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Black like us? The occupational integration of Black immigrants

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Stratification economics is the study of group-based inequality and its relationship to intergroup power dynamics (Darity Jr. W. A., 2022). Groups, although often taken as given, and in popular thought as fixed and biological are in fact malleable, socially constructed and heterogeneous along many dimensions. Most groups are not of single origin but are often constructed from multiple populations absorbed over time. Here we follow Stuart Hall in not seeing groups as given but rather as produced (Hall, 2021). This production is mediated along four axis, one the real culture as lived, two the culture as imagined, three legal definitions that mediate the creation of the groups, and four the material or economic conditions that produce the culture (wa Gĩthĩnji, 2025) (Azhar, 2025) (Mamdani, 2012). In this work we will focus on the way economic conditions through occupational segregation may impact identity.

The extent to which groups remain cohesive is dependent on the extent to which newcomers are assimilated into the group. Further assimilated newcomers may change the character or culture of the group. The second reason is that what may seem to be a homogeneous group from the outside may be internally stratified or in fact separate groups. Thus, attributions of group behavior or trends may actually be the characteristic of a sub-group. For example, in the USA all people of African descent are often characterized as one group, namely Black despite their different histories and attendant cultures. Often what may be characteristic of one part of the group may be incorrectly interpreted as a trend for the whole group. An example is the slight increase in Black votes that Donald Trump received in the last election which was attributed to his increased popularity among African Americans when in fact most of this increase was from African immigrants (Cobb, 2024).

Historically the Black community in the USA has been dominated by African descendants of domestic enslavement. The common history of this group includes West African

origins, enslavement, Jim Crow, Southern residence, Christianity¹, English-speakers, Civil Rights and Black power movements, and a large set of institutions (for example, the “Black Church”). The long common history of the community in addition to the material conditions under which it has existed has contributed to a somewhat common culture (with regional variation), political outlook and economic outcomes. For most of US history, immigration disfavored Black immigrants. In fact, from Slavery to the height of the Civil Rights Movement foreign-born Blacks accounted for less than 1 per cent of the Black population (Kent, 2007). The Hart Celler Act of 1965 abolished the white racial embedded advantage in US immigration law; it eliminated the national origins formula and prioritized skill, family reunification, and refugee protection. The Immigration Act of 1990 provided the diversity visa lottery for populations that were underrepresented by the existing system, thereafter the number of foreign-born Blacks has increased significantly. By 2019 ten per cent of the Black population was foreign born, with close to 90 per cent of this population evenly divided from the Caribbean and African countries (Tamar, 2021). Presently first and second generations immigrants make up 20-21 per cent of working age African-Americans (Tamir, 2022) (Dahir, 2025).

While the initial rise of Black immigrants was driven by Caribbean immigrants from countries that shared a similar colonial history and systems of slavery as was found in the USA, more recent immigrants are increasingly coming from African countries who while having a colonial history did not similar systems of chattel slavery as was found in the USA. As the number of immigrants with a different set of historical circumstances increases Black identity as we know it may change. The degree and speed of change will depend on the extent to which the new immigrants are integrated into the existing Black community and identity. We should note

¹ Although some enslaved people were already Muslim when enslaved, the vast majority of native born African-Americans and their descendants have had an upbringing that has been mostly Christian.

here that immigrants are not evenly randomly distributed across the USA. Immigration settlement depending on the nature of the immigrant e.g. refugees vs voluntary immigration, is determined by two important factors. One, is the US government policy on where to settle refugees which is often determined by cost of living especially housing and its availability, and two, existing networks and populations of immigrants from the sending nations. Both of these factors can result in situations where immigrants can become a sizeable part of the population and a recognizable group in their own right, separate from existing US born groups. Examples of these include the Somali immigrants in Minneapolis and other urban areas of Minnesota such as Rochester, St. Cloud as well as Columbus, Ohio, the Ethiopian population in the greater Washington DC metro area, East Africans namely Kenyans, Somali, Sudanese and Ethiopians in Fargo, North Dakota and Seattle-Tacoma Metro level (Migration Policy Institute, 2025) (Herman, 2025). Interestingly, Somali (second generation) and other African immigrants make up 17 per cent of the population of Lewiston, Maine (Anderson, 2019). Among those localities where black immigrants are the majority of the black population, the black identity that develops may be very different from what is commonly perceived as the US Black identity.

This paper is the first step in a research program that aims to examine the impact of Black immigration on Black identity. In this paper we examine the extent to which Black immigrants in the 20th and 21st centuries integrate into the Black community measured by the degree of Black Immigrant and Native nonimmigrant Black occupational integration.

Black Immigrants come from different places with different racial interactions and histories though dominated by white supremacy. We hypothesize that beyond national origin and language, that the degree of integration will be driven by wealth and class, education, political and economic conditions of the home country and the possibility of return, ease of movement

between the home country and the USA, in addition to the socioeconomic conditions in the USA. Using data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) we estimate the degree to which these characteristics and socio-economic conditions predict occupation segregation between 3rd and higher generation African-Americans (“native-born Blacks”) and 1st and 2nd generation African-Americans (“Black Immigrants”) as well segregation between native-born Non-Hispanic white-only (“Native born white”) Americans.

The economic circumstances and population densities of native-born and immigrant Blacks vary by location and region (South, Northeast, Mid-West, West) and location (core based statistical area, or “cbsa”). This spatial variation creates dissimilar opportunities and incentives for assimilation.

The extent to which integration is possible will determine whether we continue to have a relatively stable Black identity in the country or whether we are likely to see the rise of multiple Black identities characterized by different political visions and economic outcomes.

Literature Review

The literature on Black immigrants can be broadly grouped into four strands. One, is on the maintenance of ethnic identity as a mechanism to both network and mobilise community resources as well as self-protection from discrimination (Adida, 2023). In particular, immigrants who are likely to be misidentified as African American have an incentive to select an ethnic identity strategy, that is, emphasize their ethnic distinctiveness as strategic protection against racial discrimination. Black immigrants have for example been found to settle in white areas with an outcome being that their access to better resources has resulted in the closing of the earnings gap between blacks and whites (Economist, 2025). We should note that however the choice is to assimilate or not into one or other community is structurally constrained by existing

norms and attitudes of the receiving community. For example, Bayer et al (2025) find that a homeowner is more likely to move after receiving a different-race neighbor. On the other hand (Dahir, 2025) finds that Black immigrants moving into a Black neighborhood may increase the number of whites and other races while diminishing the number of native-born blacks.

Two, literature on the attitudes of migrants towards success and its possible impacts. Three, the examination of the selectivity of the immigrants and how it contributes to their success. Four, the importation of stratification from the immigrant's home country and its impact on assimilation or lack thereof.

Major African American sub-groups include two disproportionately immigrant groups from Africa and the Caribbean. Afro-Caribbeans are mostly English-speaking, French/Creole-speaking, and Hispanic, though all have national origins in societies characterized chattel slavery and colonialism and are the Black immigrants with the greatest time in the United States. African immigrants have national origins in societies characterized by colonialism, but not chattel slavery. African immigrants are mostly English or French-speaking and have less time in the U.S. than Caribbean immigrants.

The heterogenous cultural and political economic legacies of the African Americans influence their expectations of "success" in the U.S. Christina Greer interviewed union members and found that African immigrants "expressed positive opinions² pertaining to the possibility of success in America and the least favorable attitudes towards other black ethnic groups (quoted in (Demby, 2020))." Afro-Caribbeans were the most negative, while African groups were the most optimistic and native-born African Americans were in the middle. Africans, Greer explains, have been here the shortest amount of time as a wholesale group, and there's still a lot

² Choi, et al. (2025) find that subjective social mobility may have an impact on success. Immigrants who have downward subjective mobility have "significantly lower work volition, work need satisfaction and decent work compared to other groups".

of optimism there. Afro-Caribbeans were saying, "I'm now considered black in America. There's some limits to my success as an immigrant. And that's not right." At once, you have a shared identity with black people in the United States, Black immigrants aren't allowed to become American the way other immigrant groups are. If they are to assimilate or acculturate, they become *black American*.

This was the first time that when I spoke to people, they were choosing to remain *immigrant*.

There's a long legacy of people coming to this country trying to assimilate as quickly as possible so that they can become American. [But] to become American for a Caribbean or an African means to become *black American*, and that wasn't necessarily something they wanted for themselves [or] their kids, either."

Black immigrants are not randomly selected populations from African, Caribbean, and other countries. Three hypotheses on immigrant selectivity have crystalized within the perspective of stratification economics (Darity, 2022: 420). Consider first hyper- and hypo-selected immigrants (Lee, 2015). Hyper-selected immigrants are better educated and better resourced relative to average member of country of origin and relative to the average member of host country. Hypo-selected immigrants are less educated and less resourced relative to average member of country of origin and relative to the average member of host country. Hyper-selected immigrant groups are more likely to do well in the host country than hypo-selected immigrant groups. This is so because "Hyper-selected immigrant groups are better poised to form strong ethnic communities and ethnic institutions, which generate supplemental resources conducive to mobility. Because the resources are offered in ethnic communities, they give poor and working-class co-ethnics an advantage over their counterparts who are not members of hyper-selected groups (Lee, 2015, p. 30) (Darity Jr. W. A., 1989)."

Caribbean-English and African immigrants are hyper-selected relative to native-born Non-Hispanic Blacks and, sometimes, relative to native-born whites((Mason P. , 2023, pp. 263-265)(Mason P. , 2023, pp. 263-265) (Mason P. , 2023, pp. 263-265) (Mason P. L., 2016, pp. 9-

11). Native-born Non-Hispanic Blacks and whites have 12.8 and 13.6 years of education, respectively. African-English and African-French Black immigrants have 14.9 and 13.6 years of education, respectively, while African-other language and Caribbean-English Black immigrants have 13.4 and 12.9 years of education, respectively. All other Black immigrants are positively selected but not hyper-selected, that is, they are better educated and better resourced relative to the average member of country of origin but not relative to native-born Non-Hispanic African Americans.

Second, the lateral mobility hypothesis, “says that immigrant communities will retrieve the relative class position they held historically in their country of origin within two generations in the receiving country. The presumption is they typically move from lower-income to higher-income nations. Therefore, in retrieving their prior class position, they obtain higher levels of income, usually sufficient to send remittances to those who remain in the home country (Darity, 2022: 420).” With both positive selection and lateral mobility, black immigrants of middle or higher socioeconomic status in their country of origin should achieve the same relative status in the USA, and thus, some black immigrants are more likely to obtain higher socioeconomic status than native-born African-Americans, who are disproportionately poor and of lower socioeconomic status (Darity Jr. W. A., 1989; Darity Jr. W. A., 2022; Darity Jr. W. A., 2022) (Darity Jr. W. A., 2022) (Darity Jr. W. A., 1989) (Foner, 1979) (Hamilton T. G., 2014) (Hamilton T. G., 2012) (Pierre, 2004).

