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# EXPORTING AND PLANT-LEVEL EFFICIENCY GAINS: IT'S IN THE MEASURE

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# ABSTRACT

Gains from trade due to exporting can result from the reallocation of resources to more productive producers, or from efficiency increases within exporting firms over time. While there is strong evidence for the former, the latter has received little support in the data. Previous research has documented minuscule or no efficiency gains within exporting plants. This result is derived from revenue productivity measures and thus also reflects variation in prices. Using a census panel of Chilean manufacturing plants, we first show that, in line with the previous results, there is no evidence for within-plant increases in revenue productivity after export entry. We then derive product-plant level marginal cost and use it as an efficiency measure that is not affected by prices. We find that marginal costs drop substantially when plants begin to export – on average by 15-25%. Prices drop by the same order of magnitude (while volume grows). Since new exports initially charge lower prices, revenue productivity measures fail to identify these within-plant efficiency gains from exporting.

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An online appendix is available at: http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w19033

# **1** Introduction

While exporting plants are on average significantly more productive than their non-exporting counterparts, empirical studies typically find that new exporters do not increase their productivity over time. This suggests that selection of the most productive plants into exporting, rather than efficiency gains within plants, is responsible for aggregate productivity gains from trade competition. The selection effect across plants has received strong theoretical and empirical support (c.f. Melitz, 2003; Pavcnik, 2002; Bloom, Draca, and van Reenen, 2012). On the other hand, within-plant productivity gains after export entry are typically found to be small and insignificant (c.f. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Wagner, 2012).<sup>1</sup> This non-result is surprising, given that exporters can learn from international buyers and have access to larger markets to reap the benefits of innovation or investments in productive technology.

In this paper, we show that the missing evidence on within-plant efficiency gains after export entry is an artefact of the measure: previous studies have typically used revenue-based productivity, which is affected by changes in prices. If gains in physical productivity are passed on to buyers in the form of lower prices, then revenue-based productivity will be downward biased. Addressing this caveat by measuring physical productivity is difficult. For example, changes in product quality make physical units of output incomparable – even within products from given plants. Thus, meaningful results can only be derived for physically homogenous products (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008) – a small subset of all exported goods. To bypass this issue, we first apply the method pioneered by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to derive plant-product level markups in a rich panel of Chilean establishments. Second, because our dataset comprises physical units as well as revenues for each product-plant pair, we can calculate product prices (unit values). Dividing these by the corresponding markups allows us to identify marginal costs. This procedure is flexible with respect to the underlying price setting model and the functional form of the production function (e.g., allowing for different degrees of returns to scale).<sup>2</sup> In standard production functions, marginal costs are directly (inversely) related to physical productivity, and are thus a good candidate for analyzing within-plant efficiency gains after export entry.

We find that gains from exporting are substantial: marginal costs within plant-product categories drop by approximately 15-25% during the first three years after export entry. At the same time, in line with previous findings, *revenue* productivity does not change within exporting plants. This is due to prices falling by a similar magnitude as marginal costs – new exporters pass physical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The exception are two articles in specific empirical settings – De Loecker (2007) for Slovenia and Van Biesebroeck (2005) for sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2012) use the same methodology to analyze how trade liberalization in India affected prices, markups, and marginal costs.

productivity gains on to their customers.<sup>3</sup> Our results are also very similar when using propensity score matching to construct a control group of plant-products that had an a-priory comparable likelihood of entering the export market, but continued to be sold domestically only. In addition, we show that we obtain quantitatively similar results when using reported (average) cost measures at the plant level. This suggests that our findings are not an artefact of the methodology used to calculate marginal costs. Finally, restricting the sample to single-product plants confirms our results, and a placebo test shows no efficiency gains for non-exported products in multi-product plants that begin to export another good.

To guide the discussion of possible drivers behind our results, we provide a stylized framework that combines the flexible supply-demand structure from Foster et al. (2008) with heterogeneous returns to technology investment as in Lileeva and Trefler (2010). We discuss four main channels that may drive export entry: (i) shocks to foreign demand, (ii) productivity shocks, (iii) learning by exporting, and (iv) investment opportunities in new technologies that become profitable in combination with access to larger markets. Since we find *falling* prices associated with export entry, demand shocks (i) are an unlikely driver. On the other hand, the supply-side mechanisms (ii)-(iv) are all broadly compatible with our empirical observations. However, they imply different causal effects. Productivity shocks as in (ii) mean a selection effect – firms enter the export market as a consequence of higher productivity, as in Melitz (2003), and causality runs from productivity to export entry. The opposite is true in case (iii), where plants enter the export market because they anticipate learning effects. Finally, case (iv) reflects a complementarity between efficiency gains driven by a fixed investment cost and export entry – the fixed cost can only be recovered in a large-enough market.<sup>4</sup>

We provide some suggestive evidence that learning-by-exporting and the complementarity effects are the most likely drivers of our results. To address selection into exporting after a productivity shock (channel ii), we follow the matching approach by De Loecker (2007), which controls for pre-exporting differences in productivity levels and trends, as well as other characteristics. The fact that our results are robust to this methodology suggests that they are probably not driven by productivity shocks *before* export entry. This leaves (iii) and (iv) as more probable mechanisms. Export entry goes hand-in-hand with a decline in marginal costs in the entry period. This suggests

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>In other words, for an average plant-product, markups do not change significantly after export entry. Over the medium run, we find some evidence that old exporters charge higher markups than young ones, in line with De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) who document increasing markups for Slovenian export entrants. However, our data suggest that this effect is limited, making it unlikely that the efficiency gains observed in marginal costs will be fully reflected in revenue productivity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Strictly speaking, mechanism (iv) is not causal, because the investment in new technology would have raised productivity regardless of export status. However, since the investment is not profitable in the domestic market alone, export entry and productivity increases are closely associated.

that investment complementarity (iv) is important, which is also supported by the observation that marginal costs drop particularly steeply for plants that are initially less productive. As pointed out by Lileeva and Trefler (2010) for the case of investment-exporting complementarity, plants that start off from lower productivity levels will only begin exporting if the associated productivity gains are large. In addition, the observation that marginal costs keep falling in the years *after* entry is in line with learning-by-exporting (iii).

Our analysis is subject to two important caveats. First, we do not establish causality. While our matching estimation takes a step in this direction, we cannot rely on exogenous variation. Second, we cannot completely disentangle the three supply mechanisms (ii)-(iv). For example, if productivity shocks (ii) occur suddenly (i.e., are not preceded by pre-trends), and if export entry occurs immediately (in the same period as the shock), then we cannot differentiate between (ii) and (iv). Similarly, if learning-by-exporting lowers marginal costs immediately when export entry occurs, then we cannot differentiate between (iii) and (iv). Nevertheless, our main result does not hinge on causality or which exact mechanism is at play: we document substantial within-plant efficiency gains associated with export entry, and these gains have previously not been identified because the literature has used downward-biased revenue-based productivity measures.

We observe that new exporters pass on most efficiency gains to customers in the form of lower prices, which is accompanied by a strong increase in volume (see Figure 1). This is broadly in line with models that deliver constant markups.<sup>5</sup> In a subset of our data with more detailed information, we separately analyze the domestic and exported price of the same product for young exporters (maximum 3 years of exporting). We find that both drop significantly after export entry – domestically by 20%, and when exported by 23%. The somewhat larger drop in the latter may be explained by exporters charging low prices to attract buyers, as implied by the model of Fishman and Rob (2003).<sup>6</sup> Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2012) provide evidence that supports such models of 'demand capital' building. They show that by selling more today, firms shift out their future demand. This reflects the expansion of buyer-supplier relationships, for example via customer learning.

