2013) results with the same task. Without a practice period, Charness *et al.* observed learning only between the first and second two-minute periods of their experiment. Since we included a three-minute practice period, their results would suggest zero learning between our Parts 1 and 2. Like us, Charness *et al.* found no gender difference in task performance.

²¹ Consistent with this interpretation, we find no significant performance differentials when the group piece rate is changed from 20 to 22 cents. Also, as we show below, participants' team-choice responses to own and expected partner ability are strongly consistent with own-payoff-maximizing behavior; this argues against strong social preferences as an explanation for the lack of free riding. Indeed, note that under this interpretation even strong social preferences would not affect task performance levels, though they may certainly affect the choice of compensation scheme (individual versus team).

interpretation of the results, it may also enhance the applicability of our results to real workplace teams. As a number of field-based studies have shown (Knez and Simester, 2001; Hamilton *et al.*, 2003; Boning *et al.*, 2007; Babcock *et al.*, 2011), free-riding seems to be effectively absent in most workplace teams that have been studied.

Our next result refers to the players' beliefs and expectations.

Result 2: a) Neither men nor women expect free riding in teams. b) Women have much higher expectations regarding their partner's ability than men.

Support for Result 2.

Table 3 shows participants' mean beliefs concerning their co-participant's performance in Parts 1 and 2.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

Table 3 shows that, not only was there no free riding in teams, participants did not *expect* free riding in teams either. Specifically, if the participants expect their partner to free ride in the team setting, they should expect a lower level of output from him/her in Part 2 than in Part 1. This is decidedly not the case; in fact they expect a small, but statistically significant improvement in their partner's performance in the team setting. This increase could reflect some anticipated learning, or even an expected motivational benefit of the team environment.²²

The other key finding from Table 3 is a highly significant gender gap in expectations of the partner's ability: As a number of other studies (including Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) have found, both men and women expect their partner to be less able than themselves. Strikingly, however, men have much lower expectations of their partner's ability than women. Aside from being statistically significant, this gender gap in expectations is quantitatively large as well. For example, in the B treatment, women's mean assessment of their partner's Part 1 performance (55.14 units) is at the 47th percentile of participants' actual Part 1 performance. For men, the corresponding figure (50.26 units) is at the 16th percentile of actual performance.²³

²² Additional, behavioral evidence that subjects did not expect moral hazard is provided in the next section: participants did not choose teams more often in Part 4 than Part 3, which suggests that they did not expect their partner to be less productive when team pay was imposed.

²³ One might wonder whether participants' perceptions of their partner's ability depend on the *partner's* gender as

One might wonder whether participants' perceptions of their partner's ability depend on the *partner's* gender as well. This issue is explored in Table O-1 in the online Appendix, which shows that neither actual performance, nor perceived partner performance, depend on the partner's gender. The only partner-gender effect that approaches statistical significance is a tendency for men to rate male partners higher than female partners (p=.149). These results contrast with some studies on competitiveness showing that the partner's gender influences decisions or performance (see notably Gneezy *et al.*, 2003 and Datta Gupta *et al.*, 2013).

5. Gender and Team Choice: Basic Results

This Section summarizes participants' choices in the four 'team choice' Parts of the experiment (Parts 3-6) in which subjects were free to choose their compensation scheme. We begin with the baseline (B) treatment.

Result 3: In the absence of efficiency advantages, women are much more likely to choose the team payment scheme than men.

Support for Result 3.

The share of men and women who choose team compensation in the B treatment is shown in Figure 1.

(Insert Figure 1 about here)

According to Figure 1, female participants elected to receive team-based pay more frequently than male participants in all of the team-choice parts. Specifically, in Part 3 --which provides the simplest test of selection into teams--, more than three times as many women as men (22.73 percent versus 7.14 percent; p = .044) chose to be paid on a team basis; recall that this choice was made despite the lack of any efficiency advantage to team production and despite the fact that the team situation could in principle expose the participant to a risk of free-riding by a self-interested teammate. Perhaps surprisingly, despite designing the experiment to ensure that participants knew their partner's gender, we found no evidence that the partner's gender affected the decision to receive team-based compensation. 24

Comparing Parts 3 and 4 strongly confirms our (incentivized) questionnaire-based evidence that subjects did not expect free riding in the team environment: in fact, women selected team compensation less frequently in Part 4, despite the fact that Part 4 protects them against free riding by pairing them with their co-participant's output under the individual piece rate. Men, on the other hand, selected teams slightly more in Part 4, though for both men and women the difference between their Parts 3 and 4 choice is statistically insignificant (p=.262 for women and p=.570 for men, two tailed). Comparing Parts 5 and 6, there is no indication that women were more attracted to teams when the team experience was more interactive. In fact, women selected team compensation less frequently in Part 6 but insignificantly so (p=.767), despite the fact that Part 6 allows for a period of communication between the team members prior to production.

²⁴ Table O-3 in the online Appendix shows regression coefficients (with no controls) that parallel the statistics reported in Figures 1 and 2 of the paper, broken down by the partner's gender. Table O-4 presents regression results that replicate Table 4 of the paper. It clearly shows higher team formation rates if the participant is female (unless a control for beliefs is introduced), regardless of whether her prospective teammate was male or female.

Men, on the other hand, selected teams significantly more often in Part 6 than in Part 5 (p=.044). This difference could be due to gender differences in communication preferences or in the search for information (during the chat interactions, many try to learn the performance of their teammate in the previous parts).

Result 4: Women are much more likely to choose the team pay option when choosing 'team' affects their partner's payoff (Part 5).

Support for Result 4.

Comparing Parts 3 and 5, we find essentially no difference in men's behavior: team pay was chosen 10.81 versus 7.14 percent of the time (p=.160). Women, on the other hand, are much more likely to choose teams (41.03 versus 22.73 percent of the time, p=.033) in Part 5, which captures more features of the team production environment.²⁵ While this dramatic gender gap could be explained by other differences between Parts 3 and 5, Section 6 of our paper argues that the distribution of the gap among our subjects is consistent with a simple model of inequity aversion in which women are more averse to having more income than their partner than men are.²⁶

Turning next to the Efficiency-Advantage (EA) treatment, we have:

Result 5: The gender gap in the willingness to form a team vanishes when efficiency advantages are introduced. This is because both genders increase their team choices, but men's increase is much larger.

Support for Result 5.

Figure 2 displays the share of participants who choose team compensation in the EA treatment.

(*Insert Figure 2 about here*)

Two features of the results are immediately apparent: First, despite only a small improvement in efficiency associated with team production, the share of both men and women choosing team compensation is much higher than in the B treatment. In all cases the new rates of

²⁵ At 6.8 percent, the share of women who ultimately formed a team was, not surprisingly, actually lower in Part 5 than in Part 3. For men, team formation was the same in Parts 3 and 5, at 7.1 percent.

²⁶ One non-social-preference-based explanation of the "Part 5 effect" is that women expect more positive selection into teams than men do, or that they expect a more positive treatment-on-the-treated (ToT) effect of the team environment on their partners' performance. While we do not have direct measures of our participants' beliefs regarding how others will self-select into team compensation, Results 6 and 7 show that actual selection into teams is negative and the ToT effect of team pay is effectively zero.

team choices are above 50 percent.²⁷ Second, the gender gap in team selection essentially vanishes: although women still choose teams more frequently than men, the gap is much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant as men's propensity to choose teams rises much more between the B and EA treatments. It thus appears that men are more responsive to the introduction of these extrinsic benefits of being on a team.²⁸

Comparing Parts 3 and 4 of the EA treatment, there is once again no indication that participants expected a moral hazard problem in the team environment (t-tests, p=.743 for women and p=.253 for men, two-tailed). Comparing Parts 5 and 6, there is now no indication that participants of either gender were more attracted to teams when the team experience was more interactive (p=.421 for women and p=1.0 for men).²⁹ Finally, comparing Parts 3 and 5, we find additional, strong support for stronger social preferences among women: women are more likely to choose teams (76.74 versus 53.49 percent of the time) when subjects' team production decisions affect their partners' payoffs, a difference which is highly significant (p=.003). For men, this difference is smaller (68.89 versus 55.56 percent of the time) and only marginally significant (p=.083) (it was insignificant in the B case).

