2.1 Introduction

This chapter proposes procedures for measuring the productivity of US postsecondary institutions. It also implements these procedures for most undergraduate programs. The evidence has interesting implications. For instance, at least at selective institutions, a dollar spent on a student’s education appears to generate multiple dollars of value added based on earnings over her lifetime. Productivity is also stable across a wide range of selective institutions, suggesting that market forces are sufficiently strong to maintain regularity in how these institutions’ resources scale up with the capacity of their students to convert educational resources into value added. Compared to selective institutions, nonselective institutions have productivity that is
lower on average but also much more dispersed. This suggests that market forces may be too weak to discipline productivity among these schools.

This study also examines institutions’ productivity based on their producing public service and innovation. Public service productivity varies substantially even among selective schools. Innovation productivity is distinctly higher at very selective schools than all other schools.

The study attempts to cover considerable ground and is in a “glass-half-full” mode in the sense that it attempts to answer key questions about productivity in higher education while acknowledging that it cannot answer them all or answer them perfectly. In the first part of the study, I define what is meant by productivity in higher education and explain why measuring it is a useful exercise even if an imperfect one. I outline the key issues that plague measurements of productivity: (1) the multiplicity of outcomes that schools might affect and the difficulty of measuring some of them, (2) the fact that a student may enroll in several schools before her education is complete (the “attribution problem”), and (3) selection.

Since vertical selection (students who differ in aptitude enrolling at different institutions) and horizontal selection (similarly apt students who differ on grounds such as geography enrolling at different institutions) are arguably the most serious issues for measuring productivity, I especially discuss methods for addressing these problems. The proposed remedy for the selection problem is based on comparing the outcomes of students who are the same on measured incoming achievement (test scores, grades) and who also apply to the same postsecondary institutions, thus demonstrating similar interests and motivation. This approach employs all the possible quasi experiments in which a student “flips a coin” between very similar schools or in which admission staff members “flip a coin” between very similar students. Put another way, schools are compared solely on the basis of students who are in the common support (likely to attend either one) and who are quasi-randomly allocated among them. See below for details about the method.

Using this method to account for selection, the study computes productivity for approximately 6,700 undergraduate programs. I show productivity for three outcomes: earnings, a measure of public service based on the earnings a person forgoes by being employed in the nonprofit or public sector (think of a talented attorney employed as a judicial clerk), and a measure of participation in innovation. The first measure is intended to reflect private returns, the second social returns, and the third spillovers to economic growth.

In the next section, I define productivity for the purposes of this chapter. Section 2.3 explains why productivity measures would be useful to policy making but also for numerous other reasons. The key challenges we face in measuring productivity are described in section 2.4. Because selection is so important, Section 2.5 is dedicated to the method used to address it.
empirical issues are discussed in sections 2.6–2.8, and section 2.9 presents
the main productivity results. A discussion of the broad implications of the
results closes the chapter in section 2.10.

2.2 Defining Productivity

For the purposes of this study, the productivity of an institution of higher
education is the value to society of its causal effect on outcomes (value
added) divided by the cost to society of educating its students (social invest-
ment). Specifically, this is the productivity of the average dollar of social
investment in a university’s students, and it is this measure of productivity
that policy makers usually need to make a returns-on-investment argument
(see below). There are, however, certain questions for which the productiv-
ity of the marginal dollar of social investment is more relevant. This is the
point I take up below.1

The main causal effects of a postsecondary institution are likely to be on
its own students’ private outcomes, such as earnings. However, some effects,
such as its students’ contributions via public service, may not be reflected
in private outcomes. Also, some effects, like its students’ contributions to
innovations that raise economic growth, may spill over onto people who
were not the students of the institution.

Social investment is the total cost of a student’s education, not just costs
funded by tuition. For instance, taxpayers fund some social investment
through government appropriations and tax expenditures. Social investment
is also funded by current and past donors to postsecondary institutions.

Thus the productivity of an institution is not in general equal to the pri-
ivate return on private investment that an individual could expect if she
were to enroll in the school. Such private calculations are interesting for
individuals but less so for policy makers. I employ them in related studies
(for instance, studies of how students choose colleges), but they are not the
object of interest in this study. In any case, private calculations are less dif-
derent from social calculations than they might seem at first glance.2

1. For some economic applications, we might instead be interested in marginal productivity:
the increase in value added produced by a marginal increase in social investment. Although
most of the analysis in this study applies equally to average and marginal productivity, I com-
pute only average productivity because to compute the marginal productivity, one would need
a comprehensive set of policy experiments in which each school’s spending was raised for an
exogenous reason uncoordinated with other schools’ spending. This is an extremely demand-
 ing requirement. We would not merely require “lightning to strike twice” in the same place; we
would need it to strike many times.

2. For instance, if taxpayer funding of a student’s education corresponds approximately
to funding he will have to contribute to others’ education through paying higher future taxes
(higher as a result of education-driven higher earnings), his private investment may be close to
social investment. As a result, the productivity of a dollar of social investment may be close
to the productivity of a dollar of private investment.
2.3 Why Measuring Productivity Is Useful

Higher education in the United States has survived and even thrived for many years without reasonably credible or comprehensive measures of institutions’ productivity. Why, then, should we attempt to produce measures now? There are at least four reasons.

First, as government intervention in higher education has grown, it is reasonable for the public to ask for productivity measures. Most government interventions are based on returns-on-investment logic that requires the education to be productive. Policy makers, for instance, often argue that appropriations that support higher education institutions pay for themselves by generating benefits that are more than equal to the social investment. They make a similar argument for tax credits, grants and scholarships, and subsidized student loans. Leaders of postsecondary institutions also make the returns-on-investment argument: donations to their school will more than repay themselves by delivering benefits to society.3

Second, the United States contains unusual (by international standards) and varied environments for higher education. We cannot know whether these environments promote a productive postsecondary sector if productivity is never measured. For instance, should institutions compete with one another for students and faculty, or should these people be allocated through centralized rules as they are in many countries and a few US public systems? What autonomy (in wage-setting, admissions, etc.) and governance structures (e.g., trustees, legislative budget approval) promote an institution’s productivity? Does the information available to students when they are choosing schools affect the productivity of these schools? Is productivity affected by an institution’s dependence on tuition-paying students versus students funded by grants or third parties? While this study does not attempt to answer questions such as those posed above, it does attempt to provide the dependent variable (productivity) needed for such analyses.4

Third, highly developed economies like that of the United States have a comparative advantage in industries that are intensive in the advanced skills produced by postsecondary education. These industries tend to contribute disproportionately to such countries’ economic growth and exports. Advanced-skill-intensive industries also have some appealing features, such as paying high wages and being relatively nonpolluting. However, economic logic indicates that a country cannot maintain a comparative advantage in advanced-skill-intensive industries if it is not unusually productive in generating those skills. A country cannot maintain a comparative advantage in

3. In a related paper, I show how the productivity estimates computed in this chapter can be used to evaluate policies such as the tax deductibility of gifts to nonprofit postsecondary institutions.
4. Some of these questions are addressed in Hoxby (2016).
equilibrium simply by generously funding a low-productivity higher education sector.

Finally, once we have measures of institutions’ productivity, we may be better able to understand how advanced human capital is produced. What the “education production function” is is a long-standing and complex question. While productivity measures, by themselves, would not answer that question, it is hard to make progress on it in the absence of productivity measures. For instance, some results presented in this chapter strongly suggest that the production function for selective higher education exhibits single crossing: a higher-aptitude student is likely to derive more value from attending an institution with a higher level of social investment than a lower-aptitude student would derive. While many economists and higher education experts have long suspected the existence of single crossing and assumed it in their analyses, evidence for or against single crossing is scanty. If true, single crossing has important implications, a point to which I return toward the end of the chapter.

