IMMIGRANT GROUP SIZE AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION:
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Allison Shertzer

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<u>ABSTRACT</u>

This paper investigates the determinants of political mobilization for immigrants to the United States.
I use newly assembled data on ethnic enclaves in American cities to explore how immigrant group
size influences the political behavior of immigrants, focusing on their decision to become naturalized
citizens at a time when the United States maintained an open border and citizenship conferred only
voting rights. I find that immigrants were more likely to become politically mobilized as their ethnic
group's share of the local electorate grew relatively larger, peaking at about one fifth electorate share
and declining subsequently. I show this effect is driven by political mobilization of immigrants in
places where the Democratic Party likely needed their vote to win elections and where immigrants
had established social networks.

Allison Shertzer
Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
4901 WW Posvar Hall
230 South Bouquet Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
and NBER
shertzer@pitt.edu

I.   Introduction

The resurgence of immigration to the United States in the late twentieth century has renewed public and scholarly interest in the consequences of a diverse electorate. Economists have investigated the role that ethnic heterogeneity plays in political participation and spending on public goods, showing that more diverse municipalities spend less on education and roads and have residents that are less likely to participate in civic organizations or support welfare programs (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999 and 2000; Alesina and La Ferrera, 2000; Luttmer, 2001). An expansion in voting rights to African-Americans has also been shown to shift resources toward black localities (Cascio and Washington, 2012; Ananat and Washington, 2009).

Yet the question of how and when minorities, and particularly immigrants, many of whom are from undemocratic sending countries, choose to participate in the US political process remains largely unexplored. Evidence from political science demonstrates that *individual* socioeconomic factors do not fully explain patterns in immigrant voting behavior.[1] Suggestive work has shown that immigrant voter turnout appears to be also linked to immigrant *group* characteristics, increasing when foreign-born voters are surrounded by a larger number of members of their own ethnic group. Political scientists have proposed that larger immigrant groups perceive a greater benefit to participating in the political process and are more likely to have structures in place to facilitate organization (Jang, 2009; Leighley, 2001).

This paper shows that immigrants are more likely to become politically mobilized as their groups grow in size in a local area. Using novel, detailed data on ethnic enclaves in American cities, I seek to distinguish between mechanisms that could generate this pattern. The first channel I consider is that immigrant groups engage in a voting "calculus," mobilizing where they are likely to be a decisive voting bloc and hence derive greater benefits from participation. This hypothesis stems from the

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[1] For a review of this literature pertaining to Latino voters, see de la Garza (2004).

theory of minimal winning coalitions, first proposed by Riker (1962). Second, I explore the

importance of established social networks for immigrant political mobilization. This channel has

been recently explored by Chay and Munshi (2012) in their work on the political mobilization of

blacks in the postbellum South. To my knowledge this is the first paper to consider both of these

mechanisms in the same framework to explain the political mobilization of immigrant groups.

Existing work on immigrant political mobilization has been hampered by two measurement

problems: first, many immigrants are undocumented and thus ineligible for citizenship. However,

existing datasets do not contain information on legal status, thereby rendering it impossible to know

who is a potential voter. Second, few contemporary datasets combine detailed demographic

microdata, measures of political participation, and fine political geography.[2] Previous work has

necessarily relied on either aggregate regressions using voter turnout measures or analyses of

microdata with coarse geographic identifiers such as the National Election Survey.

Given the limitations of the modern data, I turn instead to the era of mass migration from

Europe to the United States in the early twentieth century, which I argue provides an ideal setting for

studying the relationship between immigrant group size and political mobilization. First, the United

States maintained a nearly open border to immigration during this period, so every European

immigrant had equal capacity to initiate citizenship proceedings. Second, citizenship was optional for

immigrants simply interested in living and working in the United States, even over the long term.[3]

Becoming a citizen was necessary only to obtain the right to vote, and there were virtually no

publicly provided benefits that were available to citizens only. Therefore, obtaining citizenship is a

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[2] An exception is the November CPS supplement available since 1994 which has measures of voting behavior and county-level geographic identifiers. This data source was used by Jang (2009) to study immigrant group size and voting behavior and by Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2005) to study group size and black political participation. Although counties are smaller than states, they are not an important political unit and hence cannot be used to study the role of electorate share on immigrant political participation unless they are aggregated to the state level.

[3] The entry of the United States into WWI in 1916 changed the costs and benefits of citizenship: anyone from a non-hostile sending country who had initiated citizenship proceedings could be drafted. The United States government ended the open border policy in 1921 by implementing an immigration system based on quotas from each sending country.

good proxy for political engagement and was recorded by the Census in 1900 and 1910, allowing the use of detailed microdata in my analysis.

In particular, I investigate how the likelihood that a European immigrant became politically mobilized (i.e., became an American citizen) varied with the size of his local ethnic group. To construct the dataset used in this paper, I collected the universe of census records from a genealogy website and precisely measured the size of ethnic groups in wards, the political unit used to elect city councilmen, for four large cities in 1900 and 1910. City governments invested substantial resources in infrastructure related to sanitation and transportation at the start of the century, and immigrant groups could compete for local revenue only if they became citizens, registered to vote, and translated their numbers into credible voting blocs.

The setting and dataset used in this paper have two other advantages over existing studies. First, I observe year of arrival for each foreign-born individual in the sample, enabling me to examine multiple dimensions of immigrant group size. In my data I can differentiate between enclaves with a population of long-term immigrants – who together had enough time to found the institutions necessary for political mobilization – and similarly-sized enclaves composed almost entirely of fresh arrivals with little knowledge of the American political system. This distinction makes it possible to separately investigate the role of electorate share (relative size) and ethnic social networks (network size) in determining an immigrant's likelihood of becoming a voting citizen.

The final advantage of this paper is the rich variation in group sizes across the city wards in the panel dataset. Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Poles, and Russians each comprise as much as a third of ward electorates across the sample of 88 wards. The scope of empirical work that can be undertaken using contemporary data is comparatively limited because there are only a few states such as California and Nevada where Latino voters are a sizeable share of the electorate, and the policies that affect immigrants most today come from the state or federal level of government. The large number

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of voting units and multiple ethnic groups present in the data allow me to include both ward and ethnic group fixed effects in my analysis.

The empirical results of this paper both support the existence of strategic immigrant political mobilization and underscore the importance of established social networks for mobilizing new foreign-born voters. I find that an immigrant's likelihood of initiating citizenship proceedings increased with the size of his group in his ward; this relationship is maximized at about one fifth electorate share and declines subsequently. I show that the nonlinearity is driven by political mobilization of immigrants in wards where the Democrats likely needed to form a coalition with new immigrants to win elections. In those wards, a one standard deviation in relative group size around the mean implies an increase in naturalization likelihood of 10 percentage points (28 percent). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that established political parties should seek to coalesce with a group that will yield a minimal winning coalition.