Mason (2016) provides an econometric procedure to control for lateral mobility. Estimate separate regressions for high school-equivalent (12 or fewer years of education) and college-equivalent (13 or more years of education) workers. Immigrants with high status in their country of origin are more likely to be college-equivalent workers in the U.S., while immigrants with a

low status in their country of origin are more likely to be unskilled workers. To the extent that immigrants re-establish their status position in the U.S. labor market, we observe immigrant assimilation with white male workers within 10–15 years. Further, second generation black immigrants within each market segment should have wage parity with native-born non-Hispanic white workers.

Finally, imported stratification suggests that social and economic stratification structures in the country of origin might be imported and sustained by immigrant groups in the destination country ((Dávila, 2011) (Pariyar, Gupta, & Fonseka, 2022). Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants are considered Black in the United States. Although American racial norms will not allow them to assimilate into whiteness and they may not wish to do so, some dominant Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants espouse an ethnic and racial self-identification that will separate them from native-born Blacks and from subaltern Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants. The Amhara, Tigray, and Tigrinya are dominant political economic semitic groups in Ethiopia (Amhara and Tigray) and Eritrea (Tigrinya). Both the Tigray and Tigrinya speak Tigrinya, while the Amhara speak Amharic. These Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants have a common cultural heritage, and each is disproportionately located in metropolitan Washington, DC.

Tigray, Tigrinya, and Amhara self-identify as Habesha – an ethnic and racial identity that emphasizes their Semitic heritage and that is distinct from native-born African Americans and all other Blacks.

Ethnic Amharas and Tigrinyans, who were Orthodox Christians that monopolized state power in the highlands of Ethiopia (and what is now Eritrea), gradually began to use the term Habesha to distinguish themselves from other peoples of Ethiopia, particularly pagans and Muslims. Inherent within their concept of Habesha-ness was a sense of exceptionalism. Indeed, Ethiopian nationalists continue to employ primordialist arguments emphasizing the antiquity and unity of Ethiopia's identity, which they trace back 3000 years to biblical and classical references.

Within a regional context, the ruling elites of Ethiopia, particularly Menelik and Haile Selassie, shaped the nation's image in paradoxical ways that emphasized on the one hand Ethiopia 'as a symbol of Africa and freedom', yet on the other hand asserted that 'Ethiopians were neither Africans nor black', focusing instead on their links to ancient Israel and the legend of Solomon and Sheba.... Numerous scholarly accounts describe the racial prejudices and pretensions of Ethiopian elites who were said to consider themselves better than blacks, whom they scorned as barya, which means slave in Amharic (Habecker, 2012, p. 1204).

Maintaining transnational ties, construction of Habesha spaces, perpetuating an image of success ("model minority"), and a strong preference for endogamy (only marrying Habesha) are mechanisms for reproducing Habesha identity and sharing resources among Habesha immigrants. A focus on hard work, academic excellence, and strong family values are attributes viewed as part of a Habesha identity, "in contrast to lower-class American blacks, whom they consider as lazy and lacking in discipline."

Oromo are a separate ethnicity, the largest in Ethiopia. They reject being called Habesha and seek to amplify the links between Oromoness and Blackness (Guluma, 2023). Just as there is anti-Black racism in the U.S., the Oromo believed they are discriminated against in Ethiopia. Oromo immigrants self-identify as an ethnic group within the Black American racial group. Despite being the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, they have a long history of being excluded from the Ethiopian political economic elite and speak their own (non-semitic, Cushite) language. For the Oromo, "Blackness as an American, African, and even global identity, is inextricably linked to a) the experience of subjugation and b) attempts to by Black people to liberate themselves from marginalization in all its forms (Guluma, 2023)." The Oromo ethnic identity and Black racial identity here may be complementary and mutually reinforcing.

Broadly, like the Oromo second generation Black immigrants assimilate into American society by combining their specific ethnic identity with a Black racial identity. Although Onoso

Imoagene was specifically focused on second generation Nigeria immigrants, in both the US and the UK, she observes that “second generation have developed a multifaceted identity that balances being racially Black, a diasporic Nigerian ethnicity, and a pan-African identity (Imoagene O. , 2025, p. 1621).”

This paper focuses on occupational assimilation in the U.S. labor market. Differences in the nature and significance of selectivity as well as heterogeneity in identity strategies, viz., combining immigrant ethnicity with a group specific Black racial strategy, implies that Black immigrants will not have a singular degree of assimilation. Further, their racial identity as Black may mean that 1st generation Black immigrants will suffer some racial discrimination in access to better occupations. But, their attachment to an ethnic identity may help moderate this discrimination. Second generation Black immigrants will have an assimilation experience that differs from their parents.

Model

We estimate equation (1), a statistical model of the probability that individual $i = 1, \dots, n$ works in occupation $j = 1, \dots, 22$ survey-year major occupations and production workers are the comparative occupation; X = age, years of education, marital status (married, separated, divorced, widowed), limitation on the type or amount of work, citizen, region (northeast, northcentral (Midwest)), west), size of city; Z = year of arrival in U. S. (1948 – 1965, 1966 – 1973, 1974 – 1980, 1981 – 1990, 1991 – 2000, 2001 – 2007, 2008 – 2019, 2019 – 2024), age of arrival in U. S. (0 – 5, 12 – 16, 17 – 24, 25 – 33, 34 – 43, 44 – 53, 54 – 63, 64 and above), and distance (miles) from country of origin to the U.S.; Migration Advantage is index of selectivity; and, trend = (0 for 2002, 1 for 2003, ..., 22 for 2024). The regressions are estimated for men.

$$(1) \Pr(Y = y_{ij}) = \beta_0 + X_i\beta_1 + Z_i\beta_2 + \beta_3 * \text{Migration Advantage} + \alpha_1 * \text{African American, 3}^{\text{rd}} \text{ gen}^+$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& + \alpha_2 * \text{Black Hispanic, 3}^{\text{rd}} \text{ gen}^+ + \alpha_3 * \text{Africa-English} + \alpha_4 * \text{Africa-French} + \alpha_5 * \text{Africa-Arabic} \\
& + \alpha_6 * \text{Africa-Other language} + \alpha_7 * \text{Africa, 2}^{\text{nd}} \text{ gen} + \alpha_8 * \text{Caribbean-English} \\
& + \alpha_9 * \text{Caribbean-English, 2}^{\text{nd}} \text{ gen} + \alpha_{10} * \text{Caribbean-Spanish} \\
& + \alpha_{11} * \text{Caribbean-Spanish, 2}^{\text{nd}} \text{ gen} + \alpha_{12} * \text{Haiti} + \alpha_{13} * \text{Haiti, 2}^{\text{nd}} \text{ gen} \\
& + \alpha_{14} * \text{Other Immigrants} + \alpha_{15} * \text{Other Immigrants, 2}^{\text{nd}} \text{ gen} + \text{trend} + u_i,
\end{aligned}$$

The racial comparison group is native-born Americans: Native born white $\equiv$ comparative group is white-only, native-born, and Non-Hispanic; African American, 3rd gen⁺ (“Native born Black”) $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 3rd or higher generation, native-born, Non-Hispanic; and, Black Hispanic, 3rd gen⁺ $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 3rd or higher generation, native-born, Hispanic.

The ethnic groups of interest are the groups presented in Table 1: Africa-English $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st generation African immigrant from a country where English is the major language spoken or an official language, Non-Hispanic; Africa-French $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st generation African immigrant from a country where French is the major language spoken or an official language, Non-Hispanic; Africa-Arabic $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st generation African immigrant from a country where Arabic is the major language spoken or an official language, Non-Hispanic; Africa-Other $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st generation African immigrant from a country where neither English, French, or Arabic is the major language spoken or an official language, Non-Hispanic; Africa, 2nd $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 2nd generation African immigrant, Non-Hispanic; Caribbean-English $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st and 2nd generation Caribbean immigrant from a country where English is the major language, Non-Hispanic; Caribbean-Spanish $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed, 1st and 2nd generation Caribbean immigrant from a country where Spanish is the major language; Haiti $\equiv$ black-only, black-mixed,

1st and 2nd generation Haitian immigrant, Non-Hispanic; and, Other Immigrant = black-only, black-mixed, 1st and 2nd generation immigrant from a country other than Africa or Caribbean, Non-Hispanic.

Table 1. Composition of language groups

Variable	Countries
Caribbean-English	Guayana (South America), Bermuda (North Atlanta), and Belize (Central America), Jamaica, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts – Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Caribbean not specified, North America not specified, Americas not specified, West Indies not specified
Caribbean-Spanish	Cuba, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvado, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Central America, not specified
Haiti	Haiti
Africa-English	Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Eritrea
Africa-French	Republic of Congo, Guinea, Coite D'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Central African Republic
Africa-Arabic	Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, North Africa, Africa not elsewhere classified
Africa-Other	Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Africa not elsewhere classified
Other Immigrant	immigrants with national origins other than Caribbean English, Caribbean Spanish, Haiti, or Africa

Source for languages of African countries: One World - Nations Online, "Countries by Languages." http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/countries_by_languages.htm#French. The World Population Review (<https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/english-speaking-countries>) lists English as the language de jure of Cameroon and Eritrea. The CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/>) lists English and French as official languages of Cameroon and English is an official language of Eritrea,

Index of Revealed Advantage of Migration to the United States

In studying immigration, the question of selection looms large. Immigrants from countries from which it is difficult to emigrate from are likely to have higher skills, social networks, and capital that may not be easily controlled. In an attempt to control for these, we create an Index of Revealed Advantage in Migration³. If we assume that migration was equally easy and desirable from every country, then the proportion of immigrants from any country to the


³ Data for population was obtained from the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2025) and data on Migrant Stock from the UN Database (United Nations Population Division, 2019)

USA would be the same as the proportion of that country's population in global population. The difference between the proportion of a country's emigrants to a receiving country and its share in global population is an indicator of how selective emigration is from the sending country to the receiving country. We calculate this as follows: $\frac{M_i}{M_{usa}} - \frac{P_i}{P_w}$, where M_i is migrant population from country i , P_i is population of country i , M_{usa} is the population of immigrants in the USA, and P_w is world population. An index of less than zero means immigration from the country is highly selective and the country sends fewer emigrants to the USA than its proportion of the population of the world. An index larger than zero means a country sends more than its fair share of emigrants to the USA and therefore other things being the same emigration to the USA is relatively easier.

