Symbiotic, resilient, and rapidly transforming food supply chains in LMICs: supermarket and e-commerce revolutions helped by wholesale & logistics co-pivoting

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1. Introduction

a) FSCs in developing countries are transforming rapidly

FSCs (food supply chains) in developing countries (referred to here as LMICs, low- and middle-income countries) are transforming rapidly in the past several decades (Reardon et al. 2019; Barrett et al. forthcoming). FSCs are transforming along three stages: from "traditional" to "transitional" to "modern" (Reardon et al. 2012b). The main changes are spatial lengthening, consolidation, technological intensification, and movement along the product cycle from niche to commodities to differentiated products (and thus introduction of innovations).

While most attention concerning transformation is paid to food trade and global value chains, the domestic FSCs are also crucial. On the one hand, domestic FSCs are important and have grown quickly. Only about 10% of national food consumption in developing countries is imported and 5% of food output is exported, so 90% of their food is from domestic sources. Most of that food comes via supply chains: about 80% of all national food consumption is purchased; only about 20% is subsistence farming. The FSCs have grown extremely rapidly, such as 800% in Africa and 1000% in Southeast Asia in the past 25 years (Reardon et al. 2019).

On the other hand, domestic FSCs have transformed rapidly during globalization (somewhat at odds with common image that trade and "global value chains" are the main face of globalization in the developing country food economy). Reardon and Timmer (2007) give an example of the "supermarket revolution" and contend that:

The primary impact of globalization on domestic food markets came not through the trade effect, but through direct changes wrought on domestic food markets by FDI liberalization... Spurred by massive retail sector foreign direct investment (FDI) to which was added competitive investments from domestic capital, a profound retail transformation has occurred in the past decade – the “supermarket revolution”. (Reardon & Timmer: 2808, 2824)

b) FSCs face long-term risks & short-term shocks and develop resilience or pivoting strategies based on symbiotic relationships

As supply chains grow, introduce their innovations to the market, and transform in structure and conduct, they face two kinds of challenges in developing countries: (1) long-term conditions and problems like high transaction costs and risks; (2) short-term shocks like climate disasters and COVID-19. To deal with these two sets of challenges, supply chains (and their individual actors,
the farms and firms) undertake two strategies, one that can be thought of as the internal design of the supply chain and one as linkages between supply chains, as follows.

First, supply chain firms make choices about the design of their own supply chains in order to develop new markets for the product or service which is innovative in the new setting. To develop their supply chains over time, they have, as the Chinese say, "to cross the river by feeling the stones". They have to adapt or "pivot" to deal with long-term problems and still achieve rapid growth and resilience. Reardon et al. (2007: 400) note that "... firms "undertake ‘proactive fast-tracking strategies’ ... These strategies reveal that the leading retailers saw demand and supply-side conditions in food markets as ‘endogenous’ rather than ‘exogenous’—things they could influence to their own gain." Examples they give are of outsourcing procurement to sidestep fragmented, transaction-costly traditional market sources.

Zilberman et al. (2019) cast this endogenous design of supply chains as a set of specific choices: technological, institutional (contract or spot markets, standards), and organizational (make or buy). The aggregate of these micro design choices then affect the meso market environment of these variables. Note that part of the choices involve choices of linkages with complementary supply chains to which we turn next.

Second, symbiotic relationships are formed among supply chains for co-adaptation and growth and transformation of FSCs, with the concepts heuristically laid out in Reardon et al. (2007) and Reardon and Timmer (2012). As lead segments in PSCs pivot to long-term challenges and sudden shocks (like COVID-19) they work out arrangements with complementary supply chains that need to "co-innovate" or "co-pivot." Those terms are used by Reardon and Swinnen (2020) and Reardon et al. (2021b) as an illustration of this (reviewed below) when during COVID-19 retailers (small and large) in developing countries had to quickly pivot to e-commerce and relied on co-pivoting by delivery intermediary and logistics supply chains. In section 3 we will explore this in more depth especially related to our illustrative foci in retail (supermarkets and e-commerce).