2.4 The Key Issues for Measuring Productivity

2.4.1 Selection

As previously stated, vertical selection (students who differ in aptitude enrolling at different institutions) and horizontal selection (similarly apt students who differ on grounds such as geography enrolling at different institutions) are probably the most serious issues for measuring productivity. A naive comparison of, for instance, earnings differences between Harvard University’s former students and a nonselective college’s former students would be largely uninformative about Harvard’s value added. A naive comparison of earnings differences of community college students in San Francisco (where costs of living are high) and rural Mississippi (where costs of living are low) would also be largely uninformative about their relative value added. Addressing selection is sufficiently challenging that I devote the next section entirely to it.

2.4.2 The Attribution Problem

The second problem for evaluating a postsecondary institution’s productivity is attribution. Suppose that we have mastered selection and can credibly say that we are comparing outcomes and social investment of students at schools A and B who are as good as randomly assigned. Even under random assignment, we would have the issue that school A might induce students to enroll in more classes (a graduate program at school C, for instance) than school B induces. When we eventually compare the lifetime outcomes of school A students to school B students, therefore, the A students will have more education, and not just at school A. There is no way for us to identify
the part of the school A students’ outcomes that they would have had if they had attended only school A for as long as they would have attended school B. Part of school A’s causal effect on outcomes flows through its inducing students to attend school C.

Another example of the attribution problem arises because even when pursuing a single degree, students may take classes at multiple institutions. For instance, part of the effect of a two-year college flows through its inducing students to transfer to four-year colleges. One-third of students transfer institutions at least once before receiving a bachelor’s degree and nearly one-sixth transfer more than once.5

Consider two examples. Suppose that one two-year college tends to induce students to finish associates degrees that have a vocational or terminal (not leading to a four-year degree) character. Suppose that another two-year college tends to induce students to transfer to a four-year college and earn their degrees there. If we were not to credit the second college with the further education (and outcomes and social investment) it induced, the second college would appear to be very unproductive compared to the first college. Much of its actual productivity would be attributed to the four-year colleges to which its students transferred. Consider Swarthmore College. It is a liberal arts college and, as such, does not train doctoral students. However, it tends to induce students to attend PhD programs in academic subjects. If they go on to become leading researchers, then Swarthmore is productive in generating research and should be credited with this effect.

In short, part of the outcomes and thus the productivity of any school are due to the educational trajectory it induces. This attribution issue cannot be evaded: it is a reality with which we must deal. I would argue that the best approach is to assess the productivity of a school using lifetime outcomes as the numerator and all the social investments induced by it as the denominator.6

5. This is a quotation from Staiger (chapter 1 in this volume), who is quoting from National Student Clearinghouse (2015).
6. In theory, one could identify the contribution of each institution to a person’s lifetime outcomes. To see this, consider teacher value-added research in elementary and secondary education. Some researchers have been able to identify the effect on long-term outcomes of each teacher whom a student encounters in succession. Identification can occur if teacher successions overlap in a way that generates information about their individual contributions. What is ideal is for each possible pair of students to have some teachers in common and some not in common. By combining the results of all pairs of students, one can back out each teacher’s contribution. Chapter 9 (Carrell and Kurlaender) in this volume has some of this flavor. Identification works, in their case, because California students who attend community colleges tend to have overlapping experiences as they move into the four-year California State Universities. However, identification is often impossible in higher education because students’ experiences do not overlap in a manner that generates sufficient information. Postsecondary students are not channeled neatly through a series of grades: they can exit, get labor market experience between periods of enrollment, choose multiple degree paths, take courses in the summer at school A and then return each fall to school B, and so on. In other words, there are so many factors that
2.4.3 Multiple Outcomes

Postsecondary institutions may causally affect many outcomes: earnings, public service, civic participation, research, innovation, cultural knowledge, tolerance and open-mindedness, marriage, and child-rearing, to name but a few. These outcomes may affect individuals’ utility, sometimes in ways that would be invisible to the econometrician. Also, some of these outcomes may have spillover effects or general equilibrium effects. For instance, higher education might generate civic participation, and societies with greater civic participation might have institutions that are less corrupt, and less corrupt institutions might support a better climate for business. Then higher education might affect the economy through this indirect channel. Researchers encounter severe empirical challenges when trying to evaluate such spillover and general equilibrium effects.

Even if we could accurately observe every outcome, there is no correct or scientific way to sum them into a single index that could be used as the universal numerator of productivity. Summing across multiple outcomes is an inherently value-laden exercise in which preferences and subjective judgments matter. It is fundamentally misguided to attach a weight to each outcome, compute some weighted average, and thereafter neglect the underlying, multiple outcomes. To make matters worse, the choice of weights in such exercises is not merely arbitrary but sometimes designed to serve the ends of some interest group.

I would argue that researchers ought to make available credible estimates of all the outcomes for which there appears to be a demand and for which reliable measures can be constructed. This would at least allow an individual student or policy maker to evaluate each postsecondary institution on the grounds that matter to him or her. Accordingly, in this chapter, I show evidence on multiple outcomes that—though far from comprehensive—are intended to represent the three basic types: private (earnings), social (public service), and spillover-inducing through nonsocial means (innovation).

This being said, lifetime earnings have a certain priority as an outcome because they determine whether social investments in higher education are sufficiently productive to generate societal earnings that can support social investments in higher education for the next generation of students. However, even if we accept the priority of earnings, we are left with the problem that many of the outcomes listed above affect societal earnings, but they do
so in such an indirect way that the earnings could not plausibly be connected
to the institution that produced them. For instance, consider the problem
of attributing to specific schools the societal earnings that arise through the
indirect civic participation channel described above.

How bad is it to focus on the private earnings of a school’s own students as
the basis of productivity measures? The answer depends, to some extent, on
how the measures are used. If the data are used to evaluate individual insti-
tutions, the focus is problematic. Certain institutions are at an obvious dis-
advantage because they disproportionately produce outcomes whose effects
on society run disproportionately through externalities or general equilib-
rium channels: seminaries, women’s colleges, schools that induce students to
become future researchers, and so on. However, if we are looking not at indi-
vidual schools but at more aggregate statistics (schools grouped by selectivity,
for instance), these concerns are somewhat reduced. For instance, within the
group of very selective schools, some may be more research oriented, others
more public service oriented, and yet others more business oriented.

2.5 Selection

For measuring productivity, the problems associated with selection are
the “elephant in the room.” Vertical selection occurs when students whose
ability, preparation, and motivation are stronger enroll in different colleges
than students whose ability, preparation, and motivation are weaker. If not
addressed, vertical selection will cause us to overestimate the value added
of colleges whose students are positively selected and to underestimate the
value added of colleges whose students are negatively selected. This leads to
the legitimate question that plagues college comparisons: Are the outcomes
of students from very selective colleges strong because the colleges add value
or because their students are so able that they would attain strong outcomes
regardless of the college they attended?

However, colleges’ student bodies are not only vertically differentiated;
they are also horizontally differentiated—that is, they differ on dimensions
like geography and curricular emphasis. For instance, suppose that earnings
differ across areas of the country owing, in part, to differences in the cost
of living. Then two colleges that enroll equally able students and generate
equal value added may have alumni with different earnings. We could easily
mistake such earning differences for differences in value added. As another
example, consider two colleges that are equally selective but whose students,
despite having the same test scores and grades, differ in preferring, on the one
hand, a life replete with inexpensive activities (local hikes) and, on the other
hand, a life replete with expensive activities (concerts with costly tickets).
These incoming differences in preferences are likely to play out in later career
and earnings choices regardless of what the colleges do. We do not wish to
mistake differences in preferences for differences in value added.
Vertical selection is probably the more serious problem for two reasons. First, social investment at the most- and least-selective colleges differs by about an order of magnitude. Second, some nonselective colleges’ median students have a level of achievement that is similar to that attained by the eighth grade (or even earlier) by the median students at the most-selective colleges. One cannot give the most-selective colleges credit for the four or so additional years of education that their incoming students have. Nor can one give them credit for the ability that allowed their students to acquire learning more readily than others. (Ability earns its own return, human capital apart.)