The lower bound of this index, that is, the measure of maximal disadvantage, is country specific occurring at $M_i = 0$; hence, the lower bound $= -\frac{P_i}{P_w}$. The upper bound is the maximum revealed advantage $= \frac{M_i}{M_{usa}} - \frac{P_i}{P_w} \approx 1$, if all U.S. immigrants have a single country of origin and $\frac{P_i}{P_w}$ is small. So, $-\frac{P_i}{P_w} \leq \frac{M_i}{M_{usa}} - \frac{P_{usa}}{P_w} \leq 1$.

To give some empirical intuition to the migration advantage index we present the averages below in a series of maps that helps us explore the importance of geography in determining the migration advantage of individuals from different countries. We begin with a baseline map of the simple migration index in Map 1. The simple index runs from -0.1317 to 0.2248 . At the bottom India and China are outliers with a disadvantage four times larger than the next country. At the top Mexico is an outlier with a value ten times the size of the next country El Salvador. Because of this distribution mapping using the raw data shows little difference as most countries are bunched in the middle. In Map 1 we present the countries


ranked in quintiles by the simple index. A few patterns immediately emerge. Distance and size matter. Most countries close to the US or with good airline connections (Europe) have a positive migration index and are in the top two quintiles. On the other hand countries that are further away from the US dominate the lower quintiles. These are dominated by African and Asian countries with the exceptions of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which had a large refugee influx to the USA and South Korea which has historically also had very strong ties to the USA.




Map 1: Simple Migration Index by Quintile

We adjust the migration advantage index for its correlation with distance, education, and age. Specifically, our adjusted migration advantage index are the residuals ($\hat{\epsilon}$) from the immigrant regression $\text{Madvidx} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{distance} + \alpha_2 \text{education} + \alpha_3 \text{age} + \alpha_4 \text{age}^2 + \epsilon$. The results are presented below in Map 2. Once we correct, especially for distance a number of interesting patterns matter. The adjusted index runs from -0.12251 to 0.093583. Whereas approximately half the sample have positive values in the simple index this number only the top quintile and a

small fraction of the second highest quintile are positive. While Mexico remains the country with the highest index the gap between it and the rest of the sample is closed substantially with its index being less than 1 per cent larger than that of Australia. Surprisingly Canada shows no advantage probably being a reflection more of the fact that there is little desire to migrate to the USA and the countries of Central America are also highly disadvantaged. Surprisingly African countries of southern and eastern Africa all now have relatively strong migration advantage indices, as do Australia and other Pacific island nations as well as Asian states that have had strong ties to the USA often due to US colonial relationships or interventions in those countries since World War II.



Since we are particularly interested in black migrants we also show below the raw data for the adjusted migration index for African and Caribbean countries in Maps 3 and 4.



Map 3: Adjusted Migration Index for African Countries.

The data for African countries is quite telling. Apart from the fact that the corrected index moved most African countries from a negative index to a positive one there are some distinct and interesting geographic patterns that appear. First is the regional variation with Southern and Eastern African countries being advantaged. Interestingly the further south you go towards South Africa the more positive the index becomes. These countries from Kenya to South Africa have a colonial history of being either settler colonies or protectorate/mandate states and all have English based education systems. As you go further north the index remains positive though not as strong. Most of the countries were former British colonies with the exception of Ethiopia and parts of Somalia which have more recently built ties to the USA as allies during parts of the post war period and also as refugee sending countries more recently. West Africa proper and Western North Africa have the lowest migration advantages. Some of this may be explained by the dominant languages Arabic and French in many instances but also by poorer airline networks to the USA and weaker ties. In the chart below we provide some evidence that there is a mostly positive correlation between English proficiency and our

migration index for the African countries for which we have data.





Chart 1: English Proficiency and Adjusted Migration Index.

Source: Authors own calculations and EF English Proficiency Index 2025, A Ranking of 123 countries and Regions by English Skills (Education First, 2025).

The geographic pattern for our index in the Caribbean is striking (see Map 4). The large islands led by Cuba all have an advantage, one that is probably dominated by the advantageous law for people fleeing Cuba and for some periods those fleeing Haiti, plus the relative dense networks of citizens from these islands already in the USA. A puzzling but distinct other pattern is the fact that the Windward islands of the lesser Antilles have positive indices, the leeward islands are practically all negative. It may be the case that in these islands that have much closer connections to the USA (some are territories) and European states there is less of a push factor to migrate as the gains to migration may not be as large.



Map 4: Adjusted Migration Index for Caribbean Countries.

For purposes of the empirical work we use the migration index as follows. The migration advantage index (Madvidx) was constructed for 2005, 2015, and 2019. Our data are CPS ASEC, 2003 – 2024. For immigrants:

Madvidx = 2005 index if 2001 ≤ CPS ASEC survey year ≤ 2005;

Madvidx = 2015 index if 2006 ≤ CPS ASEC survey year ≤ 2015; and,

Madvidx = 2019 index if 2016 ≤ CPS ASEC survey year ≤ 2024.

For native-born persons, Madvidx = 0 for all CPS ASEC survey years.

Failure to control for migration advantage would create omitted variable bias, that is, $E(u_i | \text{immigrant group}) \neq 0$ since $\text{Cov}(\text{immigrant group}, \text{migration advantage}) \neq 0$ and, in this case, the immigrant group coefficients are biased and inconsistent. Including our index of migration advantage eliminates this problem. Further, we hypothesize:

$H_0: \beta_3 = 0$ and

$H_1: \beta_3 \neq 0$.

On the one hand, an increase in immigrant migration advantage (less selective migration) will have a negative effect on individual upward occupational mobility ($\beta_3 < 0$). On the other hand, an increase in immigrant migration advantage may have a positive effect on the group's labor strength in niche markets ($\beta_3 > 0$).

$H_0: \alpha'_j = \alpha_j$ and

$H_1: \alpha'_j \neq \alpha_j$, where $j = \{3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14\}$ are the coefficients on first generation immigrants, α'_j are the coefficients when ease of immigration is included in the model, and α_j are the coefficients when ease of immigration is excluded from the model.

Data

The data are extracts of the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Survey, 2002 – 2024. All persons are 25 – 64 years-old. The sample includes only labor force participants; the following persons were excluded from the sample: ill or disabled last year, taking care home/family last year, enrolled in school last year, armed forces last year, retired, or other reasons did not work. The occupation is for the survey year.

Black immigrants have high years of education, usually more than native-born Blacks and often more than whites. White men average 14.1 years of education while native-born African American men average 13.2 years of education (Table 2). First generation African, Caribbean, and Other immigrants average 13.7 – 15.3, 11.5 – 13.3, and 13.6 years of education, respectively. Second generation African, Caribbean, and Other immigrants average 15.3, 14 – 14.3, and 14.2 years of education, respectively.

[Insert Table 2]

The first two decades of the 21st century were the strongest years of African immigration, 50.5 (men) and 54 percent (women), respectively. The final two decades of the 20th century were

the strongest years of Caribbean and Other immigration: Caribbean-English, 41.1 percent; Caribbean-Spanish, 37.4 percent; Haiti, 36.6 percent; and Other Immigrants, 34.4 percent.

Most Black immigrants are 18 – 34 years-old on arrival in the U.S.: Africa, 57 percent; Caribbean-English 41 percent; Caribbean-Spanish, 47 percent; Haiti, 46 percent; and, Other Immigrants, 52 percent.

Sixty percent of Native-born African Americans live in the South and 18 percent live in the Midwest. By contrast, 41 percent and 43 percent of 1st and 2nd generation African men, respectively, live in the South, while 24 percent and 22 percent live in the Northeast. Among Caribbean-English, 39 percent and 36 percent of 1st and 2nd generation immigrant men, respectively, live in the South, while 54 percent and 47 percent live in the Northeast. Among Caribbean-Spanish, 37 percent and 36 percent of 1st and 2nd generation immigrant men, respectively, live in the South, while 51 percent and 44 percent live in the Northeast. Among Haitian immigrants, 55 percent and 37 percent of 1st and 2nd generation men, respectively, live in the South, while 40 percent and 57 percent live in the Northeast. Finally, among Other Immigrants, 36 percent and 43 percent of 1st and 2nd generation men, respectively, live in the South, while 34 percent and 21 percent live in the Northeast.

No more than 2 or 3 percent of Black immigrants live in cities with less than 100,000 people.

The three highest frequency occupations for Native born white men are Management (21.14 percent), Sales and related (9.39 percent), and Construction and extraction (9.28 percent). (See Table 3). Although Management is often a top three occupation for African American men, Production and Transportation and material moving are usually the major occupations.

[Insert Table 3]

Table 4 has Duncan indices comparing Native born white men and Native born African American men, respectively, to all other groups. For all African Americans, regardless of nativity or ethnicity, the Duncan index indicates that 23 percent of African Americans would have to move to new occupations to end dissimilarity with native-born white male workers. Native born Black men are slightly more occupationally dissimilar (0.244) to Native born white men than Native born, Hispanic African American men (0.231). African-French and African-Arabic immigrants have the highest segregation; 40 percent and 43 percent, respectively, would have to relocate to have the same occupational distribution as Native born white men. Native-born Hispanic African Americans are the most similar to Native born Black men, with a Duncan indices of 0.106. Thirty-one percent of second generation African immigrant men would have to find new occupations in order to have the same occupational distribution as Native born Black men.

On the whole, the occupational distribution of Black immigrants is less dissimilar to Native born Blacks than it is to the occupational distribution of Native born whites. For example, the Duncan index for African-English and Native born Black men is 0.218, while the Duncan index for African-English and Native born white men is 0.294. Occupational dissimilarity between second generation Black immigrants and Native born Blacks is often higher than occupational dissimilarity between first generation Black immigrants and Native born Blacks: African, 1st generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.179, but African, 2nd generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.310; Caribbean-English, 1st generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.129, but Caribbean-English, 2nd generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.195; and, Haiti, 1st generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.132, but Haiti, 2nd generation – Native born Black dissimilarity is 0.258.

