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1050 Massachusetts Avenue

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ABSTRACT

During World War II and the Korean War, real GDP grew by about half the amount of the increase in government purchases. With allowance for other factors holding back GDP growth during those wars, the multiplier linking government purchases to GDP may be in the range of 0.7 to 1.0, a range generally supported by research based on vector autoregressions that control for other determinants, but higher values are not ruled out. New Keynesian macro models have multipliers in that range as well. On the other hand, neoclassical models have a much lower multiplier, because they predict that consumption falls when purchases rise. The key features of a model that delivers a higher multiplier are (1) the decline in the markup ratio of price over cost that occurs in those models when output rises, and (2) the elastic response of employment to an increase in demand. These features alone deliver a fairly high multiplier and they are complementary to another feature associated with Keynes, the linkage of consumption to current income. Multipliers are higher—perhaps around 1.7—when the nominal interest rate is at its lower bound of zero, as it was during 2009.

Robert E. Hall

Hoover Institution

Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305-6010

and NBER

rehall@gmail.com

1 Introduction

Major contractions in economic activity bring policies of temporary expansions in government purchases of goods and services. The severe contraction that hit the U.S. and world economies in 2008 was no exception. The need for fiscal expansion was particularly acute because monetary policy had driven short-term safe interest rates down to zero without heading off the contraction. Fiscal policy, including increases in federal purchases and in state and local purchases financed by federal grants, has become an important part of the government's response to a severe recession.

I concentrate on a major issue: the magnitude of the increase in total output in the U.S. economy when the government temporarily buys more goods and services. The ratio of the output increase to the purchases increase is the government purchases multiplier. I emphasize that my concern is with government *purchases*, not all of government *spending*. Spending includes purchases plus transfers and interest payments. I assume in all cases that the products the government purchases enter preferences in a separable fashion—they do not affect the household's marginal rates of substitution between consumption and work or between consumption this year and any future year. Military spending is the obvious example. If, on the other hand, the government provides consumers with goods and services they would have purchased anyway, the resulting multipliers would be lower. In the extreme case, where the government purchases consumption goods and provides them to consumers, multipliers would be zero in the standard life-cycle model.

Note that I exclude effects that operate through externalities. One such effect is that the government, as the nation's agent for collective action, may have uses for output that exceed the private value of the output. For example, law enforcement is under-provided by private action and may be under-provided by current government action. If the increase in government purchases includes more spending on law enforcement, its value exceeds its direct contribution to GDP. I leave out that increased value, which could either be attributed to the purchases or to the increase in GDP that would occur because production became more efficient with more enforcement. Another example is road-building, where the benefits would be mainly in the future, because roads are part of the public capital stock. I omit benefits related to externalities not because I think they are unimportant, but because I want to focus on a limited, macroeconomic question. Thus, as a general matter, I do not offer a welfare analysis of government purchases, but one important piece of a welfare analysis,

having to do with the aggregate effects, mainly in the labor market, of the government's increase in product demand.

I assume that there are no special distortionary taxes that apply during the brief period of the countercyclical purchases—the government balances its budget in the long run with whatever taxes it normally uses.

I also do not comment on the other major branch of fiscal stimulus, tax reductions. An analysis of fiscal stimulus in the form of higher transfers or lower taxes would make use of the conclusion about the effects of higher purchases on overall economic activity, because it is a fair presumption that the effects of higher consumer purchases are similar to the effects of higher government purchases. But I do consider the effects of the subsequent financing of increased government purchases, explicitly in the models I study and implicitly in empirical work, where the public knew that eventually the government would need to service the debt issued to pay for higher purchases. Here, my focus on temporary increases in purchases is critical—permanent increases in purchases have a different effect because households cut consumption in anticipation of permanent increases in taxes, the wealth effect. I demonstrate the irrelevance of any wealth effect for temporary programs of higher government purchases.

My discussion describes a closed economy. In effect, it is about the world economy, though I use data from the United States to find parameter values. In the context of the events of 2008 and 2009, a focus on the world economy is appropriate, because every major economy has suffered substantial declines in employment and output and many have responded with increases in government purchases.

I start with a discussion of the direct regression evidence about the output and consumption multipliers for government purchases. Based on the assumption that movements in military purchases are exogenous and the fact that they account for much of the variation in government purchases, the natural approach is to study the econometric relation between output and consumption, on the one hand, and military spending, on the other hand. The resulting multipliers are about 0.5 for output and slightly negative for consumption. Though the standard errors of these estimates are agreeably small, they are under suspicion for understating the multiplier, because the bulk of the evidence comes from the command economy of World War II and may not be relevant to today's market economy. Omitting World War II from the sample yields similar multipliers with rather larger standard errors, based largely on the Korean War buildup, but these too are questionable because the

buildup was accompanied by large increases in tax rates. Changes in military purchases from Vietnam, the Reagan years, or the two wars in Iraq were not large enough to deliver usable estimates of the multipliers. I conclude that the evidence on the magnitude of the multipliers available from U.S. historical experience is persuasive only to make the case that the multiplier is above 0.5.

Evidence from vector autoregressions finds fairly consistently that the output multiplier is in the range from 0.5 to 1.0 and that the consumption multiplier is somewhat positive. To varying extents, these estimates include adjustments for the factors such as taxes that may correct downward biases in the simple regressions.

The paper then turns to models, specifically those derived from the blending of neoclassical and Keynesian macro theory that has flourished in the past decade under the name New Keynesian. Following many earlier authors, I demonstrate that the purely neoclassical general-equilibrium model without unemployment yields the pretty much unshakable conclusion that increases in government purchases come largely out of investment and consumption and do not raise total output substantially. The output multiplier—the response of aggregate output to an increase in government purchases—is well under one and the consumption multiplier is quite negative. The reason is that increased output can only come from increased employment. Without a reservoir of unemployed to draw down, any increase in employment must drive the wage down, resulting in less labor supply. The neoclassical model predicts small increases in output and fairly large declines in consumption.

A key idea of modern macroeconomics that results in more reasonable multipliers is that the margin of price over cost falls during expansions—the markup ratio declines as output rises. Often this property is expressed as stickiness of the price level—prices stay constant during a boom that raises input costs. Other rationalizations based on oligopoly theory or other principles deliver the result directly. The declining markup permits the wage to rise or at least not fall as much as it would with constant markup during an expansion. Hence it permits the household to supply much more labor when the government increases its claim on output.

A second key idea of modern macroeconomics needed to rationalize a reasonably positive output multiplier is elastic labor supply. Research based on household data is adamant that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is below one. Such an elasticity precludes a substantially positive output multiplier with any reasonable response of the markup to changes in output.

It takes both a declining markup and elastic labor supply to generate a substantial output multiplier.

My approach to rationalizing high wage elasticity of labor supply starts from the observation that most of the cyclical movements of work effort take the form of variations in unemployment. I raise the elasticity of labor supply to incorporate the response of unemployment to changes in labor demand, following the search-and-matching approach to the labor market. A standard dynamic general-equilibrium model with a sufficiently responsive markup and realistically elastic effective labor supply (including the response of unemployment) yields an output multiplier as high just below one, in accord with the direct evidence.

One might think that the traditional Keynesian hypothesis of rigid wages might be a close cousin of elastic labor supply, but this turns out to be quite wrong. An unresponsive wage constrains the immediate effect of an increase in government purchases to zero, because employment and thus output are determined entirely by the equality of the marginal product of labor and the wage. This predetermination of output remains in an economy where the markup ratio declines with higher output.

The standard model with responsive markup and elastic labor supply still generates a negative consumption multiplier. I show that adding hours-consumption complementarity—a topic of extensive recent research—can tame the negative multiplier. The logic is that employed people consume significantly more market goods and services than do the unemployed, who have more time to create non-market equivalents. My preferred specification for matching the observed positive multiplier for output and slightly negative multiplier for consumption has substantial negative response of the markup of price over cost to output, fairly elastic response of employment to labor demand, and a degree of complementarity of consumption and work derived from the micro evidence.

Modern models generally embody the life-cycle model of consumption where households use credit markets to smooth consumption. It is widely believed that replacing this feature of models with a traditional consumption function linking consumer spending to current income will boost the output and consumption multipliers. The issue becomes one of the magnitude of the crowding out of investment by increased government purchases. Traditional Keynesian models assume rigid real wages, in which case output is determined on the demand side of the labor market by firms that equate the marginal product of labor to the fixed real

wage. With output unresponsive, crowding out is complete and the output multiplier is zero. Adding partial borrowing constraints to an otherwise standard New Keynesian model does boost the consumption multiplier.

Multipliers are not structural constants. They describe the responses of endogenous variables to changes in the driving force of government purchases. Multipliers depend on monetary policy. In normal times, monetary policy leans against the expansionary effect of increases in government purchases, a factor that reduces the multipliers. But when monetary policy lowers nominal interest rates to their minimum values of zero, the offsetting effect disappears, so an economy at the lower bound has higher multipliers. In an economy with an output multiplier of just under one in normal times, the multiplier rises to 1.7 when monetary policy becomes passive with a zero nominal interest rate.

I conclude that the efficacy of stimulus from higher government purchases depends on two features of the economy: (1) a markup of price over cost that declines as output expands and (2) substantially wage-elastic labor supply or the equivalent. Both features are related to traditional Keynesian views about price and wage stickiness—the negative response of the markup can be viewed as price stickiness and elastic labor supply can be viewed as wage stickiness. Both features appear to describe the U.S. economy, though research on this topic is still far from definitive.

I review the evidence on the movements of the markup ratio as output expands. The hypothesis of a negative response implies that the share of profit in total income should fall during expansions. In fact, that share rises. The most promising rationalization involves a substantial amount of wage smoothing. Then the observed increase in profit during booms is the combination of a larger increase associated with a wage contract that gives management the bulk of the benefit of higher revenue offset by the decline in profit per unit of output. But this is pure guesswork—we lack any handle on measuring wage smoothing. There is no meaningful factual support for the key hypothesis that the markup ratio declines with output.