Solving selection problems is all about (1) randomization or something that mimics it and (2) overlap or “common support.” Randomization solves selection problems because with a sufficient number of people randomized into each treatment, the law of large numbers ensures that they are similar on unobservable characteristics as well as observable, measurable ones for which we might control.

The point about common support is less obvious and is especially important for selection problems in higher education.

2.5.1 Addressing Selection, Part 1: Common Support

The requirement of common support means that it is highly implausible if not impossible to use comparisons between the outcomes of Harvard University students and students who would be extremely atypical at Harvard to judge Harvard’s productivity. We need students who overlap or who are in the common support between Harvard and another institution. There are many such students, but most end up attending another very selective institution, not a nonselective institution or a modestly selective institution. The common support requirement also exists horizontally. Two geographically proximate institutions that are similarly selective are far more likely to have common support than ones located thousands of miles away. Similarly, two similarly selective institutions that have the same curricular emphases (engineering or music) or campuses with similar amenities (opportunities for hiking versus opportunities for concert-going) are more likely to have common support.

We can analyze productivity while never moving outside the common support. In fact, the problem is almost exactly the same, as a statistical matter, as rating tennis players, for example. The top tennis players in the world rarely play matches against players who are much lower rated: the vertical problem. Also, apart from the top players whose matches are international, most players play most of their matches against other players from the same region: the horizontal problem. In tennis (as in many other sports that require ratings), the problem is solved by statistical paired comparison

methods (PCMs) that rely entirely on players who actually play one another (i.e., players in the common support).

Sticking to the tennis analogy, the rating of a top player is built up by seeing how his outcomes compare with those of other fairly top players whom he plays often. Then their outcomes are compared to those of other slightly less-apt players with whom they play often. And step-by-step, the distance in outcomes between most- and least-apt players is computed even if the most apt never play the least-apt ones. Similarly, the rating of players who are geographically distant is built. A Portuguese player might routinely play Spanish players who routinely play those from Southwest France, who play against Parisians, who play against Belgians, who play against Germans, who play against Danes. What is key is that PCMs never employ mere speculation of how one player would play someone whom in fact he or her never plays. Also, PCMs are designed to incorporate the information generated when a lower-rated player occasionally beats a much higher-rated one. PCMs do not impose any functional form on the rating. There can be abrupt discontinuities: for instance, the distance between players 2 and 3 could be small, but the distance between players 4 and 5 could be very large. There can be ties.

If we compare the outcomes of people who could attend either institution A or institution B but in fact divide fairly randomly between them, then we can measure the relative value added of the two schools. These are the direct A-versus-B “tournaments,” but of course there are many other tournaments: A versus C, A versus D, B versus D, B versus D, and so on. Using the same PCMs that one uses to build up a tennis player’s ranking, one can build up a school’s value added. Step-by-step, the difference in value added between schools with the most- and least-apt students is computed even if the most apt rarely choose among the same portfolio of schools as the least-apt ones. Similarly, the value added of schools that are, say, geographically distant is built. Again, what is key is that PCMs never employ mere speculation of how one student would choose among schools that, in fact, he never considers. An institution that has lower value added on average is allowed to have higher value added for some students. (This is the equivalent of the less-apt player beating the more-apt player sometimes.) PCMs seamlessly incorporate the information generated when a student occasionally chooses a school that is much less selective than the “top” one to which he was admitted. And PCMs do not impose any functional form on how value added relates to students’ aptitude. There can be abrupt discontinuities: for instance, the distance in value added between similarly selective schools A and B could be small, but the distance between similarly selective schools B and C could be very large. There can be ties. In short, we derive the same benefits from common support: the measure of value added is never based on mere speculation of how outcomes would compare among students who differ in aptitude or in the colleges they consider. There is no functional form
imposed on institutions’ value added: institutions can be tied, very close, or very far apart.

Interestingly, PCMs are much easier to apply to value added than to sports because outcomes such as earnings are far more continuous than the score of a tennis match or other game. Also, small score differences that result in a win versus a loss matter in sports but not in the outcomes that matter for schools’ productivity. No one would care, for instance, if one school’s students earned $50,000 on average and another school’s earned $50,001.

So far, this discussion has emphasized that by applying PCMs, I can estimate differences in value added among schools. But all the points just made apply equally to differences in social investment. Attending school A might trigger a social investment of $20,000 in a student, while attending school B might trigger a social investment of $22,000. Just as with value added (the numerator of productivity), social investment is built through PCMs step-by-step so that the difference in social investment between schools with the most- and least-apt students is computed even if the most apt rarely choose among the same portfolio of schools as the least-apt ones. Similarly, PCMs build, step-by-step, the differences in social investment between schools that are, say, geographically distant. We derive all the same benefits from common support: the measure of social investment is never based on mere speculation of how educational spending would compare among students who differ in aptitude or in the colleges they consider. There is no functional form imposed on the social investment triggered by attending an institution: institutions can be tied, very close, or very far apart.

PCMs can be used to build a school’s value added (akin to a tennis player’s ranking) or its marginal value added relative to another school (akin to the ranking difference between two players). Similarly, it can be used to build the social investment triggered by attending a school or the marginal social investment triggered by attending one school versus another. However, important caveats apply. I take them up after discussing the data because they can be made more clearly at that point.

2.5.2 Addressing Selection, Part 2: Quasi Randomization

Applying PCMs to measuring productivity without the plague of selection is straightforward if we can identify students whose attendance at any given pair of institutions is quasi random. I do this with two procedures that correspond, respectively, to the vertical and horizontal selection problems.

The procedure for the horizontal problem is simpler. In it, we identify pairs of students who have equally observable application credentials, who apply to the same schools A and B that are equally selective, and who have a high probability of admission at schools A and B. For instance, one might think of students who choose between equally selective branches of a state’s university system. If the students knew for certain which school had the higher value added for them, they might always choose it. But in fact, they
have an imperfect understanding and still must make a choice. Thus horizontal college choices are often influenced by small factors that only affect the students’ lifetime outcomes through the channel of which college they attend. While few students actually flip a coin, they choose among horizontally equal colleges based on the architecture, the weather on the day they visited, the offhand suggestion of an acquaintance, and so on. This is quasi randomization.

Once we have identified students who choose quasi randomly among horizontally equal and proximate schools A and B, we can identify students who choose among horizontally equal and proximate B and C, C and D, and so on. Thus we can derive a measure of school A’s productivity relative to D’s even if students do not (or rarely) choose between A and D. The horizontal selection problem is solved. While geography is the most obvious source of differentiation among horizontal equals, the logic applies far more broadly. For instance, A and B might both have strong engineering programs, B and C might both have strong natural sciences programs, C and D might both be strong in the biological sciences, and so on.

Now consider the procedure for the vertical selection problem. Here, we identify pairs of students who have equally observable application credentials, who apply to the same schools A and B that are not necessarily equally selective, and who are “on the bubble” for admission at school A. I define students as being on the bubble if admissions staff are essentially flipping coins among them when making admissions decisions.