Our next result concerns the role of abilities and beliefs in accounting for gender differences in team formation:

Result 6:

- a) Regardless of the institutional environment (i.e. the rules for team formation) and the economic environment (i.e. the efficiency gains associated with team production), abler participants of both genders are always less likely to choose the team environment.
- b) Similarly, participants who thought their co-participant was abler were more likely to choose team compensation.
- c) Statistically, women's more generous beliefs about their partner's ability account for all of the gender gap in team choices in Part 3 of the experiment.

²⁷ It is perhaps worth noting that, with a 10 percent efficiency advantage to team production, the marginal private return to effort in teams rises from 50 to 55 percent of the marginal return to effort under individual compensation. Thus, in a 'standard' model, we should still expect high levels of free riding in teams, and would therefore still expect most if not all participants to rationally avoid the team environment.

²⁸ If participants interpret the EA treatment's higher piece rate for teams as the experimenter's preferred choice, then their responses to the EA treatment could include an experimenter demand effect. To account for our results using experimenter demand effects, however, men would need to be more eager to please the experimenter than women. We are not aware of any gender dimension in experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010).

²⁹ All of the differences mentioned are small in magnitude and none are statistically significant at conventional magnitudes. Perhaps an effect of interaction would be found if we allowed for collaboration on the work task itself.

Support for Result 6.

To explore the role of abilities and beliefs on participants' choices of team compensation, Table 4 regresses a team choice indicator on measures of individual ability, risk attitudes and beliefs about partner ability.³⁰ Table 4 pools our results for Parts 3 and 5 of the experiment, and for the B and EA treatments respectively, with gender-specific fixed effects for the parts and treatments.³¹ All the regressions use the participant's own actual performance in Part 1 as a measure of his/her ability, and his/her estimates of his/her partner's Part 1 performance to measure expected partner ability.³² Since Parts 3 and 5 were administered to the same participants, all the regressions are clustered at the individual level.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

With no controls except the parts and treatments interacted with gender, column (1) of Table 4 replicates the significant positive gender effect of about 15 percentage points in the regression's baseline treatment and condition (Part 3 of the B treatment). It also shows that workers of both genders elect to form teams more often when team choices affect one's partner's payoffs (Part 5), though the effect is twice as large and statistically more significant for women (p=.053 for men; p<.001 for women). Both genders also respond positively to efficiency advantages in team production, though here the effect is much larger for men than women.³³ These effects of Part 5 and the EA treatment are highly robust to the addition of controls for ability, risk aversion and expected partner ability, as indicated in columns 2-4.

Row 2 of Table 4 introduces a control for the participant's own Part 1 performance. As claimed, abler participants are less likely to choose the team environment in all specifications. Since abler participants will earn a lower payoff when matched with a random teammate than when working independently, this pattern is consistent with a simple, own-payoff maximizing adverse selection hypothesis. Also consistent with adverse selection, column 4 Table 4 shows that participants who thought their co-participant was abler were more likely to choose team

³⁰ Risk aversion could affect decisions to join teams, though its predicted effects are ambiguous in sign. On the one hand, if there is a lot of part-to-part variation in performance, greater risk aversion might lead participants to prefer teams, since being paid the average of the two workers' performance adds an element of insurance. On the other hand, uncertainty about the ability (or intentions) of one's teammate will work in the opposite direction. We also detected no statistically significant gender gap in risk aversion in our subject pool.

³¹ Parallel results for Parts 4 and 6 are shown in Table O-2 of the online Appendix.

³² Arguably we could use expectations of their partner's Part 2 output, since this reflects his/her performance in a team environment. In practice, given the lack of free riding in our experiment it makes no difference which measure we use.

³³ The p-value for a test of no gender difference in the Part 5 coefficient is .092, while the p-value for no gender difference in the EA coefficient is .080.

compensation. Notably, the effect of higher estimated partner ability is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the effect of own ability. Another robust result from both Tables is that regardless of specification, risk attitudes do not predict the choice of team compensation.³⁴

Finally, note that the gender gap in team choice, while robust to controls for own ability and risk aversion, falls sharply in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant when controls for perceived partner ability are added in column 4. This demonstrates our claim that gender differences in beliefs about others' ability are a major determinant of the gender gap in team choices in our experiment.³⁵

6. Social Preferences and the "Part 5 Effect": A Model

One of our most unexpected findings is the large effect of apparently minor changes in the 'rules' of the team-formation process between Part 3 and 5 on the frequency with which subjects, especially women, pick the 'team' option. As already noted, one possible explanation of this phenomenon might have to do with social preferences, since –unlike Part 3—subjects' Part 5 team formation decisions affect their partners' incomes. Pursuing this intuition, the goal of this section is to develop and test a simple model of how social preferences might affect decisions to select team-based pay. In addition to helping us interpret the observed choice patterns across experimental conditions and by gender, the model yields an unanticipated prediction which we test against our data.

To keep the model simple, we take advantage of the lack of evidence of moral hazard in our experiment to focus on a pure adverse-selection model where task performance is a fixed characteristic of the individual; accordingly, let Q_i and Q_j denote subject i's and j's task performance respectively, regardless of whether either is working under team or individual incentives. Since output is the same between the team and individual environments, so is effort; thus the utilities of the various outcomes depend only on the amount of income received by the two participants. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), let individual i's utility be given by:

³⁴ Table O-4 in the online appendix replicates Table 4, allowing for teammate gender to affect team choices. No significant effects are detected.

³⁵ In order to quantify the effects of men's more biased beliefs on their payoffs, we compared the participants' actual team-formation rates and Part-specific payoffs to what they would have been if the participants picked the compensation scheme that maximized their earnings given unbiased expectations. Perhaps surprisingly, while unbiased expectations generate much higher rates of team choice, especially among men, they did not increase men's relative payoffs much. For example, in Part 3 of the Baseline treatment, unbiased expectations would raise men's team choices from .071 to .524 and women's from .227 to .432. Payoffs, however, only rise from €11.55 to €11.63 for men and from €11.71 to €11.75 for women, due to the relatively compressed distribution of performance on this task among our participants.

$$U_i = Y_i - \alpha (Y_i - Y_i)(1 - P) - \beta (Y_i - Y_i)P$$
 (1)

where Y_i is i's experimental income, Y_j is his partner's income, and P is an indicator for whether $Y_i > Y_j$. An individual with no inequity aversion has $\alpha = \beta = 0$; an individual with symmetric inequity aversion has $1 > \alpha = \beta > 0$, and an individual with asymmetric inequity aversion (i.e. who is more averse to having less income than his partner than to having more income than him has $1 > \alpha > \beta \ge 0$. In what follows, we refer to α as disadvantageous inequity aversion, and to β as advantageous inequity aversion. Our goal in this section is to see whether such an outcomesbased model can explain the pattern of gender differences in choices across our experimental conditions, or whether a more general model incorporating other social preferences is required. ³⁷

The main predictions of model (1) for Parts 3 and 5 of our experiment are stated formally in Propositions 1 and 2 below; importantly, all of these predictions identify the unique, strictly dominant strategy of player i, conditional on i's own beliefs only. In other words, these predictions identify i's optimal actions, independently of j's actions, and independently of j's beliefs. Proofs of both propositions are supplied in Appendix 1.

Proposition 1 (Baseline Treatment): In the Baseline Treatment, regardless of their social preferences (α, β) all agents who believe they are less able than their partner $(Q_i/Q_j < 1)$ should pick the 'team' option in both Part 3 and Part 5. All agents who believe they are abler than their partner $(Q_i/Q_j > 1)$ should pick the individual option in Part 3. In Part 5, agents who believe they are abler than their partner should pick 'team' if they are sufficiently averse to having more income than their partner $(\beta>.5)$ and the individual option otherwise.