I show that the expansion of government purchases so far enacted to deal with the severe current recession is far too small to add meaningfully to our knowledge on this subject and far too little to offset much of the recession. A debate about whether the government purchases multiplier is 1.0 or 1.5 is completely off the point in this respect.

2 Estimates of Output and Consumption Multipliers

2.1 Estimates from regressions on military purchases

The most direct way to measure the government purchase multipliers is to exploit large and arguably exogenous fluctuations in military spending. I start with a review of that evidence for the U.S. over the past 80 years. I use the following specification:

$$\frac{z_t - z_{t-1}}{y_{t-1}} = m_z \frac{g_t - g_{t-1}}{y_{t-1}} + \kappa_z + \epsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

Here z is either y for the output multiplier m_y or c for the consumption multiplier m_c . κ_z is an inessential constant. Note that using the same denominator on the left and the right preserves the normal definition of the multiplier as the dollar change in output or consumption per dollar of government purchases.

In this approach I am treating the change in non-military government purchases as one of the sources of the noise, ϵ_t . Because these purchases grow smoothly, their difference has little variability. The alternative of using military spending as an instrument for total purchases gives essentially identical results.

I assume that the change in military spending g is uncorrelated with the non- g component of the left-hand variable, ϵ_t . This identifying assumption has two aspects. First, military spending does not respond to forces determining GDP or consumption, such as monetary or financial forces, but only to geopolitical events. I have long believed that this aspect of the identifying assumption was among the more plausible made in macroeconomics. Second, there are no other determinants of output or consumption growth that change when government purchases change. The basis for this aspect of the identifying assumption is much weaker. In particular, when military spending rises substantially, two other policy responses may occur: command-type interventions in the economy, including rationing, and increases in taxes. Both of these presumably decrease consumption demand and thus reduce output growth. The result is a failure of the identifying assumption in the direction of a negative correlation of the disturbance ϵ_t and thus a downward bias in the estimate of the multiplier m_z . I conclude that the value of the multiplier is probably better interpreted as a lower bound than an unbiased estimate.

Because the movements in GDP and consumption induced by changes in government purchases have essentially the same dynamics as the changes in purchases, it is not necessary (in fact, it is inefficient) to find the innovation in g and then track the response to the

innovation, as would occur in a vector autoregression. The advantage of a VAR is that it can account for other influences, notably taxes, and isolate the causal effect of government purchases. The simple regression considered here confounds the effects of wartime increases in purchases with the effects of accompanying tax increases. Temporary increases in purchases for stimulus purposes are not accompanied by comparable tax increases. I discuss evidence from VARs later in this section.

To form the differences in the data, I use the various versions of Table 1.1.6, Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars, in the National Income and Product Accounts. Each version of the table uses a different base year for the deflator. For the overlap years, I take the average of the two measures of the two changes; these are usually identical to two figures. I use this approach because the deflator for military spending drifts relative to the GDP deflator and I wish to retain the usual interpretation of the multiplier as the effect of one current dollar of purchases on GDP, also measured in current dollars.

Table 1 shows the results of the regressions for output and consumption. The top line of the table shows that, over the entire sample, 1928 through 2008, the output multiplier is just over a half, with a standard error of 0.08, and the consumption multiplier is close to zero, though slightly negative, with a standard error of 0.03. The higher precision of the consumption multiplier arises because the change in consumption has a much lower volatility than does the change in real GDP.

As I noted earlier, estimates of the multiplier that include the huge changes in military spending during World War II are biased downward because important parts of the economy were run on command principles during the war. Direct controls on consumption through rationing arguably held back consumption growth that would have occurred under free-market conditions. Other factors, including the draft and the wartime surge in patriotism, result in an upward bias. Although I am inclined to believe that the net bias is downward, there is no solid evidence about the bias.

The other rows in Table 1 show the evidence from sub-periods. The second row starts the sample in 1948, after the rise and fall of military purchases during the war. The multiplier estimates are similar, but with much larger standard errors. The confidence interval for the output multiplier runs from about zero to about one. The confidence interval for the consumption multiplier remains fairly tightly concentrated near zero.

The third row of the table starts the sample in 1960, after the Korean War. It shows that

<i>Period</i>	<i>GDP multiplier</i>	<i>Consumption multiplier</i>
1930-2008	0.55 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.03)
1948-2008	0.47 (0.28)	-0.12 (0.10)
1960-2008	0.13 (0.65)	-0.09 (0.29)
1939-1948	0.53 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.02)
1949-1955	0.48 (0.56)	-0.18 (0.05)
1939-1944	0.36 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.03)
1945-1949	0.39 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.05)

Table 1: Estimates of Output and Consumption Multipliers for Military Spending

military spending did not move enough during the Vietnam war, the Reagan buildup, or the two wars in Iraq, to identify the multipliers. The estimates are fully consistent with those in the first two rows but are almost completely uninformative about the output multiplier. They do rule out larger positive or negative values of the consumption multiplier.

The fourth row reinforces the message of the earlier rows by showing that the results for just the period enclosing the World War II expansion and contraction of military spending are virtually identical to those for the whole period—essentially all the identifying power comes from the large movements during World War II.

The fifth row looks at the years enclosing the Korean War. The estimates are similar to those found for periods including World War II, but have much larger standard errors, especially for the output multiplier.

The last two rows of Table 1 break World War II into its expansion phase, ending in 1944, and a phase containing the military contraction and the resumption of normal economic conditions, from 1945 to 1949. One of the strengths of the parsimonious specification I use is its ability to deliver useful results with a small number of observations. The results are interesting because many economists—most recently Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009)—believe that the multiplier is higher when the economy is slack. The U.S. economy was extremely slack in 1939, the first year of the expansion phase in the table. The results here give no support to the view of higher multipliers in a slack economy. The downward multipliers found for the period from 1945 to 1949 are virtually identical to those for the expansion from slack starting in 1939. Both are measured with good precision.

Barro and Redlick (2009) consider similar evidence in a regression framework that includes tax rates and other determinants of GDP along with government purchases. They use data starting in 1917 and so take advantage of World War I as another period when the military component of purchases rose dramatically. Their estimates of the output multiplier lie in the range from 0.59 to 0.77; the estimate for all data starting in 1917 is 0.64 with a standard error of 0.10. Their estimates of the consumption multiplier are close to zero. They do not report results without tax variables, but it appears that their inclusion somewhat increases estimates of the multipliers. Thus tax increases with negative effects tend to coincide with increases in government purchases.

The most important lesson from the data on military purchases is that all the real information comes from big wars. The standard errors in Table 1 reflect this fact. They blow

up when the big wars are omitted. Another way to see the point is to observe that the regression coefficient is

$$m_z = \frac{\sum_t \Delta z_t \Delta g_t}{\sum_\tau (\Delta g_\tau)^2} \quad (2)$$

$$= \frac{\sum_t \frac{\Delta z_t}{\Delta g_t} (\Delta g_\tau)^2}{\sum_\tau (\Delta g_\tau)^2} \quad (3)$$

$$= \sum_t w_t \frac{\Delta z_t}{\Delta g_t}.$$

Here Δz_t is the change in real GDP or consumption as a fraction of earlier real GDP less its mean and Δg_t is the change in military purchases as a fraction of GDP less its mean. Thus the overall estimate of the multiplier is a weighted average of year-to-year observed multipliers, where the weights w_t depend on the squared values of the growth in military purchases.

Figure 1 shows the weights calculated from the data on military purchases and real GDP. The only visibly positive weights are for the two wars. Between the two, World War II is vastly more informative. There is little hope of learning much about the multipliers from any data after the mid-1950s. Note that the weights are the same for the output and consumption multipliers.

I conclude that the regression evidence from big wars demonstrates that the government purchases multiplier is probably at least 0.5, based on the hypothesis that the net effect of biases is downward. World War II does not yield a higher estimate of the multiplier than does the Korean war, despite the fact that the buildup starting in 1940 was from a much more slack economy than was the one starting in 1950. Possible explanations for the failure to find the expected relation between initial slack and the multiplier include more aggressive command interventions in the earlier mobilization and the fact that World War II involved enormous expansions in motor vehicles, ships, and aircraft, all highly specialized industries with bottlenecks.

2.2 Estimates of multipliers from vector autoregressions

Vector autoregressions or VARs are a more powerful approach to measuring multipliers, in principle. The regressions in the previous section take all the movements in real GDP and consumption not attributable to changes in government purchases as noise, captured by the residual. Even if these movements arise from driving forces that are uncorrelated




Figure 1: Weights Implicit in Regression Estimates of Output and Consumption Multipliers

with military purchases, so that the estimated multipliers are unbiased, the estimates have high sampling error. A VAR can soak up much of the noise by associating it with other causal factors. Thus the precision of the estimates can be higher in a VAR than in a simple regression. Further, a VAR can take account of effects that are correlated with changes in government purchases that result in biases in the simple regressions. Probably the main effect of this type is the tax rate, though this correlation can be captured in a regression as in Barro and Redlick (2009). By far the biggest increase in government purchases over the sample included in VARs occurred during the Korean War, when tax rates also increased substantially.

Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), Perotti (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), and Ramey (2008) estimate VARs subject to a variety of identification schemes, all of which basically rely on the exogeneity of the movements of government purchases. Blanchard and Perotti consider two versions of their VAR, one with a deterministic trend and the other with a stochastic trend. Ramey estimates elasticities rather than multipliers; I convert these to multipliers by dividing by the ratios of government purchases to GDP and to consumption of nondurables and services. Ramey’s innovation is to identify shocks to government purchases from events presaging rises in military spending,

	Variable Y=GDP, C=Con- sumption	Multipliers and standard errors (in parentheses)			Source
		Impact	After 4 quarters	After 8 quarters	
Blanchard-Perotti, stochastic trend	Y	0.90 (0.30)	0.55 (0.60)	0.65 (1.20)	Table IV, p. 1347
Galí, <i>et al.</i>	Y	0.41 (0.18)	0.31 (0.54)	0.68 (0.72)	Table 1, p. 233
	C	0.07 (0.05)	0.11 (0.14)	0.49 (0.21)	
Perotti	Y	0.70 (0.20)	1.00 (0.50)	1.20 (0.50)	Figure 3, p. 43
	C	0.10 (0.05)	0.30 (0.20)	0.40 (0.25)	
Mountford-Uhlig	Y	0.65 (0.39)	0.27 (0.78)	-0.74 (1.95)	Table 4, p. 18
Ramey, restated from elasticities	Y	0.30 (0.10)	0.50 (0.25)	0.90 (0.35)	Figure 10a, p. 52
	C	0.02	-0.17	-0.09	

Note: Ramey estimates separate C multipliers for durables, non-durables, and services, so no standard errors are available for total consumption.

Table 2: Estimates of Multipliers from Vector Autoregressions

which she weighted by the present value of the predicted increase in military purchases.

Table 2 shows the estimated multipliers for real GDP (Y) and in some cases consumption (C) for the five studies at three points in time after an innovation in government purchases: on impact, after 4 quarters, and after 8 quarters. None of the estimated output multipliers is as high as one. They range from 0.90 to -0.74 . The variation arises from differences in the identification strategies. Perotti and Galí and co-authors find consumption multipliers as high as 0.49, while Ramey's estimates are slightly positive or negative. The difference arises from her identification strategy based on the time when a military expansion became likely rather than the other authors' use of the innovation in all government purchases. The standard errors shown in parentheses indicate the wide range of uncertainty in the responses, especially at longer lags. Note that all of these studies use the same data, so that their estimated coefficients are highly correlated with each other. The standard errors are indicative of the overall uncertainty from VARs—they would not be smaller for an average across the various estimates.

One important difference between the earlier VAR estimates and the question pursued

in this paper is that government purchases rose very persistently in response to innovations, over the period from 1948 to the present. The Korean War was the exception to the general rule that military spending is transitory, as military spending remained high after the end of that war because of the intensification of the Cold War. By contrast, the increase in government purchases to offset a recession is intended to be transitory.

2.3 Conclusions on regression and VAR estimates of multipliers

Empirical work using simple regressions or more elaborate VARs finds output multipliers in the range from 0.5 to 1.0, with a few exceptions, and consumption multipliers in the range from somewhat negative to 0.5. All the empirical work is limited in its ability to measure multipliers for the period from 1948 onward by the lack of variation in government purchases, especially in the most exogenous component, military purchases. Figure 1 shows that essentially all the information comes from the Korean War. The regressions and the VARs infer the multipliers entirely or mainly from the rise in military spending starting in 1950 and in 1940 (regressions only) and the VARs are probably only partially successful in adjusting for taxes and other confounding forces. Thus one could not say that the evidence rules out multipliers above 1.0.

For the rest of the paper, I will speak as if the evidence supports an output multiplier a bit below one and a consumption multiplier a bit negative, as if the evidence spoke somewhat clearly on this point. To avoid painful repetition, I will not comment each time on the weakness of the evidence on this point.

3 Multipliers Derived from Structural Macro Models

Today, most research-oriented macroeconomic models combine, in varying proportions, ideas from dynamic optimization. In the majority of these models, households choose consumption to balance present against future satisfaction, according to the life-cycle-permanent-income principle, though some households may face binding borrowing constraints. In almost all models, firms choose inputs to maximize firm values, subject to the wage for labor and the rental price for capital. In many models, firms are price-setting monopolists facing fairly but not fully elastic demand. A popular assumption is that a firm keeps price at a constant level for an extended period of random length, after which the price pops to its value-maximizing level. Few modern macro models embody any monetary sector. Rather, consistent with

modern central-bank practice, the economy has a Taylor rule relating the interest rate to the rate of inflation. Finally, models view households as having preferences that govern labor supply, but may permit a varying gap between labor demand and labor supply, with a view that the wage is sticky in the shorter run but clears the labor market in the longer run.

I omit consideration of macro models used in proprietary forecasting. I do not have access to information about the underlying economic principles of those models. In particular, I do not comment on the analysis in Romer and Bernstein (2009), which uses an average of multipliers from “a leading private forecasting firm” and the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model (page 12). I do find that their fairly high estimate of the output multiplier is in line with the findings of a model applied to conditions of 2009 with the federal funds rate at its lower bound of zero.

The class of models favored by academic macroeconomists and many central banks has a neoclassical growth model at its core. With prices adjusted frequently to value-maximizing levels and wages adjusted frequently to market-clearing levels, the economy grows reasonably smoothly along a full-employment path, with some volatility associated with changing rates of productivity growth, changing levels of market power, changing preferences, and other driving forces. A topic of intense debate is how much of the observed volatility of output and employment would occur without price and wage stickiness.

Two recent developments in general-equilibrium macro are worth noting. First is the development of coherent theories of unemployment, which are replacing over-simplified ideas that unemployment is just the gap between labor supply and labor demand. Second is the recognition that the models are missing truly important features of financial markets, especially the widening of spreads between private interest rates and safe government rates that occurs in a financial crisis and recession.

My discussion of macro models and their implications for the output multiplier for government purchases adheres to the general philosophy of the class of models sketched above. I begin with the neoclassical growth-model core. A single equation from that model—the first-order condition for balancing consumption of goods and services against work effort—has played a huge role in the literature on government purchase multipliers over the past 30 years. When that equation is given its full role, as in a neoclassical model, the consumption multiplier for government purchases is quite negative. Much of the history of commentary on government purchase multipliers looks for alterations in the model that boost the con-

sumption multiplier toward zero or even above zero, in accord with the empirical studies that do not generally find very negative values.

The consumption-work tradeoff is irrelevant in a sticky-wage model, because workers can be off the labor-supply function implied by the first-order condition. But an otherwise neoclassical model with a sticky wage cannot have much of an output multiplier or a non-negative consumption multiplier, as I will show.

3.1 The neoclassical starting point

Suppose people have preferences described by the within-period utility function

$$\frac{c^{1-1/\sigma}}{1-1/\sigma} - \gamma \frac{h^{1+1/\psi}}{1+1/\psi}. \quad (4)$$

Here σ describes the curvature of utility with respect to the consumption of goods and services, c ; it is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The parameter ψ describes the curvature of utility with respect to the volume of work, h , and is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Finally, the parameter γ controls the overall disamenity of work.

With the price of goods and services normalized at one and a real wage of w , the first-order condition for the optimal mix of consumption and work is

$$wc^{-1/\sigma} = \gamma h^{1/\psi}. \quad (5)$$

Under what conditions will an increase in government purchases (or any other source of higher employment and output) actually raise work effort h ? If work effort does rise, the real wage must fall, given that the capital stock is a state variable whose level cannot change immediately. For h to rise, the left side of the equation must rise, despite the fall in the real wage. The only way for the product to fall is for $c^{-1/\sigma}$ to rise by a higher proportion than the wage falls. This rise requires, in turn, that consumption falls.

Much of the history of formal macroeconomics of the past three decades rests on this issue. Any driving force that raises product demand and thus employment and output must depress consumption, contrary to the evidence and common sense. The real business cycle model broke the conundrum by invoking a stimulus that raised wages—it took bursts of productivity growth to be the driving force of employment fluctuations, rather than the changes in product demand that had generally been taken as the primary driving forces in earlier macro models.

But the real business-cycle model implies that an increase in government purchases achieves an increase in hours of work and output by depressing consumption through wealth and intertemporal substitution effects. The model is fundamentally inconsistent with increasing or constant consumption when government purchases rise.

Parameter values that alleviate but do not avoid the property of consumption declines with higher government purchases are low values of intertemporal substitution, σ , and high values of the elasticity of labor supply, ψ . Advocates of the real business-cycle model have adopted the second enthusiastically, but have been less keen on low σ , because $\sigma = 1$ (log of consumption) is needed to match the absence of a trend in hours of work as real wages have risen. Another helpful feature of preferences is to introduce complementarity of consumption and hours, but, again, this cannot deliver an increase in consumption along with an increase in hours of work. I discuss complementarity in a later section.

To see how the basic marginal-rate-of-substitution condition limits the multiplier, consider the simplest static general-equilibrium model. The technology is Cobb-Douglas:

$$y = h^\alpha. \quad (6)$$

Capital is fixed and normalized at one. The real wage is the marginal product of labor:

$$w = \alpha h^{-(1-\alpha)}. \quad (7)$$

Output splits between consumption and government purchases g :

$$y = c + g. \quad (8)$$

Combining the first-order condition from equation (5) and the two previous equations, I get a single equation to describe general equilibrium:

$$(y - g)^{-1/\sigma} = \frac{\gamma}{\alpha} y^{\frac{1+\psi}{\alpha} - 1}. \quad (9)$$

It is convenient to normalize the model, without loss of generality, so that output is one at a designated level of government purchases g . This implies

$$\gamma = \alpha(1 - g)^{-1/\sigma}. \quad (10)$$

Then the output multiplier is

$$m_y = \frac{dy}{dg} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \sigma(1 - g)(1 - \alpha + 1/\psi)}. \quad (11)$$

Because $\alpha \leq 1$ and $\psi > 0$, the conclusion follows, under the assumptions so far, that the *output multiplier cannot exceed one*. Further, the multiplier is an increasing function of the labor supply elasticity ψ , an increasing function of the labor elasticity of production, α , and a decreasing function of the consumption curvature parameter σ . Conditions under which the multiplier is close to one are (1) labor supply highly elastic (ψ large) *and* low diminishing returns to labor (α close to one), (2) high curvature of utility in consumption (σ close to zero), *or* (3) government purchases close to all of output (g close to one).