That is the definition, but why does this range exist, and how can one learn where it is? A typical procedure for selective colleges is to group applicants, after an initial evaluation, into fairly obvious admits, fairly obvious rejects, and students who are on the bubble because they would be perfectly acceptable admits but are not obvious. The on-the-bubble group might contain two or three times as many students as the school has room to admit once the obvious admits are accounted for. (For instance, a school that plans to admit 1,000 students might have 800 obvious admits and put 400 in the on-the-bubble group in order to admit 200 more.) The staff then look at the composition of the students whom they intend to admit and note deficiencies in the overall class composition. For instance, the prospective class might be missing students from some geographical area or with some curricular interest. Then the staff conduct a final reevaluation of the on-the-bubble students, keeping themselves attuned to these issues. Thus an on-the-bubble student may be more likely to be admitted if she comes from a geographical area or plans to major in a field that was initially underrepresented. In another year, these same characteristics would not increase her probability of admission. Thus admissions officers make decisions that, while not random, are arbitrary in the sense that they only make sense in the context of that particular school in that year.

How does one find the on-the-bubble range? It is the range where, as a
statistical matter, there is a structural break in the relationship between the probability of admission and observable credentials. To clarify, the probability of admission above the bubble range is fairly high and fairly predictable. It increases smoothly and predictably in observable credentials such as test scores and grades. The probability of admission below the bubble range is low but also increases smoothly and predictably in observable credentials. (Students below the bubble range who gain admission usually have, in addition to their academic qualifications, some other observable characteristic, such as athletic prowess.) In contrast, the probability of admission in the bubble range is very difficult to predict using observable credentials. This is because the on-the-bubble students all have perfectly acceptable credentials, and the admissions decision, which occurs in the final reevaluation, depends not on these credentials but on some characteristic that in another year or similar school would not predict a more favorable outcome.

Statistical methods that uncover structural breaks in a relationship are made precisely for situations such as this: a relationship is smooth and predictable in range A; there is another range B in which the relationship is also smooth and predictable. Between ranges A and B, the relationship changes suddenly and cannot be predicted using data from either the A or B range. This is an issue into which I go into more detail in the companion methodological study (Hoxby 2015). The point is, however, that structural break methods are a statistical, objective way to find the on-the-bubble range. While structural break methods will find a strict credentials cutoff if one exists (for instance, if a school admits students who score above some threshold and rejects those who score below it), the methods will also find the on-the-bubble range for schools that practice more holistic admissions. It is worth noting that the on-the-bubble range does not typically coincide with the admits who have the lowest academic credentials. Rather, it contains students whose credentials usually place them only modestly below the median enrollee.10

Once one has located each school’s on-the-bubble range, one can solve the vertical selection problem using chains of schools. One can compare schools A and B by comparing the outcomes of students who were on the bubble at school A. Some of them end up at school A; others end up at school B. Schools B and C may be compared using students on the bubble at school B, C and D may be compared using students on the bubble at school C, and so on. Thus school A ends up being compared to school D through these connections even if few on-the-bubble students at A actually attend school D.

Summarizing, I identify “horizontal experiments” among students who have equal admissions credentials and who apply to the same equally selective schools where they are obvious admits. They more or less flip coins

10. Note that students who have minimal academic credentials but some offsetting observable characteristic such as athletic prowess are not on the bubble. Their admission is predictable.
among the colleges. I identify “vertical experiments” among students who are on the bubble at some college and who are therefore admitted based on the equivalent of coin flips by the admission staff. I combine all these experiments using PCMs. Notably, these measures comply to the maximum extent possible with the requirements of randomization and common support. More detail on the procedure can be found in Hoxby (2015).

In this chapter, I show the results of applying this procedure to undergraduate students. It could also be applied to graduate and professional schools where test scores (LSAT, GMAT, etc.) and undergraduate grades dominate an admissions process that is run by staff.11

2.6 Data

I use administrative data on college assessment scores, score sending, postsecondary enrollment, and 2014 earnings from wages and salaries for people in the high school graduating classes of 1999 through 2003 who were aged 29 through 34 in 2014. That is, I employ data on students who graduated from high school at age 18 and 19, which are the dominant ages at high school graduation in the United States. Earnings are from deidentified Form W-2 data, and these data are available for nonfilers as well as tax filers. A student with no W-2 is assumed to have zero wage and salary earnings. Enrollment data come not from students’ self-reports but from institutions’ reports to the National Student Clearinghouse and through Form 1098-T. Further details on this part of the data set are in Hoxby (2015).

The data on social investment come from the US Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), a source derived from institutions’ official reports. For the purposes of this study, social investment is equal to the amount spent on a student’s education. This is called “core” spending by the US Department of Education and is equal to the per-pupil sum of spending on instruction, academic support12 (for instance, advising), and student support.13 In IPEDS data, core spending is the same for all students who attend the same school in the same year at the same level (i.e., undergraduate versus graduate). This is a limitation.

11. It would work less well for small doctoral programs where faculty meet with or read considerable material from the students with whom they may choose to work and whose admission they greatly influence.

12. Academic support includes expenses for activities that support instruction. For instance, it includes libraries, audiovisual services, and academic administration. The source is National Center for Education Statistics (2015).

13. Student support includes expenses for admissions, registrar activities, and activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students’ emotional and physical well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context of the formal instructional program. Examples include student activities, cultural events, student newspapers, intramural athletics, student organizations, supplemental instruction outside the normal administration, and student records. The source is National Center for Education Statistics (2015).
of the data. In fact, core spending differs among programs and thus among students within a school year level. For instance, Altonji and Zimmerman (chapter 5 in this volume) demonstrate that some undergraduate majors, such as engineering, are actually more expensive than others, such as philosophy. Also, some graduate programs are more expensive than others.

Another limitation of the core spending measure is that it probably contains a type of error that I call “classification error.” Schools may make every effort to allocate each expenditure properly to its IPEDS category, but inevitably some judgment is required for certain expenditures. For instance, an administrative staff person in a math department might mainly coordinate instruction but occasionally help with an activity that would best be classified as “public service.” For instance, the math department might have its students tutor in local secondary schools, and she might organize that activity. Her salary would probably be classified as core spending, even though part of it could really be classified as public service. Another university, though, might put all its tutoring programs, regardless of field, under one unit with dedicated staff. The salaries of those staff persons would be classified as public service.

Because the classification of many expenditures is unambiguous, classification error is unlikely to dominate the variation in core spending among schools. Nevertheless, small differences in core spending between two schools should be interpreted with caution.

2.7 Three Empirical Issues: A Normalization, Lifetime Measures, and the Productivity of the Average Dollar versus the Marginal Dollar

In this section, I discuss three important empirical issues: (1) normalizing the value added of some schools to zero, (2) constructing lifetime measures of value added and social investment, and (3) measuring the productivity of the average dollar of social investment versus measuring the productivity of the marginal dollar.

2.7.1 A Normalization

I do not believe that there is a method of accounting for selection between no and some postsecondary education that is both credible and broadly applicable. There are methods that credibly account for this selection at the extensive margin for a particular institution or set of students. However, a method that works fairly ubiquitously does not exist for the simple reason that the decision to attend postsecondary school at all is not a decision that most people make lightly or quasi randomly. It is a fairly momentous decision. Thus it does not lend itself to selection control methods that require quasi randomization and common support.

14. See the recent review by Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013).
Because I cannot find a broadly applicable, credible method of accounting for selection between no and some postsecondary education, I normalize the value added of some institutions to zero. In practice, these will be the least selective institutions, for reasons discussed below. This does not mean that these institutions’ value added is actually zero. An institution in the lowest selectivity group may have value added near zero, but it might improve earnings or other outcomes substantially relative to no postsecondary education at all. It might also worsen outcomes relative to no postsecondary school if attending an institution keeps the student away from employment at which he would gain valuable skills on the job. In short, I caution readers against interpreting the normalized zeros as a true value added of zero: the true value added could be positive, zero, or negative for those institutions.

