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Ambiguity and Asset Markets  
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**ABSTRACT**

The Ellsberg paradox suggests that people behave differently in risky situations -- when they are given objective probabilities -- than in ambiguous situations when they are not told the odds (as is typical in financial markets). Such behavior is inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory (SEU), the standard model of choice under uncertainty in financial economics. This article reviews models of ambiguity aversion. It shows that such models -- in particular, the multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler -- have implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing that are very different from those of SEU and that help to explain otherwise puzzling features of the data.

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## Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Preference
  - 2.1 Models of Preference: Static or One-Shot Choice Settings
    - 2.1.1 Ellsberg and the Formal Set Up
    - 2.1.2 Multiple-priors Utility
    - 2.1.3 The “Smooth Ambiguity” Model
    - 2.1.4 Robust Control, Multiplier Utility and Generalizations
  - 2.2 Models of Preference: Dynamic or Sequential Choice Settings
    - 2.2.1 Recursive Utility
    - 2.2.2 Updating and Learning
3. Ambiguity in Financial Markets
  - 3.1 Portfolio Choice
    - 3.1.1 One Ambiguous Asset: Nonparticipation and Portfolio Inertia at Certainty
    - 3.1.2 Hedging and Portfolio Inertia away from Certainty
    - 3.1.3 Multiple Ambiguous Assets: Selective Participation and Benefits from Diversification
    - 3.1.4 Dynamics: Entry & Exit Rules and Intertemporal Hedging
    - 3.1.5 Differences between Models of Ambiguity
    - 3.1.6 Discipline in Quantitative Applications
    - 3.1.7 Literature Notes
  - 3.2 Asset Pricing
    - 3.2.1 Amplification
    - 3.2.2 The Cross Section of Returns and Idiosyncratic Ambiguity
    - 3.2.3 Literature Notes: Representative Agent Pricing
    - 3.2.4 Literature Notes: Heterogeneous Agent Models

## 1. Introduction

Part one of the article recalls the Ellsberg-based critique of subjective expected utility theory and then outlines some of the models that it has stimulated. Our coverage of preference models is selective - we focus only on models that have been applied to finance, or that seem promising for future applications: multiple-priors (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989), the “smooth ambiguity” model (Klibanoff et al. 2005) as well as multiplier utility and related robust-control-inspired models (Hansen & Sargent 2001, Maccheroni et al. 2006a).

We provide a unifying framework for considering the various models. A confusing aspect of the literature is the plethora of seemingly different models, rarely related to one another, and often expressed in drastically different formal languages. Here we put several of these models side-by-side, expressed in a common language, and we examine the properties of each with respect to implications for both one-shot-choice and sequential choice. In particular, we provide thought experiments to illustrate differences in behavior implied by the various models.

Part two derives implications of the models for finance. One common theme shared by all models is that ambiguity averse agents choose more conservative positions, and, in equilibrium, command additional “ambiguity premia” on uncertain assets. Ambiguity aversion can thus help to account for position and price behavior that is quantitatively puzzling in light of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. A second common theme is that, in dynamic settings, ambiguity averse agents may adjust their positions to account for future changes in ambiguity, for example due to learning. This adds a new reason for positions to differ by investment horizon, and, in equilibrium, generates time variation in premia.

Models of ambiguity aversion differ in how ambiguity aversion compares with risk aversion, and thus in how implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing differ from those of SEU. On the one hand, many of the qualitative implications of multiplier utility and of the smooth ambiguity model are identical to those of SEU. In all three models, with standard specifications, agents are locally risk neutral, portfolios react smoothly to changes in return expectations and diversification is always beneficial. Consequently, in many settings, the multiplier and smooth models do not expand the range of qualitative behavior that can be explained by SEU. Instead, they offer reinterpretations of SEU that may be quantitatively more appealing (for example, ambiguity aversion can substitute for higher risk aversion).

On the other hand, most applications of the multiple-priors model have exploited qualitative differences from SEU. These arise because the multiple-priors model allows uncertainty to have first order effects on portfolio choice and asset pricing. Thus the model can give rise to selective participation, optimal underdiversification, and portfolio inertia at portfolios that hedge ambiguity. In heterogeneous agent models with multiple-priors, portfolio inertia has been used to endogenously generate incompleteness of markets and to account for markets “freezing up” in response to an increase in uncertainty. Finally, uncertainty has a first order effect on average excess returns, which can be large even if the covariance of payoffs with marginal utility is negligible.

## 2. Preference

The outline is divided into two major parts. First, we consider static or one-shot-choice settings where all choices are made at a single instant prior to the resolution of uncertainty. Models of preference under uncertainty are typically formulated first for such static settings. However, just as in Epstein & Zin (1989) which studies risk preferences, any such model of static preference can be extended uniquely into a recursive dynamic model of preference. Therefore, the discussion of static models is revealing also about their dynamic extensions, which are outlined in the second part of this section. In addition, a dynamic setting, where choice is sequential, raises new issues - dynamic consistency and updating or learning - and these are the major focus of the subsection on dynamic models.

### 2.1. Models of Preference: Static or One-Shot Choice Settings

#### 2.1.1. Ellsberg and the Formal Set Up

Ellsberg’s (1961) classic experiments motivate the study of ambiguity. In a variant of one of his experiments, you are told that there are 100 balls in an urn, and that each ball is either red  $R$  or blue  $B$ . You are not given further information about the urn’s composition. Presumably you would be indifferent between bets on drawing either color (take the stakes to be 100 and 0). However, compare these bets with the risky prospect that offers you, regardless of the color drawn, a bet on a fair coin, with the same stakes as above. When you bet on the fair coin, or equivalently on drawing blue from a second risky urn where you are told that there are 50 balls of each color, then you can be completely confident that you

have a 50-50 chance of winning. In contrast, in the original “ambiguous” urn, there is no basis for such confidence. This difference motivates a strict preference for betting on the risky urn as opposed to the ambiguous one.

Such preference is incompatible with expected utility. Indeed, suppose you had in mind a subjective probability about the probability of a blue draw from the ambiguous urn. A strict preference for betting on the fair coin over a bet on a blue draw would then reveal that your probability of blue is strictly less than one half. At the same time, a preference for betting on the fair coin over a bet on a red draw reveals a probability of blue that is strictly greater than one half, a contradiction. It follows that Ellsberg’s choices cannot be rationalized by SEU.

Ellsberg’s choices have been confirmed in many laboratory experiments. But this is an experiment that did not need to be run in order to be convincing - it simply rings true that confidence, and the amount of information underlying a likelihood assessment, matter. Such a concern is not a mistake or a form of bounded rationality - to the contrary, it would be irrational for an individual who has poor information about her environment to ignore this fact and behave as though she were much better informed.<sup>1</sup> The distinction between risk and ambiguity is sometimes referred to alternatively as one between risk and “Knightian uncertainty.” In terminology introduced by Hansen & Sargent (2001), Ellsberg’s urn experiment illustrates that the distinction between payoff uncertainty and *model uncertainty* is behaviorally meaningful.

We need some formalities to proceed. Following Savage (1954), adopt as primitives a state space  $\Omega$ , representing the set of relevant contingencies or states of the world  $\omega \in \Omega$ , and a set of outcomes  $C \subset \mathbb{R}_+^n$ . (Little is lost by assuming that both  $\Omega$  and  $C$  are finite and have power sets as associated  $\sigma$ -algebras; however, considerable generalization is possible.) Prior to knowing the true state of the world, an individual chooses once-and-for-all a physical action. As in Anscombe & Aumann (1963), suppose that the consequence of an action is a lottery over  $C$ , an element of  $\Delta(C)$ . Then, any physical action can be identified with a (bounded and measurable) mapping  $h : \Omega \rightarrow \Delta(C)$ , which, is called an *Anscombe-Aumann (or AA) act*. Thus to model choice between physical actions, we model preference  $\succeq$  on the set of AA acts.

To model the Ellsberg experiment above, take  $\Omega = \{R, B\}$  as the state space, where a state corresponds to a draw from the ambiguous urn. The relevant bets are expressed as AA acts as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>The normative significance of Ellsberg’s message distinguishes it from that emanating from the Allais Paradox contradicting the vNM model of preference over risky prospects.

Ellsberg's urn:		$R + B = 100$	(2.1)
	$R$	$B$	
$f_R$	100	0	
$f_B$	0	100	
$f_C$	$(100, \frac{1}{2})$	$(100, \frac{1}{2})$	

Bets on a red and a blue draw correspond to acts  $f_R$  and  $f_B$ , respectively. A bet on the fair coin corresponds to a constant AA act  $f_C$  that delivers same lottery  $(100, \frac{1}{2})$  in both states; throughout, we denote by  $(c, p)$  the lottery paying  $c$  with probability  $p$  and 0 with probability  $1 - p$ .

Two special subsets of acts should be noted. Call  $h$  a *Savage act* if  $h(\omega)$  is a degenerate lottery for every  $\omega$ ; in that case, view  $h$  as having outcomes in  $C$  and write  $h : \Omega \rightarrow C$ . Both  $f_R$  and  $f_B$  above are Savage acts. For the second subset, we can identify any lottery  $\ell \in \Delta(C)$  with the constant act that yields  $\ell$  in every state. An example is the fair coin lottery above. Consequently, any preference on AA acts includes in it a ranking of risky prospects. This makes clear the analytical advantage of adopting the large AA domain, since the inclusion of risky prospects makes it straightforward to describe behavior that would reveal that risk is treated differently from other uncertainty. This is a major reason that all the models of preference that we discuss have been formulated in the AA framework.

Another analytical advantage of the AA domain is the simple definition it permits for the *mixture* of two acts. The mixture of two lotteries is well-defined and familiar. Given any two AA acts  $h'$  and  $h$ , and  $\alpha$  in  $[0, 1]$ , define the new act  $\alpha h' + (1 - \alpha)h$  by mixing their lotteries state by state, that is,

$$(\alpha h' + (1 - \alpha)h)(\omega) = \alpha h'(\omega) + (1 - \alpha)h(\omega), \omega \in \Omega. \quad (2.2)$$

A key property of the Ellsberg urn is that  $\frac{1}{2}f_R + \frac{1}{2}f_B = f_C$  a mixture of the bets on states  $f_R$  and  $f_B$  gives a lottery that no longer depends on the state.

Ellsberg's choices can now be written as

$$\frac{1}{2}f_R + \frac{1}{2}f_B \succ f_R \sim f_B. \quad (2.3)$$

From this perspective, Ellsberg's example has two important features. First, *randomization between indifferent acts can be valuable*. This is a violation of the independence axiom, and thus a key departure from expected utility. Second, *randomization can be valuable because it can smooth out, or hedge, ambiguity*.

The negative comovement in the payoffs of the ambiguous acts  $f_B$  and  $f_R$  implies that the act  $\frac{1}{2}f_R + \frac{1}{2}f_B$  is not ambiguous; it is simply risky. One can be confident in knowing the probabilities of the lottery payoffs, even if one is not confident in those of the underlying bets  $f_R$  and  $f_B$ .

The literature has identified the first property – a strict preference for randomization between indifferent acts – as the behavioral manifestation of (strict) ambiguity aversion. Accordingly, say that the individual with preference  $\succeq$  is (weakly) *ambiguity averse* if, for all AA acts  $h'$  and  $h$ ,

$$h' \sim h \implies \alpha h' + (1 - \alpha) h \succeq h. \quad (2.4)$$

For a related comparative notion, say that 1 is *more ambiguity averse than* 2 if: For all AA acts  $h$  and lotteries  $\ell \in \Delta(C)$ ,

$$\ell \succeq_2 h \implies \ell \succeq_1 h. \quad (2.5)$$

The idea is that if 2 rejects the ambiguous act  $h$  in favor of the risky prospect  $\ell$ , then so should the more ambiguity averse individual 1. The uncertainty aversion axiom (2.4) is satisfied by all the models reviewed below.

Models of ambiguity aversion differ in *why* randomization is valuable, in particular, whether it can be valuable even if it does not hedge ambiguity. To see the main point, consider the following extension of the Ellsberg experiment. Let  $c$  denote the number of dollars you are willing to pay for the bet  $f_R$ . Next, imagine a lottery that delivers either the bet  $f_R$  or its certainty equivalent payoff  $c$ , each with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . How much would you be willing to pay for such a bet? One reasonable answer is  $c$  – randomizing between an asset (here a bet) and its own subjective value cannot be valuable. Intuitively, if you perceive the value of an asset to be low because you are not confident in your probability assessment of its payoff, then your confidence in your assessment should not change just because the asset is part of the lottery. As a result, the asset, its subjective value, and the lottery should all be indifferent.

The above view underlies the *multiple-priors* (MP) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). According to that model, preference for randomization between indifferent acts is valuable *only if* it hedges ambiguity and thus increases confidence, as in the Ellsberg experiment. When there is no opportunity for hedging – as in the last example where one of the acts (the subjective value of the asset) is constant – then randomization is not valuable. In contrast, “smooth” models of ambiguity aversion, in particular multiplier preferences (Anderson et al. 2003)



and the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al. 2005), assume a pervasive value for randomization. Those models can rationalize Ellsberg’s choices *only if* randomizing between an asset and its subjective value is also valuable.

