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The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks. Why are the 2000s So Different from the 1970s?
Olivier J. Blanchard and Jordi Gali
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ABSTRACT

We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.

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Introduction

Since the 1970s, and at least until recently, macroeconomists have viewed changes in the price of oil as an important source of economic fluctuations, as well as a paradigm of a global shock, likely to affect many economies simultaneously. Such a perception is largely due to the two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, and high inflation that characterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s. Conventional accounts of those episodes of stagflation blame them on the large increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and the Iranian revolution of 1979, respectively.\footnote{Most undergraduate textbooks make an unambiguous connection between the two oil price hikes of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 and the period of stagflation that ensued. See e.g. Mankiw (2007, p. 274).}

The events of the past decade, however, seem to call into question the relevance of oil price changes as a significant source of economic fluctuations. The reason: Since the late 1990s, the global economy has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s but, in contrast with the latter episodes, GDP growth and inflation have remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world.

Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the nature of the apparent changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks, as well as on some of its possible causes. Disentangling the factors behind those changes is obviously key to assessing the extent to which the episodes of stagflation of the 1970s can reoccur in response to future oils shocks and, if so, to understanding the role that monetary policy can play in order to mitigate their adverse effects.

One plausible hypothesis is that the effects of the increase in the price of oil proper have been similar across episodes, but have coincided in time with large shocks of a very different nature (e.g. large rises in other commodity prices in the 1970s, high productivity growth and world demand in the 2000s). That coincidence could significantly distort any assessment of the
impact of oil shocks based on a simple observation of the movements in aggregate variables around each episode.

In order to evaluate this hypothesis one must isolate the component of macroeconomic fluctuations associated with exogenous changes in the price of oil. To do so, we identify and estimate the effects of an oil price shock using structural VAR techniques. We report and compare estimates for different sample periods and discuss how they have changed over time. We follow two alternative approaches. The first one is based on a large VAR, and allows for a break in the sample in the mid 1980s. The second approach is based on rolling bivariate VARs, including the price of oil and one other variable at a time. The latter approach allows for a gradual change in the estimated effects of oil price shocks, without imposing a discrete break in a single period.

Two conclusions clearly emerge from this analysis: First, there were indeed other adverse shocks at work in the 1970s; the price of oil explains only part of the stagflation episodes of the 1970s. Second, and importantly, the effects of a given change in the price of oil have changed substantially over time. Our estimates point to much larger effects of oil price shocks on inflation and activity in the early part of the sample, i.e. the one that includes the two oil shock episodes of the 1970s.

Our basic empirical findings are summarized graphically in Figure 1 (we postpone a description of the underlying assumptions to Section 3). The left-hand graph shows the responses of U.S. (log) GDP and the (log) CPI to a 10 percent increase in the price of oil, estimated using pre-1984 data. The right-hand graph displays the corresponding responses, based on post-1984 data. As the Figure makes clear, the response of both variables has become more muted in the more recent period. As we show below, that pattern can also be observed for other variables (prices and quantities) and many (though not all) other countries considered. In sum, the evidence suggests that economies face an improved trade-off in the more recent period, in the
face of oil price shocks of a similar magnitude.

We then focus on the potential explanations for these changes over time. We consider three hypotheses, not mutually exclusive:

First, real wage rigidities may have decreased over time. The presence of real wage rigidities generates a tradeoff between stabilization of inflation and stabilization of the output gap. As a result, and in response to an adverse supply shock and for a given money rule, inflation will generally rise more and output will decline more, the slower real wages adjust. A trend towards more flexible labor markets, including more flexible wages, could thus explain the smaller impact of the more recent oil shocks.

Second, changes in the way monetary policy is conducted may be responsi-
ble for the differential response of the economy to the oil shocks. In particular, the stronger commitment by central banks to maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation, reflected in the widespread adoption of more or less explicit inflation targeting strategies, may have led to an improvement in the policy tradeoff that make it possible to have a smaller impact of a given oil price increase on both inflation and output simultaneously.

Third, the share of oil in the economy may have declined sufficiently since the 1970s to account for the decrease in the effects of its price changes. Under that hypothesis, changes in the price of oil have increasingly turned into a sideshow, with no significant macroeconomic effects (not unlike fluctuations in the price of caviar).

To assess the merits of the different hypotheses we proceed in two steps. First, we develop a simple version of the new-Keynesian model where (imported) oil is both consumed by households and used as a production input by firms. The model allows us to examine how the economy’s response to an exogenous change in the price of oil is affected by the degree of real wage rigidities, the nature and credibility of monetary policy, and the share of oil in production and consumption. We then look for more direct evidence pointing to the relevance and quantitative importance of each of those hypotheses. We conclude that all three are likely to have played an important role in explaining the different effects of oil prices during the 1970s and during the last decade.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a short summary of how our paper fits in the literature. Section 2 presents basic facts. Section 3 presents results from multivariate VARs. Section 4 presents results from rolling bivariate VARs. Section 5 presents the model. Section 6 uses the model to analyze the role of real rigidities, credibility in monetary policy, and the oil share. Section 7 concludes.
1 Relation to the Literature

Our paper is related to many strands of research.

The first strand is concerned with the effects of oil price shocks on the economy. The seminal work in that literature is Bruno and Sachs (1985), who were the first to analyze in depth the effects of oil prices of the 1970s on output and inflation in the major industrialized countries. They explored many of the themes of our paper, the role of other shocks, the role of monetary policy, and the role of wage setting.

On the empirical side, Hamilton showed in a series of contributions (see, in particular, Hamilton (1983, 1996)) that most of U.S. recessions were preceded by increases in the price of oil, suggesting an essential role for oil price increases as one of the main cause of recessions. The stability of this relation has been challenged by a number of authors, in particular Hooker (1996). Our findings that the effects of the price of oil have changed over time is consistent with the mixed findings of this line of research.

On the theoretical side, a number of papers have assessed the ability of standard models to account for the size and nature of the observed effects of oil price shocks. Thus, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) argued that it was difficult to explain the sheer size of these effects in the 1970s. They argued that something else was going on, namely an endogenous increase in the markup of firms, leading to a larger decrease in output. Finn (2000) showed that effects of the relevant size could be generated in a perfectly competitive RBC model, by allowing for variable capital utilization. Neither mechanism would seem to account for the depth of the effects of the 1970s and not in the 2000s. The latter observation motivates our focus on the role of real wage rigidities, and the decline in these rigidities over time, an explanation we find more convincing than changes in either the behavior of markups or capacity utilization over time. In following this line, we build on our earlier work on the implications of real wage rigidities and their interaction with
nominal price stickiness (Blanchard and Gali 2007).

A second strand of research related to the present paper deals with the possible changes over time in the effects of oil shocks. Of course, that strand is in turn related to the literature on the “Great Moderation,” a term used to refer to the decrease in output fluctuations over the last 30 years (e.g., Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2003)). The latter literature has tried to assess to what extent the declines in volatility have been due to ”good luck” (i.e. smaller shocks) or changes in the economy’s structure (including policy changes). In that context, some authors have argued that the stagflations of the 1970s were largely due to factors other than oil. Most prominently, Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that they may have been partly caused by exogenous changes in monetary policy, which coincided in time with the rise in oil prices. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) argue that much of the decline in output and employment was due to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the Fed’s endogenous response to the higher inflation induced by the oil shocks.

While our evidence suggests that oil price shocks can only account for a fraction of the fluctuations of the 1970s, our findings that the dynamic effects of oil shocks have decreased considerably over time, combined with the observation that the oil shocks themselves have been no smaller, is consistent with the hypothesis of structural change.

We know of four papers which specifically focus, as we do, on the changing impact of oil shocks. Hooker (2002) analyzes empirically the changing weight of oil prices as an explanatory variable in a traditional Phillips curve specification for the U.S. economy. He finds that pass-through from oil to prices has become negligible since the early eighties, but cannot find evidence for a significant role of the decline in energy intensity, the deregulation of energy industries, or changes in monetary policy as a factor
behind that lower pass-through. De Gregorio, Landerretche, and Neilson (2007) provide a variety of estimates of the degree of pass-through from oil prices to inflation, and its changes over time, for a large set of countries. In addition to estimates of Phillips curves along the lines of Hooker (2002), they also provide evidence based on rolling VARs, as we do in the present paper, though they use a different specification, and focus exclusively on the effects on inflation. Their paper also examines a number of potential explanations, including a change in the response of the exchange rate (in the case of non-U.S. countries), and the virtuous effects of being in a low inflation environment. In two recent papers, developed independently, Herrera and Pesavento (2007), and Edelstein and Kilian (2007), also document the decrease in the effects of oil shocks on a number of aggregate variables using a VAR approach. Herrera and Pesavento, following the approach of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), explore the role of changes in response of monetary policy to oil shocks in accounting for the more muted effects of those shocks in the recent period. Their answer is largely negative: Their findings point to a more stabilizing role of monetary policy in the 1970s relative to the recent period. Edelstein and Kilian focus on changes in the composition of U.S. automobile production, and the declining importance of the U.S. automobile sector. Given that the decline in the effects of the price of oil appears to be present in a large number of OECD countries, this explanation appears perhaps too U.S. specific.

