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IMMIGRANT GROUP SIZE AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION:
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

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Working Paper 18827
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w18827>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
February 2013

Previously circulated as "Immigrant Group Size and Political Mobilization: Evidence from the European Migration." I am grateful for the access to census manuscripts provided by Ancestry.com. Phil Wetzel provided outstanding research assistance. I thank seminar participants at UCLA, the University of Houston, the University of Michigan, Rutgers University, and Northwestern University. I appreciate helpful suggestions from Dora Costa, Leah Boustan, Naomi Lamoreaux, Jeffrey Lewis, Randall Walsh, Werner Troesken, David Albuoy, Paul Rhode, Carolyn Moehling, and Martin Saavedra. I also thank David Ash and the California Center for Population Research for providing computing resources and support, Carlos Villareal and the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago for producing the digitized city ward maps, and Martin Brennan and Jean-Francois Richard for their support of the project. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Immigrant Group Size and Political Mobilization: Evidence from European Migration to the United States

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NBER Working Paper No. 18827

February 2013, Revised April 2014

JEL No. D72,J15,N31

ABSTRACT

Immigration to democratic nations generates new groups of potential voters. This paper investigates how the electorate share of immigrant groups influences their decision to become politically mobilized. I consider two mechanisms through which electorate share could impact an immigrant's likelihood of voting: the contestability of local elections and the existence of ethnic social networks that facilitate political organization. Using newly assembled data on ethnic enclaves in American cities in the early twentieth century, I show immigrants were more likely to mobilize politically as their share of the local electorate grew larger, but only in places where the Democratic Party likely needed to their vote to win elections and where immigrants had established enclaves. I also consider the shape of the electorate share effect, showing it is nonlinear and in particular tapers off for groups larger than one fifth of the local electorate.

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I. Introduction

The question of how minority groups access public goods has received a great deal of attention in economics, particularly from the perspective of ethnic fractionalization studies. Economists have documented that more diverse municipalities spend less on education and infrastructure and have residents who are less likely to participate in civic organizations or support welfare programs (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999 and 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Luttmer, 2001). However, the question of how minorities, and particularly immigrants, many of whom are from undemocratic sending countries, choose to mobilize and participate in the political process themselves remains largely unexplored. Of particular interest to scholars and policy makers is whether immigrants are more likely to vote as their ethnic group's share of the electorate grows and their political clout increases. Empirical investigation of this question has been thus far limited by measurement problems in contemporary voting datasets.

The first measurement problem that complicates empirical investigation of immigrant political mobilization is that many foreign-born individuals in the present day United States are undocumented and thus ineligible for citizenship. However, existing datasets do not contain information on legal status, rendering it impossible to know which immigrants are potential voters and hence what share of the electorate is composed of foreign-born individuals eligible to participate in the political process. The second measurement problem is that few datasets combine measures of political participation, detailed demographic characteristics, and political geographic identifiers below the state level.² Previous work has necessarily relied on aggregate regressions using voter

² An exception is the November CPS supplement which has measures of voting behavior and county-level geographic identifiers. This data source was used by Jang (2009) to study immigrant group size and voting behavior and by Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2005) to study group size and black political participation. Although counties are smaller than states, they are not an important political unit and hence cannot be used to study the role of electorate share on immigrant political participation unless they are aggregated to the state level.

turnout as the dependent variable, making it difficult to know what is driving any correlation between immigrant electorate share and turnout.³

To overcome the limitations of contemporary data for studying immigrant political mobilization, I turn instead to the mass migration from Europe to the United States in the early twentieth century. This setting has several key advantages for the study of why immigrants vote. First, the United States maintained a nearly open border to immigration during this period, so every European immigrant had equal capacity to initiate citizenship proceedings and participate in the political process. Second, citizenship was optional for immigrants simply interested in living and working in the United States, even over the long term.⁴ Becoming a citizen was necessary only to obtain the right to vote, and there were virtually no publicly provided benefits that were available to citizens only. Therefore, citizenship attainment can be used as a proxy for political mobilization in this era. The census asked every immigrant about his citizenship status in 1900 and 1910, providing an unusually broad measure of the political engagement of foreign-born individuals living in the United States.

To construct a dataset covering immigrant citizenship attainment and local electorate share in the early twentieth century, I collected the universe of census records from the genealogy website Ancestry.com and computed the size of ethnic groups in wards, the political unit used to elect city councilmen, for four large cities in 1900 and 1910. City governments invested substantial resources in infrastructure related to sanitation and transportation at the start of the century, and immigrant groups could compete for local spending only if they became citizens, registered to vote, and translated their numbers into credible voting blocs. Another advantage of this context is the rich

³ A recent paper on the impact of the Voting Rights Act sidestepped this problem by instead studying the shift of public resources towards black localities after African Americans' voting rights increased (Cascio and Washington, 2012).

⁴ The entry of the United States into WWI in 1916 changed the costs and benefits of citizenship: anyone from a non-hostile sending country who had initiated citizenship proceedings could be drafted. The United States government ended the open border policy in 1921 by implementing an immigration system based on quotas from each sending country.

variation in immigrant group electorate share across city wards. Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, and Russians each comprised as much as a third of ward electorates across the sample of 87 wards. The large number of voting units and multiple ethnic groups present in the data allow me to include both ward and ethnic group fixed effects in my analysis.

Using citizenship attainment, I investigate the determinants of immigrant political mobilization, focusing on the role of local ethnic group electorate share. I consider two mechanisms through which electorate share could impact an immigrant's likelihood of voting: the contestability of local elections and the existence of ethnic social networks that facilitate organization. The contestability of local elections influences the potential *benefit* to mobilization, and immigrants should be more likely to mobilize where they are likely to be a decisive voting bloc and derive greater payoffs from political participation. This hypothesis stems from the theory of minimal winning coalitions, first proposed by Riker (1962). Established social networks should influence the *cost* of mobilization, and in particular mobilization should be less costly in enclaves that have existed long enough for local institutions that facilitate mobilization to form.

I find that immigrants were more likely to naturalize as their ethnic group's share of the local electorate grew, but only in wards where the benefits were potentially large due to the possibility of a Democratic coalition and where the costs were lower due to the presence of an established ethnic enclave. For these immigrants, a standard deviation increase in electorate share around the mean implies an increase in naturalization likelihood of 12 percentage points (21 percent increase relative to the mean of 56 percent naturalized).⁵ To measure the ex ante size of the Democratic Party in a ward (and hence determine where an new immigrant coalition partner would be attractive), I use the share of the population composed of individuals whose ethnic ancestry made them likely to align with Democrats on key social issues of the day such opposing the prohibition of alcohol, allowing

⁵ I present the magnitude of the effect with respect to the mean of electorate share because the effect is nonlinear.

foreign language schools, and keeping the border open to further immigration. To distinguish established enclaves from new immigrant settlements, I use the year of immigration variable in the Ancestry.com data and count the number of earlier arriving immigrants from the same source country in each ward. I provide evidence that the selection into wards with good coalition potential or established enclaves is unlikely to drive the electorate share effect.