We now define and compare the models in more detail.

### 2.1.2. Multiple-Priors Utility

Where information is scarce and a single probability measure cannot be relied on to guide choice, then it is cognitively intuitive that the decision-maker think in terms of a set of probability laws. For example, she might assign the interval  $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}]$  to the probability of drawing a red ball from the ambiguous urn in the Ellsberg experiment. Being cautious, she might then evaluate a bet on red by using the minimum probability in the interval, here  $\frac{1}{3}$ , which would lead to the strict preference to bet on the risky urn. Similarly for blue. In this way, the intuitive choices pointed to by Ellsberg can be rationalized.

More formally and generally, the multiple-priors model postulates the following utility function on the set of AA acts:

$$U^{MP}(h) = \min_{p \in C} \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp. \tag{2.6}$$

Here,  $u : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a vNM functional on lotteries that is affine, that is,

$$u(\alpha\ell + (1 - \alpha)\ell') = \alpha u(\ell) + (1 - \alpha)u(\ell'),$$

for all lotteries  $\ell, \ell'$  in  $\Delta(C)$ .<sup>2</sup> The vNM assumption for  $u$  excludes risk preferences exhibiting the Allais Paradox - ambiguity is the only rationale admitted for deviating from SEU in the multiple-priors model, as well as in all the other models that we discuss. The central component in the functional form is the set  $C \subset \Delta(\Omega)$  of probability measures on  $\Omega$  - the set of priors. The special case where  $C$  is a singleton gives the Anscombe & Aumann (1963) version of SEU.

Ambiguity aversion, as defined in (2.4), is the central assumption in Gilboa & Schmeidler’s (1989) axiomatization of the multiple-priors functional form. Another important axiom is certainty independence (CI): For all AA acts  $h'$  and  $h$ , all constant acts  $c$  and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ,

$$h' \succ h \iff \alpha h' + (1 - \alpha)c \succ \alpha h + (1 - \alpha)c. \tag{2.7}$$

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<sup>2</sup>Below identify  $c$  with the degenerate lottery giving  $c$  and write  $u(c)$ . Also, assume that  $u$  is strictly increasing for deterministic consumption.

In other words, the invariance required by the independence axiom holds as long as mixing involves a constant act. This axiom ensures that Ellsberg-type choices are motivated by hedging. Essentially, moving from expected utility to multiple-priors amounts to replacing the independence axiom by uncertainty aversion and certainty independence.

Further, comparative ambiguity aversion is simply characterized: 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2 if and only if

$$u_1 = u_2 \text{ and } C_1 \supset C_2. \quad (2.8)$$

Thus the model affords a separation between risk attitudes, modeled exclusively by the vNM index  $u$ , and ambiguity attitudes, modeled in the comparative sense by the set of priors  $C$ . Put another way, expanding  $C$  leaves risk attitudes unaffected and increases ambiguity aversion.

The multiple-priors model is very general since the set of priors can take many different forms. Consider briefly two examples that have received considerable attention and that offer scalar parametrizations of ambiguity aversion. Refer to *ε-contamination* if

$$C = \{(1 - \epsilon)p^* + \epsilon p : p \in P\}, \quad (2.9)$$

where  $P \subset \Delta(\Omega)$  is a set of probability measures,  $p^* \in P$  is a reference measure, and  $\epsilon$  is a parameter in the unit interval.<sup>3</sup> The larger is  $\epsilon$ , the more weight is given to alternatives to  $p^*$  being relevant, and the more ambiguity averse is the individual in the formal sense of (2.5). An act is evaluated by a weighted average of its expected utility according to  $p^*$  and its worst-case expected utility:

$$U(h) = (1 - \epsilon) \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp^* + \epsilon \min_{p \in P} \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp. \quad (2.10)$$

In the second example,  $C$  is an *entropy-constrained ball*. Fix a reference measure  $p^* \in \Delta(\Omega)$ . For any other  $p \in \Delta(\Omega)$ , its relative entropy is  $R(p \parallel p^*) \in [0, \infty]$ , where

$$R(p \parallel p^*) = \int_{\Omega} \left( \log \frac{dp}{dp^*} \right) dp, \quad (2.11)$$

if  $p$  is absolutely continuous with respect to  $p^*$ , and  $\infty$  otherwise. Though not a metric, for example, it is not symmetric,  $R(p \parallel p^*)$  is a measure of the distance

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<sup>3</sup>It is used heavily in robust statistics (see Huber (1981), for example). For application to finance, see Epstein & Wang (1994). Kopylov (2009) provides axiomatic foundations.

between  $p$  and  $p^*$ ; note that  $R(p \parallel p^*) = 0$  if and only if  $p = p^*$ . Finally, define

$$C = \{p : R(p \parallel p^*) \leq \eta\}. \quad (2.12)$$

The MP model is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it implies extreme aversion, or paranoia. But that interpretation is based on the implicit assumption, not imposed by the model, that  $C$  is the set of all logically possible priors.<sup>4</sup> For example, in the Ellsberg example, it is perfectly consistent with the model that the individual use the probability interval  $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}]$ , even though any probability in the unit interval is consistent with the information given for the ambiguous urn. Ultimately, the only way to argue that the model is extreme is to demonstrate extreme behavioral implications of the axioms, something that has not been done.

### 2.1.3. The “Smooth Ambiguity” Model

Klibanoff et al. (2005), henceforth KMM, propose the following utility function over AA acts:

$$U^{KMM}(h) = \int_{\Delta(\Omega)} \phi \left( \int_{\Omega} u(h(\omega)) dp(\omega) \right) d\mu(p). \quad (2.13)$$

Here  $\mu$  is a probability measure on  $\Delta(\Omega)$ ,  $u : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a vNM functional as before, and  $\phi$  is continuous and strictly increasing on  $u(C) \subset \mathbb{R}$ . For simplicity, suppose that  $u$  is continuous and strictly increasing on  $C$ . Identify a KMM agent with a triple  $(u, \phi, \mu)$  satisfying the above conditions.<sup>5</sup>

This functional form suggests an appealing interpretation. If the individual were certain of  $p$  being the true law, she would simply maximize expected utility using  $p$ . However, in general, there is uncertainty about the true law, or “model uncertainty,” represented by the prior  $\mu$ . This uncertainty about the true law matters if  $\phi$  is nonlinear. In particular, if  $\phi$  is concave, then the individual is ambiguity averse in the sense of (2.4); and greater concavity implies greater ambiguity aversion in the sense of (2.5). On the other hand, ambiguity (as opposed to the attitude towards it) seems naturally to be captured by  $\mu$  - hence, it is

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<sup>4</sup>The difference between the subjective set of priors  $C$  and the set of logically possible probability laws is nicely clarified by Gajdos et al. (2008).

<sup>5</sup>The multiple-priors functional form is a limiting case - if  $C$  is the support of  $\mu$ , then, up to ordinal equivalence, (2.6) is obtained in the limit as the degree of concavity of  $\phi$  increases without bound.

claimed, a separation is provided between ambiguity and aversion to ambiguity. This separation is highlighted by KMM as an advantage of their model.

To see how the smooth model can accommodate Ellsberg’s choices, assume that the prior puts equal weight on two possible “models” of the composition of the ambiguous urn: the share of blue balls is either  $\frac{3}{4}$  or  $\frac{1}{4}$ . Without loss of generality, here and below normalize  $u$  so that  $u(100) = 1$  and  $u(0) = 0$ , where 100 and 0 are the stakes in the bets on the urn. Then, if the agent is ambiguity averse ( $\phi$  strictly concave), the utility of a bet on blue from the ambiguous urn is  $\frac{1}{2}\phi\left(\frac{3}{4}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\phi\left(\frac{1}{4}\right) < \phi\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$ , the utility from a bet on a fair coin.

However, counterintuitive behavior is implied when the agent can bet directly on what the true model is.<sup>6</sup> To illustrate, modify the Ellsberg experiment by adding details about how the urn is filled. In particular, suppose there is a second urn, urn II, that is used as a tool for filling the original urn, urn I. Urn II also contains 100 balls that are either red or blue, and no further information is given about its composition. It is announced that a ball will be drawn from urn II, and that its color will determine the composition of urn I: if the draw from urn II is blue (red), then the share of blue (red) balls in urn I is  $\frac{3}{4}$ . In other words, the draw from urn II describes model uncertainty – it determines which of the “models” of urn I considered above is correct.

Compare now betting on a blue draw from urn I and betting on a blue draw from urn II. Both bets are ambiguous, because of the lack of information about urn II, which affects also urn I. However, since it is known that urn I contains at least  $\frac{1}{4} \times 100 = 25$  blue balls (while no such information is available for urn II), the bet on urn I is less ambiguous, and thus presumably preferable. But the KMM model predicts the opposite ranking. That is because, according to their model, bets on urn II are evaluated via expected utility with vNM index  $\phi(u(\cdot))$  and a uniform prior over the two colors. (This is suggested by the interpretation above of the functional form (2.13), and is an explicit and key assumption in the foundations they provide for the latter.) Thus a bet on drawing blue from urn II has utility  $\frac{1}{2}\phi(1) + \frac{1}{2}\phi(0)$ . On the other hand, bets on urn I are ranked according to the utility function in (2.13), which implies that the bet on blue has utility  $\frac{1}{2}\phi\left(\frac{3}{4}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\phi\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)$ . Thus the counterintuitive ranking is implied if  $\phi$  is (strictly) concave.

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<sup>6</sup>Such bets on the “true model” are an integral part of the foundations that KMM provide for the smooth ambiguity model. The following critique is adapted from Epstein (2010) to which the reader is referred for elaboration. See Baillon et al. (2009), and Halevy and Ozdenoren (2008) for other criticisms of the smooth ambiguity model.

The smooth model is intriguing because of the separation that it appears to afford between ambiguity, seemingly modeled by  $\mu$ , and aversion to ambiguity, seemingly modeled by  $\phi$ . Such separation suggests the possibility of calibrating ambiguity aversion - if  $\phi$  describes the individual's attitude alone, and thus moves with her from one setting to another, then it serves to connect the individual's behavior across different settings. For example, one might use experimental evidence about choices between bets on Ellsberg urns to discipline applications to financial markets. However, the KMM model does not justify such calibration, or a natural notion of "separation." A variant of the above thought experiment makes this point.

You are faced in turn with two scenarios, A and B. Scenario A is the one described above, involving urns I and II. Scenario B is similar except that you are told more about urn II, namely that it contains at least 40 balls of each color. Consider bets on both urns in each scenario. The following rankings seem intuitive: bets on blue and red in urn II are indifferent to one another for each scenario; and the certainty equivalent for a bet on blue (or red) in urn I is strictly larger in scenario B than in A, because the latter is intuitively more ambiguous.

How could we model these choices using the smooth ambiguity model? Suppose that preferences in the two scenarios are represented by the two triples  $(u_i, \phi_i, \mu_i)$ ,  $i = A, B$ . The basic model does not impose any connection across scenarios. However, since these differ in ambiguity only, and it is the same decision-maker involved in both, one is led naturally to consider the restrictions

$$u_A = u_B \text{ and } \phi_A = \phi_B.$$

These equalities are motivated by the hypothesis that risk and ambiguity attitudes describe the individual and therefore move with her across settings. But with these restrictions, the indicated behavior *cannot* be rationalized.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the above behavior *can* be rationalized if we assume that the priors  $\mu_i$  are fixed (and uniform) across scenarios, but allow  $\phi_A$  and  $\phi_B$  to differ. The preceding defies the common interpretation that  $\mu$  captures ambiguity and  $\phi$  represents ambiguity aversion.

Seo (2009) provides alternative foundations for  $U^{KMM}$ . In his model, an individual can be ambiguity averse only if she fails to reduce objective (and timeless) two-stage lotteries to their one-stage equivalents. Thus the rational concern with model uncertainty and limited confidence in likelihoods is tied to the failure to

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<sup>7</sup>It is straightforward to show that the behavior implies that  $\mu_A = \mu_B$ , which obviously rules out any difference in behavior across scenarios.

multiply objective probabilities, a mistake that does not suggest rational behavior. Such a connection severely limits the scope of ambiguity aversion as modeled by Seo’s approach.

Both multiple-priors and the smooth model satisfy ambiguity aversion (2.4) and thus can rationalize Ellsberg-type behavior. However, they represent distinct, indeed, “orthogonal” models of ambiguity aversion - the only point of intersection is SEU. One way to see this, and to highlight their differences, is to focus on what the models imply about the value of randomization. The multiple-priors model satisfies (because of Certainty Independence): if  $f \sim c$ , then  $\frac{1}{2}f + \frac{1}{2}c \sim f$ ; thus mixing with a certainty equivalent is never valuable. In contrast, the smooth model satisfies, (restricting attention to the special case where  $\phi$  is strictly concave): if  $f \sim c \sim \frac{1}{2}f + \frac{1}{2}c$ , then for all acts  $h$ ,  $\frac{1}{2}f + \frac{1}{2}h \sim \frac{1}{2}c + \frac{1}{2}h$ ; that is, if mixing with a certainty equivalent is not beneficial, then neither is mixing with any other act. (To see why, argue as follows, using the functional form (2.13) and strict concavity and monotonicity of  $\phi$ : If  $f \sim c \sim \frac{1}{2}f + \frac{1}{2}c$ , then  $\int_{\Omega} u(f) dp = u(c)$  with  $\mu$ -probability 1, and the expected utility of  $f$  is certain in spite of model uncertainty. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} U^{KMM} \left( \frac{1}{2}f + \frac{1}{2}h \right) &= \int_{\Delta(\Omega)} \phi \left( \int_{\Omega} \frac{1}{2}u(f) + \frac{1}{2}u(h) dp \right) d\mu(p) \\ &= \int_{\Delta(\Omega)} \phi \left( \frac{1}{2}u(c) + \frac{1}{2} \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp \right) d\mu(p) \\ &= U^{KMM} \left( \frac{1}{2}c + \frac{1}{2}h \right) . \end{aligned}$$

Finally, it is straightforward to see that the two properties together imply the independence axiom and hence SEU.