2.7.2 Lifetime Measures

Investments in higher education generally take place over a number of years and generate an asset (human capital) that creates benefits for potentially an entire career. Thus I need to have lifetime measures of both social investment and value added. There are two issues that arise as a result: discounting the future and predicting benefits at higher ages than I observe in the data.

Only the first of these issues, discounting, really applies much to the computation of lifetime social investment. This is because I observe actual social investment for people when they are age 18 to age 34, and social investments in higher education are in fact very modest for people aged 17 or under or people aged 35 and over. Thus I do not attempt to project social investment after age 34, and I need only choose a plausible discount rate.15

In my main results, I use a real discount rate of 2.5 percent. In sensitivity testing (available from the author), I have considered real rates as low as 2 percent and as high as 3 percent. Keep in mind that these are real discount rates that might correspond to nominal discount rates that cover a wider range, depending on the rate of inflation. For instance, with an inflation rate of 3.0 percent, a real discount rate of 2.5 percent would be 5.5 percent.

Computing lifetime value added is more complicated because it is necessary not only to discount but also to project outcomes to higher ages.

For earnings through age 34, I simply take observed earnings from the data and discount them using the same discount rate applied to social investment.

But I do not use a person’s actual earnings at ages greater than 34 because it would force me to compute value added based on students who attended

15. More precisely, by age 34, most people have completed the postsecondary education that is induced by their initial enrollment. If people return to college after, say, a decade in the labor market, that second enrollment episode is likely triggered by a labor market experience and should be evaluated separately.
postsecondary school too long ago: the results would be unduly dated. For instance, a 65-year-old in 2014 would likely have started attending postsecondary school in 1967 or 1968. On the other hand, I do not attempt to project future earnings based on earnings at an age earlier than 34 because people tend only to “settle down” on an earnings trajectory in their early 30s, not their 20s. That is, studies of US workers tend to establish that their later earnings are substantially more predictable when one uses their earnings through their early 30s as opposed to earnings through, say, their 20s.

To project earnings, I use empirical earnings dynamics. Specifically, I categorize each 34-year-old by his percentile within the income distribution for 34-year-olds. Then I compute a transition matrix between 34-year-olds’ and 35-year-olds’ income percentiles. For instance, a 34-year-old with income in the 75th percentile might have a 10 percent probability of moving to the 76th percentile when aged 35. I repeat this exercise for subsequent pairs of ages: 35 and 36, 36 and 37, and so on. In this way, I build up all probable income paths, always using observed longitudinal transitions that differ by age. (When a person is younger, she has a higher probability of transitioning to a percentile far from her current one. Incomes stabilize with age, so off-diagonal transition probabilities fall.) I considered alternative projection methods, the more plausible of which generated similar projections.16

Note that this method produces earnings for ages 35 and higher than are already in the same dollars of the day as earnings at age 34.

2.7.3 The Productivity of the Average Dollar versus the Marginal Dollar

In a previous section, I described how I build a school’s value added using PCMs. This gives me the numerator for a measure of the school’s productivity of the average dollar of social investment. I also use PCMs to build the social investment triggered by a student’s enrolling in a school. This gives me the denominator for the school’s productivity of the average dollar of social investment.

16. I investigated alternatives to this procedure. The first set of alternatives used empirical earnings paths that played out for the same person over a longer time span than one year (i.e., the year-to-year transition matrix mentioned in the text). For instance, one could take a time span of 10 years. In this case, one would use the longitudinal pattern for each 34-year-old, following him through age 43. One would use the longitudinal pattern for each 43-year-old, following him through age 52. And so on. The longer the time span, the more one has allowed for patterns in earnings that play out of multiple years. However, a longer time span has the disadvantage that one is forced to use data from calendar years that are farther away from the present (more outdated). For time spans of two to ten years, this set of alternatives produced results similar to those shown. An alternative method that I rejected was keeping a person at the same percentile in the earnings distribution as he was at age 34. For instance, a person at the 99th percentile at age 34 would be assigned 99th percentile earnings for all subsequent ages. I rejected this alternative method because it does not allow for a realistic degree of reversion toward the mean. Thus despite the method’s producing reasonable lifetime outcomes for middling percentiles, it produces lifetime earnings distributions that contain too many extremely low and extremely high outcomes compared to reality.
In theory, one could build a measure of school A’s productivity of the *marginal* dollar of social investment by focusing exclusively on the vertical and horizontal experiments that involve other schools whose core spending is only a little lower than school A’s. However, such calculations—which I call the “marginal PCM exercise” hereafter for conciseness—turn out not to be reliable in practice, owing to classification error. (I do not give up entirely on computing the productivity of the marginal dollar. See below.)

Why does classification error make the marginal PCM exercise described in the previous paragraph unreliable? Although classification error probably has only a minor effect on measures of the *level* of a school’s core spending, it may very plausibly have a major effect on measures of the *differences* in core spending among schools whose core spending levels are similar. This is a familiar result in applied econometrics, where measurement error that causes only modest problems in levels regressions often causes dramatic problems in differenced regressions. The problem is, if anything, exacerbated in this application, owing to the fact that IPEDS-based core spending is the same for all students who attend the same school at the same level in the same year.

To see this, suppose that schools A and B are similarly selective and have similar core spending. Suppose that they often compete with one another for the same students so that they generate many horizontal experiments. Suppose that true social investment is the same at schools A and B but that the two schools classify certain spending differently so that school A’s measured core spending is slightly higher than school B’s. Then the difference in the two schools’ measured core spending is entirely classification error (measurement error).

If one were to carry out the marginal PCM exercise in an attempt to compute the productivity of the marginal dollar of social investment at school A, then A’s horizontal experiments with school B would naturally receive considerable weight because it competes often with school B and because school B’s measured core spending is only a little lower than school A’s. But each of the A-B horizontal experiments would reveal nothing about the productivity of *true* marginal differences in social investment, since the two schools truly have identical social investment.

Indeed, the A-B comparisons could easily generate an estimate that suggests (wrongly) that the productivity of a marginal dollar of social investment at school A is *negative*. School A would only need to have value added that is slightly lower than school B. Its slightly lower value added would be associated with slightly higher measured core spending.

17. The seminal demonstration of this point is made in Griliches (1979). He is interested in measures of educational attainment where measurement error is a minor problem in levels regressions but becomes a dramatic problem in differenced regressions—for instance, regressions that depend on differences in attainment between siblings. The point applies much more broadly, however.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the same classification error affects every A-B comparison. That is, the classification error does not vary among students within a school, as would other types of measurement error—in earnings, say—where error for one student might very plausibly offset error for another student.

It might seem at this point that one can only credibly estimate the productivity of the average, not marginal, dollar at various schools. The reality is less disappointing. Although classification errors do not cancel out across students within a school, they do tend to cancel out across otherwise similar schools. Thus a logical way to proceed is to group schools with others that are similar. Then one can estimate the productivity of the marginal dollar for each group by carrying out the marginal PCM exercise at the group level rather than the school level. One obtains only a group-level estimate of the productivity of the marginal dollar, but this is informative for many purposes as shown below.

2.8 Why the Results Are Shown with Institutions Grouped in Selectivity-Based Bins

2.8.1 Group-Based Results

In the sections that follow, I present the productivity findings for schools grouped into “bins,” not for individual schools. This is for several reasons. First, since there are more than 6,000 postsecondary institutions, it would be impractical to show productivity school by school.

Second, small differences among similar schools tend to be interpreted more strongly than is justified by the nature of the estimates. Even in exercises like those carried out in this chapter, which rely on administrative data that are vast and not prone to error, there are reasons why small differences may be misleading and not robust. For instance, structural break methods are a statistically grounded and logical way to identify each school’s on-the-bubble region, but they are not a perfect way. Thus some schools’ on-the-bubble regions are probably slightly off, and this could affect their results enough to make small estimated differences misleading.