The presence of established social networks also mattered for mobilization: there is little evidence of coalition-driven group behavior for immigrant enclaves composed almost entirely of recent arrivals. This finding contributes to a more recent literature on the role of social networks in determining political and economic outcomes for minority groups. For instance, economists have examined the importance that the density of social networks plays in immigrant enrollment in welfare in the present day and the ability of immigrants and refugees to secure employment (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000; Munshi, 2003; Beaman, 2012). My results provide the first evidence on the importance of social networks for immigrant political mobilization in this era.

While the historical setting provides a rich laboratory for studying immigrant political mobilization, inevitable differences across time and cultures limit the ability to extrapolate the findings of this paper to predict contemporary immigrant political mobilization. For instance, the sending countries studied in this paper are all in Europe while major sending countries today are

located in Central America and Asia. Also, the citizenship process is now considerably more

complex, and economic motivations dominate political considerations for most immigrants

contemplating naturalization. The citizenship approach used in this paper is thus of limited use in

later time periods.

My findings also contribute to the literature on the social and economic assimilation process

of immigrants to the United States. Economists have investigated many aspects of immigrant

assimilation and convergence, particularly earnings and education (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985;

LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson, 2012; Card, 2005; Lleras-Muney and

Shertzer, 2012). Yet the political dimension of immigrant assimilation has remained largely

unexplored. My methods also provide insight into the question of why people vote more generally.

The primary finding of this paper, that ethnic group size influences an immigrant's decision to

participate in the political process, underscores the importance of considering social structures in

models of voter turnout and provides new evidence for the validity of group-based approaches (for

instance, Uhlaner, 1989; Morton, 1991; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999).

The paper is organized as follows: Section II surveys the historical context of immigrant

politics in early twentieth century cities and justifies naturalization as a proxy for political

participation. Section III describes the sources of historical data used in the paper and the empirical

strategy. Section IV discusses the relationship between group size and citizenship attainment.

Section V concludes.

II.   Historical Context and Citizenship in the Early 1900s

A. Immigrants and Urban Politics

The United States maintained an open border to European immigrants in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, and ward-based politics played a prominent role in the lives of the

millions of newcomers who settled in the industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Locally

elected ward aldermen, or city councilmen, served as a vital link to services and favors from the

central city government (Kornbluh, 2000, p. 129). [4] To secure the loyalty of new immigrants and

remain politically competitive, aldermen strategically provided informal public assistance to their

constituents. In the colorful collection of talks by George W. Plunkitt about his career in the

Tammany Hall political machine in New York City, the former aldermen describes how he bought

clothes for fire victims, gave candy to children, and matched up young men to jobs with local

businesses (Riordon [1905] 1994, p. 64).

Aldermen were also responsible for presenting public works and licensing proposals to the

relevant city boards on behalf of individuals in their wards. It was feasible for aldermen to

concentrate their lobbying efforts on decisive constituencies in their wards in part due to the

prevailing custom of "aldermanic courtesy" in which council committees deferred to an alderman on

any issue that dealt solely with his ward (Teaford, 1984, p. 26). If an alderman wished to bestow a

privilege such as the right to erect a sidewalk fruit stand on one of his constituents, he could do so on

his own accord since the matter did not affect the rest of the city. An alderman could also present

proposals for road paving or sidewalk improvement that would differentially benefit members of a

particular group in his ward. The concentrated authority of the alderman served as a powerful

incentive for ethnic groups to become involved in ward politics. The first step in this process was

naturalization of foreign-born members so they could register to vote.

The political mobilization of these new immigrants, most of whom had never participated in

an election before, often occurred within the framework of the patronage political systems of the day.

For instance, the Tammany Hall machine attempted to absorb Jewish and Italian newcomers using a

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[4] Some cities switched to at-large elections in the early twentieth century. The cities in my sample were still using a system of ward-level elections to choose aldermen between 1900 and 1909.

variety of favors including municipal jobs and protection from Irish gangs (Werner, 1928). One boss

summarized his machine's mobilization efforts thusly:

"Tammany looks after them for the sake of their vote, grafts them onto the Republic, makes citizens of them in short; and although you may not like our motives or our methods, what other agency is there by which so long a row could have been hoed so quickly or so well?"

-Tammany Hall Boss Richard Croker[5]

Although it was not the case for all urban areas in the United States, most large, immigrant-receiving

cities in the Northeast and Midwest had political machines by 1900, including the four studied in this

paper (Menes, 1999).

New immigrant groups tended to vote as homogenous blocs along ethnic lines once members

of the group became naturalized citizens able to vote. Reformers of the day considered this tendency

to be a form of fraud since immigrants were voting in their narrow self-interest instead of in the "true

public spirit" (Kleppner, 1987, p. 169). Nonetheless, the bloc voting behavior noted by Kleppner and

others justifies the grouping individuals by country of origin used this paper. The desire to win the

"Polish vote" or "Italian vote" also motivated strategists from both political parties to incorporate the

new immigrants into their coalitions. An observer of Tammany Hall noted that "every time an

election comes around, the Republicans and Democrats cater to the German element… or the

Jewish… and tell them they are the greatest things that ever happened." (Henderson, 1976, p. 159).

Established political parties lobbied for support among the new immigrant groups, and they assisted

the newcomers with the naturalization and registration procedures required to bring them into the

electorate.

   B. *Naturalization status as an indicator of political engagement*

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[5] As cited in Werner (1928).

The suitability of naturalization status as a proxy for political participation is rooted in the role of the state and federal governments in the early twentieth century. In stark contrast to the present day, there was no direct benefit to becoming a naturalized citizen except securing the right to vote and run for public office. [6] Immigrants from European countries were de facto permanent residents in the sense that they could live and work in the United States indefinitely without applying for a visa or beginning naturalization proceedings. [7] In addition, prior to the New Deal the government offered little in the way of retirement benefits or welfare to citizens that could serve as motivation for immigrants to begin the naturalization process. Access to education was not an issue for resident aliens; in fact, illiterate immigrants above the compulsory schooling age were encouraged to attend publicly-funded evening schools in many cities (Hill, 1919).

Should he decide to become an American citizen, any white male immigrant could file a declaration of intention, or "first papers," in a court of law after a residency period in the United States of at least two years. After having completed a total residency period of five years, the immigrant could complete the citizenship process by taking an oath of allegiance and filing a petition of naturalization, or "second papers." I focus on men in the empirical analysis because women and children usually received derivative citizenship from the male head of the family when he completed the naturalization process.

To further justify the use naturalization status as a proxy for political engagement, I provide evidence that foreign-born men who became naturalized citizens in fact participated in elections. The anonymous and aggregate nature of voting data makes a direct test impossible since the individual characteristics of the participants in early twentieth century urban elections are unobserved.

[6] Most states restricted licensed occupations such as attorney, physician, or accountants to American citizens, but these laws likely had little effect on poor, recently arrived immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Non-citizens were also barred from becoming plumbers in four states and barbers in five states (Konvitz, 1946 provides a complete list of restrictions by state). It is difficult to determine how thoroughly these statutes were enforced. In the paper I assume that obtaining the right to vote was the primary motivation to naturalize; nonetheless, I acknowledge that gaining entry to a restricted occupation may have served as an incentive for some immigrants.