Table 4. Duncan Indices of Dissimilarity, Men

	Comparison Group	
	All	African American
African American, all	0.233	n.a.
African American, 3+ gen	0.244	n.a.
Afr Amer, Hispanic	0.231	0.106
African, 1st gen	0.306	0.179
African, 2nd gen	0.296	0.310
African, English	0.294	0.218
African, French	0.403	0.225
African, Arabic	0.434	0.252
African, Oth language	0.306	0.195
Caribbean-English, 1 st gen	0.172	0.129
Caribbean-English, 2 nd gen	0.203	0.195
Caribbean-Spanish	0.345	0.201
Caribbean-Spanish, 2 nd gen	0.226	0.184
Haiti, 1 st gen	0.301	0.132
Haiti, 2 nd gen	0.278	0.258
Other Immigrant, 1 st gen	0.227	0.256
Other Immigrant, 2 nd gen	0.190	0.185

Source: Author's calculations, CPS ASEC, 2003 – 2024. All persons are at least 25 years-old and there are 22 major occupations.

Generational transitions of occupations among Black immigrants are presented in Table 5. The occupations in the tables are ordered by the frequency of white male employment. Each entry is the difference in the frequency of occupational employment between immigrant group's 2nd and 1st generation. The top panel is the 7 occupations with the highest frequencies of white employment, while the bottom panel is the 7 occupations with the highest frequencies of white employment and the second panel has the 8 occupations with the middle range of frequencies. Second generation Caribbean workers tend to move out of occupations with high white employment. Second generation Black males leave transportation and materials movement occupations: African and Haitian occupational frequencies declined by 10.8 and 10.6 percentage points, respectively, while Caribbean-Spanish and Caribbean-English occupational frequencies declined by 5.7 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively.

Table 5. Male generational transition of occupations among Black immigrants

Occupation	Africa	Carib-English	Carib-Spanish	Haiti	Other Immigrants
Management	2.5	2.5	8.5	4.7	3.3
Sales and Related	1.4	-0.4	2.3	3.6	1.5
Construction and Extraction	2.5	-6.1	-11.3	-0.8	-3.45
Business and Financial Operations	0.2	-1.5	-0.4	-1.5	0.69
Transportation and Material Moving	-10.8	-4.6	-5.7	-10.6	0.02
Production	-7.1	-0.9	-4.7	-4.2	1.22
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair	-1.7	-2.9	2.8	-1.2	-1.54
Office and Administrative Support	-0.2	3.2	3.1	5.5	2.73
Computer and Mathematical	10.5	2.5	1.9	3.7	-5.03
Architecture and Engineering	3.4	0.2	0.4	-0.7	-2.04
Educational Instruction and Library	-0.7	1.1	1.7	2.6	0.67
Protective Service	0.3	0.6	3.3	0.4	1.69
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical	2.0	1.4	3.9	1.5	-2.61
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance	-2.1	-1.7	-4.9	-4.2	2.03
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media	2.5	2.1	2.1	3.6	-2.37
Food Preparation and Serving Related	-0.2	1.2	-5.4	-2.5	2.53
Legal	1.2	1.8	0.7	0.6	0.27
Life, Physical, and Social Science	-0.2	0.8	0.3	0.8	0.50
Community and Social Service	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.4	1.44
Personal Care and Service	-1.1	0.7	0.4	-0.5	-0.69
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry	-0.1	-0.3	-0.8	-0.6	-0.07
Healthcare Support	-2.8	-0.4	0.7	-0.5	-0.79

Source: Author's calculations, CPS ASEC, 2003 – 2024. All persons are at least 25 years-old. Occupations are ranked by the distribution of white men, from highest to lowest percentage of group within the occupation.

Second generation Africans tend to move out of occupations with low white employment.

On the whole, second generation Black males either move out of or have only moderate increases in occupations with low Native born white male employment.

Second generation Black males move into computer and mathematical occupations:

African and Haitian occupational frequencies increased by 10.5 and 3.7 percentage points, respectively, while Caribbean-Spanish and Caribbean-English occupational frequencies declined by 1.9 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively. Other Immigrant frequency of employment rose

by 0.1 percentage points.

Results

Ordered logit regression results for a sample of immigrant men are presented in Table 6. Occupations are ranked by the mean white male wage of each occupation. The regression in column 1 is limited to 1st generation immigrant, while the regression in column 2 includes 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. Caribbean immigrants are the comparative group for both groups.

[Insert Table 6]

Ease of immigration has a statistically significant and negative impact on occupational mobility. Moving from no immigration advantage (index = 0) to the maximum ease of immigration (index = 0.2523), the relative risk of male immigrant movement to a higher wage white male occupation falls by $(0.124-1)*0.2523 = 22$ percent relative to Caribbean-English immigrants when the sample includes only 1st generation immigrants; the relative risk ratio falls by $(0.178-1)*0.2523 = 21$ percent relative to Caribbean-English immigrants when the sample includes 1st and 2nd generation immigrants. Moving from no immigration advantage to the minimum ease of immigration (index = -0.1694), the relative risk of male immigrant movement to a higher wage white male occupation increases by 15 percent relative to Caribbean-English immigrants when the sample includes only 1st generation immigrants; the relative risk ratio falls by 14 percent relative to Caribbean-English immigrants when the sample includes 1st and 2nd generation immigrants.

Ordered logit regression results for a sample of native-born and immigrant men are presented in Table 7. The regressions in 1 and 3 control for revealed advantage in immigration, while columns 2 and 4 do not control for ease of immigration. All men are the sample for columns 1 and 2, where white men are the comparative group. African American men are the

sample for columns 3 and 4, where native-born Non-Hispanic men, that is, Native born Blacks, are the comparative group. Ease of immigration has a statistically significant and negative impact on occupational mobility. However, there are inter- and intra-racial differences in the impact of migration advantage. Moving from no immigration advantage to the maximum ease of immigration, the relative risk of male immigrant movement to a higher wage white male occupation falls by 21 percent relative to white men; the relative risk ratio falls by 10 percent relative to Native born Black men when the sample includes only African American men. Moving from no immigration advantage to the minimum ease of immigration, the relative risk of male immigrant movement to a higher wage white male occupation increases by 14 percent relative to white men; the relative risk ratio rises by 6.6 percent relative to Native born Black men when the sample includes only African American men.

[Insert Table 7]

Coefficients of native-born and second generation African American men do not change with inclusion of immigration advantage. Second generation African immigrant men have statistically identical odds of occupational mobility as white men and these odds are not affected by controlling for ease of immigration. Second generation African immigrant men have 90 percent higher relative risk of occupational mobility than Native born Black men. When immigrant advantage is included in the regression, 1st generation Other Immigrants have a 36 percent higher relative risk of occupational mobility than white men. When immigrant advantage is excluded from the regression, 1st Other Immigrants have an 18 percent higher relative risk of occupational mobility than white men. This suggests 1st generation Other Immigrants have a positive correlation with ease of immigration.

So, except for 2nd generation African immigrants and 1st generation Other immigrants,

Native born Black men and all other Black male immigrants have a lower relative risk than white men of moving into a higher wage occupation.

Caribbean-English and Other immigrants have 12 percent and 59 percent greater relative risk than Native born Black men, respectively. All 1st generation African immigrants, 1st generation Caribbean-Spanish, and 1st generation Haitian immigrants have a lower relative risk than Native born Black men of moving into a higher wage occupation. All 2nd generation Black male immigrants have a higher relative risk than Native born Black men of moving into a higher wage occupation.

Native-born Hispanic Black men have higher odds (13 percent) of upward occupational mobility than Native-born Non-Hispanic Black men.

Multinomial logit regression results are presented in Tables 8a-v. Production workers are the comparative occupation. Among white men, production workers have the 6th highest employment frequency, 9th lowest wage, and 6th lowest education (12.34 years). The coefficients on the migration advantage index for each occupation are grouped in Table 8a. Row 1 includes the coefficients for Legal occupations, which have the highest mean wage for white men. Row 2 includes the coefficients for Healthcare Practitioners and Technical occupations, which have the second highest mean wage for white men. ... The final row includes the coefficients for Protective Services occupations, which have the lowest mean wage for white men. The top panel of each table includes 7 high white male wage occupations, while the bottom panel includes the 7 low white male low wage occupations, and middle wage occupations are included in the 2nd panel.

Relative migration advantage has less influence on inter-racial differences in occupational mobility than it does on intra-racial differences in occupational mobility. An

increase in ease of immigration tends to decrease Black immigrant access to high wage occupations and increase the relative risk of employment in the occupations where white men have the lowest wages. When we use all observations the revealed advantage in migration index is statistically significant for 12 occupations. In comparison to white men and production workers, the relative risk ratio declines for Black immigrants in four high wage occupations (Architecture and engineering, Computer and mathematical, Management, and Life, physical, and social sciences), though the relative risk ratio increases for Business and Financial Operations; declines for two mid-wage occupations (Art, design, entertainment, sports and media and Installation, maintenance, and repair); and, increases for 3 of the significant low wage occupations (Farming, fishing, and forestry, Food preparation and serving related, Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance) and decreases for Office and administrative support.

When we limit our sample to African American men, the revealed advantage in migration index is statistically significant for 16 of 21 occupations. In comparison to Non-Hispanic native-born Black men and production workers, the relative risk ratio increases for Black immigrants in one high wage occupations (Business and financial operations) and decreases for Architecture and engineering, Computer and mathematical, Management, and Life, physical, and social sciences; increases for two mid-wage occupations (Construction and extraction, Installation, maintenance, and repair) and decreases for Art, design, entertainment, sports and media and Community and social service; and, increases for 3 of the significant low wage occupations (Farming, fishing, and forestry, Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance, Food preparation and serving related) and decreases for Sales and related, Office and material support, and Protective services.

Legal, Health Practitioners, and Technical, and Computer and Mathematical are the three highest white male wage occupations. Native born Black men have lower relative risks than white workers in Legal (0.45), Health Practitioners, and Technical (0.71), and Computer and Mathematical (0.58). Black immigrants sometimes have greater occupational mobility than white men. For example, African-English, Caribbean-English, Haitian, and Other Immigrant Black men have higher relative risks than white male workers in Health Practitioners, and Technical, 2.75, 2.28, 3.47, and 2.77, respectively. Other Immigrant Black men have higher relative risks than white male workers (1.72) in Computer and Mathematical.

Educational Instruction and Library, Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media, Construction and Extraction are three middle white male wage occupations. Native born Native born Black men have no significantly different relative risks than white workers in Educational Instruction and Library, lower relative risks ratios in Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media (0.61) and Construction and Extraction (0.52). Black immigrants have mixed occupational differentials relative to whites and Native born Blacks. For example, Haitian higher relative risks than white workers in Educational Instruction and Library (2.00), lower relative risk in Construction and Extraction (0.48), and no significant difference in Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media.