Third, this chapter and other chapters in this volume aim to produce evidence about higher education productivity that addresses consequential, long-standing questions. It is difficult to see how productivity calculations for individual schools would much advance this goal. Indeed, reports on individual schools, such as the US News and World Report rankings, seem to trigger plenty of gossip but few important analyses.

Fourth, as noted in the previous section, it is necessary to group schools in some way to estimate the productivity of the marginal dollar of social investment.
2.8.2 Grouping Postsecondary Institutions by Selectivity

There are a variety of ways in which one could group postsecondary institutions, and several could be interesting. The logical place to start is grouping them by selectivity—for a few reasons. First, differences in vertical selection among institutions are a dominant feature of US higher education and a key feature that explains students’ college choices and institutions’ roles in the market for higher education (Hoxby 2009). Second, vertical selection is the primary threat to accurate calculations of productivity, so by grouping schools by selectivity, I allow readers to judge how remedying the selection problem (as described above) affects the results. Third, productivity by selectivity is the crucial statistic for understanding the education production function, especially for assessing single crossing—the degree to which a higher-aptitude student derives more value from attending an institution with a higher level of social investment than a lower-aptitude student would derive.

I present the results using figures in which each institution is assigned to a “selectivity bin” according to the empirical combined math and verbal SAT (or translated ACT) score of its average student. Note that it is institutions, rather than individual students, that are binned, since we are interested in showing the productivity of institutions.

Although score-based bins are probably the most objective way to organize the institutions by selectivity, it may help to provide an informal translation between the scores and the “competitiveness” language used in Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges and Universities, familiar to higher education researchers and policy makers. Roughly, institutions with an average combined score of 800 are noncompetitive. Indeed, they often explicitly practice “open admission,” which means that they admit anyone with a high school diploma or passing score on a high school equivalency test. Institutions with an average combined score of 1,000 to 1,050 are “competitive plus”; 1,050 to 1,150 are “very competitive”; 1,150 to 1,250 are “very competitive plus”; 1,250 to 1,350 are “highly competitive” or “highly competitive plus”; and 1,350 and over are “most competitive.” These classifications are approximate, and some schools do not fit them well. There is an indeterminate area between nonselective and selective schools that corresponds roughly to the 800 to 1,000 range. Toward the top of this range, schools tend to be selective but more reliant on high school recommendations and grades and less reliant on test scores. Toward the bottom of this range, schools tend to be nonselective. However, schools in this range can be hard to classify because information about them is often only partial. This is a point to which I will return.

18. The empirical average score is not necessarily the same as the SAT/ACT score that appears in college guides. Some schools submit scores to the college guides that reflect “management” of the (subpopulation of) students for whom scores are reported.
2.9 Results

I show productivity for three key outcomes: wage and salary earnings (including zero earnings for people who have none), a measure of public service, and a measure of innovation produced. The construction of the two latter measures is discussed below. All of these are lifetime measures in which I compute the actual measure for ages 18 through 34 and then project the outcome for ages 35 through 65, the ages for which persons’ outcomes cannot be linked to their postsecondary institutions. A real discount rate of 2.5 percent is used throughout for the results shown here. I consistently normalize the productivity of the least-selective institutions to zero.

2.9.1 Productivity Measures Based on Earnings

Figure 2.1 shows lifetime wage and salary earnings and value added for institutions of higher education. The earnings are “raw” because no attempt has been made to account for the effects of selection. Value added, in contrast, is computed using the method described above to account for selection.

The figure shows that both raw earnings and value added are higher for institutions that are more selective. Indeed, both series rise almost monotonically. However, value added rises more slowly than earnings. This is particularly obvious as we reach the most-selective institutions, where the slope of the relationship implies that about two-thirds of the earnings gains
do not represent value added but instead represent what their very apt students would have earned if they had attended less-selective schools. (Because of the normalization, only the gain in value added relative to the lowest-selectivity schools is meaningful. The level is not.)

Of course, this does not mean that the more selective an institution is, the greater its productivity. Value added rises with selectivity but, as figure 2.2 demonstrates, so does social investment in each student’s education. Recall that social investment is the increase in educational spending triggered by attending one institution rather than another. Like value added, this measure accounts for selection using the method described above. Also like value added, it is a lifetime measure and discounted using a real rate of 2.5 percent.¹⁹

Just for comparison, figure 2.2 also shows the present discounted value of tuition paid. This is always lower than social investment because it does not include spending funded by taxpayers, donors, and so on.

Social investment in each student’s education is higher for institutions that are more selective. It rises almost monotonically with the institution’s average test score. Note also that social investment rises notably more steeply

¹⁹. Recall that I consider social investment only through age 34, since by that age, the vast majority of people have completed the postsecondary education induced by their initial enrollment.
than tuition paid. This is partly because more selective institutions spend considerably more per curricular unit on each student’s education. But it is also partly because students who attend more-selective institutions tend to enroll in more curricular units. They are less likely to drop out, more likely to attend full time, more likely to continue onto graduate school, and so on. This is true even when we have accounted for selection.

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that the pattern of institutions’ productivity of an average dollar will be something of a race between value added (the numerator), which is rising in selectivity, and social investment (the denominator), which is also rising in selectivity. Figure 2.3 shows the results of this “race.” The pattern is striking: (1) Within the selective institutions (combined SAT scores of 1,000 or above), productivity of the average dollar is quite flat; it rises slightly but not at all dramatically. (2) Within the nonselective institutions, productivity of the average dollar is roughly flat in selectivity. (3) The productivity of the average dollar is lower among nonselective schools than it is among the selective ones.

The first of these results—that among selective schools, the productivity of the average dollar rises only slightly with selectivity—is very striking and has potentially important implications. It is striking because social investment and earnings both rise substantially, not slightly, as selectivity rises. Thus the relative flatness comes from the numerator and denominator rising at a sufficiently similar rate so that the value added of the average dollar is

Fig. 2.3  Productivity based on lifetime earnings of a dollar of social investment in higher education, institutions grouped by selectivity
not terribly different between an institution with an average score of 1,000 and one with an average score of 1,400. An implication of this finding is that there would be little change in sector-wide productivity if one were to remove the average dollar from more-selective schools (i.e., make a radial reduction in core spending) and were to use that dollar to make a radial increase in the core spending of less-selective schools. Moving the dollar in the other direction would also generate little change—that is, social investment is scaling up with student aptitude such that higher-aptitude students get resources that are commensurate with their capacity to use them to create value.

This result, with its important implications, seems unlikely to be a matter of pure coincidence. Since students are actively choosing among the institutions throughout this range, this may be the result of market forces: students choosing among schools and schools consequently competing for faculty and other resources. In other words, students who can benefit from greater resources may be willing to pay more for them, inducing an allocation of schools’ resources that corresponds roughly to students’ ability to benefit from them.

That market forces would have this effect would not be surprising if all students paid for their own education, the financing of such education was efficient, and students were well informed about the value they could expect to derive from educational resources. But clearly, these idealized conditions do not obtain: third-party payers (taxpayers, donors) are the proximate funders of a considerable share of selective higher education, student loan volumes and interest rates are such that students can be liquidity constrained (on the one hand) or offered unduly generous terms (on the other), and many students appear to be poorly informed when they choose a postsecondary school. Thus what the result suggests is that even with all these issues, market forces are sufficiently strong to maintain some regularity in how institutions’ resources scale up with the aptitude of their students.