#### [Insert Figure 1 here]

Finally, we gauge the magnitude of the observed within-plant efficiency gains after export entry, comparing them to the well-documented exporter revenue-productivity premium in the cross-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>While our results imply (almost) complete pass-through of efficiency gains to customers in the form of lower prices, De Loecker et al. (2012) find incomplete pass-through in Indian firms after *import*-driven declines in marginal costs. These estimates are derived for *existing* products, with an established customer base.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>When consumers have different search costs, Fishman and Rob's (2003) model implies that low-cost firms charge low prices in order to attract more flexible (low search cost) customers who currently buy from high-price firms.

section. This premium is 17% in our sample, which is very similar to the exporter premium reported for other countries (c.f. Bernard and Jensen, 1999). When focusing exclusively on young exporters (three years or less after entry), we find a comparable revenue-productivity export premium. This suggests selection into exporting based on revenue productivity in the spirit of Melitz (2003). However, revenue productivity does not *change* after export entry. Therefore, the drop in marginal costs that we identify in the data reflects efficiency gains *in addition* to the typically documented selection effect.<sup>7</sup> Our results suggest that these within-plant gains are of the same magnitude as the between-plant differences.<sup>8</sup>

Our findings relate to a substantial literature on gains from trade in general, and on within-plant productivity increases due to export entry, more specifically. Olley and Pakes (1996) paved the road for consistent plant-level production function estimates, accounting for the relationship between unobserved productivity and plant shutdown, as well as the simultaneity of productivity and input choice. The subsequent research revealed substantial heterogeneity of productivity across plants within industries. Trade-induced competition can contribute to the reallocation of resources from less to more efficient producers. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003) introduce this reallocation mechanism in trade theory, based on firm-level heterogeneity. The empirical evidence on this mechanism is vast, and summarizing it would go beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>9</sup> Wagner (2007, 2012) provides comprehensive reviews.

In contrast, another prominently discussed channel has received astonishingly little empirical support: on balance, exporting does not appear to have important effects on productivity *within* firms or plants. Such gains can be expected because exporters face tougher competition, have stronger incentives to innovate since they serve a larger market, and because they have access to expertise from international buyers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Clerides et al. (1998, for Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco) and Bernard and Jensen (1999, using U.S. data) were the first to analyze the impact of exporting on plant efficiency. Both document no (or quantitatively weak) empirical support for this effect, while reporting strong evidence for selection of productive firms into exporting. The same is true for numerous papers that followed: Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) for Taiwan and Korea, Alvarez and López (2005) for Chile, and Luong (2013) for Chinese

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>As we discussed above, selection based on *physical* productivity may be responsible in part for our marginalcost based results. However, even if this is quantitatively important, it will not be captured by the standard revenue productivity measures, and our results still reflect additional gains.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>If new exporters raise their markups over time, the marginal-cost based efficiency gains will also be reflected in revenue productivity. We show that this effect is probably limited and use this observation to gauge overall magnitudes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Two influential early papers are Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Pavcnik (2002), who analyze U.S. and Chilean plants, respectively. More recently, Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2013) have used Colombian data to show that a quantity-based TFP measure yields larger aggregate efficiency gains from reallocation than the usual revenue-based productivity measures.

automobile producers.<sup>10</sup> The survey article by ISGEP (2008) compiles micro level panels from 14 countries and finds nearly no evidence for within-plant productivity increases after entry into the export market. The exception are the papers by Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker (2007), which document evidence for learning-by-exporting. Both derive their results in potentially unrepresentative environments: Sub-Saharan Africa and Slovenia during its transition from communism to a market economy.<sup>11</sup>

The general paucity of evidence for productivity growth after export entry is in stark contrast to what case studies typically suggest. Rhee, Ross-Larson, and Pursell (1984) surveyed 112 Korean exporters, out of which 40% reported to have learned from buyers in the form of personal interactions, knowledge transfer, or product specifications and quality control. The importance of knowledge transfer from foreign buyers to exporters is also highlighted by the World Bank (1993) and Evenson and Westphal (1995). López (2005) summarizes further case study evidence that points to learning-by-exporting via foreign assistance on product design, factory layout, assembly machinery, etc. Finally, in a more systematic fashion, Bustos (2011) shows that rising export revenues – driven by exogenous changes in tariffs – foster firms' investment in new technology.<sup>12</sup>

In sum, there is a striking discrepancy between case studies documenting strong micro-level evidence for export-driven productivity growth within firms or plants, and econometric studies failing to detect it. Our first contribution is to suggest a solution to this puzzle – revenue-based productivity measures fail to detect export-driven within-plant productivity gains if these are passed on to buyers in the form of lower prices. To bypass this issue, we derive product-plant-specific marginal costs under a general set of conditions following De Loecker et al. (2012) and use it as an indicator for efficiency gains. This measure implies substantial gains after export entry in a panel of Chilean plants. At the same time, our data confirm the usual non-result when using a standard revenue productivity measure. Thus, a second contribution of this paper is to point to substantial export-related efficiency gains within firms that have thus far passed under the radar. Our third contribution is to shed light on possible drivers of the observed efficiency gains. The evidence points towards a complementarity between export entry and investment in technology. Learning

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Alvarez and López (2005) use an earlier version of our Chilean plant panel. They conclude that "Permanent exporters are more productive than non-exporters, but this is attributable to initial productivity differences, not to productivity gains associated to exporting." [p.1395] We confirm this finding when using revenue-productivity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>In Van Biesebroeck's findings, exporting lifts credit constraints and thus allows sub-Saharan African firms to grow and profit from scale economies. Syverson (2011) points out that these results may reflect heterogenous treatment effects, with firms that gain most from scale economies sorting into exporting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Amiti and Konings (2007) show that access to intermediate inputs (as a result of import tariff reductions) has stronger effects on productivity than enhanced competition due to lower final good tariffs. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) provide evidence from Indian data that access to new input varieties is an important driver in the productivity gains associated with imported inputs.

by exporting probably also plays a role. Finally, we show that export entry does not affect markups in the context of our Chilean plant data; at least in the short run there is complete pass-through of efficiency gains to customers. This qualifies the findings of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) who document increasing markups for Slovenian export entrants.<sup>13</sup>

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical framework to identify product-plant specific revenue productivity and marginal costs. Section 3 describes our dataset, and Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 discusses possible mechanisms that may drive the observed efficiency gains. Section 6 concludes.

# **2** Empirical Framework

In this section, we explain the calculation of our productivity measures. Our first measure of efficiency is plant-level *revenue-based* total factor productivity (TFPR) – the standard efficiency measure in the literature that analyzes productivity gains from exporting. We discuss why this measure may fail to detect such gains, and show how we calculate TFPR at the plant level. Our second measure of efficiency is the marginal cost of production, which can be derived at the plant-product-level under a set of non-restrictive assumptions.<sup>14</sup> Marginal cost is directly (negatively) related to physical productivity in most production functions; we thus use it as a proxy for quantity-productivity. Finally, as a consistency check, we also use reported expenditure data to calculate average costs at the plant-product level.

#### 2.1 Revenue vs. Physical Total Factor Productivity

Revenue-based total factor productivity (TFPR) is the most widely used measure of efficiency. It is calculated as the residual between total revenues and the estimated contribution of production factors (labor, capital, and material inputs).<sup>15</sup> This measure has an important shortcoming: it combines physical (or quantity-) productivity (TFPQ) with prices (P):  $\ln(\text{TFPR}) = \ln(\text{P}) + \ln(\text{TFPQ})$ . If prices are unrelated to productivity, using TFPR as a proxy for TFPQ merely introduces noise,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>However, our data confirm De Loecker and Warzynski's cross-sectional finding that established exporters charge higher markups. In addition, we find that in the medium run, markups rise: old exporters charge slightly higher markups than their young counterparts. This difference in markups between new and old exporters is in line with our explanation that initially, export entrants seek to attract customers by charging low prices. Once the 'demand stock' has grown, exporters may begin to raise markups, as argued by Foster et al. (2012) for new firms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Note that TFPR is computed at the plant level, while marginal costs are calculated at the plant-product level. The reason is that TFPR is derived using data on inputs, which are only available at the plant level, while marginal costs follow from prices and markups, which can be computed or observed at the product level within each plant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Some authors have used labor productivity – i.e., revenues per worker – as a proxy for efficiency (for a recent survey see Wagner, 2007, 2012). This measure is affected by the use of non-labor inputs and is thus inferior to TFP when different plants combine inputs in different proportions (see Syverson, 2011).

and TFPR is an unbiased proxy for physical productivity. However, when prices respond to productivity, TFPR is biased. For example, when facing downward-sloping demand, firms typically respond to efficiency gains by expanding production and reducing prices. This generates a negative correlation between prices and TFPQ, so that TFPR will underestimate physical efficiency.