A key part of the intuition behind Proposition 1 stems from the fact that in Part 3, player *i*'s actions have no impact on player *j*'s income. Thus, despite the fact that player *i* might care about player *j*'s payoffs, there is nothing *i* can do to affect them. It follows directly that *social* preferences should have no effect on any agent's Part 3 behavior: all agents should act selfishly in Part 3, choosing individual pay when they think they are abler than their teammate and team pay otherwise. A second key piece of intuition is that *inequity-aversion should have no effect on*

³⁶ It seems reasonable to restrict attention to cases where the individuals' concern with income inequality is not greater than their concern for their own income.

³⁷ A distinct type of social preferences, specifically intentions-based preferences, could also generate differences

between Part 3 and Part 5 behavior if subjects are averse to frustrating the partner's possible desire to form a team, which can only happen in Part 5. We do not claim that intentions-based behavior of this type is absent; only that a simpler, outcomes-based model of social preferences is adequate to account for the observed patterns. Other possible explanations include (a) the fact that participants who choose team in Part 5 will learn the level of their partner's pay, and (b) the fact that increasing one's own *effort* raises one's partner's pay in Part 5, but not in Part 3. In our discussion, we will assume there is no intrinsic value to knowing one's partner's pay. Possibility (b) seems unlikely given the fact that effort levels do not vary between team and individual pay environments.

players who think they are less able than their partner. Selfish players who think they are less able always pick the 'team' option; adding inequity-aversion only strengthens subjects' motivation to pick 'team' since it narrows the income gap between them and their partner. An interesting implication is that subjects' degree of disadvantageous inequity aversion (α) has no effect on team formation decisions in any of our experimental Parts or treatments. Putting these predictions together, the only case in which inequity-aversion affects predicted behavior is in Part 5, among subjects who think they are abler than their partner. Some of these subjects, if they are sufficiently advantageous inequity-averse, might pick team pay to raise their partner's income at the expense of reducing their own income.

Proposition 2 (EA Treatment): In the EA Treatment, regardless of their social preferences all agents who believe they are less than 11/9 as able as their partner $(Q_i/Q_j < 11/9)$ should pick the 'team' option in both Parts 3 and Part 5. All agents who believe they are more than 11/9 as able as their partner should pick the individual option in Part 3. In Part 5, agents who believe they are more than 11/9 as able as their partner $(Q_i/Q_j > 11/9)$ should pick 'team' iff their level aversion to having more income than their partner (β) satisfies $\frac{Q_i}{Q_j} < \frac{.55 - \beta}{.45 - \beta}$.

The intuition behind Proposition 2 is parallel to Proposition 1, modified to incorporate the fact that both selfish and inequity-averse agents now have an additional incentive to pick the 'team' option.

Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 have the following implications. First and most obviously, the overall rate of team formation should be higher in the EA treatment since the threshold relative ability below which all agents choose teams is greater than before. This will be true regardless of the level of inequity-aversion and is thus not directly informative about social preferences. Second, in both the B and EA treatments, subjects' choices in Part 3 should be unaffected by the participants' level of inequity aversion. It follows that gender differences in inequity aversion cannot explain the gender gap in team choice in Part 3. Fortunately, this is not a major concern since we have already demonstrated that gender differences in Part 3 behavior can be fully accounted for by measured gender differences in overconfidence.

Third, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that if some subjects are sufficiently advantageous inequity-averse, the rate of team choice should increase between Parts 3 and 5. This is because a subset of subjects are predicted to switch from individual to team pay between these Parts in order to benefit their partner, while the rest are predicted to make the same choice in both Parts. It follows that a simple inequity aversion model has the potential to explain an increase in the

rate of team formation between Parts 3 and 5. Further, recall that the increase in team choices between Parts 3 and 5 was significantly greater for women than men. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that this is consistent with greater advantageous inequity-aversion (β) among women than men. Finally, Propositions 1 and 2 also imply that the increase in team choices between Parts 3 and 5 should be confined to subjects who believe they are abler than their partner (if we take the model literally), or should at least be concentrated among abler subjects (if we take the model as a rough guide to where the effects of inequity aversion are most likely to be seen). This unexpected feature provides a possible test of that model.

To examine this hypothesis, the rates of team choice in Parts 3 and 5, by a subject's own perceived relative ability, are presented in Table 5. According to Table 5, women who thought they were less able than their partner increased their team formation rates by 9 percentage points (.73-.64) between Parts 3 and 5. Among women who thought they were more able than their partner, this increase was much larger, at 29 percentage points. The difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p=.086), and is consistent with our inequity-aversion model. For men who thought they were less able than their partner there was no difference in team choices between Parts 3 and 5 (.47 in both cases), while the share choosing 'team' rose by 12 percentage points among men who thought they were abler than their partner. This difference is statistically insignificant (p=.273). Overall, we see these results as supportive of a model in which inequity-aversion among women raises their team-formation rates between Part 3 (where abler women can't help their partner by choosing 'team') and Part 5 (where they can). The fact that the increase in women's team formation rates between Parts 3 and 5 is concentrated among women who thought they were abler than their partner may also distinguish an inequity-aversion model from other social-preference-based explanations (such as intentions-based models) which do not necessarily depend on perceived relative ability in this way.³⁸

7. Gender and Performance in Self-Selected Teams

Result 1 stated that, when assigned to work in a team environment, men and women perform equally well, both in absolute terms and relative to their performance when compensated individually. For at least two reasons, however, this zero treatment effect of teams does not necessarily imply that men and women will, on average, perform equally on teams that are

³⁸ For example, there is no reason to think that more able women compared to less able ones would chose the team payment scheme more frequently in Part 5 than in Part 3 because they do not want to frustrate a partner who would prefer to form a team.

voluntarily formed. One reason, of course, is ability bias or *selection on levels*: indeed we have demonstrated that there is adverse selection into teams. And because adverse selection is stronger among men, we would expect voluntarily-formed female teams to outperform voluntarily-formed male teams.

The second reason why performance on self-selected teams might differ from mandated teams, however, may not work in this direction. Specifically, suppose that participants who expect that they will respond better to the team environment disproportionately select into teams (i.e. there is *selection on slopes*, or on responsiveness to the treatment as in any Roy model of comparative advantage). If the amount –or direction-- of selection on slopes differs between men and women, then voluntarily-formed male teams could perform better or worse than voluntarily-formed female teams. Fortunately, our design allows us to non-parametrically estimate causal effects of the team environment on the sample of persons who chose that environment (i.e. the treatment on the treated (ToT) effect) without any assumptions on the form of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus we can determine not only whether self-selected teams perform differently from randomly-assigned teams, but also why.

Our main findings are as follows:

Result 7: a) Self-selected teams perform worse than mandated teams due to strong selection on levels, but little evidence is found of selection on slopes. b) Because adverse selection is worse among men than women, self-selected male teams perform worse than self-selected female teams.

Support for Result 7.

Appendix 2 presents performance information for team joiners and nonjoiners in Parts 3 and 5, showing that performance on teams was worse than performance under an individual payment scheme. It also presents information on the *Part 1* performance of persons who voluntarily joined teams in Parts 3 and 5, which demonstrates a strong role for negative self-selection into teams. Finally, Appendix 2 uses information on each participant's Part 1 output to partition the performance gap between voluntary team joiners and nonjoiners into two components: selection on levels and selection on slopes. It shows that selection on levels is the dominant effect.

In sum, this Section has shown that the output gaps between voluntarily-formed teams and individuals who choose to produce individually are driven by adverse selection on levels, and not by differential selection on slopes. Thus, firms offering voluntary teamwork should in general be

wary of adverse selection, and especially so in male workplaces: Because men more strongly underestimate their co-workers' ability, only the men with low productivity will tend to sign up for the teams. By the same token, one might expect men who select into "co-operative" occupations to be more adversely selected than women who do so.