Office and Administrative Support, Food Preparation and Serving Related, and Protective Services are the three lowest white male wage occupations. Native born Black men have higher relative risks than white workers in Office and Administrative Support (1.20), Food Preparation and Serving Related (1.35), and Protective Services (1.31). Black immigrants often have greater mobility into these low wage occupations than white men. For example, Caribbean-English men have higher relative risks than white workers in Office and Administrative Support (1.65) and

Protective Services (2.65 percent), though Caribbean-English men have no significant difference in relative risk of entering into Food Preparation and Serving Related.

Discussion

The migration advantage index captures international differences in selectivity and it is a statistically significant variable for occupational achievement. Except for Caribbean-English and Other Immigrants, first generation Black immigrants have lower occupational achievement than otherwise identical native-born Non-Hispanic African Americans, i.e., “Native born Blacks.” However, each group of second generation immigrants has greater occupational achievement⁴ Native born Blacks. Except for Caribbean-English and Other Immigrants, first generation Black immigrants have lower occupational achievement than otherwise identical native-born Non-Hispanic white-only Americans, i.e., “Native born Whites.” The latter have greater occupational achievement while the former have statistically identical achievement. Second generation Africans have statistically identical occupational achievement with Native born Whites; otherwise, each group of second generation Black immigrants have lower occupational achievement Native born Whites.

Mostly, our results are consistent with the lateral mobility hypothesis, where the second generation reproduces the relative class position a group would have had in their country of origin. Ethiopian immigrants are the largest group in African-Other Language. The results for this group are consistent with imported stratification, but we cannot say with certainty since the data are not sufficiently rich to distinguish between different ethnic groups from any country.

⁴ This finding is consistent with that of (Rauxa, 2023) work on immigrants in Germany where they show that assimilation reduces the gap between immigrant and native-born wages. We should note that in the US at least for the immigrant group that enters the country on a student visa they earn wages high than their native born counter parts after graduation (Peck, 2025). Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al also find similar results globally although although it is not universally the case that second generations do better (Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 2009).

Finally, the results for Caribbean-English are also consistent with positive selection of Black immigrants.

Our results are suggestive, not fully causal. The statistical model also needs additional measures of individual-specific differences in selectivity. Further, our analysis does not control for migration among native-born African Americans. Butcher (1994) finds that “on a variety of employment and wage measures, black Jamaican and other Caribbean immigrant men in 1979 were remarkably similar to native-born black “movers” (men who had moved out of their state of birth by the Census date).” Finally, our migration advantage index might be improved by accounting for a country’s political and cultural connection to the US and the density of the immigrant network from the specific country.

Table 2. Male descriptive statistics, by racial and ethnic group

	African American, 3rd gen+			Africa			Other		
	White	Native born	Hispanic	1st gen	2nd gen	English	French	Arabic	Language
N	616,383	76,359	1,748	6,205	440	3,200	413	467	2,125
Age	44.0	41.9	38.0	42.0	33.7	42.5	41.3	39.8	41.7
Years of education	14.1	13.2	13.1	14.5	15.3	15.0	13.8	13.3	13.9
Married	0.658	0.446	0.394	0.635	0.332	0.629	0.672	0.671	0.630
Separated	0.015	0.038	0.039	0.035	0.015	0.040	0.024	0.020	0.033
Divorced	0.108	0.111	0.070	0.074	0.033	0.084	0.059	0.031	0.072
Widowed	0.008	0.011	0.008	0.007	0.000	0.008	0.001	0.014	0.006
Health	0.032	0.039	0.030	0.025	0.018	0.024	0.029	0.035	0.023
Citizen	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.517	1.000	0.542	0.376	0.588	0.493
South	0.342	0.600	0.323	0.405	0.427	0.422	0.419	0.239	0.409
Northeast	0.189	0.118	0.390	0.239	0.224	0.255	0.272	0.176	0.216
Northcentral	0.272	0.180	0.102	0.199	0.180	0.179	0.251	0.421	0.172
West	0.198	0.102	0.185	0.158	0.169	0.144	0.058	0.164	0.203
Trend	10.3	10.9	13.7	13.3	15.5	13.5	16.2	13.0	12.4
Year arrived, 1948-1965	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001
Year arrived, 1966-1973	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.007	0.012
Year arrived, 1974-1980	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.025	0.007	0.017	0.020
Year arrived, 1981-1990	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.101	0.000	0.106	0.039	0.089	0.110
Year arrived, 1991-2000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.179	0.000	0.194	0.101	0.234	0.159
Year arrived, 2001-2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.254	0.000	0.247	0.258	0.262	0.264
Year arrived, 2008-2019	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.251	0.000	0.240	0.463	0.223	0.226
Year arrived, 2020-2024	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.081	0.000	0.074	0.096	0.084	0.089
Age at migration, 0 - 5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.026	0.001	0.021	0.014
Age at migration, 6 – 12	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.037	0.000	0.041	0.026	0.025	0.035
Age at migration, 13 – 17	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.054	0.000	0.053	0.036	0.061	0.060
Age at migration, 18 – 25	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.259	0.000	0.267	0.240	0.305	0.240

Table 2 (Continued). Male descriptive statistics, by racial and ethnic group

	African American, 3rd gen+			Africa					
	White	Native born	Hispanic	1st gen	2nd gen	English	French	Arabic	Other Language
Age at migration, 26 – 34	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.307	0.000	0.291	0.337	0.334	0.320
Age at migration, 35 – 44	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.177	0.000	0.184	0.243	0.099	0.156
Age at migration, 45 – 54	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.048	0.061	0.014	0.036
Age at migration, 55 – 64	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.005	0.023	0.008	0.011
Non-metropolitan	0.226	0.129	0.048	0.038	0.017	0.031	0.042	0.039	0.046
100,000 - 249,999	0.073	0.055	0.031	0.034	0.013	0.027	0.095	0.058	0.031
250,000 - 499,999	0.095	0.088	0.056	0.036	0.032	0.045	0.020	0.044	0.029
500,000 - 999,999	0.111	0.099	0.092	0.063	0.056	0.070	0.063	0.047	0.051
1,000,000 - 2,499,999	0.182	0.204	0.185	0.176	0.178	0.145	0.181	0.218	0.224
2,500,000 - 4,999,999	0.142	0.172	0.155	0.268	0.277	0.272	0.155	0.334	0.291
5,000,000+	0.170	0.254	0.432	0.385	0.428	0.410	0.443	0.334	0.327

Table 2 (continued). Male descriptive statistics, by racial and ethnic group

	Caribbean-English		Caribbean-Spanish		Haiti		Other Immigrant	
	1st gen	2nd gen	1st gen	2nd gen	1st gen	2nd gen	1st gen	2nd gen
N	3608	1027	1679	453	1863	286	325	873
Age	44.6	35.2	41.8	35.4	43.0	33.3	41.5	37.6
Years of education	13.3	14.3	11.5	14.0	13.0	14.3	14.2	14.2
Married	0.592	0.288	0.542	0.321	0.610	0.289	0.611	0.407
Separated	0.037	0.026	0.058	0.025	0.031	0.015	0.019	0.028
Divorced	0.090	0.071	0.088	0.057	0.055	0.039	0.065	0.086
Widowed	0.009	0.004	0.011	0.001	0.011	0.004	0.000	0.003
Health	0.020	0.016	0.030	0.019	0.016	0.014	0.044	0.043
Citizen	0.610	1.000	0.355	1.000	0.564	1.000	0.476	1.000
South	0.386	0.358	0.369	0.361	0.550	0.367	0.379	0.432
Northeast	0.538	0.465	0.510	0.444	0.404	0.569	0.309	0.213
Northcentral	0.035	0.075	0.043	0.041	0.029	0.027	0.169	0.117
West	0.042	0.102	0.078	0.154	0.017	0.037	0.142	0.238
Trend	11.1	13.3	12.9	14.0	11.3	14.7	17.9	13.5
Year arrived, 1948-1965	0.009	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.006	0.000
Year arrived, 1966-1973	0.078	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.020	0.000
Year arrived, 1974-1980	0.094	0.000	0.046	0.000	0.056	0.000	0.061	0.000
Year arrived, 1981-1990	0.247	0.000	0.155	0.000	0.189	0.000	0.106	0.000
Year arrived, 1991-2000	0.164	0.000	0.192	0.000	0.177	0.000	0.154	0.000
Year arrived, 2001-2007	0.115	0.000	0.184	0.000	0.158	0.000	0.243	0.000
Year arrived, 2008-2019	0.095	0.000	0.158	0.000	0.138	0.000	0.297	0.000
Year arrived, 2020-2024	0.078	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.102	0.000	0.112	0.000
Age at migration, 0 - 5	0.051	0.000	0.057	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.043	0.000
Age at migration, 6 – 12	0.135	0.000	0.080	0.000	0.077	0.000	0.097	0.000
Age at migration, 13 – 17	0.120	0.000	0.126	0.000	0.108	0.000	0.098	0.000
Age at migration, 18 – 25	0.222	0.000	0.254	0.000	0.217	0.000	0.327	0.000

Age at migration, 26 – 34	0.187	0.000	0.219	0.000	0.237	0.000	0.246	0.000
Age at migration, 35 – 44	0.108	0.000	0.082	0.000	0.126	0.000	0.132	0.000
Age at migration, 45 – 54	0.037	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.042	0.000
Age at migration, 55 – 64	0.013	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.011	0.000
Non-metropolitan	0.021	0.019	0.023	0.021	0.019	0.012	0.025	0.083
100,000 - 249,999	0.022	0.023	0.009	0.023	0.011	0.011	0.048	0.027
250,000 - 499,999	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.022	0.060	0.027	0.048	0.068
500,000 - 999,999	0.052	0.050	0.052	0.052	0.068	0.054	0.074	0.094
1,000,000 - 2,499,999	0.109	0.116	0.105	0.132	0.143	0.119	0.152	0.176
2,500,000 - 4,999,999	0.105	0.119	0.160	0.160	0.086	0.128	0.227	0.194
5,000,000+	0.661	0.649	0.621	0.588	0.613	0.649	0.427	0.359

Table 3. Distribution of occupations by race and ethnicity

[illegible]

[illegible]

Table 6. Ordered logit. Impact of Black identity on occupational rank: Black immigrants