Because all output is either consumed or purchased by the government, the consumption multiplier is simply the output multiplier less one. Thus, under the assumptions I have made so far, *the consumption multiplier is never positive*.

Note that the expansion in output that occurs in this economy with an increase in government purchases g results in a lower wage—employers would not be willing to increase employment and lower the marginal product of labor if the cost of labor did not decline. The parameter ψ controls the response of labor supply to the lower wage. A higher value of ψ results in a larger decline in hours from the decrease in the wage, in the substitution sense (ψ is exactly the Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply). The reason that a higher value of ψ results in a larger increase in hours when g increases is the income effect, which also depends on ψ . The consumption curvature parameter σ also enters the income effect. For parameters that bring the multiplier close to one, the income effect is swamping the substitution effect. Notice as well that the labor elasticity α enters the multiplier because it controls the wage depression accompanying the increase in output. With α close to one, diminishing returns are weak and the substitution effect correspondingly smaller, so there is less offset to the income effect.

The elasticity of the production function with respect to labor input, α , is widely believed to be around 0.7. The critical (and controversial) parameter in the model is the Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply, ψ . Empirical work with household data places the elasticity in the range from 0.2 to 1.0 (see the appendix to Hall (2009)). With σ at the fairly standard value of 0.5 and g at 0.2, the output multiplier is about 0.4, at the low end of the range of empirical findings, and the consumption multiplier is -0.6 , out of line with all of the empirical evidence.

I will now consider a set of modifications of the model that improve its match to the evidence. These incorporate (1) variations in the markup of price over cost, (2) unemploy-

ment, (3) complementarity of consumption and hours of work, and (4) a negative response of investment to government purchases. The last modification requires moving to a dynamic model.

3.2 Endogenous markup of price over cost

The neoclassical model assumes competition in output and labor markets. The New Keynesian branch of macroeconomics drops that assumption in favor of market power in product markets and makes the extent of market power depend on the state of the economy. Forces, such as higher government purchases, that expand output also make the economy more competitive, with a lower markup of price over cost.

New Keynesian and many other macro models take the product price as sticky. In a monetary economy, this hypothesis can take the form of a sticky nominal price level combined with variations in factor prices. My approach is to continue to normalize the price of output at one, so the implication of price stickiness is that factor prices are inside the competitive factor-price frontier. Firms have market power. That power is high in slumps and low in booms—markups are countercyclical. The relation between price stickiness and countercyclical markups has been noted by many authors, notably Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).

Sticky-price models generally derive the variable markup from the Calvo pricing model and Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence preferences, but I will take it for now as a primitive feature of the economy. I build this feature into the earlier model with a constant-elastic relation between the markup and output: $\mu(y) = y^{-\omega}$. I continue to normalize the reference level of output, the point where I take the derivative for the multiplier, at one. Now the wage equals the marginal revenue product of labor,

$$w = \frac{1}{y^{-\omega}} \alpha h^{-(1-\alpha)}. \quad (12)$$

The multiplier becomes:

$$m_y = \frac{dy}{dg} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \sigma(1-g)[1 - (1+\omega)\alpha + 1/\psi]}. \quad (13)$$

The more responsive the markup to output (the higher the value of ω), the higher the multiplier. Further, the multiplier can now exceed one and thus the consumption multiplier can be positive. The condition for an output multiplier above 1 is:

$$\omega > \frac{1 - \alpha + 1/\psi}{\alpha}. \quad (14)$$

If $\psi = 0.5$, the markup elasticity ω needed to deliver an output multiplier of 1 is 3.3, far above the plausible range. With $\omega = 0.5$, the output multiplier is 0.5 and the consumption multiplier is -0.5 .

3.3 Unemployment and the employment function

Even today, many general-equilibrium macro models struggle to explain the volatility of employment without explicit consideration of unemployment. But good progress has occurred in this area. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) introduced unemployment as described by in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) into otherwise neoclassical models. Blanchard and Galí (2007) did the same for the New Keynesian model. With a Nash wage bargain, the wage is sufficiently flexible that fluctuations in driving forces of reasonable volatility cause almost no movements of unemployment, as Shimer (2005) showed in an influential paper. Blanchard-Galí introduced sticky, non-Nash wages to generate realistic unemployment volatility. Hall (2009) developed a more general framework based on a broad family of bargaining solutions and with standard preferences to replace the linear preferences in Mortensen-Pissarides.

My framework describes an employment function $n(w, \lambda)$ giving the fraction of the labor force employed (one minus the unemployment rate). Here w is the wage in the sense of the marginal product of labor—the actual compensation paid to workers may differ because of two-part pricing and wage smoothing. λ is the marginal utility of consumption. The second argument arises because of the diminishing marginal rate of substitution between consumption and work. A second function, $h(w, \lambda)$ is the Frisch supply function for hours of work *per employed worker* (not to be confused with hours per person, the variable considered in models that disregard unemployment). I assume that an efficient relationship between worker and employer results in the setting of hours on the basis of the marginal product of labor and show that the assumption results in a reasonable account of the movements of hours per employed worker. For the purposes of studying a transitory alteration in the economy such as countercyclical government purchases, λ can be taken to be roughly constant, so the functions becomes $n(w)$ and $h(w)$. Further, the size of the labor force does not change significantly in response to the forces causing the business cycle, so I can standardize it at one and write the total volume of work effort as $n(w)h(w)$. This object replaces the labor-supply function in a general-equilibrium model.

I take the Frisch elasticity of hours per employed worker—the elasticity of $h(w)$ —to be

0.7, based on research surveyed in the appendix to Hall (2009). This elasticity is a cousin of the compensated elasticity of labor supply and must be non-negative according to the standard theory of household behavior. This elasticity is far below the level needed to explain the observed volatility of total hours of work per person.

The employment function $n(w)$ is not the result of household choice. Rather, as in the Mortensen-Pissarides model, it is determined by the interaction of job-seekers and employers in the labor market. If the marginal product of labor rises and compensation paid to workers does not rise as much (compensation is sticky), then employers put more resources into recruiting workers, the labor market tightens, and unemployment falls. Thus, with sticky compensation, $n(w)$ is an increasing function of the marginal product of labor, w . The stickier compensation, the higher the elasticity. I find that the elasticity is 1.2 (Table 1, page 300). Compensation is quite sticky—under a Nash bargain, the elasticity would be only barely positive.

The elasticity of work effort $n(w)h(w)$ is, accordingly, 1.9. The conclusion of this analysis is that the use of a standard labor-supply specification with a fairly high elasticity, namely 1.9, properly captures both the lower elasticity of the choice of hours by employed workers and the elasticity resulting from sticky compensation in a search and matching setup following Mortensen and Pissarides. For almost 30 years, a chorus of criticism (including, I confess, my voice) fell upon Kydland and Prescott (1982) and the proponents of general-equilibrium macro models with elastic labor supply. Now it turns out that their specification fits neatly into the Mortensen-Pissarides framework with Nash bargaining replaced by some other type of bargaining that results in a sticky level of compensation.

With the Frisch wage elasticity ψ raised to 1.9, the output multiplier becomes 0.8 and the consumption multiplier -0.2 , an important step toward realism.

3.4 Consumption-work complementarity

Though the empirical finding of a somewhat negative consumption multiplier is hardly new—see Hall (1986)—the model considered here so far yields consumption multipliers that are rather more negative than those from empirical studies. One further ingredient, consumption-work complementarity, helps to close the gap. Bilbiie (2009) shows that complementarity cannot turn the consumption multiplier positive in models without a negative response of the markup to increases in output, but can bring it close to zero.

Christiano et al. (2009) discuss the role of complementarity in connection with variable markups and provide a number of cites of earlier treatments of this subject for preferences that assume a particular pattern of complementarity.

In the Frisch framework, as laid out in Hall (2009), complementarity means that the level of goods and services consumption rises when the wage rises, with marginal utility held constant. Equivalently, it means that the marginal utility of consumption rises when an individual moves from non-work to work or when the individual works more hours. I have not found any studies of the cross-effect in a Frisch system or in other representation of preferences. But the subject of the dependence of consumption on work levels, with wealth or marginal utility held constant, has been the subject of an extensive recent literature. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) is a well-known study of the subject. The “retirement consumption puzzle”—the drop in consumption of goods and services upon cessation of work—is resolved nicely by complementarity. A retired person relies more on home production and less on purchases in the market, given the availability of time previously devoted to work. The same point applies to changes in consumption during a spell of unemployment, with the possibly important difference that retirement is more likely to be a planned, expected event than is unemployment. Some of the decline in consumption observed among the unemployed may be the result of imperfect insurance and lack of liquid savings.

Hall and Milgrom (2008) set out a family of preferences with complementarity:

$$\frac{c^{1-1/\sigma}}{1-1/\sigma} - \chi c^{1-1/\sigma} h^{1+1/\psi} - \gamma \frac{h^{1+1/\psi}}{1+1/\psi}. \quad (15)$$

Positive values of the parameter χ introduce an increase in the marginal utility of consumption c that depends on the level of hours of work h (provided, as I assume, $\sigma < 1$). I use the following parameter values: $\sigma = 0.4$, $\psi = 1.54$, $\chi = 0.334$ and $\gamma = 1.1$. The Frisch elasticities for these parameter values are:

- Own-price elasticity of consumption: -0.5
- Wage elasticity of hours of work: 1.9
- Elasticity of consumption with respect to wage: 0.4

See the appendix to Hall (2009) for a discussion of the household-level evidence on the own-price elasticity of consumption and the cross-elasticity. In the latter case, the evidence

relates to the decline in consumption that occurs at retirement or upon unemployment. Hall and Milgrom show how to calculate the cross-elasticity to match the consumption decline.

