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Chapter Author: Richard B. Freeman, Robert S. Gibbons

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# Getting Together and Breaking Apart: The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining

Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons

The centralized system is a catastrophe. LO cannot deliver wage restraint. We'll go for anything else wherever it leads.

—SAF EMPLOYER ASSOCIATION REPRESENTATIVE, 1990

Provided it is given the opportunity [the traditional system] will continue to serve both sides . . . for years to come

—LO UNION REPRESENTATIVE, 1987

From the 1970s through the mid-1980s, many economists extolled the virtues of centralized bargaining arrangements. Crouch (1985), Tarantelli (1986), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Olson (1990), Calmfors and Driffil (1988), and Soskice (1990) among others stressed that centralized bargaining can internalize the negative externalities of sectoral union-management bargaining such as inflationary wage and price increases or unemployment. Empirical studies of macroeconomic responses to the 1970s oil shocks found that centralized systems had better unemployment-wage trade-offs and unemployment and inflation outcomes than systems where unions operate as limited special interest groups and at least as good outcomes as highly decentralized systems.<sup>1</sup> Some countries with decentralized union movements, such as Australia, sought to centralize labor relations. Analysts in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, suggested that their country would do better with a more centralized mode of wage setting (Layard 1991). The International Labour Organisation endorsed tripartite national agreements as a mode of addressing labor market problems.

Richard B. Freeman holds the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University. He is also director of the Labor Studies Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research and executive programme director for comparative labour market institutions at the London School of Economics' Centre for Economic Performance. Robert S. Gibbons is professor of economics at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Part of the research in this paper is based on fieldwork at FIEF. The paper has benefited from detailed discussions with many specialists from Swedish labor and management organizations, including LO, SIF, Metall, SAF, and SVF, and with academic researchers.

1. For studies finding better performance for centralized systems, see Bruno and Sachs (1985) or Crouch (1985). For studies showing that centralized systems yield better outcomes than systems with local bargaining or considerable state intervention in wage setting and similar outcomes to decentralized systems, see Calmfors and Driffil (1988) and Freeman (1988).

Despite the reputed virtues of centralized bargaining, however, many centralized arrangements fell into disarray in the 1980s. Country after country moved toward more decentralized bargaining (Katz 1993). Italy abandoned the *scala mobile*, which had been the major centralizing force in its wage-setting system. New Zealand introduced legislation that greatly weakened its collective bargaining system. In France, there was a huge increase in plant-level agreements. Australian unions and employers sought more company and plant negotiations. Perhaps most striking, Sweden abandoned the peak-level wage-bargaining system that had served it since the 1950s. In 1983, the Swedish metalworkers and Volvo withdrew from centralized negotiations, and bargaining lurched thereafter toward the company and sector level. The central union and management groups alternated between increasingly weak central agreements and complete abandonment of peak negotiations.

What explains the retreat from the centralized bargaining that seemed so fruitful in the 1970s? Are centralized wage-setting arrangements intrinsically less stable than decentralized bargaining? Did the costs of centralized arrangements rise relative to their benefits? What determines whether labor and firms “get together” or “break apart” in peak-level negotiations?

This paper examines these questions, paying particular attention to the decline in peak-level bargaining in Sweden. We develop a model of centralized bargaining among independent unions and firms that treats the costs as well as the benefits of centralization. Our analysis stresses that central negotiators have neither the instruments nor the information needed to tailor national agreements to the particular circumstances of individual industries or enterprises and thus must allow for some “wage drift” to maintain flexibility. But drift opens the door for defection by local bargaining pairs, which threatens the viability of centralized arrangements. We argue that the more variegated the economic environment, the greater is the equilibrium level of wage drift, and the stronger is the incentive for some local pair to defect. We attribute the decline in centralized bargaining in the 1980s to two forces that increased the dispersion of the local conditions covered by the central bargain—growing unionization of new groups, such as white-collar workers, and market forces favoring greater wage differentials—and to the decline in the threat of inflation, which was an initial motivation for centralized bargaining.<sup>2</sup> While simple, our model captures some of the major elements of the decay in peak-level

2. We recognize that the paper falls short of giving a “complete” model of centralized bargaining, in which several unions voluntarily give the right to bargain to a union federation and determine a bargaining stance for the federation; several employers voluntarily give the right to bargain to an employer federation and determine a bargaining stance for the employers’ group; the union confederation and employer federation reach a centralized agreement; and the local parties concur or defect from the central agreement. Developing such an analysis is extremely difficult (for the problems of trying to capture too much, see Elster [1989]) and risks losing insights in a full “general equilibrium”-type story. Our goal is the more limited one of laying out selected themes that illuminate some forces that contribute to the decline of centralized bargaining.

bargaining in Sweden and, we hope, illuminates the decentralization of collective bargaining elsewhere.

### 10.1 The Basic Framework: Centralization versus Flexibility

Most analyses of centralization stress the benefits of treating externality problems in wage determination (such as inflationary wage-price spirals) through peak-level bargaining arrangements (e.g., Flanagan 1987; Calmfors 1987; Calmfors and Driffil 1988; Calmfors and Forslund 1990; Calmfors and Horn 1986; and Horn and Wolinsky 1988a, 1988b). What is less stressed in the literature is that centralized arrangements cost an economy flexibility and require that the center monitor and police settlements reached by independent bargaining pairs that have information unavailable to the center. If central bargainers had the same information as local bargainers, centralization should increase social well-being by leading to an efficient solution. With full information, local parties would give negotiating rights to the center, which would set wages, just as might an omniscient wage- or price-control agency. Deviations from the settlement would be instantly detected and potentially punished, for instance, through fines. Centralized bargaining would be a superior way to restrain aggregate wages, compared to macroeconomic policies that operate largely through unemployment.

The problem is that central bargainers never have the same information as do local bargainers and thus cannot be certain whether any wage (or price) change that deviates from the central agreement does so because of local market conditions unknown to the center or because local bargainers defected from the agreement. In one state of the world, for example, the market might require a 0 percent wage increase for efficiency so that a 2 percent increase in sector A would reflect defection from a central agreement that had, say, a 0 percent wage inflation goal. In another state, however, a 2 percent increase might be needed for efficient production so that a 0 percent increase would be an inflexibility that would reduce output by failing to induce workers to move to sector A (or to work hard, or to invest in skills, or the like), for reasons unknown to and not verifiable by the center. These considerations yield the following:


*Basic Point 1.* An ideal central wage-setting system must allow deviations from the frame agreement so that local parties can take account of conditions unknown to the center.

This is commonly done in centralized bargaining with a multilevel system of wage setting. For simplicity, we consider two levels. At the first level, central bodies determine appropriate aggregate wage changes on the basis of national economic conditions. For example, in Sweden during the heyday of centralized bargaining, the main union federation (LO, Landsorganisationen) and employers' association (SAF, Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen) reached peak-level

agreements that set the frame for lower-level industry and firm bargaining. Once the frame is set, local unions cannot strike, and firms cannot lock out workers to obtain a wage settlement that differs from the frame, but the two sides can agree to further wage changes on the basis of local conditions, producing wage drift. What distinguishes drift from other negotiated wage changes is that it arises from a Pareto-improving agreement by the local union and employer. In essence, the central agreement determines the threat point in local bargaining and guarantees that negotiated drift will benefit both sides, as neither can use economic force (such as a strike) to gain a bigger share of the pie. In Sweden and other countries with centralized wage arrangements, a substantial proportion of wage changes normally consisted of positive wage drift.

