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Commodity Exports and NIEO Proposals for Buffer Stocks and Compensatory Finance: Implications for Latin America

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THE COMMODITY PROBLEM AND LATIN AMERICA

Nonfuel primary products have accounted for a steadily declining percentage of total Latin-American exports during the postwar era. Nevertheless, they still represent a major source of foreign exchange for the region. In the first half of the 1970s, for example, they represented over 40 percent of total regional merchandise exports and over half of the individual country merchandise exports for 18 of the 24 major Latin-American countries which Montague J. Lord [33] includes in his analysis. For the region as a whole and for many of the individual countries, primary nonfuel exports will continue to be important sources of foreign exchange during the 1980s, whatever changes occur in the world economy.

The "commodity problem" refers to the allegedly detrimental impact on developing countries of two dimensions of international primary commodity markets: instabilities and declining secular trends. The instabilities are hypothesized to be negative because of public and private problems of planning under uncertainty, risk aversion, and asymmetrical responses, all of which means that short-run transmissions of such instabilities to developing producing countries may have high costs in terms of short- and long-run economic goal attainment. Declining secular trends are hypothesized to be troublesome because of the importance of foreign exchange in goal attainment in developing countries and internal rigidities in moving factors in response to changing comparative advantages. Latin-American analysts and policymakers long have been in the forefront of those concerned about the commodity problem and development. It is not surprising, therefore, that Latin Americans have given considerable (although not unanimous) support for the revision of conditions

in international nonfuel primary markets that has been the foremost demand of the developing countries in their quest for a "new international economic order."¹

The framework for recent and ongoing explorations of changes in the international nonfuel primary commodity markets was established by the UNCTAD IV [43 and 44] proposal and resolution of the Nairobi 1976 meetings. In the second part of this paper we summarize this proposal, note limitations of too simple a priori analyses of its impact, and summarize simulations of the implications of a UNCTAD type scheme for both of the dimensions of the commodity problem on primary commodity earnings in Latin America and other developing countries.

Such an analysis is informative, but limited in terms of what it tells us about the relation between goal attainment and the commodity problem in Latin America. Therefore, in the third part we turn more intensively to this question. We define broad economic goals, indicate why we think previous studies on this topic tell us almost nothing of use, introduce a more satisfactory approach of integrated econometric international commodity market—primary commodity sector—overall developing economy modeling, and present some illustrative results for a specific Latin-American case study. In the fourth part we give some concluding remarks.

THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAM, THE COMMODITY PROBLEM, AND PRIMARY COMMODITY REVENUES IN LATIN AMERICA²

The UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program

The UNCTAD [43] proposal emphasizes price stabilization for 10 core primary commodities through international buffer stock agreements. Thus focus is on the instability dimension of the commodity problem. But there also are a number of phrases that suggest the possibility of increasing the secular trends of commodity prices and thereby dealing with the second dimension of the commodity problem. Moreover, secondary operations are recommended for commodities for which buffer stocks are not practical due to perishability, other existing arrangements, and so on.

The original proposal designated 10 core commodities. Five of these are significant from a Latin-American perspective in that they provide at least 1 percent of total regional merchandise export value (8 percent from coffee, 7 percent from sugar, 5 percent from copper, 2 percent from cotton, and 1 percent from cocoa). Tin represents half of the merchandise export value for Bolivia. Together these six core commodities accounted for 24 percent of Latin-American merchandise export earnings in the first half of the 1970s. The proposal also mentions eight other commodities which provided 10 percent of total Latin-American merchandise export value.

The UNCTAD proposal is called an integrated commodity program. The main feature of integration is a common fund which would provide financing for the core commodity agreements and, secondarily, would conduct "second-window" lending operations for commodities not amenable to stockpiling, for product diversification, and so on. It also would pool and reduce risks, have more bargaining power in international capital markets than would a set of individual stabilization funds for the same commodities, and would require smaller total financing than the aggregate of a set of individual funds because of differences in the phasing of cycles across commodity markets. The original proposed magnitude of the common fund was \$6 billion.

Negotiations over the details of the common fund have continued over several years. The "Group of 77" developing countries sought paid-in capital from direct assessments of about \$2 billion, to be supplemented by borrowing approximately \$4 billion from capital markets. They advocated that about one-quarter of the total would be used for "second-window" operations. The "Group B" or industrial countries wanted financing by deposits from the individual international commodity agreements instead of direct assessments and initially opposed "second-window" operations.

A breakthrough occurred at the March 1979 UNCTAD negotiating session with the resolution of the two major controversial issues: (1) In regard to the basic capital structure, the negotiators agreed that direct assessment would be \$400 million (about two-thirds of which would be from Group B countries) and that other financing would come from contributions of producing and consuming country governments in each individual international commodity agreement (amounting to one-third of the agreements' prospective financial requirements). (2) In regard to the second window, the negotiators agreed to establish such operations with funding of \$370 million, but without any transfers allowed from the first window. More than 100 countries approved a plenary document which concerns these issues and refers further negotiations and the drafting of the articles of the common fund to an interim committee. Although some difficult issues remain (that is, the distribution of voting rights), common fund negotiations well may be successfully concluded in the near future. Subsequently ratification by national legislatures will be required.

Limitations of a Priori and of Reduced Form Correlation Analysis of Commodity Markets

The UNCTAD International Commodity Program has been evaluated and criticized extensively. But most of these analyses are overly simplistic and therefore may be misleading.