8. Discussion and Conclusion

Our laboratory experiment has found that when participants can choose between team and individual compensation, and when there is no efficiency advantage associated with team production, women choose team-based compensation more frequently than men. Statistically, this gap is entirely explained by a gender gap in overconfidence, as men are more pessimistic than women about the ability of their potential teammate. In contrast, as soon as we introduce a small efficiency advantage of team production, women and men join teams with equal frequency. This suggests that gender differences in responsiveness to efficiency gains can also play a large role in the team formation process, with men being more responsive to such gains than women. Finally, superficially minor differences in the rules for team formation also have large effects on the frequency with which team pay is selected, especially among women; these effects suggest a strong potential role for social preferences in the choice of team compensation as well. Specifically, we find that women are much more likely to pick the 'team' option when doing so would have a positive impact on their partner's incomes, and show that this pattern is consistent with a higher level of 'advantageous' inequity aversion among women than men.

Gender differences in overconfidence have of course been observed in previous studies. For example, men's greater overconfidence plays an important role in studies of entry into competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Sutter and Rützler, 2010). Of some interest is the fact that, consistent with the simplest own-payoff-maximizing models, overconfidence works in opposite directions in the tournament versus team cases: encouraging entry in the former while discouraging it in the latter. Similarly, our findings that men respond more than women to the efficiency gains associated with team production echo those of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) who found that men's demand curve for altruism is more reactive to price changes. Finally, our findings regarding inequity aversion relate to a broader literature on gender differences in social preferences, as summarized in Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bertrand (2010). Emerging findings from this literature include the tendency for women to be more generous in the dictator game (Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman,

1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001); to have more redistributive preferences in field data; and – at least in experiments that hold constant the level of risk and provide more anonymity—to contribute more in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Although the literature also indicates that women's social preferences are malleable to the environment, these findings are consistent with the higher willingness of women to choose a more egalitarian mode of payment in our experiment.

We recognize, of course, that all the above results are predicated on the specific task environment we have created: The concept of a team in our experiment is a mere shadow of what it means to be on a real workplace team. Our team members interact only a few times, never meet in person, and our linear production process does not exhibit any complementarities. Moreover, in this environment moral hazard in teams plays little or no role and we have deliberately eliminated any element of competition *between* teams from our design. That said, a key advantage of a tightly-controlled laboratory experiment is that it allows us to distinguish several fundamental aspects of any team-formation decision, including participants' willingness to tie their economic fate to others' efforts and abilities and their willingness to share rewards equally with others. In addition, we can isolate the effect of factors like overconfidence, risk aversion and responsiveness to team-related efficiency gains on gender differences in behavior. Without varying these factors one by one in a controlled experiment, it would be very difficult to convincingly isolate their individual effects.

Our results might help shed light on the substantial and continuing gap in the occupational distribution of men and women, even in societies where a great deal of equality of opportunity exists. As is well known, women are highly overrepresented in the nonprofit sector and in helping occupations (Powell and Steinberg, 2006), both of which arguably involve cooperative production with little financial reward. These are precisely the conditions where the gender gap in voluntary team participation was the largest in our experiment. Since women are never less prone to select the team option than men in our experiment, our results also suggest that replacing tournament- by team-based incentives in highly paid jobs (at least where appropriate given the production technology) might increase women's representation in those jobs.

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Table 1: Summary of the experimental design

Part	1	2	3	4	5	6
Is Work Performed?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Can participants choose the pay scheme?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pay scheme	Individual	Team	Individual or Team	Individual or Team	Team if both agree, otherwise Individual	Team if both agree, otherwise Individual
Partner's performance in this Part is used to compute team pay	-	Part 2	Part 2	Part 1	Part 5	Part 6
Communication	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Table 2: Task Performance under Mandatory Individual versus Mandatory Team Pay, by Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Part 1:	Part 2:	p-value for difference
	Individual	Team	between Parts 1 and 2
	Compensation	Compensation	
A. Baseline Treatment			
Women	56.93	57.95	.065
Men	54.83	55.98	.073
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.093	.127	
B. Efficiency Advantage Treatment			
Women	54.88	55.84	.089
Men	55.49	55.29	.813
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.624	.685	

Note: Sample sizes are 44 women and 42 men in the B treatment and 43 women and 45 men in the EA treatment. *P*-values are from 2-sided *t*-tests for differences between means.

Table 3: Beliefs Regarding Partner's Task Performance under Mandatory Individual versus Mandatory Team Pay, by Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Part 1: Individual Compensation	Part 2: Team Compensation	<i>p</i> -value for difference between Parts 1 and 2
A. Baseline Treatment			
Women	55.14	56.39	.045
Men	50.26	52.10	.002
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.000	.001	
B. Efficiency Advantage Treatment			
Women	53.88	55.16	.013
Men	51.47	52.78	.002
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.031	.040	

Note: Sample sizes are 44 women and 42 men in the B treatment and 43 women and 45 men in the EA treatment. *P*-values are from 2-sided *t*-tests for differences between means.

Table 4: Regressions for the Probability of Choosing Team Pay, Parts 3 and 5 (Linear Probability Models with robust standard errors)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. Female	.1681*	.1985**	.1864*	.0720
	(.0750)	(.0716)	(.0720)	(.0731)
2. Own Part 1 output		0151**	0143**	0289**
		(.0051)	(.0050)	(.0054)
3. Holt-Laury switch point			0364	0350
			(.0204)	(.0187)
4. Multiple switches			.1400	.1164
			(.1200)	(.1133)
5. Beliefs re partner's Part 1 output				.0301**
				(.0061)
6. Part5 * Male	.0882	.0906*	.0948*	.0956*
	(.0453)	(.0452)	(.0447)	(.0449)
7. Part5 * Female	.2083**	.2080**	.2058**	.2092**
	(.0543)	(.0544)	(.0545)	(.0544)
8. EA * Male	.5308**	.5383**	.5202**	.4936**
	(.0740)	(.0688)	(.0694)	(.0702)
9. EA * Female	.3316**	.3009**	.2996**	.3048**
	(.0855)	(.0867)	(.0853)	(.0757)
10. R-squared	.242	.272	.288	.352
p-values for:				
11. Part5 * Male = Part5 * Female	.092	.098	.117	.109
12. EA * Male = EA * Female	.080	.032	.045	.067

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors, clustered on participants, in parentheses. N=338 in all columns.

Table 5: Team Choice Rates in Parts 3 and 5, by Perceived Relative Ability

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Chose Team in	Chose Team in	N
	Part 3	Part 5	
A. WOMEN			
Less Able than partner:			
Share	0.64	0.73	
Number	21	24	33
Abler than partner:			
Share	0.22	0.51	
Number	11	25	49
B. MEN			
Less Able than partner:			
Share	0.47	0.47	
Number	7	7	15
Abler than partner:			
Share	0.30	0.42	
Number	20	28	67

p-values for (Part 5 – Part 3 among Abler) = (Part 5 – Part 3 among Less Able) :

Women: *p*=.086 Men: *p*=.273

p-values are for the significance of an interaction term between Part 5 and relative ability in a gender-specific regression of team formation on Part, relative ability and their interaction. Robust standard errors are clustered on participant id. Statistics are for the B and EA treatments combined.





Figure 1: Share of Participants Choosing Team Compensation, by Gender, B Treatment:

Figure 2: Share of Participants Choosing Team Compensation, by Gender, EA Treatment



p-values in both figures are from two-tailed t-tests

Appendix 1: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:

Predictions of the Inequity-Aversion Model in the Baseline Treatment.

In Part 3 of the baseline treatment, i's income if he chooses 'team' is $20 \, \overline{Q}$, where $\overline{Q} = (Q_i + Q_j)/2$. His income if he chooses individual compensation is $Y_i = 20 \, Q_i$. Similarly, j's income is $20 \, \overline{Q}$ if j chooses 'team' and $20 \, Q_i$ otherwise. Thus, in Part 3, each player's income –by design—depends only on his/her own actions. This does not, however, imply that the parties' *utilities* are independent of each others' actions; in fact they are interdependent whenever the players are inequity-averse. Thus, for example, player i's utilities as a function of both i's and j's choices in Part 3 of the Baseline treatment are shown below, for the case where i believes he is abler than j.

