

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

DE FACTO FISCAL SPACE AND FISCAL STIMULUS:  
DEFINITION AND ASSESSMENT

Joshua Aizenman  
Yothin Jinjarak

Working Paper 16539  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w16539>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
November 2010

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

© 2010 by Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

De facto Fiscal Space and Fiscal Stimulus: Definition and Assessment  
Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak  
NBER Working Paper No. 16539  
November 2010  
JEL No. E62,F42

### **ABSTRACT**

We define the notion of ‘de facto fiscal space’ of a country as the inverse of the outstanding public debt relative to the de facto tax base, where the latter measures the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. We apply this concept to account for the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus associated with the global crisis of 2009-2010. We find that greater de facto fiscal space prior to the global crisis, higher GDP/capita, and higher financial exposure to the US, were associated with a higher fiscal stimulus/GDP during 2009-2010. Intriguingly, higher trade openness has been associated with lower fiscal stimulus.

Joshua Aizenman  
Department of Economics; E2  
1156 High St.  
University of California, Santa Cruz  
Santa Cruz, CA 95064  
and NBER  
jaizen@ucsc.edu

Yothin Jinjarak  
Yothin Jinjarak  
University of London  
College Buildings, 534  
London, WC1H 0XG  
yj5@soas.ac.uk  
yothin.jinjarak@gmail.com

## 1. Introduction

The dire outlook of the global economy in the second half of 2008 propagated unprecedented fiscal expansions of most OECDs and emerging-market countries. The resultant fiscal stimulus focused attention on the degree to which countries possess ‘fiscal space’ and on ways to apply it in a counter-cyclical manner. A frequent concern about ‘fiscal space’ is the lack of clarity about it. In attempts to clarify this fuzzy concept, Heller (2005) defined it “*as room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the stability of the economy.*” Our paper aims at defining a measurable ‘fiscal space’ variable, and applies this concept in the context of the global crisis.

To proceed, we define the *de facto* fiscal space of a country at a given time by the inverse of outstanding public debt relative to the *de facto* tax base, where the latter is constructed to measure the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. We apply these concepts in order to explain the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis.

## 2. Assessment of the *de facto* fiscal space prior to the crisis (2000-2006), and the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus, 2009-10

Insight regarding fiscal space may be provided by tracing the pre-crisis, 2006 public debt as a fraction of the pre-crisis average tax revenue during 2000-2006. To recall, the early 2000s were viewed as the continuation of the blissful “Great Moderation” – a period characterized by the drop in macroeconomic volatility and risk premium during the late 1990s and early 2000s.<sup>1</sup> The pre-crisis tax revenue measures the *de facto* tax capacity in years of relative tranquility. The presumption is that a *lower* pre-crisis public debt relative to the pre-crisis tax base implies *greater* fiscal capacity to fund stimuli using the existing tax capacity. Similarly, lower average

---

<sup>1</sup> See Stock and Watson (2002) for analysis of the Great Moderation hypothesis. Recent observers refer to 1987- 2007 as the “Great Moderation” period.

fiscal deficits relative to the average tax revenue during 2000-2006 may suggest greater fiscal space at the on-set of the crisis. Figures 1a and 1b report these measures, subject to data availability, of 81 countries. Noticeable in Figure 1a is the wide variation in the *de facto* fiscal space, from well below 1 in Australia (indicating high fiscal space), to about 5 in Brazil, and above 10 in Madagascar (indicating low fiscal space). For most of the countries in our sample, the *de facto* fiscal capacity reported in 2006 was below 4 (see Figure 1a). These figures are consistent with the notion that, even without increasing the tax base, a fair share of countries had significant fiscal space in 2006.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 2 summarizes the averages of these measures for the low, lower-middle, upper middle, and high-income countries. The figure suggests that in 2006, the middle income countries' fiscal space was higher than the low income countries. While the debt overhangs [2006 public debt/GDP] of the low and lower middle income countries are slightly above the other groups, their ratio to the tax base is much higher than that of the upper middle income and the OECD countries. This in turn implies that the low and lower middle income countries may have more limited fiscal space than the upper middle income and the OPEC countries. Consequently, the fiscal stimuli of the richer countries would have the side benefit of helping the poorer countries in invigorating the demands facing lower income countries.