One problem with many studies is that the results are sensitive to the assumed forms of the supply and demand functions. For example, Harry C. Johnson [27] argues that "elementary economics" demonstrates the incompetence of UNCTAD economists, since they did not recognize the trade-off be-

tween price and earnings stabilization in their consideration of the impact of buffer stocks on the instability dimension of the commodity problem. However, Johnson's analysis of this trade-off depends upon his particular assumptions of linear price-elastic curves and additive shifts, without any empirical testing. With alternative assumptions different results are obtained!³

Another example is provided by Lord's [33] recent empirical analysis of the supply versus demand causes of fluctuations in Latin-American commodity exports. By looking at the sign of the correlations between detrended quantities and prices, he claims to identify whether the underlying shifts primarily were in supply (negative correlations) or in demand (positive correlations).⁴ This approach is based upon reduced forms for simple supply and demand curves. But Richard Porter [37] proves that such a test is valid only if the supply and demand price elasticities are equal.⁵ It seems very unlikely that the relevant short-run elasticities are anywhere near equal for most of the country-commodity combinations that Lord considers. The market shares of Latin-American countries for the six UNCTAD core commodities of interest generally are small, with values higher than 10 percent only for Bolivia for tin, Brazil for coffee and cocoa, Chile for copper, and Colombia for coffee. Thus the demand price elasticities facing individual countries are probably very high, often approaching infinity, since they are approximately the overall market price elasticities divided by the market share of the individual countries. Lord's analysis is appropriate only if the short-run country supply elasticities are equally high, an assumption that does not seem to be grounded in empirical facts. As a result, his conclusions seem to be suspect because they are not based on relevant assumptions regarding the underlying structure (in this case, the elasticities and the nature of shifts) of the markets.⁶

Yet another problem with much of the simple theoretical and empirical analysis is that all adjustments are assumed to be instantaneous so that fairly long-run price equilibria are reached immediately. Both Johnson and Lord and other analysts make this simplifying assumption. But in the real world lags are considerable because of time required for adjustment of production, consumption, and investment processes, and for the creation of expectations. Such lags may alter substantially the outcomes from those implied by analysis that ignores them, as the textbook explosive cobweb model vividly demonstrates.

Simulation with Econometric Models of UNCTAD Price Stabilization for Six Core Commodities

We analyze the UNCTAD program with deterministic simulations of simple econometric models of the relevant international markets for a recent historical period. These models capture the time pattern of simultaneous and lagged responses in supply, current demand, and private inventory demand relations. The parameters in the models are those that are most consistent with observed aggregate behavioral and technological responses. They differ from the Johnson-

Lord type of analysis in that decisions regarding a number of critical questions (for example, magnitude of elasticities, additive versus multiplicative shifts, pattern of lags) were made to assure as great consistency as is possible with the historical data from these markets. Our models still depend upon a number of important assumptions [7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15], but simulation with them provides a much better basis for this analysis than the frequency encountered approaches with much stronger critical assumptions of the types that we have already discussed.⁷

We simulate operation of a "successful" UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program for the six core commodities of particular interest in Latin America. It is successful in the sense that the buffer stock operators have sufficient financial and commodity reserves to keep price fluctuations within 15 percent of secular trends estimated from those that actually prevailed in the 1950-75 period. The simulation is conducted over a 13-year period so that ongoing behavior of the agreement can be considered under a variety of external conditions regarding world economic activity, and so on.

Magnitudes Involved in Simulated Buffer Stock Operations

For half of the six commodities, the buffer stocks must begin with initial stocks in order to be able to defend the price ceilings throughout the 13-year period. After establishing their initial position, the buffer stock authorities intervene in the market slightly more than half of the time. Despite such a frequency of intervention, there are long periods in which the buffer stock authorities are not on the selling or not on the buying side. Also the interventions are more than twice as frequent on the purchasing than on the selling side. These patterns suggest that it might be difficult to be confident whether or not the target price path around which the buffer stocks are stabilizing are in fact related to long-run equilibrium paths.

The aggregate magnitude of financing for the buffer stocks becomes fairly large after several years, even though there are significant advantages from pooling finances across these six core commodities. For example, the sum of purchases minus sales indicates that, on average, a total of about \$1 billion per year would be expended.⁸ For half of these commodities, moreover, the maximum access to financing would occur in the first five years of operation. Therefore, in about six years the buffer stocks would exhaust the \$6 billion fund originally mentioned in the UNCTAD proposal, even if only these six of the 10 core commodities were included and even if no second-window operations were conducted. This occurs despite a gain from pooling across commodities of about 21 percent by letting sales of one commodity offset purchases of other commodities.⁹ However, we make an important caveat. The model for sugar seems much less satisfactory than those for the other commodities [13], and sugar plays a very big role in these estimates. If sugar is excluded, the average

required access to funding drops 70 percent to less than \$350 million per year, with a 43 percent gain from pooling. This level of financing would be possible for a number of years with funding on the order of magnitude proposed by UNCTAD even if allowance is made for the four core commodities not of particular interest to Latin America and for some second-window operations.

The net costs of this buffer stock activity (after adjustments for storage, transactions, deterioration, interest costs, and buying-selling differentials) depend critically on the value placed on the final stocks and on whether or not the simulations for sugar are reliable. For all six core commodities the present discounted value of operating the UNCTAD program for 13 years is \$-7.0 billion if final stocks are valued at actual prices prevailing the year after the simulations and is \$-19.3 billion if final stocks are valued at zero. The most realistic estimate presumably is somewhere between these two numbers, since if all of the stocks were sold after the last year of the simulation, prices would fall considerably, but not to zero. If sugar is excluded the two values are \$-0.7 and \$-5.4 billion. The range is still negative and may imply fairly large costs, but is of the order of magnitude that has been discussed in the UNCTAD negotiations (and the upper estimate for this range increases only to \$-6.9 billion if the other four core commodities are added).

Such considerations about the simulated operation of the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program suggest some reservations. There would be start-up problems in about half of the agreements in that the price ceilings could not be defended due to inadequate prior purchases, and such events would strain the patience of consuming participants. It would be difficult to know whether or not the target price paths were close to the long-run equilibrium paths from the frequency or pattern of market interventions by the buffer stocks. Even if the target price paths were the long-run equilibrium price paths, moreover, considerable finances might be involved. If the target price paths substantially exceed the equilibrium price paths, the required financing could become enormous (see the section which follows). At the cost of reducing the price stability around the long-run trends, however, the target price paths could be adjusted for buffer stock accumulations to ensure that financial requirements did not explode.¹⁰

On the other hand, the simulations suggest that price stabilization for the core commodities of interest to Latin America (or of all of the core commodities) is feasible over a number of years with total financing not too much greater than the numbers mentioned in the negotiations. If the estimates for sugar are misleading because of inadequacies in the underlying model, if sugar were excluded, or if a flexible target price path reduced the financial requirements for sugar, the order of magnitude of financing would be within the limits discussed at the negotiating sessions.