Given these shortcomings, why has the literature not used TFPQ to analyze productivity gains from exporting? One practical caveat is the lack of information on physical quantities.<sup>16</sup> While some corrections to the estimation of production functions have been proposed, only a few studies have derived TFPQ directly.<sup>17</sup> Foster et al. (2008) obtain TFPQ, using product-level information on physical quantities from U.S. census data for a subset of manufacturing plants that produce homogeneous products.<sup>18</sup> They find a negative correlation between prices and TFPQ. This is consistent with more efficient businesses having lower marginal costs and, in turn, charging lower prices. As a consequence, changes in TFPR understate true efficiency gains.

Even if quantities are known so that TFPQ can be calculated, the measure is problematic. Product quantity cannot readily be compared because quality may change. As Foster et al. (2008) recognize, it is essentially impossible to isolate changes in quality from TFPQ. This is the reason why these authors restrict their analysis to a set of homogeneous products that are arguably not subject to significant changes in quality.<sup>19</sup> An additional problem emerges for multi-product plants. Since the use of inputs is typically not disaggregated for individual products, TFPQ has to be computed at the plant level, which requires the aggregation of quantities. This is problematic because goods produced by multi-product plants often differ in their physical and functional attributes. For example, if a furniture manufacturer produces both tables and chairs, the sum of the two does not provide a meaningful index of quantity. In addition, products are usually measured in different units, and the correspondence between units is often non-trivial.

To circumvent these issues, we use marginal cost as a measure of efficiency, following the methodology by De Loecker et al. (2012). For most production functions, marginal cost is directly (inversely) related to TFPQ. In addition, since we recover marginal cost at the product level, we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Data on physical quantities have only recently become available for some countries (c.f. De Loecker et al., 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012, for India and Colombia, respectively).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Melitz (2000) and De Loecker (2011) discuss corrections to the estimation of the production function to account for cross-sectional price heterogeneity in the context of a CES demand function. Gorodnichenko (2012) proposes an alternative procedure for estimating the production function that models the cost and revenue functions simultaneously, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in productivity and factor prices. Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2009) show that revenue-based output can lead to productivity mismeasurement and incorrect interpretations of how heterogeneous producers respond to shocks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also recover TFPQ using a model of monopolistic competition for India, China and the United States.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>The products included in their analysis are boxes, bread, carbon black, coffee, concrete, flooring, gasoline, block ice, processed ice, sugar, and plywood.

avoid the aggregation issues for multi-product plants.

# 2.2 Estimating Revenue Productivity

To compute TFPR, we first have to estimate the production function. We follow Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006, henceforth ACF), who extend the framework of Olley and Pakes (1996, henceforth OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, henceforth LP). This methodology controls for the simultaneity bias that arises because input demand and unobserved productivity are positively correlated.<sup>20</sup> The key insight of ACF lies in their identification of the labor elasticity, which they show is in most cases unidentified by the two-step procedure of OP and LP.<sup>21</sup> We modify the canonical ACF procedure, specifying an endogenous productivity process, where past export-status is allowed to impact current productivity. This reflects the correction suggested by De Loecker (2013); if productivity gains from exporting also lead to more investment (and thus a higher capital stock), the standard method would overestimate the capital coefficient in the production function, and thus underestimate productivity (i.e., the residual).<sup>22</sup>

We estimate a translog production function with labor (l), capital (k), and materials (m) as production inputs:

$$q_{it} = \beta_l l_{it} + \beta_k k_{it} + \beta_m m_{it} + \beta_{ll} l_{it}^2 + \beta_{kk} k_{it}^2 + \beta_{mm} m_{it}^2 + \beta_{kl} l_{it} k_{it} + \beta_{mk} m_{it} k_{it} + \beta_{lm} l_{it} m_{it} + \beta_{lmk} l_{it} m_{it} k_{it} + \omega_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$(1)$$

where all lowercase variables are in logs;  $q_{it}$  are revenues of plant *i* in year *t*;  $\omega_{it}$  is plant-level productivity, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  represents measurement error as well as unanticipated shocks to output.<sup>23</sup> While the translog specification nests the typically used Cobb-Douglas production function, it is more flexible, allowing for varying degrees of economies of scale and complementarities between the inputs. We follow De Loecker et al. (2012) in using the subset of single-product plants to identify the coefficients in (1) within each manufacturing sector.<sup>24</sup> Once the coefficients are estimated,

<sup>24</sup>The reason for using single-product plants is that we do not observe how inputs are allocated across outputs within

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>We follow LP in using material inputs to control for the correlation between input levels and unobserved productivity. Our approach for estimating the production function is explained in detail in Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The main technical difference is the timing of of the choice of labor. While in OP and LP, labor is fully adjustable and chosen in t, ACF assume that labor is chosen at t - b (0 < b < 1), after capital is known in t - 1, but before materials are chosen in t. In this setup, the choice of labor is unaffected by unobserved productivity shocks between t - b and t, but a plant's use of materials now depends on capital, productivity, and labor. In contrast to the OP and LP method, this implies that the coefficients of capital, materials, and labor are all estimated in the second stage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>On a related point, Roberts and Tybout (1997) show that due to sunk costs, prior exporting experience can have a substantial impact on a firm's present decision to export.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we also include an export dummy when estimating the coefficients in (1) to allow exporters to produce under a different technology. The value of this coefficient is not of direct interest, and it does not enter the calculation of productivity below.

productivity is computed as

$$\hat{\omega}_{it} = \hat{q}_{it} - \hat{f}_s(k_{it}, m_{it}, l_{it}) \tag{2}$$

where  $\hat{f}_s(\cdot)$  represent the estimated contribution of the production factors to total output in manufacturing sector s.<sup>25</sup> Note that the estimated production function allows for returns to scale, so that the residual  $\hat{\omega}_{it}$  is not affected by increasing or decreasing returns.

## 2.3 Estimating Marginal Cost

To construct a measure of marginal production cost, we follow a two-step process. First, we derive the product-level markup for each plant. Second, we divide product-plant level output prices (observed in the data) by the calculated markup to obtain marginal cost.

The methodology for deriving marginal costs follows the production approach proposed by Hall (1986), recently revisited by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). This approach computes markups without relying on detailed market-level demand information; it only requires standard plant-level data on input use and output. The main assumption is that at least one input is fully flexible and that plants minimize costs. The first order condition of the plant's cost minimization problem with respect to the flexible input V can be rearranged to obtain the markup of product j produced by plant i at time t:<sup>26</sup>

$$\underbrace{\mu_{ijt}}_{Markup} \equiv \frac{P_{ijt}}{MC_{ijt}} = \underbrace{\left(\frac{\partial Q_{ijt}(\cdot)}{\partial V_{ijt}}\frac{V_{ijt}}{Q_{ijt}}\right)}_{\text{Output Elasticity}} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\frac{P_{ijt}^V \cdot V_{ijt}}{P_{ijt} \cdot Q_{ijt}}\right)^{-1}}_{\text{Revenue Share}},$$
(3)

where  $P(P^V)$  denotes the price of output Q (input V), and MC is marginal cost. According to equation (3), the markup can be computed by dividing the elasticity of product j (with respect to the flexible input) by the share of the flexible input in the sales of product j. We use materials as the flexible input to compute the output elasticity, based on our estimates of (1).<sup>27</sup> The second

a plant, which makes the estimation of (1) at the product level unfeasible for multiple-product plants. For the set of single product plants no assumption on the allocation of inputs to outputs is needed, and the estimation of (1) can be performed with standard plant level information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>These sectors are: Food and Beverages, Textiles, Apparel, Wood, Paper, Chemicals, Plastic, Non-Metallic Manufactures, Basic and Fabricated Metals, and Machinery and Equipment. When computing TFPR in multi-product plants we use the  $f_s$  that corresponds to the product category s of the largest product produced by plant i.

we use the  $f_s$  that corresponds to the product category s of the largest product produced by plant i. <sup>26</sup>More precisely, the first order condition with respect to V is  $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial V} = P^{\nu} - \lambda \frac{\partial Q(\cdot)}{\partial V} = 0$ , where the Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda$  equals the marginal cost of production. Manipulating this expression yields (3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>In principle, labor could be used as an alternative. However, in the case of Chile, labor being a flexible input would be a strong assumption due to its regulated labor market. A discussion of the evolution of job security and firing cost in Chile can be found in Montenegro and Pagés (2004).

component needed in (3) – the expenditure share for material inputs – is observed in our data.<sup>28</sup> Because markups are computed at the plant-product level, and prices (unit values) are observed at the same level, we derive marginal costs at the plant-product level in each year. Appendix B provides further detail on the estimation of marginal costs.