Unfortunately for the center, there are two ways in which both local parties can benefit by wage drift. They can agree to market-efficient wages that raise output and joint surplus. Or they can bargain for inflationary wage (and price) gains that redistribute income from the rest of society to them. Changes in wages in any sector  $i$  ( $W_i$ ) thus consist of three parts: the common frame wage inflation ( $W$ ); deviation or drift due to market conditions ( $DM_i$ ); and drift due to defect strategies ( $DD_i$ ). In an ideal world, one could imagine that the common frame agreement should be set so that  $E(DM_i) = 0$ : some sectors would increase wages by more than the frame, while others would increase wages by less owing to their particular market conditions, balancing out to zero net drift. Furthermore, in this ideal world,  $DD_i$  would be zero: no one would defect. If local parties chose only economically efficient drift, then centralization would yield a first-best optimum—the optimal aggregate wage inflation and the optimal change in relative wages.

Knowing that some drift is likely to be efficient and other drift likely to reflect defection, the center must develop a strategy of “allowable” drift. If the center does nothing to penalize deviations, the incentive to defect is likely to be high, leading to a breakdown of the agreement and the loss of the benefits of centralization. At the other extreme, if the center prevents all deviations, the economy loses from inflexibility. Figure 10.1 depicts the problem. The horizontal axis measures centralization on a scale from zero to one, where a value of 0 represents a totally decentralized wage-setting system, while a value of 1 represents a totally centralized system. Intermediate values reflect differences in the leeway given local bargainers to deviate from the frame agreement because the center either imposes different penalties for deviation or allocates different amounts of resources (from moral suasion to side payments) to reduce deviation. The vertical axis measures the benefits and costs from centralized wage setting. Benefits are a rising parabola on the assumption that inflation costs follow a quadratic loss function. Costs fall with increasing centralization until point  $M$ , then rise. The fall reflects the possibility that some centralization may be necessary to control monopoly or monopsonistic wage setting or inefficient “rent sharing” between profitable firms and their workers. The rise rep-



**Fig. 10.1 Benefits and costs of centralization**

resents the fact that high degrees of centralization extract a large cost in terms of lost flexibility. Absent any costs of flexibility, optimal centralization is 1 since it minimizes wage inflation. Absent inflation costs, optimal centralisation is  $M$  ( $= 0$  if there are no dangers of inefficient rent sharing). Given a trade-off between the benefits of centralization and the loss of flexibility, optimal centralization is  $M^* > M$ . The wider the gap between the benefit and cost curves, the more beneficial and stable will centralized wage setting be, given "random" shifts in those curves.<sup>3</sup>

This framework sets the stage for analyzing the three elements of centralized wage setting: the benefits of centralization from internalizing the externalities of local agreements; the costs of centralization due to lost flexibility; and the process of controlling or limiting defection from a frame agreement.

## 10.2 The Benefits of Centralization

Why should local unions or firms voluntarily give the right to bargain to a higher-level organization? The most widely mentioned reason invokes a prisoner's dilemma (or other externality) model of wage settlements: lower-level bargaining pairs choose between socially desirable restraint in wage setting or inflationary settlements.<sup>4</sup> Absent centralization, they end up at a noncooperative inflationary outcome. By internalizing the costs of inflationary settlements, centralized bargaining should, by contrast, produce the cooperative settlement.

3. The curves in the exhibit reflect two underlying relations: (i) the effect of centralization on wage inflation/inappropriate wage structures and (ii) the welfare costs of each. Thus, the curves will shift whenever centralization becomes more/less effective in altering the outcomes or when the outcomes become more/less costly to the economy.

4. Centralization has other potential benefits as well. It can reduce labor disputes by bringing the costs of third parties to bear on the disputees. It can minimize the inefficiency costs of local monopoly union wage setting or monopsonistic employer wage setting. Also, it insures workers against wage losses due to negative shocks, and ensures that firms benefit from positive shocks, because wages do not respond. Regressions show that industry wage changes are uncorrelated with changes in value added per worker in Sweden but highly correlated in the United States and that Swedish wages are only modestly correlated with such things as firm size, profitability, etc. (Holmlund and Zetterberg 1989).


The major benefit of centralization is presumably reductions in wage inflation, but any gain due to internalizing an externality can demonstrate how forming a central organization can produce benefits in collective bargaining. Since we do not want to develop a full macro model to assess the costs of inflation, we briefly analyze the externality created by wage settlements that result from an unemployment benefit system.

Consider the following two-sector, two-union model. Labor is the only factor of production, and union  $i$  is the monopoly supplier of labor to firm  $i$ . Union  $i$  has  $N_i$  members and seeks to maximize its members' income (or indirect utility, more generally), which depends on wages,  $W_i$ , the probability members work in the sector,  $P(W_i)$ , and the unemployment benefit they get,  $b$ .

Decentralized bargaining proceeds as follows: unions choose wages separately; firms choose prices and employment; and workers get  $W_i$  or  $b$ . Bargaining under a union federation differs only in the first stage: unions bargain between themselves over a wage vector; firms choose prices and employment; and workers get  $W_i$  or  $b$ . In brief, we model centralization *not* as a change in the parties' preferences (such as union  $i$  suddenly caring about members of union  $j$ ) but rather as a change in the game the parties play (bargaining with each other first rather than individually with firms). This modeling strategy parallels Grossman and Hart's (1986) observation that the best way to model changes in vertical integration is to analyze how they affect the structure of interactions between parties rather than their preferences.

To keep things simple, this model is based on monopoly-union behavior. In both the decentralized and the federation cases, given wages from the first stage we solve the last two stages of the model by backward induction. In the decentralized case, the first-stage wages are then given by the Nash equilibrium of the wage-choice game between the unions, whereas in the federation case these wages are given by the Nash bargaining solution. Since in this model the union federation has the instruments that the individual unions have (namely, one wage per sector), both unions are better off in the federation case. The externality in the decentralized case is the cost of  $b$  paid by nonmembers of each union. To see this, contrast a union whose members pay no taxes to the unemployment benefit fund with a union that has a fully experience-rated fund, where workers pay the full cost.

If all unemployment benefits come from taxes on other workers, the union maximizes  $pW + (1 - p)b$ . It ignores the tax burden created by  $b$ . The first-order condition is  $W = b - p/p'$ . If, by contrast, the unemployment benefit system is fully funded by its members, the union maximizes the after-tax income received by members,  $(1 - t)pW + (1 - p)b$ , subject to the budget constraint that taxes paid by those working equals the unemployment benefits received by jobless members,  $tpW = (1 - p)b$ . This calls for maximizing  $pW$ , yielding the standard revenue-maximizing result:  $W = -p/p'$ ; that is, the union raises wages until the elasticity of labor demand,  $-Wp'/p$ , equals one.