I also consider the shape of the electorate share effect, showing it is nonlinear and in particular tapers off for groups larger than one fifth of the local electorate. This finding is consistent with an extensive margin effect as a group initially grows larger and becomes increasingly likely to be pivotal in local elections. However, after some threshold is reached, additional immigrant voters are not needed to maintain the winning coalition, and due to this intensive margin effect recent immigrants are not increasingly likely to naturalize as the group grows larger after this point. Although I cannot observe the weights of every group in the electorate as in studies of legislative bargaining, I argue that the observed threshold in the data is consistent with the average electoral share of the ex ante Democratic Party in wards where immigrants were mobilizing politically.

While the historical setting provides a rich laboratory for studying immigrant political mobilization, inevitable differences across time and cultures limit the ability to extrapolate the findings of this paper to the contemporary setting. For instance, the sending countries studied in this paper are all in Europe while major sending countries today are located in Central America and Asia. Also, the citizenship process is now considerably more complex, and economic motivations dominate political considerations for most immigrants contemplating naturalization. The citizenship approach used in this paper is thus of limited use in later time periods.

My findings contribute to the literature on the social and economic assimilation process of immigrants to the United States. Economists have investigated many aspects of immigrant assimilation and convergence, particularly earnings and education (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985;

LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson, 2012; Card, 2005; Lleras-Muney and Shertzer, 2012). This paper studies the political dimension of immigrant assimilation, which previously received much less attention in economics. The necessity of an established enclave for political mobilization contributes to a more recent literature on the role of social networks for immigrant outcomes. Economists have demonstrated that the density of social networks impacts immigrant employment and welfare enrollment (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000; Munshi, 2003; Beaman, 2012). My methods also provide insight into the question of why people vote more generally. The primary finding of this paper, that ethnic electorate share influences an immigrant's decision to participate in the political process, underscores the importance of considering social structures in models of voter turnout and provides new evidence for the validity of group-based approaches (for instance, Uhlaner, 1989; Morton, 1991; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999).

The paper is organized as follows: Section II surveys the historical context of immigrant politics in early twentieth century cities and justifies naturalization as a proxy for political participation. Section III describes the sources of historical data used in the paper and the empirical strategy. Section IV discusses the relationship between electoral share and political mobilization as indicated by citizenship attainment. Section V concludes.

II. Historical Context and Citizenship in the Early 1900s

A. Immigrants and Urban Politics

The United States maintained an open border to European immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and ward-based politics played a prominent role in the lives of the millions of newcomers who settled in the industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Locally elected ward aldermen, or city councilmen, served as a vital link to services and favors from the

central city government (Kornbluh, 2000, p. 129).⁶ To secure the loyalty of new immigrants and remain politically competitive, aldermen strategically provided informal public assistance to their constituents. In the colorful collection of talks by George W. Plunkitt about his career in the Tammany Hall political machine in New York City, the former aldermen describes how he bought clothes for fire victims, gave candy to children, and matched up young men to jobs with local businesses (Riordon [1905] 1994, p. 64).

Aldermen were also responsible for presenting public works and licensing proposals to the relevant city boards on behalf of individuals in their wards. It was feasible for aldermen to concentrate their lobbying efforts on decisive constituencies in their wards in part due to the prevailing custom of “aldermanic courtesy” in which council committees deferred to an alderman on any issue that dealt solely with his ward (Teaford, 1984, p. 26). If an alderman wished to bestow a privilege such as the right to erect a sidewalk fruit stand on one of his constituents, he could do so on his own accord since the matter did not affect the rest of the city. An alderman could also present proposals for road paving or sidewalk improvement that would differentially benefit members of a particular group in his ward. The concentrated authority of the alderman served as a powerful incentive for ethnic groups to become involved in ward politics. The first step in this process was naturalization of foreign-born members so they could register to vote.

The political mobilization of these new immigrants, most of whom had never participated in an election before, often occurred within the framework of the patronage political systems of the day. For instance, the Tammany Hall machine attempted to absorb Jewish and Italian newcomers using a variety of favors including municipal jobs and protection from Irish gangs (Werner, 1928). One boss summarized his machine’s mobilization efforts thusly:

⁶ Some cities switched to at-large elections in the early twentieth century. The cities in my sample were still using a system of ward-level elections to choose aldermen between 1900 and 1909.

“Tammany looks after them for the sake of their vote, grafts them onto the Republic, makes citizens of them in short; and although you may not like our motives or our methods, what other agency is there by which so long a row could have been hoed so quickly or so well?”

-Tammany Hall Boss Richard Croker⁷

Although it was not the case for all urban areas in the United States, most large, immigrant-receiving cities in the Northeast and Midwest had political machines by 1900, including the four studied in this paper (Menes, 1999). Immigrant political mobilization in this context is thus intrinsically linked to strategic actions taken by political machines.

New immigrant groups tended to vote as homogenous blocs along ethnic lines once members of the group became naturalized citizens able to vote. Reformers of the day considered this tendency to be a form of fraud since immigrants were voting in their narrow self-interest instead of in the “true public spirit” (Kleppner, 1987, p. 169). Nonetheless, the bloc voting behavior noted by Kleppner and others justifies the grouping individuals by country of origin used in this paper. The desire to win the “Polish vote” or “Italian vote” also motivated strategists from both political parties to incorporate the new immigrants into their coalitions. An observer of Tammany Hall noted that “every time an election comes around, the Republicans and Democrats cater to the German element... or the Jewish... and tell them they are the greatest things that ever happened.” (Henderson, 1976, p. 159). Established political parties lobbied for support among the new immigrant groups, and they assisted the newcomers with the naturalization and registration procedures required to bring them into the electorate.

B. Naturalization status as an indicator of political engagement

The suitability of naturalization status as a proxy for political participation is rooted in the role of the state and federal governments in the early twentieth century. In stark contrast to the present

⁷ As cited in Werner (1928).

day, there was no direct benefit to becoming a naturalized citizen except securing the right to vote and run for public office.⁸ Immigrants from European countries were de facto permanent residents in the sense that they could live and work in the United States indefinitely without applying for a visa or beginning naturalization proceedings.⁹ In addition, prior to the New Deal the federal government offered little in the way of retirement benefits or welfare to citizens that could serve as motivation for immigrants to begin the naturalization process. Access to education was not an issue for resident aliens; in fact, illiterate immigrants above the compulsory schooling age were encouraged to attend publicly-funded evening schools in many cities (Hill, 1919).

Should he decide to become an American citizen, any white male immigrant could file a declaration of intention, or “first papers,” in a court of law after a residency period in the United States of at least two years. After having completed a total residency period of five years, the immigrant could complete the citizenship process by taking an oath of allegiance and filing a petition of naturalization, or “second papers.” I focus on men in the empirical analysis because women and children usually received derivative citizenship from the male head of the family when he completed the naturalization process.

To further justify the use naturalization status as a proxy for political engagement, I provide evidence that foreign-born men who became naturalized citizens in fact participated in elections. The anonymous and aggregate nature of voting data makes a direct test impossible since the individual characteristics of the participants in early twentieth century urban elections are unobserved. However, I can document that higher voter turnout was associated with a larger number of naturalized foreign-born male residents of city wards, all else equal. I use Chicago voting data

⁸ Most states restricted licensed occupations such as attorney, physician, or accountants to American citizens, but these laws likely had little effect on poor, recently arrived immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Non-citizens were also barred from becoming plumbers in four states and barbers in five states (Konvitz, 1946 provides a complete list of restrictions by state). It is difficult to determine how thoroughly these statutes were enforced. In the paper I assume that obtaining the right to vote was the primary motivation to naturalize; nonetheless, I acknowledge that gaining entry to a restricted occupation may have served as an incentive for some immigrants.