2 Basic Facts

Figure 2 displays the evolution of the price of oil since 1970. More specifically, it shows the quarterly average price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate, measured in U.S. dollars. The figure shows how a long spell

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2. The description of the stylized facts discussed below is not altered significantly if one uses alternative oil price measures, such as the PPI index for crude oil (used e.g. by
of stability came to an end in 1973, triggering a new era characterized by large and persistent fluctuations in the price of oil, punctuated with occasional sharp run-ups and spikes, and ending with the prolonged rise of the past few years. The shaded areas in the figure correspond to the four large oil shock episodes discussed below.

Figure 2. Oil Price ($ per barrel)

Figure 3 displays the same variable, now normalized by the U.S. GDP deflator, and measured in natural logarithms (multiplied by 100, so that its variations can be interpreted as percent changes). This transformation gives us a better sense of the magnitude of the changes in the real price

Hamilton (1983) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) or the price of imported crude oil (e.g. Kilian (2006)).
of oil. As the figure makes clear, such changes have often been very large, and concentrated over relatively short periods of time.

It is useful to start with descriptive statistics associated with the large oil shocks visible in the previous figures. We define a large oil shock as an episode involving a cumulative change in the (log) price of oil above 50 percent, sustained for more than four quarters. This gives us four episodes, starting in 1973, 1979, 1999, and 2002 respectively. Exact dates for each run-up are given in Table 1 (given our definition, the largest price changes need not coincide with the starting date, and, indeed, they don’t). For convenience we refer to those episodes as O1, O2, O3 and O4, respectively. Note that our criterion leaves out the price rise of 1990 (triggered by the
Gulf War), due to its quick reversal. We also note that O3 is somewhat different, since it is preceded by a significant price decline.

Table 1 lists, for each episode, (i) the run-up period, (ii) the date at which the cumulative log change attained the 50 percent threshold (which we use as a benchmark date below), and (iii) the percent change from trough to peak (measured by the cumulative log change), both in nominal and real terms. The duration of the episodes ranges from 3 quarters (O1) to 15 quarters (O4). Interestingly, the size of the associated nominal price rise is similar across episodes, around 100 percent. A similar characterization emerges when we use the cumulative change in the real price of oil (with the price normalized by the GDP deflator), except for O2 where the rise is somewhat smaller because of the high rate of inflation during that episode. In short, the four episodes involve oil shocks of a similar magnitude. In particular, the numbers do not seem to justify a characterization of the two recent shocks as being milder in size than the shocks of the 1970s.

### Table 1. Postwar Oil Shock Episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>run-up period</th>
<th>50% rise date</th>
<th>max log change ($)</th>
<th>max log change (real)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O1</td>
<td>1973:3-1974:1</td>
<td>1974:1</td>
<td>104 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O2</td>
<td>1979:I-1980:2</td>
<td>1979:3</td>
<td>98 %</td>
<td>85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O3</td>
<td>1999:1-2000:4</td>
<td>1999:3</td>
<td>91 %</td>
<td>87 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O4</td>
<td>2002:1-2005:3</td>
<td>2003:1</td>
<td>113 %</td>
<td>104 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of their relatively similar magnitude, these four oil shock episodes have been associated with very different macroeconomic performances. Fig-
ures 4 and 5, which show respectively the evolution of (annual) CPI inflation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. over the period 1970:1-2005:4, provide a visual illustration.

Each figure shows, in addition to the variable displayed, the (log) real price of oil and the four shaded areas representing our four oil shock episodes. Note that the timing of O1 and O2 coincide with a sharp increase in inflation, and mark the beginning of a large rise in the unemployment rate. In each case, both inflation and unemployment reached a peak a few quarters after the peak in oil prices (up to a level of 11.3% and 13.4%, respectively, in the case of inflation, 8.8% and 10.6% for the unemployment rate). The
pattern of both variables during the more recent oil shock episodes is very different. First, while CPI inflation shows a slight upward trend during both O3 and O4, the magnitude of the changes involved is much smaller than that observed for O1 and O2, with the associated rises in inflation hardly standing out relative to the moderate size of fluctuations shown by that variable since the mid-1980s. Second, the variation in the unemployment rate during and after O3 and O4 is much smaller in size than that observed in O1 and O2. The timing is also very different: While O1 and O2 lead to a sharp rise in unemployment, the latter variable keeps declining during the length of the O3 episode, with its rebound preceding O4. Furthermore, after a persistent (though relatively small) increase, unemployment starts declining in the midst of O4, i.e. while the price of oil is still on the rise.
Tables 2 and 3 provide related evidence for each of the G7 countries as well as for three aggregates (the G7, the euro-12, and the OECD countries). More specifically, Table 2 displays, for each country and episode, the average rate of inflation over the 8 quarters following each episode’s benchmark date (at which the 50% threshold oil price rise is reached) minus the average rate of inflation over the 8 quarters immediately preceding each run-up. Note that the increase in inflation associated with O1 is typically larger than the one for O2. The most striking evidence, however, relates to O3 and O4, which are typically associated with a change in inflation in their aftermath of a much smaller size than that following O1 and O2. The last two columns, which average the inflation change for O1-O2 and O3-O4, makes the same point in a more dramatic way.

### Table 2. Oil Shock Episodes: Change in Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>O1</th>
<th>O2</th>
<th>O3</th>
<th>O4</th>
<th>AVG (1,2)</th>
<th>AVG (3,4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro12</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. We use quarterly data from OECD’s Economic Outlook Database. For the purpose of this exercise, inflation is the annualized quarter-to-quarter rate of change in the CPI.
4. Even for Canada and Germany, the largest change in inflation occurs in either O1 or O2.
The evidence on output across episodes is shown in Table 3, which reports for each country and episode (or averages of two episodes in the case of the last two columns) the cumulative GDP gain or loss over the 8 quarters following each episode’s benchmark date, relative to a trend given by the cumulative GDP growth rate over the 8 quarters preceding each episode. The pattern closely resembles that shown for inflation: O1 and O2 are generally associated with GDP losses that are much larger than those corresponding to O3 and O4 (with the latter involving some small GDP gains in some cases). When averages are taken over pairs of episodes the pattern becomes uniform, pointing once again to much larger output losses during and after the oil shocks of the 1970s.

### Table 3. Oil Shock Episodes: Cumulative GDP Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O1</th>
<th>O2</th>
<th>O3</th>
<th>O4</th>
<th>AVG (1,2)</th>
<th>AVG (3,4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.K.</strong></td>
<td>-16.4</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G7</strong></td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euro12</strong></td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD</strong></td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence presented above is consistent with the hypothesis that the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks have become smaller over time, being currently almost negligible (at least in comparison with their effects in the 1970s). But it is also consistent with the hypothesis that other (non-oil) shocks have coincided in time with the major oil shocks, either
reinforcing the adverse effects of the latter in the 1970s, or dampening them
during the more recent episodes. In order to sort out those possibilities we
turn next to a more structured analysis of the co-movements between oil
prices and other variables.

3 Estimating the Effects of Oil Price Shocks using
Structural VARs

In this section we provide more structural evidence on the macroeconomic
effects of oil price shocks, and changes over time in the nature and size of
those effects. We provide evidence for the United States, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, using a 6-variable VAR. In the next
section we turn to a more detailed analysis of the U.S. evidence, using a
battery of rolling bivariate VARs.

Our baseline VAR makes use of data on the nominal price of oil (in dollars),
three inflation measures (CPI, GDP deflator, and wages) and two quantities
(GDP and employment). By using a multivariate specification, we allow
for a variety of shocks in addition to the oil shock that is our focus of
interest. We identify oil shocks by assuming that unexpected variations
in the nominal price of oil are exogenous relative to the contemporaneous
values of the remaining macroeconomic variables included in the VAR.
In other words, we take the oil shock to correspond to the reduced form
innovation to the (log) nominal oil price, measured in U.S. dollars.

This identification assumption will clearly be incorrect if economic devel-
opments in the country under consideration affect the world price of oil
contemporaneously. This may be either because the economy under con-
sideration is large, or because developments in the country are correlated
with world developments. For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996),
who rely on the same identification assumption as we do when studying
the effects of oil shocks on the U.S. economy, restrict their sample period to end in 1980 on the grounds that variations in the price of oil may have a significant endogenous component after that date. We have therefore explored an alternative assumption, namely, letting the price of oil react contemporaneously to current developments in the two quantity variables (output, and employment), while assuming that quantity variables do not react contemporaneously to the price of oil. Because the contemporaneous correlations between quarterly quantity and oil price innovations are small, the results are nearly identical, and we do not report them in the text.

Another approach would be to use, either in addition or in substitution to the oil price, a more exogenous variable to proxy for oil shocks. This is the approach followed by Kilian (2007), who constructs and uses a proxy for unexpected movements in global oil production. What matters, however, to any given country is not the level of global oil production, but the price at which firms and households can purchase oil, which in turn depends also on world demand for oil. Thus, if the price of oil rises as a result of, say, higher Chinese demand, this is just like an exogenous oil supply shock for the remaining countries. This is indeed why we are fairly confident in our identification approach: The large residuals in our oil price series are clearly associated either with identifiable episodes of large supply disruptions or, in the more recent past, with increases in emerging countries’ demand. These observations largely drive our estimates and our impulse response functions.