	1st generation		1st and 2nd generation	
Distance	1.004		1.005	
	[0.0097]		[0.0089]	
Immigration Adv.	0.124	***	0.178	***
	[0.0415]		[0.0580]	
Africa-English	0.929		0.883	**
	[0.0609]		[0.0551]	
Africa-French	0.725	***	0.700	***
	[0.0807]		[0.0764]	
Africa-Arabic	0.576	***	0.568	***
	[0.0636]		[0.0607]	
Africa-Oth Lang	0.623	***	0.613	***
	[0.0546]		[0.0510]	
Carib-Span	0.741	***	0.764	***
	[0.0400]		[0.0408]	
Haiti	0.652	***	0.658	***
	[0.0339]		[0.0340]	
Othr-Immg	1.432	***	1.398	***
	[0.1156]		[0.1113]	
Africa2			1.866	***
			[0.2159]	
Carib-Engl2			1.388	***
			[0.1297]	
Carib-Span2			1.279	**
			[0.1469]	
Haiti2			1.308	**
			[0.1677]	
Othr-Immg2			1.225	**
			[0.1097]	
N	13452		16974	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 7. Ordered logit. Impact of Black identity on occupational rank: Full Sample

	All		All		African American		African American	
Distance	0.972	***	0.976	***	1.005		1.007	
	[0.0070]		[0.0070]		[0.0076]		[0.0075]	
Immigration Adv.	0.182	***			0.612			
	[0.0562]				[0.1926]			
Native born Black	0.517	***	0.517	***				
	[0.0038]		[0.0038]					
Natv Blk Hspn	0.635	***	0.639	***	1.119	**	1.125	***
	[0.0278]		[0.0279]		[0.0497]		[0.0498]	
Africa-English	0.726	***	0.754	***	0.869	**	0.882	*
	[0.0504]		[0.0522]		[0.0612]		[0.0616]	
Africa-French	0.592	***	0.568	***	0.766	**	0.723	***
	[0.0684]		[0.0605]		[0.0886]		[0.0771]	
Africa-Arabic	0.532	***	0.545	***	0.629	***	0.635	***
	[0.0593]		[0.0606]		[0.0700]		[0.0706]	
Africa-Oth Lang	0.558	***	0.578	***	0.645	***	0.653	***
	[0.0494]		[0.0510]		[0.0573]		[0.0579]	
Africa2	1.083		1.083		1.902	***	1.901	***
	[0.0914]		[0.0914]		[0.1588]		[0.1587]	
Carib-Engl	0.803	***	0.823	***	1.116	**	1.132	**
	[0.0346]		[0.0353]		[0.0552]		[0.0550]	
Carib-Engl2	0.819	***	0.82	***	1.439	***	1.44	***
	[0.0456]		[0.0456]		[0.0800]		[0.0800]	
Carib-Span	0.661	***	0.674	***	0.931		0.944	
	[0.0373]		[0.0380]		[0.0566]		[0.0568]	
Carib-Span2	0.771	***	0.772	***	1.372	***	1.373	***
	[0.0672]		[0.0672]		[0.1184]		[0.1185]	
Haiti	0.499	***	0.51	***	0.721	***	0.731	***
	[0.0266]		[0.0272]		[0.0418]		[0.0419]	
Haiti2	0.776	**	0.776	**	1.362	***	1.362	***
	[0.0804]		[0.0804]		[0.1395]		[0.1395]	
Othr-Immig	1.359	***	1.175	**	1.591	***	1.537	***
	[0.1134]		[0.0929]		[0.1341]		[0.1250]	
Othr-Immig2	0.755	***	0.757	***	1.312	***	1.315	***
	[0.0393]		[0.0394]		[0.0684]		[0.0685]	
N	698445		698520		91379		91454	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8a. Multinomial logit: impact of migration advantage on occupational inclusion

	All		Afr Amer	
Legal (6)	0.701		0.839	
	[2.3854]		[3.15]	
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical (9)	0.106		0.034	
	[0.1843]		[0.0594]	
Architecture and Engineering (3)	0.003 ***		0.010 **	
	[0.0059]		[0.0202]	
Computer and Mathematical (2)	0.0004 ***		0.002 ***	
	[0.0007]		[0.0030]	
Management (0)	0.004 ***		0.027 ***	
	[0.0036]		[0.0275]	
Life, Physical, and Social Science (4)	0.001 **		0.001 **	
	[0.0026]		[0.0022]	
Business and Financial Operations (1)	1.815		3.659 ***	
	[1.619]		[3.40]	
Healthcare Support (10)	1.280		0.114	
	[2.8918]		[0.2430]	
Personal Care and Service (14)	0.583		0.144	
	[1.0574]		[0.2628]	
Educational Instruction and Library (7)	0.064		0.028 *	
	[0.1163]		[0.0522]	
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media (8)	0.002 ***		0.001 ***	
	[0.0047]		[0.0037]	
Construction and Extraction (18)	1.084		4.288 **	
	[0.7462]		[3.1305]	
Community and Social Service (5)	2.140		0.037 ***	
	[7.9181]		[0.1334]	
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair (19)	0.140 **		1.816	
	[0.1349]		[1.8349]	
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry (17)	6654.4 ***		4753.178 **	
	[9132.5]		[7977.1]	
Sales and Related (15)	0.056 ***		0.118 **	
	[0.0534]		[0.1198]	
Transportation and Material Moving (21)	0.287		0.215 *	
	[0.2230]		[0.1689]	
Building and Grounds Cleaning & Maint (13)	5.488 **		2.115 **	
	[4.6914]		[1.8732]	
Office and Administrative Support (16)	0.114 **		0.041 ***	
	[0.1246]		[0.0463]	

Food Preparation and Serving Related (12)	66.006	***	18.788	***
	[55.5]		[16.3]	
Protective Service (11)	0.010	**	0.006	***
	[0.0189]		[0.0115]	

Multinomial logit: impact of Black identity on occupational inclusion

N	698,445	91,379
LR chi2(1071) =	362,985	46,516
Prob > chi2 =	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2 =	0.0957	0.0920
	-	-
Log-L	1,714,242	229,505

Table 8b. Legal

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
			**			
Native born Black	0.4464	0.0247	*			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.8511	0.2714		1.5178	0.4894	
Africa-English	0.5074	0.2520		0.8621	0.4818	
Africa-French	0.5349	0.3525		1.1861	0.8260	
Africa-Oth Lang	0.0000	0.0000		0.0000	0.0001	
Africa-Arabic	0.0000	0.0001		0.0000	0.0005	
Africa 2nd	1.0969	0.5477		2.4392	1.2273	*
Carib-Engl	0.8130	0.2728		1.4545	0.6216	
Carib-Engl 2nd	1.1617	0.3124		2.0805	0.5705	**
Carib-Span	0.6777	0.3822		1.1115	0.6873	*
Carib-Span 2nd	0.9897	0.5707		1.5603	0.8971	
Haiti	0.2842	0.2121	*	0.4921	0.3899	
Haiti 2nd	1.0465	0.8733		1.5715	1.3096	
Othr-Immig	0.5875	0.5073		1.1554	1.0327	

Table 8c. Healthcare Practitioners and Technical

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
			**			
Native born Black	0.711		**			
	9	0.0255	*			
	0.983				1.042	
Natv Blk Hspn	1	0.2125		5	0.2279	
	2.751		**	3.073		**
Africa-English	7	0.7233	*	4	0.8266	*
	0.700			0.881		
Africa-French	9	0.2888		4	0.3645	
	1.141			1.035		
Africa-Oth Lang	7	0.3932		9	0.3573	
	0.586			0.609		
Africa-Arabic	7	0.2798		6	0.2916	
	5.009		**	6.851		**
Africa 2nd	4	1.7827	*	8	2.4463	*
	2.282		**	2.279		**
Carib-Engl	3	0.4176	*	5	0.4829	*
	1.711			1.911		**
Carib-Engl 2nd	7	0.3657	**	6	0.4116	*
	1.140			1.061		
Carib-Span	7	0.3354		7	0.3292	
	3.358		**	3.555		**
Carib-Span 2nd	4	1.1347	*	5	1.1903	*
	3.472		**	3.316		**
Haiti	7	0.7414	*	7	0.7866	*
	5.080		**	5.078		**
Haiti 2nd	7	2.5450	*	0	2.5355	*
	2.773		**	3.064		**
Othr-Immig	4	0.9694	*	4	1.0790	*

Othr-Immig 2nd	0.5105	0.1787	*	1.0576	0.3760	Othr-Immig 2nd	1.481 4	0.2985	*	1.918 8	0.3914	** *
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Table 8d. Architecture and Engineering

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born Black	0.4072	0.0145	** *			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.5947	0.1212	**	1.3195	0.2786	
Africa-English	1.0587	0.2931		1.5231	0.4720	
Africa-French	0.3165	0.1680	**	0.4989	0.2737	
Africa-Oth Lang	1.0140	0.3559		1.2755	0.4880	
Africa-Arabic	0.3073	0.1684	** **	0.5051	0.2883	**
Africa 2nd	2.8981	1.0489	* **	6.0700	2.2322	* **
Carib-Engl	1.2469	0.2310		2.2628	0.5273	*
Carib-Engl 2nd	0.7327	0.1758		1.4701	0.3610	
Carib-Span	0.8616	0.2403		1.5357	0.4806	
Carib-Span 2nd	0.6797	0.3090		1.3465	0.6165	**
Haiti	1.3656	0.3173		2.5478	0.6920	*
Haiti 2nd	0.9517	0.6194		1.8163	1.1880	**
Othr-Immig	2.0591	0.7568	**	3.1325	1.2430	*
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.6733	0.1490	*	1.4935	0.3411	*

Table 8e. Computer and Mathematical

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born Black	0.575 5		** *			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.728 7	0.0169	*	1.139 4	0.1953	
Africa-English	0.817 9	0.1199	*	0.972 7	0.2536	
Africa-French	0.319 3	0.1987	** *	0.405 8	0.1788	**
Africa-Oth Lang	0.613 6	0.1361		0.647 6	0.2140	
Africa-Arabic	0.212 8	0.1931	** *	0.289 7	0.1486	**
Africa 2nd	3.860 6	0.1064	** *	5.452 4	1.8603	** *
Carib-Engl	1.027 8	1.2943		1.572 3	0.3177	**
Carib-Engl 2nd	0.977 2	0.1720		1.291 6	0.2588	
Carib-Span	0.741 7	0.1904		1.062 7	0.2854	
Carib-Span 2nd	0.985 4	0.1799		1.277 6	0.4591	
Haiti	0.667 1	0.3498		1.023 2	0.2754	
Haiti 2nd	2.247 4	0.1624	*	2.733 8	1.3389	**
Othr-Immig	1.723 7	1.0910	*	2.048 8	0.6813	**
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.961 0	0.5405	*	1.508 2	0.2766	**