To show the breadth of applicability of the concept of "symbiotic supply chains" introduced in the literature on food supply chains in the past 25 years, it suffices to note literature emphasizing this symbiosis across a range of situations: supermarkets and (logistics) lateral supply chains (in Asia, Reardon et al. 2012; in Central & Eastern Europe and China, Reardon and Swinnen 2004; in Latin America, Reardon and Berdegué 2002); processors and input and finance supply chains in Slovakia (Gow and Swinnen, 1998); supermarkets and farm input and R&D&E supply chains in Indonesia (Reardon et al. 2007); supermarkets and large processors in dairy in Brazil (Farina et al. 2005), and R&D&E innovation supply chains and product supply chains (Zilberman et al. forthcoming).

Supply chains complementary to product supply chains include: (1) farm inputs; (2) "lateral supply chains" like the supply of logistics, finance, energy, and labor, feed the nodes of the product and input supply chains; and (3) the R&D&E (research and development and extension) supply chains feed the other supply chains. Together these three and the product supply chain form a "dendritic" (tree form) cluster of complementary supply chains (Reardon et al. 2019).
A central message of this paper is that food supply chain transformation and inter-supply chain symbiosis (and co-adaptation) are intimately connected: (1) transformation of PSCs requires "pivoting" by the firms - new investments and innovations and to adapt to long term challenges and opportunities and short term shocks (like COVID-19); (2) the quest for transformation calls forth or induces complementary supply chains (lateral, farm inputs, and R&D&E) to "co-pivot", to co-adapt and co-innovate, to enable the pivoting. FSC resilience is based on these two pillars.

The balance of the paper provides illustrations of these concepts for the rapid rise of the supermarket revolution (section 2) and the rise of e-commerce and its acceleration during SAR1 and SARS2 (COVID) (section 3). We show that the explosive rapidity of the take-off of these retail transformations was considered surprising, predicted improbable, in the earlier literature, but that their rapid rise and numerous pivots to address the unique challenges of developing country food economies was dependent in large part initially on a transfer of innovations from developed countries but then a series of "co-pivots" by symbiotic supply chains - wholesale and delivery intermediaries, logistics supply chains, large processors, and farm input supply chains.

2. The Supermarket Revolution in LMICs: fast-tracked diffusion via supply chain symbioses involving resilience to long-run challenges

2.1. Surprisingly rapid diffusion of supermarkets

a) The supermarket revolution was predicted to be improbable in LMICs – before it happened

Supermarkets have been around for a half-century in a number of developing countries. Goldman (1974) noted the emergence of domestic supermarket chains in a number of countries due to various demand side factors (rising incomes, urbanization, increasing opportunity cost of women’s time in large cities). However, he noted at that time that this was a very limited phenomenon – limited mainly to large cities, upper middle or rich consumer segments, and was an affair nearly exclusively of domestic-capital chains.

Goldman, and other retail researchers in the 1960s-1980s contended that supermarkets were destined to not "take off" in developing countries for two sets of reasons. On the demand side, they maintained that the poor and even the middle class would not be induced to switch from shopping at "mom and pop" stores and open markets – to buy flour here, fruit there, meat another place, and so on - to shop in supermarkets.

They had several reasons for their demand-side contention. (1) They reasoned that as shopping in supermarkets was meant to save women's time, and women worked little outside the home and so their opportunity costs of time were low, only the upper class would shop in supermarkets, and it would scarcely penetrate the middle class let alone the poor. In a similar vein, they observed that at the time the poor did not tend to buy processed foods as they had low opportunity costs of processing them at home. (2) They also maintained that supermarkets sold large units that required lumpy outlays that the poor could not afford at one go. (3) They also observed that supermarkets at that time charged high food prices compared to traditional shops, and so the poor would not be drawn to them. (4) They observed in those decades that
supermarket chains in the US and Europe had large stores and were located mainly in the outskirts of cities and required cars to get to, that the poor in developing countries, who tended to live in center city or in slums would not be able to go out to them, even if the supermarkets reduced their prices.