⁹ Immigrants of Chinese descent were barred from becoming U.S. citizens under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

compiled by Skogan (1989) to obtain turnout rates coupled with the IPUMS census samples from 1900, 1910, and 1920 to obtain measures of the number of both naturalized and alien foreign-born men aged 21 and above in each ward. I partition the potential electorate and estimate the number of ballots cast in the Chicago mayoral elections as a function of the number of naturalized, foreign-born male immigrants aged 21; the number of native-born white men aged 21 and over; the number of native-born, nonwhite men aged 21 and over and estimate:

$$\begin{aligned} Ballots_{kt} = & \alpha + \beta(Naturalized\ Men\ 21+)_{kt} + \gamma(Native\ White\ Men\ 21+)_{kj} + \\ & + \pi(Native\ Nonwhite\ Men\ 21+)_{kj} + \theta(Year)_t + \varepsilon_{kt} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where k indexes wards and t indexes the year. I pool data from 1900, 1910, and 1920 and include year fixed effects in both regressions reported in Table 1.¹⁰

The first column reports the relationship between the numerical size of each group and the number of ballots cast in Chicago's wards. The coefficient on the number of naturalized foreign-born men is equal to .495 and significant. This effect is consistent with the notion that many immigrants did in fact vote after they become eligible, and in fact that they voted at rates comparable to native-born whites (the coefficient on native-born whites is .751). There is no similar positive effect for native-born nonwhites, suggesting that African Americans voted less often than whites. In the second column I rerun the same specification on just the white population (e.g. dropping the black population from the regression) and find similar results. In the third and fourth columns, I also present the results from a specification with the groups expressed as shares of the electorate with voter turnout (as a share of registered voters) as the dependent variable, controlling for the size of the registered electorate in each ward. I find similar results with the effect of naturalized immigrant share on turnout positive and close in size to the effect of native-born white share.

¹⁰ I focus on men in these regressions even though women were permitted to vote in Illinois in 1913. Women initially voted at much lower rates and hence voter turnout as a share of the eligible population appeared to plunge after the franchise was extended to women. I do not include ward fixed effects in this regression because Chicago redistricted its ward system after each census.

In this aggregate framework I cannot distinguish between naturalized immigrants voting themselves and the presence of naturalized immigrants spurring higher turnout from natives as a form of “defensive voting.” The difficulty associated with interpreting these results underscores the advantage of using individual-level data in a panel framework to study political mobilization, and I use such an approach for the remainder of the paper. Nonetheless, the results from Table 1 are consistent with higher voter turnout among naturalized immigrants compared with resident aliens and similar to Tuckel and Maisel (1994), who show that voter turnout in the 1908 election in eight large cities is positively correlated with the fraction of the electorate that is foreign born and naturalized.

III. Data and Estimation Framework

A. Ward Data from the 1900s

I combine three data sources for the main empirical work. First, I employ detailed digital maps of four major cities to establish consistent political geography for 106 city wards from 1900 to 1910. I then use novel 100 percent census samples of the electorate from a genealogy website to precisely measure the size of ethnic groups within wards. Finally, I rely on smaller census microdata samples to obtain data on the naturalization status of individuals, which was not digitized in the 100 percent samples.

The Center for Population Economics (CPE) at the University of Chicago provided the redistricting histories for the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia used in this paper.¹¹ The sample is thus composed of four of the five largest cities in the United States in 1900, all of them major immigrant destinations. Furthermore, all the cities in the sample had local (at the ward level) elections for city councilmen through at least 1910 and are considered by historians to

¹¹ I do not include the other two cities for which the CPE digitized ward maps (Cincinnati and Baltimore) because wards were not used for municipal elections in Cincinnati and relatively few immigrants settled in Baltimore. Constructing ward histories is a costly and complex endeavor, and consequently I restrict my potential sample to the cities covered by the CPE’s research team (NIH grant P01 AG10120, PI Robert W. Fogel).

have had political machines in place. In sum, while the sample is not representative of all areas in which immigrants settled in the early twentieth century, the included cities reflect the institutional environment facing many European newcomers to the large cities of the Northeast and Midwest.

Unlike Congressional districts, city wards were not legally required to be redrawn at any point, and cities could simply add wards to their existing system when they annexed land.¹²

Although all four of the cities made changes to their ward systems over the decade, I am able to use about 80 percent of the wards present in 1900 in the panel. The excluded wards are mainly from outlying areas that were annexed or split into two wards during at some point in the decade. Thus my sample consists primarily of the core urban wards in each city where nearly all immigrants settled.

Further details on the panel wards can be found in the Data Appendix.

The detailed CPE maps also enable me to address redistricting events from early in the decade which would otherwise render the ward systems from the two censuses incomparable. In particular, both the ward systems in Chicago and Manhattan were redrawn shortly after the 1900 census, so the wards in place in 1900 and 1910 were very different from each other. To create a panel of wards, I use census enumeration districts (small administrative units used internally by the Census Bureau) from 1900 to construct synthetic 1910 wards for the year 1900. I use the 1901 to 1910 borders because they represent the political units in place when the recently arrived immigrants I study in this paper were deciding whether or not to naturalize.¹³ Specifically, I use the 1900 census enumeration districts to construct synthetic 1910 wards for the year 1900, which I then use to estimate the population characteristics of the 1910 wards had they been in place in 1900. Using these synthetic

¹² Assembly Districts were used to elect aldermen in Manhattan by 1900 although wards were still used for other municipal purposes. For this reason I use Assembly Districts in place of wards for Manhattan. For simplicity of exposition, I continue to use the term “ward” to refer to voting units in the paper.

¹³ A concern with these borders is that they were redrawn in 1901 to dilute the vote of growing immigrant groups from the 1890s decade. However, since my baseline sample contains immigrants who arrived within the past 15 years, the majority of naturalization decisions in the 1900 to 1910 decade would have been made based on electorate share relative to the 1901 to 1910 borders. For this reason I use the 1901 to 1910 borders as the “treatment” throughout the paper.

1910 wards I am able to construct a panel dataset with the 1910 wards as the geographic unit of observation for both 1900 and 1910.

The second source of data is a novel 100 percent sample of census records covering the population of these four cities, with both ward and enumeration district identifiers, taken from the genealogy website AncestryLibrary.com. These counts are a substantial improvement over existing sources of data. IPUMS samples are at present only 5% and 1.4% of the population for 1900 and 1910, respectively, and are insufficient for precisely estimating the size of minority immigrant groups at the ward level. Furthermore, using AncestryLibrary.com allows me to make counts by gender, age, year of immigration, and place of birth so the potential electorate was for each group and ward in my sample can be precisely measured. I restrict the sample to men aged 21 and older since only men over the age of 21 could vote.¹⁴ Since only men who had been in the United States for at least two years were eligible for citizenship, I also restrict the immigrant counts to men who arrived at least two years before the respective censuses of 1900 and 1910. The full sample covers 9 million records from the AncestryLibrary.com database. Total sample counts line up closely with city population tallies published by the census for both 1900 and 1910, although some of the records are illegible and could not be included in the sample.¹⁵

I focus on ethnic groups whose peak year of immigration to the United States was after 1880: Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, and Russians. To compute the ethnic group electorate shares, I classify individuals based on their reported place of birth where possible. However, because of changes in how the census treated individuals born in present-day Poland and the Czech Republic, it is not possible to match individuals to the Polish and Czech groups in 1910 using place of birth.¹⁶

¹⁴ The voting age was not lowered to 18 until 1971.