Table 7f. Management

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
			**			
Native born Black	0.4697	0.0089	*			
			**			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.5194	0.0642	*	0.9622	0.1243	
Africa-English	0.9441	0.1798		1.1876	0.2367	
			**			
Africa-French	0.3444	0.1155	*	0.4899	0.1684	**
Africa-Oth Lang	0.6026	0.1521	**	0.6680	0.1746	
Africa-Arabic	0.5205	0.1627	**	0.7869	0.2534	
Africa 2nd	1.2090	0.4111		2.0421	0.7038	**
						**
Carib-Engl	1.1995	0.1458		1.8196	0.2560	*
Carib-Engl 2nd	0.8424	0.1359		1.3189	0.2180	*
Carib-Span	0.8297	0.1340		1.1969	0.2109	
Carib-Span 2nd	1.2945	0.3598		2.0320	0.5707	**
Haiti	0.8845	0.1369		1.3456	0.2293	*
Haiti 2nd	2.0301	0.9007		2.9627	1.3231	**
			**			**
Othr-Immig	2.0655	0.5197	*	2.8194	0.7322	*
						**
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.8324	0.1191		1.5136	0.2242	*

Table 7g. Life, Physical, and Social Science

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
	0.456		**			
Native born Black	4	0.0270	*			
	0.614				1.144	
Natv Blk Hspn	2	0.2154			1	0.4150
	0.754				0.994	
Africa-English	7	0.2787			3	0.3960
	0.098				0.144	
Africa-French	2	0.1040	**		8	0.1552
	0.953				1.128	*
Africa-Oth Lang	6	0.4469			7	0.5528
	0.266				0.341	
Africa-Arabic	1	0.2159			8	0.2840
	1.347				3.078	
Africa 2nd	8	0.7378			3	1.7041
	0.772				1.102	**
Carib-Engl	0	0.2186			7	0.3781
	1.128				2.224	
Carib-Engl 2nd	4	0.3456			5	0.7016
	0.286				0.378	**
Carib-Span	0	0.1768	**		2	0.2453
	0.637				1.209	
Carib-Span 2nd	4	0.4803			4	0.9153
	0.409				0.569	
Haiti	7	0.2025	*		3	0.3024
	2.278				4.262	
Haiti 2nd	6	1.6297			5	3.0729
	0.597				0.787	**
Othr-Immig	7	0.4026			2	0.5473
	0.882				1.853	
Othr-Immig 2nd	5	0.2713			9	0.5931
						*

Table 7h. Business and Financial Operations

All African American

Table 7i. Healthcare Support

All African American

	RRR	Std. err.		RRR	Std. err.		RRR	Std. err.		RRR	Std. err.	
Native born Black	0.6973	0.0147	**				2.294		**			
			*				0	0.1186	*			
			**				2.415		**	1.054		
Natv Blk Hspn	0.6470	0.0926	*	0.9055	0.1356		8	0.6045	*	5	0.2685	
							8.572		**	6.411		**
Africa-English	1.2362	0.2589		1.6307	0.3518	**	6	3.1751	*	1	2.2122	*
							2.031			1.467		
Africa-French	0.9446	0.3075		1.5007	0.4998		6	1.0386		4	0.7293	
							2.244			1.528		
Africa-Oth Lang	0.8314	0.2296		1.0037	0.2838		5	1.0421	*	6	0.6659	
							0.916			0.660		
Africa-Arabic	0.4428	0.1705	**	0.6890	0.2696		0	0.6029		1	0.4247	
					**		5.237		**	2.601		
Africa 2nd	2.0065	0.7285	*	3.3907	1.2477	*	6	2.8394	*	5	1.4171	*
							3.741		**	2.038		**
Carib-Engl	1.0945	0.1460		1.3244	0.2014	*	6	1.0105	*	4	0.5636	*
							2.461		**	1.037		
Carib-Engl 2nd	0.8392	0.1564		1.1483	0.2190		9	0.8220	*	2	0.3501	
							3.988		**	2.020		
Carib-Span	0.8694	0.1563		1.0124	0.1960		0	1.2570	*	0	0.6478	**
							6.481		**	2.618		
Carib-Span 2nd	0.8942	0.3031		1.2039	0.4119		2	2.6948	*	2	1.0966	**
							7.125		**	3.893		**
Haiti	1.3110	0.2086	*	1.5336	0.2684	**	0	2.0317	*	9	1.1345	*
							7.183		**	2.972		
Haiti 2nd	2.2302	1.0646	*	2.9966	1.4423	**	0	4.6596	*	6	1.9367	*
							2.314			1.800		
Othr-Immig	1.1379	0.3791		1.8214	0.6158	*	3	1.2126		2	0.9050	
							2.101			1.038		
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.7068	0.1251	**	1.0608	0.1930		7	0.6850	**	6	0.3421	

Table 7j. Personal Care and Service

All	African American
RRR	RRR
Std. err.	Std. err.

Table 7k. Educational Instruction and Library

All	African American
RRR	RRR
Std. err.	Std. err.

Native born Black	1.4762	0.0552	** *		** *	Native born Black	1.003 7	0.0311					
Natv Blk Hspn	1.4675	0.3028	*	0.9008	0.1898	Natv Blk Hspn	1.061 8	0.2124		0.953 6	0.1921		
Africa-English	1.9260	0.6406	**	2.1004	0.6950	Africa-English	0.891 7	0.2389		1.065 5	0.2925		
Africa-French	0.4783	0.2843		0.5252	0.3134	Africa-French	0.116 6	0.0755	** *	0.150 4	0.0978	** *	
Africa-Oth Lang	1.6778	0.6728		1.6902	0.6684	Africa-Oth Lang	0.360 1	0.1407	** *	0.389 8	0.1532	**	
Africa-Arabic	1.0474	0.5241		1.0840	0.5453	Africa-Arabic	0.425 0	0.2037	*	0.553 8	0.2665		
Africa 2nd	2.8654	1.3933	**	1.8091	0.8847	Africa 2nd	1.179 3	0.5063		1.188 8	0.5120		
Carib-Engl	1.2029	0.2909		1.0969	0.2904	Carib-Engl	1.317 1	0.2448		1.468 7	0.3165	*	
Carib-Engl 2nd	1.9889	0.4923	** *	1.1995	0.3013	Carib-Engl 2nd	1.166 6	0.2577		1.015 4	0.2259		
Carib-Span	2.2552	0.5783	** *	1.8981	0.5264	Carib-Span	0.793 3	0.2338		0.861 5	0.2693		
Carib-Span 2nd	3.0818	1.2001	** *	1.7273	0.6768	Carib-Span 2nd	1.575 9	0.6065		1.298 9	0.4972		
Haiti	2.2449	0.5770	** *	2.0776	0.5778	Haiti	2.002 4	0.4466	** *	2.045 7	0.5059	** *	
Haiti 2nd	2.8427	1.8412		1.6189	1.0519	Haiti 2nd	4.440 7	2.1953	** *	3.406 0	1.6819	**	
Othr-Immig	0.9113	0.4593		0.9668	0.4891	Othr-Immig	0.787 3	0.3428		0.960 8	0.4215		
Othr-Immig 2nd	1.1425	0.3174		0.7337	0.2065	Othr-Immig 2nd	1.115 6	0.2288		1.137 6	0.2357		

Table 7l. Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.
Native born Black	0.6081	0.0219	** *		

Table 7m. Construction and Extraction

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.
Native born Black	0.519 3	0.0108	** *		

								0.623	**	1.162			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.9881	0.1796		1.3060	0.2464		Natv Blk Hspn	8	0.0772	*	4	0.1506	
								0.280	**		0.296	**	
Africa-English	0.6037	0.2280		0.7160	0.2777		Africa-English	3	0.0657	*	9	0.0713	*
								0.122	**		0.129	**	
Africa-French	0.2419	0.1894	*	0.3033	0.2397		Africa-French	5	0.0610	*	9	0.0651	*
								0.220	**		0.206	**	
Africa-Oth Lang	0.6912	0.3323		0.6922	0.3362		Africa-Oth Lang	0	0.0697	*	2	0.0664	*
								0.211	**		0.227	**	
Africa-Arabic	0.6933	0.4071		0.8442	0.5062		Africa-Arabic	2	0.0848	*	0	0.0926	*
								1.133			2.250		
Africa 2nd	1.7550	0.7087		2.5505	1.0408	**	Africa 2nd	0	0.4302		1	0.8604	**
								1.340			1.671	**	
Carib-Engl	1.3302	0.3033		1.7416	0.4575	**	Carib-Engl	8	0.1659	**	6	0.2348	*
								0.560	**		1.028		
Carib-Engl 2nd	1.0380	0.2259		1.4248	0.3177		Carib-Engl 2nd	7	0.1084	*	3	0.2012	
								1.265			1.520	**	
Carib-Span	0.9325	0.3077		1.0495	0.3727		Carib-Span	7	0.1803	*	9	0.2372	*
								0.760			1.360		
Carib-Span 2nd	1.3623	0.5095		1.7294	0.6520		Carib-Span 2nd	1	0.2436		5	0.4382	
								0.482	**		0.604	**	
Haiti	1.0793	0.3317		1.4327	0.4782	**	Haiti	4	0.0855	*	1	0.1141	*
								0.965			1.717		
Haiti 2nd	3.0853	1.5422	**	4.0294	2.0274	*	Haiti 2nd	4	0.4990		8	0.8900	
								2.144	**		2.084	**	
Othr-Immig	2.2372	1.0054	*	2.3288	1.0744	*	Othr-Immig	0	0.4122	*	4	0.4118	*
								0.536	**		1.044		
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.7124	0.1655		0.9365	0.2230		Othr-Immig 2nd	7	0.0907	*	8	0.1801	

Table 7n. Community and Social Service

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.
Native born			**		
Black	2.1897	0.0782	*		
			**		
Natv Blk Hspn	2.7336	0.5902	*	0.9793	0.2148

Table 7o. Installation, Maintenance, and Repair

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.
Native born	0.524		**		
Black	5	0.0122	*		
	0.686		**	1.269	
Natv Blk Hspn	6	0.0952	*	8	0.1830