[7] Immigrants of Chinese descent were barred from becoming U.S. citizens under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

However, I can document that higher voter turnout was associated with a larger number of naturalized foreign-born male residents of city wards, all else equal. I use Chicago voting data compiled by Skogan (1989) to obtain turnout rates coupled with the IPUMS census samples from 1900, 1910, and 1920 to obtain measures of the number of both naturalized and alien foreign-born men aged 21 and above in each ward. I partition the potential electorate and estimate the number of ballots cast in the Chicago mayoral elections as a function of the number of native-born white men aged 21 and over; the number of native-born, nonwhite men aged 21 and over; the number of naturalized, foreign-born male immigrants aged 21 and above; and the number of foreign-born, male resident aliens aged 21 and above. More formally, I estimate:

$$Turnout_{kt} = \alpha + \beta(Naturalized\ Men\ 21+)_{kt} + \delta(Alien\ Men\ 21+)_{kt} +$$
$$+ \gamma(Native\ White\ Men\ 21+)_{kj} + \pi(Native\ Nonwhite\ Men\ 21+)_{kj} + \theta(Year)_t + \varepsilon_{kt} \tag{1}$$

where k indexes wards and t indexes the year. I pool data from 1900, 1910, and 1920 and include year fixed effects in both regressions reported in Table 1.[8]

The first column reports the relationship between the size of each group and election turnout in Chicago's wards. The coefficient on the number of naturalized foreign-born men is equal to .68 and significant. This effect is consistent with the notion that many immigrants did in fact vote after they become eligible, and in fact that they voted at rates comparable to native-born whites (the coefficient on native-born whites is .62). There is no similar positive effect for native-born nonwhites, and the addition of a resident alien is associated with a decrease in ballots cast. The results for naturalized immigrants and native-born whites are similar when I restrict the sample to white men only.

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[8] I focus on men in these regressions even though women were permitted to vote in Illinois in 1913. Women initially voted at much lower rates and hence voter turnout as a share of the eligible population appeared to plunge after the franchise was extended to women. I do not include ward fixed effects in this regression because Chicago redistricted its ward system after each census.

In this aggregate framework I cannot distinguish between naturalized immigrants voting themselves and the presence of naturalized immigrants spurring higher turnout from natives as a form of "defensive voting." Furthermore, the negative association between voter turnout and resident aliens suggests that recent immigrants were concentrated in wards where turnout was lower in general. The difficulty associated with interpreting these results underscores the advantage of using individual-level data in a panel framework to study political mobilization, and I use such an approach for the remainder of the paper. Nonetheless, the results from Table 1 are consistent with higher voter turnout among naturalized immigrants compared with resident aliens and similar to Tuckel and Maisel (1994), who show that voter turnout in the 1908 election in eight large cities is positively correlated with the fraction of the electorate that is foreign born and naturalized.

III.   Data and Estimation Framework

A. Ward Data from the 1900s

I combine three data sources for the main empirical work. First, I employ detailed digital maps of four major cities to establish consistent geography for 106 city wards from 1900 to 1910. I then use novel 100 percent census samples of the electorate from a genealogy website to precisely measure the size of ethnic groups within wards. Finally, I rely on smaller census microdata samples to obtain data on the naturalization status of individuals, which was not digitized in the 100 percent samples.

The Center for Population Economics (CPE) at the University of Chicago provided the redistricting histories for the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia used in this paper.[9] The sample is thus composed of four of the five largest cities in the United States in 1900, all

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[9] I do not include the other two cities for which the CPE digitized ward maps (Cincinnati and Baltimore) because wards were not used for municipal elections in Cincinnati and relatively few immigrants settled in Baltimore. Constructing

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of them major immigrant destinations. Furthermore, all the cities in the sample had local (at the ward level) elections for city councilmen through at least 1910 and are considered by historians to have had political machines in place. In sum, while the sample is not representative of all areas in which immigrants settled in the early twentieth century, the included cities reflect the institutional environment facing many European newcomers to the large cities of the Northeast and Midwest.

Unlike Congressional districts, city wards were not legally required to be redrawn at any point, and cities could simply add wards to their existing system when they annexed land.[10] Although all four of the cities made changes to their ward systems over the decade, I am able to use almost 80 percent of the wards present in 1900 in the panel. The excluded wards are mainly from outlying areas that were annexed or split into two wards during at some point in the decade. Thus my sample consists primarily of the core urban wards in each city. Further details on the panel, plus a list of included wards, can be found in Appendix A.

The detailed CPE maps also enable me to address redistricting events from early in the decade which would otherwise render the ward systems from the two censuses incomparable. In particular, both the ward systems in Chicago and Manhattan were redrawn shortly after the 1900 census, so the wards in place in 1900 and 1910 were very different from each other. I overcome this obstacle using digital maps of the census enumeration districts. Enumeration districts were administrative units used internally by the Census Bureau and were substantially smaller than wards. Specifically, I use the 1900 census enumeration districts to construct synthetic 1910 wards for the year 1900, which I then use to estimate the population characteristics of the 1910 wards had they been in place in 1900.

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ward histories is a costly and complex endeavor, and consequently I restrict my potential sample to the cities covered by the CPE's research team (NIH grant P01 AG10120, PI Robert W. Fogel).

[10] Assembly Districts were used to elect aldermen in Manhattan by 1900 although wards were still used for other municipal purposes. For this reason I use Assembly Districts in place of wards for Manhattan. For simplicity of exposition, I continue to use the term "ward" to refer to voting units in the paper.

Using these synthetic 1910 wards I am able to construct a panel dataset with the 1910 wards as the geographic unit of observation for both 1900 and 1910.

The second source of data is a novel 100 percent sample of the population of the four cities, with both ward and enumeration district identifiers, taken from the genealogy website AncestryLibrary.com. These counts are a substantial improvement over existing sources of data. IPUMS samples are at present only 5% and 1.4% of the population for 1900 and 1910, respectively, and are insufficient for precisely estimating the size of minority immigrant groups at the ward level. Furthermore, using AncestryLibrary.com allows me to make counts by gender, age, year of immigration, and place of birth so I can compute exactly how large the potential electorate was for each group and ward in my sample. I restrict the sample to men aged 21 and older since only men over the age of 21 could vote.[11] Since only men who had been in the United States for at least two years were eligible for citizenship, I also restrict the immigrant counts to men who arrived at least two years before the respective censuses of 1900 and 1910. The full sample covers 9 million records from the AncestryLibrary.com database. Total sample counts line up closely with city population tallies published by the census for both 1900 and 1910, although some of the records are illegible and could not be included in the sample.[12]

I focus on ethnic groups whose peak year of immigration to the United States was after 1880: Poles, Czechs, Greeks, Italians, and Russians.[13] To compute the ethnic group shares, I classify individuals based on their reported place of birth where possible. However, because of changes in how the census treated individuals born in present-day Poland and the Czech Republic, it is not

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[11] The voting age was not lowered to 18 until 1971.
[12] Less than 5 percent of the census records are illegible in my sample.
[13] In the IPUMS microdata I can observe that nearly all Russian immigrants were Jewish because they reported Yiddish as their mother tongue. AncestryLibrary.com did not digitize mother tongue and so I use place of birth as the means of classification.

possible to match individuals to the Polish and Czech groups in 1910 using place of birth.[14] My algorithm for estimating the number of ethnic Poles, Czechs, Russians, and Germans in each ward in 1910 can be found in Appendix B. The final dataset contains a count of the number of eligible potential voters for every immigrant group and ward in my sample as well as the total number of voters, including the native born.