Table 1 overviews the crisis related fiscal stimulus/GDP, 2009-2010, subject to data availability and latest releases. The crisis propagated a significant fiscal stimulus in the USA, Japan, and Germany, the magnitude of which increased from 2009 to 2010, reflecting various lags associated with fiscal policy. It also induced massive "bailout" transfers to the banking systems in the USA, Germany and the UK, attempting to stabilize the financial panic. It is noteworthy that in Germany and the UK the size of the transfers to the financial systems exceeded the fiscal stimulus to the non-financial sector. Similar trends, though in varying intensity, were observed in emerging markets. China, South Korea and Russia provided front loaded fiscal stimulus at rates that were well above the one observed in the OECD countries.

---

<sup>2</sup> This inference is in line with Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), finding that the projected flow cost of public debt is low for about half of the OECD countries. See Aizenman and Jinjark (2009) for a study accounting for the cross country variation in the *de facto* tax base.

Notable is the greater agility of the emerging markets' response relative to that of the OECD countries, reflecting possibly a faster policy response capacity of several emerging markets.<sup>3</sup> This observation is remarkable considering the earlier evidence of the fiscal pro-cyclicality observed in emerging markets and developing countries during the 1980s-90s [see Kaminsky, Reinhart and (2005)].

Based on data availability reported in Table 2, we present in Table 3 the regression analysis, accounting for the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during 2009-10, in 75 (out of 81) countries. The explanatory variables are the *de facto* fiscal space, GDP per capita, trade openness, inflation, and measures of the financial exposure to the US. GDP per capita (PPP, thousands), Trade/GDP (percentage), and Inflation (GDP deflator, percentage) are 2000-06 averages. The financial exposure to USA is the position of each country as of 2006, obtained from the US Treasury International Capital System (TIC): 'assets' is foreign portfolio holdings of USA securities, and 'total' is 'assets' plus USA portfolio holdings of foreign securities. To account for potential correlation among countries in each geographic region, the cross-section estimation is done with clustering at a regional level (according to the World Bank's geographic classification). As shown, the regression analysis explains about a third of the variations across countries in crisis-related fiscal stimulus, and in the stimulus plus net cost of financial sector support. The coefficient estimates of key determinants are all statistically significant (t-statistics in parentheses), indicating that a greater *de facto* fiscal space, higher GDP/capita, higher financial exposure to the US, and lower trade openness were positively associated with fiscal stimulus/GDP during 2009-2010.<sup>4</sup>

We provide in Figure 3 the economic significance of the cross-country estimates in regressions (2) and (5) of Table 3. For each explanatory variable, we multiply its standard

---

<sup>3</sup> The deeper safety net of the OECD [unemployment insurance, food stamps, social security, socialized medical care, etc.] provides automatic stabilizers that work to cushion the economy in addition to the crisis related stimulus.

<sup>4</sup> The interaction term in regression (3) implies that the positive association of *de facto* fiscal space with the fiscal stimulus is stronger in higher GDP/Capita countries.

deviation with the estimated coefficient in the regression, to approximate the effect of its one standard deviation change on the size of fiscal stimulus. The calculation suggests that the size of the stimulus in 2009-10 is larger in countries with higher income, smaller trade openness, larger *de facto* fiscal space, and greater financial exposure to the USA. For the *de facto* fiscal space measure, a decrease in the public debt/tax revenue by 1.84 [from that of the lower middle income group (3.70) to that of the high income OECD group (1.86)] implies, all other things being equal, an increase of the fiscal stimulus during 2009-2010 by  $9.6 \times 1.84 = 18$  basis points, or 0.18 percent of GDP.<sup>5</sup>

### 3. Concluding remarks

Our analysis shows the usefulness of the *de facto* fiscal space concept in accounting for the size of fiscal stimulus. Intriguingly, we found that higher trade openness had been associated with a lower fiscal stimulus. A possible interpretation is that, as fiscal multipliers may be lower in more open economies, these countries opted for a smaller fiscal stimulus, putting greater weight on adjustment via exchange rate depreciation ('exporting their way to prosperity'). If this interpretation is valid, it suggests gains associated with greater fiscal coordination among countries. A coordinated fiscal stimulus may generate positive spillover effects, mitigating the reliance on competitive depreciations.