To illustrate the effect of smoothness in applications it is helpful to briefly abstract from risk. Assume that the agent is risk neutral, or, equivalently, restrict attention to acts that come with perfect insurance for risk. Formally, take  $u$  to be linear and rewrite the utilities as

$$\begin{aligned} U^{KMM} (h) &= E^{\mu} [\phi (E^{\mathcal{P}} [h])], \\ U^{MP} (h) &= \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}} E^p [h]. \end{aligned}$$

For risk neutral agents, ambiguity only matters if it affects means. Under the smooth model, ambiguity about means is reflected in a nondegenerate distribution of  $E^p [h]$  under the prior  $\mu$ . For a risk neutral, ambiguity averse KMM agent, an

increase in ambiguity (in means) works like an increase in risk. Under the MP model, ambiguity about means is reflected in a nondegenerate interval for  $E^p [h]$ . For a risk neutral MP agent, an increase in ambiguity (in means) can thus work like a change in the mean. The latter is a first order effect.

#### 2.1.4. Robust Control, Multiplier Utility and Generalizations

Fix a reference measure  $p^* \in \Delta(\Omega)$ , and define relative entropy  $R(p \parallel p^*) \in [0, \infty]$ , for any other measure  $p$ , by (2.11). *Multiplier utility (MU)* is defined by:

$$U^{MU}(h) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Omega)} \left[ \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp + \theta R(p \parallel p^*) \right], \quad (2.14)$$

where  $0 < \theta \leq \infty$  is a parameter.

This functional form was introduced into economics by Anderson et al. (2003), who were inspired by robust control theory, and it was axiomatized by Strzalecki (2007). It suggests the following interpretation. Though  $p^*$  is the individual's "best guess" of the true probability law, she is concerned that the true law may differ from  $p^*$ . In order to accommodate this concern with model misspecification, when evaluating any given act  $h$  she takes all probability measures into account, weighing more heavily those that are close to her best guess as measured by relative entropy. Reliance on the (weighted) worst-case scenario reflects an aversion to model misspecification, or ambiguity. In particular, multiplier utility is ambiguity averse in the sense of (2.4), and ambiguity aversion increases with  $\theta^{-1}$  in the sense of the comparative notion (2.5). At the extreme where  $\theta = \infty$ , the minimum is achieved at  $p = p^*$ , and  $U^{MU}(\cdot) = \int_{\Omega} u(\cdot) dp^*$ , reflecting complete confidence in the reference measure.

A key difference between multiplier utility and other models of ambiguity is that for choice among Savage acts – that is, acts that do not involve objective lotteries – it is *observationally indistinguishable* from subjected expected utility (SEU). Indeed, utility can be rewritten as<sup>8</sup>

$$U^{MU}(h) = -\theta \log \left( \int_{\Omega} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\theta} u(h) \right) dp^* \right). \quad (2.15)$$

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<sup>8</sup>See Dupuis and Ellis (1997, Propn 1.4.2), or Skiadas (2009b).

Thus, on the domain of Savage acts  $h$ , for which outcomes are elements of  $C$ ,  $U^{MU}$  conforms to subjective expected utility (SEU), with prior  $p^*$  and vNM index

$$u_\theta(c) = \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\theta}u(c)\right), c \in C.$$

For Savage acts, introducing robustness ( $\theta < \infty$ ) is thus indistinguishable from increasing risk aversion by moving from  $u$  to the more concave  $u_\theta$ .<sup>9</sup> This observational equivalence matters for applications since most empirically relevant objects of choice in financial markets are Savage acts – objective lotteries are rare. In many settings, multiplier utility may thus help *reinterpret* behavior that is also consistent with SEU, but it does not expand the range of behavior that can be rationalized. Reinterpretation can be valuable, for example, if there is an a priori bound on the degree of risk aversion. Of course, any exercise along these lines requires taking a stand on  $u$  or  $\theta$  – from choice behavior alone, one can hope to identify at most the composite function  $\exp\left(-\frac{1}{\theta}u(\cdot)\right)$ . Thus, for example, Barillas et al. (2009) and Kleschelski & Vincent (2009), fix  $u(c) = \log c$ , and then arrive at estimates of the robustness parameter  $\theta$ .

Multiplier utility has restrictive implications for choice in urn experiments. With one ambiguous urn, it can rationalize the intuitive choices in Ellsberg’s experiment surrounding (2.1) - take  $p^* = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$  and  $\theta < \infty$ . However, consider an experiment with two ambiguous urns – in urn I you are told that  $R + B = 100$  and  $R, B \geq 40$ , while in urn II you are told only that  $R$  and  $B$  sum to 100. Since there is more information about the composition of urn I, we would expect a preference to bet on red in urn I to red in urn II, and similarly for black. But this is impossible given multiplier utility. To see this, take the state space  $S = \{R_I, B_I\} \times \{R_{II}, B_{II}\}$ . The ranking of bets would be determined by how multiplier utility ranks Savage acts over  $S$  - but it conforms to subjective expected utility on the Savage domain. Thus bets would have to be based on a probability measure  $p$  on  $S$ , which assigns higher probability to  $R_I$  than to  $R_{II}$ , and similarly for  $B_I$  and  $B_{II}$ , an impossibility.

There is a parallel with CES utility functions in consumer theory that is useful for perspective. The CES utility function is a flexible specification of cross-substitution effects between goods when there are only two goods, since then the elasticity is a free parameter. However, when there are more than two goods it also imposes the a priori restriction that the noted elasticity is the same for all

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<sup>9</sup>Observational equivalence holds in the strong sense that even if one could observe the entire preference order over Savage acts, and not only a limited set of choices associated with more realistic sets of financial data, one could not distinguish the two models.



pairs of goods. While CES utility remains a useful example, applications may call for more flexible functional forms (translog utility, for example). Analogously, multiplier utility can rationalize intuitive choice with one risky and one ambiguous urn. Once there are two or more ambiguous urn, it imposes additional a priori restrictions that need not be intuitive in applications.

Finally, consider briefly generalizations. Maccheroni et al. (2006a) introduce and axiomatize the following generalization, called *variational utility*:

$$U^{var}(h) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Omega)} \left[ \int_{\Omega} u(h) dp + c(p) \right], \quad (2.16)$$

where  $c : \Delta(\Omega) \rightarrow [0, \infty]$  is a cost or penalty function. Multiplier utility is the special case where  $c(p) = \theta R(p \parallel p^*)$ . The above model is very general - it even encompasses multiple-priors utility, which corresponds to a cost function of the form: for some set of priors  $C \subset \Delta(\Omega)$ ,

$$c(p) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p \in C \\ \infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Such a general model has no difficulty accommodating any number of ambiguous urns; and Maccheroni et al. (2006a) describe a number of interesting functional forms for  $c$  and hence utility. It remains to be seen whether they are useful in applications.

## 2.2. Models of Preference: Dynamic or Sequential Choice Settings

Here we outline how the preceding models of preference can be extended to recursive, hence dynamically consistent, intertemporal models. Then further extensions to accommodate learning are discussed.

### 2.2.1. Recursive Utility

The formal environment is now enriched as follows. In addition to the (finite) state space  $\Omega$ , let  $\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1, \dots, T\}$  be a time set, and  $\{\Sigma_t\}_{t=0}^T$  a filtration, where  $\Sigma_0 = \{\emptyset, \Omega\}$  and  $\Sigma_T = 2^\Omega$ . Each  $\Sigma_t$  can be identified with a partition of  $\Omega$ ;  $\Sigma_t(\omega)$  denotes the partition component containing  $\omega$ . If  $\omega$  is the true state, then at  $t$  the decision-maker knows that  $\Sigma_t(\omega)$  is true. One can think of this information structure also in terms of an event tree, with nodes corresponding to time-event pairs  $(t, \omega)$ .

For simplicity, assume consumption in any single period lies in the interval  $C \subset \mathbb{R}^+$ . We are interested primarily in  $C$ -valued consumption processes and how they are ranked. However, we again enlarge the domain in the Anscombe-Aumann way and consider the set of all  $\Delta(C)$ -valued processes. Each such process  $H$  is the dynamic counterpart of an AA act; it has the form  $H = (H_t)$ , where  $H_t : \Omega \rightarrow \Delta(C)$  is  $\Sigma_t$ -measurable.

The new aspect of the dynamic setting is that choices can be made at all times. To model sequential choice, we assume a preference order at each node in the tree. Formally, let  $\succeq_{t,\omega}$  be the preference prevailing at  $(t, \omega)$ , thought of as the ordering conditional on information prevailing then. The primitive is the *collection* of preferences  $\{\succeq_{t,\omega}\} \equiv \{\succeq_{t,\omega} : (t, \omega) \in \mathcal{T} \times \Omega\}$ . The corresponding collection of utility functions is  $\{V_{t,\omega}\} \equiv \{V_{t,\omega} : (t, \omega) \in \mathcal{T} \times \Omega\}$ . They are assumed to satisfy a recursive structure that we now describe.<sup>10</sup> Define  $B_t \equiv [1 + \beta + \dots + \beta^{T-t}]$ ; in the infinite horizon case, these discount terms simplify and each  $B_t$  is equal to  $(1 - \beta)^{-1}$ .

To evaluate the act  $H$  from the perspective of node  $(t, \omega)$ , observe that it yields the current consumption (lottery)  $H_t(\omega)$ , and a random future payoff  $V_{t+1,\cdot}(H)$ ; here  $\cdot$  in the subscript indicates that future utility is a function of  $\omega' \in \Sigma_t(\omega)$ , the realized node in the the continuation of the tree from  $(t, \omega)$ . For each such node  $\omega'$ , (and only such nodes matter), let

$$V_{t+1,\omega'}(H) = B_{t+1} u(c_{t+1,\omega'}^H). \quad (2.17)$$

Thus  $c_{t+1,\omega'}^H$  is a *certainty equivalent* in the sense of being the (unique) level of consumption which if received in every remaining period would be indifferent, from the perspective of  $(t+1, \omega')$ , to  $H$ . Since this certainty equivalent varies with the continuation  $\omega'$ , it defines a “static” act, of the sort discussed above, and whose utility can be computed using one of the static ambiguity models discussed previously. Finally, the latter utility is aggregated with current felicity in the familiar discounted additive fashion to yield  $V_{t,\omega}(H)$ .

To be more precise, let  $*$  denote any of the models of ambiguity preference discussed above. Let  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$  be a collection of utility functions conforming to the model  $*$ , one for each node in the tree, having fixed risk preferences -  $U_{t,\omega}^*(\cdot) = u(\cdot)$  on  $\Delta(C)$ , for every  $(t, \omega)$ . (Some obvious measurability restrictions are also assumed.) Refer to  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$  as a set of *one-step-ahead utility functions*. Say

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<sup>10</sup>For more detailed formal presentations, see Epstein & Schneider (2003) for the multiple-priors-based model and Skiadas (2009a, Ch. 6) for the general case. In fact, Skiadas relaxes the intertemporal additivity that we assume in (2.18) below.

that preferences  $\{\succeq_{t,\omega}\}$ , or the corresponding utilities  $\{V_{t,\omega}\}$ , are *recursive* if there exist  $u : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  affine, a discount factor  $0 < \beta < 1$ , and a set  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$  of one-step-ahead utilities such that, for all acts  $H$ : (i)  $V_{T+1,\cdot}(H) = 0$ ; and (ii) utilities  $V_{t,\omega}(H)$  are evaluated by backward induction according to, for each  $(t, \omega)$ ,

$$V_{t,\omega}(H) = u(H_t(\omega)) + \beta B_{t+1} U_{t,\omega}^*(c_{t+1}^H). \quad (2.18)$$

The primitive components of the recursive model are  $u(\cdot)$ , modeling attitudes towards current consumption risks (and intertemporal substitutability<sup>11</sup>), a discount factor  $\beta$ , and the set  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$ . It is straightforward to see that  $U_{t,\omega}^*$  represents preference, conditional on  $(t, \omega)$ , over the set of “one-step-ahead acts” - acts  $H$  for which  $H_\tau(\cdot) = H_{t+1}(\cdot)$  for all  $\tau > t$ , that is,  $H$  produces a constant stream (of lotteries) for times  $t + 1, t + 2, \dots$ , and, in particular, all ambiguity (though not risk) is resolved at  $t + 1$ . Thus  $U_{t,\omega}^*$  models preferences over bets on the next step.