On the supply side, Goldman and others contended that traditional supply chain conditions in developing countries as observed in the 1960s-1980s would present such a risky and high transaction cost procurement situation for supermarket chains that they would not be able to generate a cost or quality advantage over traditional retailers. Their procurement supply chains would be enmired in traditional conditions and forced thus to equality with traditional retailers. These very conditions, exacerbated with FDI regulations restricting investment by foreign firms especially in the "downstream" segments of the value chains, were seen as dissuading foreign direct investment (FDI) from modern retailers in the US and Europe.

b) The supermarket revolution "took off" against predictions - and diffused rapidly in waves

In the 1990s and 2000s private-sector modern retail took off in the supermarket revolution. This surprising takeoff in the 1990s is documented by a body of literature that emerged mainly in the 2000s (e.g., Reardon et al. 2003, Traill 2006). The diffusion of modern food retail rolled out in broadly three waves in different regions. (1) The first wave, with takeoff in the early 1990s, was in East Asia (outside Japan and China), South America, South Africa, and Central Europe. The share of modern retail in food retail went from roughly 5–10% in 1990 to some 50–60% by the late 1990s. (2) The second wave, in the mid- to late 1990s, was in Southeast Asia (outside transition countries like Vietnam), Central America, and Mexico. The share of modern retail in food retail reached some 20–50% by the late 1990s. (3) The third wave, in the late 1990s and 2000s, was mainly in China, Vietnam, India, and Russia. The share of modern retail in food retail climbed to some 5–20% by the end-2000s in a rapid rise. In Africa outside South Africa, mainly in eastern and southern Africa, modern retail is by the 2010s just starting in most countries.

The spread of supermarkets that started mainly in the 1990s continued rapidly in the 2000s and 2010s especially in Asia and Latin America. For Latin America, Popkin and Reardon (2018) analyzed PlanetRetail data for food sales of the top 100 chains in 12 countries from 2002-2016. The sales increased about 400% from 2002 to 2011. For Asia, Reardon et al. (2012) used the same method and data source for 9 countries and 195 leading chains and found roughly a 400% increase from 2002 to 2009. The sales growth rates strongly exceeded GDP/capita growth rates, meaning that we were observing a structural change in retail away from small shops and wetmarkets.

This rapid growth occurred in three spatial sets of waves. The first set were waves over countries per region. For example, Reardon et al. (2012) show that the first wave countries, (South Korea and Taiwan), i.e., those that had started their surge of supermarket growth in the 1980s/1990s, had by the 2000s the slowest sales growth rate; one expects this as countries near the modern retail saturation point. They found the second wave countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) with their retail take-off in the 1990s, showed moderate sales growth rates; while the third wave countries (China, India, and Vietnam) showed very rapid yearly sales growth
rates. This is the "catch-up" or convergence phenomenon. Popkin and Reardon (2018) showed similar waves over countries and catch-up trends in Latin America.

The developing regions themselves show these waves, with the first wave among East Asian and South American countries, the second among Southeast Asia, Central American/Mexico, and Central European countries, and the third wave in the transition such as China and Vietnam and Eastern Europe, and the emerging fourth wave mainly in Africa (Reardon and Timmer 2012).

Within a given country, waves of supermarket diffusion occur from large to small cities and then to rural areas, from more urban and richer to less urban and poorer zones, and from richer to middle to poorer consumers. The diffusion also occurs in waves over products, from non-food to processed food, to semi-processed food such as milk, to perishables such as produce, meat, and fish (Reardon et al. 2003).

The same spatial, socioeconomic, and product waves of supermarket penetration had been seen over the 20th century in the US, starting from a similar traditional retail system to that found in developing countries. The most salient difference was that retail change in the US had been much more gradual in the US than it was from the 1980s/1990s on in developing countries.

2.2. How supermarket chains "pivoted" to fast-track their spread

Recall from above that the constraints to a supermarket revolution hypothesized by the retail literature before 1990s revolved around four perceived traits of supermarkets as disadvantages in developing countries: (1) their accessibility (outside city center because "big box", need a car) is too low for most consumers; (2) their prices are too high for most consumers if they relied on imports and just the same as traditional retail (or higher if they had to pay taxes) if they had to use the traditional markets to source; (3) they are agglomerations of products that save time but time does not need to be saved by poor households; (4) they were thought to mainly sell processed foods which also represent time-savers; (5) their possible food safety advantages were not perceived as they had change attributes faced by consumers; (6) their quality was no higher and possibly lower than traditional markets with high turnover.

