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# Index

- Aerospace industry, 219–221  
Africa, 261  
Agriculture, defense of, 103  
Aircraft, 22, 202  
    French aircraft development, 246  
Air Force, 257  
    and Defense Department, 208  
    missile projects, 256–257  
    personnel replacement, 186*n*  
    tactical, 201–203  
Air Force Industrial Fund, 180  
Airlift programs, 16–17, 181  
Alliance efficiency, 45–48  
    *See also* Military alliances; NATO  
Antarctica agreement, 161  
Anthony, Robert N., 257*n*  
Antiballistic missile systems, 50, 87*n*,  
    122, 135, 150  
    and defense, 21, 93  
    and economies of scale, 22  
    as offensive and defensive weapons,  
        162–163  
    *See also* Missiles  
Arms, *see* Arms control; Weapons  
Arms control, 151–153, 160, 163*n*  
    criteria for, 161–164  
    and deployment of defensive weap-  
        ons, 78–91  
    failures in, 161  
    and shared information, 147–149  
    and strategic defense, 145–149  
    symmetry and asymmetry in, 75  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agen-  
    cy, 163*n*  
Arms race, 102  
Army Ballistic Missile programs, 266–  
    267  
Army Stock Fund, 180  
Asia, 261  
Atlas program, 250*n*  
Atomic war, *see* Nuclear war  
Atomic weapons, *see* Nuclear weapons  
  
Baumol, William J., 25*n*, 32–39, 44, 56,  
    58  
Berlin crisis, 156  
Besen, Stanley, 180*n*  
Bombing:  
    of civilians, 100, 108  
    of North Vietnam, 159  
    in World War II, 122  
Boulding, Kenneth, 153  
Breckner, Norman J., 173  
British Navy, 52  
Buchanan, James M., 25*n*, 28–39, 42,  
    44, 47, 54, 58  
Budget, *see* Military budget  
Budget Bureau, 180  
Bureaucracy:  
    and defense institutions, 205–212  
    and dissent, 163*n*, 269  
  
Capabilities:  
    of defense contractors, 222  
    jointly valued, 118–120  
    and research and development, 246  
Carlson, Jack W., 256–258  
Cherington, Paul W., 247*n*, 250*n*  
China:  
    attack by, 21  
    nuclear attack on, 160  
    U.S. view of, 198*n*  
    and Vietnamese war, 211  
Cities, defense of, *see* Urban defense  
Civil defense, *see* Civilian casualties;  
    Shelters  
Civil Defense Procurement Fund, 175,  
    180  
Civilian casualties, 14  
    approximate estimate, 93  
    and cost calculations, 112  
    and deterrence, 145*n*  
    as diversionary threat, 120  
Clark, Paul G., 48  
Coase, R. H., 244*n*  
Collective goods, 32–35  
    comparative advantage theory of, 47  
    and cost curve, 41*n*, 42*n*  
    cost of production, 40–43