AncestryLibrary.com did not digitize the naturalization status of immigrants, so my third source of data is the Integrated Public Use Microdata IPUMS microdata samples (Ruggles et al., 2008). I use the 5 percent sample of the 1900 census and 1.4 percent sample of the 1910 census. I match foreign-born respondents living in the four sample cities to their ward of residence and to their ethnic group using place of birth generally and mother tongue for Poles and Czechs in 1910.   My main dependent variable, an indicator for having initiated the naturalization process, is equal to one if the individual has either first or second papers.

The summary statistics in Table 2 cover the 88 wards in the panel containing at least one immigrant from the five sending countries studied in this paper. The ward-level statistics presented in the top panel give a glimpse of the magnitude of immigration flows to large industrial cities in the early twentieth century: the average ward population in the sample is almost 40 percent foreign born in 1910. Because Germans and Irish had begun arriving sixty years earlier, a substantial second-generation population from these groups existed alongside the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The share of the electorate composed of either first- or second-generation Irish immigrants is about 20 percent in both sample years, and the share for Germans is 14 percent in 1900 and 18 percent in 1910. The average total electorate size (men aged 21 and above, excluding immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for less than two years) is about 11,500 men per ward.

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[14] Poland and Czechoslovakia were not independent countries until after WWI. Earlier in the twentieth century, the territory that would become Poland and Czechoslovakia was partitioned between the Russian, German, and the Austro-Hungarian empires.

The summary statistics of individual characteristics of recent immigrants from Poland, Bohemia (the area comprising the present-day Czech Republic), Greece, Italy, and Russia are presented in the lower panel of Table 2. The sample covers immigrants who have been in the U.S. for at least two years (and are hence eligible to vote) but not more than 15 years, limiting the likelihood of observing an immigrant in a different ward from which he naturalized. I discuss this limitation of my approach in the next section. There are 197 enclaves (defined as population of a particular ethnic group of any size in a ward) across the 88 wards with an average of 730 eligible voters in 1900 and 1,070 in 1910. The average electorate share increased from 7 percent to 10 percent over the decade with some groups as large as 35 percent. [15] The naturalization rate fell over the decade from 51 percent to 27 percent, consistent with the secular decline in new immigrant naturalization after 1900 reported in previous work (Trounstine, 2008).

B. Empirical Framework

The objective of the empirical work is to ascertain the role of group characteristics on an immigrant's likelihood of becoming politically active, as measured by citizenship attainment. In this section I review the key ideas related to relative size and network size and indicate how I will test them. I close by considering the role of numerical size of ethnic groups in political mobilization.

Relative size: The relative size of ethnic groups in their wards is also predicted by economic theory to affect political behavior, namely because a group's electorate share is a factor in determining the expected payoff for participating in elections. Since the immigrant groups I consider in this paper are all ward minorities who could not have captured aldermanic seats on their own, coalition formation is the mechanism through which relative group size should affect immigrant

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[15] I exclude the five immigrant enclaves in my sample that were approaching majority status in their ward and focus on minority groups comprising less than 35 percent of the ward electorate. I found suggestive evidence that the incentive to mobilize again increases for groups nearing majority status in their wards; however, I have too few groups greater than 35 percent of their ward electorate to investigate this systematically.

political behavior. The core notion of minimal winning coalitions due to Riker (1962) is that, because the payoff to any victorious coalition is identical, winning coalitions should only contain members required to win, lest the winning coalition need to split the spoils of victory amongst more members than necessary.

Empirical predictions from Riker's model on the relationship between relative group size and the payoffs to participation are not sharp (for an elaboration on this problem, see Lucas, 1978). However, the context of this paper is considerably simpler than the general legislative bargaining framework studied in much of the previous literature. In particular, I am interested the outcome from a process where two extant political parties competing for an aldermanic seat face a fixed cost of incorporating new immigrant groups into their respective coalitions. This fixed cost, which is related to the wooing of the ethnic group leadership by established political parties, means that larger ethnic groups should be more attractive as coalition partners than relatively smaller ones.[16] However, once a minimal coalition has been formed with a group of decisive size, additional immigrant arrivals to that group are unnecessary to the coalition and should not be mobilized.

What constitutes a decisively-sized immigrant group depends on several factors that are difficult to observe, including the *ex ante* closeness of elections (see Nalebuff and Schachar, 1999 for a discussion of the limits of *ex post* election data for measuring contestability) and the size of likely coalition partners for new immigrants. Although I cannot observe all of the other groups in the electorate, most critically the size of the main political parties in each ward, the historical context provides a way to measure the size of the Democratic Party. This party, dominated by second-generation Irish and Germans, was the most common coalition partner of new immigrant groups. Referred to as Liturgical Democrats, Catholic Irish and Lutheran Germans had similar preferences to

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[16] This fixed cost also rules out employing recent advances in the legislative bargaining theory literature to simplify the analytical framework. For instance, Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) show that an individual's payoff is proportional to her voting weight in the context of a noncooperative bargaining game.

new immigrant groups, particularly opposing prohibition, allowing foreign-language schools, and keeping the American border open. Examining the size of these earlier arriving ethnic groups gives a sense of the size immigrant groups needed to reach to be credible coalition partners. The average relative size of the combined first and second-generation Irish and German groups was about 35 percent of the electorate in 1900 for the wards in the sample, so a coalition with a new immigrant group of comprising 15 percent of the ward would be sufficient to form a majority coalition in the average ward. In the empirical work I use linear and quadratic specifications in electorate share to examine the role of relative size.

The prediction regarding the role of relative size is different in wards in which the Germans and Irish themselves constituted a majority of the electorate. If these older immigrant groups were able to win the aldermanic seat on their own, there would be little to gain by mobilizing new immigrant groups. Similarly, if the German and Irish faction were themselves a small minority, then a new immigrant group comprising even a quarter of the electorate would be insufficient for a winning Democratic coalition. [17] To explore this notion further, I separately consider wards where the Democratic Party likely needed a coalition partner and wards where Germans and Irish either held a majority or were themselves a small minority.

Network Size: A separate strain of work in the group behavior literature has emphasized the role of social networks in determining economic and political outcomes. Larger networks have been associated with both a higher likelihood of employment and the ability to escape occupational traps (Munshi, 2003, 2011). Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) demonstrate a similar phenomenon in the present day by showing that welfare participation by non-English-speaking immigrants is affected by the density of their social network. In more recent work, Chay and Munshi

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[17] Although new immigrants primarily identified with Democrats, there were instances where opportunistic Republicans courted their vote. In New Haven, CT, the local Republican Party actively engaged eastern European Catholics and Jews to vote against the "Irish party," or Democrats (Kleppner, 1982, p. 184).