For each of the six countries, we estimate a VAR containing six variables: the dollar price of oil (expressed in log differences), CPI inflation, GDP deflator inflation, wage inflation, and the log changes in GDP and employment. We use the dollar price of oil rather than the real price of oil, to

5. For the United States we use non-farm business hours instead of employment, and the wage refers to non-farm business compensation per hour. For simplicity we use the term employment to refer to both hours (in the case of the United States) and employment proper (for the remaining countries).
avoid dividing by an endogenous variable, the GDP deflator. For the same reason we do not convert the price of oil into domestic currency for non-US countries. For the United States, the data are taken from the USECON database, and cover the sample period 1960:1-2005:4. For the remaining countries, the data are drawn from OECD’s Economic Outlook database, with the sample period being 1970:1-2005:4. Our three inflation measures are quarter-to-quarter, expressed in annualized terms. Each equation in our VAR includes four lags of the six variables above, a constant term and a quadratic trend fitted measure of productivity growth.

Some of the oil price changes, and by implication, some of the residuals in the price of oil equation, are extremely large. The change in the price of oil for 1974:1, for example, is equal to eight times its standard deviation over the sample. Such large changes are likely to lead to small sample bias when estimating the oil price equation: The best OLS fit is achieved by reducing the size of these particular residuals, thus by spuriously linking these very large realizations to movements in current or past values of the other variables in the regression. This in turn overstates the endogenous component of the price of oil, and understates the size of the true residuals. We deal with this issue by estimating the oil price equation using a sample which excludes all oil price changes larger than three standard deviations. (These large changes in oil prices are clearly essential in giving us precise estimates of the effects of oil prices on other variables. Thus, we use the complete sample when estimating the other equations.)

3.1 Impulse Responses

Figures 6a-6f display the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) for the different variables of interest to an oil price shock where, as discussed above, the latter is identified as the innovation in the oil price equation. Estimates are reported for two different sample periods: 1970:1-1983:4 and 1984:1-2006:4. The break date chosen corresponds roughly to the beginning
of the Great Moderation in the United States, as identified by several authors (e.g. McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000). Note that each subperiod contains two of the four large oil shock episodes identified in the previous section.

One-standard-deviation confidence intervals, obtained using a Monte Carlo procedure, are shown on both sides of the point estimates. The estimated responses of GDP and employment are accumulated and shown in levels. The size of the shock is normalized so that it raises the price of oil by 10 percent on impact. This roughly corresponds to the estimated standard deviations of oil price innovations for the two subsamples, which are very similar. In all cases, the real price of oil shows a near-random walk response (not shown here), i.e. it jumps on impact, and then stays around a new plateau.

The estimates for the United States, shown in Figure 6a, fit pretty well the conventional wisdom about the effects of a rise in oil prices. (Figure 1, presented in the introduction, corresponds to Figure 6a, with the results for the CPI shown in levels rather than rates of change.) For the pre-1984 period, CPI inflation shifts up immediately, and remains positive for a protracted period. The response of GDP inflation and wage inflation is similar, though more gradual. Output and employment decline persistently, albeit with a lag. Most relevant for our purposes, the responses of the same variables in the post-1984 period are considerably more muted, thus suggesting a weaker impact of oil price shocks on the economy. The only exception to this pattern is given by CPI inflation, whose response on impact is very similar across periods (though its persistence is smaller in the second period). This may not be surprising since part of the increase in oil prices is reflected mechanically in the oil component of the CPI.

6. The estimated standard deviation of oil price innovations is 9.4 percent in the pre-1984 period, 12.4 percent in the post-84 period.
The estimates for France and the United Kingdom show a pattern very similar to that of the United States. In the case of France, the contrast between the early and the late periods is particularly strong, both in terms of the size and the persistence of the effects, and for both prices and quantities. In the case of the United Kingdom, the response of inflation variables is almost non-existent in the latter period though, in contrast with France, there is some evidence of a decline in output and employment (albeit smaller than in the first sample period).

Some of the estimated responses for Germany and Italy fit conventional wisdom less well. The inflation measures in Germany hardly change in response to the rise in oil prices in either period, though the impact on output and employment is more adverse in the pre-1984 period. This is consistent with a stronger anti-inflationary stance of the Bundesbank, relative to other central banks. The slight increase in employment and output in the post-1984 period goes against conventional wisdom. In the case of Italy, there is barely any employment response in the pre-1984 period. Still, for both countries the sign of most of the responses accord with conventional wisdom, and the responses are smaller in the post-1984 period.

The story is different for Japan. The sign of many of the responses to the rise in oil prices is often at odds with standard priors. Also, the uncertainty of the estimates is much larger, as reflected in the wider bands. The effect on inflation is weak and does not have a clear sign in either period. There is a (slight) rise in output in both periods, and of employment in the post-1984 period.

In short, except for Japan (and to some extent, for Germany), most of the responses fit conventional wisdom rather well: An increase in the price of oil leads to more wage and price inflation, and to a decrease in employment and output for some time. In all cases, however, the effects on both inflation and activity are considerably weaker in the second subsample than in the first.
Figure 6a

US – Impulse response to an oil price shock

dp(cpi)
dp(def)
dw
y
n
Pre 1983:04 Post 1984:01
Figure 6b

France -- Impulse response to an oil price shock

dp(cpi) dp(def) dw y n

Pre 1983: 04 Post 1984: 01
Figure 6c

UK -- Impulse response to an oil price shock

dp(cpi) dp(def) dw y n

Pre 1983:04 Post 1984:01
Figure 6d

Germany -- Impulse response to an oil price shock

Pre 1983:04 Post 1984:01

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

0 .75
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
-0 .5
-0 .4
-0 .3
-0 .2
-0 .1
-0 .0
0 .1
0 .2
0 .3
0 .4

Figure 6d
Figure 6e
Italy – Impulse response to an oil price shock

Pre 1983:04 Post 1984:01

Figure 6e
Japan -- Impulse response to an oil price shock

dp(cpi)  dp(def)  dw  y  n

Pre 1983:04  Post 1984:01

Figure 6f
3.2 Variance and Historical Decompositions

How important are oil shocks in accounting for the observed fluctuations in inflation, output and employment in the U.S. economy?

Table 4 and Figure 7 answer this question by using the decomposition associated with the estimated six-variable VAR, with data starting in 1960. For each variable and sample period, they compare the actual time series with the component of the series that results from putting all shocks, except the identified oil price shocks, equal to zero. Series for GDP and employment are accumulated, so the resulting series are in log-levels. All series are then HP-filtered so that the series can be interpreted as deviations from a slowly moving trend. Table 4 provides statistics for the role of oil shocks as a source of fluctuations, including its percent contribution to the volatility of each variable (including the real price of oil, measured relative to the GDP deflator), both in absolute and relative terms. Figure 7 plots the series over time.

The estimated standard deviations of the oil-driven component of the different variables (“conditional standard deviations”), given in the first three columns of Table 4, show that the volatility of fluctuations caused by oil shocks has diminished considerably for all variables, except for the real price of oil itself. In fact, the standard deviation of the exogenous component of the latter variable is about 30 percent larger in the second sample period. This can be explained to a large extent by the limited variation in the real price of oil before the 1973 crisis, and despite the two large spikes in that year and during 1979-80.
TABLE 4: The Contribution of Oil Shocks to Economic Fluctuations, 1960-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conditional Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Unconditional SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil Price (Real)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI Inflation</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Inflation</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Inflation</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This evidence reinforces our earlier IRFs-based findings of a more muted response of all variables to an oil shock of a given size. Thus, the change in the way the economy has responded to oil shocks has contributed to the dampening of economic fluctuations since the mid-1980s, the phenomenon known as the Great Moderation. Interestingly, our estimates suggest that this has been possible in spite of the slightly larger volatility of oil prices themselves.

The next two columns of Table 4 give the relative contribution of oil shocks to movements in the various variables, measured as the ratio of the conditional to the unconditional standard deviation. The estimates suggest that the relative contribution of oil shocks to fluctuations in quantity variables...
Figure 7. The Role of Oil Price Shocks

(GDP and employment) has remained roughly unchanged over time, at around 1/3. In the case of wage inflation and GDP deflator inflation, the contribution of oil shocks has declined to 1/4 in both cases, from a level close to 1/2. In contrast, the contribution of oil shocks to CPI inflation has increased in the recent period. Note that this is consistent with a relatively stable core CPI, with oil price changes being passed through to the energy component of the CPI, and accounting for, according to our estimates, as much as sixty percent of the fluctuations in overall CPI inflation.

Figure 7 allows us to focus on the contribution of oil prices to the 1973-1974 and 1979-1981 episodes. It shows the substantial but non-exclusive role of exogenous oil shocks during each of the two episodes. In particular, while for our three inflation variables the oil price shocks seem to have accounted for the bulk of the increases in 73-75 and 79-81, no more than a half of
the observed decline in employment and output during those episodes can be attributed to the oil shocks themselves. Thus, our findings suggest that other shocks played an important role in triggering those episodes.