But these comments refer only to the direct costs of operating the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program. We now consider the benefits and costs from the point of view of the developing countries in general, and those in Latin America in particular.

Implications of UNCTAD Program for Developing Countries in General and for Those in Latin America in Particular

The developing countries are primarily producers and exporters of the six core commodities of interest. They account for virtually all of the world production and exports of coffee and cocoa, almost a third of production and over two-thirds of exports of cotton, and about three-quarters of production and a slightly higher proportion of exports for tin. The developing countries as a group import and consume a significant, although much smaller, proportion of these goods. They account for 12 to 20 percent of world imports of sugar, cotton, and tin — although only 4 to 6 percent of world imports of coffee, cocoa, and copper. We focus on the producer-exporter role because that is the more important one in the aggregate, but for a few developing countries the consumer-importer role is significant, particularly for sugar, cotton, and tin. We begin by discussing revenue changes for all producers, and then focus on those in Latin America.

We first consider the impact on the *levels of producers' revenues*. Revenue changes, of course, reflect movements both in quantities supplied and in prices received. In regard to the former, the buffer stock activities induce fairly substantial supply responses for the agricultural products, some of which may be destabilizing because of the lag structures. The percentage effects on prices, however, are larger. Except for tin¹¹ the prices are changed in almost every year, sometimes above and sometimes below levels that would have prevailed without the buffer stock activity. The average price changes range from less than one percent for the minerals to over 23 percent for sugar.¹²

In some cases, the movements in prices and quantities reinforce each other. In other cases they are opposing. The total effects are fairly significant revenue gains for agricultural commodities and much smaller revenue losses for the two minerals. For sugar the estimated annual average revenue gain is 23.6 percent, which implies a present discounted value of additional producers' revenues of over \$10 billion. For the other three agricultural commodities the average annual percentage revenue gains range from 2.4 for coffee to 6.7 for cocoa. The total 6.1 percent average annual revenue gain for cotton, however, implies a present discounted value of total producers' revenue gains on the order of magnitude of \$8 billion. Across all six commodities the total simulated present discounted value of additional producers' revenues is somewhat over \$20 billion. This gain is fairly substantial, with most of it accruing to sugar and cotton producers and less so to coffee producers. We interpret the losses to the

mineral producers to reflect the particular time period of our simulations. The simulated price stabilization eliminates the mineral price boom in the late 1960s Vietnam War years. The lesson to be learned is not that stabilization is good for agricultural producers and bad for mineral producers, but that during any particular period there probably will be both losers and gainers.

We now consider the impact on the *stability of producers' revenues*. Johnson [27] argues that under reasonable assumptions increases in revenues will be accompanied by decreases in the stability of those revenues. However, as we indicate in the second section, whether or not there is a trade-off between the level and the stability of revenues cannot be settled a priori. It depends upon the elasticities of the underlying curves and the nature of shifts in those curves.

The simulations indicate that only for copper is there evidence of a trade-off between the stability and the level of revenues. In the case of copper, the buffer stock program stabilizes revenues slightly, but with an accompanying somewhat lower present discounted value. For the four agricultural commodities, revenues are increased fairly substantially, and revenue instabilities fall significantly. For tin there is a slight reduction in revenues with almost no change in the degree of revenue stability. At least for the agricultural commodities, thus, the strong critique which Johnson has made about the trade-off between the level and stability of revenues does not seem warranted.

Now we focus on the *Latin-American producers*.¹³ The present discounted values of gains to producers in an individual country depend upon the total present discounted value of additional producer revenues and the country's marginal share in world supply. We assume that the marginal shares equal the average shares.¹⁴ Gross gains do not include any contributions to the financing of the buffer stock operations. If the producing countries contributed half of the net cost of buffer stock operations, the aggregate producer net gains would be from 17 to 46 percent lower, depending on the evaluation of final buffer stocks. Because of differential cost-sharing arrangements and final buffer stock evaluations, it is simpler to discuss gross gains.

The largest absolute gainers in terms of products are sugar and cotton (because of the large overall gains for those producers) and the coffee producers (because of the moderate overall gain and the large Latin-American share in world production). The gains for the other three commodities are much smaller and negative for the two minerals.

Therefore, the big simulated gainers in absolute terms among Latin-American countries include \$1,507 million for Brazil, \$849 million for Cuba, \$741 million for Mexico, \$431 million for the Dominican Republic, \$328 million for Colombia, \$286 million for Peru, and \$106 million for Jamaica. Smaller gainers include Argentina and the Central American countries. Bolivia and Chile are small losers. The total present discounted value of these revenue gains to Latin-American producers is about \$4.5 billion.

We put these numbers in perspective by considering them as ratios to the average annual value of exports in 1970–75. These ratios range from –2 to 97 percent. The big relative gainers are the Dominican Republic with almost a year's export value (97 percent), and Cuba with over a half of a year's (55). Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, and Jamaica all gain from a fifth to a third of a year's export value. For all of Latin America the gain is about one-sixth (16 percent) of an average year's export value.

Are such gains for Latin America small or large? The answer depends partly upon the point of comparison. A total of \$4.5 billion is not so small as to be irrelevant. On the other hand, to obtain it requires the operation of the buffer stock programs for a fairly long period of time. It is small, moreover, in comparison to the transfers of roughly \$65 billion per year engendered by the 1973–74 OPEC petroleum price increases. Furthermore, some of the poorer Latin-American countries (for example, Bolivia and Paraguay) would not benefit from the simulated program. Finally, there are many other dimensions of possible gains and losses to which we shall return later.¹⁵

Simulation with Econometric Models of Buffer Stock Program to Change Secular Price Trends for Six Core Commodities

The second dimension of the commodity problem is alleged negative secular trends. Over the 1950–75 period the secular trends in the deflated prices of the six UNCTAD core commodities of interest to Latin America were –3.5 percent per year for coffee, –2.4 for cocoa, –3.8 for cotton, and insignificantly different from zero for sugar, copper, and tin [7]. However, in the 1970s many of these trends changed with improvements for agricultural commodities relative to the minerals [2]. Prior to UNCTAD IV the developing countries advocated strongly “indexation” (that is, tying the commodity price movements to changes in the import prices of the developing countries). Opposition to indexation from the developed countries, however, also was very strong. Therefore, in the UNCTAD IV proposal and resolution, no mention is made of indexation per se, but a number of references are suggestive of such an effort. Since the possibility of altering the secular price trends is a major factor in both the strong support of some developing countries and the opposition of some developed countries to the UNCTAD program, a brief consideration of the implications of indexation (as one special case of so altering the price trends) is useful.