(2012) argue that social ties were critical for the development of networks used by blacks to mobilize politically during Reconstruction. The key insight from this paper is that the frequency and depth of social interactions determine the efficacy of political networks. Importantly, the numerical strength of a group may not be the same as the quality of the group's social network.

Social interactions between immigrants in early twentieth century cities would have been facilitated by ethnic churches, ethnic newspapers, civic organizations, and other local institutions founded by earlier arrivers from the same group. Although I cannot directly measure the number of local ethnic institutions, I can proxy for their development using a measure of how established immigrant groups were in a particular area. Intuitively, I want to differentiate between enclaves with an established core of earlier arrived members – who would have founded some of the institutions necessary for political mobilization – and similarly-sized enclaves composed almost entirely of fresh arrivals with little knowledge of the American political system.

To measure how established enclaves were, I use the year of immigration variable in my 100 percent census samples to create a count of the number of individuals in each enclave in 1900 who had lived in the U.S. for a decade or more (i.e. immigrated before 1890). The average enclave in 1900 contained 870 men and women who had been living in the U.S. for at least ten years and the median was 488.[18] To investigate the role of established social networks in political mobilization, I subdivide the sample using the median number of individuals present since 1890. For ease of exposition, I call the enclaves with above median number of members present since 1890 "established" enclaves and those with below median number "new" enclaves. I then explore the role of group size in new and established enclaves.

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[18] I use both the total population (men and women of any age) when measuring the size of social networks because women could contribute to development of churches and civic associations. I use men aged 21 and over when measuring the size of the electorate because only they could vote.

Numerical size: The notion that numerically larger interest groups are less effective owing to collective action failures is central to the political economy literature. However, laboratory experiments have found that the number of individuals in a group has a weaker effect on behavior than the theory would predict (Marwell and Ames, 1979; Isaac and Walker, 1988). More recent empirical work by Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2005) documents that the structure of media markets can lead to an outcome contrary to what collective action models predict: specifically, economies of scale in media provision may lead to numerically small groups being offered fewer products tailored to their interest and hence lower voter turnout among small groups relative to larger groups. In sum, the impact of numerical size of the group on political behavior is both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Because an immigrant group's size is closely correlated with his group's relative size, in most specifications I simply control for the total size of the voting population in each ward. I also explore whether relative and absolute size can be separately identified.[19]

C. Estimating Equation

In order to estimate the effect of group size on political mobilization, I take advantage of the variation in the relative size of ethnic groups in different wards across time. The main estimating equation relates changes in the naturalization likelihood of immigrants to changes in the share of the electorate comprised of their ethnic group. Focusing on first differences allows me to disentangle the impact of group size from other unobserved determinants of voting. In particular, I include ward fixed effects to capture time-invariant characteristics of wards that are correlated with political participation, such as the entrenched relationship of the ward political elite to the central city government. The year fixed effect controls for time trends affecting all cities and ethnic groups, for

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[19] I also considered the size of other immigrant enclaves in neighboring wards, weighted by the distance between the respective ward centroids, but found no significant effects. Hence I restrict my attention to the size of the immigrant's group in his own ward in the empirical work.

instance, the national debate regarding closing the border. I also include fixed effects for each ethnicity in the study, which allows each immigrant group to have different baseline probability of political participation.

To examine the relationship between the group size characteristics of ethnic groups and political mobilization, I estimate equations of the form:

$$Naturalized_{ijkt} = \alpha + \beta(Electorate\ Share)_{jkt} +$$

$$+ \delta(Size\ of\ Ward\ Electorate)_{jkt} + \eta(Individual\ Controls)_i +$$

$$+ \theta(Ward)_j + \lambda(Year)_t + \mu(Group)_k + \varepsilon_{ijkt} \tag{2}$$

where i indexes individuals, j indexes the ward, k indexes the ethnic group, and t indexes the census year. Individual controls include literacy in any language, age, and a series of dummies for years lived in U.S. Group share is computed using the number of foreign-born men from that group aged 21 and over as the numerator and the total number of men aged 21 and over living in the ward as the denominator. The dependent variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. Standard errors are clustered at the ward-group-year level. I restrict the sample to foreign-born men aged 21 and over who have been in the U.S. for at least two years since only they were eligible to both naturalize and vote.

The primary difficulty in estimating the causal effect of group size on political activity comes from the fact that immigrants were not randomly distributed across wards, and those who were the least likely to become politically active may have been drawn to large ethnic enclaves within a city. The selection concern is particularly acute in this context because of the large share of immigrants who sought temporary employment in the United States and then returned to their home countries after a few years.[20] If these temporary immigrants were attracted to large enclaves and at the same time unlikely to seek citizenship, the pool of potential voters in these wards would appear larger than

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[20] Gould (1980) estimates that between 30 and 40 percent of Polish and Hungarians returned home while between 40 and 50 percent of Italians did so in the twenty years before the First World War.

it actually was and the group size effect would be biased towards zero. Because they could not vote, I drop all immigrants who had been in the United States for less than two years from the electorate group share and size variables; this sample restriction should also have the effect of reducing the downward bias on the group size coefficient because immigrants intending to repatriate would be concentrated amongst the most recent arrivals.

Immigrants were not eligible to become citizens until they spent two years in the U.S. and long-standing immigrants may no longer live in the ward in which they first chose to naturalize. Thus, another concern with my approach is that I may not observe an immigrant in the same ward in which he became a citizen. The ideal sample selection balances the tradeoff from measurement error associated with observing an immigrant long after he naturalized, possibly in a different ward, with the loss of statistical power from restricting the sample to very recent arrivals who are less likely to have applied for citizenship. To illustrate the second consideration, Figure 1 reports the coefficients from the years-since-immigrating dummies from a version of (2) without any ward-specific size variables. I include new immigrants who have been in the U.S. for less than twenty years. Compared with immigrants in their first year of eligibility (two years in the U.S.), individuals who have been in the U.S. for seven years are 27 percent more likely to have initiated the process, and those who have been in the country for eleven years are 45 percent more likely. In sum, the more I limit the sample by residency duration, the less likely I am to observe an immigrant when he naturalizes. I demonstrate the robustness of my results to the choice of duration cut-off in Section IV.

IV.   The relationship between group size and political mobilization

In this section I present the empirical results of the effect of immigrant group size on political mobilization, focusing on relative share (share of ward electorate) and network size (new or

established). I begin by showing the relationship between relative size and naturalization likelihood graphically for both established and new enclaves. First, I appeal to the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and take the residual from equation (2) with the relative group size variable omitted. Figure 2 presents local linear regression estimators of the relationship between an ethnic group's relative size and the naturalization residual from the modified regression. For the established enclave sample (Panel A), the relationship between group size and naturalization increases until about 20 percent electorate share and then declines subsequently. For the new enclave sample, there is no relationship between group size and naturalization for relatively small groups (Panel B). Due to small sample sizes, the confidence intervals become very large for relative sizes above 10 percent.