With the negative of the elasticity of the markup, ω , at 0.5, the output multiplier is 0.97 and the consumption multiplier is -0.03 , figures easily consistent with the empirical evidence.

4 Dynamic model

The output multiplier is relatively high in the static model because of the income effect. In a dynamic version of the model, the analog of the income effect is the wealth effect—when people feel poorer because of current and future government purchases, they work harder. When the program of purchases is transitory, as I assume throughout this paper, the wealth effect can be much smaller than the corresponding static income effect. Put differently, the wealth effect would be comparable to the static income effect if the increase in purchases were permanent, but if the increase is transitory, people will smooth their work effort and consumption. They accomplish the smoothing by investing less. The economy pays for temporary government purchases by cutting investment rather than by increasing output, so the output multiplier is smaller.

4.1 Investment

To incorporate the investment effect, one needs a dynamic model that characterizes the investment process. I will use James Tobin’s now-standard approach, based on the distinction between installed capital and newly produced investment goods. The price of installed capital is q in units of investment goods, which I take to be the same as consumption goods, in a one-sector model. The flow of investment equates the marginal benefit of investment, the price q , to the marginal installation and acquisition cost, which I take to be linear in the flow of investment as a fraction of the earlier capital stock:

$$q_t = \kappa \frac{k_t - k_{t-1}}{k_{t-1}} + 1. \tag{16}$$

The parameter κ measures capital adjustment cost—if $\kappa = 0$, q is always 1 and there are no adjustment costs. If κ is large, most fluctuations in the demand for capital are absorbed by the price of installed capital, q , rather than causing changes in the amount of installed capital. In that case, the decline in investment when government purchases increase will be

small and the earlier analysis of a static economy will yield a fairly accurate estimate of the output and consumption multipliers.

Capital rents for the price

$$b_t = q_{t-1}(r_t + \delta) - \Delta q_t. \quad (17)$$

The interest rate r_t is the net marginal product of capital. Capital demand in period t equals capital supply as determined in the previous period:

$$(1 - \alpha) \frac{y_t}{\mu b_t} = k_{t-1}. \quad (18)$$

At the beginning of a period, the stock of installed capital is k_{t-1} ; people choose hours of work h_t . At the end of the period, output y_t becomes available and is allocated to government purchases g_t , consumption c_t , and investment, including adjustment cost, resulting in the new capital stock, k_t . The law of motion for capital is

$$k_t + \frac{\kappa (k_t - k_{t-1})^2}{2 k_{t-1}} = (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + y_t - c_t - g_t. \quad (19)$$

I continue to consider only a real model and to embody sticky prices in the form that matters for my purposes, the countercyclical markup that a sticky product prices implies.

Worker-consumers order their paths of hours and goods consumption according to the utility function in equation (15). The first-order condition for the optimal mix of consumption and work is:

$$wc^{-1/\sigma} [1 - \chi(1 - 1/\sigma)h^{1+1/\psi}] = h^{1/\psi} [-\chi(1 + 1/\psi)c^{1-1/\sigma} - \gamma]. \quad (20)$$

The economy's discount factor is

$$m_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{c_{t+1}^{-1/\sigma}}{c_t^{-1/\sigma}} \frac{1 - \chi(1 - 1/\sigma)h_{t+1}^{1+1/\psi}}{1 - \chi(1 - 1/\sigma)h_t^{1+1/\psi}}. \quad (21)$$

The Euler equation for consumption is

$$(1 + r_{t+1})m_{t,t+1} = 1. \quad (22)$$

Government purchases decline from an initial level $g + barg$ with a rate of persistence of ϕ :

$$g_t = \bar{g} + g\phi^t. \quad (23)$$

<i>Case</i>	<i>Parameters</i>					
	σ , <i>consumption curvature</i>	ψ , <i>labor supply elasticity</i>	χ , <i>comple- mentarity</i>	γ , <i>labor weight</i>	κ , <i>capital adjust- ment cost</i>	ω , <i>markup response</i>
Base	0.4	1.54	0.334	1.103	8	0.7
Constant markup	0.4	1.54	0.334	1.103	8	0
No adjustment cost	0.4	1.54	0.334	1.103	0	0.7
No complementarity	0.5	1.9	0	1.102	8	0.7
Less elastic labor supply	0.4	0.5	0.334	0.617	8	0.7

Table 3: Parameter Values

Capital at the end of period T is required to be at the economy’s stationary level: $k_T = k^*$. For a reasonably large value of T , the result is very close to the infinite-horizon solution. Variables requiring initial values in period 0 before the government purchases shock are capital k_0 , I use the value $k_0 = k^*$.

I use the solution to the non-stochastic perfect-foresight model as a (close) approximation to the impulse response of a stochastic model to an innovation in government purchases in an AR(1) equation with persistence ϕ . I take $T = 80$ quarters or 20 years but the model has the turnpike property that makes T essentially irrelevant to the results as long as it is more than a decade.

I take the parameter κ that controls capital adjustment cost to be 8 at a quarterly rate, corresponding to 2 at an annual rate, a representative value from the literature on this subject.

Table 3 gives parameter values for the base case and for a number of variants, to illustrate the roles of the various features added to the original neoclassical model. I picked the value of the markup response parameter, $\omega = 0.7$, to yield a reasonable value of the output multiplier. All the other parameters are drawn as described earlier from my review of earlier research.

For the cases described in Table 3, Table 4 shows some of the properties of the dynamic model in terms of the impulse response functions, comparable to those shown earlier for the structural VAR results. The left pair of columns, labeled “Impact”, are the multipliers, defined as the immediate effects of \$1 increased government purchases on output, measured as dollars of real GDP. In the base case, the multipliers are 0.98 for output and -0.03 for

<i>Government purchases impulse responses</i>						
<i>Case</i>	<i>Impact</i>		<i>4 quarters later</i>		<i>8 quarters later</i>	
	<i>Output</i>	<i>Consumption</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Consumption</i>	<i>Output</i>	<i>Consumption</i>
Base	0.98	-0.03	0.68	-0.02	0.48	-0.01
Constant markup	0.60	-0.16	0.41	-0.12	0.28	-0.10
No adjustment cost	0.98	-0.03	0.69	-0.02	0.48	-0.01
No complementarity	0.92	-0.15	0.65	-0.10	0.46	-0.07
Less elastic labor supply	0.40	-0.25	0.24	-0.21	0.13	-0.18

Table 4: Impulse Responses

consumption. After 4 quarters, the effects decline to 0.68 for output and -0.02 for consumption and after 8 quarters, decline even further. Recall that the increase in government purchases declines at a 30-percent annual rate, so much of the decline in the response is the direct result of the decline in the stimulus from the extra purchases.

Eliminating the New Keynesian property of a markup ratio that declines with output and replacing it with a constant markup of zero (dropping ω from 0.7 to 0) alters the responses dramatically. The impact multipliers become 0.60 for output and -0.16 for consumption, both low relative to the earlier evidence. Again these become even smaller as the impulse dies out in 4 and 8 quarters.

On the other hand, removing adjustment costs for capital formation has essentially no effect. The reason is simple. If the output multiplier is about one and the consumption multiplier is zero, the effect of government purchases on investment must be about zero (here the closed economy assumption is important). To put it differently, one effect of the government purchases is to drive up the real interest rate and inhibit investment. The second effect is the accelerator—investment increases because businesses add capacity to serve the demand for more output. In the base case, the two effects offset each other. Because nothing happens to investment when government purchases increase, adjustment costs are irrelevant to their effect on other variables.

The fourth line of Table 4 shows that dropping complementarity of work and consumption has a small downward effect on the output response and a larger downward effect on the consumption response, pushing it into unrealistic territory. Thus complementarity—a feature

of household production and preferences well supported by recent research—helps to make the model’s properties fit the data.

The bottom line of the table shows the overwhelming importance of elastic labor supply (including the large part of the elasticity arising from unemployment) in bringing the model into agreement with the data. Without labor elasticity, all the other features of the model, including the price stickiness that accounts for the variable markup, leaves its output response at about a third of the realistic value and its consumption response deeply negative. Although I favor modeling the elastic response with a labor supply function, the New Keynesian literature (not to mention its other Keynesian predecessors) speaks of the same response as wage stickiness. Some of this distinction is only one of vocabulary, but I will show later that a sticky wage does not result in as realistic a model as does elastic labor supply.

5 Other Issues

5.1 Is an analysis without consideration of the price level appropriate?

In most modern macro models, including all of the ones discussed later in Section 8, the central bank intervenes in the economy to stabilize the price level or rate of inflation. Consequently, the bank’s policy rule is part of the model and the government purchases multipliers depend on the rule. The more draconian the response to inflation, the lower the multipliers. The analysis in this paper does not ignore this point, but puts it in the background—the central bank’s policy rule is one of the determinants of the elasticity ω of the markup of price over cost.

To explore the relation between the standard New Keynesian model and the reduced-form approach taken in this paper, based on the negative response of the markup ratio to output, I created a version of the New Keynesian model embodying all the same features and parameters as the benchmark model just discussed, altered to include the Calvo (1983) sticky-price specification, with a parameter θ , the quarterly probability that a price remains fixed, and an elasticity of demand of $\epsilon = 5$ facing each producer whose price is sticky. The model also includes a standard Taylor Rule governing the path of the price level in relation to the interest rate. The online appendix to this paper gives a full description and code for the model.

In the New Keynesian model, the sticky price is the fundamental source of variations in

<i>Price persistence, θ</i>	<i>Output multiplier</i>	<i>Consumption multiplier</i>	<i>Elasticity of markup ratio, ω</i>
0.60	0.60	-0.21	0.06
0.70	0.62	-0.20	0.13
0.80	0.68	-0.18	0.29
0.89	0.95	-0.07	0.75
0.90	1.02	-0.04	0.84
0.95	1.60	0.20	1.24

Table 5: Price Persistence, Multipliers, and Markup Elasticity in the New Keynesian Model

the markup of price over cost—variations in the markup occur when firms are hit by demand surprises that raise marginal cost during the time when the price is fixed. Marginal cost rises because firms move up their short-run marginal cost functions and because the wage rises. Many New Keynesian models invoke sticky wages as well as sticky prices, but I continue to rely on a high wage elasticity to explain larger movements in employment in the face of small changes in wages.