J. R. Behrman and Pranee Tinakorn [15] simulate the effects of indexation of all 10 UNCTAD core commodities to the 1963 price levels for a 13-year period. The results suggest that indexation is not likely to be politically feasible for all 10 core commodities, nor for the 6 of interest to Latin America. Buffer stock interventions are required in every year and for most commodities usually only on one side of the market. The present discounted value of buffer stock activi-

ties is large: —\$142 billion for all 10 core commodities, —\$70 billion if sugar is excluded, —\$93 billion for the core commodities of interest to Latin America, —\$21 billion for the core commodities of interest to Latin America excluding sugar.¹⁶ The required financial access suggests numbers of a similar order of magnitude. Therefore scepticism seems warranted about the feasibility of persuading consuming countries to agree to or to allow changing the secular trends for long nearly as much as would be required for indexation.

THE COMMODITY PROBLEM AND GOAL ATTAINMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY

The foregoing discussion of the impact of the commodity problem on Latin-American and other developing countries is suggestive, but quite partial. It is partial because it focuses on what happens to revenues from primary commodities. But what is of interest from a national policy point of view is the impact of the commodity problem on more basic economic goal attainment, not on these revenues. The latter only serve as a transmission mechanism through which the commodity problem is transferred to the overall economy.

We shall therefore provide an illustration of what we consider to be a much more fruitful approach: simulations with integrated econometric models.¹⁷

Major Macroeconomic Goals of Latin-American and Other Developing Countries

We find it useful to designate four major goals for the Latin-American countries: (1) growth, (2) distribution of earnings and of economic power, (3) short-run stability regarding employment, inflation, and capacity utilization, and (4) the international position relating to net benefits from participation in the international sector, including the degree of control over one's own destiny. Of course different countries and different individuals and groups within countries weight these goals differently in their social objective functions. We are not so presumptuous as to impose an explicit social welfare function in our analysis. We do think it important, however, to be cognizant of the multiplicity of goals and the possible trade-offs among them.

Both dimensions of the commodity problem are hypothesized to have many effects on the attainment of these goals. We attempt to structure our integrated econometric modeling to incorporate these hypotheses in a following section. We also wish to emphasize that the direct effects of changes in international commodity markets on goal attainment may be dwarfed by the indirect ramifications within the overall constrained economic system.

Previous Studies of the Impact of the Commodity Problem on Goal Attainment in the Developing Countries

Previous studies have investigated the impact of instability by using reduced form models that relate export changes to various representations of goal attainment in the developing countries on the bases of cross-section regression esti-

mates. Prominent examples include [19, 22, 28, 29, and 34]. These studies, particularly those by Joseph D. Coppock and A. MacBean, have shaped considerably the conventional textbook wisdom in the developed world that there is very limited empirical support for the often hypothesized negative impact of commodity market fluctuations on goal attainment in the developing countries.

Elsewhere we review these studies in some detail [24; also see 34, 35, and 48]. We find them so wanting on a priori and methodological grounds that we doubt that they tell us anything useful about the commodity problem and goal attainment in developing countries. We shall list our criticisms and refer the interested reader to the aforementioned reference for more details: (1) The instability indexes do not relate to fluctuations around long-run trends and have arbitrary weighting schemes. (2) The use of reduced forms confounds shifts in the underlying structural relations with changes therein and gives unstable results. (3) The lack of specification of the structural relations leads to probable omitted variable problems. (4) Policies are not represented and thus the results are not controlled for policy impact. (5) Overall constraints on the economy and on government and central bank behavior are ignored. (6) The attention to the major macro goals is unbalanced, with almost all focus on growth and almost none on distribution. (7) The estimates probably are subject to simultaneous bias since exports generally reflect internal and external developments, but are treated as exogenous in these studies.¹⁸ (8) The implicit assumption of homogeneity across countries in structures and in lag patterns is untenable. (9) Important short-run response paths are ignored.

A much more satisfactory approach is to use integrated econometric models of the underlying structural relations in the primary commodity-producing sector, the overall economy, and perhaps the international commodity market of concern. The resource cost is higher than with the cross-country reduced forms, but the assumptions in principle at least can be so much more realistic that the returns in terms of useful understanding may be much greater.

The work of Paul Acquah [1] on Ghana and cocoa is seminal in this area. He uses an integrated model of cocoa production in Ghana, the overall Ghanaian economy and the world cocoa market to explore the impact of the introduction of international buffer stocks for cocoa on goal attainment in Ghana. He finds that cocoa price stabilization has dynamic benefits in terms of employment and output.

We can criticize a number of features of this study: the micro relations do not test for asymmetrical micro responses or for micro responses to variances. The demand orientation is overly strong. Insufficient attention is paid to non-growth economic goals. But given its promising nature and the severe resource constraints under which it was conducted, we find Acquah's study to be an impressive and suggestive effort.

There is one further study that is a hybrid of the cross-country and macro-econometric structural approaches. C. Rangarajan and V. Sundararajan [39] use very aggregate econometric models to simulate the effects of stable versus fluctuating export paths for 11 (mostly developing) countries. They find improvements with greater stability in about half of the cases. The impact of better secular trends are substantial in almost all cases.

The Rangarajan and Sundararajan study is more satisfactory than the cross-country reduced form efforts. At least they allow for some structural differences among countries, use a reasonable representation of instability, and apply some overall constraints. But their overall economy models are so rudimentary that it is not clear what their results really tell. The extreme Keynesian version they use has no supply constraints and no price effects. Exports are exogenous. Overall fiscal and monetary budgets are not imposed. Micro responses to variances and asymmetrical micro responses are not explored. The whole litany of criticisms of macroeconometric modeling to date for developing countries is appropriate [5, 6, and 11].

One must conclude that previous studies of the impact of the commodity problem on developing countries reveal little about the effect of fluctuations. By far the most interesting and promising approach is the integrated modeling of Acquah, even though we have some reservations about the details of his work.

We shall not review the large number of studies that explore the impact of changes in secular trends in the commodity markets on goal attainment in developing countries. They are more satisfactory than are most studies focusing on the first dimension of the commodity problem. In regard to many details of specification, nevertheless, we have strong reservations about the representation of special features of developing economies and of all of the major macro-economic goals. Our integrated econometric modeling for the present study has improved on most of the previous efforts.

An Integrated Econometric Model for Chile and Copper

The next two sections explore the impact of the commodity problem on goal attainment in Chile. Because there are over 300 endogenous variables in the overall system, we neither present nor discuss the individual relations. Instead we focus on the important general features.

The International Copper Market Submodel

Within the integrated scheme the submodel of the international copper market can play at least three roles: (1) It can indicate how shocks in copper-consuming countries (for example, business cycle fluctuations) or in other producing countries (for example, political instability in Zaire) are transmitted to Chile, including the lags in such transmission. (2) It can suggest

what impact various international copper market policies, such as the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program that was discussed in the second section, would have on the copper prices and demands that Chile faces. (3) In cases in which there is considerable market power (for example, Brazil and coffee, Ghana and cocoa, Morocco and phosphates), it can represent the nature of the feedback through the international market of national policies.

Our world copper submodel consists of three sets of relations: (1) production submodels for each of the major primary producers such as that which is described for Chile in the next subsection and for secondary sources such as scrap; (2) the demand for current use by the major users; and (3) the demand for current inventory accumulation (positive or negative). These relations, government policies pertaining to international copper trade and US official stockpiles, the exogenous levels of industrial activity in the major producing countries, the price of aluminum and other substitutes, inventory holding costs, and price expectations and the overall market-clearing identities determine short-run international copper prices. We refer to prices because our model includes the segmentation which has resulted in "two-tier" pricing (US producers' price versus rest of the world) in much of the past two decades. In addition to this market segmentation, other important features include the large role of secondary copper, the close and increasing substitution in some uses by aluminum, and the impact of US stockpile changes. The effects of a hypothetical UNCTAD-style buffer-stock policy are easily incorporated by adding buffer-stock-operating rules to the overall submodel. Because of considerable adjustment and expectation formation lags, the impact of any such policy intervention or of other exogenous changes is distributed over a number of years.

The Copper Sector

The copper sector is the direct linkage between the international copper market and most of the Chilean economy. Fluctuations and secular movements in the international copper market impinge first directly on the copper production sector and then are transmitted through that sector to the rest of the economy. Even though the backward and forward linkages in the traditional sense of factor demand and supply are not very large, the indirect effects are quite substantial because of the foreign exchange constraint on some dimensions of economic activity, the dependence of government revenue, and induced expenditures on copper and on foreign exchange constrained activities (for example, imports), and the largely passive response of the monetary system to government deficits and foreign exchange reserves. In addition to representing the direct effects and the transmission of the indirect effects to the rest of the economy of developments in the international copper market, the copper sector is the locus of direct policy responses to these developments.

The Chilean copper submodel distinguishes between large-scale mining, which accounts for about seven-eighths of Chilean copper, and small- and medium-scale mining, which produces the rest. This separation is important because of the different ownership, policies, and factor intensities of the two. Before the Frei government of 1964–70, large-scale mining was dominated by two US multinational companies — Kennecott and Anaconda. During the Frei administration ownership began to shift towards Chile with an agreement in 1967 under which the Chilean government eventually would acquire 51 percent control. In 1972 the Allende government nationalized completely large-scale mining. In contrast, small- and medium-scale mining has been composed of a number of small domestic operations throughout recent decades.

In the international copper market, Chile is a price taker. The Frei government forced large-scale mining to switch from the US producers' price to the generally higher London Metal Exchange (LME) price for their Chilean exports. This (profitable to Chile) change reflects the peculiarity of the two-tier copper market system, not that Chile generally has much market power in the sense of being able to alter the international copper prices much by changing her exports. The price of small- and medium-scale copper has followed closely the LME price for decades.

Large-scale copper supply has an estimated short-run elasticity of 0.11 and a long-run one of 0.18 with respect to the ratio of the copper price to costs, with an underlying secular trend due to technological changes and expansion of capacity. The costs are defined by input-output coefficients for domestic and imported intermediate inputs, plus the wage bill. Small- and medium-scale copper supply has estimated short-run and long-run elasticities of 0.14 and 0.66 with respect to the ratio of the copper price to costs, with the latter represented by the domestic GDP deflator.

For large-scale copper the estimated value-added production function has a variable elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The capital stock input depends on investment, which responds quite elastically to expectations concerning the future real price of copper, with a downward shift in the Allende 1971–73 period because of limited access to traditional capital equipment suppliers and because of critical skilled personnel shortages. Wages are determined by general inflationary expectations and the size of nonlabor income since the latter enters into the employer-union bargaining over wage rates, with an upward shift during the Allende years to reflect the shift in bargaining power towards labor. Maximization of net revenues given the VES production function, the stock of capital, the level of output, and labor gives the desired demand for labor. Actual labor employed adjusts slowly towards the desired level. The same maximization can be interpreted as giving average labor productivity, which is estimated to respond positively to capital stock per laborer, but with a downward shift in productivity during the Allende regime

because of strikes, political turmoil, less attention to efficiency, and the negative impact on productivity of nationalization. In any case, the wage bill that is determined by this actual demand for labor and the wages feed back into the total costs and thereby affect the supply of copper.

On the distribution side total value added goes to the wage bill and to non-labor income. Before nationalization, nonlabor income was divided between direct taxes and earnings of the foreign owners. The exact division depended upon changing tax schedules with rates dependent on the price of copper during part of the period, but the marginal tax rates at times exceeded 80 percent. After the nationalization, all nonlabor returns go to the government. Both before and after nationalization, at times a disadvantageous exchange rate has been used by the government for large-scale mining expenditures on inputs (of course, after nationalization the revenue effect of this distortion was to shift resources from one part of the government to another). The combination of this exchange rate policy, high wages, low productivity, and low copper prices caused nonlabor income to fall 95 percent in 1971, the first full year of the Allende government.

Responses throughout this model are distributed over time because of adjustment and expectation formation lags in supply, investment, and labor demands. Thus the transmission of fluctuations or secular movements in the international copper market to the rest of the Chilean economy is also distributed over several years.

The Overall Chilean Economy

The overall submodel of the Chilean economy is necessary to indicate how the commodity problem, as transmitted through the copper-producing sector, affects the degree of goal attainment in each of the four major areas which are discussed in the first part of this section. It also is the locus of overall economic policies, as opposed to those that directly impinge upon the copper sector, that may be utilized to attempt to mitigate any perceived negative effects of the commodity problem.

In order to represent the impact on the attainment of various goals and the functioning of government policy within the framework of Chilean institutions, the overall submodel of Chile is relatively large. It includes relations to determine value-added in five sectors, aggregate demand components, prices, foreign trade, and balance of payments, labor demands and payments, production capacity and utilization, and passive government and central bank policies. It is estimated on the bases of annual data for 1960-76, with some earlier lagged values in adjustment and expectation formation processes.

Impact of the Commodity Problem

Developments in the international copper market have a direct effect on the copper sector and an indirect effect on the economy as a whole. The linkages of transmission include the copper sector demand for domestic intermediate inputs and labor, the amplified Keynesian aggregate demand effect from factor payments in copper, and induced governmental expenditures and money supply changes, the impact of the foreign exchange constraint on certain import categories, and the determination of expectations that alter investment decisions. The transmission of fluctuations to overall instabilities and of secular trends to longer-run goals is clear without further elaboration in general terms, although one should recall the distributed lag nature of the transmission — which might smooth short-term fluctuations.

There exists the possibility that fluctuations may not cancel out over a complete cycle, but have longer-run impact. Most macro studies of developing countries do not well represent all of the various channels for such a possibility. This possibility is incorporated in three ways:

(1) We test to see if there are significant micro responses in key investment, import, and other expenditure relations to variances (or related measures) in exports or in foreign exchange. A priori such reactions may be positive or negative due to planning difficulties and risk-averse behavior. The negative response is usually emphasized, but risk-averse precautionary behavior may imply inventory buildup or investment speedup in response to greater uncertainty about future foreign exchange availabilities. In fact, we find very little evidence of such a micro response, with small significant positive responses in government consumption and overall consumption imports and a negative one in other material imports.

(2) We include other possible micro asymmetries in response to upward versus downward changes by incorporating nonlinear specifications of individual relations. We find evidence of significant nonlinearities throughout the submodel, particularly in the form of logarithms, inverses, and exponentials.

(3) We include possible macro asymmetries due to overall capacity constraints, circular flow constraints, government and central bank budgets, and the balance of payments.

Through such means we feel that we give a fair chance to the “fluctuations matter for longer-run goals” hypothesis.

Special Characteristics of Chile

All too often developing countries have been modeled by simple transplantation of models of the developed economies [5, 6, and 11]. We have tried to incorporate the particular features of Chile, many of which are common to a

number of other developing countries, into our modeling. We give six illustrative examples.

(1) Pluralism is a pervasive feature of most developing economies. Therefore some disaggregation is required. We find evidence of heterogeneities in structures and in lag patterns, for example, across production sectors and across imports for Chile.

(2) Overall product in developing economies is neither completely demand-determined as in the stereotypic Keynesian extreme nor completely supply-determined as in the classical extreme and in the input-output programming tradition. Often there are differences across sectors as part of the pluralism. We find evidence of such differences across sectors in the weight of demand versus supply considerations, with both interacting to determine overall product and with feedbacks through capacity utilization on prices and, to a lesser extent, investment and foreign trade.

(3) Structural change is hypothesized to be a critical feature of the development process. We believe that much of what is called structural change reflects stable underlying structures with changes in the relative importance of various components. For example, production may shift from primary to secondary sectors with stable underlying supply and demand curves for both sectors because of factor movements and differential income elasticities of demand. Viewed this way, the concern about aggregate structural change is closely tied to that about pluralism and also requires disaggregation. As was already noted, we tried to disaggregate where appropriate.

In addition, however, we have tested to see if the radical political shifts in the 1970s have affected our structural relations. There is evidence of such shifts in a number of cases for the Allende 1971-73 period: downward shifts in agricultural production because of the political turmoil associated with land reform, in noncopper exports because of nationalization of many firms; upward shifts in demand for manufacturers because of income redistribution (with a significant subsequent drop below pre-Allende years under the Pinochét regime due to income distribution shifts and import competition with trade liberalization), in nonfood consumption imports because of income distribution (accentuated under Pinochét because of trade liberalization), in capital imports (that did not fall as much as the drop in investment alone would have suggested), in current government expenditures due to the expanded government role, in real wages due to explicit redistribution policies, and in the central bank credit to the government to finance the expanded government activity.

(4) Government policies in developing countries often have a passive or endogenous nature and not infrequently depend more on the use of quantitative restrictions than in developed countries. The failure to recognize the passivity can result in a substantial overstatement of government control. The failure to recognize the use of quantitative restrictions may miss some of the channels

through which government policies do have an impact. We find evidence of passive policy responses in regard to both current and investment expenditure and particularly in regard to the determination of the monetary base by the government deficit and foreign reserves. Our estimates indicate significant responses to quantitative restrictions for some import categories (for example, nonfood consumption imports), but little evidence for domestic variables.

(5) For Chile and for many developing countries the foreign sector plays a pervasive role in economic goal attainment. Of course this observation is related to the core of our interest, and we have attempted to incorporate the links to the foreign sector throughout our model.

(6) A striking aspect of the Chilean experience is the high rate of inflation for decades and the hyperinflation in 1972-74 (for example, average annual percentage price increases of 33 percent for 1960-70 and of 274 percent for 1970-76). As already noted, we attempted to incorporate the government deficit-foreign reserve-money supply-price-wage nexus. We also find some evidence of significant impact of inflation in the individual relations in the model, such as the inverse one in the determination of real wages or the direct one in private consumption.

Model Performance

We have subjected the model to a number of within-sample and beyond-the-sample tests. We report only the mean absolute errors in 12-year dynamic simulations for 1965-75 for a few major variables: 2.6 for GDP, 2.0 for private consumption, 3.7 for public consumption, 5.7 for nonlarge-scale mining investment, 3.5 for imports, 2.5 for exports, and 6.4 for the GDP price deflator. In light of the radical political shifts of the 1970s and the inflation throughout this period, we think that these errors are remarkably small. These and other test results give us a fair amount of confidence in our simulations.

Simulations of Impact of Fluctuations in International Copper Market on Chilean Goal Attainment

We shall consider only the impact of copper price movements, looking first at fluctuations and then at secular trends. We begin by examining the impact of a one-period 10 percent decline in the LME price in order to investigate the time pattern of the responses to such a shock. We then explore to what extent there are asymmetries by considering the impact of a one-period 10 percent increase in the LME price, and finally the combined effect of one-period 10 percent increases and decreases in the LME copper price. The table presents relevant percentage deviations from a base simulation with no such price shocks for major variables on a year-by-year basis, and the average over five years.

SIMULATED IMPACT OF CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL COPPER PRICE ON CHILEAN GOAL ATTAINMENT: PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FOR MAJOR VARIABLES^a

	10 percent one-period change in LME copper price					Increase 5-year average	1 percent increase in secular growth rate for LME copper price: average for years 6-10
	D e c r e a s e						
	1	2	3	4	5		
1. Large-scale copper mining sector							
1.1 Export price to cost ratio	-10.5	2.6	.2	-.8	-.1	-1.7	1.6
1.2 Value added	-3.6	-.7	-.7	-1.1	-.5	-1.3	.9
1.3 Employment	-.5	-.6	-.2	.0	.2	-.2	-.2
1.4 Wage bill	-5.0	-4.0	3.7	1.5	2.2	-.3	n.a.
1.5 Nonwage income	-25.2	2.0	3.9	-1.4	1.8	-3.8	2.8
2. Overall economy							
2.1 GDP							
(a) Agriculture	-.1	-1.0	-1.1	-.9	-.7	-.8	1.5
(b) Secondary	.0	.3	-.3	-.3	-.1	-.1	.3
(c) Tertiary	-.2	-1.3	-1.2	-1.1	-.8	-.9	2.1
(d) Imports	.0	1.0	-1.1	-.7	-.7	-.6	1.2
2.2 Aggregate demand							
(a) Private consumption	.3	-.5	-1.1	-1.4	-1.0	-.7	1.4
(b) Public consumption	.4	-.4	-.7	-.5	-.5	-.6	.7
(c) Investment ^b	.4	-1.0	-1.4	-1.7	-1.0	-.9	1.9
(d) Imports	.5	-2.0	-1.3	-1.0	-.8	-.9	1.6
2.3 Income and employment							
(a) Wages and salary rate (net of taxes)	.7	-1.1	-.6	-.3	-.5	-.4	1.4
(b) Nonwage income (net of taxes)	-.6	-2.6	-2.9	-2.7	-2.2	-2.3	3.0
(c) Employment ^b	.4	-.1	-.5	-.5	-.4	-.2	1.2
2.4 Capacity utilization and prices							
(a) Capacity utilization	.8	-.1	-.5	-.2	.0	.0	.9
(b) GDP deflator	-5.9	1.8	4.7	1.2	2.8	.9	-3.6
2.5 Balance of payments	-44.9	7.5	11.1	3.0	3.1	-4.0	21.5
2.6 Fiscal and monetary policies							
(a) Current revenues ^c	-4.8	-1.1	2.3	.6	1.3	-.3	-1.8
(b) Current expenditures ^c	-2.7	.4	1.7	.1	1.0	-.3	-1.5
(c) Current savings	-9.8	-9.0	.1	1.7	-.8	-3.4	165.9
(d) Credit to public sector	22.9	25.7	-1.5	-7.0	3.7	8.8	.5
(e) Money supply ^c	-6.9	7.3	9.3	4.1	6.1	4.1	-6.4

^aThe percentages refer to a base simulation in which there is no shock. All variables are in real terms unless otherwise noted.

^bExcluding large-scale copper mining.

^cIn current terms.

One-Period 10 Percent Decline in LME Price

In large-scale copper the immediate impact is a fall in production of -3.6 percent, in the wage bill of -5.0 percent, in employment of -0.5 percent, and in nonwage income of -25.2 percent. For most of these variables the effects are quickly dampened, although the lags in wage and employment adjustments mean that in the second year the effects for these two variables are still relatively large. After the initial impact in the first year or two, for most of these variables the dynamics lead to values in some years for which the discrepancies from the base solution are positive. For example, the large decline in wages reduces total costs so that the export price to cost ratio rises 2.6 percent in the second year.

A major transmission mechanism to the overall economy is through passive fiscal and monetary policies. In the first year, primarily because of the drop in government direct revenues from large-scale mining, government current revenues in nominal terms drop -4.8 percent and induced current expenditures in nominal terms drop -2.7 percent. Current public savings drop and are covered by a 22.9 percent increase in real credit to the public sector. But the immediate decline of -44.9 percent in the balance of payments more than compensates for the increased loans to the government, so the money supply falls by -6.9 percent in the first year. Prices are heavily influenced by the fall in the money supply and also fall by -5.5 percent in the first year.

For many of the other variables, however, the first-year impact is small and often not negative because of the lag structure. The larger decline in prices than in government expenditures, for example, means that real public consumption and total investment increase by 0.4 percent, with multiplier effects inducing a 0.3 percent increase in private consumption and a 0.5 percent increase in imports. The increased demand induces a 0.4 percent increase in employment and real wages go up by 0.7 percent because nominal wages are sticky, with the resulting redistribution towards labor also adding to the enlarged private consumption already noted.