Table 3 reports the average marginal effects from a probit estimation of the full equation (2) for immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for between two and fifteen years, first for the established enclave sample and then new enclave sample. I first show that, consistent with the graphical evidence, there is no statistically significant linear relationship between electorate share and naturalization likelihood for the full enclave sample (column 1). However, if I restrict the sample to the "upward sloping" portion of the parabola, the group share effect is positive and significant (column 2). The third column shows the results of the quadratic specification on the full sample: the electorate share coefficients are 2.9 for the linear term and -7.9 for the quadratic term. These terms, which are individually and jointly significant at the five percent level, imply a naturalization parabola with a peak around 20 percent of the electorate. For the individuals living in new enclaves, the negative coefficient on electorate share is not significant (column 4), nor are coefficients with a quadratic in electorate share included (column 5).

To explore the difference between established and new enclaves further, the sixth column of Table 3 presents the results of a fully interacted specification run on the pooled sample of both enclaves. The difference between the relative size effects for new and established enclaves suggests

that denser social networks facilitated group political mobilization. However, immigrants who select into new enclaves are more likely to naturalize than immigrants in established enclaves independently of group characteristics, and the "new enclave" main effect coefficient is .69. There is evidence that the economically weakest migrants are attracted to large enclaves in the present day, perhaps because of limited language skills (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund, 2003). It is reasonable to expect a similar selection mechanism was operating in the early twentieth century.

Table 4 assesses the sensitivity of the relative group size estimates for established enclaves to the sample restriction regarding years lived in the United States. The four columns present the results from equation (2) for immigrants from established enclaves who have lived in the U.S. for between two and five, ten, fifteen, and twenty years, respectively. Importantly, the group share and group share squared estimates are jointly significant in all but the most restricted sample where immigrants have had only three years to commence naturalization proceedings (column 1). The naturalization parabola implied by the least limited sample estimates (between two and twenty years) is very similar to that of the baseline (between two and fifteen years) sample estimates but slightly decreased in magnitude, suggesting that measurement error from immigrant mobility has attenuated the results.

The fifteen year sample restriction appears to balance the tradeoff between the loss of statistical power from focusing only on the most recent arrivals and the measurement error owing to unobserved mobility among earlier arrivals, and I use this restriction for the remainder of the paper.[21] The baseline estimates for established enclaves imply that a standard deviation (.08) increase in group size from .10 to .18 of the electorate (the mean group size of .15 is roughly centered in this range) is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of naturalization. This is an economically meaningful effect given only about 36 percent of immigrants in these samples have

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[21] To the best of my knowledge there is no source that would allow me to systematically account for the mobility of these immigrants since the Census Bureau did not ask about migration until 1940.

undertaken the citizenship process. Thus, this change is a 14 percent increase in naturalization likelihood.

I next investigate whether new immigrant political mobilization varies according to the electoral strength of the local Democratic Party, the most likely coalition partner of the groups I study in this paper. If coalition formation with earlier arriving ethnic groups – the core constituency of the Democratic Party in urban areas – is driving the nonlinearity in naturalization likelihood, then I would expect the effect to be strongest in wards where these older Democratic factions needed the new immigrant vote to win. In other words, relative size of new immigrant groups should be less predictive of naturalization in wards where the Democratic Party already held a majority or was so small that coalition partner comprising even a quarter of the electorate would be insufficient for a winning coalition.

I use the share of the electorate composed of first- and second-generation Germans and Irish as my proxy for the extant Democratic Party size in each ward and partition the sample into wards where the combined Irish and German share was between 25 and 50 percent and wards where the Irish and German groups were either a majority on their own or together comprised less than a quarter of the electorate. Figure 3 presents the local linear regression estimators of the residual from equation (2) with no relative size effects against relative size for both subsamples. The difference is striking: the entire nonlinearity in electorate share appears driven by immigrant political mobilization wards where the likely extant Democratic Party was a large minority (Panel A). The estimator for the other sample, where the extant Democratic Party was either a majority or a small minority, shows a nearly flat relationship between electorate share and naturalization likelihood (Panel B).

The fact that the nonlinearity in group size is only evident in wards where the Democratic Party was a sizable minority and likely in need of a coalition partner serves as strong evidence that political strategy indeed influenced immigrant political mobilization. The first three columns of

Table 5 present the quadratic specification results for the full established enclave sample (column 1), established enclaves in wards where the Democratic Party was either a majority or relatively small (column 2), and established enclaves in wards where the Democratic Party was a large minority (column 3). The estimates for the sample in third column imply that the same one standard deviation in group size from .10 to .18 is associated with an increase in naturalization likelihood of 10 percentage points, or an increase of 28 percent relative to the mean. The group size parabola implied by these estimates is also consistent with strategic behavior by the Democratic Party with respect to new immigrant groups. Since the Germans and Irish ethnic groups comprised about 35 percent of the electorate in these wards, on average a coalition with a new immigrant group of comprising 20 percent of the ward would be sufficient to capture aldermanic seats. The last three columns of Table 5 present the same bifurcation of the data for the new enclaves. No group size effects are apparent for either subsample.

Up to this point I have focused my attention on network size and relative size. I close by considering the third dimension of size, numerical strength. Table 6 presents these results, beginning with the baseline sample and specification for established enclaves (column 1). The electorate size effect is positive and significant at the ten percent level, contrary to predictions regarding diseconomies of scale in numerically larger groups. Column 2 reports the results for a specification where I include both relative and absolute size in spite of the collinearity between relative and absolute size (the correlation coefficient is .84). The standard error on the relative size coefficients more than doubles while the negative effect on numerical group size is insignificant. The last three columns present various combinations of the size variables, including controlling for absolute group size only (column 3), including no absolute size or electorate controls (column 4), and including only absolute group size (column 5). I do not find strong evidence of either positive or negative numerical

size effects. This could be because of the collinearity of relative and absolute size or because of the comparatively small voting units used in this paper.

V. Conclusions

Although the process of immigrant assimilation has been contentiously debated in both the scholarly literature and broader society for a century, we know relatively little about its political dimension. The question of how newcomers become integrated into democratic political systems is particularly relevant because the flow of immigrants over the past century has primarily been from monarchies and empires to democracies like the United States. In this paper, I use a novel dataset and empirical approach to investigate how immigrants joined the American electorate. Specifically, I use the citizenship attainment of immigrants during a period when the United States maintained a nearly open border to measure political mobilization. The naturalization approach frees me from the ecological regression framework employed in much of the previous literature on ethnic and racial political behavior.

I find evidence that early twentieth century immigrants living in urban areas mobilized politically when their group became large enough to be decisive in ward elections, but only in established enclaves where institutions necessary for group political mobilization were likely to exist. Recent immigrants were the most likely to naturalize when their group comprised about a fifth of the ward electorate, and I show this effect is driven by political mobilization of immigrants in places where the Democratic Party likely needed their vote to win elections. I find no significant electorate share effects for immigrants living in enclaves composed almost entirely of very recent arrivals, suggesting established social networks facilitated group political mobilization. However, immigrants who selected into new enclaves were more likely to naturalize independently of group characteristics. An interesting question for future research concerns the persistence of (or withering away of) ethnic

voting. What are the factors that encourage immigrants and their descendants to deprioritize ethnic

identification and stratify into other political interest groups in American society?