- Collective goods (cont.)
  - defense as, 45–48, 175
  - definition, 25–28
  - efficiency of, 56–57
  - and externalities, 26–28, 55–56
  - and international cooperation, 27
  - military alliances as, 27, 58–63
  - output of, 42–43
  - and Pareto-optimal levels, 27, 47*n*, 50–51
  - and reciprocal externalities, 39–43
- Collectivization:
  - and activities with externalities, 38*n*
  - and efficiency, 36*n*, 39*n*, 54–55
- Colonial wars, 113
- Communism, 157–158
- Comparative advantage, 47
- Consumers, and war costs, 112
- Cooper, Richard N., 33*n*, 34*n*, 51–58
- Costs:
  - and adaptation, 123–126
  - of collective goods, 40–43
  - of damage to enemy, 85*n*
  - of defense contracts, 241–242
    - cost-plus-fixed-fee and incentive compared, 227, 264–265
    - incentive-fee, 228–240
    - and research and development, 245–250
    - and sharing rate, 233–240
    - and task partition, 243–244
  - of diversionary threats, 121–122
  - of enemy:
    - and adaptive cost-avoidance, 124–126
    - nonzero- and zero-sum, 126–127
  - of French aircraft development, 246
  - of National Health Service, 38*n*, 39*n*
  - of research and development, 129, 245
  - of severance of employment, 226*n*
  - and suboptimization, 108–110
  - and zero-sum orientation, 105–111
  - of war, 114–118
    - See also* Cost-avoidance; Cost-effectiveness; Military budget
- Cost-avoidance, 124–126
- Cost-effectiveness, 202*n*
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, 221–229, 263, 276
  - awarding of, 226
  - compared with incentive-fee contracts, 228–231
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (cont.)
  - cost overrun, 264–265
  - and profits, 227
  - and underestimation bias, 230
- Crash programs, 249
- Cryptography, 106
- Cuba, 150–151, 159
- Cuban missile crisis, 153, 157
- Czechoslovakia, 157
- Damage:
  - in defense considerations, 102–104
  - and force-mix choices, 141–142
  - and Strategic Forces, 130–131
- Damage limitation capability, 59
- Defense:
  - advance planning, 203–204
  - of agriculture, 103
  - and analytical marginalism, 48–51
  - and antiballistic missiles, 10–12
  - budget for, *see* Military budget
  - and bureaucratic problems, 205–212
  - of cities, *see* Urban defense
  - as collective good, 25, 43, 45–48
  - Cook's-tour planning of, 261
  - crash program for, 249
  - and crisis management, 93–94
  - and deterrence, 101–102
  - and dissent, 211
  - durability of, 99–101
  - of economic resources, 102–104
  - and economic ruin strategy, 105–108
  - and fallout shelters, 93–94
  - and first-strike incentives, 96–97
  - and force planning, 199
  - general approach to, 191
  - Great Britain and United States compared, 269–274
  - and large organizations, 185–187
  - Lewis-and-Clark planning, 189–190, 261
  - local, 60
  - long-range planning for, 198
  - and marginal analysis, 52
  - market mechanism in, *see* Market mechanism
  - and missiles, 134–135
  - mobile, 49–51
  - model for, 49
  - and NATO, 18, 58–63
  - new methods for, 17
  - as nonzero-sum game, 155–156
  - and offense, 150–152

## Defense (cont.)

- and options and hedges, 193–194
  - price mechanism and planning, 275–276
  - and programmed commitment of inputs, 189
  - as public good, 61, 175
  - and research and development, 195
  - and rivals, 196–198
  - against superior numbers, 17
  - and systems analysis, 205–206
  - and tactical air forces, 201–203
  - and trade-offs, 194–195
  - of weapons, 97–99
  - zero-sum orientation, 105–111
- Defense budget, *see* Military budget
- Defense contracts:
- cost-plus-fixed-fee, *see* Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
  - and cost uncertainties, 241–242
  - and economies of scale, 248, 267–277
  - incentive-fee, *see* Incentive-fee contracts
  - investigations of, 217
  - “locked-in” effect, 226
  - overestimations bias, 230
  - reputation effect, 243
  - systems approach to, 249
  - task decomposition approach to, 249
  - and task partitioning, 243, 251–252
  - and task uncertainty, 242–243
  - time-is-of-the-essence argument, 249–250
  - underestimation bias, 230, 231
- Defense Department, 3–4, 7, 129, 153, 187
- bureaucratic process in, 267–268
  - changes since 1960, 207–209
  - and conflict variety, 199*n*–200*n*
  - and dissent, 269
  - and economic planning, 212–216
  - expenditures, 212
  - five-year force structure and financial program, 210
  - and incentive-fee contracts, 228
  - and inputs, 215
  - and lower-level managers, 256–257
  - and market mechanism, 173–184, 258–260
  - and multiple options, 208–209, 268
  - and nuclear warfare, 208–209
  - organizational structure of, 187
  - reform of, 260–263