---

<sup>5</sup> We also run a regression using the flow fiscal space (fiscal deficit/tax revenue in Table 2). The coefficient estimate of this second measure is also statistically significant both in the fiscal stimulus equation and in the stimulus plus net cost of financial sector support equation. For this second measure of *de facto* fiscal space, a decrease in the fiscal deficit/tax revenue by 0.18 [a one standard deviation] implies, other things being equal, an increase in the fiscal stimulus during 2009-10 by 0.36 percent of GDP. The fiscal deficit/tax revenue provides therefore an alternative measure of fiscal space to the public debt/tax revenue variable.

## References

- Aizenman J. and G. Pasricha. (2010) “Fiscal Fragility: What the Past may say about the Future,” NBER Working paper # 16478, September.
- Aizenman, J. and Y. Jinjarak. (2009) “Globalisation and Developing Countries - a Shrinking Tax Base?” *Journal of Development Studies*, 45 (5), pp. 653-671.
- Fiscal Monitor. (2010) “Navigating the Fiscal Challenges Ahead,” Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF, May.
- Heller, S. P. (2005) “Back to Basics -- Fiscal Space: What It Is and How to Get It,” *Finance and Development*, 42 (2), June.
- Kaminsky, G. L., C. M. Reinhart and C. A. Végh. (2005) “When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies,” *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 19 (2004), pp. 11-53.
- Stock J. H. and M. W. Watson. (2003) “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 17 (2002), pp. 159-218.

**Table 1: Fiscal stimulus, financial sector support, and government expenditures.**

This table reports crisis-related fiscal stimulus/GDP, net cost of financial sector support/GDP, and government expenditures/GDP [G/Y] from 2000-09 (all in annual percentage). For USA, the difference of G/Y between 2008 and 2009 = 5.4 percent, consisting of 1.8 percent of crisis-related fiscal stimulus and 3.6 percent of financial sector support. While the matching of data is less precise for other countries, the reported G is inclusive of transfers and bailouts to banks, and does not match the G in GDP accounts [which is the base of Y]. Hence, in understanding the aggregate demand equation where  $G + C + I + NX = Y$ , 'G' in the equation is not the G reported below; the bailout, beyond a transfer, does not increase aggregate demand directly.

Sources: Authors' calculation from IMF Fiscal Monitor (2010, May) and WEO (2010, April).

Country		Crisis-Related Fiscal Stimulus/GDP		Net Cost of Financial Sector Support/GDP	Government Expenditures/GDP			
					Total	Transfers		
		2009	2010		2000-2007	2008-09	2000-2007	2008-09
Industrial Countries	Australia	2.8	1.8	-0.1	34.3	35.9	3.1	3.1
	Canada	1.8	1.7	4.4	40.1	42.0	7.6	7.9
	France	1.0	.5	0.3	52.6	54.7	23.9	25.0
	Germany	1.5	2.1	4.8	46.5	46.5	18.8	18.1
	Japan	2.8	2.2	0.1	35.6	38.3	15.3	18.0
	Norway	1.2	..	..	42.8	43.4	13.7	12.8
	Sweden	1.4	..	..	52.5	53.0	17.7	17.1
	Switzerland	.6	..	..	35.8	36.2	10.4	9.9
	United Kingdom	1.6	.2	5.4	39.1	45.8	11.2	11.5
	United States	1.8	2.9	3.6	34.4	40.9	8.7	10.6
Euro Area	Austria	1.5	.3	..	51.1	51.0	24.1	24.9
	Belgium	1.0	..	..	49.7	52.6	18.6	20.8
	Denmark	1.9	3.1	..	53.6	54.6	2.8	1.8
	Finland	3.3	..	..	44.1	48.3	12.5	14.5
	Greece	..	..	..	44.7	50.2	15.9	20.4
	Ireland	..	..	..	32.9	44.4	6.6	9.4
	Italy	.0	.1	0.3	47.8	50.6	19.4	21.5
	Netherlands	1.4	..	..	45.6	48.6	14.9	16.6
	Portugal	1.3	..	..	45.4	48.2	12.6	15.5
	Spain	3.7	..	..	38.7	44.4	10.4	12.1
Emerging Markets	Argentina	1.5	.0	..	27.2	34.9	5.5	6.9
	Brazil	.7	.6	..	38.9	38.5	6.4	7.0
	China	3.1	2.7	..	18.5	22.3	..	..
	Czech Republic	1.6	..	..	44.5	44.3	12.4	13.4
	India	.6	.4	..	27.3	29.7	..	..
	Indonesia	1.1	.6	..	19.5	18.6	..	..
	Mexico	1.5	1.0	..	22.5	25.5	..	..
	Russia	4.5	2.8	..	33.3	37.9	8.9	10.6
	South Korea	3.6	1.1	0.1	20.0	23.1	..	..
	Thailand	..	..	..	20.6	22.7	..	..