Demand side and supply side factors combined to allow supermarket chains to "fast track" their diffusion.

On the demand side, roughly in the late 1980s/1990s and certainly in the 2000s and 2010s (with the period a function of the wave and region), income and employment characteristics, especially of urban areas began to change quickly, and urbanization itself soared, such as in Asia (Reardon et al. 2012) and Latin America (Popkin and Reardon, 2018). Women's participation in the workforce outside the home increased and with it their opportunity costs of home-preparation and home-processing of food and of shopping; incomes rose. With these factors, the demand for processed food rapidly increased not just in Asia (Pingali 2007) and Latin America (Popkin and Reardon 2018) but also in Africa (Reardon et al. 2021c). Bus systems and ownership of motorbikes and cars spread.

Important for supermarket diffusion, sensitivity to food safety issues increased both because urbanization and greater consumption of perishables led to more worries, but the perception that supermarket chains were more careful with food safety increased (Reardon et al. 2010). Food crises, like bird flu and some produce scares, have sensitized the urban consumers (for Thailand,
see Posri and Chadbunchachai 2006; for Tianjin China, see Zhang 2005; for Vietnam, see Moustier et al. 2006; for chicken and ducks after the shock of bird flu, see Phan and Reardon 2007).

On the supply side, the essence of the rapid and surprising take-off and spread of supermarkets is that modern retailers found ways to "fast track" solutions to the problems of high prices, low accessibility, and undifferentiated quality and safety over time (Reardon et al. 2003), as follows.

First, chains drove up their accessibility by diversifying formats away from "big box" stores on the periphery of cities and creating small-format stores (but still using procurement with economies of scale over the small outlets in a chain) that could nestle into city centers and fit into tertiary cities and be reachable by bus and foot and motorbike. This made the accessible to the poor (Reardon and Berdeguée (2002) for Latin America, for example). As discussed below, they implemented e-commerce and delivery which made them even more accessible and diminished the local shops' prior advantage of proximity (Lu and Reardon 2018).

Second, chains drove down their consumer prices to wrest the price advantage from traditional retail. They did this by creating economies of scale in procurement, buying in large quantities and storing in distribution centers (DCs). DCs served as an aggregation mechanism that helped retailers to step around traditional wholesale markets and traditional wholesaler dominated supply chains. This was accomplished in symbiosis with emergent specialized/dedicated wholesalers and 3PLS as discussed further below.

Chains did this first and most successfully for processed and semi-processed foods such as flour, oil, noodles, and dairy (such as in Delhi, Minten et al. 2010), and then second and gradually successfully for fresh foods like chicken and meat; finally, they have begun competing on fresh produce especially for basic staples like kale in Kenya (Minten and Reardon 2008; Minten et al. 2010).

Third, supermarket chains as well as large processors such as dairy firms instituted private standards of quality and safety on suppliers. This was done for two reasons. The first was to differentiate themselves and their products and services in the eyes of consumers from traditional retailers and processors in terms of quality and safety and to compete with one another on product differentiation along the product cycle, instituted private standards. The second was to impose practices that reduced costs and risks and increased consistency in procurement and processing and farming, such as dairy (Reardon et al. 1999; Farina and Reardon 2000; Spencer and Reardon 2005; Swinnen 2007).

Private standards were imposed formally via contracts and via informal "relational contracts" (Macchiavello forthcoming) between retailers and processors and specialized/dedicated wholesalers (discussed below) and farmers. Traditional retailers and small processors did not have the leverage or bargaining power to impose such standards on firms and farms in their procurement supply chains as they had to buy from the spot market.

Moreover, "resource provision contracts" between supermarket chains or large processors on the one hand and farmers on the other allowed fast-tracking of modernization and meeting of private standards (Reardon et al. 2009). These contracts included provisions for assistance to farmers (and others) who face "idiosyncratic market failures" such as lack of access to credit, to technological information, to special inputs, and to services such as delivery. Modern food
industry firms working with traditional supply chain actors that needed to upgrade quickly often have had to use such contracts and provide such assistance, such as for sugar beet farming in Slovakia (Gow and Swinnen, 1998), horticultural export farming in Mexico (Key and Runsten, 1999), dairy in Central and Eastern Europe (Dries and Swinnen, 2005, 2010), and melon farming for Carrefour in Indonesia (Reardon et al. 2007, discussed more below).