# **3** Data

Our data are from a Chilean plant panel for the period 1996–2005, the *Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual* (Annual National Industrial Survey – ENIA). Data for ENIA are collected annually by the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE), with direct participation of Chilean manufacturing plants. ENIA covers the universe of manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers, using to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 2. It contains detailed information on plant characteristics, such as sales, spending on inputs and raw materials, employment, wages, investment, and export status. ENIA contains information for approximately 4,900 manufacturing plants per year with positive sales and employment information. Out of these, about 20% are exporters. Approximately two third of the plants are small (less than 50 workers), while medium-sized (50-150 workers) and large (more than 150 workers) plants represent 20 and 12 percent, respectively.

In addition to aggregate plant data, ENIA provides rich information for every good produced by each plant, reporting the value of sales, its total cost of production, the number of units produced and sold, and the fraction of production that is exported. Products are defined according to an ENIA-specific classification of products, the *Clasificador Unico de Productos* (CUP). This product category is comparable to the 7-digit ISIC.<sup>29</sup> The CUP categories identify 2,169 different products in the sample. These products – in combination with the specific plants that produce them – form our main unit of analysis. In the following, we briefly discuss how we deal with inconsistent product categories, units of output, and other issues of sample selection.

## **3.1** Sample Selection and Data Consistency

In order to ensure consistent product-plant categories in our panel, we follow three steps. First, we drop plant-product-year observations whenever there are signs of unreliable reporting. In particular, we exclude plant-products that have missing or zero values for total employment, investment,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>To derive the expenditure share of material inputs in multi-product plants, we follow Foster et al. (2008) in assuming that plants allocate their inputs proportionately to the share of each product in total revenues.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>For example, the wine industry (ISIC 3132) is disaggregated by CUP into 8 different categories, including "Sparkling wine of fresh grapes", "Cider", "Chicha", and "Mosto", among others.

demand for raw materials, sales, or product quantities. Second, whenever our analysis involves quantities of production, we have to carefully account for possible changes in the unit of measurement. For example, wine producers change in some instances from "bottles" to "liters." Total revenue is generally unaffected by these changes, but the derived unit values (prices) have to be corrected. This procedure is needed for about 1% of all plant-product observations; it is explained in Appendix C.1. Third, a similar correction is needed because the product identifier in our sample changes in the year 2001. We use a correspondence provided by the Chilean Statistical Institute to match the new product categories to the old ones (see Appendix C.1 for detail). After these adjustments, our sample consists of 109,210 plant-product-year observations.

#### **3.2 Definition of Export Entry**

The time of entry to export markets is crucial for our analysis. We observe the exporting history for each plant-product pair from 1996 to 2005. We impose three requirements for considering product j produced by plant i as an entry at time t: (i) product j is exported for the first time at t in our sample, which avoids that dynamic efficiency gains from previous export experience drive our results, (ii) product j is sold domestically for at least one period before entry into the export market, and (iii) product j is the first product exported by plant i. The last requirement is only needed for multi-product plants. It rules out that spillovers from other, previously exported products affect our estimates. Under this definition we find 671 export entries (plant-products at the 7-digit level), and approximately 7% of active exporters are new entrants.<sup>30</sup>

#### **3.3** Validity of the Sample

Before turning to our empirical results, we check whether our data replicate previously established stylized facts – main differences between exporters and non-exporters. Following Bernard and Jensen (1999), we run the regression

$$\ln(y_{ist}) = \alpha_{st} + \delta \, d_{ist}^{exp} + \gamma \, \ln(L_{ist}) + \varepsilon_{ist} \,, \tag{4}$$

where  $y_{ist}$  denotes several characteristics of plant *i* in sector *s* and period *t*,  $d_{ist}^{exp}$  is an exporter dummy,  $L_{ist}$  is total plant-level employment, and  $\alpha_{st}$  denotes sector-year fixed effects.<sup>31</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>This is based on our conservative definition which only includes the first product that is exported by any given plant. Note that there are no export entries in the first year of our sample, 1996, because we do not observe domestic sales or export volumes prior to that date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Throughout the empirical analysis, whenever we use plant-level regressions, we control for sector-year effects at the 2-digit level. When using the more detailed plant-product data, we include a more restrictive set of 4-digit sector-year effects.

coefficient  $\delta$  reports the percentage-point difference of the dependent variable between exporters and non-exporters. Table 1 shows that, within their respective sectors, exporting plants are more productive (measured by revenue productivity), larger both in terms of employment and sales, pay higher wages, and are more capital intensive. This is in line with the exporter characteristics documented by Bernard and Jensen (1999) for the United States, Bernard and Wagner (1997) for Germany, and De Loecker (2007) for Slovenia, among others. We also find that markups are higher among exporters, confirming the findings in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).

# [Insert Table 1 here]

# **4** Empirical Results

In this section we present our empirical results. We first show the dynamics of revenue productivity and marginal costs (MC) within plants. Our main finding is that TFPR does not change after export entry, while MC drops substantially. We then use propensity score matching to address selection and pre-exporting trends. Finally, we check the robustness of our results.

#### 4.1 Within Plant Trajectories

We begin by analyzing the trajectories for price, marginal cost, markups and revenue productivity for the sub-sample of new export entrants. For each plant i producing good j in period t, we estimate the following regression:

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_{st} + \alpha_{ij} + \sum_{\substack{k=-2\\Pre-Trend}}^{-1} T_{ijt}^k + \sum_{\substack{l=0\\Entry-Effect}}^{L} E_{ijt}^l + \varepsilon_{ijt} , \qquad (5)$$

where  $y_{ijt}$  refers to the characteristic of product j – either price, marginal cost, markup, or TFPR;  $\alpha_{st}$  are sector-year effects that capture trends at the 4-digit level, and  $\alpha_{ij}$  are plant-product fixed effects (at the 7-digit level).<sup>32</sup> We include two sets of year-plant-product specific dummy variables to capture the trajectory of each variable  $y_{ijt}$  before and after entry into export markets. First,  $T_{ijt}^k$ reflects pre-entry trends in the two periods before exporting. Second, the post-entry trajectory of the dependent variable is reflected by  $E_{ijt}^l$ , which takes value one if product j is exported l periods

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Sector fixed effects at the 4-digit level correspond to approximately 200 aggregate product categories. For TFPR, the product index j in  $y_{ijt}$  is irrelevant since revenue productivity is computed at the plant level. We include sector-year fixed effects at the 2-digit level for the TFPR regression (see footnote 31).

after entry.<sup>33</sup>

Figure 2 visualizes the results of estimating (5) for the sample of export entrants. The figure shows the point estimates and whiskers representing the 90 percent confidence interval. Time on the horizontal axis is normalized to zero for the entry period. The left panel of the figure shows that TFPR within plants is virtually unaffected by exporting, with tight confidence intervals around zero (see Table 2 for the corresponding estimates). This result is in line with the previous literature: there are no apparent efficiency gains when TFPR is used as a measure of efficiency. The right panel of Figure 2 shows a radically different pattern. After entry into the export market, price and marginal cost decline markedly, while markups remain relatively unchanged. The point estimates (reported in Table 2) show that prices and marginal cost are about 17% lower at the moment of entry, as compared to pre-exporting periods. This difference widens over time: one period after entry it is 22%, and after 3 periods, about 25%. These differences are not only economically but also statistically significant.

#### [Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 here]

Table 2 also reports the trajectories for markups, which are close to zero with small standard errors, and for physical quantities sold, which increase by approximately 30% after export entry. Finally, Table 2 shows a slight (statistically insignificant) decline in price and marginal cost of new exported products before entry occurs (in t = -1). This raises the concern of pre-entry trends. Possible pre-trends would affect how we interpret our results. For example, price and marginal cost could have declined even in the absence of exporting, or export entry could be the result of selection on pre-existing productivity trajectories. In the next section we address this issue.