**Fig. 10.2 The effect of a union federation**

Figure 10.2 shows how the choice of wages in these two cases affects employment (output). In the free-rider case, the union chooses the wage  $W_b = b - p/p'$ , and the firm chooses  $E_b$ ; in the fully funded case, the union chooses  $W$ , and the firm chooses  $E$ . The lost output is the trapezoid  $W_b WEE_b$ . It is larger the greater the level of  $b$  and the more elastic the demand curve. The magnitude of the gain from internalizing funding of the unemployment system through a union federation can be sizable since centralization reduces unemployment.

Extending the analysis to a case where a percentage of the tax burden of financing own-member unemployment is paid by union  $i$ 's members is simple and makes clear that changing the structure of bargaining from decentralized firm-union pairs to a central union federation is beneficial because it forces each union to internalize the cost of unemployment benefits.

### 10.3 The Costs of Inflexibility

There are two ways in which inflexibility in wage setting can reduce economic well-being. First, it can lead to a misallocation of labor between expanding and contracting sectors. For simplicity, consider a two-sector economy that is in full employment. Each sector faces an upward-sloping labor supply schedule, owing to heterogeneity among workers in the costs of mobility, preferences, or skills. The elasticity of demand in sector A is  $h$ , while the elasticity of supply is  $e$ . When demand shifts upward by  $X'$ , as in figure 10.3a, the wage should rise by  $X'/(e + h)$ , inducing an increase in employment of  $W'_a$ . But centralized bargaining does not allow sector A to raise its wage. The result is that neither employment nor output in the sector increases. Instead of  $E'$  persons working in sector A,  $E$  work in the sector. The social loss is a standard welfare triangle set by the gap between the value of adding additional workers to sector A and their reservation wage/the opportunity value of their time for working in B. Too many people remain in sector B, and too few (none) move to sector A. Misallocation losses of this sort are usually viewed as being of second-order importance compared to the costs of lost output due to unemployment or the costs of wage inflation.



**Fig. 10.3 The costs of inflexibility**

But inflexibility in wage setting can also produce “first-order” effects in the form of wasted resources that show up in unemployment or possibly inadequate work effort that reduces output just as does unemployment. Consider, for example, what happens when demand for labor falls in sector A from  $D'$  to  $D$  (see fig. 10.3a). With rigid wages, employment will drop from  $E'$  to  $E''$  rather than to  $E$ , as it would in a flexible wage regime. Thus,  $E'' - E'$  more workers are displaced from the sector because of inflexible wages. Since wages are fixed in sector B, these workers will end up unemployed, barring macroeconomic changes that might alter the real cost of labor in both sectors. Inflexible relative wages produce inflexible real wages and joblessness that would have been avoided had sector A been free to reduce pay in the face of the decline in demand or had sector B been able to reduce wages to hire those displaced from A.

Inflexibility in wages can also have first-order effects on an economy by altering work effort and preventing the appropriate adjustments in efficiency

wages. Consider again an economy that has full employment and the “right” wage structure. Let work requirements change in a particular sector so that the supply of labor shifts from  $S$  to  $S'$ , as in figure 10.3b: individuals want a higher wage in the sector because the work has become more difficult, work conditions have eroded, and so on, relative to other sectors. The market-clearing wage is  $W'$ , and the market-clearing employment is  $E'$ , but with inflexible wages the sector can pay only  $W$  and will obtain only  $E''$  workers. If wages are rigid elsewhere and unemployment is less desirable than working, the loss in labor supply is likely to take the form of reduced effort rather than of an actual reduction in employment. Relabel the horizontal axis to refer to effort. At the “right” wage  $W'$  a given workforce would offer  $E'$  units of effort, whereas at  $W$  it will offer just  $E''$ . The loss to the economy is the difference in effort levels  $E''$  and  $E'$ .

While we have not “proved” that inflexibility in wages has sizable first-order effects on economic performance, our discussion suggests that it is reasonable to treat the costs of inflexibility on employment or effort on a par with the costs that come from free-riding on the unemployment benefit system in figure 10.2 above.

#### 10.4 The Centralized Bargaining Game

Consider next a centralized bargaining system with three players: the center, a union, and a firm. The center’s actions represent peak-level bargaining between union and employer federations, and the firm’s and the union’s actions represent lower-level bargaining at the industry or enterprise level. The maxims of the three players are the following:

*Union.*  $U = w_0 - c(a) + g(w - w_0)$ , where  $w_0$  is the wage floor set by the center,  $c(a)$  is the cost of activity level  $a$  (such as effort or investing in skills) to workers,  $w$  is the wage (so  $w - w_0$  is the amount of drift), and  $g$  is the rate at which the union values wage drift. (Economically it might seem that  $g$  should equal one so that the union cares only about the realized wage  $w$ , but politically there may be a difference between wage gains granted from on high,  $w_0$ , and wage drift resulting from bargaining between ongoing players at the local level.)

*Firm.*  $\pi_f = rv(a) - w_0 - h(w - w_0)$ , where  $v(a)$  is the revenue function,  $r$  is a shift parameter known to the firm and union that affects the value of production (perhaps a productivity or price shock), and  $h$  is the rate at which wage drift costs the firm. (Again,  $h$  may differ from one for political reasons.)

*Center.*  $\pi_c = [rv(a) - c(a)] - kw_0 - m(w - w_0)$ , where  $rv(a) - c(a)$  is social output in the sector,  $k$  is the rate at which a high central wage settlement harms

the center, and  $m$  is the additional cost to the center of the modeled sector's wage drift. (If the center cares only about realized wages, then  $m = k$ .)

Some comments on this structure:

1. The parameter  $r$  measures the private information about local conditions held by the firm and union but not by the center. It may seem strange that the firm and union observe  $r$  but that the center does not since the center is the amalgam of a federation of firms and a federation of unions. One interpretation is that  $r$  is realized after the center has determined  $w_0$ . Another interpretation is that political processes within federations (not modeled here) lead firms or unions to keep  $r$  private information.

2. The variable  $w_0$  is a wage floor so that deviations from the frame involve higher wages only. We assume this because it would be politically difficult for a union to settle for less than was recommended by higher-level bargainers. In the "no-drift" model that follows,  $w_0$  is a wage ceiling as well, but in the "full-drift" model the firm and union can negotiate a Pareto-improving increase in the wage.

3. While the firm and union payoffs are standard, the center's deserves explanation. We assume that the center cares about (i) the efficiency of production, as measured by  $rv(a) - c(a)$ , but not (directly) about its division between the parties; (ii) the cost of inflationary central agreements, as reflected by the parameter  $k$ ; and (iii) the extent of wage drift from the frame wage  $w_0$  as reflected by the parameter  $m$ . To keep things simple, we assume hereafter that  $m = k$ , but in a richer model it might be valuable to distinguish between these effects. (For example,  $m$  might vary across sectors.) Likewise, we hereafter assume  $g = h = 1$ .