Table 5 reports the multipliers corresponding to varying degrees of price stickiness, as controlled by the parameter θ , the probability that a price remains fixed in a given quarter. A value of θ between 0.8 and 0.9 delivers an output multiplier in the range just below one and a consumption multiplier only barely negative. The implied frequency of price change is between 20 percent and 10 percent per quarter. Christiano et al. (2009) take θ to be 0.85.

I conclude that the reduced-form approach taken in this paper, based on a negative elasticity of the markup ratio with respect to output, provides a reasonable basis for inferring the effects of changes in government purchases on output and consumption. From the perspective of the issues studied in this paper, it is not necessary to take separate stands on the various ingredients of a nominal model, including the frequency of price adjustment and the response of the central bank. What matters is the reduction in the markup when output expands. The model here is compatible with any explanation for that negative relation, including those that do not depend on sticky prices, such as Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).

5.2 The importance of the state of the economy

The output and consumption multipliers are derivatives of two endogenous variables with respect to an exogenous shock. They are not fundamental structural parameters of the economy, invariant to the state of the economy. Quite the contrary, the multipliers are themselves endogenous. The state of the economy in 2009 is a perfect example. With extreme slack in the economy and the federal funds rate at essentially zero, there are good reasons to believe that the government purchases multipliers are higher than in normal times.

Christiano et al. (2009) find that the government-purchases multiplier in a New Keynesian model becomes large when an economy hits the zero nominal interest bound. In a model with an output multiplier of 0.9 in normal times, the multiplier rises to 3.9 when the nominal interest rate hits the lower bound of zero and the central bank loses the ability to stimulate the economy to avoid deflation.

In the simple New Keynesian model of the previous section, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule that increases the nominal interest rate by 1.5 percentage points for each percent of inflation. At the zero bound, the coefficient becomes zero. The output multiplier rises from 0.95 to 1.72 and the consumption multiplier from -0.07 to 0.26.

5.3 The wealth effect

Much of the modern literature on multipliers takes the key difference between neoclassical (RBC) models and traditional models to be a wealth effect on consumption. Galí et al. (2007) (page 228, footnotes omitted) provides a clear statement of the standard view of the difference between the two models:

The standard RBC and the textbook IS-LM models provide a stark example of such differential qualitative predictions. The standard RBC model generally predicts a decline in consumption in response to a rise in government purchases of goods and services (henceforth, government spending, for short). In contrast, the IS-LM model predicts that consumption should rise, hence amplifying the effects of the expansion in government spending on output. Of course, the reason for the differential impact across those two models lies in how consumers are assumed to behave in each case. The RBC model features infinitely-lived Ricardian households, whose consumption decisions at any point in time are based on

an intertemporal budget constraint. *Ceteris paribus*, an increase in government spending lowers the present value of after-tax income, thus generating a negative wealth effect that induces a cut in consumption. By way of contrast, in the IS-LM model consumers behave in a non-Ricardian fashion, with their consumption being a function of their current disposable income and not of their lifetime resources. Accordingly, the implied effect of an increase in government spending will depend critically on how the latter is financed, with the multiplier increasing with the extent of deficit financing.

A related issue is that some critics of the use of temporary increases in government purchases have argued that their effect is blunted by the public's expectation of higher future taxes. The model says the opposite—the expectation of higher future taxes lowers wealth, stimulates work effort, and discourages consumption. The output multiplier is higher and the consumption multiplier is more negative in a model with the wealth effect than without. Other critics believe that the public is unaware of the future burden of higher government purchases and are skeptical of stimulus estimates that include the wealth effect. To evaluate this issue, I examined the response of the model with elastic labor supply and an elasticity of the markup with respect to output, ω , of 0.6 to an immediate increase in purchases followed by a decline at a rate of 30 percent per year. This model embodies the wealth effect. I compared the multipliers in that model to those in an otherwise identical model in which the increase in immediate purchases was paid back, so to speak, by a decrease in purchases at the end of the solution period with the same present value. Recall that the immediate increase is g , the persistence rate is ϕ , and the economy's discount factor is β . The repayment in the last period is

$$\left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)^T \frac{g}{1 - \beta\phi}. \quad (24)$$

This alteration in the model lowers the output multiplier by 0.022 and makes the consumption multiplier 0.001 points more negative. These changes are in the expected direction but are trivial in magnitude. I conclude that it hardly matters whether the public anticipates future taxes needed to finance a temporary increase in government purchases. Ricardian neutrality is irrelevant in this respect.

This calculation also demonstrates the unimportance of the wealth effect for *temporary* increases in government purchases. The standard view, quoted above, applies to permanent increases but not to the type of temporary increase that occurs in a countercyclical stimulus.

6 Sticky wage

The results in the paper so far rely on what I have called “equilibrium sticky wages” Hall (2005). The wage and volume of work is an equilibrium in the bargain between worker and employer, but because the wage does not respond much to labor demand, when demand is strong, employers find it desirable to recruit more aggressively and these efforts tighten the labor market and reduce unemployment. An earlier view of wage stickiness rejects the equilibrium concept and supposes that the wage can be sticky in the sense of preventing a worker-employer pair from achieving bilateral efficiency. Hall (2009) argues that the disequilibrium sticky-wage view is unnecessary to an understanding of employment fluctuations—equilibrium stickiness is enough. Here, on the contrary, I explore briefly the implications of an extreme form of disequilibrium sticky wages, a fixed real wage. For a discussion of the details of a different and less extreme form in New Keynesian models based on Calvo wage-setting, see Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2009).

This version of the model differs from the earlier version in that the consumption-work effort condition of equation (20) no longer holds and the wage w is now fixed at its stationary value for the baseline level of government purchases. The effect is to make labor supply infinitely elastic at the fixed wage, rather than fairly elastic around a wage determined by wealth.

The fixed-wage model implies that *the output and consumption multipliers are exactly zero*. Absent the markup response, this proposition follows directly from the observation that firms hire up to the point that the marginal revenue product of capital equals the wage. The response of the markup does not alter this proposition. Putting the markup response into the profit-maximization condition for the firm’s choice of labor input and restating in terms of labor input h_1 and capital k_0 yields what I call the extended labor demand function:

$$h_1 = \left[\alpha k_0^{(1-\alpha)(1+\omega)} \frac{1}{w} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha(1+\omega)}}. \quad (25)$$

With k_0 at its historical, pre-shock level, the only potentially endogenous variable here is the wage. If it is fixed, labor input in the first post-shock period is also fixed, and so output and consumption are fixed.

By contrast, in the baseline model of this paper, where the wage is endogenous, a change in the wage can alter the levels of employment and output. Now comes the surprise—the labor demand function extended to include the markup response, in the above equation,




Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions for the Fixed-Wage Model and the Baseline Model with Elastic Labor Supply

slopes upward!. In the base case, $\alpha = 0.7$ and $\omega = 0.7$, so $1 - \alpha(1 + \omega) = -0.19$ and the exponent on the wage in the extended labor demand is more than 5. The baseline model gets its brisk response of employment and output from a small wage *increase* that stimulates both demand and supply.

In the fixed-wage case, a high response does emerge once time goes by and the capital stock expands, thus increasing labor demand. Figure 2 compares the impulse response functions for the fixed-wage and baseline models. The fixed-wage response builds slowly for an extended period. Output remains high even 15 years after the shock in government purchases, many, many years after purchases have returned to normal.

7 Departures from the Life-Cycle Model of Consumption

One of Keynes’s contributions to macro theory was the consumption function, where current consumption depends mainly on current income. As the life-cycle model became the standard framework for thinking about consumption behavior, researchers developed hybrid models in which some households have full access to capital markets, so they smooth consumption

according to the life-cycle principle, while others—those who would borrow if they could—are constrained to consume current income. Despite a quarter of a century of research in this framework, substantial disagreement prevails about the fraction of consumption governed by the life-cycle model. Note that the issue is the fraction of consumption, not the fraction of consumers. Given that more prosperous households are surely less likely to be constrained, the fraction of constrained consumption is less than the fraction of constrained consumers.

To the extent that the factual premise of this paper holds—that the output response to government purchases is robust and close to dollar for dollar, whereas the consumption response is essentially zero—the idea that consumption responds mainly to current income is completely unsupported. The reason is that the ratio of the consumption response to the output response is the perfect instrumental variables estimator of the marginal propensity to consume if a simple consumption function links output (income) and consumption. If one took the evidence in Table 1 seriously, the marginal propensity to consume is slightly negative and estimated with precision, provided at least the Korean war is included in the sample. Obviously a negative MPC is profoundly inconsistent with the idea of a consumption function, so the appropriate conclusion is that important forces other than current income determine consumption, such as the forces implicit in the life-cycle model. Despite the problems with inference based on the behavior of consumption during wars, I think the hypothesis that current income has a large effect on consumption faces an uphill battle with the data.

7.1 Consumption constraints in a general equilibrium model

The standard view of the government purchases multiplier—as expressed, for example, in the quote from Galí and co-authors in the previous section—is that a Keynesian consumption function delivers fairly high multipliers.