Africa-English	10.37	4.3411	** *	5.6679	2.1804	** *	Africa-English	1.259 3	0.2984	1.351 6	0.3410
Africa-French	2.6550	1.5644	*	1.5265	0.8795		Africa-French	0.449 2	0.1922	0.532 3	0.2330
Africa-Oth Lang	2.8034	1.6746	*	1.3425	0.7474		Africa-Oth Lang	0.534 7	0.1757	0.518 9	0.1786 *
Africa-Arabic	2.4912	1.8168		1.3766	0.9780		Africa-Arabic	0.550 0	0.2207	0.669 4	0.2770
Africa 2nd	4.9352	2.1074	** *	2.1588	0.9260	*	Africa 2nd	0.529 0	0.2688	0.861 9	0.4403
Carib-Engl	4.6790	1.1830	** *	1.9503	0.5270	**	Carib-Engl	2.050 3	** 0.2857	3.041 2	** 0.4981 *
Carib-Engl 2nd	2.7086	0.6944	** *	0.9506	0.2459		Carib-Engl 2nd	0.851 6		1.344 0	0.2683
Carib-Span	4.2788	1.4263	** *	1.5953	0.5523		Carib-Span	1.300 9		1.992 2	** 0.3870 *
Carib-Span 2nd	4.4859	1.8367	** *	1.4763	0.6042		Carib-Span 2nd	1.940 5		2.998 9	** 0.8928 *
Haiti	8.6676	2.3428	** *	3.5542	1.0220	** *	Haiti	1.190 8		1.845 6	** 0.3700 *
Haiti 2nd	7.7739	4.4040	** *	2.4218	1.3741		Haiti 2nd	1.374 5		2.047 8	
Othr-Immig	0.0000	0.0001		0.0000	0.0002		Othr-Immig	2.166 5	** 0.5600	2.474 5	** 0.6661 *
Othr-Immig 2nd	1.6333	0.4506	*	0.6831	0.1904		Othr-Immig 2nd	0.690 4		1.251 0	
								0.1239	**	0.2295	

Table 7p. Farming, Fishing, and Forestry

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born Black	0.7558	0.0435	** *			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.9644	0.3558		1.5875	0.6095	
Africa-English	0.2138	0.1316	**	0.3613	0.2529	

Table 7q. Sales and Related

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born Black	0.476 4	** 0.0103	*			
Natv Blk Hspn	0.760 0			1.221 5	0.1568	
Africa-English	0.657 5	** 0.1337	**	0.914 5	0.1964	

Africa-French	0.2138	0.2346		0.2963	0.3396	Africa-French	0.415		**	0.617	
							5	0.1341	*	5	0.2045
Africa-Oth Lang	0.0916	0.1014	**	0.1267	0.1482	Africa-Oth Lang	0.891			1.049	
					*		4	0.2202		9	0.2704
Africa-Arabic	0.0000	0.0000		0.0000	0.0001	Africa-Arabic	0.485			0.698	
							1	0.1538	**	6	0.2294
Africa 2nd	0.0000	0.0002		0.0000	0.0015	Africa 2nd	1.386			2.135	
							0	0.4841		1	0.7531
Carib-Engl	1.0700	0.4336		1.4635	0.6800	Carib-Engl	0.814			1.317	**
							4	0.1102		6	0.2056
Carib-Engl 2nd	0.0000	0.0001		0.0000	0.0006	Carib-Engl 2nd	0.547		**	0.812	*
							9	0.1024	*	1	0.1542
Carib-Span	1.4842	0.5915		1.4234	0.6524	Carib-Span	0.694			1.015	
							3	0.1232	**	4	0.1955
Carib-Span 2nd	0.0000	0.0001		0.0000	0.0011	Carib-Span 2nd	0.902			1.262	
							9	0.2766		6	0.3891
Haiti	2.2342	0.9029	**	2.0981	0.9725	Haiti	1.034			1.711	**
							0	0.1687		8	0.3082
Haiti 2nd	0.0000	0.0003		0.0000	0.0027	Haiti 2nd	2.227			3.022	*
							2	1.0053	*	3	1.3696
Othr-Immig	1.5330	0.4737		1.4531	0.4866	Othr-Immig	1.415			1.831	**
							0	0.3563		9	0.4775
Othr-Immig 2nd	0.8422	0.3911		1.3531	0.6413	Othr-Immig 2nd	0.767			1.215	**
							9	0.1191	*	5	0.1936

Table 7r. Transportation and Material Moving

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born			**			
Black	1.4969	0.0270	*			
					**	
Natv Blk Hspn	1.1694	0.1339		0.7329	0.0868	*
			**			**
Africa-English	2.3298	0.4199	*	1.9345	0.3536	*
Africa-French	1.6393	0.3975	**	1.3413	0.3319	

Table 7s. Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born	1.463		**			
Black	5	0.0348	*			
	1.607		**		1.147	
Natv Blk Hspn	0	0.2178	*		8	0.1613
	1.097				1.251	
Africa-English	2	0.2700			0	0.3103
	0.705				0.746	
Africa-French	6	0.2521			9	0.2697

			**			**			0.999		1.035		
Africa-Oth Lang	3.3008	0.7011	*	2.5938	0.5570	*	Africa-Oth Lang	1	0.2985	3	0.3099		
			**			**			0.695		0.806		
Africa-Arabic	2.9351	0.7172	*	2.9464	0.7309	*	Africa-Arabic	8	0.2662	6	0.3122		
			**						1.289		0.940		
Africa 2nd	2.7391	0.9487	*	1.4965	0.5225		Africa 2nd	4	0.6557	1	0.4801		
			**						1.371		1.153		
Carib-Engl	1.8047	0.2190	*	1.3031	0.1752	**	Carib-Engl	4	0.2094	**	6	0.1920	
						**			1.156		0.767		
Carib-Engl 2nd	1.0744	0.1917		0.5560	0.1004	*	Carib-Engl 2nd	0	0.2637		7	0.1768	
			**						2.097	**	1.617	**	
Carib-Span	1.8977	0.2668	*	1.3702	0.2066	**	Carib-Span	9	0.3453	*	3	0.2851	*
									2.921	**	1.890		
Carib-Span 2nd	1.9595	0.5628	**	0.9753	0.2817		Carib-Span 2nd	0	0.9292	*	0	0.6049	**
			**			**			1.867	**	1.549		
Haiti	3.0921	0.4334	*	2.2412	0.3385	*	Haiti	2	0.3272	*	2	0.2891	**
									2.076		1.341		
Haiti 2nd	3.1656	1.4466	**	1.4836	0.6799		Haiti 2nd	6	1.2008		4	0.7773	
									1.228		1.257		
Othr-Immig	1.6308	0.3515	**	1.3662	0.2966		Othr-Immig	2	0.2936		2	0.3055	
									1.504		1.118		
Othr-Immig 2nd	1.3151	0.1933	*	0.8306	0.1245		Othr-Immig 2nd	3	0.2736	**	9	0.2070	

Table 7t. Office and Administrative Support

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born			**			
Black	1.1967	0.0251	*			
			**			
Natv Blk Hspn	1.3962	0.1694	*	1.0411	0.1312	
					**	
Africa-English	1.6419	0.3670	**	1.9122	0.4345	*
Africa-French	1.3412	0.4031		1.5390	0.4712	
Africa-Oth Lang	1.0380	0.2963		1.1121	0.3199	

Table 7u. Food Preparation and Serving Related

	RRR	All Std. err.		RRR	African American Std. err.	
Native born	1.346		**			
Black	3	0.0361	*			
	1.308				1.008	
Natv Blk Hspn	9	0.1899	*		0	0.1499
	0.590				0.712	
Africa-English	4	0.1523	**		7	0.1850
	0.566				0.614	
Africa-French	5	0.2133			4	0.2332
	0.606				0.657	
Africa-Oth Lang	7	0.1895			3	0.2055

Africa-Arabic	1.4678	0.4665		1.9121	0.6168	**	Africa-Arabic	0.547		0.548	
								8	0.2097	4	0.2128
Africa 2nd	2.0175	0.7268	*	1.5040	0.5468		Africa 2nd	1.800		1.515	
			**			**		4	0.7563	7	0.6391
Carib-Engl	1.6543	0.2327	*	1.5278	0.2401	*	Carib-Engl	1.297		1.298	
								2	0.2156	8	0.2330
Carib-Engl 2nd	1.5302	0.2615	**	1.0604	0.1842		Carib-Engl 2nd	1.243		0.986	
								4	0.2579	8	0.2066
Carib-Span	1.3573	0.2401	*	1.1589	0.2195		Carib-Span	2.461	**	2.025	**
								7	0.4260	8	0.3744
Carib-Span 2nd	1.9252	0.5703	**	1.2699	0.3785		Carib-Span 2nd	1.046		0.771	
			**					9	0.4071	7	0.3009
Haiti	1.5997	0.2742	*	1.4651	0.2704	**	Haiti	3.615	**	3.592	**
			**					7	0.6161	1	0.6565
Haiti 2nd	4.7456	2.1063	*	3.1006	1.3814	**	Haiti 2nd	3.834	**	2.945	
								3	1.8444	8	1.4203
Othr-Immig	1.5599	0.4432		1.6459	0.4736	*	Othr-Immig	1.855	**	1.927	**
								3	0.4269	6	0.4494
Othr-Immig 2nd	1.3226	0.2064	*	0.9964	0.1593		Othr-Immig 2nd	1.758	**	1.425	*
								6	0.2977	1	0.2454
											**

Table 7v. Protective Service

	All			African American		
	RRR	Std. err.		RRR	Std. err.	
Native born			**			
Black	1.3091	0.0321	*			
			**			
Natv Blk Hspn	1.6472	0.2228	*	1.1705	0.1642	
			**			**
Africa-English	2.9967	0.8774	*	3.0850	0.9101	*
Africa-French	0.6827	0.3422		0.6970	0.3515	
Africa-Oth Lang	1.5662	0.5953		1.4919	0.5645	
Africa-Arabic	0.9591	0.4807		1.0768	0.5425	
Africa 2nd	2.2197	0.8659	**	1.6234	0.6382	
			**			**
Carib-Engl	2.6671	0.4534	*	2.2475	0.4304	*

Carib-Engl 2nd	1.4050	0.2768	*	0.9126	0.1825	
Carib-Span	1.0429	0.2696		0.8356	0.2273	
Carib-Span 2nd	1.9217	0.6321	**	1.2136	0.4014	
			**			**
Haiti	3.4754	0.6699	*	2.9980	0.6330	*
			**			
Haiti 2nd	4.1909	1.9872	*	2.6338	1.2542	**
Othr-Immig	1.5307	0.6529		1.4260	0.6120	
Othr-Immig 2nd	1.0867	0.2077		0.7970	0.1550	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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