¹⁵ Less than 5 percent of the census records are illegible in the sample.

¹⁶ Poland and Czechoslovakia were not independent countries until after WWI. Earlier in the twentieth century, the territory that would become Poland and Czechoslovakia was partitioned between the Russian, German, and the Austro-Hungarian empires.

My algorithm for estimating the number of ethnic Poles, Czechs, Russians, and Germans in each ward in 1910 can be found in the Data Appendix. The final dataset contains a count of the number of eligible potential voters for every immigrant group and ward in my sample as well as the total number of voters, including the native born.

AncestryLibrary.com did not digitize the naturalization status of immigrants, so my third source of data is the Integrated Public Use Microdata IPUMS microdata samples (Ruggles et al., 2008). I use the 5 percent sample of the 1900 census and 1.4 percent sample of the 1910 census. I match foreign-born respondents living in the four sample cities to their ward of residence and to their ethnic group using place of birth generally and mother tongue for Poles and Czechs in 1910. My main dependent variable, an indicator for having initiated the naturalization process, is equal to one if the individual has either first or second papers.

The summary statistics in Table 2 cover the 87 wards in the panel containing at least one immigrant from the five sending countries studied in this paper. The ward-level statistics presented in the top panel give a glimpse of the magnitude of immigration flows to large industrial cities in the early twentieth century: the average ward population in the sample is almost 40 percent foreign born in 1910. Because Germans and Irish had begun arriving sixty years earlier, a substantial second-generation population from these groups existed alongside the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The share of the electorate composed of either first or second-generation Irish immigrants is about 20 percent in both sample years, and the share for Germans is 14 percent in 1900 and 18 percent in 1910. The average ward group electorate size for the new immigrant groups I focus on in the paper (men aged 21 and above, excluding immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for less than two years) is about 11,500 men per ward.

The summary statistics of individual characteristics of recent immigrants from Poland, Bohemia (the area comprising the present-day Czech Republic), Hungary, Italy, and Russia are

presented in the lower panel of Table 2. The sample covers immigrants who have been in the U.S. for at least two years (and are hence eligible to vote) but not more than 15 years, limiting the likelihood of observing an immigrant in a different ward from which he naturalized. I discuss this limitation of my approach in the next section. There are 192 enclaves (defined as population of a particular ethnic group of any size in a ward) across the 87 wards with an average of 740 eligible voters in 1900 and 1,060 in 1910. The average electorate share increased from 7 percent to 10 percent over the decade with some groups as large as 35 percent.¹⁷ The naturalization rate fell over the decade from 51 percent to 26 percent, consistent with the secular decline in new immigrant naturalization after 1900 reported in previous work (Trounstine, 2008).

B. Empirical Framework

The objective of the empirical work is to ascertain whether an immigrant's likelihood of becoming politically mobilized depends on his ethnic group's share of the local electorate. I consider two mechanisms through which electorate share could impact an immigrant's likelihood of voting: the contestability of local elections and the existence of ethnic social networks that facilitate organization. In this section I review the key ideas related to these mechanisms from the literature and explain how I will test them.

Electorate share and the contestability of elections: The electorate share of an immigrant group is predicted by economic theory to affect the benefit of political mobilization. Since the immigrant groups I consider in this paper are all ward minorities who could not have captured aldermanic seats on their own, coalition formation is the primary mechanism through which ethnic group electorate share should affect the expected payoff for participating in elections. The core

¹⁷ I exclude the four immigrant enclaves in my sample that were approaching majority status in their ward and focus on minority groups comprising less than 35 percent of the ward electorate. I found suggestive evidence that the incentive to mobilize again increases for groups nearing majority status in their wards; however, I have too few groups in this range to investigate this idea systematically.

notion of minimal winning coalitions due to Riker (1962) is that, because the payoff to any victorious coalition is identical, winning coalitions should only contain members required to win, lest the winning coalition need to split the spoils of victory amongst more members than necessary.

Empirical predictions from Riker's model on the relationship between electorate share and the payoffs to participation are not sharp (for an elaboration on this problem, see Lucas, 1978).¹⁸ However, the context of this paper is considerably simpler than the general legislative bargaining framework studied in much of the previous literature. In particular, I am interested the outcome from a process where two extant political parties competing for an aldermanic seat face a fixed cost of incorporating new immigrant groups into their respective coalitions. This fixed cost, which is related to the wooing of the ethnic group leadership by political parties, means that immigrant groups become more attractive as a coalition partner as they grow larger and are increasingly likely to be decisive in local elections. While this *extensive* margin consideration should lead to an increasing likelihood of mobilization as electorate share grows, after some threshold is reached, additional immigrant voters are not needed to maintain the winning coalition. Due to this *intensive* margin effect, immigrants may not be increasingly likely to naturalize as the group grows beyond this threshold.

The threshold for a decisively-sized immigrant group depends on several factors that are difficult to observe in this context, including the *ex ante* closeness of elections (see Nalebuff and Schachar, 1999 for a discussion of the limits of *ex post* election data for measuring contestability) and voter turnout by group. Although I cannot observe all of these factors, the historical context provides a way to measure the size of the *ex ante* local Democratic Party. This party, dominated by first and second-generation Irish and Germans, was the most common coalition partner of new immigrant

¹⁸ This fixed cost also rules out employing recent advances in the legislative bargaining theory literature to simplify the analytical framework. For instance, Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) show that an individual's payoff is proportional to her voting weight in the context of a noncooperative bargaining game.

groups. Referred to as Liturgical Democrats, Catholic Irish and Lutheran Germans had similar preferences to new immigrant groups, particularly opposing prohibition, allowing foreign-language schools, and keeping the American border open. Examining the size of these earlier arriving ethnic groups gives a sense of the size immigrant groups needed to reach to be credible coalition partners. The average electorate share of the combined first and second-generation Irish and German groups was about 35 percent of the electorate in 1900 for the wards in the sample, so a coalition with a new immigrant group of comprising 15 or 20 percent of the ward would be sufficient to form a winning coalition in the average ward.

In the empirical work I consider the relationship between local electorate share and immigrant political mobilization for enclaves located in wards where liturgical Democrats, as measured by the share of the electorate composed of first and second-generation German and Irish voters, likely needed a coalition partner and where did they not, either because they were a small minority or already an electoral majority. I refer to these wards where liturgical Democratic voters were between 25 and 50 percent of the electorate as having “good coalition potential” and places where they were less than 25 percent or more than 50 percent (e.g. already a majority) as having “poor coalition potential.” I also allow the effect of electorate share and mobilization to be nonlinear, both by examining the relationship nonparametrically and by including linear and quadratic electoral share terms in the empirical work.

Electorate share and ethnic social networks: A separate literature has emphasized the role of social networks in determining economic and political outcomes for immigrants. Larger networks have been associated with both a higher likelihood of employment and the ability to escape occupational traps (Munshi, 2003, 2011). Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) demonstrate a similar phenomenon in the present day by showing that welfare participation by non-English-speaking immigrants is affected by the density of their social network. In more recent work, Chay

and Munshi (2013) argue that social ties were critical for the development of networks used by blacks to mobilize politically during Reconstruction. The existence of established ethnic social networks should thus be expected to impact the cost of immigrant group political mobilization, namely, more established enclaves should have been easier to mobilize.