There are simple restrictions on preferences, specific to the dynamic setting, that are the main axioms characterizing recursive utility. First, preference at any node depends only on available information. Second, when evaluating  $H$  at any node, the individual cares only about what  $H$  prescribes in the continuation from that node - unrealized parts of the tree do not matter, an assumption that is commonly called *consequentialism*. Third, the ranking of risky prospects (lotteries) is the same at every node - a form of state independence. Finally, the collection of preferences is *dynamically consistent* - (contingent) plans chosen at any node remain optimal from the perspective of later nodes.

Next we discuss the recursive utility specifications corresponding to each of the static models discussed above. All previous comments remain relevant, (they relate to the ranking of one-step-ahead acts). We add comments that relate specifically to the dynamic setting. As will become clear from the connections drawn to the applied literature, the recursive model unifies a range of dynamic utility specifications that have been pursued in applications. It excludes specifications adopted in (Hansen & Sargent 2007, 2009, Barillas et al. 2009) and in several other papers in the robust-control-inspired literature, which violate either consequentialism or dynamic consistency.

We refer also to continuous-time counterparts of the recursive models. In that case, the recursive construction of utility functions via (2.17)-(2.18) is replaced by

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<sup>11</sup>The confounding of risk aversion and substitution in  $u$  can be improved upon via a common generalization of (2.18) and Epstein & Zin (1989). The resulting model can (partially) disentangle intertemporal substitution, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Skiadas' (2009, Ch.6) treatment is general enough to admit such a three-way separation. Hayashi (2005) describes such a model where the ranking of one-step-ahead acts conforms to the multiple-priors model.

backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). These were introduced into utility theory by Duffie & Epstein (1992) in the risk context, and extended to ambiguity aversion (modeled by multiple-priors) by Chen & Epstein (2002). See Skiadas (2008) for a nice exposition, original formulations, and references to the technical literature on BSDEs.

*Recursive SEU:* If one-step-ahead acts are evaluated by expected utility, then, from (2.17)-(2.18),

$$V_{t,\omega}(H) = u(H_t(\omega)) + \beta \int_{\Omega} V_{t+1,\omega'}(H) dp_{t,\omega}(\omega'), \quad (2.19)$$

where  $p_{t,\omega} \in \Delta(\Omega, \Sigma_{t+1})$  gives  $(t, \omega)$ -conditional beliefs about the next step. This is the standard model.

*Recursive Multiple-Priors:* Let  $P_{t,\omega} \subset \Delta(\Omega, \Sigma_{t+1})$  be the set of  $(t, \omega)$ -conditional probability measures describing beliefs about the next step (events in  $\Sigma_{t+1}$ ), and let  $U_{t,\omega}^*(h) = \min_{p \in P_{t,\omega}} \int u(h) dp$ , for any  $h : (\Omega, \Sigma_{t+1}) \rightarrow \Delta(C)$ . Then (2.17)-(2.18) imply:

$$V_{t,\omega}(H) = u(H_t(\omega)) + \beta \min_{p \in P_{t,\omega}} \int_{\Omega} V_{t+1,\omega'}(H) dp(\omega'). \quad (2.20)$$

This model was first put forth by Epstein & Wang (1994); Epstein & Schneider (2003, 2007, 2008) axiomatize and apply it. The special case, where each set  $P_{t,\omega}$  has the entropy-constrained form in (2.12), was suggested in Epstein & Schneider (2003) and has subsequently been applied by a number of papers in finance, described in Part 2 below. For a continuous-time formulation of recursive multiple-priors see Chen & Epstein (2002).

*Recursive Smooth Ambiguity Model:* Define  $\phi \circ U_{t,\omega}^*$  by (2.13), where  $\mu$ , but not  $u$  or  $\phi$ , varies with  $(t, \omega)$ . One obtains:

$$V_{t,\omega}(H) = u(H_t(\omega)) + \beta B_{t+1} \phi^{-1} \left( \int_{\Delta(\Omega)} \phi \left( B_{t+1}^{-1} \int_{\Omega} V_{t+1,\omega'}(H) dp(\omega') \right) d\mu_{t,\omega}(p) \right). \quad (2.21)$$

This is closely related to the recursive version of the smooth ambiguity model described in Klibanoff et al. (2009) and the specifications in the applied papers by Chen et al. (2009) and Ju & Miao (2009).

Skiadas (2009b) shows that in Brownian and Poisson environments, the continuous-time limit of the recursive smooth ambiguity model is indistinguishable from one where the function  $\phi$  is linear, that is, ambiguity aversion vanishes in the limit. He assumes that  $\phi$  is invariant to the length of the time interval. There may be other ways to take the continuous-time limit, for example, by allowing the concavity of  $\phi$  to increase suitably as the interval shrinks. However, keeping  $\phi$  fixed seems unavoidable if one sees ambiguity aversion as (separate from ambiguity and as) subject to calibration across settings.

(Recursive) Multiplier Utility and Generalizations: Following (2.15), define

$$\exp\left(-\frac{1}{\theta_{t,\omega}}U_{t,\omega}^*(h)\right) = \left(\int_{\Omega} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\theta_{t,\omega}}u(h)\right) dp_{t,\omega}^*\right), \quad (2.22)$$

where  $p_{t,\omega}^* \in \Delta(\Omega, \Sigma_{t+1})$  is the reference one-step-ahead measure. For simplicity, and since it is assumed universally, let  $\theta_{t,\omega} = \theta$ , a constant. Then (2.17)-(2.18) imply:

$$V_{t,\omega}(H) = u(H_t(\omega)) + \beta B_{t+1} \log \left[ -\theta \left( \int_{\Omega} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\theta} B_{t+1}^{-1} V_{t+1,\omega'}(H)\right) dp_{t,\omega}^*(\omega') \right) \right].$$

This is a special case of recursive utility as defined by Epstein & Zin (1989), where  $\theta^{-1}$  parametrizes risk aversion separately from  $u$ , which models also intertemporal substitution. In continuous time, one obtains a special case of *stochastic differential utility* (Duffie & Epstein (1992)).

To see the connection to robustness as proposed by Hansen & Sargent (2001), let  $p^* \in \Delta(\Omega, \Sigma_T)$  be the reference measure corresponding to  $\{p_{t,\omega}^*\}$  and  $p$  any other measure on  $\Sigma_T$ , and denote by  $p_t$  and  $p_t^*$  the restrictions of  $p$  and  $p^*$  to  $\Sigma_t$ . Define the time averaged entropy by  $\mathcal{R}(p \parallel p^*) = \sum_{t \geq 0} \beta^t E_p \left[ \log \left( \frac{dp_t}{dp_t^*} \right) \right]$ , if  $p_t$  is absolutely continuous with respect to  $p_t^*$  for each  $t$ , and  $\mathcal{R}(p \parallel p^*) = \infty$  otherwise. Then, (see Skiadas (2003) for a general proof for continuous-time), the recursive utility functions above can be written alternatively in the following form paralleling (2.14):

$$V_0^\theta(H) = \min_{p \in \Delta(\Omega)} \left[ \int_{\Omega} \left( \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t u(H_t(\omega')) \right) dp(\omega') + \theta \mathcal{R}(p \parallel p^*) \right], \quad (2.23)$$

and similar expressions obtain for conditional utility  $V_{t,\omega}^\theta(H)$ . This reformulation parallels the equivalence of (2.15) and (2.14) in the static context - it permits a

reinterpretation of existing risk-based models, (such as the Barillas et al. (2009) reinterpretation of Tallarini (2000) in terms of robustness), but does not add new qualitative predictions.

To accommodate behavior towards several urns, it could be interesting to extend the model to allow “source dependence”, that is, several driving processes and a concern for robustness that is greater for some processes than for others. However, this is hard to square with dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Indeed, let  $\Omega = \prod_{i=1}^n \Omega_i$ , and think of  $n$  driving processes. To capture source dependence, extend (2.23) so that for each  $\Omega_i$ , relative entropy measures distance between  $\Omega_i$ -marginals with a separate multiplier  $\theta_i$  for each  $i$ . However, unless the  $\theta_i$ ’s are all identical, such a model is not recursive and thus precludes dynamic consistency.

This is in stark contrast to the recursive framework (2.17)-(2.18) that accommodates a wide range of ambiguity preferences, while having dynamic consistency built in. For example, Skiadas (2008) formulates recursive models that feature source dependence and that are special cases of our general framework (2.17)–(2.18). Maccheroni et al. (2006b) axiomatize a recursive version of variational utility that is the special case of our recursive model for which one-step-ahead acts are evaluated using variational utility (2.16).

Skiadas (2009b) derives continuous-time limits for a subclass of recursive variational utility containing the multiplier model (2.23). He shows that, in a Poisson environment, (though not with Brownian uncertainty), these models, with the single exception of multiplier utility, are distinguishable from stochastic differential utility. (This is another sense in which multiplier utility is an isolated case.) Skiadas also suggests that some of them have tractability advantages and are promising for pricing, particularly because of the differential pricing of Brownian and Poisson uncertainty.

### 2.2.2. Updating and Learning

The one-step-ahead utilities  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$  are primitives in the recursive model (2.17)-(2.18), and are unrestricted except for technical regularity conditions. Since they represent the individual’s response to data, in the sense of describing his view of the next step as a function of history, one-step-ahead utilities are the natural vehicle for modeling learning. Here, for each of the specific recursive models just described, we consider restrictions on  $\{U_{t,\omega}^*\}$ . Since we remain within the recursive utility framework, dynamic consistency is necessarily satisfied. The central issue

is whether the specification adopted adequately captures intuitive properties of learning under ambiguity.

Learning is sometimes invoked to criticize models of ambiguity aversion. The argument is that since ambiguity is due to a lack of information and is resolved as agents learn, it is at best a short run phenomenon. Work on learning under ambiguity has shown that this criticism is misguided. First, ambiguity need not be due only to an initial lack of information. Instead, it may be generated by hard-to-interpret, ambiguous signals. Second, there are intuitive scenarios where ambiguity does not vanish in the long run. We now consider a thought experiment (based on that in Epstein & Schneider (2008)) to illustrate these points.<sup>12</sup>

#### *A thought experiment*

You are faced with two *sequences* of urns. One sequence consists of risky urns and the other of ambiguous urns. Each urn contains black ( $B$ ) and white ( $W$ ) balls. Every period one ball each is drawn from that period's urns and bets are offered on next period's urns. The sequence of risky urns is constructed (or perceived) as follows. First, a ball is placed in each urn according to the outcome of a fair coin toss. If the coin toss produces heads, the "coin ball" placed in *every* urn is black; it is white otherwise. In addition to a coin ball, each risky urn contains four "non-coin balls", two of each color. The sequence of risky urns is thus an example of learning from i.i.d. signals. After sufficiently many draws, you will become confident about the color of the coin ball from observing the frequency of black draws.

Each urn in the *ambiguous* sequence also contains a single coin ball with color determined as above (the coin tosses for the two sequences are independent.) In addition, you are told that each urn contains *either*  $n = 2$  or  $n = 6$  non-coin balls of which exactly  $\frac{n}{2}$  are black and  $\frac{n}{2}$  are white. Finally,  $n$  varies "independently" across ambiguous urns. The ambiguous urns thus also share a common element (the coin ball), about which you can hope to learn, but they also have idiosyncratic elements (the non-coin balls) that are poorly understood and thus possibly unlearnable.

Ex ante, not knowing the outcome of the coin tosses, would you rather have a bet that pays 100 if black is drawn from the first risky urn (and zero otherwise), or a bet that pays 100 if black is drawn from the first ambiguous urn? The intuition

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<sup>12</sup>The literature has not provided compelling axioms, beyond those underlying recursivity (2.17)-(2.18), to guide the modeling of learning under ambiguity. Thus we rely on the thought experiment to assess various models.

pointed to by Ellsberg suggests a strict preference for betting on the risky urn.<sup>13</sup> The unambiguous nature of the bet on the risky urn can thus be offset by reducing the winning stake there. Let  $z < 100$  be such that you are indifferent between a bet that pays  $z$  if black is drawn from the risky urn and a bet that pays 100 if black is drawn from the ambiguous urn.

Now sample by drawing one ball from the first urn in each sequence. Suppose that the outcome is black in both cases. With this information, consider versions of the above bets based on the second period urns. Would you rather have a bet that pays  $z$  if black is drawn from the second risky urn or a bet that pays 100 if black is drawn second ambiguous urn? Our intuition is that, even with this difference in stakes, betting on the risky urn would be strictly preferable. The reason is that inference about the coin-ball is clear for the risky urn - the posterior probability of a black coin ball is  $\frac{3}{5}$  - and thus the predictive probability of drawing  $B$  is  $\frac{3}{5} \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) + \frac{2}{5} \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) = \frac{13}{25}$ . In contrast, for the ambiguous urn the signal (a black draw) is harder to interpret, leaving us less confident in our assessment of the composition of that urn. We now elaborate on this point.