Finally, two sources of expertise, innovation, investment funds, and complementary actions flowed like surging rivers into the midstream and downstream segments of the transforming food supply chains that enabled and "fast tracked" the above pivoting strategies to overcome long term risks and transaction costs and create advantages for modern firms.

On the one hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed massively into developing country food supply chains. In an earlier period, these flows had been mainly by agribusinesses like Dole to establish plantations, such as of bananas in Central America, and created export platforms; this was termed "vertical FDI." In the 1990s on, the FDI shifted to being mainly "horizontal FDI", where FDI was mainly by supermarket chains and large processors to buy or establish firms, such as Nestle did at a vertiginous pace in the late 1980s and 1990s in Brazil's dairy sector (Farina and Reardon 2000). The "push factor" for FDI from Europe and the US was that profits in those mature food markets had been competed down and products and approaches (like chains) that had been niches then commoditized in those markets were ripe for transfer to developing country markets as new profitable niche innovations to be commoditized there (Awokuse and Reardon 2018). This FDI was facilitated by the diffusion of FDI liberalization (along with trade liberalization) part of "globalization" following GATTs in the 1980s and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s on (Reardon et al. 2003).

On the other hand, there emerged a host of "specialized/dedicated wholesalers" (Reardon and Berdegué 2002) and 3PLS (third party logistics firms) that formed symbiotic supply chains of their services that dovetailed with the needs of retailers and large processors to implement the strategies above. To this symbiosis we turn next.

2.3. Symbiotic value chain firms (in wholesale & logistic services) "co-pivoting" to enable the supermarket revolution

Given the steep challenges in developing countries discussed above of transferring and developing a new way of retailing via chains that require massive procurement system, consistent quality and safety, and prices and accessibility competitive with traditional retailers, it was usually impossible for modern retailers to "go it alone." Reardon et al. (2007) emphasized that the retailers' solution was to pursue a symbiosis of the supermarket's supply chain and the supply chains of services (wholesale and logistics) and processing, so they could work together to solve the problems. To wit:

Beside the retail investments that have been extensively treated in recent literature, these proactive strategies focus on improving the ‘enabling conditions’ via (i) procurement system modernization and (ii) local supply chain development. One important strategy retailers have used to facilitate (i) and (ii) is to form symbiotic relationships with modern wholesale, logistics and processing firms. (Reardon et al. 2007: 399).

Here we briefly illustrate the innovative ways that this symbiosis occurred.
First, retailers and processors worked together to co-innovate new processed products that would confer a "product cycle" advantage over traditional competitors. For example, Carrefour and other large retailers in Brazil worked with Nestlé and Parmalat to create new dairy beverages (e.g., mixing with tropical fruit juices) geared to the Brazilian market (Farina and Reardon 2000).

Second, retail chains "follow sourced" services from home-market partners to fast-track solutions in new markets instead of being held back by relying on local traditional services. (Recall that was a limitation cited in the arguments of retail researchers pre-1990 to say that supermarkets would be held back from developing.) For example, modern retailers from the US and Western Europe starting in Central Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s called on multinational logistics (3PLS) companies from the US and Western Europe to undertake FDI ("follow source") in Central Europe and set up regional procurement networks with series of DCs (Dries et al. 2004); Carrefour in Brazil called on Penske Logistics of the US to do the same in partnership with Cotia Trading (a Brazilian specialized/dedicated wholesaler, a term treated next) (Reardon and Berdegué 2002). Tesco in China called on its purveyor (processor and wholesaler) of semi-processed vegetables for its European operations to follow it to China to set up fresh-cuts operations instead of relying on local companies to work out that supply (Reardon et al. 2007). In these cases, the FDI partner often bought and upgraded local companies to assemble a new supply chain.