## Defense Department (cont.)

- and revolving-fund enterprises, 178–180
  - and Special Forces, 201*n*
- Defense industries:
- and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, 221–229
  - economic performance in, 218–221
  - efficiency performance in, 218
  - employment in, 219
  - and firm variability, 253
  - and procurement, 250
  - sales variability experience in, 219, 253
  - stability performance of, 218
  - and weapon development, 265–266
- Defense organizations:
- and bureaucracy, 259–260
  - under Eisenhower administration, 188*n*
  - estimation of costs, 244*n*
  - operations-oriented, 192–193
  - size of, 192–193
- Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 188
- Defense Supply Agency, 179
- Demsetz, Harold, 149–153
- Department of Defense, *see* Defense Department
- Department of State, 159
- De Strihou, Jacques van Ypersele, 58
- Deterrence, 59–62
- and arms control, 149
  - and civilian fatalities, 145*n*
  - and damage, 102
  - and defense, 145
  - and defensive systems, 95–101
    - with arms control, 89–92
    - without arms control, 78
  - and diversionary threats, 121–123
  - against non-nuclear provocation, 92
  - and offensive weapons, 104
  - and returns to defense expenditure, 272
  - transition to defense strategy from, 101–102
  - in zero-sum context, 106
- Disarmament, *see* Arms control
- Dissent, 215, 268, 269
- in defense planning, 211
  - and Department of Defense, 269
  - and department mergers, 163*n*
  - and personnel selection, 191*n*

- Diversionary threats, 120–123  
 Domar, Evsey D., 258–260  
 Downs, Anthony, 244*n*  
 Dulles, John Foster, 158, 260  
  
 Economic ruin strategy, 105–108  
 Economies of scale:  
     and alliances, 54  
     and defense contracts, 248, 276–277  
     military applications, 22–23  
     and satellite development, 53  
 Economy of force, 14  
 Efficiency:  
     and collective goods, 54–57  
     in defense industries, 218, 250  
 Eisenhower administration, 188, 188*n*, 215  
 Eisner, Robert, 153–161, 259  
 Elasticity of demand, 114–118  
     and diversionary threats, 122  
     and jointly valued capabilities, 119–120  
     and missile sites, 118*n*  
 Employment, in defense industries, 219–221, 226*n*  
 Enke, Stephen, 177  
 Enthoven, Alan, 227, 245, 246  
 External diseconomies, 26*n*  
     and output, 44*n*–45*n*  
 External economies, 44, 55  
     and collective goods, 26–32, 39–43, 55*n*, 58, 109  
     and distribution of services, 36*n*  
     and improvements, 34–35  
     and returns to scale, 32, 32*n*  
  
 Fallout shelters, 93–94, 100, 151  
 First strikes, 101, 154, 155  
 Force-mix selection, 136–144  
 Force planning, 200  
     and cost-effectiveness analyses, 205  
 France, 61  
 Free market system, 54  
  
 Germany:  
     in World War II, 17–18, 52–53  
     bombing of, 122  
     naval warfare, 15–16  
 Great Britain:  
     defense policy, 269–274  
     National Health Service in, 29–32, 38–39  
 Gross national product, 111  
  
 Haldi, John, 180*n*  
 Hall, G. R., 185*n*, 226  
 Hauser, John, 25*n*  
 Hiroshima, 113  
 Hitch, Charles J., 3–4, 8, 109, 175, 241, 247*n*  
 Hitler, 113  
 Hoag, Malcolm W., 3–23, 48–63  
 “Hot line” agreement, 161, 162  
  
 Incentive-fee contracts, 228–240, 277–278  
     bargaining behavior, 229–233  
     sharing rate and investment expense relations for, 233–240, 251*n*  
     and target profit, 234  
 Inflicting costs strategy, 156  
 Institute for Defense Analyses, 153  
 Internal security, 57  
 Intriligator, Michael D., 34*n*, 161–164  
 Iron Curtain, 18  
  
 Japan:  
     bombing of, 108  
     after World War II, 113  
 Johnson administration, 204  
 Johnson, Robert E., 226  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 180  
  
