52. The impact of the export-promotion attempts is examined further in chapters 5, 7, and 11, below.

53. Some other general policies also have applied, but have been relatively unimportant for the purposes of this study. For example, since 1963 private persons buying exchange in the brokers' market have been required to show proof of prior income tax payments.

54. At about the same time the tax of 30 escudos a trip on travel by Chilean residents to other Latin American countries was abolished and the tax on travel to all other locations was increased from 60 to 310 escudos a trip.

55. The relative shift in these maximums favored travel to Latin America and discriminated against travel to the United States and Canada. This shift was consistent with the over-all aims of the Allende government regarding changes in the geographical pattern of international economic and political interactions.

56. These last measures were in part directed at limiting black-market activity in escudos.

57. The value of United States investment alone (including large-scale mining) at the time of the election of Allende was over a billion dollars. The largest nonmining operations included Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate, Boise Cascade, International Telephone and Telegraph, Coca-Cola, Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Motors, Crown Zellerbach International, General Cable, and RCA International, all of which had 1968 Chilean sales of about $10 million at the least, although some were owned partially by Chilean entities. See Szulc [1970] for a complete listing of such enterprises and their sales value.

58. Imports financed by those flows were at times exempted from some import regulations such as the additional taxes and prior deposits.

59. In the case of large-scale copper mining the nature of such official obligations was redefined, however, as is indicated above in subsection 4.2.1.

60. In his announcement Allende noted that in the previous six months the foreign debt actually had been reduced; the foreign debt inherited from the previous government plus the $728 million in obligations taken over from the foreign copper companies made Chile second only to Israel in terms of per capita national debt; and debt payment obligations for 1971–1973 were approximately 40 per cent of total Chilean exports. Furthermore, he claimed that the fulfillment of Chile's scheduled debt payment commitment to date had been made much more difficult by its failure to receive more than $100 million in dividends and taxes from the foreign copper companies prior to nationalization; the closing of approximately $190 million in credit lines by United States banks in part because of the Edward Bank's failure to fulfill its contractual obligations; the drop in international copper prices; and the increase in imports due to the boom in the Chilean economy and to income redistribution. See CORFO [1971a, November 23: 1–2].

61. These included $5.8 million to Kennecott (see subsection 4.2.1, above), $6 million to International Telephone and Telegraph Company, $7.8 million to United States banks, and $4.5 million to the United States Export-Import Bank. For more details, see de Onis [1972b], Vúskovic [1972:544], and Wilcke [1972].

62. The United States held over half of the debt. No other individual country nor all international organizations considered together held as much as a tenth.