Social interactions between immigrants in early twentieth century cities would have been facilitated by ethnic churches, ethnic newspapers, civic organizations, and other local institutions founded by earlier arrivers from the same group. Although I cannot measure the number of these local ethnic institutions directly, I can proxy for their development using a measure of how established immigrant groups were in a particular area. Intuitively, I want to differentiate between enclaves with an established core of earlier arrived members – who would have founded some of the institutions necessary for political mobilization – and enclaves representing the same electorate share composed almost entirely of fresh arrivals with little knowledge of the American political system.

To measure how established enclaves were, I use the year of immigration variable in the 100 percent census samples to create a count of the number of individuals in each enclave in 1900 who had lived in the U.S. for at least a decade. The average enclave in 1900 contained 870 men and women who had been living in the U.S. for at least ten years and the median was 488.¹⁹ To investigate the role of established social networks in political mobilization, I subdivide the sample using the median number of individuals present since 1890. For ease of exposition, I call the enclaves with above median number of members present since 1890 “established” enclaves and those with below median number “recent” enclaves. I then explore the role of electorate share for political mobilization of immigrants living in established and recent enclaves.

¹⁹ I use both the total population (men and women of any age) when measuring the size of social networks because women could contribute to development of churches and civic associations. I use men aged 21 and over when measuring the size of the electorate because only they could vote.

C. Estimating Equation and Identification of Electorate Share Effect

In order to estimate the effect of electorate share on immigrant political mobilization, I take advantage of the variation in the relative size of ethnic groups in different wards across time. The main estimating equation relates changes in the naturalization likelihood of immigrants to changes in the share of the electorate comprised of their ethnic group. Focusing on first differences allows me to disentangle the impact of electorate share from other unobserved determinants of voting. In particular, I include ward fixed effects to capture time-invariant characteristics of wards that are correlated with political participation, such as the entrenched relationship of the ward political elite to the central city government. The year fixed effect controls for time trends affecting all cities and ethnic groups, for instance, the national debate regarding closing the border. I also include fixed effects for each ethnicity in the study, which allows each immigrant group to have different baseline probability of political participation.

To examine the relationship between the electorate share of ethnic groups and political mobilization, I estimate equations of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} Naturalized_{ijkt} = & \alpha + \beta(Electorate\ Share)_{jkt} + \\ & + \delta(Size\ of\ Ward\ Electorate)_{jkt} + \eta(Individual\ Controls)_i + \\ & + \theta(Ward)_j + \lambda(Year)_t + \mu(Group)_k + \varepsilon_{ijkt} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where i indexes individuals, j indexes the ward, k indexes the ethnic group (Czechs, Italians, Poles, Russians, and Hungarians), and t indexes the census year. Individual controls include literacy in any language, age, and a series of dummies for years lived in U.S. Electorate share is computed using the number of foreign-born men from that group aged 21 and over as the numerator and the total number of men aged 21 and over living in the ward as the denominator. The dependent variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. Standard errors are clustered at the ward-group-year level. I restrict the sample to foreign-born men aged 21 and over who have been in the

U.S. for at least two years since only they were eligible to both naturalize and vote in both the numerator and denominator.

Immigrants were not eligible to become citizens until they spent two years in the U.S. and long-standing immigrants may no longer live in the ward in which they first chose to naturalize. Thus, a concern with the approach in this paper is that I may not observe an immigrant in the same ward in which he became a citizen. The ideal sample selection balances the tradeoff from measurement error associated with observing an immigrant long after he naturalized, possibly in a different ward, with the loss of statistical power from restricting the sample to very recent arrivals who are less likely to have applied for citizenship. I use a cutoff of 15 years for the empirical work and demonstrate the robustness of my results to other duration cutoffs in Section IV.

The primary difficulty in estimating the causal effect of electorate share on political mobilization comes from the fact that immigrants were not randomly distributed across wards, and those who were the least likely to naturalize may have been drawn to large ethnic enclaves within a city. The selection concern is particularly acute in this context because of the large share of immigrants who sought temporary employment in the United States and then returned to their home countries after a few years.²⁰ If these temporary immigrants were attracted to large enclaves and at the same time unlikely to seek citizenship, the pool of potential voters in these wards would appear larger than it actually was and the electorate share effect would be biased towards zero.²¹ Because they could not vote, I drop all immigrants who had been in the United States for less than two years from the electorate group share and size variables; this sample restriction should also have the effect of reducing the downward bias on the electorate share coefficient because immigrants intending to repatriate would be concentrated amongst the most recent arrivals.

²⁰ Gould (1980) estimates that between 30 and 40 percent of Polish and Hungarians returned home while between 40 and 50 percent of Italians did so in the twenty years before the First World War.

²¹ Alternatively, this type of selected return migration could make the electorate share effect appear to taper off for the largest groups in the sample.

To visualize this selection concern, Figure 1 shows the share of Czech, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian immigrants who had naturalized broken down according to the share of their home ward's electorate composed their ethnic group in the sample (data pooled across 1900 and 1910). Immigrants living in wards where their own ethnic group comprised less than 1 percent of the electorate were the most likely to have initiated or completed the citizenship process (45 percent), particularly compared with immigrants living in wards where their own group comprised 20 percent or more of the electorate (just over 25 percent). This pattern of immigrants who are least likely to naturalize sorting into largest ethnic settlements is consistent with the evidence that the economically weakest migrants are attracted to enclaves in the present day (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund, 2003). However, a striking feature of the data is that the immigrants are not monotonically less likely to have become politically mobilized as their share of the electorate increases: for the three middle bins, immigrants are *more* likely to have naturalized as their share of the electorate increases.

I argue that upward-sloping shape of the unconditional electorate share effect is more likely to be the result of immigrant group political mobilization as opposed to individual location decisions based on economic factors. In particular, immigrants who are more likely to naturalize and remain in the U.S. permanently appear to sort out of large ethnic enclaves, making it unlikely that selection into these older, established ethnic settlements could drive any increasing relationship between electorate share and political mobilization. In fact, this sorting is likely to bias such effects towards zero. Regarding selection by electoral contestability, it seems unlikely that immigrants who are more or less likely to naturalize sorted themselves into wards according to the ex ante strength of the Democratic Party. The unconditional correlation between electorate share and the measure of good coalition potential with liturgical Democrats is -.11 in the sample.

IV. The relationship between electorate share and political mobilization

In this section I present the empirical results of the effect of immigrant electorate share on political mobilization. Due to the potential for a nonlinear effect of electorate share, I begin by documenting the relationship nonparametrically. In particular, I appeal to the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and purge both naturalization status (the dependent variable) and electorate share (the independent variable of interest) of the other independent variables from equation (2). Year, ward, and group fixed effects are also purged from both variables; the nonparametric regressions thus illustrate the same variation used in the panel estimation. Figure 2 presents local linear regression estimators of the residuals for the full sample and key subsamples. Figure 2.A shows that for the full sample, with the exception of a slight decline in the naturalization residual for the smallest electorate share residuals, the relationship is indistinguishable from zero. Figures 2.B and 2.C partition the sample by established and recent enclaves, respectively. For established enclaves, there is evidence of an increasing relationship between electorate share and naturalization, but it tapers off for the largest share residuals. The picture is much different for recent enclaves, with no distinguishable effect and a very wide confidence interval for small electorate share residuals.