## 4.2 Matching Results

We apply propensity score matching (PSM) in the spirit of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and further developed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). This approach attempts to isolate the causal effect of exporting by comparing newly exported products with products that had a-priori a similar likelihood of being exported, but that continued to be sold domestically only (De Loecker, 2007). Once the comparable control group is identified, the average effect of treatment on the treated plant-products (ATT) can be obtained by computing the average differences in outcomes between the two groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>Due to our relatively short sample, we only report the results for l = 0, ..., 3 periods after export entry. However, all regressions include dummies  $E_{ijt}^l$  for all post-entry periods. We exclude one-time exporters – plant-products that are only exported for one period throughout the sample. Table A.1 shows that when including these, our results are quantitatively very similar but standard errors are slightly larger.

All our results are derived using the nearest neighbor matching technique. Accordingly, treatment is defined as export entry of a plant-product (at the 7-digit level), and the control group consists of the plant-products with the closest propensity score to each treated observation. The control group is obtained from the pool of plants that produce similar products as new exporters (within 4-digit categories), but for the domestic market only.<sup>34</sup> The PSM approach requires to choose a set of control variables such that, conditional on the propensity score, the distribution of treated and control units does not differ significantly. To estimate the propensity score we use a flexible specification that is a function of plant and product characteristics including the lagged marginal cost before export entry ( $MC_{t-1}$ ) of the product, lagged plant-level revenue TFPR, the capital stock of the plant ( $k_{t-1}$ ), as well as a pre-trend in marginal costs ( $\Delta MC_{t-1}$ ), and a vector of other controls ( $Z_{t-1}$ ).<sup>35</sup> Appendix D provides further detail. Once we have determined the control group, we use the difference-in-difference (DID) methodology to evaluate the impact of exporting on TFPR, prices, cost and markups. As Blundell and Dias (2009) suggest, using DID can improve the quality of matching results because initial differences between treated and control units are removed.

Table 3 shows the matching estimation results.<sup>36</sup> Since all variables are expressed in logarithms, the DID estimator reflects the difference in growth between newly exported products and their counterfactuals, relative to the pre-entry period (t = -1).<sup>37</sup> These results confirm the withinplant pattern documented above: changes in TFPR after export entry are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant. Price and marginal cost, on the other hand, both decrease after entry into export markets. Interestingly, marginal costs closely follow the price trajectory, which reflects the fact that there is no significant markup difference after entry between treated and controls (row 4 in Table 3). The main difference with respect to the previous subsection is the time trend of the decrease in marginal cost and price. While the within-plant trajectories were relatively stable between a 15-25 percent drop in both variables, the PSM results show somewhat smaller initial differences that grow over time: the difference in price (marginal cost) relative to the control group falls from 15% (10%) in the period of export entry, to 30% (28%) after two years, and to more than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Products that are already exported in the first year of the sample (1996) enter neither the treatment nor the control group.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Other controls include product sales, number of employees, import status of the plant and the ratio of blue- to white-collar workers. Following Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004), we use the five nearest-neighbors. Our results are very similar when using 1, 3 or the 10 nearest neighbors instead. The difference in means of treated vs. controls are statistically insignificant for all matching variables in t = -1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>In some cases products are exported intermittently after export entry. In the baseline analysis we keep these in the treatment group. In Table A.2 we show that results are very similar when we allow separate coefficients for plant-products that are exported intermittently.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>For example, a value of 0.1 in period t = 2 means that two years after export entry, the variable in question has grown by 10 percentage points more for exporters, as compared to the non-exporting control group.

50% (70%) three periods after entry.<sup>38</sup>

# [Insert Table 3 here]

#### 4.3 Robustness and Additional Results

In this subsection we address potential concerns about the validity of our results. We test if they are affected by: (i) the estimation of markups and the derivation of marginal costs, (ii) products exiting export markets, (iii) plant-product vs. plant level observations, and (iv) the chosen matching technique. We also perform a placebo check using non-exported products of export entrants. Finally, we separately analyze the trajectories of foreign and domestic prices charged for the same good after export entry.

#### Reported Average Costs

One potential concern for our marginal cost results is that they rely on the correct estimation of markups. If we underestimate the true changes in markups after export entry, then the computed marginal cost would follow prices too closely.<sup>39</sup> We can address this concern by using data reported in ENIA, which allow us to compute an alternative cost measure. Plants covered by ENIA report the total production cost *per product* and the number of units produced. The questionnaire defines total cost per product as the product-specific sum of raw material costs and direct labor involved in production. It excludes transportation and distribution costs, as well as potential fixed costs. Since fixed costs are excluded, we expect the reported average costs to be a reasonable proxy for marginal costs. Using this alternative cost-based measure of efficiency, we employ propensity score matching to show that our results are not an artifact of the estimated markups.

Row 5 of Table 3 shows that average costs decrease after export entry, closely following the trajectory that we identified for marginal cost.<sup>40</sup> Similar to our previous estimates, export entry is followed by a decline in average costs of 14% in the period of entry, growing to 23% after one year, and to 75% three periods after entry. Table A.3 shows that *within* plant-product estimates for reported average costs are also very similar to the coefficients for marginal costs in Table 2. These results confirm that the procedure in section 2.2 yields sensible estimates of production efficiency.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>The results for three years after entry have to be interpreted with caution due to the low number of observations in the treatment group. In addition, the large effects in t = 3 may reflect selection, as more productive plant-products are more likely to survive as exporters. We address this issue below in section 4.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>For example, suppose that prices actually fall because markups shrink upon export entry, but that noisy production data lead to quantitatively small estimates of markups in section 2. Then we would wrongly attribute the observed decline in prices after export entry to a decline in marginal cost.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>The only exception is 2 periods after export entry, when the average cost coefficient is insignificant.

# Balanced Sample of Entrants

To what extent does unsuccessful export entry drive our results? To answer this question, we construct a balanced sample of exporters, excluding plant-products that exit the export market within 3 periods after entry. Table 4 shows the results, using propensity score matching as explained above. The main pattern is unchanged. TFPR results are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant, while both prices and marginal costs drop markedly after export entry (at approximately 45-60%). The same is true for reported average costs. The main difference with Table 3 is that price, marginal, and average cost are now substantially lower already at the time of export entry (t = 0).<sup>41</sup> This makes sense, given that we only focus on successful export entrants, who will tend to experience larger efficiency gains. In addition, in our baseline matching results, effects tended to increase over time. This may have been driven by less productive products exiting the export market, so that the remaining ones showed larger average differences relative to the control group. Compatible with this interpretation, the drop in costs and prices is more stable over time in the balanced sample. In sum, the results from the balanced sample confirm our full sample estimates and suggest more stable efficiency gains over time.

## [Insert Table 4 here]

#### Single-Product Plants

Our results for marginal costs are based on plant-product level observations, while TFPR is computed at the plant level. To analyze if this difference drives our results, panel B in Table 4 repeats our matching estimation for the sub-sample of single-product plants. For these, marginal costs and TFPR are both measured at the plant level. This robustness check comes at a cost: export entries by single-product plants represent only about one-fourth of the total number of entries in our sample. Correspondingly, the results are noisier than before. Nevertheless, the main pattern is confirmed: as in our main sample, there is no significant increase in TFPR after export entry, while price and marginal costs fall.

# Alternative Matching Specifications and Placebo using Domestic Products

In Table A.4 we study whether our matching results are affected by the number of neighbors. The main empirical pattern does not change qualitatively if 1, 3 or 10 neighbors are used instead of 5. Finally, Table A.5 performs a placebo test of our results, analyzing outcomes for non-exported products of export entrants. Specifically, we compare the non-exported products of export-entry

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Since the matching procedure uses the pre-entry period t = -1 as a reference point, differences at t = 0 are attributed to entry into export markets.

plants to similar goods produced by other non-exporting plants.<sup>42</sup> For marginal costs, these differences are small, mostly positive, and statistically insignificant. This suggests that our results are specific to the exported products, and are probably not driven by more general efficiency trends at the plant level.<sup>43</sup>