Just as for the risky sequence, the only useful inference for the ambiguous sequence is about the coin ball (since non-coin balls are thought to be unrelated across urns in the sequence). But what does a black draw tell us about the coin ball? On the one hand, it could be a strong signal of the color of the coin ball (if  $n = 2$  in the sampled urn) and hence also of a black draw from the second urn. On the other hand, it could be a weak indicator (if  $n = 6$  in the sampled urn). The posterior probability of the coin ball being black could be anywhere between  $\frac{6/2+1}{6+1} = \frac{4}{7}$  and  $\frac{2/2+1}{2+1} = \frac{2}{3}$ , with a range of predictive probabilities for  $B$  ensuing.

The difference in winning stakes,  $z$  versus 100, compensates for prior ambiguity, but not for the difficulty in interpreting the realized signal. Thus a preference for betting on the risky urn is to be expected, even given the difference in winning prizes. By analogous reasoning, similar rankings for bets on white are intuitive, both ex ante and ex post conditional on having drawn black balls. Indeed, the lower quality of the signal from the ambiguous urn makes it harder to judge any bet, not just a bet on black. This completes the description of the thought experiment.

#### *A multiple-priors model of learning under ambiguity*

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<sup>13</sup>In the risky urn,  $B$  has an objective probability of  $\frac{1}{2}$ . For the ambiguous urn, the corresponding probability is either in  $[\frac{4}{7}, \frac{2}{3}]$ , or in  $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{3}{7}]$ , each with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Averaging endpoints yields the interval  $[\frac{19}{42}, \frac{23}{42}]$ , which has  $\frac{1}{2}$  as midpoint. Thus ambiguity aversion suggests the preference for the precise  $\frac{1}{2}$ .



Epstein & Schneider (2008) propose a model of learning, within the recursive multiple-priors framework (2.20), that accommodates the intuitive choices in the thought experiment. It is motivated by the following interpretation of the experiment. The preference to bet on the risky urn *ex post* is intuitive because the ambiguous signal – the draw from the ambiguous urn – appears to be of lower quality than the noisy signal – the draw from the risky urn. A perception of low information quality arises because the distribution of the ambiguous signal is not objectively given. As a result, the standard Bayesian measure of information quality, precision, seems insufficient to adequately compare the two signals. The precision of the ambiguous signal is parametrized by the number of non-coin balls  $n$ : when there are few non-coin balls that add noise, precision is high.

A single number for precision cannot rationalize the intuitive choices because behavior is *as if* one is using different precisions depending on the bet that is evaluated. When betting on a black draw, the choice between urns is made as if the ambiguous signal is less precise than the noisy one, so that the available evidence of a black draw is a weaker indicator of a black coin ball. In other words, when the new evidence – the drawn black ball – is “good news” for the bet to be evaluated, the signal is viewed as relatively imprecise. In contrast, in the case of bets on white, the choice is made as if the ambiguous signal is more precise than the noisy one, so that the black draw is a stronger indicator of a black coin ball. Now the new evidence is “bad news” for the bet to be evaluated and is viewed as relatively precise. The intuitive choices can thus be traced to an asymmetric response to ambiguous news.

The implied notion of information quality can be captured by combining worst-case evaluation with the description of an ambiguous signal via *multiple likelihoods*. To see how, think of the decision-maker as trying to *learn* the colors of the two coin balls - that is all he needs to learn for the risky sequence, and for the ambiguous sequence, his perception of non-coin balls as varying independently across urns means that there is nothing to be learned from past observations about that component of future urns. For both sequences, his prior over these “parameters” places probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  on the coin ball being black. (More generally, the model admits multiple-priors over parameters.) The intuition given above for the choices indicated in the experiment suggests clearly a translation in terms of multiple likelihoods. Signals for the risky sequence have objective distributions conditional on the color of the coin ball, and thus can be modeled in the usual way by single likelihoods. However, for the ambiguous sequence, the distribution of the signal is unknown, even conditioning on the color of the coin ball, because it varies with

$n$ , suggesting multiple-likelihoods.

### *Other models of learning*

How do other models perform with respect to the thought experiment? SEU is ruled out by the ex ante ambiguity averse ranking (the situation is ultimately analogous to Ellsberg’s original experiment). The same applies to multiplier utility since it coincides with SEU on Savage acts. Recursive variational utility (Maccheroni et al. 2006b) inherits the generality of variational utility. In particular, it generalizes recursive multiple-priors and so can accommodate the thought experiment. The question is whether the added generality that it affords is useful in a learning context. A difficulty is that it is far from clear how to model updating of the cost or penalty function  $c(\cdot)$ .

The situation is more complicated for the smooth ambiguity model. It can accommodate the ex ante ambiguity averse choices. In order to consider also the ex post rankings indicated it is necessary to specify updating for the recursive smooth model (2.21). We assume that beliefs  $\mu_{t,\omega}$  about the true law are updated by Bayes’ Rule. Then the recursive smooth model *cannot* accommodate the intuitive behavior in the thought experiment, at least given natural specifications of the model, that we now outline.

Consider the functional form for utility (2.13). For the risky urns, all relevant probabilities are given, and thus bets on the risky urns amount to lotteries, which are ranked according to  $u$ . To model choice between bets on the ambiguous urns, we must first specify the state space  $\Omega$ . Take  $\Omega = \{B, W\}$  so that a state specifies the color of the ball on any single draw.<sup>14</sup> Then a bet on  $B$  corresponds to the act  $f_B$ , with  $f_B(B) = 100$  and  $f_B(W) = 0$ . The smooth model specifies prior beliefs  $\mu$  about the true probability of drawing  $B$ . Here the latter is determined by the color of the coin ball  $\theta = B$  or  $W$ , and by the number  $n = 2$  or  $4$  of the non-coin balls, according to

$$\ell(B | \theta, n) = \begin{cases} \frac{2}{3} & \theta = B, n = 2 \\ \frac{1}{3} & \theta = W, n = 2 \\ \frac{4}{7} & \theta = B, n = 6 \\ \frac{3}{7} & \theta = W, n = 6. \end{cases} \quad (2.24)$$

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<sup>14</sup>An alternative is to take the state space to be  $\{2, 4\}$ , corresponding to the possible number of the non-coin balls. However, it is not difficult to see that with this state space, even the (ambiguity averse) ex ante choices cannot be rationalized.

Thus view  $\mu$  as a probability measure on pairs  $(\theta, n)$ . Let  $\mu$  be uniform over the above four possibilities and suppose that  $\phi$  is strictly concave (as in all applications of the model that we have seen). Then it is a matter of elementary algebra (provided in the appendix) to show that the choices described in the thought experiment cannot be accommodated.

A final comment concerns a theme we have emphasized throughout the discussion of preference models: appearances can be misleading - the only way to understand a model is through its predictions for behavior, whether through formal axioms, or thought experiments. On the surface, what could be more natural than to use Bayes' Rule to update the prior as in the recursive smooth model? There is no need to deal with the issue of how to update sets of priors as in Epstein & Schneider (2007, 2008), for example, and one can import results from Bayesian learning theory. The models in Hansen (2007), Chen et al. (2009) and Ju & Miao (2009) share this simplicity - in all cases, updating proceeds exactly as in a Bayesian model and ambiguity aversion enters only in the way that posterior beliefs are used define preference. However, the thought experiment illustrates what is being assumed by adopting such an updating rule - indifference to "signal or information quality."

### 3. Ambiguity in financial markets

This section illustrates the role of ambiguity in portfolio choice and asset pricing. We consider simple 2- and 3-period setups. These are sufficient to illustrate many of the effects that drive more elaborate (and now increasingly quantitative) models studied in the literature. We also focus on the multiple-priors model. This is because the range of new effects - relative to models of risk - is arguably larger for that model. Specific differences between the multiple-priors and smooth models are pointed out along the way.

#### 3.1. Portfolio choice

Begin with a 2-period problem of savings and portfolio choice. An agent is endowed with wealth  $W_1$  at date 1 and cares about consumption at dates 1 and 2. There is an asset that pays the interest rate  $r^f$  for sure, as well as  $n$  uncertain assets with log returns collected in a vector  $r$ . The returns  $r$  could be ambiguous; let  $\mathcal{P}_1$  denote a set of beliefs held at date 1 about returns at date 2. The agent chooses consumption at both dates and a vector of portfolio shares  $\theta$  for the  $n$

uncertain assets to solve

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{C_1, \theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} \{u(C_1) + \beta E^p[u(C_2)]\} \\ \text{s.t. } C_2 &= (W_1 - C_1)R_2^w \\ R_2^w &= (\exp(r^f) + \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \exp(r_i)), \end{aligned}$$

where  $R_2^w$  is the return on wealth realized at date 2.

Now restrict attention to log utility and lognormally distributed returns. With  $u(c) = \log c$ , the savings and portfolio choice problems separate. In particular, the agent always saves a constant fraction  $\beta/(1 + \beta)$  of wealth, and he chooses his portfolio to maximize the expected log return on wealth. With lognormal returns, a belief in  $\mathcal{P}_1$  can be represented by a vector  $\mu^r$  of expected (log) returns as well as a covariance matrix  $\Sigma$ . Throughout, we use an approximation for the log return on wealth introduced by Campbell & Viceira (1999),

$$\log R_2^w \approx r^f + \theta' \left( r + \frac{1}{2} \text{diag } \Sigma - r^f \iota \right) - \frac{1}{2} \theta' \Sigma \theta, \quad (3.1)$$

where  $\text{diag } \Sigma$  is a vector containing the main diagonal of  $\Sigma$  and  $\iota$  is an  $n$ -vector of ones. In continuous time, the formula is exact by Ito's Lemma; in discrete time, it yields simple solutions that illustrate the key effects.

It is convenient to work with excess returns. Define a vector of premia (expected log excess returns, adjusted for Jensen's inequality) by

$$\mu^e = \mu^r + \frac{1}{2} \text{diag } \Sigma - r^f \iota.$$

Let  $\Pi_1$  denote the set of parameters  $(\mu^e, \Sigma)$  that correspond to beliefs in  $\mathcal{P}_1$ . This set can be specified to capture ambiguity about different aspects of the environment. In general, the size of  $\Pi_1$  reflects the agents' lack of confidence when thinking about returns. For example, worse information about an asset might lead an agent to have a wider interval of possible mean log returns for that asset. In a dynamic setting, the size of the sets  $\Pi_1$  and  $\mathcal{P}_1$  will change over time with new information. Below we discuss the effects of such updating by doing comparative statics with respect to features of  $\Pi_1$ .

Using the approximation (3.1), the portfolio choice problem becomes

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} E^p [\log R_2^w] \approx \max_{\theta} \min_{(\mu^e, \Sigma) \in \Pi_1} \left\{ r^f + \theta' \mu^e - \frac{1}{2} \theta' \Sigma \theta \right\}, \quad (3.2)$$

If there is no ambiguity – that is,  $(\mu^e, \Sigma)$  is known and is therefore the only element of  $\Pi_1$  – then we have a standard mean-variance problem, with optimal solution  $\theta = \Sigma^{-1}\mu^e$ . More generally, the agent evaluates each candidate portfolio under the worst case return distribution for that portfolio.

### 3.1.1. One ambiguous asset: nonparticipation and portfolio inertia at certainty

Assume that there is only one uncertain asset. Its log excess return has known variance  $\sigma^2$  and an ambiguous mean that lies in the interval  $[\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x}, \bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x}]$ . Think of  $\bar{\mu}^e$  as a benchmark estimate of the premium;  $\bar{x}$  then measures the agent’s lack of confidence in that estimate. The agent solves

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{\mu^e \in [\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x}, \bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x}]} \left\{ r^f + \theta\mu^e - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\theta^2 \right\}, \quad (3.3)$$

Minimization selects the worst case scenario depending on the agent’s position:  $\mu^e = \bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x}$  if  $\theta > 0$  and  $\mu^e = \bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x}$  if  $\theta < 0$ . Intuitively, if the agent contemplates going long in the asset, he fears a low excess return, whereas if he contemplates going short, then he fears a high excess return. If  $\theta = 0$ , the portfolio is not ambiguous and any  $\mu^e$  in the interval solves the minimization problem.

The optimal portfolio decision anticipates the relevant worst case scenario. For a given range of premia, the agent evaluates the best nonnegative position as well as the best nonpositive position, and then chooses the better of the two. This leads to three cases. First, if the premium is positive for sure ( $\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x} > 0$ ), then it is optimal to go long. Since any long position is evaluated using the lowest premium, the optimal weight in this case is  $\theta = (\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x})/\sigma^2 > 0$ . Similarly, if the premium is known to be negative ( $\bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x} < 0$ ), then the optimal portfolio sells the asset short:  $\theta = (\bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x})/\sigma^2 < 0$ . Finally, if  $\bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x} > 0 > \bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x}$ , then it is optimal to not participate in the market ( $\theta = 0$ ). This is because any long position is evaluated using the lowest premium, which is now negative, and any short position is evaluated using the highest premium, which is positive. In both cases, the return on wealth is strictly lower than the riskless rate and so it is better to stay out of the market.