Figure 8. The Role of Shocks to Crude Materials Prices

Within our 6-variable VAR, our partial identification approach does not allow us to determine what those additional underlying shocks may have been. Yet, when we replace the price of oil by the broader PPI index for crude materials in our six-variable VAR, the estimates of GDP and employment driven by exogenous shocks to that broader price index track more closely the movements of the actual time series themselves in the pre-1984 period, including the two large oil shock episodes contained in that period, as shown in Figure 8. In particular those shocks account for more than half the fluctuations in all variables over the pre-1984 period.
On the other hand, such broader supply shocks play a very limited role in accounting for the fluctuations in output and employment in the post-1984 period (though a more important one in accounting for variations in CPI inflation, in a way consistent with earlier evidence).

4 U.S. Evidence Based on Rolling Bivariate Regressions

So far, we have analyzed the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks and their change over time under the maintained assumption of a discrete break sometime around the mid-1980s. While the findings reported above are largely robust to changes in the specific date of the break, some of the potential explanations (discussed below) for the change in the effects of oil price shocks are more likely to have been associated with a more gradual variation over time. This leads us to adopt a more flexible approach, and estimate rolling IRFs to oil price shocks, based on a simple dynamic equation linking a variable of interest to its own lags and the current and lagged values of the change in the (log) oil price. We do this using a moving window of 40 quarters, with the first moving window centered in 1970.

More specifically, letting \( y_t \) and \( p^o_t \) denote the variable of interest and the price of oil, respectively, we use OLS to estimate the regression:

\[
y_t = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{4} \beta_j \, y_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{4} \gamma_j \, \Delta p^o_{t-j} + u_t
\]

and use the resulting estimates to obtain the implied dynamic response of \( y_t \) (or a transformation thereof) to a permanent 10 percent (log) change in the price of oil, thus implicitly assuming in the simulation that \( \Delta p^o_t \) is an i.i.d. process (which is roughly consistent with the random walk-like response of the price of oil obtained using our multivariate model).
Relative to the multivariate model analyzed in the previous section, correct identification of oil price shocks is obviously more doubtful in the present bivariate model, given the lower dimension specification of the economy’s dynamics. This shortcoming must be traded-off with the possibility of estimating the VAR with much shorter samples and, hence, being able to obtain our rolling IRFs. In order to check the consistency with our earlier results, we first computed the average IRFs across moving windows within each of the subperiods considered earlier (pre-1984 and post-1984), and found the estimated IRFs (not shown) to be very similar to the ones obtained earlier. In particular, both the inflation variables, as well as output and employment, show a more muted response in the more recent period.

Figures 9a-9e display the rolling IRFs for our three inflation measures, output, and employment. Several features stand out:
CPI inflation appears quite sensitive to the oil shock over the entire sample period, but particularly so in the late 1970s, when inflation is estimated to rise more than 1 percentage point two/three quarters after a 10 percent rise in the oil price. The response becomes steadily more muted over time and, perhaps as important, less persistent, especially in the more recent period (in a way consistent with our earlier evidence based on the 6-variable VAR). The evolution over time in the response of GDP deflator inflation to an oil price shock is similar to that of CPI inflation, but shows a more dramatic contrast, with the response at the end of our sample being almost negligible. The response of wage inflation is rather muted all along,
Figure 9b

Response of GDP Deflator Inflation

Quarters after shock

Period
Figure 9c

Response of Wage Inflation

Quarters after shock

Period
Figure 9d

Response of GDP

Quarters after shock

Period

-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Figure 9e

Response of Employment

Quarters after shock

Period
except for its large persistent increases in the late 1970s and early 80s, and a similar spike in the 1990s.

The most dramatic changes are in the responses of output and employment (Figures 9d-e). In the early part of the sample output is estimated to decline as much as 1 percent two years after the 10 percent change in the price of oil. The estimated response, however, becomes weaker over time, with the point estimates of that response becoming slightly positive for the most recent period. A similar pattern can be observed for employment.

The previous evidence thus reinforces the picture that emerged from the earlier evidence, one which strongly suggests a vanishing effect of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables, both real and nominal. In the next section we try to uncover some of the reasons why.

5 Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: A Simple Framework

We now develop a simple model of the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. Our focus is on explaining the different response of the economy to oil price shocks in the 1970s and the 2000s. With this in mind, we focus on three potential changes in the economy:

First, the behavior of wages. To us, this looks a priori like the most plausible candidate. The 1970s were times of strong unions, and high wage indexation. In the 2000s, unions are much weaker, and wage indexation has practically disappeared.

Second, the role of monetary policy. Faced with a new type of shock, the central banks of the 1970s did not know at first how to react, policy mistakes were made, and central bank credibility was low. In the 2000s, supply shocks are no longer new, monetary policy is clearly set, and credibility is much higher.
Third, and trivially, the quantitative importance of oil in the economy. Increases in the price of oil have led to substitution away from oil, and a decrease in the relevant shares of oil in consumption and in production. The question is whether this decrease can account for much of the difference in the effects of oil prices in the 1970s and the 2000s.\(^7\)

We start from the standard new-Keynesian model and introduce two modifications. First, we introduce oil both as an input in consumption and as an input in production. We assume the country is an oil importer, and that the real price of oil (in terms of domestic goods) follows an exogenous process. Second, we allow for real wage rigidities, along the lines of our earlier work (Blanchard and Gali 2007). We present only log-linearized relations in the text, leaving the full derivation to Appendix 1. Lower case letters denote logarithms of the original variables, and for notational simplicity, we ignore all constants.

### 5.1 The Role of Oil

Oil is used both by firms in production and by consumers in consumption:

Production is given by

\[ q_t = a_t + \alpha_n n_t + \alpha_m m_t \]

where \( q_t \) is (gross) domestic output; \( a_t \) is an exogenous technology parameter; \( n_t \) is labor; \( m_t \) is the quantity of imported oil used in production;

\(^7\) Some observers have suggested another factor, an increase in hedging against oil price shocks by oil users. What is known about hedging by airlines suggests, however that, while hedging is more prevalent than in the 1970s, its extent remains limited, with few hedges going beyond a year. See for example Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006a, 2006b).
and $\alpha_n + \alpha_m \leq 1$.\footnote{We use a Cobb–Douglas specification for convenience. It has the counterfactual implication that the share of oil in output remains constant. So, in our framework, when looking at changes in the share over time, we must attribute it to a change in the parameter $\alpha_m$. For our purposes, this appears innocuous.}

Consumption is given by

$$c_t \equiv (1 - \chi) c_{q,t} + \chi c_{m,t}$$

where $c_t$ is consumption; $c_{q,t}$ is the consumption of domestically produced goods (gross output); and $c_{m,t}$ is the consumption of imported oil.

In this environment, it is important to distinguish between two prices, the price of domestic output $p_{q,t}$, and the price of consumption $p_{c,t}$. Let $p_{m,t}$ be the price of oil, and $s_t \equiv p_{m,t} - p_{q,t}$ be the real price of oil. From the definition of consumption, the relation between the consumption price and the domestic output price is given by

$$p_{c,t} = p_{q,t} + \chi s_t$$

Increases in the real price of oil lead to an increase in the consumption price relative to the domestic output price.

5.2 Households

The behavior of households is characterized by two equations. The first is an intertemporal condition for consumption:

$$c_t = E_t\{c_{t+1} \} - (i_t - E_t\{\pi_{c,t+1} \})$$

where $i_t$ is the nominal interest rate, and $\pi_{c,t} \equiv p_{c,t} - p_{c,t-1}$ is CPI inflation.
The second condition characterizes labor supply. If the labor market was perfectly competitive, labor supply would be implicitly given by

\[ w_t - p_{c,t} = c_t + \phi n_t \]

where \( w_t \) is the nominal wage, and \( n_t \) is employment. This is the condition that the consumption wage must equal the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure; \( \phi \) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

We formalize real wage rigidities by modifying the previous equation to read

\[ w_t - p_{c,t} = (1 - \gamma) \left( c_t + \phi n_t \right) \]  

(3)

where we interpret the parameter \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) as an index of the degree of real wage rigidities. While clearly ad-hoc, equation (3) is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the notion that real wages may not respond to labor market conditions as much as implied by the model with perfectly competitive markets. We have explored the implications of a dynamic version of equation (3), in which the wage adjusts over time to the marginal rate of substitution. This alternative is more attractive conceptually, and gives richer dynamics. However, it is also analytically more complex, and we have decided to present results using the simpler version above.

5.3 Firms

Given the production function, cost minimization implies that the firms’ demand for oil is given by

\[ m_t = -\mu_t^p - s_t + q_t \]

where \( \mu_t^p \) is the price markup. Using this expression to eliminate \( m_t \) in the production function gives a reduced-form production function

\[ q_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} \left( a_t + \alpha_n n_t - \alpha_m s_t - \alpha_m \mu_t^p \right) \]  

(4)
Output is a decreasing function of the real price of oil, given employment and technology.

Combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and for labor with the aggregate production function yields the following factor price frontier:

\[(1-\alpha_m) (w_t-p_{c,t}) + (\alpha_m + (1-\alpha_m)\chi) s_t + (1-\alpha_n-\alpha_m) n_t - a_t + \mu^p_t = 0 \quad (5)\]

Given productivity, an increase in the real price of oil must lead to one or more of the following adjustments: (i) a lower consumption wage, (ii) lower employment, (iii) a lower markup. Under our assumed functional forms, it can be shown that with flexible prices and wages, the entire burden of the adjustment in response to an increase in \(s_t\) falls on the consumption wage, with employment and the markup remaining unchanged. But, as we discuss next, things are different when we allow the markup to vary (as a result of sticky prices), and wages to respond less than their competitive labor markets counterpart.

Firms are assumed to set prices à la Calvo (1983), an assumption which yields the following log-linearized equation for domestic output price inflation (domestic inflation for short)

\[
\pi_{q,t} = \beta E_t\{\pi_{q,t+1}\} - \lambda_p \mu^p_t \quad (6)
\]

where \(\lambda_p \equiv [(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)/\theta][(\alpha_m + \alpha_n)/(1 + (1 - \alpha_m + \alpha_n)(\epsilon - 1))]\), where \(\theta\) denotes the fraction of firms that leave prices unchanged, \(\beta\) is the discount factor of households, and \(\epsilon\) is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods in consumption.

Note that this specification assumes a constant desired markup of firms. By doing so, we rule out a mechanism examined by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) who argue that, to explain the size of the decline in output observed
in response to oil shocks, one must assume countercyclical markups. We do so not because we believe the mechanism is irrelevant, but because we do not think that variations in the degree of countercyclicality of markups are likely to be one of the main factors behind the differences between the 1970s and the 2000s.

5.4 Equilibrium

The real wage consistent with household choices (cum real wage rigidities) is given by equation (3), and depends on consumption and employment.

The real wage consistent with the firms’ factor price frontier is given by equation (5) and depends on the real price of oil, the markup, and employment.

Together, these two relations imply that the markup is a function of consumption, employment, and the real price of oil. Solving for consumption by using the condition that trade be balanced gives:

\[ c_t = q_t - \chi s_t + \eta \mu_t^p \]

where \( \eta \equiv \alpha_m/(M^p - \alpha_m) \), with \( M^p \) denoting the steady state gross markup (now in levels). Combining this equation with the reduced form production function gives consumption as a function of employment, productivity, the real price of oil, and the markup

\[ c_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} a_t + \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} n_t - \left( \chi + \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} \right) s_t + \left( \eta - \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} \right) \mu_t^p \]

If the steady state markup is not too large, the last term is small and can safely be ignored. Replacing the expression for consumption in equation (3) for the consumption wage, and then replacing the consumption wage in the factor price frontier gives an expression for the markup.
\[ \mu_t^p = -\Gamma_n n_t - \Gamma_s s_t + \Gamma_a a_t \]  

where \[ \Gamma_n \equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha_n - \alpha_m)\gamma + (1 - \alpha_m)(1 - \gamma)(1 + \phi)}{1 - (1 - \gamma)(\alpha_m - (1 - \alpha_m)\eta)} \geq 0 \]

\[ \Gamma_a \equiv \frac{\gamma}{1 - (1 - \gamma)(\alpha_m - (1 - \alpha_m)\eta)} \geq 0 \]

\[ \Gamma_s \equiv \frac{\gamma (\alpha_m + (1 - \alpha_m)\chi)}{1 - (1 - \gamma)(\alpha_m - (1 - \alpha_m)\eta)} \geq 0 \]

Using this expression for the markup in equation (6) gives the following characterization of domestic inflation

\[ \pi_{q,t} = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{q,t+1} \} + \lambda_p \Gamma_n n_t + \lambda_p \Gamma_s s_t - \lambda_p \Gamma_a a_t \]  

Under our assumptions, the first best level of employment can be shown to be invariant to the real price of oil: Substitution and income effects cancel.\footnote{To see this, we can just determine equilibrium employment under perfect competition in both goods and labor markets, corresponding to the assumptions \( \mu_t = 0 \) for all \( t \) and \( \gamma = 0 \), respectively.} If \( \gamma = 0 \), i.e. if there are no real wage rigidities, then \( \Gamma_a \) and \( \Gamma_s \) are both equal to zero, and domestic inflation only depends on employment. Together, these two propositions imply that stabilizing domestic inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the distance of employment from first best—a result we have called elsewhere the “divine coincidence.”

Positive values of \( \gamma \) lead instead to positive values of \( \Gamma_a \) and \( \Gamma_s \). The higher \( \gamma \), or the higher \( (\alpha_m + (1 - \alpha_m)\chi) \)—an expression which depends on the shares of oil in production and in consumption—the worse the trade-off between stabilization of employment and stabilization of domestic inflation in response to oil price shocks.
5.5 Implications for GDP and the GDP Deflator

Note that the characterization of the equilibrium did not require introducing either value added or the value added deflator. But these are needed to compare the implications of the model to the data.

The value added deflator $p_{y,t}$ is implicitly defined by $p_{q,t} = (1 - \alpha_m) p_{y,t} + \alpha_m p_{m,t}$. Rearranging terms gives

$$p_{y,t} = p_{q,t} - \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} s_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

thus implying a negative effect of the real price of oil on the value added deflator, given domestic output prices.

The definition of value added, combined with the demand for oil, yields the following relation between value added and output:

$$y_t = q_t + \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} s_t + \eta \mu_t^p$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

This in turn implies the following relation between value added and consumption:

$$y_t = c_t + \left( \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} + \chi \right) s_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

An increase in the price of oil decreases consumption given value added both because (imported) oil is used as an input in production, and used as an input in consumption.

Under the same approximation as above, i.e. $(\eta - \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m}) \mu_t^p \simeq 0$, equations (4) and (11) imply the following relation between value added and employment:

$$y_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} \left( a_t + \alpha_n n_t \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Note that, under this approximation, the relation between value added and employment does not depend on the real price of oil.
5.6 Quantifying the Effects of Oil Price Shocks

Equations (1), (2), (9), (12), and (13), describe the equilibrium dynamics of prices and quantities, given exogenous processes for technology and the real price of oil, and a description of how the interest rate is determined (i.e. an interest rate rule). We now use these conditions to characterize the economy’s response to an oil price shock.

Assume that $a_t = 0$ for all $t$ (i.e abstract from technology shocks). It follows from (13) and the discussion above that the efficient level of value added is constant (and normalized to zero) in this case. Assume further that the real price of oil follows an AR(1) process

$$s_t = \rho_s s_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (14)$$

We can then summarize the equilibrium dynamics of value added and domestic inflation through the system:

$$\pi_{q,t} = \beta E_t\{\pi_{q,t+1}\} + \kappa y_t + \lambda_p \Gamma_s s_t \quad (15)$$

$$y_t = E_t\{y_{t+1}\} - (i_t - E_t\{\pi_{q,t+1}\}) + \frac{\alpha_m(1 - \rho_s)}{1 - \alpha_m} s_t \quad (16)$$

where $\kappa \equiv \lambda_p \Gamma_n(1 - \alpha_m)/\alpha_n$.

These two equations must be complemented with a description of monetary policy. Assume an interest rate rule of the form

$$i_t = \phi_\pi \pi_{q,t} \quad (17)$$

where $\phi_\pi > 1$. Note that in our model $\pi_{q,t}$ corresponds to core CPI inflation, a variable that many central banks appear to focus on as the basis for their interest rate decisions.
We can then solve for the equilibrium analytically, using the method of undetermined coefficients. This yields the following expressions for domestic inflation and output:

\[ \pi_{q,t} = \Psi_{\pi} s_t \]
\[ y_t = \Psi_y s_t \]

where

\[ \Psi_{\pi} = \frac{(1 - \rho_s) \left( \frac{\kappa \alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} + \lambda_p \Gamma_s \right)}{(1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) + (\phi - \rho_s) \kappa} \]

and

\[ \Psi_y = \frac{\alpha_m (1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) - (\phi - \rho_s) \lambda_p \Gamma_s}{(1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) + (\phi - \rho_s) \kappa} \]

Domestic inflation and GDP follow AR(1) processes with the same first order coefficient as the real price of oil. Their innovations are proportional to the innovation in the real price of oil, with the coefficient of proportionality depending on the parameters of the model.

Expressions for CPI inflation and employment can be obtained using (1) and (13), respectively:

\[ \pi_{c,t} = \Psi_{\pi} s_t + \chi \Delta s_t \]
\[ n_t = \Psi_y \frac{1 - \alpha_m}{\alpha_n} s_t \]

With these equations, we can turn to the discussion of the potential role of the three factors we identified earlier, real wage rigidities, monetary policy, and the quantitative importance of oil in the economy, in explaining the differences between the 1970s and the 2000s. In all cases we use the evidence we presented earlier for the United States as a benchmark.
Three Hypotheses on the Changing Effects of Oil Price Shocks

In order to assess quantitatively the potential for oil price shocks to generate significant macroeconomic fluctuations, we first need to calibrate our model. We assume the following parameter values:

The time unit is a quarter. We set the discount factor $\beta$ equal to 0.99. We set the Calvo parameter, $\theta$, to 0.75. We choose the elasticity of output with respect to labor, $\alpha_n$, equal to 0.7. We assume $\phi = 1$, thus implying a unitary Frisch labor supply elasticity.