If the consumption function reflects borrowing constraints for the unemployed, some alteration of the labor-supply part of the earlier model is needed—the notion of a constraint takes labor income as exogenous, not partly the choice of the worker. The development of a full model with heterogeneous households, some facing more limited choices than discussed earlier, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will pair the consumption function with another assumption of many Keynesian models, that of wage rigidity, as discussed in the previous section. Employers choose total hours of work, h , to equate the marginal revenue

product of labor to the prescribed wage. I drop both the consumption Euler equation (22) and the first-order condition for labor supply, equation (20) and replace them with a Solow-style consumption function,

$$c_t = (1 - s)y_t \tag{26}$$

and the earlier assumption that the wage is a constant, \bar{w} . For consistency with the other results in this paper, I choose the saving rate s to be its stationary value in the neoclassical model, just under 0.2. Note that this is the saving rate out of gross output and includes depreciation, which is why it exceeds normal ideas about net saving out of income net of depreciation.

The relevant equations from the earlier model are the equation for employment conditional on the wage w , equation (25), evaluated at $w = \bar{w}$, and the law of motion of the capital stock,

$$k_t + \frac{\kappa (k_t - k_{t-1})^2}{2 k_{t-1}} = (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + y_t - c_t - g_t. \tag{27}$$

The model behaves as a Solow growth model, converging to stationary values of output, capital, and consumption, which I take to equal their values in the baseline model.

Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions for the consumption-function model. Because the model embodies a fixed wage, the immediate response of output and consumption is zero. The responses build over time, but are not as strong as in the case of a fixed wage as shown in Figure 2. Not surprisingly, the simple consumption function delivers a distinctly positive consumption multiplier, not far below the output multiplier. The intertemporal substitution response that depresses consumption in the model with life-cycle consumption is absent.

The relation between this model and the simple expenditure model of the purchases multiplier is easy to explain. The simple expenditure model takes investment as exogenous. Letting i denote investment and neglecting time subscripts,

$$y = \frac{i + g}{s}, \tag{28}$$

the standard expenditure solution with multiplier $m_y = 1/s$. But this model makes investment endogenous—it declines when output rises. Government purchases crowd out investment in the consumption-function model. Because consumption has to rise by more than 80 percent of the increase in output, crowding out is severe in the presence of a consumption function.




Figure 3: Impulse Responses for the Fixed-Wage Model with Consumption Proportional to Output

A number of investigations of the role of partial borrowing constraints, discussed in the next section, suggest that they can increase the output multiplier under conditions different from the model studied here, which is extreme. This model takes wages as fixed for 20 years and it assumes that all consumption is tied to current income, contrary to the conclusions of the literature on borrowing constraints.

8 Multipliers Inferred from New Keynesian Structural Models

The term *New Keynesian* refers to the class of models combining a full treatment of the production side of the economy, life-cycle consumption behavior, sticky wages, and markup ratios that respond negatively to output increases because of sticky prices. Another name often used for the class is dynamic stochastic general equilibrium or DSGE models. These models are widely used in recent macroeconomic research, especially at central banks. Although the characterization of the effects of monetary policy has been the main use of New Keynesian models, four studies have examined responses to government purchases.

Galí et al. (2007) consider a fairly standard New Keynesian model, with one non-standard element: a fraction of consumers λ simply consume all their labor income rather than follow the life-cycle principle. Although they also consider a competitive labor market with a flexible wage, I will discuss only their results for a sticky wage, for the reasons discussed earlier in this paper—a sticky wage appears to be essential to generate meaningfully positive government purchases multipliers. Their results confirm this proposition. In their baseline model, they take the quarterly persistence of the effect of the government purchases shock to be 0.9, about the same as the annual persistence of 0.7 that I used earlier. At their preferred value of the fraction of consumption subject to rule-of-thumb behavior, $\lambda = 0.5$, the output multiplier on impact is 1.9 and the consumption multiplier is 1.0 (Figure 3, page 250). With life-cycle consumption behavior, $\lambda = 0$, the output multiplier is 0.75 and the consumption multiplier is slightly negative. Intermediate values of $\lambda = 0$ come close to matching the consumption multipliers found in the VARs reviewed earlier in this paper.

López-Salido and Rabanal (2006) find similar results in a model based on a leading New Keynesian model, that of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). With some consumption governed only by current income and the remainder by the life-cycle principle, the impact output multiplier is just above two and the consumption multiplier just below two (Figure 1, page 19). With the standard New Keynesian specification where all consumption follows the life-cycle principle, the output multiplier is 1.0 and the consumption multiplier is slightly negative.

Coenen and Straub (2005) study the Smets and Wouters (2003) New Keynesian model, an outgrowth of the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans model. They consider the original model and one altered so that about a quarter of consumption tracks current income rather than following the life-cycle principle. For the original model, the consumption multiplier is -0.14 on impact and the output multiplier for government purchases is 0.68 (one plus the consumption multiplier of -0.14 plus the investment multiplier of -0.18) (Figure 1, page 457). With an estimate that about a quarter of consumption is constrained, the consumption multiplier is -0.05 on impact and the output multiplier for government purchases is 0.77 (one plus the consumption multiplier of -0.05 plus the investment multiplier of -0.18).

Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009) also use the Smets-Wouters New Keynesian model to measure the output multiplier. The model assumes that all consumption follows the life-cycle principle. For the transitory burst of government purchases in the February

2009 stimulus bill, they find an output multiplier of about 0.6 (Figure 2, p. 12).

The four papers make similar assumptions about the single most important feature of a model with respect to multipliers, the response of the markup ratio to increases in output. The first two illustrate the importance of the controversial issue of the fraction of consumption governed by the life-cycle principle. Absent a substantial departure from the life-cycle principle, the models agree that the output multiplier is between 0.6 and 1.0 and that the consumption multiplier is around zero, values consistent with the regression and VAR evidence.

9 Negative Response of the Markup Ratio to Output

Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) provide a complete discussion as of a decade ago of the many empirical and theoretical issues relating to variations in the markup ratio.

9.1 Earlier research on cyclical changes in the markup

Research on variations in the price/marginal cost markup falls into two categories: (1) models where alteration in competition are a driving force of the business cycle or are part of a driving force, and (2) models where markups fall passively when output expands, because product prices are sticky but some elements of cost are not. For the purposes of understanding the effects of fiscal policy, the issue is the markup, not price stickiness itself. Thus both strands of research are relevant to the issue of the output multiplier for government purchases. One easy way to tell the two strands apart is to see if sticky prices are derived, as in case (1), or assumed, as in case (2). From the perspective of the fiscal issue, it does not seem to matter which way the model gets to the property of a countercyclical markup. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), page 1112-1129, survey this literature thoroughly.

9.2 Theoretical models with countercyclical markup

Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) launched the modern literature on the relation between competition and economic activity. The starting point is a model of oligopoly in which a collusive high price is an equilibrium because rivals will revert to competition to punish a deviator who tries to capture a large volume of sales by beating its rivals' price for one period. The potential deviator compares the immediate profit in one period with the present value of its share of the collusive profit. Deviation is more likely when demand is temporarily strong, so

the immediate profit exceeds the present value. Some episodes in oligopolies seem to fit the model.

Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) carried on the idea of a declining markup in a boom in a general-equilibrium setting. Since the publication of their well-known paper, it has been understood that a countercyclical markup was an important ingredient in models that take demand fluctuations as a driving force.

Kimball (1995) provides an extensive discussion of the role of markup variation in a sticky-price New Keynesian setting.

Bils (1989) developed a model of countercyclical markups based on customer loyalty. In an expanding economy where customers are seeking suppliers of products they have not previously consumed, sellers compete aggressively and customers enjoy low prices. Markups are low. In a slump, customers buy from their established suppliers and do not look for suppliers of new goods. Sellers respond by setting higher prices to reflect the less elastic demand of their customer bases.

Edmond and Veldkamp (2009) consider the effect of changes in the distribution of income over the business cycle. They conclude that booms are periods when income shifts toward lower-income, higher-elasticity consumers, so that the optimal markups of sellers fall. To the extent that increases in government purchases compress the distribution income in the same way as other driving forces, this mechanism would support the assumption in this paper about the negative relation between output and markups.

9.3 Empirical research on the cyclical movements of the markup ratio

If the markup ratio falls in booms and rises in recessions, the share of income captured by labor should rise in booms and fall in recessions, given that the markup adds to the income of business owners. In other words, labor's share should be procyclical. To formalize this idea, note that marginal cost is

$$\frac{w}{\partial Y / \partial L}, \tag{29}$$

where w is the wage, Y is output, and L is labor input. This relationship comes from the envelope theorem property that a firm minimizing cost is indifferent among increases in any

of its inputs. Then the markup ratio, μ , is

$$\mu = \frac{p}{\frac{w}{\partial Y / \partial L}} \tag{30}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{pY}{wL} \frac{L}{Y} \frac{\partial Y}{\partial L} \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{s}, \end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

where α is the elasticity of output with respect to labor input and s is the share of labor compensation wL in total revenue pY . If the elasticity α is constant—the Cobb-Douglas production function—the intuition about the relation between labor’s share and the markup is confirmed: a countercyclical markup requires a procyclical labor share.

To check this proposition against U.S. data, I create two series from BLS data. One is the reciprocal of the BLS index of labor’s share (BLS series PRS84006173), which I call the Cobb-Douglas index of the markup ratio. The other is the employment rate, 100 minus the standard unemployment rate (BLS series LNS14000000). According to the simplest version of the countercyclical markup hypothesis, the markup index should move in the opposite direction from the employment rate—as employment grows in a boom, the markup index should decline.

Figure 4 shows the two series. Though their relation is far from systematic, it is clear that they tend to move in the same direction—booms are times when the markup index rises along with employment and recessions are times when the markup index falls with employment. To put it differently, business owners’ share of income does not fall in booms, on account of lower markups, but rather their share rises. The two most recent expansions are the leading examples of declining labor and rising business shares; the markup index reached an all-time high at the most recent cycle peak at the end of 2007.