The final four figures illustrate the relationship between electorate share and naturalization likelihood for the established and recent enclave samples, further subdivided according to whether there was potential to form voting coalitions with Democrats in the ward or not. Figure 2.D shows the relationship between electorate share and naturalization for immigrants who lived in established enclaves and faced good potential Democratic coalitions. The increasing relationship evident in this figure is the main result of the paper. The relationship between electorate share and naturalization tapers off for the largest share residuals, a finding that is likely driven by the intensive margin considerations (e.g. not every Italian is required to maintain a minimal winning coalition after some threshold is reached) discussed in the previous section. Figure 2.E shows the nonparametric relationship for established enclaves where there was poor potential for Democratic coalitions: the

effect cannot be distinguished from zero at any point in the distribution of electorate share.

Furthermore, there is little evidence of an effect of electorate share on naturalization for any individual living in recent enclaves, regardless of coalition potential (Figures 2.F and 2.G). The relationship is particularly noisy for the smallest electorate share residuals.

Table 3 reports the full sample results from a probit estimation of equation (2). I include quadratic terms to capture the nonlinearity in electorate share evident in Figure 2.D. I first show that, consistent with the nonparametric evidence, there is no statistically significant linear or quadratic relationship between electorate share and naturalization likelihood for the full sample (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 and 4 show the results of a fully interacted specification run on full sample, allowing for differential effects by enclave maturity (recent or established). The difference in electorate share effects between recent and established enclaves suggests that social networks indeed facilitated immigrant group political mobilization. However, immigrants who selected into recent enclaves were far more likely to naturalize independent of electorate share characteristics: the recent enclave main effect is .71, underscoring the selection of immigrants who were the most likely to naturalize into smaller, newer enclaves. Since this sorting works in the opposite direction of the electorate share effect for established enclaves, this type of selection is unlikely to drive the main result.

Table 4 reports the electorate share result for recent and established enclaves, further broken down by whether there was potential for a coalition with the Democratic Party in the ward. Panel A shows that the entire positive effect for established enclaves is driven by political mobilization in wards where an ethnic group faced good prospects for a coalition with liturgical Democrats. The coefficients reported in column 4 are individually and jointly significant at the five percent level and imply an increasing relationship between electorate share and mobilization until ethnic groups reach about one fifth of the electorate. This implied threshold is reasonable given the ex ante size of the average liturgical Democratic voting bloc in these wards (about 35 percent of the electorate). An

ethnic group larger than 20 percent of the electorate would not require all of its members to vote in order to create a minimal winning coalition, reducing the incentive to naturalize additional immigrant arrivals. The correlation between naturalization likelihood and ward coalition potential in the sample is close to zero, making it unlikely that the effect could be driven by sorting of individuals into wards with contested elections.

For immigrant enclaves in these wards, a standard deviation (.08) increase in electorate share from .10 to .18 of the electorate (the mean electorate share of .15 for this sample is roughly centered in this range) is associated with a 12 percentage point increase in the likelihood of naturalization. This is an economically meaningful effect given only about 56 percent of immigrants in these samples have undertaken the citizenship process. Thus, this change is a 21 percent increase in naturalization likelihood. For immigrants in recent enclaves, there is little evidence of group political mobilization in the results from Panel B. The negative relationship in column 5 appears to be driven by the move from the smallest enclaves where immigrants are highly likely to naturalize on their own accord; however, this result is sensitive to the inclusion of outliers on the far left of the distribution (see Figure 2.G).

Table 5 assesses the sensitivity of the electorate share effect for established enclaves with good coalition potential to the sample restriction regarding years lived in the United States. The first four columns present the results from equation (2) for immigrants from established enclaves who have lived in the U.S. for between two and five, ten, fifteen, and twenty years, respectively. Importantly, the electorate share and electorate share squared estimates are jointly significant at the five percent level for all but the most restricted sample where immigrants have had only three years to commence naturalization proceedings (column 1). The electorate share effect implied by the least limited sample estimates (between two and twenty years) is very similar to that of the baseline (between two and fifteen years) sample estimates but slightly decreased in magnitude, suggesting that

measurement error from immigrant mobility has attenuated the results. The fifteen year sample restriction appears to balance the tradeoff between the loss of statistical power from focusing only on the most recent arrivals and the measurement error owing to unobserved mobility among earlier arrivals.²² In column 5 includes city-by-year fixed effects to address the potential for correlation between trends in citizenship attainment and immigrant settlement at the city level. Although the coefficients are slightly reduced in magnitude under this specification, the electorate share effects are still jointly significant at the five percent level.

I have thus far focused on immigrant group political mobilization, assuming that ward politicians viewed immigrants as voting blocs. It is also possible that an alderman could have formed a coalition *across* new immigrants groups, meaning that the overall share of new immigrants in a ward should matter for political mobilization. Table 6 reports the results of a regression where the independent variable of interest is the sum of Hungarian, Czech, Italian, Polish, and Russian immigrants in the electorate, again restricting the sample to individuals who have been in the U.S. for between two and fifteen years. In this case there is evidence of a similar increasing nonlinear effect for the entire sample (column 1), and the effect again appears to be driven by political mobilization in places where there was potential for coalition formation with liturgical Democrats (column 2) or where at least one of the ethnic groups had an established enclave (column 3). Column 4 reports the electorate share effect for wards for which had both coalition potential and an established enclave. The quadratic effect implies that moving from 10 to 18 percent of the electorate is associated with a 20 percentage point increase in naturalization likelihood for immigrants.

The full new immigrant electorate share effect is slightly greater in magnitude than the own group electorate share effect but similar in magnitude. Such a finding is to be expected given the segregation of ethnic groups across wards (e.g. there are rarely multiple new immigrant ethnic groups

²² To the best of my knowledge there is no source that would allow me to systematically account for the mobility of these immigrants since the Census Bureau did not ask about migration until 1940.

comprising a large share of the electorate in the same ward). It is also possible that there were spillovers from relatively large, established immigrant groups onto members of smaller ethnic groups living in the vicinity. In this case the overall size of the new immigrant population would be a more suitable treatment to predict naturalization status than own ethnic group electorate share. This phenomenon would also help explain why there is little relationship between own group electorate share and naturalization for members of small, recently established enclaves (Table 4 Panel B).

V. Conclusions

Although the economists have focused extensively on the question of how immigrants access public goods, the question of how they become politically mobilized and vote has been left large unexplored. The process by which these newcomers become integrated into democratic political systems is particularly relevant because the flow of immigrants over the past century has primarily been from monarchies and empires to democracies like the United States. In this paper, I used a novel dataset and empirical approach to investigate how immigrants joined the American electorate. Specifically, I used the citizenship attainment of immigrants during a period when the United States maintained a nearly open border to measure political mobilization. The naturalization approach allows me to expand beyond the ecological regression framework employed in much of the previous literature on ethnic and racial political behavior.