Player *i*'s utilities if *i* believes he is abler than *j*: Baseline Treatment, Part 3.

	j	i's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\beta)\bar{Q} + \beta Q_j]$
Individual	$20[\beta\bar{Q} + (1-\beta)Q_i]$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_i]$

Since $Q_i > \overline{Q} > Q_j$ and $0 < \beta < 1$, given these beliefs person i's strictly dominant strategy is to pick individual compensation, whether or not person i is inequity-averse. The intuition is obvious in the absence of inequity-aversion –abler workers sacrifice income if they share team revenue with a less-able worker. Inequity-averse workers should behave the same way as selfish workers in Part 3, because i's choice has no effect on j's income, so i might as well just maximize her own income.

Turning to the case where i believes he is less able than j, player i's utilities are given by :

Player i's utilities if i believes he is less able than j: Baseline Treatment, Part 3.

	j	's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\alpha)\bar{Q}-\alpha Q_j]$
Individual	$20[Q_i - \alpha(\bar{Q} - Q_i)]$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$

Now, i's dominant strategy is to pick team pay, regardless of his level of inequity-aversion. The intuition is that selfish and inequity-related motives now both push i in the same direction: picking 'team' both raises i's absolute pay, and reduces the gap between i's pay and his partner's. This is true regardless of j's decision.

Next, we turn to Part 5 of the Baseline treatment. Here, i's income equals $Y_i = 20 Q_i$ unless both i and j choose team compensation. If both players pick 'team', they each receive an income of $20 \overline{Q}$. So, each player's income now depends on the other's choices. Player i's utilities as a function of i's and j's choices and i's beliefs are now as follows:

Player i's utilities if i believes he is abler than j: Baseline Treatment, Part 5.

		j's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_j]$
Individual	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_i]$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_j]$

Player i's utilities if i believes he is less able than j: Baseline Treatment, Part 5.

	j	's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$
Individual	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$

Now, player i's choices have no effect on either player's incomes (and hence on i's own utility) if j chooses individual compensation. Thus, i again has a dominant strategy: he should pick whichever choice maximizes his utility in the event that j chooses 'team'. If i believes he is less able than j, that choice is always team compensation because, as before, selfish and inequity-related motives work in the same direction. If i believes he is abler than j, basic algebra reveals that i picks individual pay if he is not too inequity-averse (specifically, if β <.5); otherwise i will pick team compensation.

Proof of Proposition 2:

Predictions of the Inequity-Aversion Model in the Efficiency-Advantages Treatment.

Player i's utilities as a function of both i's and j's choices in Part 3 of the EA treatment are shown below. As before, the payoffs are displayed separately for the case where i believes he is abler, and where he is less able, than his partner, j.

Player i's utilities if i believes he is abler than j: EA Treatment, Part 3.

	j	i's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20 hetaar{Q}$	$20[(1-\beta)\theta\bar{Q}+\beta Q_j]$
Individual	$20[\beta\theta\bar{Q} + (1-\beta)Q_i]$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_j]$

Player i's utilities if i believes he is less able than j: EA Treatment, Part 3.

	j	i's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20 heta ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\alpha)\theta\bar{Q}-\alpha Q_j]$
Individual	$20[Q_i - \alpha(\theta \bar{Q} - Q_i)]$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_i]$

where $\theta = 22/20$ measures the relative efficiency of the team production environment.³⁹ Following the same logic as in the B Treatment, *i* will once again always select the team option (for all levels of social preferences) if he believes he is less able than *j* (adding efficiency advantages just strengthens the attractiveness of teams to less-able workers). However, in

³⁹ For simplicity, these tables assume that teaming doesn't reverse income rankings in the following sense: Suppose I'm abler, and I choose individual compensation but my partner picks team. We assume that the team efficiency advantage isn't so great that –in Part 3 where this is possible-- it would raise my partner's income above mine.

contrast to the B treatment, some workers who believe they are abler than their co-workers will now pick the team option, due to the associated efficiency gains. In particular, regardless of j's choice, and regardless of whether i has social preferences, i's dominant strategy is to pick team whenever $\theta \bar{Q} > Q_i$. In terms of player i's relative ability, and for the efficiency advantage implemented in our experiment ($\theta = 1.1$) this can be expressed as:

Choose team iff
$$\frac{Q_i}{Q_j} < \frac{\theta}{2-\theta} = \frac{11}{9}$$
.

In sum, as in Part 3 of the Baseline Treatment, subjects' decisions to choose the team option in Part 3 of the EA Treatment should depend only on their perceived relative ability, Q_i/Q_j , not on their level of inequity aversion. While in the B Treatment the threshold level of relative ability above which subjects should pick the individual pay option was $Q_i/Q_j = 1$, in the EA treatment this threshold rises to $11/9 \approx 1.22$.

Turning to Part 5 of the EA Treatment, we now have:

Player i's utilities if i believes he is abler than j: Baseline Treatment, Part 5.

		i's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20 hetaar{Q}$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_j]$
Individual	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_i]$	$20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_i]$

Player *i*'s utilities if *i* believes he is less able than *j*: Baseline Treatment, Part 5.

		j's choice:
i's choice:	Team	Individual
Team	$20 heta ar{Q}$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$
Individual	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$	$20[(1-\alpha)Q_i - \alpha Q_j]$

Since less-able players again always pick 'team', we focus once again on the choices of abler players. Given that player i's choice has no impact on his utility if j picks individual compensation in Part 5, player i should choose 'team' whenever $20\theta \bar{Q} > 20[(1-\beta)Q_i + \beta Q_j]$. Simplifying implies that i picks team iff $\frac{Q_i}{Q_j} < \frac{\theta - 2\beta}{2(1-\beta)-\theta}$. In our experiment, where $\theta = 1.1$, this simplifies to $\frac{Q_i}{Q_j} < \frac{.55-\beta}{.45-\beta}$. Thus, for example, if i has no social preferences (β =0), the threshold level of relative ability (Q_i/Q_j) above which i avoids teams is the same in Part 5 as in Part 3, at 11/9. As i's inequity aversion rises, so does this threshold, so that for example when $\beta = .35$, only individuals who think they are more than twice as able as their partner should choose individual pay. For levels of β above .45, all players are predicted to choose the team option when teams have a ten percent efficiency advantage ($\theta = 1.1$), regardless of their perceived relative ability.

Appendix 2: Selection on Slopes versus Levels and the Performance of Self-Selected Teams

For Parts 3 and 5 of the experiment, Table A1 shows the mean performance of participants who chose team compensation and those who did not, by gender and treatment.⁴⁰

(Insert Table A1 about here)

In seven of eight cases, team joiners performed worse on average than non-joiners; this gap is statistically significant (at p < .001, .004 and .058) in three of those cases. Further, the joiner-nonjoiner output gap is always larger for men than for women, and significantly so (p=.001 and .028) in two of the four cases. A naïve interpretation of these results might, of course, be that team production causes free riding, and that men are more prone to free riding than women. On the other hand, we have already shown that self-selection affects these comparisons; this is confirmed by Table A2, which shows $Part\ I$ output separately for individuals who chose teams in Parts 3 and 5, and for individuals who did not. Overall, the patterns are very similar to Table A1: team joiners were, on average, less productive than nonjoiners $even\ in\ Part\ I\ of\ the\ experiment$, when everyone was compensated individually. And this joiner-nonjoiner "ability" gap is always greater for men than women, significantly so the same 2 of 4 times as for current-period output (p=.009 and .035). This gap is never statistically significant for women. Thus, confirming our earlier results, not only is there adverse selection into teams, but this selection is more pronounced among men than women.