We consider two extreme models: one in which the center can impose such severe penalties that there is *no drift* in the economy, and one in which it cannot impose any penalties so that there is *full drift*. We then offer conjectures about a model of *partial drift* that compromises between these extremes. In all three models, the basic sequence of decision making is as follows: the center chooses  $w_0$ ; observing  $r$ , the firm and the union negotiate  $w \geq w_0$ ; and, given  $w$ , the firm and the union negotiate an activity level,  $a$ . In the no-drift case, the firm and the union have no choice but to settle on  $w = w_0$ ; in the full-drift case, any  $w \geq w_0$  is allowed. In the partial-drift case, the center chooses not only  $w_0$  but also a parameter  $d$  representing the maximum allowable percentage wage drift: the firm and the union must negotiate a wage  $w$  from the interval  $[w_0, (1 + d)w_0]$ .

In all three cases, we think of the negotiation(s) over activity level as occurring over the life of the contract and hence after the negotiation over wage at the start of the contract. Negotiations over activity level depend (in part) on grassroots political forces on the shop floor, whereas firm-union negotiations over wage depend (in part) on the character, credibility, and charisma of individual union leaders. It therefore seems plausible that the union's bargaining power differs in these two negotiations. We use the (generalized) Nash bar-

gaining solution to solve each negotiation but allow the union's bargaining power over wages ( $q$ ) to differ from that over activity level ( $p$ ), where  $0 \leq p, q \leq 1$ .

In the final stage of each model, when the firm and the union negotiate an activity level, we assume that, if no settlement is reached, the firm shuts down, yielding payoffs of zero to each party. Thus, given the realization of the productivity parameter  $r$  and a wage  $w$ , the Nash bargaining solution (generalized to arbitrary rather than symmetric bargaining power) solves

$$\max_a [w - c(a)]^p [rv(a) - w]^{1-p},$$


subject to the constraints that  $w - c(a) \geq 0$  and  $rv(a) - w \geq 0$ . We denote this negotiated activity level by  $a_N(r, w)$ .

To (help) ensure that such a Nash bargaining solution exists, we impose conventional regularity conditions:  $v(0) = c(0) = 0$ ,  $v'(0) > 0 = c'(0)$ ,  $v'' < 0 < c''$ , and  $a \geq 0$ , as illustrated in figure 10.4. Even with these assumptions, however, no solution exists if  $w$  is too large:  $w$  must not exceed the cost  $c(a)$  at the activity level where  $rv(a) = c(a)$ , else the firm cannot afford to remain in business. (Again, see the figure.) Given such a nonbankrupting value of  $w$ , the negotiated activity level depends on the parties' bargaining powers,  $p$  and  $1 - p$ . The highest possible negotiated activity level earns the union no surplus ( $w - c(a) = 0$ ); naturally, this occurs when the union has no bargaining power,  $p = 0$ . Similarly, the lowest possible negotiated activity level earns the firm no surplus ( $rv(a) - w = 0$ ); this occurs when  $p = 1$ . For an arbitrary  $p$ , the Nash bargaining solution  $a_N(r, w)$  solves the first-order condition

$$pc'(a)[rv(a) - w] = (1 - p)rv'(a)[w - c(a)],$$

as illustrated for a small value of  $p$  in the figure.

Given this negotiated activity level in the final stage, we can now work back-



**Fig. 10.4** Nash bargaining between firm and union

ward to the wage negotiation in the second stage, taking each of the three cases in turn.

#### 10.4.1 Model I: No Drift

In the no-drift case, we assume that the penalties at the center's disposal are sufficiently great that there is never any drift:  $w - w_0 = 0$ . In effect, the center has a fully enforced wage-control system. This simplifies the payoffs to  $\pi_c = [rv(a) - c(a)] - kw_0$  to the center,  $\pi_f = rv(a) - w_0$  to the firm, and  $U = w_0 - c(a)$  to the union. Since the intermediate stage of the model (in which the firm and the union negotiate over wages) is irrelevant, in the first stage the center chooses the wage  $w_0$  to solve

$$\max_{w_0} E_r\{rv[a_N(r, w_0)] - c[a_N(r, w_0)]\} - kw_0.$$

Even in this no-drift case, the center's optimal wage floor reflects a compromise between the center's two goals: efficient production and wage discipline. Efficient production requires a positive wage increase, while wage discipline requires a 0 percent increase. (Here and below, we allow ourselves to use the language of *wage increases* and *inflation* even though the model concerns wage levels.) For example, if the center knew  $r$ , then setting  $w_0 = 0$  would yield an inefficiently low activity level.

To compute the optimal wage floor  $w_0^*$ , the center considers the effect on the subsequent activity-level negotiation of variations in  $w_0$ . Implicitly differentiating the first-order condition for the negotiated activity level (or inspecting fig. 10.5a) shows that  $a_N(r, w)$  increases with the wage. (The bold and solid vertical lines are, respectively, the firm's and the union's surpluses at the wage  $w$ . The bold dotted and the dotted vertical lines are the analogous surpluses at the wage  $w'$ .) Roughly speaking, keeping the activity level constant, a higher wage benefits the union and harms the firm, so the Nash bargaining solution redresses this imbalanced distribution of surplus by increasing the activity level.

The complementary analysis (fig. 10.5b) shows that the negotiated activity level *decreases* with the productivity parameter  $r$ . Here, an increase in  $r$  (to  $r'$ , in the figure) benefits the firm but has no effect on the union, so the Nash bargaining solution reallocates surplus by decreasing the activity level. Unfortunately, this response runs directly counter to efficiency considerations: the efficient activity level— $a^*(r)$ , which maximizes  $rv(a) - c(a)$ —increases with  $r$ . The reason the negotiated activity level behaves in this perverse fashion is that in this no-drift case the firm is unable to compensate the union for higher activity levels, no matter how badly the firm would like to achieve such levels.

This discordance between the negotiated and the efficient activity levels motivates the center to allow wage drift, as we explore below. Alternatively, if the center persists in enforcing the present no-drift case (presumably because  $k$  is large), the firm and the union may consider breaking away from centralized bargaining. In a full analysis of this possibility, the center would appreciate




Fig. 10.5 Comparative statics of Nash bargain

that the sector might break away and so might modify the choice of  $w_0^*$  to discourage such behavior. We conduct only an initial analysis of the sector's incentive to break away, under the assumption that the center chooses  $w_0^*$  as described above.