**Table 2: *De facto* Fiscal Space.**

This table reports the measures of fiscal space based on 2000 to 2006 data. The denominator, Tax, is average tax revenue%GDP from 2000-06. Public Debt is public debt%GDP as of 2006. Fiscal Deficit is average fiscal deficit%GDP from 2000-06 [negative is surplus]. All variables are deflated by 2006 CPI. \* denotes countries included in regression analysis.

Source: Authors' calculation from the World Development Indicators.

Income Group	Country	Iso	Tax revenue avg. 2000-06	Publild debt 2006	Fiscal space 1 (II)/(I)	Fiscal deficit avg. 2000-06	Fiscal space 2 (III)/(I)	Income Group	Country	Iso	Tax revenue avg. 2000-06	Publild debt 2006	Fiscal space 1 (II)/(I)	Fiscal deficit avg. 2000-06	Fiscal space 2 (III)/(I)
			(I) %	(II) %		(III) %					(I) %	(II) %		(III) %	
A. Low Income	Afghanistan	AFG *	5.95	9.56	1.61	1.75	.29	D. High Income Non OECD	Bahamas, The	BHS	14.71	34.71	2.36	1.49	.10
	Bangladesh	BGD *	7.90	35.20	4.46	.70	.09		Bahrain	BHR	3.43	23.64	6.89	-4.48	-1.30
	Kyrgyz Republic	KGZ *	13.37	115.13	8.61	1.57	.12		Croatia	HRV *	21.02	35.50	1.69	1.88	.09
	Madagascar	MDG *	10.07	103.08	10.24	3.39	.34		Cyprus	CYP *	30.75	64.60	2.10	-.02	.00
	Nepal	NPL *	8.63	49.69	5.76	1.13	.13		Estonia	EST *	19.91	4.50	.23	-1.08	-.05
	Tajikistan	TIK *	10.14	102.61	10.12	3.83	.38		Latvia	LVA *	14.00	10.70	.76	.77	.05
	Uganda	UGA *	10.88	58.05	5.33	1.87	.17		Malta	MLT *	26.09	63.70	2.44	1.87	.07
B. Lower Middle Income	Bhutan	BTN *	9.17	63.31	6.91	4.67	.51	E. High Income OECD	Oman	OMN	7.09	19.07	2.69	2.69	.38
	China	CHN *	8.30	16.20	1.95	2.02	.24		San Marino	SMR	21.61	62.04	2.87	-4.66	-.22
	Congo, Rep.	COG *	7.69	.20	.03	-1.19	-.16		Singapore	SGP *	13.41	88.46	6.60	-6.04	-.45
	Côte d'Ivoire	CIV *	13.75	94.97	6.91	3.01	.22		Australia	AUS *	23.13	20.48	.89	-.97	-.04
	El Salvador	SLV *	11.70	43.33	3.70	3.60	.31		Austria	AUT *	28.51	62.20	2.18	2.04	.07
	Georgia	GEO *	9.34	27.96	2.99	.05	.01		Belgium	BEL *	30.34	88.10	2.90	.62	.02
	Guatemala	GTM *	11.37	21.88	1.92	1.72	.15		Canada	CAN *	29.17	53.22	1.82	-.84	-.03
	India	IND *	9.37	80.80	8.62	3.57	.38		Czech Republic	CZE *	20.28	29.40	1.45	4.21	.21
	Indonesia	IDN *	11.53	39.00	3.38	1.16	.10		Denmark	DNK *	47.76	32.10	.67	-2.03	-.04
	Maldives	MDV *	19.94	50.12	2.51	7.67	.38		Finland	FIN *	32.36	39.70	1.23	-.71	-.02
	Moldova	MDA *	15.70	29.18	1.86	.56	.04		France	FRA *	27.17	63.70	2.34	2.60	.10
	Mongolia	MNG *	19.18	54.74	2.85	-.74	-.04		Germany	DEU *	22.71	67.60	2.98	1.35	.06