(Insert Table A2 about here)

Finally, to isolate the effects of selection on levels and selection on slopes, note that the output gap between voluntary team joiners and non-joiners in (say) Part 3 can be expressed as:

$$E(Q^{3} | J^{3}) - E(Q^{3} | NJ^{3}) = E(Q^{I} | J^{3}) - E(Q^{I} | NJ^{3}) + [E(Q^{3} | J^{3}) - E(Q^{I} | J^{3})] - [E(Q^{3} | NJ^{3}) - E(Q^{I} | NJ^{3})]$$
(A1)

where Q^i denotes the individual's performance in Part i, and J^i and NJ^i respectively denote whether the participant joined or did not join a team in Part i.

The first term on the RHS of (A1) gives the pure selection component of the performance gap between joiners and non-joiners in Part 3; it is simply the difference in Part 1 output between the participants who chose team in Part 3 and those who did not. These numbers are already shown in Table A1, which are predominantly negative, showing adverse selection into teams. The remaining two terms in (A1) are the *output change* between Parts 1 and 3 for Part-3 joiners, minus the output change for Part-3 non-joiners. Only the first of these changes (for joiners) is affected by a change of the production environment from an individual to a team situation, while both are affected by any task learning or pure period effects that distinguish Parts 1 and 3. Therefore, if these part and task-learning effects are the same for persons who eventually join teams and those who do not --this is our identifying assumption--, then the last two terms in (A1) estimate the pure TOT effect of the team environment.

(Insert Table A3 about here)

⁴⁰ Recall that, in Part 5, choosing team compensation does not necessarily result in being paid on a team basis. When we repeat the analysis only for participants who successfully formed teams (because their partner also chose team compensation), they are very similar, though with a smaller sample size.

Table A3 decomposes the team-non-team output gaps identified in Table A1 using equation (A1). While the magnitudes of TOT and selection effects vary substantially across treatments and parts of the experiment, Table A3 shows clearly that selection plays the dominant role in explaining the gaps observed in Table A1: in five of the eight possible cases, selection accounts for more than 100 percent of the team-non-team output gaps; in seven of eight cases it accounts for more than half of the output gap. Also noteworthy is the fact that, in four of the eight cases (two involving men and two involving women), the TOT causal effect of team production is *positive*, not negative. This provides further support for our finding that moral hazard is essentially absent in this two-person team environment.

Table A1: Mean Performance of Participants, by Choice of Team Pay and Treatment

		PART 3]	PART 5	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Non- joiners	Joiners	Gap (2) – (1)	<i>p</i> -value for gap	Non- Joiners	Joiners	Gap (6) – (5)	<i>p</i> -value for gap
A. Baseline Treatment								
Women	59.32	56.90	-2.42	.203	60.48	58.38	-2.10	.119
Men	58.18	47.33	-10.85	.004	60.00	49.50	-10.50	.000
p-value for gender gap	.385	.020	.001		.704	.003	.028	
B. Efficiency Advantage	Treatment							
Women	57.70	56.43	-1.27	.418	57.40	57.70	0.30	.865
Men	58.80	54.80	-4.00	.058	58.36	56.52	-1.84	.372
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.536	.380	.272		.724	.379	.438	

Note: In Part 3, joining denotes the participant's decision to be paid via team compensation; in Part 5 this only results in team compensation being paid if the co-participant also chose team compensation; however performance levels are very similar for the (smaller) sample who actually formed teams. All *p*-values are from 2-sided *t*-tests for differences between means, except those for the gender gap in joiner-nonjoiner difference. These come from a Chisquared test that accounts for the fact that the underlying joiner-nonjoiner difference is itself a difference in sample means.

Table A2: Mean Part 1 Performance of Participants, by Choice of Team Pay in Parts 3 and 5

	PART 3			PART 5				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Non- joiners	Joiners	Gap (2) – (1)	<i>p</i> -value for gap	Non- Joiners	Joiners	Gap (6) – (5)	<i>p</i> -value for gap
A. Baseline Treatment					_			
Women	57.15	56.20	95	.624	57.83	55.56	-2.26	.218
Men	55.49	46.33	-9.15	.011	56.30	45.75	-10.55	.001
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.212	.011	.009		.311	.004	.035	
B. Efficiency Advantage	Treatment							
Women	56.05	53.87	-2.18	.214	53.90	55.18	1.28	.539
Men	57.05	54.24	-2.81	.110	57.64	54.52	-3.13	.097
<i>p</i> -value for gender gap	.527	.838	.789		.200	.615	.146	

Note: See Table A1.

Table A3: Decomposition of Performance Gap between Joiners and Non-Joiners, Parts 3 and 5.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Part 3		Par	rt 5	
	Gap due to	Gap due to	Total	Gap due to	Gap due to	Total
	selection	behavioral change	gap	selection	behavioral change	gap
A. Baseline	Treatment					
Women	95	-1.48	-2.42	-2.26	.16	-2.10
%	39.08	60.92	100.00	107.62	-7.62	100.00
Men	-9.15	-1.69	-10.85	-1.55	.05	-1.50
%	84.40	15.60	100.00	100.51	51	100.00
B. Efficienc	y Advantage Tr	eatment				
Women	-2.18	.92	-1.27	1.28	98	.30
%	172.34	-72.34	100.00	431.64	-331.64	100.00
Men	-2.81	-1.19	-4.00	-3.13	1.29	-1.84
%	70.25	29.75	100.00	169.84	-69.84	100.00

For Online Publication:

Online Appendix 1. Instructions for the B treatment


(Original in French. The instructions for the EA treatment are similar except that the team payment is 22 Euro-cents instead of 20)

You are about to participate in an experimental session on decision-making. During this session, you can earn money. In addition, you will receive €3 for showing up on time. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash privately at the end of the session.

The session consists of several parts. You have received the instructions for the preliminary part. The instructions for the next parts will be distributed after you have completed the preliminary part.

Preliminary part

Your computer screen will display ten decisions, as indicated in the table below.



Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" (on the left) and "Option B" (on the right). You will make ten choices between option A and option B, but only one of them will be used in the end of the session to determine your earnings for this part. You will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. Before you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part.

Look at Decision 1. Option A pays 2 €with 1 chance out of 10, and it pays 1.6 €with 9 chances out of 1. Option B yields 3.85 €with 1 chance out of 10, and it pays .1 € with 9 chances out of 1. The other

decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of a higher payoff for each option increase. For example, look at Decision 2. Option A pays $2 \in \text{with } 2$ chances out of 10, and it pays $1.6 \in \text{with } 8$ chances out of 1. Option B yields $3.85 \in \text{with } 2$ chances out of 10, and it pays $1.6 \in \text{with } 8$ chances out of 1. In fact, for Decision 10, each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2 \in \text{and } 3.85 \in \text{with } 3.85$

Once you have made your ten decisions, you must validate them by pressing the « validate » button.

At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of the ten decisions. For this decision, a second random draw will determine your earnings for the option you have chosen. Earnings in Euros for this choice will be added to your other earnings.

Please read these instructions again and raise your hand if you have any question. We shall answer to your questions in private. It is strictly forbidden to talk with the other participants during the session.

Instructions (contd) (Instructions distributed after completion of the preliminary part)

The remaining of the session consists of six parts. In most of these parts, you will be asked to complete a task. The method we use to determine your earnings varies across parts, as explained in detail at the beginning of each part.

At the end of the session, once you have completed these parts, we will randomly draw one part out of six for determining your payment. Each part has the same chance to be selected. Your payment in this part will be added to your payment from the preliminary part and your show-up fee.

In this experiment, participants are located in two adjacent rooms. At the beginning of the first part, each participant in each room will be paired with one participant located in the other room. You will only be told the first name of this participant and this participant will learn your first name. You will remain matched with the same co-participant throughout the rest of the session.

In order to protect your privacy and that of your co-participant, at the end of the session participants in the two rooms will be dismissed at different times.

Part 1

At the beginning of this part, you enter your first name in the computer and you will be informed on the first name of your co-participant who is located an the other room.