 Kafoglis, Milton, 28–32, 34, 35, 42, 44, 47, 54, 58  
 Kaysen, Carl, 217*n*, 218, 227*n*, 242*n*, 243*n*, 252  
 Kennan, George, 156  
 Kennedy, John F., 153, 157, 158  
 Kennedy administration, 201, 204  
 Khrushchev, 158  
 Klein, Burton H., 122, 185*n*, 245  
 Korea, 18, 204  
 Korean War, 176  
  
 Labor unions, and collective goods, 27  
 Lanchester’s Law, 12–14, 51, 53  
 Latin America, 261  
 Life-cycle costs, 196*n*  
  
 McGuire, C. B., 164–169  
 McGuire, Martin C., 127, 129–154  
 McKean, R. N., 8, 185*n*, 241, 247*n*  
 McNamara, Robert S., 3, 21, 154, 177, 188, 202, 204, 210, 213, 214, 268  
 Maginot Line, 17  
 Mao Tse-tung, 3, 4

- Marginalism, 9, 48–52
- Market mechanism, 256
  - in defense, 174–175
  - and defense budget, 176
  - and Department of Defense, 256
  - and war, 275
- Marshall, A. W., 263
- Masaryk, Jan, 157
- Maximization, marginal rules for, 56
- Meckling, William, 245, 263–264
- Medical care, 29–32, 38–39
- Meyer, John R., 259*n*, 260–263
- Midway, Battle of, 53
- Military Air Transport Service, 178, 179, 180
- Military alliances, 27, 56–63
- Military budget:
  - choice of offensive and defensive, 134–145
  - and “exchange rate,” 111
  - and crash programs, 249*n*
  - cuts in, 162
  - and decentralization, 177
  - and deterrence and defense, 129–169
  - of enemy, 114–118
  - and research and development, 250
  - Russian, 152
  - sequential approach, 250*n*
  - and war outcome, 142–143
  - since World War II, 175–176
  - and zero-sum orientation, 105–111
- Military operations:
  - and collective goods, 46
  - and economies of scale, 22–23, 53–54
  - and Lanchester’s Law, 12–14
  - and marginal cost-benefit analysis, 51
  - and returns to scale, 9–10
  - role of economists, 4–7, 9
  - and strategic missile forces, 15
  - and transformation functions, 9
  - zero-sum, 106–108
- Military production functions, 3–23
- Military research, 57
- Military Sea Transport Service, 179, 180
- Minuteman force, 203
- Missile gap, 250*n*, 252
- Missiles:
  - competing cost of, 115–118
  - and corporative advantage, 124–126
  - as counterforce weapon, 135
  - defensive and offensive role of, 134–135
- Missiles (cont.)
  - submarine-launched, 100
  - See also* Antiballistic missile systems; Strategic missiles; Weapons
- Model:
  - for diversification of defense contracts, 223*n*
  - for industry effect on firm variability, 253–256
  - for offensive and defensive force, 135–136
  - Pigovian externalities, 43
  - for sharing rate and investment expense in incentive-fee contracts, 234–240
  - three-sector, of Defense Department, 263
  - for zero- and nonzero-sum games, 165–168
- Moore, Frederick T., 251*n*
- National defense:
  - and increasing returns to scale, 51–52
  - input-output sequence, 51
  - and RAND economists, 51
  - See also* Defense
- National Security Act of 1947, 174
- Navy Bureau of Ships, 179–180
- Navy Stock Fund, 174
- Nelson, R. R., 245
- Nonzero-sum context, 112–113
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *see* NATO
- NATO, 18, 50
  - and alliance efficiency, 45–48
  - and defense, 18–20
  - and nuclear retaliation, 83
  - as public good, 58–63
- North Vietnam, 159
- “N-square Law,” 13
- Nuclear firebreak, 209
- Nuclear strategy:
  - Gilpatrick long view, 73–75
  - strategic freeze proposal, 72–73
  - of U.S. and USSR, 69–71
- Nuclear war, 154–161
  - and cities, 69
  - and Cuban missile crisis, 157
  - damage in, 147–148
  - and defense, 81–82
  - deterrent against, 274
  - low-level, 209
- Nuclear weapons, 113, 260
  - and China, 162