As discussed in previous sections, changes in the volatility of the real price of oil are unlikely to lie behind the changes in the size of the effects of oil shocks. Thus, for simplicity, we assume an unchanged process for the real price of oil. Based on an estimated AR(1) process over the period 1960:1-2006:4, we set $\rho_s = 0.97$ and $\text{var}(s_t) = (0.11)^2$. Also, and unless otherwise noted, we set the shares of oil in production and consumption ($\alpha_m$ and $\chi$) to equal 0.012 and 0.017, respectively, which correspond to their values in 1997.

Most of the parameters above are kept constant across all the simulations presented below. The exceptions, as well as our treatment of the remaining parameters, varies depending on the hypothesis being considered in each case.

6.1 Changes in Real Wage Rigidities

In the framework above, the presence of some rigidity in the adjustment of real wages to economic conditions is a necessary ingredient in order to generate significant fluctuations in measures of inflation and economic activity. Figure 10 illustrates this point by showing the range of volatilities of CPI inflation (annualized, and expressed in percent) and GDP implied
by our calibrated model under the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets ($\gamma = 0$), and under two alternative calibrations. The first calibration assumes a relatively favorable environment, with the two shares of oil at their “low” values prevailing in 1997, and no credibility gap in monetary policy, ($\delta = 0$; the discussion of credibility and the definition of $\delta$ will be given below). The second calibration assumes a less favorable environment, with the shares of oil at their “high” values prevailing in 1973, and the presence of a credibility gap in monetary policy ($\delta = 0.5$). For each calibration, the figure plots the standard deviations of CPI inflation and value added, as the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule, $\phi_\pi$, varies from 1 to 5, a range of values that covers the empirically plausible set (conditional on having a unique equilibrium). Two features stand out:

First, the slope of the frontier is positive. This should not be surprising: In the absence of real wage rigidities, there is no tradeoff between inflation and value added stabilization. Hence, a policy that seeks to stabilize domestic
inflation more aggressively, also stabilizes value added. In fact, one can reduce the volatility of both variables by choosing $\phi_{\pi}$ to be arbitrarily large (this is what we called the “divine coincidence” in an earlier paper). Under the assumed rule, on the other hand, CPI inflation faces a lower bound to its volatility, since it is affected directly by any change in the price of oil, in proportion to the share of oil in the consumption basket.

Second, the standard deviations implied by our simulation are well below their corresponding estimated conditional standard deviations, reported in Table 4 and represented by the two markers in the Figure. The volatility gap is particularly dramatic for GDP.

Figure 11 shows that the introduction of real wage rigidities alters that picture substantially. It plots three loci, corresponding to three different values of the real wage rigidity parameter: $\gamma = 0.0, \gamma = 0.6$, and $\gamma = 0.9$. In the three cases, we assume an otherwise favorable environment, with the 1997 oil shares, and full credibility of monetary policy. As before, each locus is obtained by varying $\phi_{\pi}$ from 1 to 5. Several results are worth pointing out:

First, the tradeoff generated by the presence of real wage rigidities is apparent in the negative relationship between inflation volatility on the one hand and GDP volatility on the other.

Second, while the introduction of real wage rigidities raises the volatility of all variables (for any given $\phi_{\pi}$), the model’s predictions still fall short of matching the (conditional) standard deviations of CPI inflation and GDP in our two samples, represented by the two crosses.

Finally, and that shortcoming notwithstanding, the figure also makes clear that a moderate reduction in the degree of real wage rigidities (e.g. a shift of $\gamma$ from 0.9 to 0.6) can account for a substantial improvement in the
policy tradeoff and hence on a simultaneous reduction in the volatility of inflation and GDP resulting from oil price shocks (or supply shock, more generally).

To what extent a reduction in the degree of real wage rigidities may have been a factor behind the more muted effects of oil shocks in recent years? We rely again on the bivariate rolling VAR approach used earlier to try to answer this question, by seeking evidence of faster wage adjustment in recent years. In particular, we use this approach to estimate the responses of the real consumption wage, the unemployment rate, and the wage markup, defined as the gap between the (log) consumption wage, $w_t - p_{c,t}$, and the (log) marginal rate of substitution, $c_t + \phi m_t$, with $\phi = 1$, as in our baseline calibration. In response to a rise in the real price of oil, we would expect this markup to increase in the presence of real wage rigidities, which in turn should be associated with a rise in unemployment.
Figure 12a

Response of Real Wage

Quarters after shock
Period

-0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
Figure 12b

Response of Unemployment Rate

Period

Quarters after shock
Figure 12c

Response of Wage Markup

Quarters after shock

Period
Figures 12a-c display the relevant IRFs representing, as before, the estimated response of each variable to a permanent 10 percent increase in the dollar price of oil. Figure 12a shows that the consumption wage tends to decline in response to the oil shock. While the response shows some variability over time, it does not show a tendency towards a larger response of the consumption wage over time. Figure 12b shows that unemployment tends to increase in response to the oil shock. It also shows that this response has declined dramatically over time. An interpretation of these two evolutions is that the decrease in real wages, which required a large increase in unemployment in the 1970s, is now achieved with barely any increase in unemployment today. This suggests, in turn, a decrease in real wage rigidities. Another way of making the same point, within the logic of the model, is to look at the evolution of the wage markup. This is done in Figure 12c. An increase in the oil price leads to an increase in the wage markup: That is, the decrease in the consumption wage is smaller than the decrease in the marginal rate of substitution. The effect has become, however, steadily smaller over time, very rapidly so in the more recent period. This suggests that the real consumption wage moves today much more in line with the marginal rate of substitution than it did in the 1970s.\footnote{At least from a qualitative point of view, the previous evidence is robust to variations in the calibration of parameter $\phi$ within a plausible range (which we take to be given by the interval $[0.5, 5]$).}

6.2 Changes in Monetary Policy

A number of studies (e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)) have provided evidence of a stronger interest rate response to variations in inflation over the past two decades, relative to the 1960s and 1970s. It should be clear, however, from the simulations of our model presented above that, other things equal, a stronger anti-inflationary stance should have reduced the volatility of inflation, but increased that of GDP. In other words, that
evidence cannot explain—at least by itself—the lower volatility of both inflation and economic activity in response to oil price shocks.

In addition to this change in behavior, captured by the literature on empirical interest rate rules, there is also widespread agreement that central banks’ commitment to keeping inflation low and stable has also become more credible over the past two decades, thanks to improved communications, greater transparency, the adoption of more or less explicit quantitative inflation targets and, ultimately, by the force of deeds. In this section we use the framework developed above to study the role that such an improvement in credibility may have had in accounting for the reduced impact of oil shocks.

We model credibility as follows: As in our baseline model we assume that the central bank follows an interest rate rule

\[ i_t = \phi \pi_{q,t} \]

The public, however, is assumed to perceive that interest rate decisions are made according to

\[ i_t = \phi (1 - \delta) \pi_{q,t} + v_t \]

where \( \{v_t\} \) is taken by the public to be an exogenous i.i.d monetary policy shock, and \( \delta \in [0, 1] \) can be interpreted as a measure of the credibility gap. Below we restrict ourselves to calibrations that guarantee a unique equilibrium, which requires that the condition \( \phi(1 - \delta) > 1 \) be met.\(^{11}\)

In addition to the above actual and perceived policy rules, the model is exactly as the one developed above, with the dynamics of value added,

\(^{11}\) The hypothesis of an indeterminate equilibrium (and, hence, the possibility of sunspot fluctuations) in the first part of the sample could also potentially explain the greater volatility in both inflation and GDP, as emphasized by Clarida et al. (2000). We choose to pursue an alternative line of explanation here, which does not rely on multiplicity of equilibria.
domestic inflation, and the real price of oil summarized by equations (14)-(16). Solving the model for domestic inflation and value added gives:

\[ \pi_{q,t} = a s_t + b v_t \]
\[ y_t = c s_t + d v_t \]

where \( a, b, c, \) and \( d \) are given by:

\[ a = \frac{(1 - \rho_s)(\kappa \alpha_m(1 - \alpha_m)^{-1} + \lambda_p \Gamma_s)}{(1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) + (\phi \pi(1 - \delta) - \rho_s)\kappa} > 0 \]
\[ b = -\frac{\kappa}{1 + \phi \pi(1 - \delta)\kappa} < 0 \]
\[ c = \frac{\alpha_m(1 - \alpha_m)^{-1}(1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) - (\phi \pi(1 - \delta) - \rho_s)\lambda_p \Gamma_s}{(1 - \rho_s)(1 - \beta \rho_s) + (\phi \pi(1 - \delta) - \rho_s)\kappa} \]
\[ d = -\frac{1}{1 + \phi \pi(1 - \delta)\kappa} \]

Imposing \( v_t = \delta \phi \pi H, t \) into the solution (so that the central bank actually adheres to its chosen rule) we get

\[ \pi_{q,t} = \frac{a}{1 - b \delta \phi \pi} s_t \]

thus implying that CPI inflation is

\[ \pi_{c,t} = \frac{a}{1 - b \delta \phi \pi} s_t + \chi \Delta s_t \]

Value added is then given by:

\[ y_t = c s_t + d \phi \pi \delta \pi_{q,t} \]
\[ = \left(c + \frac{d \alpha \phi \pi \delta}{1 - b \delta \phi \pi}\right) s_t \]
Figure 13 displays the loci of standard deviations of CPI inflation and GDP associated with $\delta = 0$ and $\delta = 0.5$, i.e. corresponding to a full credibility and a low credibility environment respectively. In both cases we restrict $\phi_\pi$ to values above 2 in order to guarantee a unique equilibrium. We set $\gamma$ equal to 0.9, and calibrate the oil shares to their 1997 values. Two points are worth noting:

First, allowing for both real wage rigidities and poor credibility, the model’s predictions come closer but still fall somewhat short of matching the (conditional) standard deviations of CPI inflation and GDP in our two samples, represented by the two crosses. Given the primitive nature of the model, this may not be overly worrisome.