Under ambiguity, *nonparticipation* in markets is thus optimal for many parameter values. In particular, for any benchmark premium  $\bar{\mu}^e$ , a sufficiently large increase in uncertainty will lead agents to withdraw from an asset market altogether. This is not true if all uncertainty is risk. Indeed, the participation decision

does not depend on the quadratic risk term in (3.3). That term becomes 2nd order as  $\theta$  goes to zero, that is, agents are "locally risk neutral" at  $\theta = 0$ . In the absence of ambiguity ( $\bar{x} = 0$ ), agents participate except in the knife edge case  $\bar{\mu}^e = 0$ . Moreover, an increase in the variance  $\sigma^2$  does not make agents withdraw from the market, it only makes them choose smaller positions.

Ambiguity averse agents exhibit *portfolio inertia* at  $\theta = 0$ . Indeed, consider the response to a small change in the benchmark premium  $\bar{\mu}^e$ . For  $\bar{\mu}^e < |\bar{x}|$ , an ambiguity averse agent will not change his position away from zero. This is again in sharp contrast to the risk case, where the derivative of the optimal position with respect to  $\bar{\mu}^e$  is everywhere strictly positive. The key point is that an increase in ambiguity can be locally "large" relative to an increase in risk. Indeed, the portfolio  $\theta = 0$  is both riskless and unambiguous. Any move away from it makes the agent bear both risk and ambiguity. However, an increase in ambiguity about means is perceived like a change in the mean, and not like an increase in the variance. Ambiguity can thus have a first order effect on portfolio choice that overwhelms the first order effect of a change in the mean, whereas the effect of risk is second order.

### 3.1.2. Hedging and portfolio inertia away from certainty

Nonparticipation and portfolio inertia can arise also when the portfolio  $\theta = 0$  does not have a certain return, and when the ambiguous asset can help hedge risk.<sup>15</sup> To see this, assume that the interest rate is not riskless but instead random with known mean  $\mu_f$ , variance  $\sigma_f^2$  and  $cov(r^f, r) = \sigma_{fr} < 0$ . One interpretation is that  $r^f$  is the real return on a nominal bond and  $r$  is the return on the stock market, which is perceived to be an inflation hedge (stocks pay off more when inflation lowers the real bond return). The agent solves

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} E^p [\log R_2^w] \approx \max_{\theta} \min_{\mu^e \in [\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x}, \bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x}]} \left\{ \mu^f + \theta(\mu^e - \sigma_{fr}) - \frac{1}{2}(\theta^2 \sigma^2 + \sigma_r^2) \right\}.$$

Investing in stocks is now useful not only to exploit the equity premium  $\mu^e$ , but also to hedge the risk in a bond position. Moreover, the portfolio  $\theta = 0$  (holding

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<sup>15</sup>It is sometimes claimed in the literature that the multiple-priors model gives rise to inertia only at certainty. The claim is often based on examples with two states of the world, where MP preferences exhibit indifference curves that are kinked at certainty and smooth elsewhere. However, the example here illustrates that in richer settings inertia is a more general phenomenon.

all wealth in bonds) is still unambiguous, but it is no longer riskless. Adapting the earlier argument, the agent goes long in stocks if  $\bar{\mu}^e - \bar{x} - \sigma_{fr} > 0$ , he goes short if  $\bar{\mu}^e + \bar{x} - \sigma_{fr} < 0$ , and he stays out of the stock market otherwise. For a positive benchmark equity premium  $\bar{\mu}^e > 0$ , the degree of ambiguity (measured by  $\bar{x}$ ) required to generate nonparticipation is now larger (because of the benefit of hedging), but the basic features of nonparticipation and portfolio inertia remain. The key point is that investing in stocks exposes investors to a source of ambiguity – the unknown equity premium – while investing in bonds does not.

Portfolio inertia is a property that is distinct from, and more general than, nonparticipation. This is because even away from certainty there can be portfolios where a small change in a position entails a large change in the worst case belief. To illustrate, consider an agent who believes in a one-dimensional set of models of excess returns indexed by an ambiguous parameter  $x \in [0, \bar{x}]$ . In particular, the premium is  $\mu^e = \bar{\mu}^e + x$  and the variance is  $\sigma^2 = \bar{\sigma}^2 + 2x/\gamma$ , where  $\gamma$  is known. Intuitively, the agent believes that risk and expected return go together, but he does not know the precise pair  $(\mu^e, \sigma^2)$ .<sup>16</sup> He solves

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} E^p [\log R_2^w] \approx \max_{\theta} \min_{x \in [0, \bar{x}]} \left\{ \mu^f + \theta(\bar{\mu}^e + x) - \frac{1}{2}\theta^2 (\bar{\sigma}^2 + 2x/\gamma) \right\}.$$

There are now two portfolios that are completely unambiguous,  $\theta = 0$  and  $\theta = \gamma$ , and the latter yields the higher return on wealth if  $\bar{\mu}^e > \gamma\bar{\sigma}^2/2$ . If, moreover, ambiguity is large enough so that  $\bar{\mu}^e < \gamma\bar{\sigma}^2 + \bar{x}$ , then it is optimal to choose  $\theta = \gamma$ .

At  $\theta = \gamma$ , a small increase in  $\theta$  leads to the worst case scenario  $x = \bar{x}$ , while a small decrease leads to  $x = 0$ . Intuitively, risk is taken more seriously relative to expected return at higher positions. Accordingly, the worst case scenario changes with position size: at high positions, agents fear high risk, whereas at small positions, they fear low expected returns. At  $\theta = \gamma$ , the two effects offset.<sup>17</sup> It follows that, at  $\theta = \gamma$ , any news that slightly changes the benchmark premium  $\bar{\mu}^e$  has no effect on portfolio choice. Indeed, changing the portfolio to exploit news about

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<sup>16</sup>Illeditsch (2009) shows that such a family of models can obtain when agents receive bad news of ambiguous precision: more precise bad news lowers both the conditional mean and the conditional variance or returns.

<sup>17</sup>The presence of an unambiguous portfolio is a knife edge case driven by the functional form (or here by the approximation we are using). More generally, even if no portfolio makes the objective function independent of  $x$ , there can exist portfolios at which the minimizing choice of  $x$  flips discontinuously.

$\bar{\mu}^e$  would require the agent to bear ambiguity. The resulting first order loss from increased uncertainty overwhelms the gain from a small change in  $\bar{\mu}^e$ .

### 3.1.3. Multiple ambiguous assets: selective participation and benefits from diversification

With multiple assets, ambiguity gives rise to selective participation. To illustrate, consider a set of  $n$  uncertain assets such that (i) returns are known to be uncorrelated: the covariance matrix  $\Sigma$  in (3.2) is diagonal, and (ii) the premia  $\mu^e$  are perceived to be ambiguous but independent:  $\mu^e$  lies in the Cartesian product of intervals  $[\bar{\mu}_i^e - \bar{x}_i, \bar{\mu}_i^e + \bar{x}_i]$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . From (3.2), it is optimal to participate in the market for asset  $i$  if and only if  $0 \notin [\bar{\mu}_i^e - \bar{x}_i, \bar{\mu}_i^e + \bar{x}_i]$ , that is, if the premium on asset  $i$  is nonzero and not too ambiguous. Agents thus stay away from those markets for which they lack confidence in assessing the distribution of returns.<sup>18</sup>

If ambiguity about premia is independent across assets, then it cannot be diversified away. To see this, specialize further to i.i.d. risk ( $\Sigma = \sigma^2 I$ ), as well as i.i.d. ambiguity about premia. In particular, let all premia lie in the same interval which is centered at  $\bar{\mu}_i^e = \hat{\mu}^e$  and has bounds implied by  $\bar{x}_i = \hat{x}$ . Assume also that it is worthwhile to go long in all markets, or  $\hat{\mu}^e - \hat{x} > 0$ . Symmetry implies that the optimal portfolio invests the same share, say  $\hat{\theta}/n$ , in each uncertain asset. Substituting  $\theta_i = \hat{\theta}/n$  for all  $i$  as well as  $\mu^e = (\hat{\mu}^e - \hat{x})\iota$  in (3.2), the return on wealth is

$$\max_{\hat{\theta}} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} E^p [\log R_2^w] \approx \max_{\hat{\theta}} \left\{ r^f + \hat{\theta}(\hat{\mu}^e - \hat{x}) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2n} \hat{\theta}^2 \right\}.$$

As the number of independent uncertain assets becomes large, the quadratic term becomes small and the effect of risk on the portfolio decreases. At the same time, the effect of ambiguity on portfolio choice remains unchanged. Intuitively, ambiguity reflects confidence in prior information about individual assets that is perceived like a reduction in the mean. Investing in many assets does not raise confidence in that prior information.

Without independence, diversification may be beneficial, because assets hedge ambiguity in other assets. For an example, retain the assumption of i.i.d. risk,

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<sup>18</sup>Introducing correlation among returns will change the conditions for participation, but will not rule out selective participation. The argument is essentially the same as in the previous subsection.



but suppose now the agent believes premia are  $\mu^e = \hat{\mu}^e \iota + x$ , for some (unknown)  $x$  satisfying  $x'x \leq \kappa^2$ ;  $\kappa < \hat{\mu}^e$  is fixed. Intuitively, the agent perceives a common factor in mean returns such that if one mean is very far away from the benchmark  $\hat{\mu}^e$ , then all others must be relatively close. The agent solves

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} E^p [\log R_2^w] \approx \max_{\theta} \min_{x'x \leq \kappa^2} \left\{ r^f + \theta(\hat{\mu}^e \iota + x) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2n} \theta^2 \right\}.$$

Symmetry again implies  $\theta = \iota \hat{\theta} / n$  for some  $\hat{\theta}$ . For  $\hat{\theta} > 0$ , minimization yields  $x = \theta \sqrt{2\kappa / \theta' \theta} = \kappa / \sqrt{n}$  and the portfolio return is thus

$$\max_{\hat{\theta}} \left\{ r^f + \hat{\theta} \left( \hat{\mu}^e - \frac{\kappa}{\sqrt{n}} \right) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2n} \hat{\theta}^2 \right\}.$$

The effect of ambiguity on portfolio choice thus shrinks as  $n$  increases, although the speed is slower than for risk.

An extreme case of cross-hedging ambiguity arises when a unambiguous *family* of portfolios can be constructed. Suppose, for example, that there are only two assets with i.i.d. risk, and that  $\mu_1^e = \hat{\mu}^e + x$  and  $\mu_2^e = \hat{\mu}^e - x$ , with  $x^2 \leq \kappa^2$ . Such a situation might arise when there is pool of assets (e.g. mortgages) with relatively transparent payoff, which has been cut into tranches in a way that makes the payoffs on the individual tranches rather opaque. In this case, holding the entire pool, or holding tranches in equal proportions hedges ambiguity. In contrast, an agent holding an individual tranche in isolation bears ambiguity.

### 3.1.4. Dynamics: entry & exit rules and intertemporal hedging

To illustrate new effects that emerge in an intertemporal context, consider a three period setup with one uncertain asset. Beliefs can be described by sets of one-step-ahead conditionals. The date 1 one-step-ahead conditionals for date 2 log excess return are normal with variance  $\sigma_2^2$  and ambiguous mean in the interval  $[\bar{\mu}_2^e - \bar{x}_2, \bar{\mu}_2^e + \bar{x}_2]$ . As of date 2, the date 3 log excess returns are again viewed as normal, now with variance  $\sigma_3^2$ . Moreover, there is a signal  $s_2$  that induces, via some updating rule, an interval of expected log excess returns  $[\bar{\mu}_3^e(s_2) - \bar{x}_3(s_2), \bar{\mu}_3^e(s_2) + \bar{x}_3(s_2)]$ . In general, the signal can be correlated with the realized excess return  $r_2^e$ . This will be true, for example, if the agent is learning about the true premium, and the realized excess return is itself a signal. Importantly, updating will typically

affect both the benchmark mean return  $\bar{\mu}_3^e$  and the agents' confidence, as measured by  $\bar{x}_3$ .

Portfolio choice at date 2 works just like in the one period problem (3.3) above. The value function from that problem depends on wealth  $W_2$  and the signal  $s_2$ . Up to a constant, it takes the form  $V_2(W_2, s_2) = \log W_2 + h(s_2)$ , where

$$h(s_2) = \frac{1}{2\sigma_3^2} (\max\{\bar{\mu}_3^e(s_2) - \bar{x}(s_2), 0\}^2 + \min\{\bar{\mu}_3^e(s_2) + \bar{x}(s_2), 0\}^2)$$

The value function is higher for signals that move the range of equity premia away from zero and thus permit worst case expected returns higher than the riskless rate. For example, Epstein & Schneider (2007) show in a model of learning about the premium with  $s_2 = r_2^e$  that the value function is  $U$ -shaped in the signal.