The empirical result does not imply that the educational resources are provided efficiently. It could be that all the institutions provide resources in a similarly inefficient manner. However, unless the productivity of least-productive institutions is substantially negative (so that the normalization to zero overstates their productivity a lot), a dollar spent on educational resources at a selective institution appears to generate multiple dollars of value over a person’s lifetime.

The second of these results—that productivity is rather flat in selectivity among nonselective schools—is not terribly surprising. More specifically,

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20. A radial change is one that changes all categories within core spending equally. For instance, if 70 percent of core spending were on instruction and 30 percent were on academic support, a radial reduction of a dollar would reduce instructional spending by 70 cents and academic support spending by 30 cents. If decision making at selective institutions is such that spending changes are usually radial, the average and marginal dollar might be spent very similarly.
among institutions whose average student has a combined score of 800 or below, productivity is rather flat. This may be because the institutions do not actually differ much in student aptitude: their average student’s score may not be terribly meaningful because some of their students take no college assessment or take an assessment but only for low stakes. Or it could well be that the aptitudes that may matter for their students’ success are poorly measured by tests. Finally, being nonselective, these institutions may differ mainly on horizontal grounds (geography, curriculum, how learning is organized) so that showing them vis-à-vis an axis based on the average student’s score is just less informative.

The third of these results—that productivity is distinctly lower at nonselective institutions—is interesting and consistent with several possible explanations. First, nonselective institutions enroll students who have struggled in secondary school, and it may simply be harder to turn a dollar of investment into human capital for them. Simply put, they may arrive with learning deficits or study habits that make them harder to teach. Second, many students who enroll in nonselective schools do not choose among them actively or in an informed manner. They simply choose the most proximate or one that becomes salient to them for an arbitrary reason (an advertisement, for instance). Because these schools infrequently participate in national college guides, students may have a difficult time comparing them on objective grounds. For all these reasons, market forces may fail to discipline these institutions’ productivity. Third, nonselective institutions disproportionately enroll students who do not pay for their own education but instead have it funded by a government grant, veterans’ benefits, or the like. As in other third-party-payer situations, this may make the students less sensitive to the commensurability between cost and benefit than they would be if they were paying the bills themselves.

The patterns discussed so far are robust to several alternatives in computing productivity, such as using discount rates anywhere within the plausible range of 2 to 3 percent real. They are robust to removing institutional support from social investment. (Social investment should certainly include instructional spending, academic support, and student support.) They are robust to excluding extensive research universities whose accounting of how spending is allocated across undergraduates and other uses is most contestable. All of these alternatives change the magnitudes of productivity, but

21. Many American students take a college assessment (or preliminary college assessment) solely to satisfy their state’s accountability rules or for diagnosis/placement. Thus many students who do not apply to any selective postsecondary school nevertheless have scores.

22. The 2000 edition of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education classified postsecondary schools as Extensive Research Universities if they not only offer a full range of baccalaureate programs but also are committed to graduate education through the doctorate, give high priority to research, award 50 or more doctoral degrees each year, and annually receive tens of millions of dollars in federal research funding.
they do not change the three key patterns just discussed. They also do not change the fact that both earnings and social investment rise fairly monotonically in selectivity.

Among institutions of similar selectivity, is productivity similar? In other words, is the average productivity within each bin representative of all institutions, or does it represent an average among schools whose productivity differs widely? This question is clearly important for interpretation, and figure 2.4 provides the answer.

Figure 2.4 shows not just the average productivity in each selectivity bin but also the productivity of the 5th and 95th percentile institutions with each bin. It is immediately obvious that productivity differences among schools are wide among nonselective institutions but narrow as schools become more selective. Indeed, among the very selective schools, productivity differences are relatively small.

Given the results on the average levels of productivity, these results on the dispersion of productivity should not be too surprising. The level results suggest that market forces might be operative among selective institutions. The students who would likely maintain the most market pressure would be students who make active choices among schools (not merely choosing the most proximate), who are best informed, whose families pay for some
or most of their education, and who are the least likely to be liquidity constrained. Such students will disproportionately be apt. Thus the more selective an institution is, the more it is probably exposed to market forces that discipline its productivity—explaining why we see low dispersion.

If market forces weaken as students get less apt, then the pressure for similarly selective schools to be similarly productive would fall as selectivity falls. This would be consistent with the pattern of dispersion in figure 2.4. Market pressure might be very weak for nonselectives if the students who tend to enroll in them choose only among local schools, are poorly informed, and have their tuition paid by third parties. Indeed, for many nonselective schools, there is not much information available about students’ outcomes. Thus we should not be surprised that low-productivity, nonselective schools do not get eliminated even though some nonselective schools have much higher productivity.

So far, the discussion in this section has focused on the productivity of the average dollar of social investment. But as discussed previously, we can potentially learn about the productivity of the *marginal* dollar of social investment. One way to do this without imposing much structure is to plot the marginal productivity curve implied by the average productivity curve shown in figure 2.2. (This is analogous to plotting the marginal cost curve associated with an average cost curve.) When I do this, I obtain figure 2.5. It shows that the productivity of the marginal dollar of social investment

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**Fig. 2.5** Marginal productivity of a dollar of social investment, institutions grouped by selectivity
is also quite flat but slightly upward sloping in selectivity over the range of selective institutions. In figure 2.6, I switch the scale of the horizontal axis to dollars of social investments, rather than selectivity, while still grouping institutions in selectivity-based bins. The resulting marginal productivity curve is, in some ways, easier to interpret because it reveals the productivity of the marginal dollar and allows us to see what that marginal dollar is. The curve is even flatter.

An implication of this finding is that there would be little change in sector-wide productivity if one were to remove the marginal dollar from more-selective schools and were to use that dollar to make a marginal increase in the core spending of less-selective schools. Moving the marginal dollar in the other direction would also generate little change. That is, social investment is scaling up with student aptitude such that higher-aptitude students get marginal resources that are commensurate with their capacity to use them to create marginal value.

2.9.2 Productivity Measures Based on Public Service

Conceptually, one wants to have a measure of public service that picks up contributions to society that earnings do not. This suggests that a good measure of public service is the percentage difference in earnings in a person’s occupation if he works in the public or nonprofit sectors versus the
for-profit sector. This is a measure of his “donation” to society: the earnings he foregoes by not being in the for-profit sector. Two concrete examples may be helpful. Highly able lawyers usually work for for-profit law firms, but some work as judicial clerks, district attorneys, and public defenders. The latter people earn considerably less than they would in the for-profit sector. Similarly, executives and managers of nonprofit organizations, such as foundations, usually earn considerably less than those in the for-profit sector. While a measure of public service based on “pay foregone” is certainly imperfect (in particular, the different sectors may draw people who have different levels of unobserved ability), it is at least an economics-based measure, not an ad hoc measure. It is also a continuous measure and one that can be specific to the schools in each selectivity bin, limiting the unobserved ability problems just mentioned.

I classify each school’s former students by their one-digit occupation at about age 34. Then I compute, for each selectivity bin, the average earnings by occupation for those employed in the for-profit sector. Next, I compute each public or nonprofit employee’s contribution to public service as the difference between his occupation-by-selectivity bin’s for-profit average earnings and his earnings. To make this akin to a lifetime measure, I multiply it by the person’s ratio of projected lifetime earnings to his age 34 earnings. (The last is simply to make magnitudes analogous to those in the previous subsection.) Also, if the contribution calculated is negative, I set it to zero. (I return to this point below.) I assume that the contribution to public service is zero for for-profit employees. Clearly, they may make contributions through volunteering or other means, but most such contributions pale in comparison to those of someone who foregoes 15 percent of pay, for example.

Once this contribution to public service is computed, it can be used to make productivity calculations in a manner that is exactly analogous to how earnings are used in the productivity calculations based on earnings. To be precise, productivity based on public service is value added through public service contributions divided by social investment.