I find that immigrants were more likely to naturalize as their ethnic group's share of the local electorate grew, but only in wards where the benefits were potentially large due to the possibility of a Democratic coalition and where the costs were lower due to the presence of an established ethnic enclave. I find no significant electorate share effects for immigrants living in enclaves composed almost entirely of very recent arrivals, suggesting established social networks facilitated group political mobilization. However, immigrants who selected into new enclaves were more likely to

naturalize independently of group characteristics. An interesting question for future research concerns the persistence of (or withering away of) ethnic voting. What are the factors that encourage immigrants and their descendants to deprioritize ethnic identification and stratify into other political interest groups in American society?

Data Appendix

A. Panel dataset creation

The ward maps of Boston, Chicago, the Manhattan Borough of New York City, and Philadelphia, were provided by the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago. I used these maps to determine which wards remained unchanged over the 1900 and 1910 censuses. Philadelphia and Boston engaged in only minor changes to their ward systems between 1900 and 1910, mainly annexing or splitting outlying wards. Chicago and Manhattan redistricted their entire ward systems after the 1900 census. I used enumeration districts, which were small (two to four city blocks) administrative units used internally by the Census Bureau, to make a correspondence between the 1900 and 1910 ward systems. Enumeration districts from the 1900 census that did not map entirely into a 1910 ward were assigned to the ward in which the majority of the enumeration district was located. There are relatively few such cases since enumeration districts tended to follow main roads. I use the 1910 wards as the unit of analysis in the paper because they were in place for nearly the entire decade of study.

To be included in the panel dataset, a ward needed to have at least one immigrant from the “new” sending countries in 1900 and 1910: Bohemia (present-day Czech Republic), Greece, Italy, Poland, and Russia. The outlying wards that were excluded because of changing borders were often sparsely populated and contained few or no new immigrants. Out of the 135 total wards, 90 wards had at least one new immigrant and stable borders. They are listed below:

Boston: 1-11, 13-14, 16-19, 21-22

Chicago: 1-17, 19-23, 28

Manhattan*: 1, 4-13, 15-16, 19-23

Philadelphia: 1-8, 11-19, 26, 28, 30-32, 36, 38-39

* Manhattan used assembly districts to elect aldermen, so I use assembly districts instead of wards for this city.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Boston had eight locally elected aldermen and some represented more than one unit (usually 2 to 3 wards). Otherwise all the cities in the sample had locally elected aldermen, each representing one ward or assembly district. Boston switched to at-large aldermanic elections in 1910 but was under a local election regime for the decade studied in this paper.

B. Ethnic group share computation

The ethnic share variables are computed from a 100% sample of digitized individual census records of the population of panel cities. These records, including the place of birth of every resident of each city ward, were collected from the genealogy website AncestryLibrary.com. The pre-WWI map of Europe coupled with changing instructions to census takers necessitates a multi-step approach to constructing ethnic group shares from the raw place of birth data. The main immigrant groups in the sample of cities are English, Germans, Irish, Scandinavians, Czechs, Greeks, Poles, Italians, and Russians. Jewish immigrants had a large presence in cities such as New York, but separately identifying them using only their name and place of birth is difficult. Because most Russian immigrants during this period were in fact Jewish, I group everyone born in Russia together.

I create the ethnic groups from the census data in both census years by aggregating the relevant countries of birth listed by census takers. However, the list of allowable responses for places of birth in central Europe changed between 1900 and 1910. In 1900, respondents born in the Austro-Hungarian, German, or Russian empires were permitted to give their place of birth as Russian Poland, German Poland, Austrian Poland, Bohemia, Austria, Germany or Russia. In 1910, respondents were only permitted to give their place of birth as Austria, Germany, or Russia. As a consequence, ethnic Poles and Czechs are counted as Germans, Austrians, or Russians in the 1910 census. To recover estimates of the true distribution of immigrant ethnic

groups in my sample cities in 1910, I first construct a series of ethnic surname indices in the spirit of Fryer and Leavitt (2004) using the mother tongue variable from IPUMS samples from 1910-1930. These indices quantify how likely an individual is to have a given surname conditional on his or her mother tongue. Because of the small sample sizes of the IPUMS data in these years (1-1.4%), I am unable to use the ethnic name indices to assign individuals from the AncestryLibrary.com data to ethnic groups using only their name. However, I use these indices to confirm the place(s) of birth commonly given by ethnic Poles and Czechs in the 1910 census.

The name indices demonstrate that ethnic Poles are distributed across the German, Russian, and Austrian categories in 1910 while ethnic Czechs are usually counted as Austrian. To estimate the true number of Russian, Polish, Austrian, Czech, and Germans, I assume that the relative shares of each group are fixed between 1900 and 1910. For instance, suppose the population of a sample ward is 10% Austrian Polish, 20% Austrian, and 10% Bohemian in 1900. Further suppose that the population of the same ward is 50% Austrian in 1910. The Austrian category in 1910 contains ethnic Poles and ethnic Czechs in addition to German-speaking Austrians. The relative share of the combined group has grown from 40% ($10\%+20\%+10\%$) to 50% over the first decade of the 1900s. Assuming the relative shares within the Austrian group are fixed, the Austrian Poland group is now 12.5% of the ward population, the Austrian group is 25%, and the Czech 12.5%.

I use these estimates of the true number of individuals from each 1900 category in 1910 to generate a consistent set of ethnic groups in both census years. The number of ethnic Poles in 1900 is defined to be the sum of Austrian Poles, German Poles, and Russian Poles. The number of Czechs in 1900 is defined to be the number of people born in Bohemia. The German, Russian, and Austrian numbers are computed as the number of individuals with that place of birth, net of those assigned to the Czech and Polish groups in 1910. The number of Scandinavians is the sum of respondents who give their place of birth as Sweden, Denmark, or Norway. Italians and the Irish are computed simply as the number of individuals with each respective country of birth.

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
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
Figure 1. Share of Eligible Immigrant Men Naturalized by Ethnic Group Electorate Share




Notes: This chart reports the share of immigrant men eligible to apply for citizenship (that is, men aged 21 and above who have lived in the U.S. for at least two years) who have obtained their first or second naturalization papers in various electorate share categories. Electorate share is computed as the share of the ward electorate composed of foreign-born men eligible to apply for citizenship from an immigrant's home country. The ethnic groups represented are Czechs, Russians, Poles, Greeks, and Italians. The individual data come from IPUMS samples for 1900 and 1910 and the group size variables are computed from the 100 percent AncestryLibrary.com samples.

Figure 2. The Relationship between Group Electorate Share and Naturalization Likelihood


A. Full Sample




B. Established Enclaves




C. Recent Enclaves




D. Established Enclaves with Good Coalition Prospects




E. Established Enclaves with Poor Coalition Prospects



F. Recent Enclaves with Good Coalition Prospects



G. Recent Enclaves with Poor Coalition Prospects



Notes: These charts show a local linear regression estimator of the naturalization residual on the residual of electorate share with the other dependent variables from equation (2). The sample is Czechs, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and Italians who have been in the U.S. from between two and fifteen years from the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia included in the panel. The dependent variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. The individual data come from IPUMS samples for 1900 and 1910 and the group size variables are computed from the 100 percent AncestryLibrary.com samples. See Section III.B for how enclaves were classified as “recent” and “established” and how coalition potential is measured.