Since the value function  $V_2$  is separable in  $W_2$  and  $s_2$ , the portfolio choice problem at date 1 can still be solved separately from the savings problem. The agent solves

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_1} \{E^p[\log R_2^w + h(s_2)]\}.$$

The difference from the one shot problem (3.3) is that minimization takes into account the effect on the expected return at the optimal portfolio to be chosen at date 2, captured by  $h$ . As a result, it is possible that the choice of  $p$ , and the choice of the optimal portfolio, are different in the 2-period problem than in the 1-period problem. In other words, an investor with a two period horizon does not behave myopically, but chooses to hedge future investment opportunities. This hedging is due entirely to ambiguity - it is well known that with log utility and a single prior, myopic behavior is optimal.<sup>19</sup>

In the intertemporal context, the (recursive) multiple-priors model delivers two new effects for portfolio choice. First, the optimal policy involves dynamic exit and entry rules. Indeed, updating shifts the interval of equity premia, and such shifts can make agents move in and out of the market. Second, there is a new source of hedging demand. It emerges if return realizations provide news that shift the interval of equity premia. Portfolio choice optimally takes into account the effects of news on future confidence. The direction of hedging depends on how news affects confidence. For example, Epstein & Schneider (2007) show that learning

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<sup>19</sup>In the expected utility case, hedging demand is linked to a nonzero cross derivative of the value function  $V_2$ . With ambiguity, hedging demand can arise in the log case even though the cross derivative is zero. The reason is that the minimization step creates a link across terms between  $E^p[\log R_2^w]$  and  $E^p[h(s_2)]$ .

about premia gives rise to a contrarian hedging demand if the empirical mean equity premium is low. Intuitively, agents with a low empirical estimate know that a further low return realization may push them towards nonparticipation, and hence a low return on wealth (formally this is captured by a U-shaped value function). To insure against this outcome, they short the asset.

### 3.1.5. Differences between models of ambiguity

This section has illustrated several phenomena that can be traced to first order effects of uncertainty under the multiple-priors model, in particular selective participation, portfolio inertia and the inability to diversify uncertainty (at least for some sets of beliefs). These effects cannot arise under SEU, which implies local risk neutrality at certainty, smooth dependence of portfolios on the return distribution (at least under the standard assumptions studied here) and benefits of diversification.

The smooth model and multiplier utility resemble SEU in the sense that they also cannot generate the above phenomena. This is immediate for multiplier utility, which is observationally equivalent to SEU on Savage acts, as explained in Section 2.1.4. Moreover, for the smooth model, if  $u$  and  $\phi$  are suitably differentiable, then so is  $U^{KMM}$ . As a result, selective participation is again a knife-edge property. A theme that is common to smooth models and the MP model is the emergence of hedging demand due to ambiguity.

Some authors have argued that smoothness is important for tractability of portfolio problems. It is true that smoothness permits the use of calculus techniques. Moreover, in the expected utility case closed form solutions for dynamic problems are sometimes available, and the same may be true for smooth models that are close to expected utility. However, most applied portfolio choice problems considered in the literature today are solved numerically. Even in the expected utility case, they often involve frictions that make closed form solutions impossible. From a numerical perspective, the additional one-step-ahead minimization step does not appear excessively costly.

### 3.1.6. Discipline in quantitative applications

In the portfolio choice examples above as well as in those on asset pricing below, the size of the belief set is critical for the magnitude of the new effects. There

are two approaches in the literature to disciplining the belief set. Anderson et al. (2000) propose the use of detection error probability (see also Barillas et al. (2009) for an exposition). While those authors use detection error probabilities in the context of multiplier preference, the idea has come to be used also to constrain the belief set in multiple-priors. The basic idea is to permit only beliefs that are statistically close to some reference belief, in the sense that they are difficult to distinguish from the reference belief based on historical data.

To illustrate, let  $A$  denote a reference belief (for example, a return distribution), and let  $B$  denote some other belief. We want to describe a sense in which  $A$  and  $B$  are “statistically close”. Let  $\pi_A$  denote the probability, under  $A$ , that a likelihood ratio test based on the historical data (of returns, say) would falsely reject  $A$  and accept  $B$ . Define  $\pi_B$  similarly as the probability under  $B$  of falsely rejecting  $B$  in favor of  $A$ . Finally, define the *detection error probability*  $\pi$  by  $\pi = \frac{1}{2}(\pi_A + \pi_B)$ . The set of beliefs is now constrained to include only beliefs with  $\pi$  small enough. (One might also choose to make additional functional form assumptions, for example, serial independence of returns.)

A second approach to imposing discipline involves using a model of learning. For example, the learning model of Epstein & Schneider (2007) allows the modeler to start with a large set of priors in a learning model – resembling a diffuse prior in Bayesian learning – and then to shrink the set of beliefs via updating. A difference between the learning and detection probability approach is that in the former the modeler does not have to assign special status to a reference model. This is helpful in applications where learning agents start with little information, for example, because of recent structural change. In contrast, the detection probability approach works well for situations where learning has ceased or slowed down, and yet the true model remains unknown.

### 3.1.7. Literature notes

The nonparticipation result with one uncertain asset is due to Dow & Werlang (1992). More general forms of portfolio inertia appear in Epstein & Wang (1994) and Illeditsch (2009). Mukerji & Tallon (2003) compare portfolio inertia under ambiguity and first order risk aversion. Garlappi et al. (2007) characterize portfolio choice with multiple ambiguous assets. Bossaerts et al. (2010) and Ahn et al. (2009) provide experimental evidence that supports first order effects of uncertainty in portfolio choice.

A large empirical literature shows that investors prefer assets that are familiar to them, and that the extensive margin matters.<sup>20</sup> Quantitative studies of familiarity bias using the multiple-priors model thus seem a promising avenue for future research. Cao et al. (2007) summarize the evidence and discuss ambiguity aversion as a possible interpretation. Most applications of ambiguity to portfolio home bias (Uppal & Wang 2003, Benigno & Nistico 2009) and own-company-stockholdings (Boyle et al. (2003)) employ smooth models and do not focus on the extensive margin.

Epstein & Schneider (2007) compute a dynamic portfolio choice model with learning, using the recursive multiple-priors approach. They derive dynamic exit and entry rules, and an intertemporal hedging demand. They also show that, quantitatively, learning about the equity premium can generate a significant trend towards stock market participation and investment, in contrast to results with Bayesian learning.<sup>21</sup> Campanale (2010) builds a MP model of learning over the life cycle. He shows that such a model helps to explain participation and investment patterns by age in the US Survey of Consumer Finances. Miao (2009) considers portfolio choice with learning and multiple-priors in continuous time.

### 3.2. Asset pricing

We now use the above results on portfolio choice to derive consumption-based asset pricing formulas. Our formal examples focus on representative agent pricing, since the literature on this issue is more mature and has proceeded to derive quantitative results; notes on new work on heterogeneous agent models are provided below.

In equilibrium, a representative agent is endowed with a claim to consumption at date 2 and prices adjust so he is happy to hold on to this claim. Write date 2 consumption as  $C_2 = C_1 \exp(\Delta c)$  where  $\Delta c$  is consumption growth. It is useful to distinguish between consumption and dividends.<sup>22</sup> Assume that a share  $1 - \delta$  of consumption consists of labor income which grows at the constant rate  $\mu_l$  and that

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<sup>20</sup>One candidate explanation for nonparticipation is that expected utility investors pay a per-period fixed cost. Vissing-Jorgenson (2003) argues that this approach cannot explain the lack of stock market participation among the wealthy in the US.

<sup>21</sup>The reason lies in the first order effect of uncertainty on investment. Roughly, learning about the premium shrinks the interval of possible premia and thus works like an increase in the mean premium, rather than just a reduction in posterior variance, which tends to be 2nd order.

<sup>22</sup>In our two period economy, we call the payoff to stocks dividends. In a dynamic model, the second period utility is a value function over wealth, and the payoff on stocks includes the stock price. The basic intuition is the same.

a share  $\delta$  consists of dividends that have a lognormal growth rate  $\Delta d$  with variance  $\sigma_d^2$  and an ambiguous mean  $\mu_d \in [\bar{\mu}_d - \bar{x}, \bar{\mu}_d + \bar{x}]$ . Using the same approximation as for the return on wealth above, write consumption growth as

$$\Delta c = (1 - \delta) \mu_l + \delta \left( \Delta d + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_d^2 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \delta^2 \sigma_d^2.$$

The consumption claim trades at date 1 at the price  $P_c$  and has log return  $r^c = \log C_2 - \log P_c = \Delta c - \log(P_c/C_1)$ . The premium on the consumption claim is

$$\mu^e = E[r^c] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}(r^c) - r^f = (1 - \delta) \mu_l + \delta \left( \mu_d + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_d^2 \right) - \log(P_c/C_1) - r^f.$$

The representative agent solves a version of problem (3.3), given wealth  $W = P_c + C_1$  and a range of premia  $\mu^e$  generated by ambiguity in dividend growth  $\mu_d$ . At the equilibrium price and interest rate, he must find it optimal to choose  $\theta = 1$  and  $C_1 = (P_c + C_1)/(1 + \beta)$ . The latter condition pins down  $P_c$  – with log utility, the price-dividend ratio on a consumption claim depends only on the discount factor.

The condition  $\theta = 1$  pins down the interest rate. Since  $\theta > 0$ , minimization in (3.3) selects the lowest premium, say  $\underline{\mu}^e$ , by selecting the lowest mean dividend growth rate  $\bar{\mu}_d - \bar{x}$ . Solving the condition  $\theta = 1$  for the interest rate, we obtain

$$r^f = -\log \beta + \left\{ (1 - \delta) \mu_l + \delta \left( \bar{\mu}_d + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_d^2 \right) - \frac{1}{2} \delta^2 \sigma_d^2 \right\} - \frac{1}{2} \delta^2 \sigma_d^2 - \delta \bar{x}, \quad (3.4)$$

The interest rate depends on the discount factor, the mean consumption growth rate (in braces), as well as on a precautionary savings term. An increase in either risk or ambiguity makes the agent try to save more, which tends to lower the equilibrium interest rate. If  $\delta < 1$ , an increase in risk also raises the mean growth rate of consumption.

The same price and interest rate would obtain in an economy where the agent is not ambiguity averse but simply pessimistic: he believes that mean consumption growth is  $\bar{\mu}_c - \bar{x}$  for sure. This reflects a general point made first by Epstein & Wang (1994): asset prices under ambiguity can be computed by first finding the most pessimistic beliefs about the consumption claim, and then pricing assets under this pessimistic belief. We emphasize that this does not justify simply modeling a pessimistic Bayesian investor to begin with. For one thing, the worst

case scenario implied by a multiple-priors setup may look absurd when interpreted as a dogmatic Bayesian belief. Moreover, a form of the Lucas critique applies: the pessimistic investor is no more than a convenient “reduced form” – focusing on him can give misleading answers to comparative statics (e.g. policy) questions.

Turn now to the stock price and equity premium. If a claim to dividends  $D_2 = D_1 e^{\Delta d}$  trades at the price  $P_d$ , absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that its premium satisfy  $\delta(\bar{\mu}_d - \bar{x} + (1/2)\sigma_d^2 - \log(P_d/D_1) - r^f) = \underline{\mu}^e$ . The price-dividend ratio on equity is thus

$$P_d/D_1 = \exp(\bar{\mu}_d + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2) \exp(-r^f - (\bar{x} + \delta\sigma^2)).$$

The price is the expected level of dividends under benchmark growth  $\bar{\mu}_d$  (the first term), discounted at an uncertainty adjusted rate that increases in both risk  $\delta\sigma^2$  and ambiguity  $\bar{x}$ . Importantly, the degree of ambiguity  $\bar{x}$  affects the discount rate one-for-one, but it affects the interest rate (3.4) only  $\delta$  for one. For small  $\delta$ , changes in ambiguity (for example due to updating) have a large effect on stock prices, but only a small effect on interest rates. This is important for addressing the equity volatility puzzle.

To discuss premia observed in the market, we need to take a stand on the true data generating process. Suppose that dividend growth is drawn from a distribution with mean  $\mu_d^*$  and variance  $\sigma_d^2$ . An econometrician who observes many realizations of the economy obtains a sample of excess returns  $\Delta d - \log(P_d/D_1) - r^f$ . The average premium measured by the econometrician is thus

$$\mu_d^* - \log(P_d/D_1) - r^f + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2 = \delta\sigma_d^2 + \mu_d^* - (\bar{\mu}_d - \bar{x}). \quad (3.5)$$

It consists of a risk premium and an ambiguity premium. The risk premium is the covariance of consumption growth and stock returns. For an asset that represents only a small share of consumption, a large risk premium thus requires large payoff volatility  $\sigma_d^2$ .

The ambiguity premium consists of the difference between true mean dividend growth and the worst case mean used by the agent to evaluate the asset. If the belief interval is centered around the truth ( $\bar{\mu}_d = \mu_d^*$ ), then the ambiguity premium is simply equal to  $\bar{x}$ . In any case, the share of the payoff in consumption does not matter for the ambiguity premium. If a lack of confidence in the asset is reflected in a range of premia, it raises the premium one-for-one. Put together, models of ambiguity aversion hold promise for resolving the equity premium and excess

volatility puzzles, especially if the distinction between consumption and dividends is made explicit.