To keep things simple, suppose that there are only two values of  $r$ ,  $H > L$ . Figure 10.5b implies that, given the centrally determined wage  $w_0^*$ , the negotiated activity level for high-productivity ( $H$ ) firms will be less than that for low ( $L$ ), and figure 10.5a implies that both these activity levels increase with  $w_0^*$ . Thus, if  $w_0^*$  is very large, then it could be that both efficient activity levels are less than both negotiated activity levels,

$$a^*(L) < a^*(H) < a_N(H, w_0^*) < a_N(L, w_0^*),$$

while, if  $w_0^*$  is very small, then it could be that both efficient activity levels are greater than both negotiated activity levels,

$$a_N(H, w_0^*) < a_N(L, w_0^*) < a^*(L) < a^*(H).$$

It seems likely that the center typically will prefer an intermediate value of  $w_0$  so that neither of these extreme cases arises. For large enough values of  $k$  (relative to the difference in the efficient social surplus for  $H$  vs.  $L$ ), however,

the center will prefer the latter extreme over the former since the latter offers a much lower wage. This suggests that for sufficiently large  $k$  the high-productivity sectors will operate most inefficiently and so have the greatest incentive to break away from centralized bargaining.

*Basic Point 2.* If the center is sufficiently dedicated to wage discipline, then a sector's incentive to abandon the system increases with the value of the sector's production.

#### 10.4.2 Model II: Full Drift

The polar opposite to central control with no drift is a situation in which the firm and the union tailor the wage and the activity level to the realized value of the productivity parameter  $r$ , without any penalty from the center. This reinvigorates the intermediate stage of the game: the firm and the union bargain over the wage, subject to the constraint that  $w \geq w_0$ , taking into account the subsequent negotiation over the activity level.

In this wage negotiation, we assume that, if no settlement were reached, then the central agreement  $w_0$  would be imposed, after which the firm and the union would proceed to negotiate over the activity level as described above. Thus, the parties' threat payoffs are

$$U_0 = w_0 - c[a_N(r; w_0)]$$

and

$$\pi_0 = rv[a_N(r; w_0)] - w_0.$$

The Nash bargaining solution in the wage negotiation therefore solves

$$\max_{w \geq w_0} \{w - c[a_N(r; w)] - U_0\}^q \{rv[a_N(r; w)] - w - \pi_0\}^{1-q},$$

subject to the constraints that  $w - c[a_N(r; w)] \geq U_0$  and  $rv[a_N(r; w)] - w \geq \pi_0$ , where  $q$  is the union's bargaining power over wages. We denote this negotiated wage by  $w_N(r; w_0)$ .

The first-order condition for the negotiated wage is

$$q(rv - w - \pi_0) - (1 - q)(w - c - U_0) + a'[(1 - q)(w - c - U_0)rv' - q(rv - w - \pi_0)c'] = 0,$$

where  $a'$  denotes the partial derivative of  $a_N(r; w)$  with respect to  $w$ . Note that the term involving  $a'$  is reminiscent of the first-order condition for the negotiated activity level,

$$pc'(a)[rv(a) - w] - (1 - p)rv'(a)[w - c(a)] = 0.$$

More specifically, if  $q = p$  and  $U_0 = \pi_0 = 0$ , then the term involving  $a'$  is zero, so the first-order condition for  $w_N(r; w_0)$  becomes  $p(rv - w) = (1 - p)(w - c)$ , or

$$w = prv + (1 - p)c.$$

The first-order condition for  $a_N(r, w)$  then becomes

$$p(1 - p)c'(a)[rv - c] - p(1 - p)rv'(a)[rv - c] = 0,$$

or  $rv' = c'$ , which defines the efficient activity level  $a^*(r)$ .

To summarize, we have just shown that, if the union's bargaining power over wages is equal to its bargaining power over activity levels ( $q = p$ ), and if the payoffs to the union and the firm from abiding by the center's wage frame  $w_0$  are both zero, then the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level (for every realization of  $r$ ). Unfortunately (from the perspective of efficient production), these sufficient conditions are also necessary. More precisely, we show in the appendix that the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level for every realization of  $r$  only if  $p = q$  and  $w_0 = 0$  (where the latter implies  $U_0 = \pi_0 = 0$ ). Thus, if  $p$  differs from  $q$ , then there is no way for full drift to achieve efficient production. This gives us a result in the spirit of the Coase theorem.

*Basic Point 3.* Full drift yields the first best micro-efficient outcome only if the unions and management have similar bargaining power in wages and in the choice of activity level; differences in bargaining power over the two outcomes can produce inefficiency in the same manner as transactions costs.

When  $p$  differs from  $q$ , the center's optimal choice of  $w_0$  involves subtle considerations. The wage floor influences the parties' threat payoffs,  $U_0$  and  $\pi_0$ . Since the center dislikes high wages but likes efficient production, the center would like to choose a wage floor that favors  $\pi_0$  over  $U_0$ , anticipating that the parties' choice of an activity level will be influenced by efficiency considerations but that negotiated wages will have to be relatively low to accommodate the firm's high threat payoffs.

When  $p = q$ , on the other hand, it seems likely that  $w_0 = 0$  will be the center's optimal wage floor in this full-drift model—since lower wage floors seem likely to lead to lower negotiated wages, in which case the center can achieve efficient production while keeping wages as low as full drift will allow them to be kept. The center would be even better off, however, if a little production inefficiency could be traded for still lower wages. To explore this possibility, we turn next to the partial-drift model.

#### 10.4.3 Model III: Partial Drift

The timing of moves in the partial-drift case is identical to that in the full-drift case, except that the center's move in the first stage now involves two actions rather than one. Whereas in the no-drift and full-drift cases the center chose only a wage floor  $w_0$ , now the center also chooses a wage-drift parameter  $d$ . Specifically, if the center chooses  $w_0$  and  $d$ , then the bargaining between the firm and the union in the second stage is constrained to produce a wage no less than  $w_0$  but no greater than  $w_0(1 + d)$ . Thus,  $d$  is the maximum percentage

drift that the center will allow. The no-drift and full-drift cases are limits of this partial-drift case ( $d = 0$  and  $d = \infty$ , respectively).

We think of the partial-drift case as a one-shot game in which the center can commit to any value of  $d$  it chooses, but we intend this to be a reduced form for a repeated-game analysis in which the center cannot constrain the firm's and the union's current behavior but can later punish a firm-union pair that exceeds the current limit on drift. When the Swedish system was in its heyday, such punishments were available. For example, both LO and SAF had large strike funds that could be used to reward members that stayed within the guidelines for drift but could also be withheld to punish members who strayed outside.

In a world in which partial drift operates, the inefficiencies of both the no-drift and the full-drift models will likely reappear, albeit in muted fashion. The center can trade off the wage discipline/grossly inefficient activity levels from the no-drift case against the more efficient production/uncontrolled wages from the full-drift case. But this trade-off will not produce fully efficient production with tightly controlled wages.

It seems reasonable to conjecture that the center will find it optimal to allow more wage drift if production inefficiencies become more important, such as would occur if the population distribution of  $r$  increased in variance. Section 10.5 describes (among other things) the growth (and eventual explosion) of wage drift that preceded the decline of centralized bargaining in Sweden. The fact that even full drift may not yield efficient production (say, because  $p$  differs from  $q$ ) seems consistent with the Swedish experience: if production efficiency becomes sufficiently important (and controlling wages sufficiently unimportant), then the institution of centralized bargaining may be unable to persist. To conclude this section, we elaborate on this and other implications of our three models.