## Prices of Exported vs. Domestic Goods

We observe that, on average, prices of plant-products fall hand-in-hand with marginal costs after export entry. One explanation is that firms charge constant markups, so that efficiency gains are passed through completely to consumers. However, if market power differs for the domestic and foreign markets, prices may also differ. Depending on the demand elasticity in the two markets, foreign prices may be higher or lower than their domestic counterparts. Another reason for differential pricing would be export entrants seeking to attract new customers by charging low prices similar to the 'demand building' mechanism described by Foster et al. (2012) for domestic entrants. If this mechanism is at work, we should expect a stronger decline in export prices. We can disentangle the two prices in a subsample for 1996–2000. For this period the ENIA questionnaire asked about separate quantities and revenues for domestic and international sales of each product. Thus, prices (unit values) can be computed for exports and domestic sales of the same product. Within this subsample, we identify 'young' export entrants as plant-products that have been exported for a maximum of 3 years and compare their average domestic and foreign prices before and after export entry. We find that within plant-products of 'young' exporters, the price of exported goods is about 23% lower than pre-export entry, while the price of the same good sold domestically falls by 20%.<sup>44</sup> Assuming that the marginal cost of production is the same for both markets, the results provide some suggestive evidence that efficiency gains are passed on to both domestic and foreign customers - and slightly more so to the latter. While we cannot pin down the exact mechanism that explains the observed price setting, models with constant markups are consistent with the overall pattern. In addition, 'demand building' in foreign markets may explain the additional decline of export prices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>The control group is selected using the same specification as for the propensity score of newly exported products, i.e., from similar plant-products within the same 4-digit categories.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>This result also suggests that spillovers of export-related efficiency gains across products are probably limited.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>To obtain these estimates, we separately regress logged domestic and export prices (at the 7-digit product-plant level) on an exporter dummy, controlling for plant-product fixed effects and 4-digit sector-year effects. Table A.6 shows the results. Due to the short sample period, these coefficients are only marginally significant (standard errors of 0.13 and 0.12, respectively).

# 5 Interpretation of Results: Possible Channels and Magnitude

In this section, we discuss possible channels that may drive the observed time-pattern of prices and marginal cost after export entry. We then shed light on the magnitude of within-plant efficiency gains, relative to the well-known cross-sectional productivity advantage of exporters.

## 5.1 A Stylized Framework of Export Entry and Within-Plant Efficiency Gains

We provide a stylized theoretical framework that allows us to analyze various drivers of export entry, distinguishing between demand- and supply forces. To differentiate between idiosyncratic technology and demand effects, we build on the framework by Foster et al. (2008). In order to further differentiate between alternative supply-side channels, we combine this setup with the model by Lileeva and Trefler (2010). In particular, export entry can be affected by initial productivity differences (as in Melitz, 2003) or by a complementarity between exporting and investment in new technology (c.f. Constantini and Melitz, 2007; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; Bustos, 2011). In addition, anticipated learning-by-exporting will also raise the odds of export entry. Finally, in the stylized framework, higher efficiency (TFPQ) reduces marginal costs, but has an ambiguous impact on TFPR due to falling prices. This reflects our discussion above that marginal costs are a more appropriate measure for efficiency gains. Appendix E provides a detailed exposition of the theoretical framework. Here, we focus on its central elements and explain the intuition.

We build on the theoretical setup in Foster et al. (2008), where the profits of plant *i* depend on market size, ideosyncratic product demand, and marginal cost.<sup>45</sup> Export entry requires the payment of a fixed cost  $F_E$  (in annualized terms). Firms enter the foreign market if the additional profits due to exporting exceed the fixed cost. In order to analyze the (bi-directional) relationship between export entry and productivity, we define the export entry wedge  $\varepsilon_i$ . This variable indicates how far (in percentage terms) plant *i*'s marginal cost is from the export threshold – where annual profits equal  $F_E$ . For plants that sell only domestically,  $\varepsilon_i > 0$ ; and  $\varepsilon_i = 0$  for plants that are indifferent between exporting and domestic sales. Given this setup, we analyze the conditions under which export entry occurs.

Demand-driven export entry. We begin by analyzing demand-side effects. If foreign demand for plant *i*'s product rises,  $\varepsilon_i$  falls because exporting is becoming more profitable. If  $\varepsilon_i$  falls below zero, plant *i* will export in response to the demand shock. Empirically, if demand shocks are responsible for export entry, we should see no change in the product-specific marginal costs, while sales would increase and markups would tend to rise. This is not in line with our empirical observation of falling marginal costs and constant markups. Thus, demand shocks are an unlikely driver

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>For ease of exposition, we assume that each plant produces one product.

of the observed pattern. Similarly, it is unlikely that quality upgrading of exporters is responsible for our results, since higher product quality is associated with higher prices and production costs (c.f. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012).

Next, we analyze the supply side, where actual or anticipated changes in marginal costs can induce export entry. We use  $\varphi_i > 0$  to denote the percentage drop in marginal cost due to one of three effects: a productivity shock (*PS*), learning-by-exporting (*LBE*), and technology-exporting complementarity (*TEC*). The marginal cost after each effect is given by  $MC_i^{post} = MC_i^0/(1+\varphi_i)$ , where  $MC_i^0$  is the initial marginal cost. We discuss the three cases in the following, always starting with a plant *i* that is currently not exporting, facing an export entry wedge  $\varepsilon_i > 0$ .

Productivity shock. Suppose that plant *i* is affected by a productivity shock that reduces marginal cost by  $\varphi_i^{PS}$  percent. Export entry will occur if  $\varphi_i^{PS} \ge \varepsilon_i$ , i.e., if the productivity shock is sufficiently strong to push marginal costs below the entry threshold. In this case, causality runs from productivity to export entry, reflecting self-selection of more productive firms into exporting. If there is a time lag between these two, the data will show efficiency gains *before* entry occurs. This is not the case in our data (see Figure 2), and our matching estimation addressed pre-entry productivity differences. However, we observe a drop in marginal cost and prices in the year of export entry. Productivity shocks are compatible with this observation if shock and export entry occur in the same period. Thus, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of selection into exporting, although it would only hold under an extremely quick response of export entry to productivity shocks. Nevertheless, note that even if some of the observed efficiency gains were due to selection, they would not be identified by the standard revenue productivity measure in the literature.

Learning-by-Exporting. Next, suppose that after export entry, marginal costs fall by  $\varphi_i^{LBE}$  percent because firm *i* gains new expertise ("learning-by-exporting").<sup>46</sup> Plant *i* will begin to export if the anticipated learning effects are sufficiently large:  $\varphi_i^{LBE} \ge g(\varepsilon_i, F^E)$ , where the function *g* is increasing in both arguments (see Appendix E). Thus, the larger plant *i*'s export entry wedge, and the higher the fixed cost of exporting, the larger is the required LBE to motivate export entry. LBE is typically characterized as an ongoing process, rather than a one-time event after export entry. Empirically, this would result in continuing efficiency growth after export entry. There is some evidence for this effect in our data: Table 2 shows that marginal costs fall during the first two years after export entry. This is also confirmed by the matching results in Table 3 (but not in the balanced exporter panel in Table 4). Thus, learning-by-exporting can explain parts of our results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>In a dynamic setting, learning-by-exporting will lead to falling marginal costs over some time after export entry. In this case,  $\varphi_i^{LBE}$  can be interpreted as the (appropriately discounted) average annual decline in marginal cost after export entry.

Technology-exporting complementarity. Finally, we analyze the case where exporting goes hand-in-hand with investment in new technology.<sup>47</sup> To gain access to the new technology, a plant has to pay the fixed cost  $F^{I}$ . As pointed out by Lileeva and Trefler (2010), expanded production due to export entry may render investments in new technology profitable. In this case, plant *i* will enter the foreign market if the additional profits (due to both a larger market and lower cost of production) outweigh the fixed costs of exporting and new technology. This can be expressed as a condition on the drop in marginal cost under the new technology:  $\varphi_i^{TEC} \ge h(\varepsilon_i, F^E, F^I)$ , where the function h is increasing in all arguments (see Appendix E). This setup implies that initially less productive plants (with a larger export entry wedge  $\varepsilon_i$ ) will require a larger efficiency gain  $\varphi_{i}^{TEC}$  in order to start exporting. Thus, as pointed out by Lileeva and Trefler (2010), we should expect "negative selection" based on initial productivity. Table 5 provides some evidence for this effect, reporting the change in marginal costs of plant-products with low and high pre-exporting productivity.<sup>48</sup> Marginal costs for initially less productive plant-products fall by approximately twice as much as compared to exporters with high initial productivity. This result is in line with a complementarity channel where exporting and investment in technology go hand-in-hand, and where initially less productive plants will only make this joint decision if the efficiency gains are substantial.