	Morocco	MAR *	20.49	56.19	2.74	1.94	.09		Greece	GRC *	21.14	97.80	4.63	5.89	.33
	Papua New Guinea	PNG *	23.63	71.56	3.03	1.99	.08		Hungary	HUN *	25.70	65.60	2.55	6.40	.25
	Philippines	PHL *	13.04	64.59	4.95	3.35	.26		Iceland	ISL *	34.01	27.90	.82	-1.27	-.04
	Senegal	SEN *	16.09	71.11	4.42	1.47	.09		Ireland	IRL *	25.38	24.90	.98	-1.40	-.06
	Sri Lanka	LKA *	13.80	88.70	6.43	7.55	.55		Italy	ITA *	28.68	106.50	3.71	2.90	.10
	Thailand	THA *	16.15	41.10	2.54	-1.74	-.11		Korea, Rep.	KOR *	19.47	34.10	1.75	-.31	-.02
	Tunisia	TUN *	20.71	53.92	2.60	2.58	.12		Luxembourg	LUX *	27.23	6.50	.24	.06	.00
	Ukraine	UKR *	14.75	53.96	3.66	1.01	.07		Netherlands	NLD *	24.05	47.40	1.97	.68	.03
C. Upper Middle Income	Algeria	DZA	32.37	54.91	1.70	-13.98	-.43		New Zealand	NZL *	32.65	44.53	1.36	-3.77	-.12
	Belarus	BLR *	24.56	6.64	.27	-.10	.00		Norway	NOR *	33.73	55.30	1.64	-13.19	-.39
	Brazil	BRA *	9.40	46.96	5.00	1.44	.15		Poland	POL *	20.54	47.70	2.32	4.27	.21
	Bulgaria	BGR *	19.78	22.70	1.15	-3.17	-.16		Portugal	PRT *	21.39	64.70	3.03	.97	.05
	Colombia	COL *	13.00	56.97	4.38	5.12	.39		Slovak Republic	SVK *	19.00	30.50	1.61	6.11	.32
	Jamaica	JAM	26.58	117.12	4.41	1.93	.07		Slovenia	SVN *	24.48	26.70	1.09	2.54	.10
	Kazakhstan	KAZ *	12.92	5.94	.46	-.61	-.05		Spain	ESP *	22.50	39.60	1.76	.49	.02
	Lithuania	LTU *	16.08	18.00	1.12	.57	.04		Sweden	SWE *	35.52	45.70	1.29	-1.21	-.03
	Mauritius	MUS *	16.06	41.08	2.56	2.69	.17		Switzerland	CHE *	22.16	25.38	1.15	.94	.04
	Mexico	MEX *	12.34	38.30	3.10	1.24	.10		United Kingdom	GBR *	28.85	43.50	1.51	1.64	.06
	Peru	PER *	13.06	31.25	2.39	1.06	.08		United States	USA *	20.51	47.13	2.32	1.75	.09
	Russian Federation	RUS *	14.56	9.10	.63	-5.78	-.40								
	South Africa	ZAF *	25.83	46.24	1.79	1.23	.05								
	St. Kitts and Nevis	KNA *	22.32	95.82	4.29	1.08	.05								
	Turkey	TUR *	19.70	46.10	2.34	4.38	.22								
	Uruguay	URY *	17.19	67.50	3.93	3.04	.18								

**Table 3: Fiscal stimulus and fiscal space.**

This table reports regression analysis of fiscal stimulus (dependent variable; Table 1) as explained by economic determinants and the (inverse) of the *de facto* fiscal space: Public debt/tax base. All variables are deflated using 2006 CPI and rescaled (see Figure 3 for their economic significance and interpretation). A constant term included but not reported. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses, with standard errors obtained by clustering on geographic region as explained in the paper.