- Nuclear weapons (cont.)  
 and defense, 21–22  
 offensive and defensive, 270–272  
*See also* Weapons
- Oates, Wallace E., 25*n*  
 Obsolescence, 101  
 Office of the Secretary of Defense, *see*  
 Defense Department  
 Olson, Mancur, Jr., 25–63  
 Operations Research Office of the  
 Army, 259  
 Opportunity costs, 5–6, 14  
 Optimization:  
 and Cuba and Vietnam, 201  
 and types of conflict, 200  
 Options:  
 and Department of Defense, 208–209,  
 268  
 and hedges, 193–194  
 Overruns penalty, 230
- Panzer units, 108  
 Pareto optimality, 45*n*  
 and collective goods, 27, 47*n*, 50–51  
 and external economies, 28  
 and level of provision, 31  
 and output, 42  
 and reallocation, 9  
 Patterson, Gardner, 35*n*  
 Payoff function, 143  
 Pearl Harbor, 53  
 Peck, Merton J., 218, 233*n*, 263  
 Pigou, Arthur C., 27–28, 58  
 Pigovian analysis:  
 and British medical care, 29–32, 38–  
 39  
 and collectivization, 34  
 and externalities, 43  
 Polaris missiles, 57  
 Polaris submarines, 50  
 Police force, 38, 55  
 British, 151  
 unequal distribution of services, 36*n*  
 Preemptive war, 106  
 Profits:  
 and defense industries, 218, 224, 227  
 and incentive-fee contracts, 233–240  
 Project FIRM, 257–258  
 Public good, *see* Collective good
- Radner, Roy, 253*n*  
 RAND Corporation, 3*n*, 51, 153, 159,  
 185*n*, 260
- Ranis, Gustav, 58*n*  
 Reaction functions, 143  
 Reciprocal externalities, 39–43  
 Research and development:  
 and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, 222–  
 223, 226  
 costs, 129  
 and defense, 91, 189, 195, 243–250  
 and deployment of defensive weap-  
 ons, 79  
 and external effect, 57*n*  
 and mix capabilities, 246  
 and nuclear control, 75  
 parallel, 245  
 and small organizations, 193  
 Returns to scale, 9–10  
 diminishing, 11  
 and externalities, 32  
 increasing, 12–14, 48–52  
 Revolving-fund enterprises, 178–180  
 Robertson, D. J., 269–278  
 Robinson, E. A. G., 244*n*  
 Rommel, General, 108  
 Rothenberg, Jerome, 67–104, 149–155,  
 161  
 Rowen, Harry S., 227, 245, 246
- Sales, in defense industries, 219–221, 253  
 Schelling, Thomas C., 105–127, 155–  
 156, 160, 230  
 Scherer, Frederick M., 38*n*, 105–106,  
 113, 218, 226  
 Schlesinger, Arthur, 153, 156  
 Schlesinger, James R., 185–216, 258,  
 259, 260–269, 275–276  
 Sharing rate:  
 and defense contracts, 233–240  
 target-cost adjustments, 240–241  
 Shelters, *see* Fallout shelters  
 Smith, Robert T., 25*n*  
 Social welfare functions, 32–35  
 Sorenson, Theodore C., 157  
 Southeast Asia, 17  
 South Korea, 18, 20  
 South Vietnam, 159  
 Soviet Union, 82  
 and Cuban missile crisis, 157  
 defense and offense strategies, 148–  
 149  
 disarmament proposals of, 77  
 nuclear strategy, 69–71  
 and United States, 154  
 and United States defense, 48, 50  
 United States view of, 198*n*