# [Insert Table 5 here]

Altogether, our findings point to an exporting-technology complementarity as an important driver of export-related within-firm efficiency gains. In addition, there is some suggestive evidence for learning-by-export in the years after entry. Importantly, we do not claim that the observed effects are necessarily causal. In fact, the exporting-investment complementarity combines both causal mechanisms, from exporting to technology and vice versa. Our main contribution is independent of which exact channels drive our results: we show that there are substantial efficiency gains associated with entering the export market, and that the standard TFPR measure does not capture these gains because of falling prices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>In principle, this channel is observationally equivalent to economies of scale: exporting could go hand-in-hand with investment in higher production capacity, which may lead to lower marginal costs even in the absence of technology upgrading. However, our production function estimates suggest approximately constant returns to scale in most sectors – the median sum of all input shares is 1.015. Table A.7 in the appendix reports the detailed estimates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Following Lileeva and Trefler (2010), we use pre-exporting TFPR to split plant-products into above- and below median productivity. The decline in prices and average costs is also more pronounced for initially less productive plants (see Table A.8).

## 5.2 Selection on TFPR and Magnitude of Efficiency Gains

In the following, we gauge the magnitude of the observed within-plant efficiency gains after export entry, comparing them to the well-documented revenue productivity gap between exporters and non-exporters in the cross-section. We begin by comparing TFPR of exporters versus all other plants in Table 6. The first column shows an exporter premium of 17.2%, which is very similar to the figures documented for US plants by Bernard and Jensen (1999). Column 2 reports the premium for young exporters only, i.e., for plants that have entered the export market within the last 3 years. This number is very similar to the TFPR premium for all exporters, and the two are not significantly different (column 3). This suggests that the standard selection on pre-exporting productivity à la Melitz (2003) is also present in our sample. Nevertheless, selection based on TFPR does not drive our results: as shown in Figure 2 and Table 2, TFPR does not change within plants after export entry. Consequently, we interpret the observed drop in marginal cost after export entry as evidence for previously unidentified efficiency gains that need to be added to the cross-sectional exporter premium.

#### [Insert Table 6 here]

We follow two approaches when comparing the observed within-plant efficiency gains after export entry to the traditional exporter premium in the cross-section. First, to obtain a conservative estimate, we assume that the marginal-cost based efficiency gains are only present while we observe them, i.e., for young exporters during their first three years of exporting. On average, in our sample the share of young exporters among all exporting plants is 10.5%. Multiplying this with the average observed drop in marginal cost from Table 2 (20%) implies additional efficiency gains from exporting of 2.1% - a little more than one-eighth of the cross-sectional exporter premium. Second, we derive an upper bound, assuming instead that the observed additional efficiency gains for new exporters persist over time and are not captured by TFPR. For this to be true, prices (and thus markups) have to remain constant. In columns 4-6 of Table 6 we show that the markups of existing and young exporters are similar.<sup>49</sup> This makes it unlikely that prices will rise sufficiently over time for TFPR to reflect the full efficiency gains of young exporters. At the extreme, if markups remain unchanged, none of the decline in marginal cost will be captured by TFPR, so that the observed 20% drop after export entry would be permanent.<sup>50</sup> Given that markups are only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>There is some evidence that young exporters charge slightly lower markups – the difference is approximately 3.7 percentage points (with a p-value of 0.067). This leaves a certain upward potential for prices after export entry. However, for the derivation of an upper bound, we assume that markups of new exporters do not change over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>To explicitly analyze this, we would have to compare marginal costs *across* exporters. This analysis would suffer from important caveats – for example, if exported products are typically of higher quality, prices and marginal costs

slightly larger for old exporters, the actual magnitude of effects is probably closer to the higher estimate. Thus, the additional gains from export entry are likely of the same magnitude as those observed for revenue productivity in the cross-section.

Summarizing our findings on selection and within-plant productivity gains, we document that (i) new exporters have higher TFPR and markups already at the time of entry; (ii) TFPR and markups do not change after export entry, and both premia are very similar for old exporters; (iii) marginal costs and prices decline significantly after export entry. The first fact is in line with more productive firms charging higher markups and sorting into exporting (c.f. Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), which may be related to their product quality (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). The second and third facts suggest that export entry is also associated with within-plant efficiency gains that are not observed in TFPR estimates because they are passed through to customers in the form of lower prices. The relatively stable markups suggest that even as exporters come of age, not all of these gains will be reflected in the standard cross-sectional estimates of revenue-productivity premia for exporters. Thus, conventional estimates miss a substantial part of the actual export-related gains from trade.

# 6 Conclusion

Over the last two decades, case studies and contributions in the management literature have provided strong suggestive evidence for within-firm productivity gains from exporting. A large number of papers has sought to pin down these effects empirically, using firm- and plant-level data from various countries in the developed and developing world. With less than a handful of exceptions, the overwhelming number of studies has failed to identify such gains. We point out a reason for this discrepancy, and apply a recently developed empirical methodology to resolve it. Previous studies have typically used revenue-based productivity measures, which are downward biased if higher efficiency is associated with lower prices. Using a detailed Chilean plant-product level panel over the period 1996-2005, we show that this bias is likely at work – new exporters charge significantly lower prices. This is in line with evidence from new entrants in domestic markets. These typically lack connections with customers, whom they seek to attract by charging prices close to marginal costs (c.f. Foster et al., 2012).

In order to avoid the effect of lower prices on the productivity measure, we use marginal cost, which is directly (negatively) associated with quantity-productivity in standard production functions. We estimate marginal costs at the plant-product level following the approach by De Loecker

will also tend to be higher. These concerns are less severe in our main analysis, where we compare the trajectories of marginal costs *within* plants and plant-products before and after export entry.

et al. (2012) – by first calculating markups under an unrestrictive set of assumptions and then deriving marginal costs as the ratio of price over markup. As a first step, we show that with the standard approach used in previous studies (revenue-based productivity), we do not find evidence for productivity gains after export entry in our panel of Chilean plants.

We then show that export entry is followed by a substantial decline in marginal costs within plants – approximately 15-25%. Prices follow a similar trajectory after export entry, suggesting that new exporters pass on most efficiency gains to their customers. This explains why previous revenue-based studies have failed to identify these gains. We also shed some light on the underlying mechanisms, guided by a stylized theoretical framework of export entry. Demand-side forces are unlikely candidates for explaining the observed efficiency gains, because markups are unchanged after export entry, while prices fall. Similarly, selection into exporting based on pre-existing productivity differences is probably not at the core of our results. Using propensity score matching, we construct a control group of plant-products with comparable initial characteristics and productivity trends. When using this comparison group, we find very similar results as within plants.

We identify two likely drivers of within-plant efficiency gains after export entry: first and foremost, a complementarity between export entry and technology investment. For this case, the theoretical framework (following Lileeva and Trefler, 2010) implies negative selection on preexporting productivity. We show that this prediction is born out by our data: initially less productive plant-products observe larger efficiency gains after export entry. Second, the fact that marginal costs continue to fall over 2-3 years after export entry suggests that learning-by-exporting may be another driver of the observed efficiency gains.

In sum, our results suggest a revision of the evidence for productivity gains from trade. So far, the main effects have been attributed to reallocation of resources across plants, in the spirit of Melitz (2003). For example, Pavcnik (2002) estimates that these reallocation effects are responsible for approximately 20% productivity gains in export-oriented sectors during the Chilean trade liberalization over the period 1979-86. On the other hand, evidence for within-plant efficiency gains has been scant, and we point out a likely reason: the typically used revenue-based productivity measures fail to detect such gains when they are accompanied by lower prices. Using marginal cost as a productivity measure that is not affected by prices, we show that within-plant efficiency gains after export entry are of the same order of magnitude as gains from reallocation – an effect that has so far passed under the radar.

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# **FIGURES**




Figure 1: Price and Volume Trajectories for New Exported Products

*Notes*: The figure shows the estimated within plant-product trajectory for price and volume (quantity) before and after export entry. For each variable, the figure reports the mean value and the 90% confidence interval (standard errors are clustered at the plant-product level). For each plant-product, export entry occurs at period t = 0. The trajectories correspond to the estimated coefficients of equation (5), as reported in Table 2. A product is defined as an entrant if it is the first product exported by a plant and is sold domestically for at least one period before entry into the export market. Section 4.1 provides further detail.