Figure 4 is only a first cut at testing the countercyclical markup hypothesis. Research has focused on two factors omitted from the figure. One is the measurement of the share. In the numerator of the share, wL , the appropriate measure of the wage is the marginal cost to the firm of adding another hour of work. If the incremental hour are more expensive than the average hour, the use of the average wage in the numerator will understate the true value of labor’s share. If the understatement were the same in booms and slumps, it would not affect the conclusion of the figure. But if the incidence of higher marginal wages is greater in booms than in slumps, the properly calculated share would be less countercyclical than the one based on the average wage and the Cobb-Douglas index would be less procyclical or it




Figure 4: Cobb-Douglas Index of Markup Ratio and Employment Rate, 1948-2009

might even be countercyclical, as the hypothesis requires. *Bils (1987)* pursued this approach.

The second factor omitted from the figure is variation in the elasticity of the production function, α . If the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than one, the elasticity falls if the labor/capital ratio rises—low substitution means that production saturates in one input if that input rises relative to another. The markup ratio is the elasticity divided by the share. If the elasticity falls more than in proportion to the share as the economy expands, the true markup ratio could fall even though the Cobb-Douglas index of the markup ratio rises. *Nekarda and Ramey (2009)* pursue this approach. They conclude that the variation in the labor elasticity of the production function with an elasticity of substitution of one-half is insufficient to deliver a countercyclical markup ratio.

Bils (1987) estimated the cyclical movements in the markup ratio by estimating the changes in the marginal cost of labor and applying the envelope theorem to infer changes in the marginal cost of output. He found that a larger fraction of workers are subject to the 50-percent overtime premium requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act in booms than in recessions. Given that employers could have avoided the increase in the marginal cost of labor by using more of other factors, but did not, he inferred a corresponding increase in the marginal cost of output. Then he found that prices are not as cyclical as marginal cost, leading to the inference that the markup of price over marginal cost must shrink in booms

and widen in recessions. Nekarda and Ramey (2009) revisit Bils's findings in much the same framework, but with new, broader data and sufficient alterations to reverse the finding in favor of procyclical markup ratios. They discuss evidence that the effective overtime premium is not the statutory 50 percent that Bils used, but rather may be 25 percent. They also question the definition of the business cycle that Bils employed. Extension from manufacturing to the entire economy appears to be the most important factor distinguishing their work from Bils's.

The framework in Bils's and Nekarda-Ramey's work is robust in a number of important ways. First, it makes no assumptions about the supply of capital services. The results apply with any type or magnitude of capital adjustment costs and variable utilization of installed capital—see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), page 1079. Second, it applies for any type of pricing, including customer pricing where the choice of the price depends on complicated intertemporal factors. The price is taken as data. Customer pricing should be visible in the data as higher profits and lower labor shares in slack markets, when firms are exploiting their installed bases. Firms should forego profit in strong markets, when it pays to set low prices to sign up new customers who will remain loyal when conditions weaken.

One important factor bearing on the measurement of cyclical fluctuations in markup ratios has escaped empirical consideration so far, to my knowledge. Employers may smooth wage payments to their workers, rather than paying a wage equal to current marginal revenue product, as assumed in the research on the cyclical behavior of the wage share. Thomas and Worrall (1988) is a representative model where employers insure workers against some of the idiosyncratic risk of working for a particular firm. In their model, the wage payment remains constant as long as it remains within the bargaining set of the worker and the firm. For employment relationships with substantial match-specific capital, the wage can remain constant despite large changes in demand for the firm's products. The result is a substantial bias in favor of a countercyclical labor share and thus procyclical markup ratio. Although this issue is well understood, no good solution has appeared so far.

Pissarides (2009), surveys the literature on wage flexibility and finds a strong consensus that the wages of newly hired workers are more sensitive to the business cycle than are the wages of continuing workers. This finding supports the hypothesis of wage smoothing.

I conclude that the cyclical behavior of the labor share does not provide direct support for the hypothesis of a countercyclical markup ratio. The simple Cobb-Douglas markup

ratio derived from the labor share is distinctly procyclical. Attempts to adjust it through improved measurement of the marginal wage and through consideration of fluctuations in the labor elasticity of the production function do not seem to deliver big enough adjustments to overcome the procyclical character of the simple measure. In the absence of effective adjustments for wage smoothing, however, I believe the hypothesis of a countercyclical markup ratio is still an open issue.

9.4 Indirect evidence on the cyclical behavior of the markup ratio

Bils and Kahn (2000) use inventory movements to shed light on the cyclical movements of marginal cost. Earlier research, based on a fixed target ratio of inventories to sales, had concluded that pro-cyclical inventory investment showed that marginal cost falls in booms, else firms would schedule the investment during times when production was cheap, in times of low output. The paper demonstrates that the movements of marginal cost cannot be big enough to induce such rescheduling of production. It goes on to show that countercyclical markups do alter inventory holding cost enough over the cycle to explain the movements of inventories if the target inventory/sales ratio is itself sensitive to the holding cost, given an extreme assumption about the cost of labor. The assumption is that all of the procyclical movement of measured productivity is actually variation in work effort. Under this assumption, labor becomes cheap in booms of the type that last occurred in the early 1980s, in the recovery following the recession of 1981-82. Not only is that assumption extreme, it is unverifiable. In any case it fails to account for the events of the following three business cycles, when productivity rose during recessions. It strains credulity that people were working harder than usual in the troughs of 1991, 2001, and today.

Research on the response of prices to cost increases has some bearing on the behavior of the markup ratio. To the extent that prices remain fixed when costs rise, the markup ratio falls. As I noted earlier, models incorporating the popular Calvo price-stickiness mechanism have this property. Bils and Chang (2000) studied highly disaggregated prices. They found stronger responses of prices to materials and fuel costs than to wages, productivity, and output (taken as a measure of the position of the firm on its marginal cost schedule). The weaker response to wages is consistent with wage smoothing, which introduces an error of measurement. The quick response to certain categories of cost is inconsistent with the Calvo model. Bils and Chang favor theories of price stickiness based on modern limit pricing

models, where firms deter entry of rivals by depressing the profits available to entrants.

10 Application to the Government Purchases Stimulus of 2009

The stimulus measure passed in February 2009 included increases in federal purchases of goods and services. The top row of Table 6 gives the CBO's estimates for likely purchases under the measure by fiscal year (October through September). The second row restates the figures by calendar year, with equal spending within fiscal year by quarter. The third row gives rough estimates of GDP for the three years 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the fourth row states the stimulus purchases as percents of GDP. The fifth line shows the results of inserting the fourth row into the model with the preferred parameter values—these are the base-case values in Table 3 but with the markup-response parameter ω at the value of 1.29 to match the response in the New Keynesian model at the constant nominal interest rate of zero that prevailed when the policy was adopted in February 2009. I substitute the fourth row into the model in place of the exponentially declining pattern used in the earlier runs of the model. This line shows the powerful anticipation effects in the model, based on the assumption that, as of the beginning of 2009, decision makers believed that purchases of the magnitude shown in the table would materialize in the three years. The purchases stimulus raised GDP in 2009 by 1.10 percent, with further effects of 1.28 percent in 2010 and 0.70 percent in 2011. The model disputes the common view that the long ramp-up in purchases will delay the effects of the stimulus until long after they would be most beneficial. Rather, announcing future purchases delivers immediate stimulus. Back-loading is a desirable feature of a stimulus program. All this according to a simple model that overlooks many potentially important features of the economy. The calculations also rest critically on the projection that the stimulus purchases will ramp down in 2011 and end in 2012, a proposition under dispute.

The bottom two rows of Table 6 show the effects of an alternative front-loaded time pattern of stimulus purchases. I assume, as in the earlier runs of the model, that a burst of new purchases dies off at 30 percent per year, rather than rising in the second year. Unlike the earlier runs, here the purchases go to zero in the fourth year, to make the policy more comparable to the three-year horizon of the stimulus measure of February 2009. I standardize the front-loaded policy to have the same total amount of purchases over the

	2009	2010	2011	Sum
Stimulus purchases, fiscal year	34.8	110.7	76.3	221.8
Stimulus purchases, calendar year	62.5	102.1	57.2	221.8
GDP	13,700	14,043	14,604	
Stimulus as a percent of GDP	0.46	0.73	0.39	1.57
Effect on GDP, percent	1.10	1.28	0.70	3.08
Front-loaded stimulus as a percent of GDP	0.71	0.50	0.35	1.56
Effect on GDP, percent	1.35	0.94	0.62	2.90

Table 6: Effects of Stimulus Measure of February 2009 and of an Alternative Front-Loaded Measure with Equal Total Purchases

three years. The effect in 2009 is somewhat larger in the front-loaded case compared to the actual back-loaded policy, but the sum of the effects on GDP of the front-loaded policy is smaller than the sum for the actual policy. The model suggests that the much criticized slow ramp-up of the stimulus was actually beneficial.

Table 6 makes it clear that the purchases component of the stimulus package passed in February 2009 could not possibly have closed much of the shortfall of GDP from normal levels. The shortfall is around \$1.2 trillion for 2009. There is no conceivable multiplier that could permit \$62.5 billion of added purchases to close much of a gap of that magnitude.

11 Concluding Remarks

I am persuaded that GDP rises by roughly the amount of an increase in government purchases and possibly rather more when monetary policy is passive because of the zero bound. I am aware that neoclassical models have no hope of explaining such a high multiplier, even if extended to include unemployment along the lines discussed in this paper. I am impressed by the success of New Keynesian models in matching the observed multiplier, for the following reason: The models were developed for rather different purposes and estimated using data containing essentially no variation in government purchases.

Notwithstanding this success, I am concerned about the weak factual support for the key mechanism underlying the New Keynesian explanation of the multiplier, the decline in the markup ratio that accompanies an increase in output. The behavior of profit margins suggests on its face that the markup ratio *rises* with output. The only plausible way for falling markups to fit the data is a lot of wage smoothing. I think there is room for new ideas outside the New Keynesian framework to explain the high value of the multiplier along with other mysteries about aggregate economic behavior.

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