Data Appendix

A. Panel dataset creation

The ward maps of Boston, Chicago, the Manhattan Borough of New York City, and Philadelphia, were provided by the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago. I used these maps to determine which wards remained unchanged over the 1900 and 1920 censuses. Philadelphia and Boston engaged in only minor changes to their ward systems between 1900 and 1910, mainly annexing or splitting outlying wards. Chicago and Manhattan redistricted their entire ward systems after the 1900 census. I used enumeration districts, which were small (two to four city blocks) administrative units used internally by the Census Bureau, to make a correspondence between the 1900 and 1910 ward systems. Enumeration districts from the 1900 census that did not map entirely into a 1910 ward were assigned to the ward in which the majority of the enumeration district was located. There are relatively few such cases since enumeration districts tended to follow main roads. I use the 1910 wards as the unit of analysis in the paper because they were in place for nearly the entire decade of study.

To be included in the panel dataset, a ward needed to have at least one immigrant from the "new" sending countries: Bohemia (present-day Czech Republic), Greece, Italy, Poland, and Russia. The outlying wards that were excluded because of changing borders were often sparsely populated and contained few or no new immigrants. Out of the 135 total wards, 87 wards had at least one new immigrant and stable borders. They are listed below:

Boston: 1-11, 13-14, 16-19, 21-22
Chicago: 1-24, 28
Manhattan*: 1, 4-13, 15-16, 19-23
Philadelphia: 1-8, 11-20, 26, 28, 30-32, 36, 38-39

* Manhattan used assembly districts to elect aldermen, so I use these districts instead of wards for this city only.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Boston had eight locally elected aldermen and some represented more than one unit (usually 2 to 3 wards). Otherwise all the cities in the sample had locally elected aldermen, each representing one ward or assembly district. Boston switched to at-large aldermanic elections in 1910 but was under a local election regime for the decade studied in this paper.

B. Ethnic group share computation

The ethnic share variables are computed from a 100% sample of digitized individual census records of the population of panel cities. These records, including the place of birth of every resident of each city ward, were collected from the genealogy website AncestryLibrary.com. The pre-WWI map of Europe coupled with changing instructions to census takers necessitates a multi-step approach to constructing ethnic group shares from the raw place of birth data. The main immigrant groups in the sample of cities are English, Germans, Irish, Scandinavians, Czechs, Greeks, Poles, Italians, and Russians. Jewish immigrants had a large presence in cities such as New York, but separately identifying them using only their name and place of birth is difficult. Because most Russian immigrants during this period were in fact Jewish, I group everyone born in Russia together.

I create the ethnic groups from the census data in both census years by aggregating the relevant countries of birth listed by census takers. However, the list of allowable responses for places of birth in central Europe changed between 1900 and 1910. In 1900, respondents born in the Austro-Hungarian, German, or Russian empires were permitted to give their place of birth as Russian Poland, German Poland, Austrian Poland, Bohemia, Austria, Germany or Russia. In 1910, respondents were only permitted to give their place of birth as Austria, Germany, or Russia. As a consequence, ethnic Poles and Czechs are counted as Germans,

Austrians, or Russians in the 1910 census. To recover estimates of the true distribution of immigrant ethnic groups in my sample cities in 1910, I first construct a series of ethnic surname indices in the spirit of Fryer and Leavitt (2004) using the mother tongue variable from IPUMS samples from 1910-1930. These indices quantify how likely an individual is to have a given surname conditional on his or her mother tongue. Because of the small sample sizes of the IPUMS data in these years (1-1.4%), I am unable to use the ethnic name indices to assign individuals from the AncestryLibrary.com data to ethnic groups using only their name. However, I use these indices to confirm the place(s) of birth commonly given by ethnic Poles and Czechs in the 1910 census.

The name indices demonstrate that ethnic Poles are distributed across the German, Russian, and Austrian categories in 1910 while ethnic Czechs are usually counted as Austrian. To estimate the true number of Russian, Polish, Austrian, Czech, and Germans, I assume that the relative shares of each group are fixed between 1900 and 1910. For instance, suppose the population of a sample ward is 10% Austrian Polish, 20% Austrian, and 10% Bohemian in 1900. Further suppose that the population of the same ward is 50% Austrian in 1910. The Austrian category in 1910 contains ethnic Poles and ethnic Czechs in addition to German-speaking Austrians. The relative share of the combined group has grown from 40% (10%+20%+10%) to 50% over the first decade of the 1900s. Assuming the relative shares within the Austrian group are fixed, the Austrian Poland group is now 12.5% of the ward population, the Austrian group is 25%, and the Czech 12.5%.

I use these estimates of the true number of individuals from each 1900 category in 1910 to generate a consistent set of ethnic groups in both census years. The number of ethnic Poles in 1900 is defined to be the sum of Austrian Poles, German Poles, and Russian Poles. The number of Czechs in 1900 is defined to be the number of people born in Bohemia. The German, Russian, and Austrian numbers are computed as the number of individuals with that place of birth, net of those assigned to the Czech and Polish groups in 1910. The number of Scandinavians is the sum of respondents who give their place of birth as Sweden, Denmark, or Norway. Italians and the Irish are computed simply as the number of individuals with each respective country of birth.

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Figure 1. Conditional Probability of Immigrants Having Applied for Citizenship

Notes: This chart reports coefficients on the dummy variables of "Years since immigrating to the U.S." from equation (2) with the ethnic group relative size variable omitted. The sample is Czechs, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and Italians from the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia included in the panel. The specification also include a control for electorate size, age, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. The dependent variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. Standard errors are clustered at the enclave-year level. I restrict the sample to foreign-born, men aged 21 and over who have been in the U.S. for between two and twenty years. The individual data come from IPUMS samples for 1900 and 1910 and the group size variables are computed from the 100 percent AncestryLibrary.com samples.

Figure 2. The Relationship between Group Electorate Share and Naturalization Likelihood: Established Enclaves and New Enclaves

A. Established Enclaves

B. New Enclaves

Notes: These charts show a local linear regression estimator of the effect of relative group size on the residual from a modified version of equation (2) with the relative group size variable omitted. The sample is Czechs, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and Italians who have been in the U.S. from between two and fifteen years from the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia included in the panel. The dependent variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. The individual data come from IPUMS samples for 1900 and 1910 and the group size variables are computed from the 100 percent AncestryLibrary.com samples. See Section III.B for details on how enclaves were classified as "established" and "new."

Figure 3. The Relationship between Group Electorate Share and Naturalization Likelihood: the Role of Democratic Party Strength

A. Wards where Irish and German voters are a large minority

B. Wards where Irish and German voters are a majority or small minority


These charts show a local linear regression estimator of the effect of relative group size on the residual from a modified version of equation (2) with the relative group size variable omitted. See Section IV.B for details on how the Democratic Party strength was measured. See Figure 2 for other sample details.