#### 10.4.4 Implications of the Analysis

In our model, three things create problems for a centralized wage-setting system:

1. An increase in the dispersion of desired outcomes across existing sectors. This will take the form of a greater dispersion in  $r$  across sectors. High- $r$  sectors have an incentive to opt out of the system.

2. An increase in the heterogeneity of groups covered by the agreement, through the addition of new groups. In our framework, this also takes the form of a greater dispersion in  $r$ . The more heterogeneous the groups covered by the central agreement, the more likely some groups will have relatively high values of  $r$  and thus consider a defect strategy.

3. A reduction in the importance of controlling inflation through centralized negotiations. A decline in the benefits curve in figure 10.1 above makes centralized bargaining less valuable. In our models, this takes the form of a reduced value of wage discipline ( $k$ ).

Our analyses suggest that decentralization could take the form of a growth of drift in a centralized system or of bargaining pairs opting out of the system if the center does not allow enough drift. These considerations seem to be relevant to the ongoing decentralization of centralized bargaining in the OECD. The widening of wage differentials in the United States and the United Kingdom, the countries that give greatest leeway to the market in wage setting, implies that developed-country economic conditions favor an increase in dispersion of labor market outcomes. The increased organization of white-collar and public-sector workers in unions in Europe in the 1970s created greater heterogeneity of interests in the organized sector. The worldwide drop in inflation meant that the gains from controlling inflation through centralized wage setting had fallen. If this analysis is correct, countries with greater market pressures for wage differentiation, with greater growth of organization of nontraditional union groups, and facing the least threat of serious wage inflation were likely to have moved furthest down the decentralization path. Rather than comparing different countries, however, our empirical analysis examines changes in the country that has moved most dramatically toward decentralized bargaining: Sweden.

## 10.5 Does the Model Illuminate the Swedish Case?

With the highest union density in the OECD and extensively organized employers' associations, Sweden has long been viewed as the archetype of centralized collective bargaining, ranked at or near the top in corporatism rates. The explicit consideration that LO and SAF gave national economic conditions made Sweden the leading example of the all-encompassing unionism that can deliver socially desirable outcomes (Olson 1990). But, from the early 1980s through the early 1990s, employers refused to enter into peak-level negotiations, and even sought to decentralize the industry negotiations, giving much greater leeway for decentralized wage setting. Even in this traditional exemplar of corporatism, centralized bargaining was not what it had once been.

Does our model capture essential features of the Swedish experience? In this section, we give a schematic description of Sweden's peak-level bargaining system and its evolution over time and then examine this bottom-line question.

### 10.5.1 The Traditional Centralized Bargaining System

Following other analysts (Ahlen 1989; Swenson 1989; Elster 1989; Martin 1984, 1992; Lundberg 1985; Nilsson 1993) we identify two major players in Sweden's traditional peak-level bargaining system. The first is LO, a strong central federation dominated by private-sector blue-collar workers, to which major unions gave a mandate to negotiate. The second is SAF, the private employer's association, with the mandate to negotiate for firms. However, we also note that Sweden's union movement now contains two other major federations

divided along skill lines: TCO, which organises white-collar workers; and SACO/SR, which covers professional workers.

Table 10.1 gives a brief chronology of the development of the traditional system through its decay in the 1980s. The 1940s set the stage for centralization. In 1938, following considerable labor turmoil, LO and SAF reached the Saltsjöbaden agreement to cooperate to resolve labor disputes. LO strengthened its authority over member unions by restricting their rights to strike without LO approval, allowing the LO executive board to participate in member unions' contract negotiations and to intervene in proposed settlements, and making union leaders rather than members the final authority in negotiations and dispute strategy. In 1944, LO founded TCO, the white-collar workers' union, to bring these weakly unionized workers into the labor movement. SAF and LO reached agreements on workplace rules and wage setting, and LO supported wage freezes as part of the Social Democrats' wartime economic policy.

In the 1950s, fearful that interindustry rivalry would produce a wage explosion harmful to the country's trade position, SAF pressed for centralized negotiations. It refused to allow its members to negotiate separately with unions until a central agreement was struck, forcing LO unions to give the right to bargain to LO, although many preferred local bargaining. Union support for centralization grew as leaders realized that it offered a mechanism for solidaristic wage policies beneficial to low-wage workers, reduced labor disputes, and lowered the risk of inflationary settlements that endangered full employment and would harm the union-allied Social Democrats. Both LO and SAF seemed to have sufficient tools to make central agreements effective. Under the rules of LO, the leaders of unions (who are on the LO executive council) rather than union members had the authority to confirm agreements. The leaders gave the federation a mandate to make "frame agreements" with SAF that set the parameters for lower-level bargaining. Unions engaged in disputes outside the frame faced the highly organized employers on their own, whereas workers on approved strikes received essentially full pay from individual union and federation strike funds. On the employer side, centralization was nominally stronger. Member firms and employer associations gave SAF the right to negotiate an agreement on their behalf. SAF had to approve lower-level agreements and lockouts and could fine firms that violated the central agreement, although it rarely did. SAF raised a large insurance fund available for firms that were struck or engaged in an approved lockout. Strengthening the importance of the central agreement, Sweden's labor courts treated the LO-SAF agreement as the legal norm: "In practice, unorganized employers thus are dependent on the agreements made by the large organizations" (Skogh 1984, 150).

Most analysts view the 1960s as the heyday of the centralized system. LO and SAF signed two- and three-year central agreements that dominated wage setting. Wage drift was moderate. LO's wage-solidarity policy reduced differentials noticeably (Hibbs and Locking 1991). Two events, however, portended future problems: 1966 legislation that granted the right to strike to public em-