### 3.2.1. Amplification

With multiple-priors preferences, prices may depend very strongly – in fact discontinuously – on fundamentals that change the representative agent’s portfolio. This is the flip side of the portfolio inertia discussed in 3.1.2, which says that portfolios may not respond to small changes in prices. To illustrate, consider a family of models for the growth of stock payoffs similar to that used for returns above: let  $\mu_d = \bar{\mu}_d + x(\gamma - 1)/\gamma$  and  $\sigma_d^2 = \bar{\sigma}_d^2 + 2x/\gamma$ , where  $x \in [0, \bar{x}]$  is ambiguous and  $\gamma \in (0, 1)$  is fixed. Intuitively, the agent believes that high growth goes along with high volatility.<sup>23</sup> The mean consumption growth now depends on  $x$  via the term  $x\delta(1 - \delta/\gamma)$ , and the worst case is  $x = 0$  if  $\delta < \gamma$  and  $x = \bar{x}$  if  $\delta > \gamma$ . If dividends make up a small part of consumption, agents fear low growth. As the share of dividends increases, concern with high risk eventually dominates.

The interest rate takes the form

$$r^f = -\log \beta + \bar{\mu}_c - \frac{1}{2}\delta^2\sigma_d^2 - \delta\bar{x}D,$$

where  $D = 1$  if  $\delta > \gamma$ ,  $D = 0$  if  $\delta < \gamma$  and  $D \in [0, 1]$  if  $\delta = \gamma$ . Viewed as a function of  $\delta$ , the interest rate thus has a discontinuity at the point  $\delta = \gamma$ . A small change in fundamentals – here the share of stock payoffs in wealth – can thus have a large effect on asset prices. Intuitively, a small drop in the share of stock payoffs in wealth redirects agents’ concern from high risk to low growth. This results in a jump in interest rates (and thus a crash in asset prices).

### 3.2.2. The cross section of returns and idiosyncratic ambiguity

To examine the cross section of stock returns, assume there is no labor income, but that the consumption claim consists of  $n$  trees of the same size with i.i.d. lognormal dividend growth rates with mean  $\mu_d$  and variance  $\sigma_d^2$ . Consumption growth is thus

$$\Delta c \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \Delta d_i + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2 \right) - \frac{1}{2n}\sigma_d^2.$$

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<sup>23</sup>While the log growth rate is decreasing in  $x$ , the adjusted growth rate  $\mu_d + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2$  is increasing.



Assume that dividend growth rates are perceived as ambiguous but independent: the vector of means  $\mu_d$  is drawn from a Cartesian product of intervals  $[\bar{\mu}_d - \bar{x}_i, \bar{\mu}_d + \bar{x}_i]$ . While the center of the interval is the same for all trees, the agent view some trees as more ambiguous than others.

In equilibrium, tree prices  $P_i$  and the interest rate are determined so that the agent is willing to hold all trees. With a true dividend growth rate  $\mu_d^* = \bar{\mu}_d$  for all trees, similar algebra as above delivers an interest rate and measured stock premia

$$\begin{aligned} r^f &= -\log \beta + \bar{\mu}_d + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2 - \frac{1}{n} \sum \bar{x}_i - \frac{1}{2n}\sigma_d^2 \\ \mu_d^* - \log(P_i/D_i) - r^f + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2 &= \frac{1}{n}\sigma_d^2 + \bar{x}_i. \end{aligned}$$

As the number of trees increases, the effects of risk on asset prices vanish. Indeed, both the precautionary savings term in the interest rate and the risk premium on a tree – the covariance of the tree return with consumption growth – go to zero. In contrast, the ambiguity premium does not depend on the number of stocks – it depends only on the ambiguity perceived about an individual stock.

### 3.2.3. Literature notes: representative agent pricing

Epstein & Wang (1994, 1995) first studied representative agent asset pricing with multiple-priors in discrete time and pointed out the possibility of amplification and price indeterminacy. Chen & Epstein (2002) characterize pricing in continuous time. Sbuelz & Trojani (2008) derive pricing formulas with entropy-constrained priors. Gagliardini et al. (2008) show how to apply detection probabilities in a MP setting. Epstein & Schneider (2008) consider the effect of learning, with a focus on the role of signals with ambiguous precision. They show that such signals induce an asymmetric response to news – bad news is taken more seriously than good news – and contribute to premia for idiosyncratic volatility as well as negative skewness in returns.<sup>24</sup> Illeditsch (2009) shows how learning from ambiguous signals can give rise to amplification particularly in times when bad news arrives.

Another key property of ambiguous signals is that the anticipation of poor signal quality lowers utility. As a result, a shock that lowers the quality of future signals can lower asset prices. In contrast, in a Bayesian setting the anticipation of less precise future signals does not change utility or prices as long as the distribution of payoffs has not changed. Epstein & Schneider (2008) use a quantitative

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<sup>24</sup>Williams (2009) provides evidence that in times of greater uncertainty in the stock market the reaction to earnings announcements is more asymmetric.

model to attribute some of the price drop after 9/11 to the discomfort market participants felt because they had to process unfamiliar signals.<sup>25</sup>

There are now a number of quantitative studies that apply the recursive multiple-priors model to different asset markets. Trojani & Vanini (2002) revisit the equity premium puzzle. Sbuelz and Trojani (2008) consider predictability of excess stock returns. Jeong et al. (2009) estimate a model of stock returns, also with an emphasis on time variation in equity premia. Drechsler (2008) studies the joint behavior of equity returns and option prices.<sup>26</sup> Ilut (2009) addresses the uncovered interest parity puzzle in foreign exchange markets using a model of regime switching under ambiguity. Gagliardini et al. (2008) and Ulrich (2009) consider the term structure of interest rates, focusing on ambiguity about real shocks and monetary policy, respectively. Boyarchenko (2009) studies credit risk in corporate bonds.

There is also a growing literature on quantitative asset pricing with smooth models. Barillas et al. (2009) use multiplier preferences to reinterpret the equity premium results found by Tallarini (2000) in a model with Epstein-Zin utility. Hansen & Sargent (2009) and Chen et al. (2009) consider the behavior of stock returns in models with learning about hidden states, using multiplier and KMM utility, respectively. Kleschinski & Vincent (2009) study the real term structure in a model with robustness. Liu et al. (2005) consider the smirk in option premia.

### 3.2.4. Literature notes: heterogeneous agent models

Recent work has explored heterogeneous agent models where some agents have multiple-priors. Epstein & Miao (2003) consider an equilibrium model in which greater ambiguity about foreign as opposed to domestic securities leads to a home-bias. Several models center on portfolio inertia as discussed above. Mukerji & Tallon (2001) show that ambiguity can endogenously generate an incomplete market structure. Intuitively, if ambiguity is specific to the payoff on a security, as in 3.1.3 above, then no agent may be willing to take positions in a security with suf-

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<sup>25</sup>There is a related literature on “information uncertainty” in accounting. For example, Autore et al. (2009) consider the failure of Arthur Anderson as an increase in (firm-specific) ambiguity about AA’s clients and document how the price effect of this shock depended on the availability of firm-specific information.

<sup>26</sup>Both Jeong et al. and Drechsler use a general specification of RMP with separate parameters for risk aversion and substitution as in Epstein & Zin (1989) and thus allow for the interaction of ambiguity and “long run risk”.

ficiently ambiguous payoffs. Mukerji & Tallon (2004) build on this idea to explain the scarcity of indexed debt contracts with ambiguity in relative prices. Easley & O’Hara (2009) consider the welfare effects of financial market regulation in models where multiple-priors agents choose in which markets to participate.

A shock to the economy that suddenly increases ambiguity perceived by market participants can drive widespread withdrawal from markets, that is, a “freeze”. This is why the multiple-priors model has been used to capture the increase in uncertainty during financial crises (Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2008, Caballero & Simsek 2009, Guidolin & Rinaldi 2009, Routledge & Zin 2009). Uhlig (2009) considers the role of ambiguity aversion in generating bank runs.

In heterogeneous agent models, prices generally depend on the entire distribution of preferences. An important point here is that if only some agents become more ambiguity averse, this may not increase premia observed in the market. The reason is that the more ambiguity averse group might leave the market altogether, leaving the less ambiguity averse agents driving prices (Trojani and Vanini 2004, Cao et al. 2005, Chapman & Polkovnichenko 2009, Ui 2009). Condie (2010) considers conditions under which ambiguity averse agents affect prices in the long run if they interact with SEU agents.

A number of papers have recently studied setups with ambiguity averse traders and asymmetric information. Condie & Ganguli (2009) show that if an ambiguity averse investor has private information, then portfolio inertia (as in 3.1.2) can prevent the revelation of information by prices even if there is the same number of uncertain fundamentals and prices. Ozsoylev & Werner (2009) and Caskey (2009) study the response of prices to shocks when ambiguity averse agents interact with SEU traders and noise traders. Mele & Sangiorgi (2009) focus on the incentives for information acquisition in markets under ambiguity.

## A. Appendix

We provide the details supporting our discussion in Section 2.2.2 regarding the KMM model and our thought experiment concerning updating.

The state space is  $\Omega = \{B, W\}$ , corresponding to the possible colors of the ball on any single draw. The parameter space is  $\{(\theta, n) : \theta = B, W, \text{ and } n = 2, 6\}$ . The prior  $\mu$  can be viewed as a probability measure on pairs  $(\theta, n)$ . Let  $\mu$  be uniform over the four possibilities. Define the likelihoods  $\ell(B | \theta, n)$  by (2.24).

A bet on  $B$  pays off either 100 or 0. Without loss of generality, normalize  $u$  so

that  $u(100) = 1$  and  $u(0) = 0$ . Then ex ante utility for the bet on drawing black from the ambiguous urn is given by (where  $B$  denotes also the act corresponding to the bet on black)

$$\begin{aligned} U(B) &= \sum_{\theta, n} \mu(\theta, n) \phi(\ell(B | \theta, n)) \\ &= \mu(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \mu(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right). \end{aligned}$$

For the risky urn, with winning prize  $u = z$ ,

$$U(B) = \phi\left(z\frac{1}{2}\frac{3}{5} + z\frac{1}{2}\frac{2}{5}\right) = \phi\left(z\frac{1}{2}\right) = U(W).$$

Thus ex ante indifference for between the two bets is satisfied if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} &\phi\left(z\frac{1}{2}\right) && \text{(A.1)} \\ &= \mu(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \mu(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right). \end{aligned}$$

By symmetry of the situation, the same  $z$  works also for bets on  $W$ .

Next consider bets ex post, after observing a black ball on a single draw each from both the ambiguous and risky urns. For the risky urn, the posterior of a black coin-ball is  $\frac{3}{5}$ , and posterior predictive probability of drawing black on the next draw is

$$\mu_1^R = \frac{3}{5} \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) + \frac{2}{5} \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) = \frac{13}{25}.$$

Therefore, given the winning prize  $z$ , bets on black and white balls being drawn next have, respectively, the conditional utilities

$$\begin{aligned} U_1^R(B) &= \phi\left(z\mu_1^R\right) = \phi\left(z\left(\frac{13}{25}\right)\right), \text{ and} \\ U_1^R(W) &= \phi\left(z\left(1 - \mu_1^R\right)\right) = \phi\left(z\left(\frac{12}{25}\right)\right). \end{aligned}$$

Turn to the ambiguous urn. Let  $\mu_1$  denote the Bayesian update of  $\mu$ , and  $U_1$  the corresponding utility function. Then

$$U_1(B) = \mu_1(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu_1(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu_1(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \mu_1(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right),$$

and

$$U_1(W) = \mu_1(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu_1(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu_1(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right) + \mu_1(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right).$$

If, as in the intuitive behavior pointed to in the thought experiment, each bet is less preferred to the corresponding bet on the risky urn, then

$$\mu_1(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu_1(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu_1(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \mu_1(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right) < \phi\left(z\left(\frac{13}{25}\right)\right),$$

and

$$\mu_1(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu_1(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu_1(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right) + \mu_1(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) < \phi\left(z\left(\frac{12}{25}\right)\right).$$

Add to obtain,

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_1(n=2) \left(\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)\right) + \mu_1(n=6) \left(\phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right)\right) &< \phi\left(z\left(\frac{13}{25}\right)\right) + \phi\left(z\left(\frac{12}{25}\right)\right) \\ &\leq 2\phi\left(z\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\right). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by (A.1),

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{2}\mu_1(n=2) \left(\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mu_1(n=6) \left(\phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right)\right) < \\ &\mu(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \mu(W, 2) \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \mu(W, 6) \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right), \end{aligned}$$

or

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{2}\mu_1(n=2) \left(\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mu_1(n=6) \left(\phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right)\right) < \quad (\text{A.2}) \\ &\mu(B, 2) \phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + [\mu(n=2) - \mu(B, 2)] \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \mu(B, 6) \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + [\mu(n=6) - \mu(B, 6)] \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Since  $\mu$  is uniform, the posterior  $\mu_1$  on  $(\theta, n)$  pairs is given by

$$\mu_1(\theta, n | B) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{3} & \theta = B, n = 2 \\ \frac{1}{6} & \theta = W, n = 2 \\ \frac{2}{7} & \theta = B, n = 6 \\ \frac{3}{14} & \theta = W, n = 6, \end{cases}$$

and  $\mu_1(n=2) = \frac{1}{2} = \mu_1(n=6)$ . Therefore, (A.2) implies the contradiction

$$\begin{aligned} &\left(\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)\right) + \left(\phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right)\right) < \\ &\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{4}{7}\right) + \phi\left(\frac{3}{7}\right). \end{aligned}$$

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