- Space programs, 23
- Special Forces, 201*n*
- Status differentials, 232–233
- Strategic defense, 129, 154
  - and arms control, 145–149
  - and information shortcomings, 147–148
  - technical improvements in, 145
  - and war outcomes, 130–135
- Strategic Freeze proposal, 72
- Strategic missiles:
  - allocation to fixed targets, 10–12
  - and military planning, 15
  - U.S. and USSR compared, 69
  - See also* Missiles
- Strategic Offensive Forces, 15
  - and arms control, 149
- Strategy:
  - of economic ruin, 105–108
  - of inflicting costs, 156
  - and Strategic Forces, 130–135
- Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 100
- Suboptimization, 164
  - and costs, 108
  - zero-sum case, 126–127
- Substitution analysis, weapons and, 8
- Substitution effect, urban defense and, 11
- System Program Office, 195*n*, 196*n*
- Systems analysis, 205–206
- Target cost:
  - and sharing rate, 240–241
  - and task partitioning, 243
- Target profit, 234
- Task partitioning:
  - and defense contracts, 243–250
  - disadvantages of, 247–248
  - in French aircraft development, 246
- Taylor, V., 185*n*
- Technical progress:
  - and cost of weapons systems, 141–142
  - and high-damage outcomes, 143
  - and nuclear strategy, 72
  - and offense versus defense, 150–152
  - and systems analysis, 206
- TFX fighters, 202
- Trade-off functions, 194–195, 200
- Trading with enemy, 169
- Transformation functions, 9
- Truman administration, 204
- Tullock, Gordon, 244*n*
- Unified-systems approach, 228
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *see* Soviet Union
- United States:
  - defense policy, *see* Defense
  - and Europe, 82
  - medical care in, 29–32, 38–39
  - nuclear strategy, 69–71
  - and Soviet ballistic missile defenses, 122
  - and Soviet Union, 154
  - view of Soviet Union and China, 198*n*
  - in World War II, 53
- United States Congress, 180
- Urban defense, 20–22, 50, 69, 80–81, 97–101, 150–151
- Vickrey, William, 34*n*
- Vietnam, 154, 159, 204, 272
  - tactical aircraft in, 202, 203
  - and China, 211
- Von Braun, 266
- War:
  - accidental, 106
  - allocations between offensive and defensive, 146–149
  - costs:
    - and adaptation to initiatives, 123–126
    - and consumers, 112
    - determining, 164–169
    - to enemy, 114
  - and counterforce, 98*n*
  - and diversionary threats, 120–123
  - and elasticities of demand, 114–118
  - and force composition, 199
  - and increasing returns to scale, 48
  - and information, 146–149
  - and jointly valued capability, 118–120
  - limited, 272, 273
  - and market mechanism, 175, 275
  - in nonzero-sum context, 112–113
  - nuclear, *see* Nuclear war
  - outbreak of, 147
  - outcome:
    - and budget, 142–143
    - and offensive-defensive force optimization, 135–138
    - and strategic forces, 130–135
    - and unpreparedness, 203–204
    - and zero-sum components, 106–109



- War (cont.)
  - and zero-sum and nonzero-sum tactics, 108-111
- Warsaw Bloc, 18
- Watts, 57
- Weapons:
  - atomic, *see* Nuclear weapons
  - biological, 163*n*
  - choices between, 138-144, 177
  - comparative effectiveness, 7-8
  - defense of, 97-99
  - and deterrence, 95-101
    - with arms control, 89-92
    - without arms control, 78
  - development projects of, 265-269
    - in Britain and U.S., 273
  - inventories of, and first strikes, 134
  - obsolescence, 101
  - ordnance effectiveness, 7-8
  - partitioning, 265
  - placement of, 98*n*
  - procurement by "systems approach," 217, 251
  - specifications of, 247*n*
  - standardization of, 53
- Weapons, standardization of (cont.)
  - See also* Arms control; Missiles; Nuclear weapons
- Williamson, Oliver E., 217-256, 263-269, 276, 278
- Wolf, C., Jr., 185*n*
- World War I, 94
  - hostages in, 113
  - and political change, 113
- World War II:
  - and Germany, 17, 52-53, 122
  - hostages in, 113
  - and United States, 53
  - zero- and nonzero-sum tactics, 108
- Yadin, Yigael, 107
- Zeckhauser, Richard, 25-63
- Zero-sum components, 105-111, 164-169
  - and adaptation, 123-136
  - and adversary relationships, 113
  - and consumer costs, 112
  - and nonzero-sum components, 124-127