**Table 10.1 Decadal Chronology of Industrial Relations Development**

1938–1940s: Development of cooperative arrangements
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saltsjöbaden Agreement (1938) establishes procedures for settling disputes</li> <li>• SAF-LO set national wage agreements for war period; reach cooperative agreements on works councils, time and motion studies, etc.</li> <li>• LO establishes greater control over member unions; founds TCO in 1944</li> </ul>
1950s–1960s: Successful centralized negotiating system
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAF pushes for centralized wage setting in 1950s; few strikes and limited wage drift</li> <li>• Public-sector workers given right to strike in 1966</li> <li>• Earnings development guarantee in LO contracts in 1966</li> <li>• LO pushes wage solidarity; reduces differentials</li> <li>• Miners wildcat strike for higher differentials, better conditions in 1969</li> </ul>
1970s: Centralized system under pressure
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Volvo workers strike for wages above central agreement; wage drift rises</li> <li>• LO uses legislation to win role at workplace it cannot gain in bargaining: employee participation legislation requires provision of information, right to strike on codetermination issues, 1976; bitter dispute over proposed wages fund</li> <li>• In 1971, government emergency legislation imposes settlement on professional workers in public sector within central agreement</li> <li>• Oil shock produces massive wage inflation in 1974–75; devaluations needed to restore competitiveness</li> <li>• White-collar union cartel (PTK) strikes in 1976</li> </ul>
1980s: System lurches toward decentralization
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Massive 1980 lockout/strike viewed as “investment for future” by employers</li> <li>• SAF-LO-PTK 1982 agreement on local level efficiency and participation, strengthening local unions</li> <li>• Strikes and lockouts by white-collar and public-sector workers: 1981 PTK strike opposed by LO; TCO massive public-sector strike in 1985; additional public-sector strikes to maintain guarantees in 1986; SIF strikes VIF to gain greater union influence on local pay in 1988</li> <li>• LO weakens solidarity wage policy in 1987 to favor differentials at top</li> <li>• Private sector led by VF moves to decentralize private-sector bargaining; VF does not give mandate to SAF in 1983, bargains separately with white-collar unions; no central bargain in 1988; SAF refuses to bargain centrally in 1990</li> <li>• Public-sector decentralizes: police gain higher settlement in 1989; SACO-SAV agree to individual negotiations for top civil servants; SAV decentralize negotiations for teachers and nurses</li> <li>• Government seeks bigger role in wage setting: 1984–85 Rosebund meetings; 1989 failure to impose national price-wage freeze/no strike central agreement</li> </ul>
1990s: Decentralized collective bargaining
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No central agreement in 1990</li> <li>• Rehnderg Commission secures national wage settlement</li> <li>• Industry agreements allow greater discretion for lower-level parties to differentiate wages even absent drift</li> </ul>

ployees, strengthening their unions, and a 1969 wildcat strike by miners in the state-owned mining company owing to miners' opposition to central settlements that restricted local union independence (and that lowered their pay relative to other blue-collar workers and to white-collar workers in mining).

In the 1970s, illegal strikes and the oil price increases placed centralized

bargaining under great stress. Volvo workers struck in 1970 and gained an 11 percent wage increase (compared to 3 percent in the SAF-LO agreement), lower wage differentials within the company, and other benefits. High demand for labor and a limited supply of workers for production jobs made Volvo unwilling to weather a labor dispute for the sake of the central agreement. Workers struck other profitable companies for a share of “excess profits” and then struck less profitable companies to restore relativities. The centralized system forced only one group into line, university graduates working for the state. It did this by enacting emergency legislation in 1971 that imposed a modest wage settlement on these workers over the opposition of their unions. While some Swedish observers cite this as demonstrating the ability of the centralized system to enforce the frame agreement, in fact it was an isolated instance in a period when most wildcat strikes succeeded.

One might expect centralized bargaining to be ideally suited to deal with the 1970s supply-side oil price explosion, but the Swedish system did not fare well. Wage drift produced huge wage increases in 1974 despite a moderate central settlement; the frame agreement and wage drift combined to produce even larger nominal increases in 1975. Wage inflation was greater than in any other advanced OECD country save Japan. A wave of wildcat strikes swept the country in 1974. Reflecting the failure of the central agreement to cap wage increases, industry and local bargaining pairs wrote earnings guarantees and cost-of-living adjustments into contracts. (Earnings guarantees are clauses assuring workers with little opportunity for drift that, if, say, Volvo workers earned 5 percent over the negotiated settlement, they would get the same.) Union rivalry was increasingly important in wage setting.

A different set of problems surfaced in the mid-1970s when LO pressed the Social Democrats for legislation opening company books to unions and establishing codetermination at workplaces. Employers fought against a union proposal for wage-earner funds to be paid by taxes on profits. Employers felt that LO’s use of political muscle to gain benefits they could not win in bargaining violated the spirit of Saltsjobaden for cooperative agreements between the “social partners.”

Finally, in the 1980s, the centralized bargaining system began to disintegrate. In 1980, there was a massive national lockout and strike that the head of SAF labeled “an investment in the future” for reducing the power of LO. Substantial wage increases in 1981–82 required a devaluation of the currency to restore competitiveness on world markets and company profitability. No longer deferring to the central agreement, white-collar and public-sector unions battled employers in major labor disputes. Public-sector workers struck unsuccessfully in 1986 to maintain earnings guarantees in contracts. In 1988, the private-sector clerical union, SIF, struck unsuccessfully for three weeks against major multinationals to gain a greater influence in local wage setting (a key to union power because of wage drift). Led by the large multinationals

of the engineering employers' association (VF), employers started to decentralize the bargaining system. In 1983, VF met separately with white-collar unions and Metall, sidestepping the central agreement. SAF negotiated no central bargain in 1988. State efforts to rejuvenate centralized bargaining in 1989 failed when the municipal employees union rejected a government-sponsored price-wage freeze/no-strike agreement that LO and some large employers had worked out. In 1990, SAF disbanded its negotiating division and announced the end of centralized bargaining. In the public sector, the university graduates' union pushed for more decentralized bargaining and individual negotiations for top civil servants. The policemen's union won a favorable contract and threatened to leave TCO because the federation had not supported their demands. In 1990, SAV stopped negotiating centrally with the teachers' and nurses' unions, and bargaining authority devolved to local governments. In 1993, employers insisted that industry bargaining would leave greater leeway to local parties to determine the allocation of changes in aggregate wages, effectively decentralizing a greater part of the wage bargain, even absent drift.

In contrast to some other centralized wage-setting systems, such as that of Austria, Swedish unions, firms, or sectoral employers' associations voluntarily chose to bargain at the peak level rather than separately. This meant that LO and SAF had to develop goals and reach agreements acceptable to member unions and firms, creating a coordinated bargaining structure: An institutional arrangement through which unions (and firms) could arrive at and carry out a common policy (Martin 1992, 49; 1995). In addition, since white-collar and public-employee unions bargain separately, LO and SAF had to consider how these groups would respond to the central agreement; these two second-movers created great problems as their sizes increased. In principle, the key players in the LO-SAF bargaining arrangement were the major export employers and their blue-collar workers. The Swedish model envisaged central bargainers setting wages to maintain competitiveness on world markets, with unions and employers in protected sectors and white-collar workers following the lead of the major private LO union, Metall, and the associated employers' association, VF. Our analysis stresses that the group most likely to want to pull out of a central agreement that imposes "too much" wage discipline is a sector with high  $r$ . This appears to be the case in Sweden, with Metall and VF leading the breakup of the centralized system.

Our analysis also stresses that the growth of new organizations (more precisely, an increase in the heterogeneity of the population of bargainers) makes centralized bargaining arrangements more difficult. Table 10.2 measures labor and management organization in Sweden from 1950 to 1988/89. Row 1 documents Sweden's extraordinary rate of unionization, which grew from 50 percent of the workforce in 1950 to peak at 88 percent in 1980, after which it began to fall gradually. Row 2 gives the distribution of union members among the major labor federations: LO, TCO, and SACO/SR. The marked fall in LO's

share of unionized workers reflects the successful organization of white-collar workers in the 1950s and 1960s and to a lesser extent the declining blue-collar share of the overall workforce. Row 3 shows a major change in the composition of the workforce in LO, from private-sector employees to public-sector workers, as employment growth in the public sector and increased unionization made the union of central government employees and the union of local government employees major players within LO. By 1989, the union of local government employees had more members than the leading industrial workers union, Metall. Row 4 summarizes the changing shares of the workforce by union status in terms of LO-associated private-sector unions, LO-associated public-sector unions, and SACO/SR-associated unions. It shows that the LO private share of the workforce was as large in 1988/89 as in 1950, which highlights the fact that it was the growth of other organized groups, not any decline in LO private unionization, that reduced the LO private union importance in the organized labor market.

The next part of table 10.2 turns to the employer side of the market. Row 5 estimates the percentage of all workers working for firms affiliated with an employers' federation: a remarkable 82 percent. Row 6 gives the percentage of private-sector workers in SAF-associated firms: the figures in the 1980s were on the order of 55 percent. Because LO does not represent white-collar workers, however, only a third of private-sector workers are directly covered by SAF-LO bargaining. Nearly a quarter are covered by bargaining between white-collar unions, who bargain together in the PTK bargaining consortium, and SAF. An additional 15 percent of private employees work in firms that are members of other associations, notably banking, newspapers, and consumer cooperatives. In total, roughly 80 percent of private workers are employed in firms who are members of employer associations. Row 7 shows the percentage of public-sector workers whose employers are members of associations. Here, membership is universal for workers employed by the central government, whose agencies form the employers' federation SAV, and extremely high (81 percent) for workers employed in public bodies associated with the association of local and county employers. Finally, row 8 gives the estimated share of workers in the various employer-union bargaining pairs. In 1988/89, only 28 percent of the workforce was covered by LO-SAF bargaining, compared to 34 percent of the workforce covered by local public-sector bargaining. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s, LO and SAF could no longer dominate the organized sector. Instead of a single leading bargaining pair and a large fringe of followers, Swedish collective bargaining expanded to include important white-collar and public-sector bargaining groups.

We speculate that centralized bargaining dominated by LO private-sector unions and SAF potentially contributed to Sweden's unionization of white-collar and public-sector workers through "defensive unionization." This reduced the stability of the centralized wage system. Shifts in bargaining power

**Table 10.2 Percentage of Workers, by Union Confederation and Employer Association in Sweden, 1950–89**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1988/89
<i>Union confederation</i>					
1. Percentage of all workers who are unionized	51	60	75	88	85
2. Percentage of union members who are:					
LO (blue collar)	80	76	66	62	59
TCO (white collar)	17	20	30	31	33
SACO/SR (professional)	3	4	5	7	8
3. Percentage of LO members who are:					
Private	80	80	76	66	63
Public	20	20	24	34	37
4. Percentage of all workers who are:					
LO private sector	33	36	38	32	33
LO public sector	7	9	11	19	20
Non-LO union	10	14	26	35	35
<i>Employer association</i>					
5. Percentage of all workers in firms who are members of employers' associations	...	...	...	...	82
6. Percentage of private-sector workers in firms in SAF	...	...	...	56	54
Wage earners (LO)	...	...	...	33	31
Salaried (PTK)	...	...	...	23	23
7. Percentage of workers in units in associations:					
Central government (SAV)	...	...	...	...	100
Local association	...	...	...	...	81
<i>Bargaining areas</i>					
8. Percentage of workers in major bargaining areas, by group:					
Private wage (LO-SAF)	...	...	...	...	28
Salaried (PTK-SAF)	...	...	...	...	21
Public central (All-SAV)	...	...	...	...	17
Public local	...	...	...	...	34

Sources: Swedish Statistical Yearbook (*Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige*); Nilsson (1993).

toward white-collar and skilled workers and employers due to market forces further eroded the economic rationale of wage-solidarity policies. The result was that frame bargaining delivered neither the noninflationary wage settlements that are the sine qua non of centralized arrangements nor economically appropriate wage differentials.

## Appendix

We show here that the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level for every realization of  $r$  only if  $p = q$  and  $w_0 = 0$ . First, recall that the first-order condition for the negotiated activity level  $a_N(r, w)$  is

$$(A1) \quad pc'(a)[rv(a) - w] = (1 - p)rv'(a)[w - c(a)]$$

and that the first-order condition for the efficient activity level  $a^*(r)$  is  $rv'(a) = c'(a)$ . Thus, to achieve  $a_N(r, w) = a^*(r)$  for every  $r$ , we must have  $w = prv[a^*(r)] + (1 - p)c[a^*(r)]$ .

Now recall that the first-order condition for the negotiated wage  $w_N(r, w_0)$  is

$$(A2) \quad q(rv - w - \pi_0) - (1 - q)(w - c - U_0) + a'[(1 - q)(w - c - U_0)rv' - q(rv - w - \pi_0)c'] = 0,$$

where  $a'$  denotes the partial derivative of  $a_N(r, w)$  with respect to  $w$ . Substituting  $w = prv[a^*(r)] + (1 - p)c[a^*(r)]$  and  $rv'[a^*(r)] = c'[a^*(r)]$  into (A2) yields

$$(A3) \quad \{q[(1 - p)(rv - c) - \pi_0] - (1 - q)[p(rv - c) - U_0]\}(1 - a'c') = 0.$$

Computing  $a'$  from (A1), and substituting  $w = prv[a^*(r)] + (1 - p)c[a^*(r)]$  and  $rv'[a^*(r)] = c'[a^*(r)]$  into the expression for  $a'$  shows that  $1 - a'c' > 0$ , so (A3) becomes

$$(A4) \quad (q - p)(rv - c) = q\pi_0 - (1 - q)U_0$$

for every  $r$ . Since  $U_0 = w_0 - c[a_N(r, w_0)]$  and  $\pi_0 = rv[a_N(r, w_0)] - w_0$ , (A4) becomes

$$(A5) \quad (q - p)\{rv[a^*(r)] - c[a^*(r)]\} = qr\pi_0 - w_0 + (1 - q)c[a_N(r, w_0)]$$

for every  $r$ .

The argument thus far establishes a first interesting result. Stated formally, there is no interval of values of  $w_0$  such that the full-drift model achieves efficient production for every realization of  $r$  (because the right-hand side of equation (A5) varies with  $w_0$  but the left does not). Stated informally, it is not true that there is a (positive) critical value of  $w_0$  such that, if the center chooses any wage floor below the critical value, then the wage floor is irrelevant in the sense that for any value of  $r$  the parties renegotiate the wage and achieve the efficient activity level.

We show next that (A5) holds for every  $r$  only if  $p = q$  and  $w_0 = 0$ . Since the efficient activity level  $a^*(r)$  approaches zero as  $r$  approaches zero, the left-hand side of (A5) approaches zero as  $r$  approaches zero, so  $w_0$  must equal zero because  $rv[a_N(r, w_0)]$  and  $c[a_N(r, w_0)]$  approach zero as  $r$  approaches zero. But, if  $w_0 = 0$ , then  $v[a_N(r, w_0)]$  and  $c[a_N(r, w_0)]$  are zero, so the right-hand side of

(A5) is zero for every  $r$ , so we must have  $p = q$ . An informal discussion of this result is given in the text.

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