The task consists of converting letters into numbers during 4 minutes. Your screen displays a table with two columns. The first column indicates letters and the second column indicates their correspondence in numbers. You are given a letter and you must enter the corresponding number in the box on your screen. You must validate your answer by pressing the 'Execute' button. Once you have validated your answer, you are immediately informed whether your answer is correct or not.

As soon as you have validated an answer, whether it is correct or not, the conversion table of letters and numbers is modified and a new letter to convert is displayed on your screen. You can convert as many letters as you like during the four-minute period of time.

During these four minutes, and in all future time periods allocated to the task in this experiment, you are allowed to read a book or a magazine that you have brought with you or to surf on the Internet. To access the Internet, you can press the "Internet" button located at the top left of your screen; you can come back to the task whenever you like, by pressing the "task" button located at the same place.

If part 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, you will get 20 Euro-cents per problem you solve correctly in these 4 minutes. Your payment does not decrease if you provide an incorrect answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as *the individual payment scheme*.

• Before we start, you are given a chance to practice this task during three minutes to familiarize yourself with the task. The number of problems solved during this practice period will not affect your

earnings.

- Then you can convert letters into numbers during 4 minutes.
- As in all parts of the experiment, you will be informed on the number of problems you have personally solved correctly (your "score") at the end of this part. You will not learn your co-participant's score in this or in any other part until the very end of the session: At that time, regardless of which part is selected for payment, you will be informed of your co-participant's score in that part.

Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Part 2 (*Instructions distributed after completion of Part 1*)

You remain matched with the same co-participant. As in Part 1 you will be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers. As before, you are allowed to read a book or to surf on the Internet.

But for this task your payment depends on your performance and on the performance of your coparticipant.

If Part 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then both you and your co-participant's earnings are determined as follows:

Your earnings = Co-participant's earnings = $\underline{\le 20 * (Work Team \text{ output})}$

where Work Team output is the total number of problems correctly solved by you **plus** the number correctly solved by your co-participant. Thus, the **work team** is paid 20 Euro-cents for every question solved by its members, together. This amount is then divided equally between the two work team members. We refer to this payment scheme as the *team payment*.

To understand how the team payment scheme differs from the individual payment scheme, please read the following examples:

Suppose, for example, that you and your co-participant each solve 40 problems. Then in the team payment scheme each of you will be paid (.20*80)/2 = 8, which is the same as you would receive in the individual payment scheme.

If, on the other hand, you solve 50 problems and your co-participant solves 30, you would till be paid (.20*80)/2 = 8 under team payment, but you (personally) would have received .20*50 = 10 under the individual payment scheme.

Likewise, if you were to solve 30 problems but your co-participant 50, you would both still be paid (.20*80)/2 = 6 under team payment, compared to the .20*30 = 6 you (personally) would receive under the individual payment scheme.

As before, at the end of this part, you will only be informed on the total number of problems that you have personally solved. If this part is selected for payment you will learn your co-participant's number of problems solved after all six parts have been completed.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Before we begin the work period, please answer the following **comprehension questions.**

Comprehension questionnaire

- **1.** If you solved 50 problems, how much would you be paid in the individual payment scheme we used in Part 1?
- **2.** If you solved 60 problems, how much would you be paid in the individual payment scheme we used in Part 1?

- **3.** If you solved 40 problems, how much would you be paid in the individual payment scheme we used in Part 1?
- 4. If you and your co-participant each solve 50 problems, how much will you be paid in the team payment scheme used in this part?
- **5.** If you solve 60 problems and your co-participant solves 40, how much will you be paid in the team payment scheme used in this part?
- **6.** If you solve 40 problems and your co-participant solves 60, how much will you be paid in the team payment scheme used in this part?

Part 3 (*Instructions distributed after completion of Part 2*)

As in the previous two parts you will be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers.

But now, before starting the task, you will get to choose which of the two previous payment schemes you prefer to apply to your performance.

If Part 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings are determined as follows.

- If you choose the *individual payment scheme*, you receive 20 Euro-cents per problem you personally solve correctly in this part.
- If you choose the *team payment scheme*, we will use your co-participant's output in the *previous* part (Part 2) to determine your work team's output. (We do this because your co-participant might not choose team payment this part). In other words, your work team's output in this part equals your own output in this part plus your co-participant's output in Part 2. As before, the team is paid 20 Euro-cents for every unit of team output. This amount is then divided equally between the two team members, so your earnings are again given by:

Your earnings =
$$\underline{\le 20 * (Work Team output)}$$
.

As before, at the end of this part you will only be informed on the total number of problems that you have personally solved. If this part is selected for payment, you will learn your co-participant's number of problems solved after all six parts have been completed. You will learn your co-participant's score in this part regardless of whether you choose team or individual compensation.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Part 4 (*Instructions distributed after completion of Part 3*)

You do not have to convert any letters into numbers for the fourth part of the experiment. Instead, if Part 4 is the one selected for payment, you will be paid one more time **for the number of problems you (and possibly your co-participant) solved in Part 1.** Recall that, in Part 1, both you and your co-participant were paid according to the **individual payment scheme.**

But you now have to choose which payment scheme you want applied to the number of problems that were solved correctly in Part 1. You can either choose to be paid according to the individual payment scheme, or according to the team payment scheme.

If the Part 4 is the one selected for payment, then your earnings are determined as follows.

- If you choose the individual payment scheme, you receive 20 Euro-cents per problem you solve correctly in Part 1.
- If you choose the team payment scheme, your team's performance will equal your performance in Part 1 **plus** your co-participant's performance in Part 1. As before, the team is paid 20 Euro-cents times team output, which is then divided equally between you and your co-participant.

The next computer screen will remind you how many problems you personally solved correctly in Part 1,

and will ask you to choose whether you want the individual payment scheme or the team payment scheme applied to your performance. As always, you will not learn the number of problems correctly solved by your co-participant until all parts of this experiment are completed; this holds whatever your choice in this part.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Interim Questions (Instructions distributed after completion of Part 4)

We would now like to ask you some questions about the number of problems you estimate that your coparticipant solved in the experiment so far. Thinking back to Parts 1 and 2, how many problems do you think your co-participant solved correctly?

You earn .50 Euro more for each correct prediction in questions 1 and 3 (plus or minus 1 problem solved).

- **1.** Number of problems you estimate your co-participant solved in Part 1 (Recall that in Part 1, each person worked on their own, and was paid 20 Euro-cents per problem solved):
- **2.** To determine how confident you are you of your estimate in Question 1, please select a number from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates you believe your estimate is extremely accurate, and 1 indicates you really have no idea of what your co-participant produced.
- **3.** Number of problems you estimate your co-participant solved in Part 2 (Recall that in Part 2, each person worked on a team with their co-participant; each team was paid 20 cents per problem solved, which was shared equally between the co-participants).
- **4.** To determine how confident you are of your estimate in Question 3, please select a number from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates you believe your estimate is extremely accurate, and 1 indicates you really have no idea of what your co-participant produced.

Part 5 (*Instructions distributed after completion of the interim questionnaire*)

You will again be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers.

Before this, you will again have to choose which of the two possible payment schemes will be applied to your performance in this part. Next, we will tell you which payment scheme your co-participant selected. The team payment is used only if **both you and your co-participant** choose it.

If Part 5 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings are determined as follows.

- If you choose the individual payment scheme, you receive 20 Euro-cents per problem you personally solve correctly in this part.
- If you AND your co-participant both choose the team payment scheme, your team's performance will equal your performance in this part plus your co-participant's performance in this part. As always, the team is paid 20 Euro-cents times team output, which is then divided equally between you and your co-participant.
- If one of you chooses the individual payment scheme and the other one chooses the team payment scheme, both you and your co-participant are paid the individual payment scheme. Therefore, you receive 20 Euro-cents per problem you personally solve correctly in this part.

The next computer screen will ask you to choose between the individual payment scheme or the team payment scheme. Then, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant. Last, you will then be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers. As always, reading books or magazines or surfing on the Internet is allowed during this time.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Part 6 (Instructions distributed after completion of Part 5)

You will again be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers. Everything is exactly the same as in Part 5, except that persons who form teams will have an opportunity to communicate with each other before starting the task.