Table 1. Turnout for Mayoral Elections in Chicago, 1900-1920

	Total Eligible Pop	White Eligible Pop
Dependent variable = number of ballots cast		
Naturalized Foreign-Born Men 21+	0.677***	0.653***
	(0.143)	(0.140)
Alien Foreign-Born Men 21+	-0.592***	-0.595***
	(0.151)	(0.150)
Native-Born White Men 21+	0.616***	0.617***
	(0.074)	(0.075)
Native-Born Non-White Men 21+	0.141	
	(0.173)	
Observations	105	105
R-squared	0.817	0.814

Notes: the ballot data come from Skogan (1989). Regressions include year fixed effects. Non-whites are omitted from the sample in the second column. *** $p<0.01$

Table 2. Summary Statistics in the Panel Dataset

	Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Poles, Russians	
	1900	1910
Ward-Level Characteristics		
Total Ward Foreign-Born Share	0.36	0.39
	(0.10)	(0.13)
Ward Irish Electorate Share	0.22	0.19
	(0.13)	(0.12)
Ward German Electorate Share	0.14	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.13)
Electorate Size (1000s)	11.53	11.36
	(5.04)	(5.97)
Number of Wards with an Enclave	88	88
Number of Enclaves	197	197
	1900	1910
Individual Characteristics		
Group Electorate Size (1000s)	0.73	1.07
	(0.81)	(0.94)
Group Share of Ward Electorate	0.07	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Naturalized	0.51	0.27
	(0.50)	(0.44)
Total Members Present in 1890 (1000s)	0.87	0.99
	(0.98)	(1.18)
Years in U.S.	8.96	6.96
	(3.67)	(3.50)
Age	34.99	32.16
	(10.28)	(9.75)
Literate	0.73	0.78
	(0.44)	(0.41)
N	2330	2708

Notes: Data source is 1900 and 1910 IPUMS for the individual characteristics and AncestryLibrary.com for the ward-level variables. The immigrant sample includes foreign-born Czechs, Greeks, Italians, Poles, and Russians who have lived in the U.S. for between two and fifteen years observed in the wards of Boston, Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia included in the panel. The share of ward electorate is computed using the number of foreign-born men from that group aged 21 and over as the numerator and the total number of men aged 21 and over living in the ward as the denominator. Foreign-born men who have lived in the U.S. for less than two years and are thus ineligible for citizenship are excluded from the computation of electorate size variables. The Irish and German share variables include the second generation as determined by father's place of birth. The naturalized variable is equal to one if the immigrant has applied for first or second papers. An enclave is defined as a population of one of the ethnic groups of any size in a particular ward.

Table 3. Group Size and Citizenship Attainment: Role of Social Networks in Political Mobilization

	Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship					
	Established Enclave Sample			New Enclave Sample		Pooled Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Share	-0.052	1.186**	2.892**	-0.077	-0.946	2.352*
	(0.234)	-0.424	(0.945)	(0.252)	(1.266)	(1.004)
Group Share Squared			-7.932**		6.925	-6.579*
			(2.629)		(5.280)	(2.769)
Electorate Size (1000s)	0.039	0.023	0.046*	0.003	-0.002	0.004
	(0.021)	-0.02	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Literate	0.074***	0.082**	0.074***	0.073***	0.120***	0.072***
	(0.022)	-0.026	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
New Enclave						0.690**
						(0.213)
New * Group Share						-4.001**
						(1.539)
New * Group Share Sqd						16.195**
						(5.867)
New * Literate						0.053
						(0.031)
Joint Significance of Group Share and Group Share Sqd			0.009		0.182	0.059
Pseudo R-squared	0.2	0.21	0.204	0.231	0.268	0.233
N	2529	2054	2529	5005	2476	5005

Notes: See Table 2 for sample details. See Section III.B. for details on how enclaves were classified as "established" and "new." Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Specifications also include a control for age, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enclave-year level. The regression on the pooled sample also contains new x year, new x ward, new x years in U.S., new x literate, and new x age interactions. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4. Group Size and Citizenship Attainment: Sensitivity of Estimates to Years Lived in U.S. Sample Restriction

	Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship			
	Established Enclave Sample			
	In U.S. ≤ 5 Years	In U.S. ≤ 10 Years	In U.S. ≤ 15 Years	In U.S. ≤ 20 Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Share	2.093	2.710**	2.892**	2.578**
	(1.233)	(0.923)	(0.945)	(0.839)
Group Share Squared	-5.54	-7.242**	-7.932**	-6.890**
	(3.495)	(2.508)	(2.629)	(2.384)
Electorate Size (1000s)	0.022	0.049**	0.046*	0.057**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Literate	0.013	0.069**	0.074***	0.087***
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Joint Significance of Group				
Share and Group Share Sqd	0.215	0.013	0.009	0.008
Pseudo R-squared	0.171	0.18	0.204	0.259
N	765	1953	2529	3088

Notes: Notes: See Table 2 for sample details. See Section III.B. for details on how enclaves were classified as "established" and "new." Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Specifications also include a control for age, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enclave-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Role of German and Irish Electorate Share on New Immigrant Political Mobilization

	Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship					
	Established Enclave Sample			New Enclave Sample		
	All	GI<25% or GI>50%	25%<GI<50%	All	GI<25% or GI>50%	25%<GI<50%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group Share	2.892**	0.991	4.412**	0.415	0.253	0.607
	(0.945)	(1.334)	(1.403)	(0.488)	(1.158)	(0.519)
Group Share Squared	-7.932**	-3.712	-10.313**			
	(2.629)	(3.605)	(3.833)			
Electorate Size (1000s)	0.046*	0.052**	0.009	-0.002	0.001	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Pseudo R-squared	0.204	0.176	0.247	0.268	0.255	0.294
Joint Significance of Share Vars	0.009	0.508	0.003			
N	2529	1379	1150	2476	817	1659

Notes: See Table 2 for sample details. See Section III.B. for details on how enclaves were classified as "established" and "new." Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Specifications also include a control for age, literacy, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enclave-year level. "GI" is the share of the electorate composed of first- and second-generation Irish and Germans. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$*

Table 6. Relative versus Absolute Group Size

	Dependent variable = 1 if immigrant applied for or obtained citizenship				
	Established Enclave Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Group Share	2.892**	3.658	2.479	2.395*	
	(0.945)	(2.206)	(2.468)	(1.091)	
Group Share Squared	-7.932**	-9.086*	-6.88	-6.755*	
	(2.629)	(4.067)	(4.654)	(3.010)	
Electorate Size (1000s)	0.046*	0.047*			
	(0.021)	(0.021)			
Group Size (1000s)		-0.034	-0.004		0.005
		(0.084)	(0.086)		(0.022)
Joint Significance of Size and Share Vars	0.004	0.007	0.147	0.081	
Pseudo R-squared	0.204	0.204	0.2	0.2	0.197
N	2529	2529	2529	2529	2529

Notes: See Table 2 for sample details. See Section III.B. for details on how enclaves were classified as "established" and "new." Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a probit regression. Specifications also include a control for age, literacy, a series of dummies for years lived in U.S., and year, group, and ward fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enclave-year level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Figure A1. Chicago Ward Map for 1900

Source: Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago.