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## 8 Industrial Wage and Employment Determination in an Open Economy

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The increasing internationalization of the U.S. economy, evinced in the growth of trade, immigration, and (post-1982) trade imbalance–induced capital flows, raises questions about the responsiveness of the labor market to shocks produced by open economy developments. How do trade-induced changes in product demand and immigration-induced changes in labor supply affect relative wages and employment? Do industrial labor markets respond to shocks generated by international flows of goods and labor as they do to those generated by domestic developments? Does a decline in demand due to international trade (and other factors) reduce wages in an industry relative to those elsewhere? To what extent do wages respond differently in union than in nonunion settings? To what extent do wages respond differently to increases as opposed to decreases in relative demand?

To answer these questions, we analyze cross-section time-series data on imports, exports, immigrant shares of employment, annual and hourly earnings, and employment for detailed U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1958–84 and contrast the responsiveness of the industry earnings in more and less highly unionized industries and between industries facing greater and lesser shocks in sales. In contrast to studies that focus on the direct and indirect effects of the trade balance or immigrant flows on the aggregate economy (using general equilibrium models or input-output analysis), our concern is with direct trade effects on disaggregated industries.<sup>1</sup>

The principal finding is that the industry wage structure responds to

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changes in product market sales, with trade-induced changes in sales having approximately the same effect on earnings as sales due to domestic market developments: on average, a 10% annual change in relative industry revenues resulting from trade or other factors alters relative earnings by about .5% over the long run. In addition, we find enough variation in changes in wages, sales held fixed, to trace out a demand curve “trade-off” between wages and employment across industries. Surprisingly, perhaps, we also find that wages respond more to sales in unionized industries than in nonunionized industries and more to relative declines in sales than to relative increases in sales. Finally, industries with growing or large immigrant shares of employment tend to fall in the industrial wage structure, apparently for reasons beyond any immigrant-native pay differential within industries.

### 8.1 Potential Labor Market Responses to Trade-induced Changes in Product Demand

When product demand changes in an industry, one expects employment to change in the same direction, with wage adjustments “buffering” the magnitude of job losses or gains. The extent of wage responses to shifts in demand is likely to depend on the mechanisms for wage setting—in particular, on whether wages are set in a decentralized fashion in industry labor markets by supply and demand to clear labor markets; by collective bargaining/administered wage setting that produces premium wages in some industries; or on a national basis with little scope for industry variation.

In *competitive decentralized wage setting*, the extent of wage response to shifts in demand or supply of labor depends on elasticities of demand and supply.<sup>2</sup> Formally, write the industry demand for labor curve in first-difference form as

$$(1) \quad dE = -k dW + dX,$$

where  $E = \ln$  employment,  $W = \ln$  wage,  $X = \ln$  shift in the derived labor demand curve due to shifts in product demand, and  $d =$  the difference operator. Let the industry labor supply curve be represented as

$$(2) \quad dE = e dW + dS,$$

where  $S = \ln$  factors that shift supply.

Market clearing produces the following reduced-form relations:

$$(3a) \quad dW = (dX - dS)/(k + e)$$

$$(3b) \quad dE = (edX - kdS)/(k + e)$$

Since elasticities are likely to be greater in the long run as factor mobility increases and as firms move in and out of industries, wage responses will be smaller and employment responses greater to any exogenous shock as time

proceeds. In the extreme, when the elasticity of labor supply to an industry approaches infinity, there is no wage response to shifts in either schedule, and the sole change is in employment.

Under *collective bargained/administered decentralized wage setting*, wages in particular industries diverge from market-clearing rates for any of a number of possible reasons (efficiency wages, rent sharing, collective bargaining), producing a queue of workers at going rates and an effective infinite/near infinite elasticity of labor supply to the sector.<sup>3</sup> Since neither employers nor unions are directly constrained by labor supply conditions, there are several possible wage responses to shifts in demand. Some argue that, in markets where senior workers have a disproportionate influence on wage setting, wages are less responsive to trade-induced changes in demand than competitively determined wages. Grossman (1984) analyzes the conditions for this to be true in a model in which wages are set (subject to a labor demand constraint) by a majority-voting union with a seniority layoff rule and free entry into the union. Modeling an increase in international competition as a exogenous decline in the world price of the product produced by the unionized sector, he shows that international competition has two offsetting effects on the wage. For a union of a given size, a lower wage will be desired because greater international competition increases the risk of layoffs. On the other hand, declines in union membership will raise the average seniority level, which, he argues, produces a median member who wants higher wages. The net effect is ambiguous in general, but, in the case of a constant elasticity labor demand schedule, his model predicts that the union wage will be completely unresponsive to the international price.<sup>4</sup> Others note the possibility (and existence in some industries in some periods) of “endgame bargaining” in which unions, seeing little future to an industry, seek to extract as much as they can in a short period (Lawrence and Lawrence 1985). Our analysis emphasizes the possibility of greater-than-competitive downward wage adjustments when wages exceed outside alternatives in a unionized-administered wage sector, so that we expect larger downward wage adjustment for union than for nonunion workers. The view that wage responses to increased product market competition may be greater under unionism is consistent with research on the effects of trucking deregulation on wages that finds substantial relative wage reductions for union truckers and much less wage response for nonunion truckers following deregulation (Rose 1987).

Consider, finally, industry wage responses under a *centralized system* in which wages are set nationally (corporatist economies) or in which there is considerable “spillover” or “flow on” of changes in wages across industries. In these settings, we would anticipate shifts in demand to have little effect on wages but substantial effects on employment. The existence of such wage-setting systems outside the United States provides potentially fruitful controls for evaluating the effect of decentralized wage setting in the United States on wage responsiveness.

### 8.1.1 Modeling Union Behavior

Consider first the wage policy of a union concerned with both wages and employment that is subject to a labor demand constraint. In simplest form, its decision making can be viewed as maximizing a utility function  $U(W, E)$  subject to a labor demand constraint  $E = E(W)$ . Then the maximizing condition is to set wages so that the ratio of the marginal value of employment to the marginal value of wages equals the elasticity of labor demand. If trade (or other factors) increases the elasticity of demand, wages are likely to drop, as the wage-employment trade-off facing the union is worsened. Huizinga (1987) shows that, in imperfectly competitive product markets, an increase in international competition is likely to increase the elasticity of the product demand elasticity facing domestic firms and lead to wage concessions by a monopoly union. If trade (or other factors) leaves the elasticity unchanged but shifts the demand curve downward, the union is also likely to lower wages when demand declines and raise them when demand increases.

Similar implications can be derived for the standard utilitarian union model (McDonald and Solow 1981) in which a union with a fixed membership maximizes the welfare of the representative member subject to the labor demand constraint.<sup>5</sup> The union maximizes

$$[e(w)/N]u(w) + \{1 - [e(w)/N]\}u(w^*),$$

where  $N$  is the fixed membership,  $u(\cdot)$  is the utility function of the representative member,  $e$  is the level of employment,  $w^*$  is the opportunity (or alternative) wage, and  $w$  is the wage level. The maximand can be rewritten as  $e(w)[u(w) - u(w^*)]$  dropping a constant term. This formulation yields the familiar optimizing condition in which the elasticity of the gain from employment is equated to the elasticity of labor demand:

$$-u'(w)w/[u(w) - u(w^*)] = e'(w)w/e.$$

Here, the union wage depends only on the elasticity of labor demand and the degree of risk aversion of the representative union member. Changes in international competition that affect the elasticity of labor demand will affect wages in the same direction, while shifts in labor demand not changing the elasticity will not affect wages. In the case of efficient bargains between the union and firms, the level of labor demand will affect wages as well as the elasticity.<sup>6</sup>

When senior workers play an especially important role in the union, there is a strong possibility of a more complex response pattern. Faced with a positive shock in demand, existing union members are likely to weigh wage gains highly relative to employment gains, producing sizable increases in wages. Faced with modest negative shocks, they are less likely to sacrifice rents to save the jobs of marginal employees, producing wage inertia. Faced with siz-

able negative shocks and threats of plant shutdowns, on the other hand, existing unionists may be willing to offer large wage concessions.

As there is reasonable a priori logic for expecting unions to respond less, more, or even “perversely” to shocks due to trade or other factors, the question of which response pattern dominates actual wage setting in the United States is an empirical one.

### 8.1.2 Sales and Shifts in Demand

The models described thus far relate changes in wages and employment to exogenous shifts in demand and supply. To apply them to data, it is necessary to measure the exogenous shifts, which, given our focus on trade, requires that we obtain appropriate indicators of shifts in product demand and the contribution of trade to such shifts. In this study, our primary indicator of shifts are industry sales and its price and quantity components and sales decomposed into domestic market sales, exports, and imports, appropriately weighted to take account of their relative magnitudes. As sales depend on industry supply as well as demand conditions, however, simply replacing the  $X$  terms in (3a)–(3b) with sales and regressing wages/employment on sales does not yield the desired response parameters. There is a potentially important simultaneity bias due to the effect of wages on industry prices and output.

As a first cut at the simultaneity problem, assume that the supply curve of industry output is flat, so that prices depend solely on costs of production. Then we can model the simultaneous relation between wages and sales with the following simple market model:

a) product demand:

$$(4) \quad dQ = -h dP + dX,$$

where  $Q$  = ln output,  $P$  = ln price of output, and  $X$  = ln shifts in demand, as in (3a);

b) the effect of wages on cost of production/product price:

$$(5) \quad dP = a dW,$$

where  $a$  is a labor's share of cost;

c) wage determination equation:

$$(6) \quad dW = q dX,$$

where  $q$  is the parameter of interest to us ( $= 1/[k + e]$  in eq. [3a]).

Note that this equation makes wage changes depend not on observable changes in prices or quantities (which are affected by wages) but rather on the unobserved exogenous shift in product market conditions.

Substituting (5) into (4) yields a relation between output and wages:

$$(7) \quad dQ = -h a dW + dX,$$

which, in turn, yields a relation between sales ( $dS = dQ + dP$ ) and wages:

$$(8) \quad dS = (1 - h)adW + dX.$$

Solving for  $dX$  in (8)<sup>7</sup> and substituting into (6) yields an equation between changes in wages and changes in sales:<sup>8</sup>

$$(9) \quad dW = \{q/[1 + q(1 - h)a]\}dS = AdS.$$

Adding an error term to (9) with the usual properties, we can estimate the parameter  $A$  by least squares regression of observables on observables. We are interested, however, not in  $A$  but in  $q$ , the response of wages to changes in product market conditions. Rearranging terms we see that, for any estimate of  $A$ :

$$(10) \quad q = A/[1 - Aa(1 - h)].$$

Equation (10) shows us that the estimated parameter of wages on sales yields the correct response coefficient only if the product demand elasticity is unity. If  $h$  is less than unity,  $A$  will understate  $q$ , while, if  $h$  is greater than unity, it will overstate  $q$ , with the magnitude of the difference between  $A$  and  $q$  dependent on the magnitude of  $Aa(1 - h)$ . For reasonable values of the parameters, however, it turns out that the difference between  $A$  and  $q$  will be *small*. For example, with the mean value of  $a$  (labor's share of cost of sales) in our data of .25 and estimated values of  $A$  below .10, the bias is modest for anything short of huge elasticities of product demand.<sup>9</sup> In the context of the model of equations (3a)–(3b), moreover, the difference between the parameter relating employment to shifts in demand and the regression coefficient of employment on sales will also be small.<sup>10</sup>

The econometrics gets more complicated, however, if, rather than adding an error term to equation (9), we allow for error terms in each of the underlying equations as well. As we substituted for  $dX$  to get (9), the error terms in the price and wage determination equations become part of the error structure in (9), with the result that  $dS$  is correlated with the error.<sup>11</sup> In this case, it is necessary to instrument  $dS$  to obtain a consistent estimate of  $A$ .<sup>12</sup>

As an alternative way of modeling the relation between wages, prices, and output in an open economy, consider the situation when prices are determined on world markets so that an industry in a given country can sell as much as it produces at the going world market price. Here, there is still likely to be a feedback of wages on sales, as increases in wages increase costs of production and reduce output, thereby reducing sales. We model this market pattern by assuming an upward-sloping industry supply curve with a fixed elasticity. Following a logic analogous to that in (4)–(10) above, we can show that the regression of wages on sales leads to an understatement of the parameter of wage responsiveness of exogenous shifts in market demand, essentially because the reverse causality is negative.

### 8.1.3 The Trade Component of Sales

Turning to the effect of changes in trade, we decompose sales into its component parts—the size of the domestic market (DOM = sales – exports + imports); exports; and the import share of domestic market sales (MSHR = imports/DOM)—and use a first-order approximation to obtain

$$(11) \quad dS = w_1 d \ln (\text{DOM}) + w_2 d \ln \text{exports} - w_3 d(\text{MSHR}),$$

where  $w_1 = (\text{sales} - \text{exports})/\text{sales}$ ,  $w_2 = \text{exports}/\text{sales}$  and,  $w_3 = \text{DOM}/\text{sales}$ . The weights are obtained by considering the effect of small changes in domestic-generated revenues, export-generated revenues, and the import share of revenues on changes in total revenues in a decomposition that ignores interaction terms,<sup>13</sup> and will, accordingly, be more accurate for small than for large changes. The purpose of the weighting is to adjust the relevant changes for the difference in absolute magnitude of sales generated by domestic demand (90% or so of sales) and trade. When there is trade balance in an industry, the weight on changes in the import share of the domestic market becomes unity [DOM/sales = (sales + imports – exports)/sales = sales/sales]. When, as in the 1980s, imports exceed exports, the weight placed on this term exceeds unity.

Substituting (11) into (9), we obtain a relation between wages (or employment) and weighted ln changes in the domestic and foreign components of revenues:

$$(12) \quad dW = Aw_1 d \ln (\text{DOM}) + Aw_2(d \ln \text{exports}) \\ - Aw_3[d(\text{MSHR})] + \text{other factors}.$$

Note that this model makes a strong implicit assumption about market behavior: it postulates that the labor market responds similarly to (weighted) changes in sales due to trade-related factors as to those due to domestic factors. While in the short run there may be some differences in market responses to trade-generated as opposed to domestic market-generated changes due, say, to differing assessments of whether changes will persist over time (e.g., because foreign competition depends on highly volatile exchange rates), in the long run we see no compelling argument to expect industry labor markets to react any differently to changes in revenues from different sources: a 10% shift in demand is a 10% shift in demand. If the assumption that foreign- and domestic-based changes have the same effects on the labor market is valid, then the coefficients on the trade and domestic revenue terms will be similar in regression analysis.

### 8.1.4 Shifts in Supply and Immigrant Labor

The impact of immigrant labor on industry wage levels is twofold. To the extent that immigrants are paid differently than otherwise comparable native-

born workers, average wages in an industry will depend on the immigrant share of labor with a coefficient equal to the wage-differential between immigrants and native workers. Changes in the immigrant share of labor in an industry will, accordingly, be associated with changes in industry wages:

$$(13) \quad dW = b \, d(\text{IMS}),$$

where  $\text{IMS}$  = immigrant share of the work force and  $b$  = wage differential between native and immigrant labor.

In addition, however, if immigrant labor is a good substitute for native labor in immigrant-intensive industries, supply-induced changes in immigrant shares will alter the wages of natives in the industry as well, further reducing the position of the industry in the industry wage structure.

## 8.2 Cross-Industry Analysis for U.S. Manufacturing

We estimate wage-sales and employment-sales equations using the NBER Trade and Immigration Industry data set for manufacturing production workers.<sup>14</sup> The data set provides information on the wages and employment of production and all workers, trade flows and immigrant shares of employment, as well as other control variables in 428 four-digit SIC manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1984.<sup>15</sup> We examine the data in three ways. First, we analyze changes over the twenty-six-year period from 1958 to 1984, which can be viewed as reflecting changes in long-run comparative statics for the “average” industry. Second, we relate annual changes in wages and employment across industries to changes in revenues and the part of those changes due to trade and domestic demand, with individual year dummy variables entered in our regressions to capture economy-wide cyclic-type phenomena.<sup>16</sup> Third, we explore responses over different time periods to see whether responses in the 1980s period of large trade imbalances differ from those in earlier periods.

As a check on the results from our establishment-based analysis, we also estimate wage change equations utilizing industry wage differentials estimated from the 1974 and 1984 Current Population Surveys (CPSs) for the fifty-eight three-digit 1980 Census industries (CICs) that can accurately be matched to the 1970 CIC system used in the 1974 CPS and to the NBER trade and immigration figures.

Our pooled cross-section time-series industry analysis differs, it should be noted, from the time-series analyses for particular industries that other researchers have used to investigate the effect of trade on the labor market.<sup>17</sup> We examine the relative responsiveness of industries to the particular shocks that face them, exploiting the differential patterns of change among industries rather than the time-series patterns of change for a particular industry. As a consequence, our estimated response parameters are average elasticities of response across industries. Formally, in terms of the model of (12), if each industry has its own response parameter  $a + a_i$ , where  $a$  is the mean of the



industry response parameters, the form of our basic equation can be written as

$$(14) \quad dW_{it} = (a + a_i)dS_{it} = adS_{it} + a_i dS_{it},$$

Where the latter term becomes part of the error structure. This term reflecting the heterogeneity in industry responses creates heteroskedasticity in the errors but does not bias estimation of the average response coefficient as long as the individual industry component of the response ( $a_i$ ) is independent of other variables in the equation.<sup>18</sup> In section 8.3, we consider potential differences in response coefficients among industries.

### 8.2.1 Data Description

Table 8.1 gives the 1984 level of variables, 1958-84 changes in variables, and standard deviations for variables of concern to us (pt. A) and selected correlations of the changes for the period 1958-84 (pt. B).

The descriptive statistics reveal several characteristics of industry labor and product markets that underlie the ensuing econometric results:

- The shares of imports and exports relative to the size of the domestic market are relatively modest even in 1984 after two or so decades of rapid growth of trade, with imports averaging 14% of domestic demand and exports averaging 8% of sales. Immigrant shares of labor are also modest, averaging 8% in 1984.<sup>19</sup>
- The principal dependent variables of concern to us—changes in  $\ln$  annual earnings (obtained by dividing payroll by employment) and in  $\ln$  hourly earnings (obtained by dividing payroll by person-hours)—show nearly identical industry variation over the period 1958-84, indicating virtually identical patterns of change in hours per employee. The correlation in the 1954–84 change in  $\ln$  annual earnings and change in  $\ln$  hourly earnings is .95. When, by contrast, we examine short-run year-to-year changes, we find considerable variation in hours per worker across industries and thus differences in changes in annual and hourly earnings.
- The standard deviation of  $\ln$  changes of industry employment exceeds the standard deviation of  $\ln$  changes in hourly earnings by a factor of 3.9 (.67/.17), documenting the fact that quantity adjustments dominate industrial labor markets, possibly because workers are good substitutes across industry lines. In the goods market, the standard deviation of  $\ln$  changes in physical output (deflated sales) exceeds the standard deviation of  $\ln$  changes in prices by a similar proportion ( $3.0 = .73/.24$ ).
- The standard deviations of our major independent variables—weighted changes in domestic demand, foreign demand, and the import share—show considerable interindustry variation, as is necessary if we are to estimate their effects on the labor market with any precision.

Turning to the correlations in part B of the table, note first the .42 positive correlation between changes in the level of imports and changes in  $\ln$  employ-

**Table 8.1** Descriptive Statistics for NBER Trade and Immigration Data Set, 428 U.S. Manufacturing Industries

A. Major Variables										
	Mean						SD			
Levels, 1984:										
Imports/domestic demand	.14						.16			
Exports/sales	.08						.10			
Immigrants/Employment	.08						.05			
Changes, 1958–84:										
DLN(hourly wages for production workers)	1.43						.17			
DLN(annual wages for production workers)	1.43						.18			
DLN(production employment)	– .02						.67			
Immigrants/Employment	– .00						.03			
DLN(sales)	1.74						.72			
DLN(price)	1.06						.24			
DLN(output)	.67						.73			
Weighted changes, 1958–84: <sup>a</sup>										
DLN(domestic demand)	1.71						.65			
DLN(foreign demand)	.16						.23			
Import share	.15						.43			
B. Correlations, 1958–84: Log Changes										
	Production			Weighted Changes						
	Hourly Wages	Employment	% Immigrants	Sales	Imports	Exports	Domestic Demand	Foreign Demand	Import Share	
Hourly wages	1.00	.04	– .12	.26	– .08	.10	.13	.15	– .23	
Production employment	.04	1.00	.06	.90	.42	.44	.83	.23	– .18	
% Immigrants <sup>b</sup>	– .12	.06	1.00	.04	.13	.05	.10	– .04	.06	

Note: DLN(·) = change in logarithm of the variable.

<sup>a</sup> Weights utilized are the average of the 1958 and 1984 weights.

<sup>b</sup> Absolute change in percent immigrant.

ment. If industries with increasing imports expand employment, why is there such public concern over the effect of imports on jobs? The reason for the seeming paradox is that imports and domestic production tend to increase in the same industries—namely, those where domestic demand is growing. This highlights the need to control for total demand or, alternatively, to focus on the import share of the domestic market, in estimating the effect of imports on the labor market. Indeed, the (weighted) change in the import share of domestic sales is negatively correlated with changes in employment at a highly significant  $-.18$ . Similarly, with respect to earnings, while the correlation between changes in imports and earnings is a modest  $-.08$ , the correlation between changes in earnings and the (weighted) change in import share is a

hefty — .23. Note finally that changes in the immigrant share of employment in an industry are negatively related to changes in wages and positively related to employment changes, indicating that immigrants have gone into industries with growing employment but declining wages.<sup>20</sup>

### 8.2.2 Basic Regression Results

Table 8.2 presents coefficients and standard errors on the major variables of concern from our regression analyses of long-term (1958-84) changes in hourly earnings and personhours worked. All the regressions contain the set of controls listed at the bottom of the table, including two-digit SIC industry dummies (to allow for broad industry differences in responses). Columns 1-3 show the estimated effect on hourly earnings of sales, prices, and physical output taken separately and weighted trade and domestic revenues; columns 4-6 show the estimated effects on hours of sales, price, and quantities and of weighted trade and domestic revenues. In addition, we report the coefficients and standard errors on the change and base year level of immigrant shares in each regression. We do not report the results of comparable regressions for

**Table 8.2** Coefficients (standard errors) for Effects of Changes in Sales, Trade Variables, and Immigration Ratios on Wages and Employment of Production Workers in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: Long Period Log Changes (N = 428), 1958-84

Variables	Hourly Wages			Annual Hours		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in log sales	.049 (.011)			.886 (.017)		
Change in log output		.049 (.011)			.886 (.017)	
Change in log price		.108 (.035)			.884 (.057)	
Change in % immigrant	-.445 (.286)	-.389 (.287)	-.432 (.286)	1.082 (.462)	1.080 (.466)	1.002 (.497)
% Immigrant in 1960	-1.164 (.441)	-1.198 (.441)	-1.164 (.440)	.900 (.713)	.901 (.714)	.545 (.765)
Weighted log change in domestic demand			.040 (.011)			.894 (.020)
Weighted log change in foreign demand			.076 (.034)			.710 (.059)
Weighted change in import share			-.064 (.017)			-.479 (.030)
R <sup>2</sup>	.38	.39	.39	.89	.89	.88

*Note:* The reported regressions include two-digit SIC dummies, change in percent union, change in percent production workers, and the initial (1958) values of the following variables: percent union, percent production workers, and log of value added per worker. Weights utilized in weighted log changes are means of 1958 and 1984 weights.

annual earnings and production worker employment as they yielded virtually identical coefficients to those in the table because of the lack of industry variation in hours per employee over the long run pointed out on page 243.<sup>21</sup>

There are three principal findings. First, the calculations show that changes in revenues significantly affect relative wages, implying that the industry wage structure is “flexible” with respect to changes in the market conditions in particular industries. Using the reduced-form model of (3a)–(3b) to interpret the results, the ratio of the estimated effect of sales on hours to the estimated effect of sales on earnings provides a measure of the magnitude of the elasticity of labor supply across industries: from columns 4 and 1, it is 18.0, which implies considerable labor mobility across industry lines in response to changes in wages.

Second, despite the long period under study, changes in the (weighted) import share of the domestic market and in exports have roughly comparable effects on wages, as do weighted changes in domestic shipments, indicating that, as a first approximation, the industrial wage structure in the United States responds to open economy developments to the same extent as to domestic developments. In addition, the trade-generated and domestic market-generated changes in sales have significant effects on person-hours, though with noticeably different estimated coefficients.

Third, the long period change estimates show that both the change and the initial level of the immigrant ratio are negatively related to changes in hourly earnings and positively related to changes in employment. The magnitudes of the coefficients on immigrant shares are, however, too large to be attributed to pure immigrant-native wage differentials given the small proportion of immigrant workers and likely modest differentials correcting for worker skill (Borjas 1985; Chiswick 1978). They are more likely to reflect the concentration and movement of immigrants into low- and declining-wage industries. That immigrants find jobs in industries that are increasing employment but falling in the wage structure is consistent with the basic fact that employment in the United States has been growing in industries with low and relatively declining wages.

### 8.2.3 Annual Changes

Next we examine the effect of domestic- and foreign-generated changes in sales on earnings using annual rather than long period changes in the variables. Because annual earnings and hourly earnings differ in the short run, owing to short-run variations in person hours worked relative to employees, we report results for both earnings variables. Because our focus is on interindustry responses, we include year dummies in these regressions to control for general cyclic phenomena.

As can be seen in table 8.3, we obtained somewhat different results between annual and hourly earnings. First, changes in sales had much larger effects on annual earnings than on hourly earnings, owing to the implicit re-

**Table 8.3** Coefficients (standard errors) for Effects of Changes in Sales and Trade Variables on Wages in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: Annual Log Changes (N = 11,165), 1959–84

Variables	Annual Earnings			Hourly Earnings		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in log sales	.068 (.004)			.027 (.004)		
Change in log output		.069 (.004)			.026 (.007)	
Change in log price		.056 (.007)			.032 (.007)	
Weighted log change in domestic demand			.066 (.004)			.029 (.004)
Weighted log change in foreign demand			.071 (.015)			.008 (.016)
Weighted change in import share			-.059 (.011)			-.011 (.012)
R <sup>2</sup>	.22	.22	.22	.19	.20	.20

*Note:* The reported regressions include year dummies, two-digit SIC dummies, change in percent union, and change in percent production workers as well as the variables listed above.

sponse of hours per employee to changes in sales (the difference in the effect of a variable on annual and hourly earnings is its effect on hours per worker) as firms responded to relative declines in sales by reducing work hours and/or temporarily laying off some workers and responded to increases in sales by increasing work hours, including over time. Comparing the effect of sales on hourly earnings in table 8.3 with the effect of sales on hourly earnings in table 8.2, we find that hourly earnings adjustments are greater in the long run, contrary to the purely competitive model of (3a)–(3b). This can be taken as evidence for collectively bargained/administrated wage settlements as opposed to spot market settlements. Second, and more disturbing to our analysis, table 8.3 shows that, while annual changes in sales due to open economy developments have substantial and well-defined effects on changes in annual earnings, they have statistically insignificant effects on changes in hourly earnings, contrary to the findings of table 8.2.

To reconcile the findings on the magnitude of the effect of sales and trade-induced changes in sales in the short run and long run, we made two further calculations. First, we examined the determination of hourly earnings over three intermediate periods: 1958–70, which covers the 1960s strong job market; 1970–80, when the economy was sluggish; and 1980–84, when the country developed an extraordinary trade imbalance. The results of this analysis are given in table 8.4. Consistent with the results for the entire period, they show substantial and significant effects for import-induced changes in sales on

**Table 8.4** Long Period Log Hourly Wage Change Regressions by Time Period, U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1958–70, 1970–80, 1980–84

Variables	Time Period					
	1958–70	1970–80	1980–84	1958–70	1970–80	1980–84
Change in log sales	.022 (.009)	.035 (.015)	.086 (.016)			
Weighted log change in domestic demand				.017 (.009)	.031 (.017)	.084 (.018)
Weighted log change in foreign demand				.095 (.039)	.043 (.033)	.040 (.066)
Weighted change in import share				–.141 (.055)	–.076 (.057)	–.067 (.018)
Change in % immigrant	–.263 (.269)	–.325 (.262)	. . .	–.148 (.271)	–.342 (.264)	. . .
$R^2$	.27	.26	.20	.28	.26	.19
$N$	428	428	428	428	428	428

*Note:* The reported regressions include two-digit SIC dummies, change in percent union, change in percent production workers, and the initial values of the following variables: percent union, percent immigrant, percent production workers, and log of value added per worker. Weights utilized in weighted log changes are mean of initial and final period weights. The 1958–70 regressions do not include change in percent union, and the 1980–84 regressions do not include change in percent immigrant because the required data are not available for these variables over these periods.

hourly earnings but weaker effects for export-induced changes. The period regressions also show a marked pattern of differences in wage responsiveness among the periods, with the effect of sales on hourly earnings greatest in the 1980s, as might be expected given the wage concessions of that period.<sup>22</sup> Second, we have explored the timing of the effect of sales on hourly and annual earnings by including lagged sales variables in our regressions of annual changes in hourly earnings on annual changes in sales. The results of these calculations (see table 8.5) suggest that within three years the effect of changes in sales on hourly earnings rises to the long-run level and is roughly equal to the effect of changes in sales on annual earnings.

The differences in timing of the effect of sales on hourly and annual earnings suggest that hours worked (which vary because of both layoffs and over-time or short time) may be an important indicator to workers of the need to adjust hourly pay in the face of demand shocks. For our purposes, what matters is that these calculations show that the long period hourly earnings results are the valid ones for assessing adjustments beyond a year or so.

#### 8.2.4 Current Population Survey Data

As a check on our findings from establishment data, we have also estimated the effect of trade and immigration on industry wages using household data from the CPS tapes. These calculations have the advantage of letting us con-

**Table 8.5** Regression coefficients (standard errors) for the Effect of  $dS$  on  $dW$ 

	Hourly Earnings	Annual Earnings
$dS$	.029 (.004)	.069 (.004)
$dS(-1)$	-.001 (.004)	-.027 (.004)
$dS(-2)$	.017 (.004)	.005 (.004)
Sum	.045	.047

*Note:* The coefficients are based on the same specifications as in table 8.3, with the addition of the lagged sales variables.

**Table 8.6** Long Period CPS Industry Wage Differential Change Regressions, 1974–84: Fifty-Eight Three-Digit 1980 CIC U.S. Manufacturing Industries

Variables	All		Union		Nonunion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in log sales	.057 (.025)		.131 (.047)		-.009 (.031)	
Weighted log change in domestic demand		.010 (.029)		.097 (.055)		-.089 (.034)
Weighted log change in foreign demand		.019 (.095)		-.180 (.181)		.067 (.112)
Weighted change in import share		-.228 (.050)		-.367 (.096)		-.221 (.059)
Change in % immigrant	-.869 (.409)	-.523 (.383)	-1.053 (.751)	-.737 (.731)	-.612 (.501)	-.071 (.451)
$R^2$	.21	.39	.18	.31	.09	.35
$N$	58	58	58	58	58	58

*Note:* Reported regressions include change in percent union and change in percent production workers.

trol for individual characteristics that affect earnings at the cost of limiting the sample to fewer and more aggregated industries. We proceeded in a two-part analysis. In step 1, we estimated industry wage effects by regressing the ln of average hourly earnings of individuals on their characteristics and dummy variables for the industry.<sup>23</sup> In step 2, we regressed the change in the estimated industry effect on changes in sales, immigrant ratios, and sales decomposed between trade and domestic factors. The basic results, shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 8.6 (we will discuss the findings in cols. 3–6 shortly), confirm the table 8.2 finding that, over an extended period of time, changes in revenues due to trade substantially affect industry hourly earnings and also confirm the finding that industries with growing immigrant shares of the labor

force fall in the wage structure. Indeed, in these calculations, the dominant factor in changes in wages in the period 1974–84 is the import part of sales.

### 8.2.5 The Wage-Employment Trade-off

While our analysis shows that wages respond to changes in sales resulting from trade and other factors, there is also a significant independent or unexplained component to changes in wages as well. Does this component of the change in wages affect the quantity of labor used, sales held fixed? To what extent do cross-industry data show a trade-off between wage responsiveness and the employment of labor? To answer these questions, we have performed the regression calculations summarized in table 8.7, in which we relate annual and long-run changes in ln annual production hours to changes in wages and sales (cols. 1, 4), product wages and deflated output (cols. 2, 5), and wages and sales decomposed into trade and domestic market determinants (cols. 3, 6), using both annual change and long period change data. The results offer strong support for the notion that, sales held fixed, there is a significant wage-employment trade-off across industries in the U.S. labor market. Employment

**Table 8.7**      **The Wage-Employment Trade-off in U.S. Manufacturing Industries:**  
**Dependent Variable = Change in Log Annual Hours of Production**  
**Workers**

Variables	Annual Changes, 1959–84			Long Period Changes, 1958–84		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in log wage	–.628 (.013)		–.629 (.013)	–.683 (.071)		–.612 (.079)
Change in log product wage		–.545 (.008)			–.887 (.045)	
Change in log sales	.670 (.005)			.921 (.016)		
Change in log output		.699 (.005)			.921 (.016)	
Weighted log change in domestic demand			.649 (.006)			.922 (.018)
Weighted log change in foreign demand			.676 (.022)			.754 (.055)
Weighted change in import share			–.545 (.017)			–.524 (.028)
$R^2$	.71	.72	.69	.91	.91	.89
$N$	11,165	11,165	11,165	428	428	428

*Note:* The reported annual change regressions include year dummies, two-digit SIC dummies, change in percent union, and change in percent production workers as well as the variables listed above. The reported long period change regressions include the same variables except for the time dummies and in addition include the change in percent immigrant. The wage variable utilized in all the regressions is the hourly wage of production workers. The change in the log product wage is given by the difference in the change in the log wage and the change in the log shipments deflator.



growth is lower, sales fixed, by roughly 5%–9% in industries where wages rise by 10%, relative to other industries. While we recognize that one cannot interpret the estimated relation as a demand curve, particularly in light of our analysis of wages as dependent on sales, the inverse relation is nonetheless impressive. Unfortunately, we lack good measures of shifts in labor supply to industries and of factors that lead to different union/employer wage-setting policies to estimate a structural demand equation given our model, in which wages are endogenous.

### **8.3 Differences in Wage Responses among Sectors**

Are the wage responses found in section 8.2 the same across all industries, or do different wage-setting institutions or economic conditions produce different responses to changes in sales? Do the more heavily unionized industries respond more, or less, to changes in sales due to trade and other factors than do the less unionized industries? Is there evidence of asymmetric wage responses to increases and decreases in sales?

#### **8.3.1 Union and Nonunion Responsiveness**

To evaluate the effect of trade unionism on the degree of wage responsiveness, we have performed two related analyses. First, we estimated earnings and employment response equations separately for industries whose union density made them high (upper third), medium (middle third), or low (lower third) in the distribution of union density as of 1973–75. Second, we added interaction terms between changes in sales and dummy variables for high, medium, and low union status to our basic regressions. As the findings for the two analyses were quite similar, we present for purposes of parsimony the separate union-density category regression results in table 8.8. Row 1 of the table records the estimated effects of sales on  $\ln$  hourly earnings by union class from annual change regressions. It shows that earnings responses tend to be higher in the more highly unionized industries.<sup>24</sup> Given that the scope for union wage responsiveness is likely to be greater the greater the gap between union and other wages, we take the analysis a step further in rows 2–5, by estimating a single change in  $\ln$  hourly earnings regression with more complex interaction terms that distinguish not only between high, medium, and low union density but also between industries with high (upper third), medium (middle third), and low (lower third) hourly earnings in 1958. These calculations show that it is the responsiveness of union wages to changes in sales in high-wage industries that underlies the greater elasticity of union wages to sales in row 1. To the extent that wages are high in these industries because of large union wage effects, this finding supports the notion that wage adjustments are greater where wages exceed competitive market levels. Finally, we note that regressions comparable to those in table 8.8 with employment as the dependent variable show that the pattern of change in employment

**Table 8.8** Wage Responsiveness to Changes in Sales by Union Density: Annual Log Wage Change Regressions, Hourly Wages, 1959–84

Wage Class	Union Density		
	High	Medium	Low
1. All industries	.041 (.006)	.021 (.007)	.019 (.007)
2. High initial wage	.088 (.025)	.066 (.019)	–.010 (.013)
3. Medium initial wage	.035 (.026)	.003 (.022)	.032 (.014)
4. Low initial wage	.027 (.022)	.023 (.012)	.031

*Note:* The union density and initial wage classes are derived by dividing the industries into thirds on the basis of initial union density and initial hourly wage. Row 1 presents the coefficients (standard errors) on change in log sales for separate log wage change regressions by union density class, which also include change in percent production workers, change in percent union, and time dummies. The regression used for rows 2, 3, and 4 included the same controls plus initial wage class and union class dummies, two-digit SIC dummies, and a full set of interactions of the union class and wage class dummies with change in log sales. Numbers in parentheses in rows 2, 3, and 4 are standard errors for difference between reported coefficient and the coefficient on the base group, low union, low initial wage.

responsiveness is opposite that for wage responsiveness, with employment responsiveness declining with union density, as would be expected if the wage adjustments serve to “buffer” employment in the market.<sup>25</sup>

Because the establishment-based data set does not permit us to differentiate between union and nonunion firms or workers within an industry, it is possible that the differences found in table 8.8 are not due to genuine differences in behavior between union and nonunion firms.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, we have also estimated response parameters for union and nonunion parts of industries using our CPS data set, where it is possible to distinguish between union and nonunion workers. Here, we estimated industry wage effects by regressing  $\ln$  wages on worker characteristics and industry dummy variables for union and nonunion workers taken separately and then regressed the change in the industry effects on changes in industry sales, immigrant ratios, etc. These results, given in the regression coefficients in columns 3–6 of table 8.6, support the finding that unionization increases rather than reduces wage responsiveness: the industry differentials for unionized workers are significantly influenced by changes in sales, and the import component of changes in sales has an especially large effect in the union sector. By contrast, there is no noticeable effect of changes in sales or the import component of those changes on the wages of nonunion workers.


### 8.3.2 Responses of Industries at the Extremes

The finding that wages as well as employment respond to open market shocks does not mean that those responses are a major element in industrial

wage and employment determination. Since the bulk of revenues are generated in domestic markets and most workers are native born, changes in trade and immigrant flows cannot possibly be a dominant force in altering the industrial wage structure or the composition of employment. Still, the wage responses to trade flows can have nonnegligible effects on wages and employment particularly at the extremes. A one standard deviation change in the import share (.43 by table 8.1), for example, induces a .028 change in wages and a .21 change in industry personhours, according to the coefficients in table 8.2. More strikingly, industries that faced massive changes in sales for either trade or domestic market reasons experienced large changes in wages as well as in employment. Figure 8.1 documents this by contrasting wage and employment changes from 1958 to 1984 between the ten industries experiencing the greatest positive and negative weighted changes in import shares, exports, and domestic market sales and changes in  $\ln$  total sales. The figure shows a wide spread in wage responsiveness between the extremes. For imports, the industries with the greatest increase in import share had wage increases some nineteen  $\ln$  points below the average for all industries and some thirty-three  $\ln$  points below wage increases for the industries with the largest decrease in import shares. Industries with the most/least rapid growth of domestic market sales show a smaller though still pronounced range of variation, while industries with the most/least rapid growth of exports show the least pronounced range. As for employment, the figure shows declines of .81  $\ln$  points in industries with the most rapid rises in import shares, but it also shows above average declines in employment in industries where import shares fell—a seeming paradox that is due to the fact that import shares dropped most in industries with falling domestic market sales.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, the figure shows a monotonic relation between extreme changes in exports and in domestic market sales and employment: here, employment rises at rates far above average in the ten industries where exports or domestic sales increase most while falling at rates far below average in the ten industries where exports or domestic sales increase the least. Finally, putting all the components of change in sales together, we see sizable differences in changes in wages as well as in employment between industries experiencing the extremes of the change in sales.

### 8.3.3 Asymmetric Responses to Changes in Sales

An important issue in decentralized labor markets where wages are flexible to industry conditions is whether wage responsiveness is symmetrical to declines in demand and increases in demand. In an economy in which wages are above the reservation wages of unemployed workers, greater responsiveness of wages to declines in demand than to increases in demand can increase employment.<sup>28</sup> To examine the symmetry of response, we have divided the change in the  $\ln$  sales variable into two parts: changes in excess of the mean change and changes below the mean change. We then regressed changes in  $\ln$  hourly wages over the twenty-six-year period 1958-84 on changes in sales interacted with a dummy for above average changes and a dummy for below



**Fig. 8.1** Mean changes for the ten industries with the highest and lowest changes in each category relative to the overall mean change—1958–84

average changes. The coefficients on the two sale interaction terms (standard errors) given below show greater responses to the below-mean than to above-mean changes on changes in  $\ln$  hourly earnings:

- effect of below-mean changes: .080 (.017);
- effect of above-mean changes: .011 (.020).

This finding suggests that relative wage flexibility in U.S. manufacturing has taken the form of “concessions” in industries doing more poorly to a greater extent than it has of large relative wage gains in industries doing better and thus may have contributed to the job growth in the country. We did not find any evidence that industries paid exceptionally large wage gains in booming markets: most of the adjustment is on the down side.

## 8.4 Conclusion

This paper has documented with two different data sets that, in detailed manufacturing industries in the United States, wages respond significantly to changes in industry sales, whether generated by domestic market or trade-related developments, and found that changes in immigrant shares are also related to industry wages. It has also found that the wage-setting institutions in the labor market condition wage responsiveness, with unionized high-wage industries showing the greatest response to changes in sales. While far from the dominant force in altering the industrial wage structure, shifts in product demand due to changes in sales from trade as well as domestic market developments have contributed to changes in earnings by industry. As the observed inverse relation between changes in the immigrant share of the work force and changes in industry wages cannot be readily explained by compositional factors, this finding evidently merits more detailed analysis of the market for immigrant labor.

## Notes

1. Dickens et al. (1985) provide a detailed review of aggregate studies of the employment effect of trade in the United States. Lawrence (1984) provides a good example of a study utilizing an input-output framework to analyze the effect of trade on employment in U.S. manufacturing.

2. We define *competitive decentralized wage setting* to be a system in which wages are set to equate labor supply and labor demand, as in a textbook perfectly competitive labor market. We defer until later in this section a discussion of the possibility that efficiency wage considerations may yield above market-clearing wages even with decentralized wage setting in competitive labor markets.

3. Katz (1986) surveys efficiency wage and rent-sharing models of wage determination and discusses some of the implications of these models for interindustry wage differences. Dickens and Katz (1987), Katz and Summers (1989), Krueger and Sum-

mers (1988), and Murphy and Topel (1987) provide evidence on the role of efficiency wage, rent-sharing, and standard competitive factors in explaining interindustry wage differentials. Lewis (1986) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) survey the vast literature on the effect of collective bargaining on relative wages.

4. Grossman assumes that the unionized sector faces an infinitely elastic product demand schedule at the exogenous international price. Labor demand elasticity depends only on the production technology and factor substitution possibilities. International competition is not viewed as changing product market structure and/or the elasticity of product demand.

5. A key assumption implicitly made in this model is that the membership is greater than the employment level that would prevail at the competitive wage rate  $w^*$ .