As before, you will begin by choosing which of the two possible payment schemes you prefer to apply to your performance in this part. Next, we will tell you which payment scheme your co-participant selected. The team payment is used only if **both you and your co-participant** choose it.

If both you AND your co-participant have chosen the team payment, you are given two minutes to exchange instant messages with your co-participant, before performing the task. A box will appear on your screen in which you can type your messages. The messages must not include information that could identify you or your co-participant; they must not be threatening; and they must use an appropriate language.

Note that this box will also appear on your screen even if you and your co-participant do not form a team, i.e. even if one or both of you selected the individual payment scheme. In this case, you may type any message you want, but your messages will not be transmitted to your co-participant.

If Part 6 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings are determined as in Part 5.

- The next computer screen will ask you to choose whether you want individual payment scheme or the team payment scheme applied to your performance.
- Then, whatever your choice, you will be informed of the choice of your co-participant.
- When applicable, you have two minutes to exchange instant messages with your co-participant.
- Last, you will be given 4 minutes to convert letters into numbers. Reading books or magazines or surfing on the Internet is allowed during this time.

After this part has been completed, you will have to answer a few last questions and your screen will give you a feedback on your payments in the preliminary part and in the part between 1 and 6 that has been drawn randomly. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Exit questionnaire (Displayed on the computer screen at the very end of the session before feedback on payoffs. Starting with the EA treatments, the same questionnaire was displayed regarding choices in Part 5, except that we added an item, mentioned in italics in the following list))

In Part 1, you were paid under an individual payment scheme; in Part 2, you were paid under a team payment scheme. At the beginning of Part 3, you chose between being paid under an individual or a team payment scheme. Could you explain why you chose/avoided the team payment scheme at that time?

I chose **not to work on a team** because (choose all that apply):

- -I was concerned that my partner might not be very good at this task.
- -I was concerned that my partner might not like to work very hard at this task.
- -I was concerned that being on a team would give my partner a chance to be paid without working very hard
- -I thought that working on my own would motivate me more
- -I prefer to work on my own rather than working on a team
- -I did not want to 'compete' with my co-participant to know which would have the best performance
- I did not want to be embarrassed if I chose team compensation but may partner did not
- -Other (please describe)

I chose to work on a team because (choose all that apply):

- -I thought my partner might be quite good at this task
- -I thought my partner might like to work quite hard at this task
- -Being on a team gives me an opportunity to be paid even if I don't work very hard
- -I thought that being on a team might motivate me more
- -I thought that being on a team might motivate my partner more
- -I prefer to be part of a team rather than just working on my own
- -I thought it would be fun to 'compete' with my co-participant for the best performance
- -I did not want to disappoint my partner in case he/she wanted to form a team
- -Other (please describe)

Online Appendix 2. Supplementary Tables

Table O-1: Task Performance and Beliefs by Partner's Gender, B and EA Treatments Combined

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Part 1: Individual Compensation	Part 2: Team Compensation	p-value for difference betweenParts 1 and 2	Sample Size
A. Own, Actual Performance				
Women, female partner	56.21	57.32	.041	38
Women, male partner	55.69	56.59	.109	49
<i>p</i> -value for partner gender effect	.669	.523		
Men, female partner	55.27	56.49	.041	49
Men, male partner	55.05	54.50	.560	38
<i>p</i> -value for partner gender effect	.870	.189		
B. Beliefs re Partner's Performance				
Women, female partner	53.63	54.92	.005	38
Women, male partner	55.20	56.45	.046	49
<i>p</i> -value for partner gender effect	.187	.231		
Men, female partner	50.63	51.71	.012	49
Men, male partner	51.21	53.39	.000	38
<i>p</i> -value for partner gender effect	.558	.149		

Table O-2: Regressions for the Probability of Choosing Team Pay, Parts 4 and 6

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.0819	0.1151	0.1086	0.0057
	(0.0704)	(0.0658)	(0.0664)	(0.0681)
Own Part 1 output	0.1750**	0.1775**	0.1780**	0.1787**
	(0.0495)	(0.0490)	(0.0487)	(0.0488)
Holt-Laury switch point	0.2410**	0.2407**	0.2396**	0.2427**
	(0.0541)	(0.0542)	(0.0544)	(0.0546)
Multiple switches	0.4203**	0.4285**	0.4213**	0.3974**
	(0.0788)	(0.0741)	(0.0749)	(0.0757)
Beliefs re partner's Part 1 output	0.4137**	0.3802**	0.3815**	0.3861**
	(0.0801)	(0.0814)	(0.0811)	(0.0740)
Part6 * Male		-0.0165**	-0.0160**	-0.0291**
		(0.0050)	(0.0050)	(0.0057)
Part6 * Female			-0.0232	-0.0219
			(0.0210)	(0.0195)
EA * Male			-0.0129	-0.0341
			(0.1370)	(0.1323)
EA * Female				0.0270**
				(0.0060)
R-squared	0.238	0.275	0.278	0.330
p-values for:				
Part6 * Male = Part6 * Female	.370	.389	.400	.384
EA * Male = EA * Female	.953	.660	.717	.914

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors, clustered on participants, in parentheses. N=338 in all columns.

Table O-3: Effects of Team Gender Mix on the Probability of Choosing Team Pay, without covariates

-				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Part 3	Part 4	Part 5	Part 6
A. Baseline Treatment				
MF	1071	.0357	0867	0500
	(.1165)	(.1100)	(.1485)	(.1628)
FM	.0714	.1429	.2733*	.1500
	(.1165)	(.1100)	(.1485)	(.1628)
FF	.1071	0089	.1905	.1071
	(.1303)	(.1230)	(.1664)	(.1823)
R-squared	.058	.035	.126	.036
B. EA Treatment				
MF	0595	.1071	.1369	.0476
	(.1519)	(.1516)	(.1348)	(.1296)
FM	0119	.1071	.1369	.2381*
	(.1519)	(.1516)	(.1348)	(.1296)
FF	0833	.1742	.1477	.0606
	(.1501)	(.1498)	(.1332)	(.1280)
R-squared	.005	.016	.020	.043

Note: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. Table shows OLS regression coefficients of team choice on indicators for the gender mix of the prospective team, without covariates. "MF" denotes a male participant with a female partner; MM is the omitted category. Standard errors are in parentheses. N=86 in columns (1) and (2), and 76 in columns (3) and (4).

Table O-4: Effects of Gender Mix on the the Probability of Choosing Team Pay, Regression Estimates for Parts 3 and 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MF	0212	0181	0173	.0035
	(.0821)	(.0774)	(.0763)	(.0777)
FM	.1631	.1909	.1717	.0463
	(.1004)	(.0968)	(.0966)	(.0940)
FF	.1378	.1781	.1802	.1135
	(.1153)	(.1095)	(.1087)	(.1110)
Own Part 1 output		0151**	0143**	0294**
		(.0051)	(.0050)	(.0053)
Holt-Laury switch point			0366	0374
			(.0206)	(.0191)
Multiple switches			.1409	.1151
			(.1215)	(.1171)
Beliefs re partner's Part 1 output				.0309**
				(.0063)
Part5 * Male	.0883	.0906*	.0949*	.0957*
	(.0454)	(.0453)	(.0448)	(.0450)
Part5 * Female	.2082**	.2080**	.2058**	.2094**
	(.0545)	(.0545)	(.0546)	(.0544)
EA * Male	.5265**	.5346**	.5166**	.4929**
	(.0779)	(.0722)	(.0724)	(.0739)
EA * Female	.3354**	.3030**	.2983**	.2945**
	(.0883)	(.0898)	(.0882)	(.0793)
R-squared	.242	.272	.288	.352

Note: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors, clustered on participants, in parentheses. *N*=338 in all columns. "MF" denotes a male participant with a female partner; MM is the omitted category.