Second, credibility gains can improve the tradeoff facing policymakers significantly. The quantitative gains, however, do not seem sufficient to account, by themselves, for the observed decline in macro volatility in the face of oil shocks, documented earlier in the paper. But they show that improved credibility may certainly have contributed to that decline.
Figures 14a-c provide some evidence of the changes in the Fed’s response to oil price shocks, as well as an indicator of potential changes in its credibility. The rolling IRFs displayed are based on estimated bivariate VARs with the price of oil and, one at a time, a measure of inflation expectations over the next 12 months from the Michigan Survey, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, and the real interest rate (measured as the difference between the previous two variables).
Figure 14b

Response of Nominal Rate

Period

Quarters after shock
Figure 14c

Response of Real Rate

Quarters after shock

Period

-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3

First, and most noticeable, the response of expected inflation to an oil price shock of the same size (normalized here to 10 percent rise) has shrunk dramatically over time, from a rise of about 50 basis points in the 1970s, to about 20 basis points since the mid-1980s, and has remained remarkably stable after that.

Second, and perhaps surprisingly, the strength of the response of the nominal interest rate has not changed much across sample periods. The shrinking response of expected inflation implies, however, that the response of the real rate to an oil price shock has become stronger over time. In fact, the real rate appears to decline significantly in response to an oil price shock in the 1970s, an observation consistent with the (unconditional) evidence in Clarida et al. (2000). This decline may have contributed to the large and persistent increase in inflation. It also suggests that had the Fed pursued a stronger anti-inflationary policy (keeping credibility unchanged) the adverse effects on output and inflation would have been even larger.\textsuperscript{12}

To summarize the lessons from the analysis above: While the weak response of inflation to oil price shocks in recent years is often interpreted as a consequence of a stronger anti-inflation stance by the Fed (a higher $\phi_\pi$, in the context of our model), the evidence of a smaller decline in employment and GDP suggests that an enhanced anti-inflation credibility may also have played a role. The sharp decline in the response of inflation expectations to an oil price shock is certainly consistent with this view.

\textsuperscript{12} Note that, for the most recent period, the real interest rate shows very little change in response to an oil price shock. There are several explanations for this finding. First, as shown above, several measures of inflation (including expected inflation and GDP deflator inflation) hardly change in response to the oil price rise. If the Fed responds to those measures, the required adjustment in the nominal and real rates will be relatively small. Secondly, the Fed may also adjust rates in response to measures of economic activity. The decline in GDP and employment may thus have induced an interest rate movement in the opposite direction, with the net effect being close to zero.
6.3 Declining Oil Shares

A third hypothesis for the improved policy tradeoff is that the share of oil in consumption and in production is smaller today than it was in the 1970s. To examine the possible impact of these changes we simulate two alternative versions of our model, with $\alpha_m$ and $\chi$ calibrated using 1973 and 1997 data on the share of oil in production costs and consumption expenditures (see Appendix 2 for details of construction). In light of this evidence we choose $\alpha_m = 1.5\%$ and $\chi = 2.3\%$ (1973 data) for the 1970s, and $\alpha_m = 1.2\%$ and $\chi = 1.7\%$ (based on data for 1997) for our two calibrations.

Figure 15. Changing Oil Shares and Policy Tradeoffs

Figure 15 displays CPI inflation and GDP volatility for the two calibrations, keeping the index of real wage rigidities unchanged at $\gamma = 0.9$ (and $\delta = 0$). The conclusion is similar to those reached for the other two candidate explanations. The reduction in the oil shares in consumption and production cannot account for the full decline in volatility, but it clearly accounts for part of it. (The values of $\alpha_m$ and $\chi$ in 1977, thus after the first but before the second oil shock, were 1.8\% and 3.6\% respectively. This sug-
gests that, other things equal, the second oil shock should have had larger effects than the first. As we saw earlier, the opposite appears to be true.

The analysis above has examined the effects on CPI inflation and GDP volatility of changes in one parameter at a time. Figure 16 shows the combined effect of a simultaneous change in the three parameters. The first calibration, which is meant to roughly capture the 1970s environment, assumes strong wage rigidities ($\gamma = 0$), limited central bank credibility ($\delta = 0.5$), and the 1973 oil shares. The second calibration assumes mild wage rigidities ($\gamma = 0.6$), full credibility ($\delta = 0$), and the 1997 oil shares. The figure shows that our stylized model still cannot match the observed (conditional) volatility of CPI inflation and GDP; in particular it predicts a much more favorable trade-off post-1984 than is actually observed. The figure also shows, however, that the combination of the three changes in the environment we have focused on can account for the improvement in the trade-off observed in the data.
7 Concluding Comments

We have reached five main conclusions:

First, that the effects of oil price shocks must have coincided in time with large shocks of a different nature. Given our partial identification strategy, we have not identified these other shocks. We have given some evidence that increases in other commodity prices were important in the 1970s. We have not identified the other shocks for the 2000s.

Second, that the effects of oil price shocks have changed over time, with steadily smaller effects on prices and wages, as well as on output and employment.

Third, that a first plausible cause for these changes is a decrease in real wage rigidities. Such rigidities are needed to generate the type of large stagflation in response to adverse supply shocks such as those that took place in the 1970s. We have shown that the response of the consumption wage to the marginal rate of substitution, and thus to employment, appears to have increased over time.

Fourth, that a second plausible cause for these changes is the increased credibility of monetary policy. We have offered a simple formalization of lack of credibility and its effect on the volatility frontier. We have shown that the response of expected inflation to oil shocks has substantially decreased over time.

Fifth, that a third plausible cause for these changes is simply the decrease in the share of oil in consumption and in production. The decline is large enough to have quantitatively significant implications.

Despite the length of the paper, we are conscious, however, of the limitations of our arguments. Some of the evidence, for example, the IRF evidence for Japan, does not fit our story. The model we have developed is too primitive in many dimensions, and its quantitative implications must
be taken with caution. The development of a richer model, at least with respect to the specification of production, and of real wage rigidities, and its estimation, seem the natural next steps to check the conclusions reached above.
Appendix 1: A New-Keynesian Model for an Oil-Importing Economy

The present appendix describes in more detail the model used in Section 5 and derives the equilibrium conditions underlying the simulations in the main text.

Households

We assume a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households. Each household seeks to maximize

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, N_t)$$

where

$$C_t \equiv \Theta_{\chi} C_{m,t}^{\chi} C_{q,t}^{1-\chi}$$

and where $C_{m,t}$ denotes consumption of (imported) oil, $C_{q,t} \equiv \left( \int_0^1 P_{q,t}(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \, di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{1-\epsilon}}$ is a CES index of domestic goods, $N_t$ denotes employment or hours worked, and $\Theta_{\chi} \equiv \chi^{-\chi}(1-\chi)^{-(1-\chi)}$.

We assume that period utility is given by

$$U(C_t, N_t) \equiv \log C_t - \frac{N_t^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi}$$

The period budget constraint, conditional on optimal allocation of expenditures among different domestic goods (not derived here) is given by:

$$P_{q,t}C_{q,t} + P_{m,t}C_{m,t} + Q_t^B B_t = W_t N_t + B_{t-1} + \Pi_t$$

where $P_{q,t} \equiv \left( \int_0^1 P_{q,t}(i)^{1-\epsilon} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$ is a price index for domestic goods, $P_{m,t}$ is the price of oil (in domestic currency), and $W_t$ is the nominal wage. $Q_t^B$ is the price of a one-period nominally riskless domestic bond, paying one
unit of domestic currency. $B_t$ denotes the quantity of that bond purchased in period $t$. For simplicity we assume no access to international financial markets.

The optimal allocation of expenditures between imported and domestically produced good implies

$$P_{q,t}C_{q,t} = (1 - \chi) P_{c,t}C_t$$

$$P_{m,t}C_{m,t} = \chi P_{c,t}C_t$$

where $P_{c,t} \equiv P_{m,t}^{\chi} P_{q,t}^{1-\chi}$ is the CPI index. Note that $\chi$ corresponds, in equilibrium, to the share of oil in consumption. Note also that $P_{c,t} = P_{q,t} S_t^\chi$, where $S_t \equiv \frac{P_{m,t}}{P_{q,t}}$ denotes the real price of oil, expressed in terms of domestically produced goods. Taking logs,

$$p_{c,t} = p_{q,t} + \chi s_t$$

where $s_t \equiv p_{m,t} - p_{q,t}$ is the log of the real price of oil (measured in terms of domestic goods).