6. In the case of Nash bargains with a utilitarian union and strongly efficient bargains, the wage is the mean of the average product of labor and the opportunity wage (McDonald and Solow 1981). In this case, a decrease in rents from increased international competition will lead to wage decreases in the union sector.

7. We can also substitute for  $dQ$  using (7) to obtain a relation between wages and output,  $dW = [q/(1 + haq)]dQ$ .

8. While we have data on prices and quantities, the likelihood that price indices are inaccurate leads us to focus on sales. In empirical work, however, we also examine the separate effect of measured quantities and prices.

9. Consider the value of  $q$  when  $A$  is .10 and  $a$  is .25. By eq. (11), we have  $q = .10/[1 - .10 \cdot .25 \cdot (1 - h)] = .10/[1 - .025(1 - h)]$ . For the minimum value of  $h$  of zero,  $q$  differs from  $\hat{A}$  by a bare 2.5%. For a high elasticity of, say, five, the difference is less than 10%.

10. To see this, we substitute  $dS - (1 - h)adW$  for  $dX$  in eq. (3b) and then substitute (11) for  $dW$ . This yields the following:

$$dE = \{v/[1 + q(1 - h)a]\}dS,$$

where  $v$  is the desired parameter.

11. Rewriting eq. (5) and (6) as  $dP = adW + u$  and  $dW = qdX + v$ , where  $u$  and  $v$  are error terms, one can easily derive a relation between wages and sales analogous to eq. (9):

$$dW = AdS + [v - q(1 - h)u]/[1 + q(1 - h)a].$$

12. Revenga (1989) uses an instrumental variables technique with the change in the (import-source-weighted) industry exchange rate used as an instrument for  $dS$  to reanalyze the data set that we examine in sec. 8.2. Her findings are qualitatively quite similar to those we report in sec. 8.2 and suggest that our least squares estimates may understate the response of industry wages to changes in industry sales.

13. This decomposition of change in log sales can be derived by writing sales as  $S = [(S - x)/DOM]DOM + x$ , where  $x$  equals exports. The application of the difference operator to this decomposition of sales yields

$$\begin{aligned} dS &= [S - x]/DOM d(DOM) \\ &- DOM \cdot [d(MSHR)] - d(DOM) \cdot d(MSHR) + dx. \end{aligned}$$

Equation (11) in the text can then be derived from the above expression by dividing through by  $S$  to yield an expression in percentage changes, approximating percentage changes as  $\ln$  changes, and dropping the interaction term. This approximation is almost exact for annual changes. We have experimented with the exact decomposition using percentage changes and including the interaction term in several of our specifications and have found results in all cases quite similar to those obtained with our  $\ln$  change approximation.

14. We have also examined all workers and nonproduction workers. As production workers are the majority of workers, the results for all workers are quite similar to those for production workers. For nonproduction workers, there are some modest differences, but nothing substantial enough to change the tone of the findings.

15. Abowd (in this volume) provides detailed descriptions of the data set and its construction.

16. We have also estimated annual change equations replacing the time dummies with observed cyclical variables, such as the aggregate unemployment rate, and allowed different industries to have different cyclical sensitivities. The results are quite similar to the reported estimates based on equations with time dummies.

17. Branson and Love (1988) analyze the effect of time-series changes in the real exchange rate on employment in U.S. manufacturing industries. Eichengreen (1988) performs a similar time-series analysis of the effect of the real exchange rate on employment in four U.S. basic industries with the industry-specific wage treated as exogenous and included as an explanatory variable. Grossman (1987) takes changes in the price of import substitutes as exogenous and analyzes the effect of time-series changes in import prices on wages and employment in nine trade-affected U.S. manufacturing industries. The lack of import price data for a large number of industries at the level of aggregation of available wage and employment data prevents us from following a similar strategy. Grossman (1986) also uses a similar methodology to analyze the effect of international competition on employment in the steel industry but treats the wage as exogenous.

18. We have computed White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for several of our specifications. The White standard errors typically differ from the reported standard errors by less than 5%.

19. The immigrant share data for 1984 are based 1980 Census of Population data. We utilize 1960, 1970, and 1980 Census of Population data on immigrant shares of population in the ensuing empirical analysis.

20. The change in immigrant share from 1960 to 1980 has a correlation of  $-.25$  with the initial (1958) industry  $\ln$  hourly wage level, and the initial (1960) immigrant share has a correlation of  $-.35$  with the change in the  $\ln$  hourly wages over the period 1958–84. Immigrants have moved into low-wage industries, and initially immigrant intensive industries have experienced relatively low wage growth.

21. For example, the estimated effect of sales on annual earnings was  $.045$  with a standard error of  $.011$ , while the effect of sales on employment was  $.890$  with a standard error of  $.018$ .

22. We have also analyzed annual changes within the periods and found the same result: greater responses of hourly earnings to sales in the 1980s than in earlier periods.

23. These regressions utilized samples from the May 1974 CPS and the full-year 1984 CPS for workers in the fifty-eight three-digit SIC manufacturing industries with consistent industry classifications over this period. The controls included in the  $\ln$  earnings regressions in addition to industry dummies were education and education squared; experience and experience squared; nonwhite, female, SMSA, region, part time, marital status, married times female, and occupation dummies; and interactions of the education and experience variables with the female dummy. The regressions for all workers (both union and nonunion) included a union dummy. Industry differentials for all workers from regressions without a union dummy yield quite similar results.

24. The same pattern of larger wage responses to sales of the high-union density class is also apparent when long changes for 1958 to 1984 are analyzed rather than annual changes.

25. In separate annual change regressions by union category for 1959–84 of changes in  $\ln$  annual production worker hours on changes in  $\ln$  sales and our usual set

of controls, the coefficients (standard errors) on change in  $\ln$  sales were .63 (.01) for high union density, .61 (.01) for medium union density, and .71 (.01) for low union density.

26. For a discussion of the potential pitfalls in interpreting estimated coefficients on union density in industry regressions, see Lewis (1986).

27. The industries with the lowest growth in import shares also experienced well above average wage growth, suggesting possible endgame behavior of the type modeled by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985). Still, fig. 8.1 does show that the industries with the biggest declines in domestic market size had below average wage increases, indicating that endgame is far from the norm for declining industries.

28. This assumes no difference in the size of sectors with increasing/decreasing demand.

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