Third, "specialized/dedicated" wholesalers emerged to service the special needs of supermarket chains (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002):

"Supermarkets tend to find that the traditional wholesalers provide inadequate service since they lack standards, mix items of different grades, and have significant bargaining power in the wholesale markets because wholesaling is usually quite concentrated per product rubric. Supermarkets tend to continue to procure from wholesale markets only where they cannot make adequate arrangements direct with producers through their own distribution centers, or where new types of wholesalers emerge to meet their needs." (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002: 380)

In the 1990s and 2000s some of these specialized wholesalers emerged as traditional wholesalers and then built DCs and set up sorting and packing operations to distribute to and for supermarkets (e.g., Bimandiri in Indonesia, Reardon et al. 2012). Some of them started as export firms and then opened a division to serve supermarkets as the latter emerged (as in the case of WingMau in Hong Kong; Hu et al. 2004).

Fourth, arrangements among firms leading value chains of inputs and products and services multiplied during the supermarket revolution to address particular challenges for which no individual firm had a full solution. For example, in Indonesia, Carrefour wanted to innovate in its melon retail by sourcing and selling a new variety of melon (seedless mini melons) attractive to the emerging educated urban singles who wanted high quality fruit but not in large sizes. No farmer was growing these, no wholesaler had them in stock, and stores were waiting to sell them. Carrefour then worked up a 5-player arrangement with a specialized wholesaler (Bimandiri) that would work with the farmers' cooperative; with a farmer cooperative that was doing traditional watermelons but had a subset of farmers skilled enough to grow the new melons; with Syngenta which had the seeds and a credit facility for the farmers; and with the government's R&D&E
department that agreed to a program focused on training farmers in the growing of these new melons (Natawidjadja et al. 2007).

A variant on the above adds in NGOs that are focused on helping small farmers enter modern markets. Such an arrangement can:

"... involve a “symbiosis” between NGOs and governments to partner with these private sector-led efforts to assist in provision of resources and services needed by small farmers, but with the promise of the latter gaining access to specific and demanding modern markets. This approach is mutually beneficial. NGOs are often seeking to help their beneficiary farmers move from low remuneration non–quality-differentiated and demand-constrained local produce markets to modern markets linked to urban and export demand, as illustrated by the Dutch NGO Himalayan Action Research Centre in India, working with the Mother Dairy/Safal chain." (Reardon et al. 2012: 6)

3. The E-commerce Revolution: fast-tracked diffusion via supply chain symbioses involving resilience to short run-run shocks and pivots

3.1. Diffusion of e-commerce in developing countries

The emergence and diffusion of e-commerce in developing countries can be seen as an extension, like a branch from a tree, of the supermarket revolution (Lu and Reardon 2018). It was driven by demand and supply factors (synthesizing from Reardon et al. 2021a, 2021b).

The demand-side factors driving e-commerce diffusion were three-fold. First, the same demand factors that drove the supermarket revolution are relevant for e-commerce, especially the rising opportunity cost of time to go out shopping. This drove the quest to shop in the "one stop shop" of supermarkets, as well now as having food delivered. As developing country cities become increasingly crowded and congested, consumers' interest in shopping from home increases. The latter undoes the location advantage of the small shops.

Second, there has been an extremely rapid spread of cell phones in particular as well as home computers in developing countries in the past two decades.

Third, while food safety shocks (such as bird flu, discussed above) spurred a shift to shopping at supermarkets, human disease shocks have been important to accelerating the diffusion of e-commerce. Yang and Wang (2013) note that Alibaba's e-commerce (taobao.com) was started in May 2003 with SARS as an important inducement. COVID-19 is related to SARS, and has been a strong inducement to the acceleration of e-commerce in developing (and developed) countries in 2020–2021. For example, Vardhan (2020) presents Euromonitor survey data showing food e-commerce upticks in yearly growth rates in various countries, comparing growth rates over 2019 with growth rates over 2020: Indonesia: 60 percent versus 120 percent; South Africa: 20 percent versus 100 percent; Brazil: 15 percent versus 100 percent; Mexico: 15 percent versus 80 percent; India: 30 percent versus 70 percent; Nigeria: 20 percent versus 50 percent, and China: 10 percent versus 20 percent.

The supply side factors driving e-commerce diffusion were several. First, there was a diffusion of the technologies and business organization needed for e-commerce. The computer revolution
of the 1950s-1960s put technology in play that was adapted to digitalization of internal processes of firms starting in the 1970s (such as SAP). In the 1980s and 1990s, supermarket chains and processors, especially in the US and Europe, began to digitalize their procurement systems toward B2B.