Figure 2: Price, Marginal Cost and TFPR Trajectories for New Exported Products

*Notes*: The left panel shows the estimated within plant trajectory for revenue productivity, and the right panel, for price, marginal cost and markup before and after export entry. Period t = 0 corresponds to the export entry year. See notes to Figure 1 for further details.

# **TABLES**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Plant S	Size	Productivity	Capital Intensity	Wages	Markup
Dependent Variable	ln(Workers)	ln(Sales)	ln(TFPR)	ln(Capital/Workers)	ln(Wage)	log(Markup)
Plant Export dummy	1.422*** (.083)	.641*** (.091)	.172*** (.028)	.719*** (.138)	.205*** (.031)	.0825*** (.018)
Sector-Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
$R^2$	.27	.71	.98	.19	.30	.09
Observations	39,611	39,324	39,583	39,611	39,608	82,924

Table 1: Plant-Level Stylized Facts

*Notes*: The table reports the percentage-point difference of the dependent variable between exporters and non-exporters in a panel of 8,500 (4,900 average per year) Chilean plants over the period 1996-2005. All regressions (except for column 1) control for log number of workers. In column 6 we use plant-product information, which explains the larger number of observations. Clustered standard errors (at the sector level) in parentheses. Key: \*\*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

Periods After Entry	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	$Obs/R^2$
Revenue TFP	0212	0192	00513	.00954	.00137	.00841	1,130
	(.0314)	(.0295)	(.0295)	(.0298)	(.0477)	(.0563)	.568
Price	.0211	0617	179**	222***	233**	230**	1,668
	(.0976)	(.0710)	(.0791)	(.0805)	(.101)	(.110)	.821
Marginal Cost	.0195	0824	169**	218***	235**	255**	1,668
	(.0992)	(.0742)	(.0821)	(.0834)	(.107)	(.117)	.805
Markup	.00161	.0207	00976	00431	.00210	.0246	1,668
	(.0250)	(.0215)	(.0215)	(.0226)	(.0327)	(.0299)	.531
Physical Quantities	.0183	.134	.286***	.347***	.280**	.286*	1,668
	(.137)	(.0991)	(.0987)	(.0987)	(.118)	(.149)	.809

Table 2: Within Plant-Product Trajectories for New Exported Products

*Notes*: Regression output corresponds to the estimation of equation (5). The regression for TFPR is run at the plant level; it controls for plant fixed effects and sector-year effects (at the 2-digit level). The remaining regressions are run at the plant-product level (with products defined at the 7-digit level); they control for plant-product fixed effects and 4-digit sector-year fixed effects. A plant-product is defined as an export entrant if it is the first product exported by a plant and is sold domestically for at least one period before entry into the export market. Section 4.1 provides further detail. Standard errors (clustered at the plant-product level) in parentheses. Key: \*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

Periods After Entry	0	1	2	3
Revenue TFP	0118	.0363	.0221	.105
	(.0229)	(.0422)	(.0528)	(.0692)
Price	145***	163**	303**	563*
	(.0529)	(.0708)	(.143)	(.274)
Marginal Cost	103*	203**	279*	733**
	(.0586)	(.0888)	(.148)	(.264)
Markup	00920	.0124	0453	.0955
	(.0284)	(.0521)	(.0539)	(.0961)
Reported Average Cost	137*	225***	152	745**
	(.0795)	(.0810)	(.186)	(.267)
Treated Observations (Min/Max)	129 / 130	83 / 84	46 / 48	24 / 25
Control Observations (Min/Max)	645 / 650	415 / 420	230 / 240	120 / 125

Table 3: Estimated Trajectories for New Exported Products: Matching Results

*Notes*: Coefficients correspond to the differential growth of each variable with respect to the preentry year (t = -1) between export entrants and controls. The control group are plant-products that had a-priori a similar likelihood (propensity score) of being exported as export entrants, but that continued to be sold domestically only. Controls are selected from the pool of plants that produce the same product as new exporters. The specification of the propensity score is explained in section 4.2 and in Appendix D. In this table we match each entrant with the 5 nearest neighbors. Period t = 0 corresponds to the export entry year. The criteria for defining a plant-product as entrant is explained in the notes to Table 2. The number of treated and control observations differ across dependent variables; the minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) number of observations are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Key: \*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \*10%.

Periods After Entry	0	1	2	3			
Panel A: Balanced Sample							
Revenue TFP	00137	0270	.0396	.0706			
	(.0808)	(.0991)	(.0728)	(.0767)			
Price	528**	508**	557***	460**			
	(.207)	(.210)	(.185)	(.207)			
Marginal Cost	593***	479**	591***	557***			
	(.203)	(.189)	(.184)	(.192)			
Markup	.0652	0293	.0343	.0968			
	(.0940)	(.120)	(.0919)	(.101)			
Average Cost	648***	518*	684***	553**			
C	(.203)	(.272)	(.213)	(.226)			
Treated Observations	19	19	19	19			
Control Observations	95	95	95	95			
Panel B: Single-Product Plants							
Revenue TFP	0318	.0210	00930	0326			
	(.0416)	(.0658)	(.0863)	(.0686)			
Price	262*	457**	526	480			
	(.136)	(.211)	(.295)	(.341)			
Marginal Cost	336**	433**	691**	805**			
	(.126)	(.186)	(.243)	(.302)			
Markup	0218	0273	.0885	.0384			
-	(.0586)	(.0774)	(.0859)	(.0634)			
Average Cost	140	471*	700**	452			
C C	(.255)	(.228)	(.288)	(.314)			
Treated Observations (Min/Max)	32/34	18 / 20	8 / 10	7/8			
Control Observations (Min/Max)	160 / 170	90 / 100	40 / 50	35 / 40			

#### Table 4: Matching Results: Robustness

*Notes*: Panel A replicates Table 3 for the sample of plant-products that are observed in each period t = -2, ..., 3 (balanced panel). In Panel B we show the matching results for the sample of single product plants. Coefficients correspond to the differential growth of each variable with respect to the pre-entry year (t = -1) between entrants and controls. The criteria for selecting controls is explained in the notes to Table 3. Period t = 0 corresponds to the entry year. The criteria for defining a plant as entrant can be found in the notes to Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Key: \*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

Periods After Entry	0	1	2	3
Low Initial Productivity	210**	221**	374*	-1.053*
	(.0804)	(.0879)	(.218)	(.559)
High Initial Productivity	00162	187	199	520**
	(.0837)	(.148)	(.205)	(.234)
Treated Observations	129	84	48	25
Control Observations	645	420	240	125

Table 5: Differential Effect on Marginal Cost for Initially Low and High Productivity Entrants

*Notes*: The table analyzes heterogenous effects of export entry, depending on initial productivity. Coefficients correspond to the average effect of entry for entrants with initially low pre-exporting productivity, relative to high pre-exporting productivity entrants. Outcome variable is the growth of marginal cost with respect to the pre-entry period (t = -1). We use pre-exporting TFPR to split plant-products into above- and below- median productivity. The criteria for selecting controls can be found in the notes to Table 3. Period t = 0 corresponds to the export entry year. The criteria for defining a plant as entrant are described in the notes to Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Key: \*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \* 10%.

Table 6: TFPR and Markup Premium for Old and Young Exporters

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	log(TFPR)			log(Markups)		
Premium reported for:	All	Young	Young vs. Old	All	Young	Young vs. Old
Premium	.172*** (.028)	.195*** (.032)	00897 (.028)	.0862*** (.018)	.0634** (.029)	-0.0365* (.019)
Sector-Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
$R^2$	.98	.98	.99	.15	.15	.24
Observations	39,583	32,227	8,204	82,924	72,206	11,623

*Notes*: Regressions using revenue productivity (TFPR) as dependent variable are run at the plant level and control for 2-digit sector-year fixed effects; regressions of markups are run at the 7-digit product-plant level and control for 4-digit sector-year effects. In addition, all regressions control for plant size (log employment). Columns (1) and (4) report the percentage difference of the dependent variable between exporters and non-exporters in a panel of 8,500 (4,900 average per year) Chilean plants over the period 1996-2005. Columns (2) and (5) replicate columns (1) and (4) for the sample of young exporters (3 years or less after export entry). Columns (3) and (6) report the percentage difference of the dependent variable between old and young exporters within a subsample that only includes exporters. Clustered standard errors (at the sector level) in parentheses. Key: \*\*\* significant at 1%; \*\* 5%; \*10%.