\*\*\* (\*\*, \*) denote a statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) percent, respectively.


Dependent (% of GDP):	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Fiscal stimulus of 2009-2010 total						Fiscal stimulus and financial sector support					
Explanatory variable	coeff.		coeff.		coeff.		coeff.		coeff.		coeff.	
	(t-stat)		(t-stat)		(t-stat)		(t-stat)		(t-stat)		(t-stat)	
GDP capita (PPP)	4.0	***	4.0	**	3.3	**	6.1	***	6.2	***	4.6	**
	(3.7)		(3.6)		(2.5)		(5.3)		(5.2)		(3.3)	
Trade/GDP	-1.0	***	-1.0	***	-1.1	***	-1.3	***	-1.4	***	-1.5	***
	(-7.8)		(-8.5)		(-10.9)		(-11.2)		(-11.0)		(-7.9)	
Public debt/tax	-9.6	*	-9.6	*	-12.5	**	-7.9		-7.7		-13.8	**
	(-2.3)		(-2.3)		(-2.5)		(-1.6)		(-1.6)		(-2.5)	
Inflation (GDP deflator)	0.9		0.9		1.1		0.7		0.7		1.0	
	(0.8)		(0.8)		(1.0)		(0.5)		(0.5)		(0.9)	
Financial exposure to USA												
Total (Assets+Liabilities)	1.9	***					4.4	***				
	(4.9)						(9.4)					
Assets			3.5	**	3.3	**			7.4	***	7.1	***
			(3.3)		(3.0)				(6.4)		(5.4)	
GDP capita*Public debt/tax					0.4	*					0.9	*
					(2.0)						(2.3)	
Countries	75		75		75		75		75		75	
R-sq.	0.3		0.3		0.3		0.4		0.4		0.4	

**Figure 1a: *De facto* fiscal space measure based on public debt and tax revenue.**

This figure plots country's fiscal space as measured by the size of public debt relative to tax revenue (fiscal space 1):

$[2006 \text{ Debt/GDP}] \div [2000-06 \text{ Average Tax Revenue/GDP}]$ , where all variables are deflated by 2006 CPI.

Source: Authors' calculation from the World Development Indicators.




**Figure 1b: *De facto* fiscal Space based on fiscal deficit and tax revenue.**

This figure plots country's fiscal space as measured by the size of government deficit relative to tax revenue (fiscal space 2):  

$$[2000-06 \text{ Average Fiscal Deficit/GDP}] \div [2000-06 \text{ Average Tax Revenue/GDP}]$$
 where all variables are deflated by 2006 CPI.


Source: Authors' calculation from the World Development Indicators.



**Figure 2: *De facto* fiscal space by income classification.**

This figure presents the level of public debt/GDP in 2006 and two measures of fiscal space: Public Debt/Tax Revenue (fiscal space 1) and Fiscal Deficit/Tax Revenue (fiscal space 2). All variables are deflated by 2006 CPI. See Table 2 for country-level data.

Source: Authors' calculation from the World Development Indicators.



**Figure 3: Significance of *de facto* fiscal space and other economic determinants of the size of fiscal stimulus.**

Based on Table 3, regression (2) and (5) estimates, this figure calculates for each economic determinant its one standard deviation effect on the size of fiscal stimulus (% GDP), 2009-10. All variables are deflated by 2006 CPI. A decrease in the public debt/tax revenue by 1.84 [from that of the lower middle income group (3.70) to that of the high income OECD group (1.86)] implies, all other things being equal, an increase of the fiscal stimulus during 2009-2010 by  $9.6 \times 1.84 = 18$  basis points, or 0.18 percent of GDP.