In developing countries that were starting to export to these chains, especially China, B2B firms arose, such as Alibaba, the fruit of FDI by Japanese Softbank and US Yahoo in 1999. In the 1990s Amazon innovated with e-commerce, B2C, starting with nonfoods and then into packaged foods and later into fresh foods. With SARS and consumer "lockdowns" in China, Alibaba started e-commerce using a good part of the Amazon model. From there the diffusion of e-commerce in developing countries proceeded rapidly (from a low base) in the 2000s and 2010s. As noted above, it was accelerated with the COVID shock. These new firms could adopt technology that was already on the shelf, already in the form of software and hardware ready to be applied.

Second, e-commerce spread due to organizational innovations. E-commerce firms bought or started "brick and mortar" supermarkets chains (like Amazon buying Whole Foods) to enter fresh food sales. Supermarket chains bought or started e-commerce (like Walmart buying Flipkart in India). E-commerce firms competed with supermarkets for e-commerce thus propelling rapid diffusion. Startups grew and were acquired thus multinationalizing, as Alibaba bought Lazada in Southeast Asia. FDI was crucial to the process, as it had been in the supermarket revolution.

Third, as in the supermarket revolution, e-commerce operators, whether "pure" or amalgams with physical stores, realized that a key component of the business is fulfillment of orders and delivery to consumers. The larger firms could "make" but many others had to "buy" this service. Crucial then was the "co-pivoting" of "delivery intermediaries" such as Instacart that created symbiotic relationships (Reardon et al. 2021b). We turn to that next.

3.2. Symbiotic supply chains: delivery-intermediaries and 3PLS co-pivoting with retailers/e-commerce

Several lines of business innovation emerged over the past decade and accelerated with COVID-19. First, delivery intermediaries have been crucial partners in symbiotic relationships (similar to the role specialized/dedicated wholesalers played upstream in the supermarket revolution but these intermediaries play downstream between the retail and consumer). Reardon et al. (2021) write:

“Delivery intermediaries” ... offer a range of services from intermediation itself (representing the retailer to the consumer) to assembling the functional elements of the transaction (communication, payment, logistics, sometimes credit and advertising and value-added such as packing). These services are thus outsourced by the retailer to the delivery intermediary. The delivery intermediary provides an app that handles an order from a customer to a client store (a supermarket or a small shop), restaurant, or an e-commerce distribution center, and the delivery intermediary processes the payment and arranges delivery. The payment function may rely on partnering with an e-payment firm; the delivery may rely on partnering with a logistics firm such as Uber or DHL (Reardon et al. 2021a: 12).
Second, as in the supermarket revolution, 3PLS co-pivoting has been crucial to the diffusion of e-commerce. For example, passenger logistics firms like Bykea in Pakistan and Uber in India added food delivery during COVID-19 and maintain it after. Rapid delivery services like Getir in Turkey have set up divisions to help small retailers with e-commerce apps as well as logistics for hyper local delivery.

4. Conclusions

We focused in this paper on showing how rapid transformation of developing country food systems has been based on fundamental innovation and "pivoting" by firms like retailers and processors to adapt to long-term challenges like high transaction costs, and short-term shocks like COVID-19.

Moreover, we showed that that pivoting was necessary but not sufficient. It was crucial that symbiotic supply chains adapted and "co-pivoted" with the retailers and processors to enable the overall set of innovations and resilience. Important players in this were specialized/dedicated wholesalers, delivery intermediaries, and 3PLS. More research on the economics of the latter segments is a crucial agenda.

The diffusion of these growth and resilience strategies over firms and supply chains is a function of inter-firm, inter-spatial, and inter-temporal heterogeneity. We have painted this with broad brush strokes in this short paper, with elements of theory and examples. Much more work needs to be done to understand the resilience mechanisms of supply chain actors and their consequences for agrifood industrial organization. Macchiavello et al. (forthcoming), Zilberman et al. (forthcoming), and Barrett et al. (forthcoming) contend that a crucial agenda for such an understanding lies in more cross-pollination between empirical industrial organization economics (EIO) and food value chain transformation in developing regions.

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