Figure 2.7 shows the results of this exercise. The relationship is fairly noisy and nonmonotonic, although, overall, productivity based on public service rises with selectivity. The bumpy relationship is the net result of two competing relationships. The percentage of former students who take up government employment falls as selectivity rises. This would tend to make public service productivity fall as selectivity rises. However, this fall is offset by the rise in earnings foregone as selectivity rises. A concrete example may help. For most of the selectivity range (above the nonselectives), the tendency of former students to become public school teachers is falling with selectivity. However, in the lower selectivity bins, public school teachers are relatively well paid compared to for-profit employees in their occupational category, so their foregone earnings are little to none. Relatively few former students
from the highest selectivity bins become public school teachers, but those who do forego a large share of their for-profit counterparts’ earnings. Similar phenomena hold for other local, state, and federal employees.

Figure 2.8 shows the dispersion of productivity based on public service. The pattern shown contrasts strikingly with that of figure 2.4, which showed that the dispersion of productivity based on earnings fell steady with selectivity. The dispersion of productivity based on public service does not. It is noisy, but it rises with selectivity. This indicates that among very selective schools, some are much more productive in public service contributions than others. Put another way, some very selective schools are much more likely to induce their students to enter public service than are other very selective schools. One might speculate that some schools have more of a service ethos or a greater number of service opportunities available to students on or near campus. In any case, there is little indication that market or any other forces constrain similarly selective schools to have similar productivity based on public service.

2.9.3 Productivity Measures Based on Innovation

Conceptually, one wants to have a measure of contributions to innovation that is broader than, say, a measure based on patenting would be. Many
more people contribute to innovation than own patents. Similarly, a measure based on former students themselves becoming researchers seems too narrow. The software industry, for instance, fits the definition of *innovative* that many economists have in mind, and it is certainly a growing industry in which the United States has a comparative advantage. Yet it does not have many employees who would describe themselves as researchers. For these reasons, I computed a measure of contributions to innovation based on the research and development (R&D) spending of each person’s employer. Specifically, I took each employer’s ratio of R&D spending to total expenses. Nonprofit and public employers, especially universities, were included as much as possible. I then multiplied each employee’s earnings at age 34 by this R&D ratio. Finally, I multiplied by the person’s ratio of lifetime earnings to her earnings at age 34. (This final multiplication is simply to make the magnitude analogous to those in the previous subsections.)

Thus a person who works for a firm that spends 10 percent of its budget on R&D would have 10 percent of her lifetime pay listed as her contribution to innovation. Of course, this is not meant to be a measure of her direct contributions. Rather, it is a way of forming an index that both reflects value

This index permits people to contribute to innovation even if they do so in a supportive capacity, as most do, rather than as an investigator or patentee. For instance, a secretary or market researcher for a software firm would be counted because she indirectly supports the innovation occurring there.

Once this contribution to innovation is computed, it can be used to make productivity calculations in a manner exactly analogous to how earnings are used in the productivity calculations based on earnings. To be precise, productivity based on innovation is value added through the innovation measure divided by social investment.

Figure 2.9 shows the results of this exercise. The pattern is mildly upward sloping in selectivity until the most-selective institutions are reached. At that point, the relationship becomes steeply upward sloping. This convex relationship indicates that very selective institutions are much more productive in contributions to innovation than all other institutions. There are at least two possible explanations. Most obviously, there is no reason to think that the relationship should be flat as it is for productivity based on earnings. In the latter case, market forces could plausibly generate a flat relationship. But if much of the return to innovation spills over onto others or works through general equilibrium effects, there is no obvious mechanism that would ensure that social investment scales up with contributions to inno-

Fig. 2.9 Productivity measured in terms of average value added through innovation of a dollar of social investment, horizontal axis in dollars of social investment, institutions grouped by selectivity

(from earnings) and innovation (from the R&D ratio).
vation. Alternatively, social investment, the denominator of productivity, could be understated in the most-selective schools. Social investment does not include these schools’ spending on research, and this research spending may have benefits for undergraduates. In fact, the channel could be subtle. It may be that research spending has no direct benefits for undergraduates but that it attracts a different type of faculty (research-oriented) who, even when they teach undergraduates, teach in a manner oriented toward developing knowledge at the frontier. Thus the undergraduate program might be almost unintentionally research oriented.

I do not show dispersion in productivity based on research because the focus would be on such a small number of schools.

2.10 Discussion

At selective institutions, a dollar in social investment appears to generate multiple dollars of value added based on earnings over a person’s lifetime. This conclusion is only unwarranted if nonselective schools have substantially negative productivity.

This is a simple but important result with broad implications for many government policies. For instance, the estimated productivity of selective institutions appears to be sufficiently high to justify taxpayer support and philanthropic support incentivized by the tax deductibility of gifts. I lay out such calculations in a companion chapter that is in process.

For nonselective schools, it is less clear whether a dollar in social investment generates at least a dollar in value added based on earnings. This is not to say that these schools’ productivity is near zero. Rather, it is to say that understanding their productivity is difficult because their students tend to be at the no-enrollment versus some-nonselective-enrollment margin, where it is extremely difficult to account for selection. For instance, this study does not attempt to say how the productivity of nonselective schools compares to the productivity of on-the-job training.

The results for productivity based on earnings suggest that market forces are sufficiently strong to maintain some regularity in how institutions’ resources scale up with the ability of their students to convert social investment into value added. Without market forces as the explanation, the stability of productivity over a wide range of schools would be too much of a coincidence. This does not necessarily imply that selective institutions provide educational resources with maximum efficiency: market forces might only compel them to provide resources in a similar but inefficient manner. However, selective schools’ efficiency is at least such that social investment channeled through them generates multiple dollars of value added.

Given the strong, even dramatic and convex, increases in the social investment that are associated with more and more selective institutions,
the result discussed in the foregoing paragraphs are only possible—as a logical matter—if single crossing holds. Moreover, single crossing must not only hold with regard to its positive sign, but the magnitude of the cross partial derivative must be fairly substantial. Put another and less purely mathematical way, education production must be such that students with greater aptitude derive substantially more value added from any marginal dollar of social investment. The implications of this finding are fairly profound for the economics of education. Exploring them fully is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I take them up in my Alfred Marshall Lectures (University of Cambridge).24

Productivity based on earnings is much more dispersed among nonselective and less-selective schools than among very selective schools. This is a hint that market forces weaken as selectivity falls, perhaps because students become less informed and/or less responsive to productivity when choosing which school to attend. In any case, a student choosing among nonselective schools can make a much larger “mistake” on productivity than a student choosing among very selective schools.

The results for productivity based on public service suggest that market forces do not maintain regularity in how institutions’ resources scale up with the ability of their students to convert social investment into public service. A plausible explanation is the lack of market rewards for public service. Without such market-based rewards, there may be no mechanism by which schools that are more productive at public service generate more funds to support additional investments.

The results for productivity based on innovation suggest that highly selective schools are much more productive than all other schools. This is not surprising if the rewards for innovation run largely through spillovers or general equilibrium effects on the economy. In such circumstances, there would be no market forces to align social investment with contributions from innovation. Alternatively, social investment (the denominator of productivity) could be understated because it does not include spending on research. Undergraduates may learn to be innovative from research spending or simply by being taught by faculty who spend part of their time on research supported by research spending.

The three outcomes by which productivity is measured in this chapter were chosen to represent private returns (earnings), social returns (public service), and likely sources of economic spillovers (innovation). But there are, of course, many other outcomes by which productivity of postsecondary institutions could be measured.

24. These are currently available in video format online and will, in time, be published in written format. See Hoxby (2018).
References


National Center for Education Statistics, Institute for Education Sciences, US
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