Furthermore, and conditional on an optimal allocation between the two types of goods, we have $P_{q,t}C_{q,t} + P_{m,t}C_{m,t} = P_{c,t}C_t$, which can be substituted into the budget constraint. The resulting constraint can then be used to derive the household’s remaining optimality conditions. The intertemporal optimality condition is given by:

$$Q_t^B = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \frac{P_{c,t}}{P_{c,t+1}} \right\}$$

Under the assumption of perfect competition in labor markets (to be relaxed below), the household’s intratemporal optimality condition is given
by

\[
\frac{W_t}{P_{c,t}} = C_t \ N_t^\phi \equiv MRS_t
\]

which is the perfectly competitive labor supply schedule. The log-linearized version of the previous two equations, found in the text, are given by:

\[
c_t = E_t\{c_{t+1}\} - (i_t - E_t\{\pi_{c,t+1}\}) - \rho
\]

(18)

\[
w_t - p_{c,t} = c_t + \phi \ n_t
\]

(19)

where we use lower-case letters to denote the logarithms of the original variables, and where \(\pi_{c,t} \equiv p_{c,t} - p_{c,t-1}\) represents CPI inflation.

**Firms**

Each firm produces a differentiated good indexed by \(i \in [0, 1]\) with a production function

\[
Q_t(i) = A_t \ M_t(i)^{\alpha_m} N_t(i)^{\alpha_n}
\]

where \(\alpha_m + \alpha_n \leq 1\).

Independently of how prices are set, and assuming that firms take the price of both inputs as given, cost minimization implies that firm \(i\)'s nominal marginal cost \(\Psi_t(i)\) is given by:

\[
\Psi_t(i) = \frac{W_t}{\alpha_m(Q_t(i)/N_t(i))} = \frac{P_{m,t}}{\alpha_m(Q_t(i)/M_t(i))}
\]

(20)

Letting \(M_t^p(i) \equiv P_{q,t}(i)/\Psi_t(i)\) denote firm \(i\)'s gross markup, we have

\[
M_t^p(i) \ S_t M_t(i) = \alpha_m \ Q_t(i) \frac{P_{q,t}(i)}{P_{q,t}}
\]

Let \(Q_t \equiv \left( \int_0^1 Q_t(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \ di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}\) denote aggregate gross output. It follows
that

$$M_t = \frac{\alpha_m Q_t}{M^p_t S_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

where we have used the fact that \(Q_t(i) = (P_{q,t}(i)/P_{q,t})^{-\epsilon} Q_t\) (the demand schedule facing firm \(i\)), and defined \(M^p_t\) as the average gross markup, weighted by firms’ input shares.

Taking logs and ignoring constants

$$m_t = -\mu^p_t - s_t + q_t$$

where \(\mu^p_t \equiv \log M^p_t\). The latter expression can be plugged back into the (log linearized) aggregate production function to yield the reduced form gross output equation

$$q_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} \left( a_t + \alpha_m n_t - \alpha_m s_t - \alpha_m \mu^p_t \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

**Consumption and Gross Output**

Note that in an equilibrium with balanced trade (and hence \(B_t = 0\)) the following relation must hold:

$$P_{c,t}C_t = P_{q,t}Q_t - P_{m,t}M_t$$

$$= \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha_m}{M^p_t} \right) P_{q,t}Q_t$$

where we have used (21) to derive the second equality. Taking logs and using the relations between the different price indexes, we obtain

$$c_t = q_t - \chi s_t + \eta \mu^p_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

where \(\eta \equiv \frac{\alpha_m}{M^p - \alpha_m}\) and \(M^p\) denotes the steady state markup.
Combining (22) and (23), and invoking the fact that 
\( \left( \frac{\alpha_m}{M^p - \alpha_m} - \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} \right) \mu^p_t \approx 0 \) for plausibly low values of \( \alpha_m \) and the net markup measures \( M^p - 1 \) and \( \mu^p_t \), we can write

\[
ct = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} at + \frac{\alpha_n}{1 - \alpha_m} nt - \left( \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} + \chi \right) st \tag{24}
\]

**Gross Output, Value Added, and the GDP Deflator**

The GDP deflator \( P_{g,t} \) is implicitly defined by

\[
P_{q,t} \equiv (P_{g,t})^{1 - \alpha_m} (P_{m,t})^{\alpha_m}
\]

Taking logs and using the definition of the terms of trade \( s_t \)

\[
p_{y,t} = p_{q,t} - \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} s_t
\]

Value added (or GDP), \( Y_t \), is then defined by

\[
P_{y,t} Y_t = P_{q,t} Q_t - P_{m,t} M_t = \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha_m}{M^p_t} \right) P_{q,t} Q_t
\]

which can be log linearized to yield

\[
y_t = q_t + \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m} s_t + \eta \mu^p_t
\]

\[
y_t = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha_m} (at + \alpha_n nt)
\]

where the last equality uses the approximation invoked above.

Note that combining the above expressions for consumption and value
added we can obtain the following relation between the two

\[ c_t = y_t - \left( \frac{\alpha_m}{1 - \alpha_m + \chi} \right) s_t \]

**Price Setting**

Here we assume that firms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). Each period only a fraction \(1 - \theta\) of firms, selected randomly, reset prices. The remaining firms, with measure \(\theta\), keep their prices unchanged. The optimal price setting rule for a firm resetting prices in period \(t\) is given by

\[
E_t \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \Lambda_{t,t+k} Q_{t+k|t} \left( P^*_t - \mathcal{M}^P \Psi_{t+k|t} \right) \right\} = 0 \tag{25}
\]

where \(P^*_t\) denotes the price newly set at time \(t\), \(Q_{t+k|t}\) and \(\Psi_{t+k|t}\) are respectively the level of output and marginal cost in period \(t + k\) for a firm that last set its price in period \(t\), and \(\mathcal{M}^P \equiv \epsilon/(\epsilon - 1)\) is the desired gross markup. Note that the latter also corresponds to the gross markup in the zero inflation perfect foresight steady state.

The domestic price level evolves according to the difference equation

\[
P_{q,t} = \left[ \theta \left( P_{q,t-1} \right)^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - \theta) \left( P^*_t \right)^{1-\epsilon} \right]^{1/\epsilon} \tag{26}
\]

Combining the log-linearized version of (25) and (26) around a zero inflation steady state, yields the following equation for domestic inflation, \(\pi_{q,t} \equiv p_{q,t} - p_{q,t-1}\):

\[
\pi_{q,t} = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{q,t+1} \} - \lambda_p \hat{\mu}_t^p \tag{27}
\]

where \(\hat{\mu}_t^p = \mu_t^p - \mu^p\) denotes the (log) deviation of the average markup from its desired level, and \(\lambda_p \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta)}{\theta} \frac{1-\alpha_k}{1-\alpha_k + \alpha_k \epsilon}\).
Appendix 2. Computation of the Oil Share

We think of the U.S. economy as having two sectors, an oil-producing sector and a non-oil producing sector. We define the oil producing sector as the sum of the “oil and gas extraction” sector (NAIC code 211) and the “petroleum and coal” sector (NAIC code 324). (“Petroleum refineries”, a subsector of “petroleum and coal” is available only for benchmark years, the last available one being 1997. It represents 85% of the gross output of the “petroleum and coal” sector.) We define the non-oil producing sector as the rest of the economy.

To compute relevant numbers for 2005, we use data from the IO tables from the BEA site.

In 2005, “oil and gas extraction” output was $227b, imports were $223b, for a total of $450b. Of this total, $5b was for domestic final uses, $440b was for intermediates, of which $259 went to “Petroleum and coal”, and $181b went to the non-oil sector. Petroleum and coal output was $402b, imports were $65b, for a total of $467b. Of this total, $167 was for domestic final uses, $279b for intermediates to the non-oil producing sector.

In 2005, total U.S. value added was $12,455b. Value added by “oil and gas” was $12b, value added by “petroleum and coal” was $12b, so value added in the non oil-producing sector was $12,431b.

These numbers imply a value for $\chi$ of $\frac{(181+279)}{(12,431+181+279)}=3.5\%$, and an estimate of $\alpha$ is $\frac{(5+167)}{(12,431+181+279)}=1.3\%$.

The shares obviously depend very much on the price of oil. The same computation for the benchmark year of 1997 (which allows us to use “petroleum refining” rather than “petroleum and coal” together) gives 1.7% and 1.2% respectively.

For the years 1973 and 1977, sectors are classified according to industry number codes. We construct the oil-producing sector as the sum of
of “crude petroleum and natural gas” (1977 industry number 8) and “petroleum refining” (1977 industry number 31). The same steps as above yield $\chi = 2.3\%$ and $\alpha = 1.5\%$ in 1973, and $\chi = 3.6\%$ and $\alpha = 1.8\%$ in 1977.
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