Table 1. Turnout for Mayoral Elections in Chicago, 1900-1920

	Dep. var. = number of ballots cast		Dep. var. = voter turnout	
	Total Eligible Pop	White Eligible Pop	Total Eligible Pop	White Eligible Pop
Naturalized Foreign-Born Men 21+	0.495*** (0.145)	0.653*** (0.140)		
Native-Born White Men 21+	0.751*** (0.0700)	0.617*** (0.075)		
Native-Born Non-White Men 21+	0.253 (0.183)			
Naturalized Men Share			0.580* (0.335)	0.590* (0.329)
Native-Born White Men Share			0.450** (0.222)	0.404* (0.211)
Native-Born Non-White Men Share			0.184 (0.326)	
Observations	105	105	105	105
R-squared	0.788	0.785	0.246	0.242

Non-whites are omitted from the sample in the second and fourth columns. The voting data are from Skogan (1989) and the demographic groups are measured using IPUMS samples. Data is pooled across 1900, 1910, and 1920 and all specifications include ward fixed effects. Voter turnout is computed as the number of ballots cast divided by the number of registered voters. The third and fourth columns include an additional control for the number of registered voters. *** p<0.01

Table 2. Summary Statistics in the Panel Dataset

	Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Poles, Russians	
	1900	1910
<u>Ward-Level Characteristics</u>		
Total Ward Foreign-Born Share	0.36 (0.10)	0.40 (0.13)
Ward Irish Electorate Share	0.22 (0.13)	0.19 (0.12)
Ward German Electorate Share	0.14 (0.11)	0.18 (0.13)
Electorate Size	11.62 (5.02)	11.43 (5.92)
Number of Wards with an Enclave		87
Number of Enclaves		192
	1900	1910
<u>Individual Characteristics</u>		
Group Electorate Size (1000s)	0.74 (0.81)	1.06 (0.94)
Group Share of Ward Electorate	0.07 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)
Naturalized	0.51 (0.50)	0.26 (0.44)
Total Members Present in 1890 (1000s)	0.87 (0.97)	0.98 (1.17)
Years in U.S.	8.92 (3.68)	6.97 (3.50)
Age	34.98 (10.27)	32.22 (9.78)
Literate	0.72 (0.45)	0.78 (0.41)
N	2325	2671

Notes: Data source is 1900 and 1910 IPUMS for the individual characteristics and AncestryLibrary.com for the ward-level variables. The immigrant sample includes foreign-born Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Poles, and Russians who have lived in the U.S. for between two and fifteen years observed in the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia included in the panel. The share of ward electorate is computed using the number of foreign-born men from that group aged 21 and over as the numerator and the total number of men aged 21 and over living in the ward as the denominator. Foreign-born men who have lived in the U.S. for less than two years and are thus ineligible for citizenship are excluded from the computation of electorate size variables. The Irish and German share variables include the second generation as determined by father's place of birth. The naturalized variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. An enclave is defined as a population of at least one member of an ethnic group in a particular ward.

Table 3. Immigrant Electorate Share and Political Mobilization: Full Sample Results

Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship				
Full Sample of Immigrant Enclaves				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Electorate Share	-0.358 (0.191)	-0.282 (0.499)	-0.094 (0.248)	2.349* (1.036)
Electorate Share Squared		-0.025 (1.594)		-6.607* (2.859)
Total Electorate Size (1000s)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Literate	0.138*** (0.017)	0.094*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.021)	0.072*** (0.021)
Recent Enclave			0.466* (0.202)	0.708** (0.240)
Recent * Electorate Share			0.528 (0.596)	-3.632 (1.873)
Recent * Electorate Share Sqd				14.819* (6.839)
Recent * Literate			0.054 (0.032)	0.052 (0.032)
Joint Significance of Group Share and Group Share Sqd		0.26		0.069
Pseudo R-squared	0.116	0.216	0.231	0.233
N	4968	4968	4963	4963

Notes: See Table 2 for sample details. See Section III.B. for details on how enclaves were classified as “established” and “recent.” Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Specifications also include a control for age, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the ward-group-year level. The regression on the pooled sample also contains new x year, new x ward, new x years in U.S., new x literate, and new x age interactions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4. Immigrant Electorate Share and Mobilization: Effects by Enclave Maturity and Prospects for Democratic Coalition

Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship						
Panel A: Established Enclaves	All	Good Coalition Potential		Poor Coalition Potential		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Electorate Share	-0.052 (0.234)	2.892** (0.945)	0.879** (0.321)	4.412** (1.403)	-0.511 (0.587)	0.991 (1.334)
Electorate Share Squared		-7.932** (2.629)		-10.313** (3.833)		-3.712 (3.605)
Joint Significance of Group Share and Group Share Sqd		0.009		0.003		0.508
Pseudo R-squared	0.2	0.204	0.241	0.247	0.175	0.176
N	2529	2529	1150	1150	1379	1379

Panel A: Recent Enclaves	All	Good Coalition Potential		Poor Coalition Potential		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Electorate Share	0.409 (0.517)	-1.158 (1.511)	0.607 (0.519)	-0.304 (1.575)	-6.492** (2.121)	-8.241* (4.194)
Electorate Share Squared		7.493 (5.978)		4.249 (6.235)		30.495 (46.945)
Joint Significance of Group Share and Group Share Sqd		0.186		0.270		0.007
Pseudo R-squared	0.268	0.268	0.294	0.295	0.269	0.269
N	2434	2434	1659	1659	775	775

Notes: See Table 3 for sample and specification details. See Section III.B for how wards were classified as having good or poor coalition potential.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Robustness of Result on Electorate Share for Established Enclaves with Good Coalition Potential

Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship					
	In U.S. ≤ 5 years	In U.S. ≤ 10 years	In U.S. ≤ 15 years	In U.S. ≤ 20 years	In U.S. ≤ 25 years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Electorate Share	3.706*	3.967**	4.412**	3.826**	2.867*
	(1.585)	(1.361)	(1.403)	(1.208)	(1.133)
Electorate Share Squared	-11.610*	-8.508*	-10.313**	-8.984**	-7.593*
	(5.270)	(3.682)	(3.833)	(3.353)	(3.261)
City by Year Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	Y
Joint Significance of Share Vars	0.064	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.041
Pseudo R-squared	0.181	0.213	0.247	0.297	0.257
N	366	902	1150	1412	1150

Notes: See Table 3 for sample and specification details. See Section III.B for how wards were classified as having good or poor coalition potential.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Table 6. Role of Total New Immigrant Electorate Share on Political Mobilization

Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship				
	Full sample	Good coalition potential	At least one established enclave	Established enclave and good coalition potential
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total New Immigrant Electorate Share	1.397** (0.431)	2.785*** (0.632)	1.858*** (0.441)	5.159*** (0.950)
Total New Immigrant Electorate Share Sqd.	-2.163** (0.760)	-4.325*** (1.197)	-2.715*** (0.811)	-8.049*** (1.620)
Electorate Size (1000s)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.04 (0.024)
Joint Significance of Size and Share Vars	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R-squared	0.217	0.258	0.204	0.252
N	4968	2812	3242	1651

Notes: See Table 3 for sample and specification details. See Section III.B for how wards were classified as having good or poor coalition potential. Total new immigrant electorate share is computed as the sum of men aged 21 and above who were Czech, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, or Russian by birth. Divided by the total number of men aged 21 and above in a ward.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A1. Chicago Ward Map for 1900



Source: Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago.