SLUM CLEARANCE AND URBAN RENEWAL IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

We study the local effects of the Housing Act of 1949, which established a federally subsidized program that helped cities clear areas for redevelopment, rehabilitate deteriorating structures, complete comprehensive city plans, and enforce building codes. We use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the program's effects on city-level measures of median income, property values, employment and poverty rates, and population. The estimates are generally positive and economically significant, and they are not driven by differential changes in cities' demographic composition. The results are consistent with a model of spatial equilibrium in which local productivity is enhanced.

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This paper develops new evidence on the local economic effects of an ambitious and highly

controversial program of slum clearance and urban redevelopment that was undertaken in the United

States after World War II. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 aimed to revitalize American central

cities by offering federal subsidies for locally planned redevelopment projects. When the subsidies

were combined with powers of eminent domain delegated by state governments, local agencies were

able to assemble, clear, and then sell parcels of land in "blighted" urban areas for redevelopment.

Cities also received funding for planning, code enforcement, and the rehabilitation of structures and

neighborhoods. By the time new funding for the program ended in 1974, local authorities had been

awarded federal support for more than 2,100 distinct urban renewal projects with grants totaling

approximately $53 billion (in 2009 dollars), as well as smaller sums for related activities (U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 1974a, p. 15).[1]

Although the U.S. urban renewal program ended nearly 40 years ago, the economic problems

that it attempted to address, the basic policy tools that were employed, and the ensuing conflict over

its implementation are not specific to American cities in this period.[2] Policymakers in many

countries struggle to manage urban growth and modernization while balancing demands for

individual property rights, historic preservation, and housing for the poor (Priemus and Metselaar

1993, Mukhija 2001, Zhang and Fang 2004, Field and Kremer 2005, Wines and Ansfield 2010).

Arguments favoring policies that facilitate urban redevelopment typically claim that private agents

face prohibitive transactions costs in assembling parcels of land that could be put to more productive

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[1] The sum of federal grants for projects understates the magnitude of resources associated with the program's operation for several reasons: the public funds typically just cleared the way for re-development, which entailed an unknown but large amount of subsequent investment; the grants covered only a portion of the costs for planning, acquiring, and clearing land; and the range of urban renewal "programs" was broader than specific "projects." After 1974, federal funds were channeled to cities under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. See Galster et al. (2004) on CDBG.
[2] The program was originally characterized as "slum clearance" and "urban redevelopment," but for brevity and consistency with later terminology, we refer to it as "urban renewal." The Housing Act of 1937 initiated federal funding for public housing and encouraged slum clearance. It was modest in scale compared to urban renewal efforts under the Housing Act of 1949.

use and that positive externalities from redevelopment may benefit a city broadly. Whether such

benefits accrue in practice is a difficult and important empirical question.

Much has been written about the U.S. urban renewal program, but surprisingly few studies

have collected and analyzed pertinent data.[3] We exploit the substantial degree of cross-place

variation in urban renewal activity to estimate the program's effects on city-level economic

outcomes. The paper makes three main advances toward a better understanding of the program's

effects. First, because cities planned and undertook the projects, selection is likely to bias ordinary

least squares estimates; therefore, our empirical strategy features an instrumental variable that legally

constrained cities' ability to participate in the program. Second, we compile and examine a new

dataset for all cities with more than 25,000 residents in 1950 and 1980, thereby spanning the entire

period during which the program operated and the recipients of the vast majority of urban renewal

funding. Since urban renewal projects often took several years to plan and execute, spanning a long

period, including several years after the program's end, is important. Third, to the extent that urban

renewal affected city-level outcomes, we examine whether such effects worked primarily through the

displacement of residents with relatively low levels of human capital (i.e., changes in population

composition) or, alternatively, through channels consistent with economic growth. We discuss these

findings in the context of a simple Rosen-Roback framework of spatial equilibrium (Rosen 1979,

Roback 1982).

The results suggest a far less dismal legacy for the U.S. urban renewal program than is

commonly portrayed. It appears that cities that were allowed to engage more actively in urban

renewal posted better outcomes in 1980 than they otherwise would have in terms of property value,

income, and population growth. Moreover, these results were not achieved by merely pushing

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[3] Bingham (1975) is closest in spirit to our work. He uses city-level data from 1960 and 1970 to describe
the distribution of urban renewal funds and correlations between housing market variables and urban
renewal grants. More recently, Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) identified sizable land value
effects from Richmond's "Neighborhoods in Bloom" program, which, like urban renewal, targeted
specific areas for concentrated program interventions.

residents with low human capital levels out of the city. We caution that the results do *not* imply that

Title I was the best way to provide aid to central cities by any criterion (economic or otherwise), nor

do they imply that the dislocation costs for displaced residents and businesses were unimportant.[4] In

practice, these costs and their perceived unfairness were fundamental to the program's demise.

1. Background

A Brief History of American Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal

In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II, housing and urban issues rose to

the top of the U.S. domestic policy agenda, and the elimination of slums and redevelopment of

central cities became prominent objectives (Gelfand 1975, Teaford 1990, Fogelson 2001). As early

as 1941, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and economists Guy Greer and Alvin Hansen

published plans for federally-aided slum clearance and urban redevelopment that had many

similarities to subsequent legislation (Foard and Fefferman 1960). Proponents of urban renewal

believed that blight was rooted in powerful negative externalities and was therefore "contagious."

They also argued that transaction costs inhibited the assembly and redevelopment of land in central

cities by private enterprise, that city governments had neither the legal nor the financial resources to

undertake large-scale clearance and renewal efforts, and that the problems associated with slums

were a national policy priority (Slayton 1966).

In 1949, Congress authorized the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) to assist

locally planned urban renewal projects with grants of two-thirds (or in some cases four-fifths) of the

net project cost, where the net cost was defined as the difference between the total cost of acquiring

and clearing properties and the income received from selling the cleared land. The original Act

emphasized slum clearance and redevelopment of a "predominantly residential" character, but

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[4] A full cost-benefit analysis of the program is beyond the scope of this paper. See Rothenberg (1967) for a discussion of the difficulties such an undertaking would entail. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) address the potential pitfalls of public policies that target specific places.

subsequent legislation widened the program's scope to include more rehabilitation and conservation efforts, made exceptions for projects that were not predominantly residential (including hospital and university expansions), and added emphasis on city-wide planning and code enforcement.

The grant application and project execution processes changed over time, but a typical chronology started with the creation of a Local Public Agency (LPA) that was "enabled" under state legislation to undertake urban renewal activities and to exercise eminent domain powers. The LPA would identify an "urban renewal area" (characterized by "blight" or signs of deterioration), hold public hearings, seek approval from the local government (e.g., city council), and then seek approval from HHFA (or later HUD) to proceed with specific project planning in that area. The project plans would include detailed information on current and proposed land use, changes in streets and utilities, aid for displaced residents and businesses, and estimates of the costs entailed. Once approved, a combination of federal loans and grants would allow the project to proceed.[5] Projects often took several years to complete, and the slow pace of progress was a continual source of frustration.

As of June 30, 1966, the last date on which detailed data are available, approved projects had cleared (or intended to clear) over 400,000 housing units, forcing the relocation of over 300,000 families, just over half of whom were nonwhite.[6] The proposed clearance areas included nearly 57,000 total acres (90 square miles), of which about 35 percent was proposed for residential redevelopment, 27 percent for streets and public rights-of-way, 15 percent for industrial use, 13 percent for commercial use, and 11 percent for public or "semi-public" use (HUD 1966, p. 9).

The urban renewal program began with fairly broad political support, but it became increasingly controversial with time. Critics decried the disproportionate impact on poor residents,

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[5] This paragraph relies primarily on Slayton (1966) and Groberg (1968). Also see Foard and Fefferman (1960) and Sogg and Wertheimer (1959). We proceed as if the supply of grants was essentially elastic for projects that met HHFA or HUD requirements. In fact, funding was subject to Congressional authorization and therefore to year-to-year changes in funding constraints.

[6] Approximately 54 percent of the displaced families were nonwhite (HUD 1966). For perspective, the 1950 Census of Housing characterized approximately 1.3 million units in metropolitan areas as "dilapidated" (defined in notes to table 1).

the use of eminent domain to trump private property rights, the destruction of cohesive

neighborhoods, the loss of historic buildings, and the aesthetics of the new structures (Jacobs 1961,

Anderson 1964, Gans 1965, Wilson 1966, and von Hoffman 2000, Gotham 2001). Although national

publications, such as *Time Magazine* (Nov. 6, 1964), trumpeted the program's accomplishments well

into the 1960s, and proponents responded strongly to the critics and clarified the program's goals and

lessons-learned (Groberg 1965, Abrams 1966, Slayton 1966), political support for the program

eroded. New funding halted in 1974.

Potential Effects: Urban Renewal and Spatial Equilibrium

Once a local urban renewal program was undertaken, how might it have affected city-level

outcomes? The most direct impact would be on the areas targeted for clearance, redevelopment, or

rehabilitation. By knocking down relatively low-quality housing and commercial buildings, the left-

hand tail of the distribution of building quality might be thinned out, and the means and medians of

various city-level measures might rise mechanically. However, the implicit model held by

proponents of urban renewal emphasized the role of substantial spillovers within the city.[7] Blight

was considered geographically contagious, highly detrimental to the well-being of people living in or

near such areas, a growing drain on public resources, and both a cause and consequence of middle-

class flight and local governments' fiscal problems. It was argued that reversing the fortunes of

specific areas would benefit the city through a virtuous circle (e.g., less blight, less outmigration, and

higher property values across the city), or at least by short-circuiting the process of deterioration. In

this context, recourse to eminent domain was important because assembling sizable areas of urban

land through individual negotiations with multiple property owners was costly and subject to

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[7] Along these lines, Ioannides (2002) finds spillover effects in neighbors' behavior regarding property
upkeep in American Housing Survey data from the 1980s. Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) find
evidence of spillover effects on property values after targeted neighborhood improvements in Richmond,
Virginia. See Brueckner and Helsley (2009) for a model where market failures lead to urban blight and
suburban sprawl.

holdouts (Davis and Whinston 1960). In addition to effects emanating from specific projects, the program's emphasis on code enforcement, city-wide planning, and rehabilitation might have had broader impacts (Carey 2001).

Urban renewal attempted to make central-city locations more attractive to both residents and businesses. In an inter-city spatial equilibrium model with freely mobile workers, capital, and goods, as described by Roback (1980, 1982), a higher level of local amenities that are valued by both workers and firms ("productive amenities") tends to raise equilibrium property values because for any given wage level, both workers and firms are willing to pay more to locate in that place. The amenities have an ambiguous effect on wages, however, because for any given rent level, workers are willing to accept lower wages to have access to the amenity, but firms are willing to pay higher wages. Figure 1 illustrates the simplest version of the model. $V(w, r; \alpha_1)$ is an indirect utility curve showing how consumers are willing to trade off wages (w) for rent (r), given a level of local amenities, α_1. $C(w, r; \alpha_1)$ shows the isocost tradeoff for competitive firms. A change in productive amenities from α_1 to α_2 leads to a shift of both curves, a rise in r, and the theoretically ambiguous movement of w. Behind the scenes of figure 1, the improved amenities attract workers, implying a rise in population.

The model's predictions are less clear when one adds consideration of a separate non-traded goods sector, such as housing production. If the amenity affects productivity only in the tradable goods sector, then the model predicts higher wages, housing prices, and population. But if the amenity affects productivity in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors and also affects consumer amenities, then only population growth would be unambiguously positive.[8] For instance, workers and firms may tend to bid up the value of local property, but an improvement in housing sector productivity would tend to lower prices. We return to this framework when discussing the results in

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[8] See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) or Moretti (2011) for recent extensions and applications of the Rosen-Roback model.

section 4.

Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that urban renewal had any noticeable impact on cities' level of amenities, productivity, or prices. Schall (1976), for example, develops an intra-city model that features externalities in property upkeep and shows that renewal-like efforts to raise local housing quality may be unsustainable. When the competitive equilibrium is at a relatively low level of quality, targeted local improvements have short-lived effects. But the possibility of multiple equilibria in Schall's model allows for a sustained, positive urban renewal effect. Whether the urban renewal program actually had economically significant effects on American cities remains an open empirical question.

2. Empirical Strategy

Data and Empirical Framework

The goals of Title I were broad and predicated on the belief that targeted improvements within a city could have positive effects for the city as a whole. Because the goals and hypothesized effects were city-wide in scope and because the program was carried out by city governments, we examine the link between urban renewal activity and city-level economic outcomes reported in the 1980 *Census of Population and Housing*.[9] We collected information on urban renewal activity from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's *Urban Renewal Directory*, which was last published in 1974. For each project in each city, the *Directory* lists the value of federal grants approved and disbursed up to the publication date. This city-level sum includes both urban renewal *projects* and funds for smaller initiatives that were added under the urban renewal *programs* umbrella. The close connection between federal funding and urban renewal expenditure ensures that

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[9] Detailed city-specific case studies, such as White (1980) would complement this paper's analysis, but such analysis would entail a difficult selection problem at the neighborhood level. Unfortunately, the data underlying White (1980) could not be recovered (personal communication with author). Our search at the National Archives and inquiries to HUD did not uncover a systematic collection of city-specific plans.

variation across cities in the volume of federal grants is a reliable indicator of variation in urban

renewal activity. We scale the "grants approved" figure by the population of each city in 1950, and

all regressions control for city-specific characteristics that might confound the interpretation of

differences in grant levels across cities (e.g., pre-existing differences in property values).[10] The

instrumental-variable strategy, discussed below, addresses concerns regarding the endogeneity of

funding and measurement error in the true intensity of urban renewal activity.

The central empirical question examined in this paper is whether more intensive urban

renewal programs (UR_{ij}, where i represents the city and j the census division) led to better economic

outcomes in 1980 (Y_{ij80}), conditional on each city's economic and population characteristics at the

time of the federal program's implementation ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) and eight census-division indicator variables

(δ_j). That is, do estimates of β_1 in equation 1 suggest a favorable effect of urban renewal efforts?

(1) $$Y_{ij80} = \alpha + \beta_1 UR_{ij} + \mathbf{X}'_{ij50}\boldsymbol{\beta}_2 + \delta_j + u_{ij80}$$

The main outcome variables of interest are the log of median value of owner occupied property, log

of median family income, employment rate, and poverty rate. Subsequent analyses examine

additional outcomes, including population and housing stock variables. The extensive set of pre-

program control variables ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) includes: *housing stock characteristics in 1950* (the percentage of

housing units built before 1920, the percentage that were dilapidated, the percentage that lacked

indoor plumbing, the percentage that were crowded, the percentage that were owner-occupied, and

the log median value of owner-occupied units); *population characteristics in 1950* (the nonwhite

percentage of the population, median educational attainment of those over age 24, and the log of the

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[10] The *Urban Renewal Directory* reports nominal sums approved and dispersed as of June 30, 1974 for
each city. It is not feasible to precisely adjust each city's nominal sum for inflation over the course of the
program, but we have undertaken an analysis in this spirit. For each city, we assumed that projects were
undertaken at a constant rate from the year of the city's first project execution until 1974, and we used the
GDP deflator series to scale the nominal sums. Effectively, urban renewal spending in early years gets
scaled up in value relative to later years. The IV regression results with this adjusted UR variable are
similar to those reported below, but the coefficients are somewhat lower because the values of the
adjusted UR variable are larger. We prefer the simpler approach that takes the reported values from the
Urban Renewal Directory at face value.

city's total population); and *economic characteristics in 1950* (log median family income, the employment rate, the percentage of employment in manufacturing, and the percentage of families with income below $2,000 [a proxy for poverty]). The list of control variables always includes the 1950 value of the outcome variable.[11] The census-division indicator variables capture differences in trends across regions. Summary statistics are in appendix table 1, and sources are described in the data appendix.

The main econometric problem in interpreting an estimate of β_1 as a program effect is that urban renewal projects were initiated, planned, and carried out at the local level. Even with a rich set of city-level control variables ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) and census-division indicators (δ_j), unobservable city-level differences may be correlated with both the intensity of program participation and subsequent economic outcomes. Cities that were deteriorating relative to others in ways that are not captured by the control variables might have pursued a large volume of urban renewal projects; such cities might have ended up with worse economic outcomes than other cities in 1980 *but* with better outcomes than if they had gone without the funding (the OLS coefficient on funding would understate the true impact of UR funding). Or, the opposite case could hold—cities with profitable investment opportunities might have enthusiastically pursued urban renewal projects. Such places might have posted relatively strong outcomes in 1980 even if the renewal program had no real effect.

We address this problem by finding plausibly exogenous variation in cities' urban renewal funding that is due to differences in the timing of state-enacted enabling legislation. Enabling legislation permitted and set legal parameters for the creation of local public agencies (LPAs) that could exercise eminent domain to acquire property for private redevelopment, a prerequisite to undertaking urban renewal projects. This legislation was crucial to the implementation of federally funded urban renewal projects and is often cited in the early social science literature that considers

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[11] See Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 243-247) for discussion of specifications that control for the pre-program value of the dependent variable.

cross-city differences in funding (e.g., Straits 1965, Plott 1968, and Bingham 1975), in historical

accounts of urban renewal initiatives (e.g., Teaford 1990, Fairbanks 2002, 2006), in considerations of

the program's legal aspects (e.g., Sogg and Wertheimer 1959, Pritchett 2003), and in urban planning

publications (e.g., see Greer and Hansen 1941 and issues of the *Journal of Housing*). Archival

material indicates that HHFA (HUD's predecessor) closely monitored the development of enabling

legislation because it determined cities' ability to participate in the program.[12]

Given that federally funded urban renewal could not be undertaken without state enabling

legislation, that Title I funding ended in 1974, that political opposition to the program increased with

time, and that there was learning-by-doing in formulating project proposals, a delay in enabling

legislation would narrow a city's window of opportunity for participation. There is historical

evidence that state legislative delays constrained the participation of cities that wanted to undertake

urban renewal.[13] *A priori*, such constraints might seem most likely to bind for smaller cities with

comparatively little political influence, but even large cities were affected by delays in enabling

legislation. This interpretation is emphasized in studies by historian Robert Fairbanks, who notes

that "When Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, Dallas and Phoenix civic leaders applauded

the new law as an important aid in their fight against bad housing and downtown blight" (2006, p.

309). However, he notes that, "The delay in state-enabling legislation deeply inhibited Dallas's

ability to participate in slum clearance and redevelopment during the 1950s and 1960s" (p. 310) and

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[12] For example, a memo from C.L. Farris (Chief of Field Operations) to H.S. Keith (Director of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment) dated December 5, 1950 discusses cities that are interested in Title I funds pending the passage of appropriate state enabling legislation. A memo from A. Foard (Assistant General Counsel) to Charles Horan (Area 4 Supervisor) dated May 10, 1951 describes the status of enabling legislation in the West (National Archives, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 207, Urban Renewal Administration, General Subject Files).

[13] In states that did not pass enabling legislation quickly, the *Journal of Housing* reports on repeated efforts, spearheaded by cities, to introduce and pass the legislation. Separately, several cities are listed in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (81st Congress, Volume V, p. 286) as "Communities for S 1070 and HR 4009" (the Housing Act of 1949) that are in states that passed enabling legislation relatively late, implying that they were constrained in their program participation. Bingham (1975, p. 84) reports that later enabling legislation tended to be more restrictive in terms of requirements for referenda on urban renewal programs and projects.

that "Despite the initial burst of enthusiasm, Phoenix, like Dallas, had to wait until state legislators passed the necessary enabling legislation" (p. 315).[14] In other work, Fairbanks argues that "No urban redevelopment would be allowed in Texas until the state passed enabling legislation specifically permitting cities to establish redevelopment authorities. The delay would have dire consequences for many Texas cities since it halted implementation of the program in the state and allowed opponents of urban renewal to organize an effective lobby" (2002, p. 186).

In Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, rulings by state courts forestalled and curtailed the implementation of urban renewal programs. Whereas other state courts interpreted the "public use" qualification for eminent domain fairly broadly when assessing the program's validity, specifically allowing for private redevelopment under Title I, the courts in these three states did not. Later in the paper, we test whether an IV based solely on these judicial decisions confirms the basic results that are based on differences in the timing of effective legislation.

If delays of enabling legislation (1) affected city-level urban renewal participation, (2) did not influence city-level outcomes in 1980 through other channels, and (3) are not correlated with unobserved factors that did influence outcomes in 1980, then the timing of enabling laws may serve as a credible instrumental variable for urban renewal funding.[15] In the paper's next subsection, we focus on examining the first condition—whether enabling legislation affected city-level funding levels. The specific nature of the urban renewal enabling legislation makes it unlikely to have influenced 1980 outcomes through any channel other than urban renewal program participation (condition 2). Potential omitted variables and unobservables (condition 3), such as contemporaneous social and urban programs, secular economic trends, differences in political conservatism, and

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[14] Fairbanks (2006) goes on to note that although representatives from Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio pushed for the state-enabling legislation, representatives from rural areas and various industry groups (e.g., Texas Real Estate Board and Texas Association of Home Builders) worked to defeat it.
[15] In our main analysis, we use the timing of legislation as reported in Aiken and Alford (1972). This maintains consistency with earlier studies and assures readers that judgment calls in coding have not been influenced by our intention to use the laws in subsequent IV regressions.

relevant state policies are assessed in section 3.

Urban Renewal Activity and Enabling Legislation

Table 1 reports ordinary-least-squares regression estimates of equation 2, where UR_{ij} is urban renewal funding per capita (in city i and census division j) and L_{ij} is each city's "years of potential participation" in the federal urban renewal program, defined as the difference between 1974 and the year in which enabling legislation was passed.

$$(2) \qquad\qquad UR_{ij} = \gamma + \tau_1 L_{ij} + \mathbf{X}'_{ij50}\, \tau_2 + \lambda_j + e_{ij80}$$

Similar to equation 1, $\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$ is an extensive set of city-level characteristics in 1950, and λ_j is a set of census-division fixed effects (states are grouped into nine census divisions). For consistency with the IV regressions that follow, we use a sample of 458 cities with populations of at least 25,000 in 1950 and 1980 and without missing data on outcome or control variables.[16] If enabling legislation constrained cities' ability to plan, apply for, and receive federal grants, then estimates of τ_1 should be positive.

Table 1's first regression specification (column 1) includes only the census-division fixed effects and L_{ij}.[17] Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states. The results indicate that an additional year of eligibility for participation is associated with 10.55 additional dollars of grants per capita; the standard error is 2.88. In column 2, the estimate of τ_1 is virtually unaffected by adding the full set of 13 control variables for observable city characteristics ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) that one might expect to underpin local demand for urban renewal projects. Rather than being undercut, the estimate of τ_1 increases slightly (from 10.55 to 11.15) and remains statistically significant. *This pattern is consistent with state enabling legislation affecting local urban renewal funding in a manner that is essentially independent of local characteristics.*

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[16] The population threshold reflects the availability of city-level census data in Haines (2004).
[17] Tobit regressions also suggest strong and statistically significant correlations. We focus on OLS results for consistency with the first-stage regressions of the IV estimates that follow.

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The specification in column 2 corresponds to the first-stage of the baseline IV estimates that are presented in the paper's next section, where we address concerns about the instrument's excludability from the second-stage at length. We have tested the robustness of the first-stage relationship extensively. Additional control variables for local political conservatism, city tax revenue per capita in 1950, state income per capita, and new federal highway mileage have little influence on the estimate of τ_1.[18] The correlation between funding and enabling legislation also remains strong when omitting cities with over 500,000 residents or the largest city in each state, or when dropping each census division from the sample in turn. Thus, the first-stage correlation reported in table 1, column 2, is not driven by otherwise unobserved differences in political orientation, willingness or ability to tax, cross-state income differences, the sample's most powerful cities, or an idiosyncratic census division.

In summary, legal requirements, historical studies, and archival information indicate that the timing of state enabling legislation constrained cities' ability to participate in the urban renewal program. Delays in access to the program narrowed the window of opportunity for planning and carrying out urban renewal projects. This interpretation is supported statistically by a strong link between the quantity of local urban renewal funding and the year of state enabling legislation, even when controlling for observable city characteristics. The regression results are consistent with a pattern of quasi-random assignment of enabling legislation across cities within census divisions.

3. Urban Renewal Effects

Reduced-Form Results and a Falsification Test with Rural Counties

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[18] Conservatism is proxied by the proportion of county votes for Barry Goldwater in 1964's presidential election. Goldwater opposed urban renewal programs, and 1964 was the first year the Republican Party's platform criticized urban renewal, so this is a relevant gauge of local conservatism. Nate Baum-Snow kindly supplied highway data from his paper on suburbanization (2007). We lose almost half of the sample when controlling for the change in central-city federal highway miles, but in the reduced sample estimates of τ_1 are similar with and without the highway control variable (12.6 compared to 12.8).

If state enabling legislation substantially affected cities' ability to participate in the urban renewal program and if benefits from participation actually existed, then one would expect to find evidence that links variation in city-level economic outcomes (Y_{ij80}) to variation in enabling legislation (L_{ij}) in reduced-form regressions (Angrist and Krueger 2001). However, if state enabling legislation for urban renewal strongly predicts outcomes in *rural* areas, that would suggest that the paper's main instrumental variable is correlated with unobserved determinants of post-1950 economic outcomes, and therefore an invalid basis for making causal inferences about the program's effects (assuming that positive spillovers from urban renewal are not strongly felt in rural areas).

The first row of table 2 reports reduced-form regressions for cities, controlling for the same set of pre-program characteristics ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) and census-division indicators as described above. There is strong evidence of a positive correlation between economic outcomes in 1980 and years of potential participation in the urban renewal program. For instance, 5 extra years of enabling legislation is associated with approximately 4 percent higher median property values and 1 percent higher family income. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. An added-variable plot of the data underlying the property value result is shown in Figure 2A.

We constructed a separate dataset of rural counties using Haines (2004), defining counties as "rural" if they had less than 25 percent urban population in 1950. This yields approximately 1,500 counties in 46 states, or about half of all U.S. counties. Because some states passed enabling legislation in stages (discussed below), row 2 assigns each rural county the earliest year of its state's enabling legislation, whereas row 3 assigns the latest year of the state's extension of enabling legislation. In both cases, the regression results show no evidence of a relationship between urban renewal enabling legislation and outcomes in the rural counties.[19] Coefficients in the rural county regressions never approach statistical significance, and they are often small and have the opposite

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[19] The county-level control variables are similar to those in our city-level regressions, but not exactly the same due to the availability of variables in Haines (2004). See table 2 notes.

sign relative to the city-level results. This strongly suggests that the instrumental variable is *not* simply reflecting unobserved differences across states in economic trends. Figure 2B is an added-variable plot of property values in rural countries and state enabling legislation for urban renewal.

Instrumental Variable Regression Results

We estimate the effect of urban renewal activity in equation 1 by instrumenting for funding (UR_{ij}) with the amount of time eligible for participation under enabling legislation (L_{ij}). In all the regressions we include the full set of city-level control variables ($\mathbf{X}_{ij50}$) described above, as well as the census-division dummy variables. The implicit first-stage regression results are the same as those in table 1, column 2. The F-statistic for the instrumental variable in the first-stage regression is 13.1, a fairly strong relationship that should mitigate biases associated with weak instruments and with deviations from the assumed exclusion restriction (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002; Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2008).

The base-specification estimates of β_1 are reported in row 1 of table 3, where each table entry is from a separate regression. The results suggest that urban renewal programs led to higher median income and higher median property values in 1980 at a 5 percent level of statistical significance. The estimated effects on the employment rate and percentage of families in poverty are less precisely estimated, but they are consistent with favorable effects.

For a program that is widely held in low regard, the basic results in table 3 are striking: a $100 per capita difference in grant funding is associated with a 2.6 percent difference in 1980 median income and a 7.7 percent difference in 1980 median property value. The median city in our dataset received $122 per capita in funding, and so the coefficient estimates imply an economically significant impact.

Because total investment (a combination of private and public resources) in the wake of federal urban renewal funding is an unknown multiple of the federal grant and because these

resources might have been invested elsewhere in the absence of urban renewal programs (e.g., more suburban development), the coefficients from these city-level regressions should be interpreted with care. They are not estimates of the social returns on investment or local fiscal multipliers.

It is interesting that the IV regression results are substantially more positive than comparable OLS results, which are reported in appendix table 2.[20] Assuming for now that the instrument is valid, this suggests that urban renewal funding was correlated with unobserved *negative* shocks or trends, which bias downward the OLS estimates of urban renewal effects.

Robustness to Additional Controls

We consider several scenarios in which the basic estimates of urban renewal effects might be confounded by omitted variables. Essentially, these are circumstances under which the instrument is hypothetically correlated with the error term in equation 1 (violating "condition 3" described above). Later, we test the sensitivity of the results to a substantial recoding of the enabling legislation instrumental variable and to using an instrumental variable that is based on state court rulings that delayed program participation.

First, it is possible that government programs that were coincident with urban renewal influenced city-level outcomes. If participation in these programs were uncorrelated with the timing of state-enabling legislation for urban renewal, then the IV estimates would still be valid. But since some programs were related to urban renewal (e.g., established in related legislation or motivated by similar concerns), we have run regressions that include control variables for the number of public housing units per capita built under Housing Act of 1949; whether the city filed a first-round application for the Johnson Administration's "Model Cities" program; and city-level spending per capita on poverty programs circa 1966. If the IV regression results were simply picking up a positive

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[20] The null hypothesis of exogenous urban renewal funding is rejected at the 5 percent level in the regressions for income, property value, and employment rate.

influence from these other programs, then the additional control variables should diminish the coefficient on urban renewal funding. Instead, the results in row 2 of table 3 show that including the "other program" variables in the regressions tends to increase the magnitude of the coefficient on the urban renewal variable.

Second, high-quality local governments might be more adept at applying for federal grants, getting the necessary enabling legislation passed, and carrying out other functions that affect city-level outcomes. This interpretation seems inconsistent with the results in row 2, where participation in public housing and Model Cities may proxy for local government initiative or administrative capability. It also seems inconsistent with the OLS results, where one might expect to see a positive link between outcomes and urban renewal funding *if* good local governments were coincidentally good grant writers and effective lobbyists. We have undertaken additional investigation of the government-quality hypothesis by collecting Moody's city bond ratings for 1950 (Porter 1950). The ratings should reflect forward-looking views of cities' fiscal soundness, which in turn depend on the quality of local management and underlying economic prospects. Not all cities had ratings available, and so we assigned cities to one of three categories for analysis: relatively high ratings (Aaa to A ratings), relatively low ratings (Baa and below), and "rating not available." The results are similar to those in row 1.[21] We have uncovered no evidence that the quality or characteristics of local government drive the results.

Third, it is possible that differences in the timing of state enabling legislation are correlated with cross-state differences in support for cities. If differences in such support contributed to differences in city-level outcomes in 1980, then the estimates above would exaggerate the effects of urban renewal. Therefore, we collected information on state aid directed to city governments in 1952

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[21] The coefficients and standard errors are as follows, where the subscript denotes the regression's dependent variable: $\beta_{value} = 0.000776$ (0.000316); $\beta_{income} = 0.000255$ (0.000113); $\beta_{employment} = 0.00337$ (0.00208); $\beta_{poverty} = -0.00624$ (0.00512). Adding controls for bond ratings in 1982 do not alter the results, nor does controlling for the type of local government (e.g., mayor-council, city manager, nonpartisan elections).

from a Bureau of Census publication (U.S. Department of Commerce 1954b). Expressed relative to

the urban population's size in each state, this provides a state-level variable that controls for

differences in state government policy with respect to cities. We also included a control variable for

cross-state differences in political conservatism: the state-level percentage of votes for Barry

Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election. Row 3 of table 3 reports the IV coefficients on urban

renewal funding from regressions that include both of these state-level control variables. Again, the

overall results are similar to those in row 1, with somewhat larger coefficients and standard errors.[22]

Results are also similar if analogous variables for state-aid to cities in 1962 or 1972 are added.

Fourth, secular shifts in the US economy may have favored some places relative to others. If

these differential trends are correlated with differences in the timing of enabling legislation within

census division, the estimated urban renewal effects would be invalid. The city-level control

variables for economic and population characteristics, including the percentage of employment in

manufacturing, should narrow the scope of this problem. We can further address the issue by

including a control variable that interacts detailed (three-digit) state-level industrial composition in

1950 with national-level industry-specific growth rates between 1950 and 1980 (Bartik 1991), which

we constructed using information from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles

et al. 2008).[23] The census division controls should capture much of the secular rise of the "sunbelt,"

but we have also included a control variable for mean January temperature which others have found

to be a strong predictor of city growth in this period (Glaeser and Tobio 2008). The results are

reported in row 4 of table 3 and are similar to the base results in row 1.

Finally, we dropped the largest city in each state from the sample and re-ran the basic IV

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[22] For a slightly reduced sample of cities we can add a city-specific control variable for per capita "aid received" from other governments in 1950 and/or per capita "intergovernmental transfer revenue" in 1964-65 (Haines 2004). The results are similar to those without the additional controls. An HHFA document from 1962 listed five states known to provide some direct financial support for urban renewal; adding a dummy variable for this group of states had little effect on the estimates of interest.
[23] The 1950 census microdata are not sufficiently detailed to construct this variable at the city level.

regressions. This leaves us with a sample of cities within each state that are less politically influential and more likely to find the timing of enabling legislation exogenous to their circumstances and demands. The results are reported in row 5. They are similar to the base results, and in most cases are marginally stronger in magnitude and statistical significance.

None of the robustness checks suggests that the basic results are driven by omitted variables that are correlated with the instrument and influence the outcomes of interest directly. Although it is not possible to completely rule out contamination from unobservable shocks that are correlated with the instrument, such shocks would have to operate differentially across cities within census divisions in a manner that is not captured by the extensive set of base-specification control variables and subsequent robustness checks, and that conforms to the falsification test with rural counties.

Robustness to Changing Instruments

We start by replacing the original instrumental variable based on the timing of enabling legislation with two alternative codings. Although we have confidence in the original variable's coding reported in Aiken and Alford (1972), we discovered that the underlying sources are not well documented. Therefore, we independently reconstructed the timeline of state enabling laws from a variety of sources, including many issues of the *Journal of Housing*, *Book of the States*, *Municipal Year Book*, archived reports from the Housing and Home Finance Agency (the predecessor of the Department of Housing and Urban Development), and academic articles. Reassuringly, our coding turned out to be similar to that in Aiken and Alford (1972), albeit not exactly the same. A separate concern is that a handful of states passed legislation for a specific city early in the program and then later passed legislation permitting broader participation. This may introduce some within-state variation in the instrument that is a function of city-specific demand. We created two alternative codings that are based on our reading of the legislative history and incorporate adjustments so that all cities in each state are assigned the same "years of exposure" value.

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Row 6 of table 3 reports results when all cities in each state are assigned the earliest date of state enabling legislation, and row 7 reports results when all cities in each state are assigned the latest date. Due to differences in our base coding relative to Aiken and Alford and to the shifting of assignments in some states to either the earliest or latest date of state legislation, about 20 percent of cities have a different "years of exposure" value in rows 6 and 7 than in previous rows. Nonetheless, the pattern of regression results is similar to previous rows.

We have also run the regressions replacing the original instrument with an indicator variable that equals one if the state supreme court invalidated enabling legislation due to a relatively narrow interpretation of what constitutes a valid use of eminent domain. This happened in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. With this instrument, variation in predicted funding that enters the second stage is driven by differences in judicial interpretations that delayed program participation and created uncertainty about the scope and nature of legally viable projects. The results are reported in row 8. The first-stage relationship between the indicator and funding is strongly negative (F-statistic = 32.2), and the second-stage results are generally similar to those in row 1. When we restrict the sample to southern cities, we get results that are consistent with those in row 8, but with somewhat larger point estimates and standard errors.[24]

Using both years-of-potential-participation and state court reversals as instruments in the two-stage-least-squares regressions yields estimates that are close to the base results.[25] Both instruments are strongly correlated with funding in the first-stage regression. With more than one instrumental variable, an overidentification test can assess whether the instruments are correlated with the regression errors, which would raise concerns about instrument validity. In each regression,

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[24] The coefficients and standard errors are as follows, where the subscript denotes the regression's dependent variable: $\beta_{value} = 0.00125$ (0.000499); $\beta_{income} = 0.000370$ (0.000251); $\beta_{employment} = 0.00696$ (0.00375); $\beta_{poverty} = -0.00734$ (0.00684). There are 117 southern cities in the regressions. Standard errors cannot be clustered by state in this case but are similar if clustered by metropolitan area or county codes.
[25] The coefficient estimates (and standard errors) are: 0.00081 (0.00030) for property value; 0.00025 (0.000089) for income; 0.0044 (0.0022) for employment rate; and -0.0068 (0.0044) for poverty rate.

the overidentification test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid; the p-values of the test statistic are generally quite high.[26] In combination with the other robustness checks, this lends additional confidence regarding the credibility of the empirical strategy.

One important qualification attaches to the basic IV results. Variation in the enabling legislation instrument is relatively large outside the industrial East North Central and Middle Atlantic regions, and the precision of the base results depends in large part on this variation. When we run reduced form regressions and restrict the sample to cities in the Northeast and Midwest, the point estimates on years-of-eligibility-for-urban-renewal remain positive and roughly similar in magnitude to those from the full sample estimates (some increase and some decline in magnitude), but the standard errors are relatively large.[27]

4. Channels of Influence

If the urban renewal program affected city-level economic outcomes, as the regression results suggest, how were these results achieved? One can imagine urban renewal's effect working through a narrow, mechanical, and perhaps even perverse channel—essentially lopping off the left-hand tail of the housing-quality distribution and driving people with low levels of human capital and earnings out of the city. We will refer to this as the "displacement channel," which works by altering the composition of the city's population. Of course, a mechanism that merely displaces the poor from the city is quite different from the mechanism touted by proponents of urban renewal, who argued that it could impart a virtuous circle of renewal and growth or at least dampen an ongoing circle of deterioration. For short, we will refer to this as the "renewal and growth channel." These two

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[26] The p-value on the Hansen J-statistic (overidentification test) is: 0.83 in the property-value regression; 0.97 in the income regression; 0.39 in the employment regression; and 0.79 in the poverty regression.
[27] When restricted to cities in the Northeast and Midwest, the reduced-form coefficient falls to 0.0067 (se=0.0045) for property value, rises to 0.0039 (se=0.0027) for income, rises to 0.056 (se=0.066) for the employment rate, changes little for the poverty rate (-0.062, se=0.13), and falls to 0.0048 (se=0.042) for population. See table 2 for comparison with the full sample results.

channels of influence are not mutually exclusive. Displacement of the poor, for example, could

occur as a byproduct of rising property values, which in turn are anchored by gains in local amenities

or productivity.

We shed light on these issues in two ways. First, in IV regressions that are similar to those

above, we directly examine whether urban renewal affected city-level proxies for the "displacement"

or "renewal and growth" channels (table 4). Then, to see if the basic results in table 2 are driven

(partially or wholly) by changes in population characteristics, as the displacement hypothesis would

suggest, we add control variables for potentially endogenous population characteristics (observed in

1980) to the base regressions from table 3. If the displacement channel were the primary means by

which urban renewal affected outcomes, we would expect to see a sharp diminution of the point

estimates on urban renewal funding (table 5).

The first two columns of table 4 estimate the effect of urban renewal on the median schooling

level of the adult population and the black percentage of the population. If urban renewal worked by

disproportionately displacing from the city those with low levels of human capital or minority

residents, one would expect the urban renewal coefficient in the schooling regression to be strongly

positive or the coefficient in the black-share-of-population regression to be strongly negative. We

find no support for these hypotheses. The estimated effect on schooling is small and imprecise, and

there is no reduction in the black population (the point estimate is positive), even though black

residents were disproportionately displaced from renewal areas *within* cities.[28]

The next four columns of table 4 assess aspects of the "renewal and growth" channel. The

middle two columns report estimates of the effect on the overall size of the population and housing

stock in 1980, controlling for their size in 1950, changes in land area, and the base set of 1950

control variables (**X**). The estimates suggest that the urban renewal program positively affected city

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[28] In a similar regression for the proportion of adults (age 25 and up) with less than four years of high
school completion (rather than median schooling), we also get a small, imprecise point estimate.

population and housing units; a $100 per capita increase in urban renewal funding is associated with about a 9 percent increase in population and housing in the base specifications. The point estimates are notably smaller, however, when only the court reversal instrument is used (row 8).

In the last two columns, urban renewal is associated with a lower proportion of old housing units in 1980 (i.e., units built before 1940). The coefficient suggests that an additional $100 per capita in funding decreased the share of old housing by 3 percentage points. The estimated effect on units-without-full-plumbing is also negative, but it is relatively imprecise.[29]

In table 5, we re-run the base regressions from table 3 and add control variables that proxy for displacement: the racial and educational composition of the city in 1980. The additional control variables may be endogenous to urban renewal, and so the resulting coefficients on urban renewal funding are no longer interpreted as estimates of the program's overall effect. Rather, the point is to see whether changes in city population characteristics underpin the coefficients estimated in table 3's baseline regressions. The first row of table 5 simply replicates the original results from table 3 for easier comparison; the table's second row adds controls for the percentage black in 1980 and median schooling in 1980. The coefficients on urban renewal are slightly *larger* in the augmented regressions, and so it seems highly unlikely that the positive estimated effects of urban renewal in table 2 are driven by changes in the city's basic population characteristics.

The weight of evidence in tables 4 and 5—the absence of a discernable effect on the population's composition in terms of race or education level, the relative increase in city population size, and the relative decline in the share of old housing units—is not consistent with a simple story in which urban renewal perversely raised city-wide outcome variables through displacement of those with relatively low levels of human capital. The results are, however, consistent with a "renewal and growth" mechanism. In particular, the combination of higher wages, property values, and

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[29] The census did not classify housing units as "dilapidated" in 1980, but in 1950 the correlation between the percent of units dilapidated and the percent of units without full plumbing was 0.77. In results that are omitted for brevity, we find no effect on the percent of housing units that were owner-occupied.

populations are consistent with higher local productivity in the Roback model, as depicted by the

rightward shift of C(r, w; α) in figure 1.[30]

5. Conclusion

The early post-war decades, especially the 1960s and 1970s, were far from an optimistic time

in most American central cities, as residents and economic activity drained away (see Cullen and

Levitt 1999, Baum-Snow 2007, and Boustan 2010). To some critics, the urban renewal program was

a *prima facie* failure because it did not prevent or reverse urban economic decline. The spreading

perception of failure—punctuated by riots, rising crime rates, and municipal fiscal crises—combined

with concerns about the costs borne by the displaced and slow pace of redevelopment eventually led

to the program's political demise. In a 50-year anniversary retrospective on the 1949 Housing Act,

Robert E. Lang and Rebecca R. Sohmer wrote, "The consensus is that Title I urban renewal mostly

failed, in part because large-scale slum clearance proved a crude and largely unworkable

redevelopment method" (2000, p. 296). In the same volume, Jon C. Teaford highlighted the

usefulness of lessons learned from urban renewal and examples of well-regarded projects, but he also

noted "…the chief product of Title I was a widely held commitment never to have another Title I"

(2000, p. 463). Nonetheless, the fundamental policy issues and tools associated with urban renewal

remain highly relevant, and there is much to be learned from the extensive U.S. experience with

government-facilitated urban redevelopment. The large literature on U.S. urban renewal is

remarkably thin when it comes to providing econometric evidence on the program's effects.

This paper's results strongly suggest that, on average, cities that were less constrained in their

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[30] Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) suggest that productivity and amenity parameters may be backed out of a Cobb-Douglas representation of the Roback model using regression of wage, housing cost, and population change. There is considerable distance between measurement and theory in this exercise, but taking the parameterization and regression results at face value, our calculations suggest that urban renewal positively affected tradable sector productivity, had little effect on local consumer amenities, and negatively affected non-tradable productivity.

urban renewal participation had larger increases in property values, income, and population than similar cities that were more constrained in their participation. This implies a far less dismal legacy than is commonly portrayed. The patterns are consistent with the program spurring more central-city growth than otherwise would have occurred, rather than simply demolishing the left-hand tail of the housing quality distribution and pushing low-earning residents out of the city. In fact, we find no evidence that the positive estimates of urban renewal effects are underpinned by changes in the observable characteristics of cities' residents. Again, it is important to acknowledge that the city-level results do not imply that the costs imposed on relatively poor residents and small businesses that were displaced by urban renewal were unimportant, nor do they imply that the program was an optimal approach to assisting cities.

The results are broadly consistent with studies that suggest that targeted local investments may have sizable economic impacts, perhaps due to the strength of externalities and spillovers (cf., Rossi-Hansberg et al. 2010; Greenstone et al. 2010). Arguments along these lines are commonly made in legal and political settings to justify local policy interventions and the use of eminent domain, but causal evidence supporting the claim is still relatively scarce. Examining similar policies in other settings, undertaking further explorations of the causal pathways, and measuring the distributional consequences of such policies are important avenues for further research.

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Figure 1: Improvement in a "Productive Amenity"

Notes: A rise in amenities that both consumers and producers value tends to raise the rental value of land (r) and have an ambiguous effect on wages (w), as in Roback (1980). The amenity level is denoted by α, and $\alpha_1 < \alpha_2$. See text for more explanation.

Figure 2A: Added-Variable Plot for Cities,
Log Median Property Value in 1980 on Years of Potential Urban Renewal Participation

coef = .0087, se = .0033

Figure 2B: Added-Variable Plot for Rural Counties

coef = .0021, se = .0040

Notes: Each regression includes controls for observable local characteristics in 1950 (described in text) and census division fixed effects. The results correspond to row 1 and 2 of column 1 in table 2.

Table 1: Urban Renewal Funding and Enabling Legislation

	1	2
Years of potential UR participation	10.548	11.153
	(2.884)	(3.077)
Percent units owner-occupied 1950	-----	-2.276
		(1.591)
Ln median property value 1950	-----	-70.259
		(106.125)
Percent units dilapidated 1950	-----	1.133
		(3.217)
Percent units built before 1920	-----	-0.165
		(1.160)
Percent units w/o full plumbing 1950	-----	-0.437
		(1.642)
Percent units crowded 1950	-----	0.059
		(2.418)
Ln population 1950	-----	-3.446
		(15.575)
Percent population nonwhite 1950	-----	1.354
		(1.443)
Percent employment in manufacturing 1950	-----	-1.126
		(1.611)
Percent labor force employed 1950	-----	-11.355
		(7.292)
Median years schooling 1950	-----	5.850
		(24.697)
Ln median family income 1950	-----	-11.644
		(210.828)
Percent families w/ income <$2k 1950	-----	-1.209
		(4.801)
Census-division dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	458	458
R-squared	0.104	0.136

Notes: The dependent variable is cumulative Title I grant approvals per capita at the city-level between 1949 and 1974. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors corrected for correlation within states are reported in parentheses. A "dilapidated" unit had "serious deficiencies, was rundown or neglected, or was of inadequate original construction, so that it did not provide adequate shelter or protection against the elements or endangered the safety of the occupants….was below the generally accepted minimum standard for housing and should be torn down or extensively repaired or rebuilt" (Bureau of Census, 1954, volume II, part 1, p. XIV). Units without full plumbing are those without "complete plumbing for exclusive use." "Crowded" units are those with more than 1 person per room. Median property value pertains to owner-occupied housing. Summary statistics are in appendix table 1.
Sources: See data appendix.

Table 2: Comparison of City and Rural County Outcomes,
Reduced-form Regressions of Outcomes on Instrumental Variable

	Ln median property value	Ln median family income	Employment rate	Poverty rate	Ln population
1. Sample of cities, IV based on year of enabling legislation	0.00866 (0.00329)	0.00286 (0.00115)	0.0366 (0.0240)	-0.0691 (0.0595)	0.0104 (0.00565)
2. Sample of rural counties, IV based on earliest year of state enabling legislation	0.00214 (0.00399)	-0.000718 (0.00164)	0.00117 (0.0536)	-0.00838 (0.0441)	-0.00271 (0.00471)
3. Sample of rural counties, IV based on latest year of state enabling legislation	0.00148 (0.00412)	-0.000952 (0.00177)	-0.0261 (0.0479)	0.00633 (0.0529)	-0.00236 (0.00462)

Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate OLS regression of an economic outcome on years of eligibility for urban renewal (based on the timing of state enabling legislation) and control variables. Row 1's sample includes the cities examined in table 1. Rows 2 and 3 include rural counties (less than or equal to 25 percent urban population in 1950, approximately half of all U.S. counties). The underlying control variables for the city and county regressions are very similar but not exactly the same due to data availability in Haines (2004). Differences are as follows: whereas the city regressions control for proportion of housing units built before 1920 (and counted in 1950), the county regressions control for the proportion of units built between 1940 and 1950 (and counted in 1950); whereas the city regressions control separately for the proportion of units without full plumbing and the proportion of units dilapidated, the county regressions control for the proportion with full plumbing and not dilapidated (a single variable); and whereas the city regressions control for the proportion of units with more than 1 person per room, the county regressions control for median number of rooms per unit and median number of persons per unit. Standard errors are clustered by state.
Sources: See data appendix.

Table 3: Urban Renewal Effects on Property Value, Income, Employment, and Poverty in 1980

	Ln median property value	Ln median family income	Employment rate	Poverty rate
Panel A: Basic specification				
1: Controls for 1950 characteristics, census division	0.000774 (0.000327)	0.000256 (0.000113)	0.00328 (0.00213)	-0.00619 (0.00513)
Panel B: Additional controls				
2: Add controls for public housing, poverty spending, Model Cities	0.00110 (0.000506)	0.000432 (0.000219)	0.00598 (0.00319)	-0.0128 (0.00940)
3: Add controls for state aid to cities and support for Goldwater	0.00106 (0.000398)	0.000287 (0.000145)	0.00690 (0.00374)	-0.00905 (0.00630)
4: Add controls for labor-demand shift (based on industrial composition) and mean January temperature	0.000787 (0.000325)	0.000277 (0.000124)	0.00396 (0.00244)	-0.00762 (0.00483)
5: Drop largest city in each state	0.000692 (0.000302)	0.000262 (0.000102)	0.00353 (0.00197)	-0.00686 (0.00474)
Panel C: Changing instruments				
6: Alternative legal coding, earliest year of enabling leg.	0.000789 (0.000445)	0.000318 (0.000130)	0.00514 (0.00266)	-0.00895 (0.00615)
7: Alternative legal coding, latest year of enabling leg.	0.000862 (0.000456)	0.000301 (0.000134)	0.00452 (0.00270)	-0.00569 (0.00584)
8: State supreme court reversal of enabling legislation	0.000852 (0.000384)	0.000252 (0.0000974)	0.00598 (0.00314)	-0.00760 (0.00497)

Notes: The top entry of each cell is the estimated coefficient on urban renewal funding per capita from a separate instrumental variable regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states and reported in parentheses below the coefficient. See table 1's notes for variable definitions.
Sources: See data appendix.

Table 4: Urban Renewal Effects on Population and Housing Characteristics in 1980

	Median schooling	Percentage black	Ln population	Ln housing units	Percentage old units	Percentage w/o all plumb.
Panel A: Basic specification						
1: Controls for 1950 characteristics, census division	0.0000960 (0.000403)	0.0108 (0.00981)	0.000939 (0.000547)	0.000953 (0.000539)	-0.0310 (0.0131)	-0.00156 (0.00115)
Panel B: Additional controls						
2: Add controls for public housing, poverty spending, Model Cities	0.000221 (0.000562)	0.00156 (0.0133)	0.00140 (0.000721)	0.00139 (0.000746)	-0.0366 (0.0169)	-0.00197 (0.00144)
3: Add controls for state aid to cities and support for Goldwater	0.000207 (0.000404)	0.00606 (0.00991)	0.00110 (0.000556)	0.00112 (0.000553)	-0.0390 (0.0158)	-0.00148 (0.00109)
4: Add control for labor-demand shift and January temperature	0.000131 (0.000401)	0.00792 (0.00892)	0.000902 (0.000456)	0.000928 (0.000488)	-0.0295 (0.0116)	-0.00164 (0.00118)
5: Drop largest city in each state	0.000111 (0.000428)	0.00402 (0.00849)	0.000769 (0.000506)	0.000748 (0.000485)	-0.0308 (0.0140)	-0.00149 (0.00109)
Panel C: Alternative instruments						
6: IV with alternative legal coding, earliest year of enabling leg.	0.000103 (0.000460)	0.0120 (0.0110)	0.00118 (0.000764)	0.00128 (0.000785)	-0.0417 (0.0167)	-0.00115 (0.00130)
7: IV with alternative legal coding, latest year of enabling leg.	0.000262 (0.000463)	0.0121 (0.0122)	0.000843 (0.000683)	0.000809 (0.000695)	-0.0314 (0.0161)	-0.00140 (0.00129)
8: State court reversal of enabling legislation	0.000683 (0.000583)	0.00749 (0.0147)	0.000428 (0.000637)	0.000126 (0.000667)	-0.00969 (0.0160)	0.000317 (0.00189)

Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient estimate on urban renewal funding per capita from a separate IV regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are adjusted for correlation within states and reported in parentheses.
Sources: See data appendix.

Table 5: Urban Renewal Coefficients,
Regressions including Controls for Potentially Endogenous Population Characteristics

	Ln median property value	Ln median family income	Employment rate	Poverty rate
1: Basic specification	0.000774 (0.000327)	0.000256 (0.000113)	0.00328 (0.00213)	-0.00619 (0.00513)
2: Basic specification plus controls for percent black and median education in 1980	0.000875 (0.000362)	0.000310 (0.000128)	0.00438 (0.00241)	-0.00850 (0.00448)

Notes and sources: See table 3 and data appendix.

<center>**Data Appendix**</center>

Housing and Population Data

We manually entered data for the percent of dilapidated housing units, units built before 1920, units without full plumbing, and crowded units for 1950 from the published volumes of the *1950 Housing Census*. Data for dilapidated units and units without full plumbing are from table 18, data for crowded units are from table 19, and data for units built before 1920 are from table 20. We collected data on the percent of families with incomes less than $2,000 from table 11 in the published volumes of the *Characteristics of Population* in the *1950 Population Census*. We collected data on median years of schooling of adults (over age 24) in 1980 from table 119 of the *General Social and Economic Characteristics* volume of the *1980 Census of Population*.

Some of the black-specific data for 1980 were also entered manually. Data for the percent of black owner-occupied units, median schooling, percent employment, and median family income were entered from the *General Social and Economic Characteristics* volume of the *1980 Census of Population*. The percent of owner-occupied units are from table 22, median schooling data are from table 132, percent employment data are from table 134, and median family income data are from table 136. Data for the percent of black units without full plumbing, crowded units, and median property values are from table 3 of the *General Housing Characteristics* volume of the *1980 Census of Housing* and data for the percent of old units are from table 77 of the *Detailed Housing Characteristics* volumes of the *1980 Census of Housing*.

The data for population, land area, housing units, percent employment, median family income, median property values, percent of owner occupied housing, and percent of employment in manufacturing for 1950 and 1980 are from the 1952 and 1983 *City Data Book* files compiled by Haines (2004, file numbers 60 and 66). These files also provide data for the percent of nonwhite residents and median schooling in 1950, and for the percent black, percent of crowded units, occupied units without full plumbing, families in poverty, and old units in 1980. The 1983 *City Data Book* provides mean January temperatures, averaged from 1951 to 1980.

Election, Government Spending, and Enabling Legislation Data

State and county-level votes for Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential Election were entered from David Leip's *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*. Data for state aid to cities were entered from "State Payments to Local Governments in 1952" in *State and Local Government Special Studies, 35*, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1954). These data were divided by state urban population from *1950 Characteristics of the Population* ("old definition" of urban).

Urban Renewal state enabling legislation data and data on city applications to the Model Cities program are from *Governmental Units Analysis Data* (Aiken and Alford 1972). Data for units of public housing per capita built under the 1949 Housing Act, spending per capita on poverty programs circa 1966, and applications to the Model Cities program are also from *GUAD*. We collected Urban Renewal funding data from the *Urban Renewal Directory* (HUD 1974). To check the accuracy of the enabling legislation dates in GUAD, we created an alternative coding for the timing of enabling legislation based on our reading of the *Journal of Housing*, *Book of the States*, *Municipal Year Book*, archived reports from the Housing and Home Finance Agency (the predecessor of HUD) and academic articles.

Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
UR funds per capita (1950 population)	177.043	221.444
Years of potential participation in UR program	22.581	4.266
Ln population 1980	11.297	0.887
Ln median family income 1980	9.827	0.172
Employment rate 1980	92.632	2.925
Percent of families in poverty 1980	11.040	5.143
Median years of schooling 1980	12.467	0.717
Percent black 1980	16.136	17.820
Ln housing units 1980	10.382	0.896
Ln median property value 1980	10.627	0.364
Percent of units built before 1940	37.401	19.070
Percent of units crowded 1980	4.208	3.538
Percent of units w/o full plumbing 1980	1.66	0.907
Percent of units owner-occupied 1980	54.327	11.325
Ln population 1950	11.090	0.879
Ln median family income 1950	8.120	0.175
Employment rate 1950	94.950	2.018
Percent of families with income under $2000 in 1950	21.410	8.997
Median years of schooling 1950	10.310	1.268
Percent nonwhite 1950	9.282	11.816
Ln housing units 1950	9.901	0.885
Ln median property value 1950	9.027	0.293
Percent of 1950 units built before 1920	49.414	21.784
Percent of units dilapidated	6.623	5.578
Percent of units crowded 1950	12.727	6.587
Percent of units w/o full plumbing 1950	21.723	13.412
Percent of units owner-occupied 1950	52.317	11.690
Percent of employment in manufacturing 1950	29.508	15.247
New England	0.120	
Mid Atlantic	0.157	
East North Central	0.245	
West North Central	0.083	
South Atlantic	0.116	
East South Central	0.055	
West South Central	0.085	
Mountain	0.039	
Pacific	0.100	

Notes and sources: See table 1 and data appendix.

Appendix Table 2: OLS Results for Comparison with IV Results (in Tables 3 and 4)

Panel A

Ln median value	Ln median family income	Employment rate	Poverty rate
-.0000747	-.0000371	-.0014021	.0005116
(.0000467)	(.0000213)	(.0006128)	(.0008834)

Panel B

Ln population	Median schooling	Percent black
.0000086	.0001091	.0038598
(.0000504)	(.0000807)	(.0025046)

Panel C

Ln housing units	Percent old housing units	Percent w/o full plumbing
.0000323	-.0053381	-.0003936
(.0000479)	(.0023411)	(.0001906)

Notes and sources: See table 3, table 4, and data appendix.