In the second year, however, the effects are different in a number of respects, and disentangling the causal flows is much more difficult because of a large number of lagged responses in addition to the simultaneous interactions. One important factor, however, is that imports drop by -2.0 percent in part due to lagged increased restrictions in response to the large foreign exchange depletion in the first year. One consequence is that the resulting increase in the balance of payments this time works in the same direction as another large increase in credit to the public sector, so the money supply is 7.3 percent and the GDP deflator is 1.8 percent above the base solution values. Real wages decline -1.1 percent in part because of the stickiness in nominal wages, which induces a fall in private consumption. Real public consumption also falls -0.4 percent because the induced expansion in nominal expenditures is less than the added

inflation. Such factors cause general declines in demands and in production (particularly in the secondary and tertiary sectors, for which there also is a decline in the demand for imports for large-scale mining), so that GDP drops by -1.0 percent.

In subsequent years the reactions are even more complex and more difficult to disentangle. For most of the variables the absolute percentage discrepancies approach zero. However, the largest absolute percentage discrepancies from the base solution are not until the fourth year in a few important cases, including private consumption and total investment. These long lags point to the difficulty of analyzing the effects of fluctuations in the copper market on the Chilean economy with too simple a model.

The impact on Chilean goal attainment of a 10 percent one-period decline in the LME price, not surprisingly, seems generally negative. Over the first five years GDP declines an average of -0.8 percent, investment drops by -0.9 percent, employment falls by -0.2 percent, wages and salaries drop by -0.4 percent, the GDP deflator rises by 0.5 percent, and the balance of payments declines by -4.0 percent. The major exception, given an equalitarian objective function, is that income becomes more equally distributed even though at a lower absolute level.

One-Period 10 Percent Increase in LME Price

The general movements are the same, except opposite in sign to those just described and are not discussed in detail here. The impact on Chilean goal attainment is, of course, generally positive. Over the first five years GDP increases by an annual average of 0.7 percent, investment goes up by 0.4 percent, employment rises by 0.3 percent, wages and salaries rise by 0.9 percent, the GDP deflator falls by -1.1 percent, capacity utilization goes up by 0.6 percent, and the balance of payments increases by 3.0 percent. The income distribution becomes more unequal, finally, with lower increments in poorer agriculture than elsewhere and with lower increments for wages than for nonwages.

Combined One-Period 10 Percent Increases and Decreases in LME Price

One way of representing the impact of greater instability in the international copper market on Chilean goal attainment is to combine the two previous cases. Under the assumption that the effects are additive, this is tantamount to considering the expected impact of adding an additional cycle of shocks with absolute amplitude equal to 10 percent of the LME price and with equal probability that the upswing precedes the downswing (and vice versa).

Once again we consider the five-year averages. The more unstable LME copper price by this measure causes GDP to fall by -0.1 percent, investment to fall by -0.5 percent, employment to rise by 0.1 percent, wages and salaries

to rise by 0.5 percent, the distribution between sectors and between factors to be equalized somewhat, the GDP deflator to fall by -0.2 percent, capacity utilization to increase by 0.6 percent, and the balance of payments to fall by -1.0 percent. By such measures greater copper price stability aids in the attainment of the Chilean growth and foreign sector goals, but at the cost of losses in terms of distributional equity and short-run internal stability. Thus whether copper market instability is good or bad depends on the weights that are attached to the various economic goals in the appropriate welfare function. The GDP, employment, and price effects are particularly small, however, and probably are not significantly nonzero.

Simulations of Impact of a Changed Secular Trend in International Copper Market on Chilean Goal Attainment

The second dimension of the commodity problem is a change in the secular trends in the international commodity market. We consider here the impact on Chilean goal attainment of a 1 percent increase in the secular trend of the LME copper price. The effect of such a change in the growth rate is cumulative with an increasing wedge between the base and the higher growth price paths. The impact on the Chilean economy is cumulative, both because of the ever higher price relative to the base price and because of the lag structures. But the induced changes are not monotonic because of simultaneous and lagged interactions among the different paths of the economy. In fact, there are sign reversals in the discrepancies from the base paths even after 9 or 10 years. Since we are interested in the effects of a sustained increase, we focus on the induced percentage changes in the second quinquennium, that is, in years 6–10. The last column of the table gives the average annual percentage changes over this period.

Within the copper sector itself, the ratio of the export price to costs is increasingly (although not monotonically so) above the base path, by an average of 4.1 percent for years 6–10. This induces an increase in value added from large-scale mining of 3.5 percent. Although added employment is induced for the first six years, the response to the altered wage-to-price ratio is to substitute capital for labor so that employment actually declines by -0.2 percent in the second quinquennium. The income distribution within the copper sector shifts away from labor, with an average increase of 9.0 percent in nonwage income.

The major transmission to the rest of the Chilean economy is through the government fiscal and monetary sectors. Government revenues in real terms are increased and induced government expenditure follows. Current government savings tend to rise and credit to the public sector tends to fall.¹⁹ In years 6–10 real public consumption increases by 0.7 percent and total real investment (including both public and private investment) rises by 1.9 percent.

The general reduction in credit to the public sector outweighs the increase in foreign exchange due to the improvement in the balance of payments, so

the monetary base falls below the base simulation path after the second year. The money supply is an average of -6.4 percent below in years 6–10. The GDP deflator initially increases slightly, but after the third year the reduced money supply and increased domestic production dominate, so that an average fall of -6.4 percent is recorded in years 6–10.

Other important transmission channels are through the availability of foreign exchange and the direct demand for domestic inputs. In part because of the greater foreign exchange availability, reinforced by the overall greater demand due to higher induced domestic production and income and lower domestic prices, imports increase an average of 1.6 percent in years 6–10. The fairly direct links in terms of providing inputs for large-scale mining, reinforced again by the general demand expansion, cause secondary and tertiary production to rise by 2.1 and 1.2 percent respectively.

In relation to most of Chile's goal attainment, the impact is positive. In the second quinquennium, growth is improved with a 1.5 percent increase in GDP and a 1.9 percent increase in investment. In regard to distribution, the absolute real wage increases by 1.4 percent and employment by 1.2 percent. In regard to short-run stability, capacity utilization improves by 0.9 percent and inflation falls by -3.6 percent. In the foreign sector, the balance of payments increases 21.5 percent despite a 1.6 percent rise in imports.

The major exception is in regard to the relative distribution dimensions. The poor agricultural sector lags behind the rest of the economy and lower-income workers lag behind nonwage recipients, in spite of general absolute increases.

CONCLUSIONS

We have investigated the impact of the two dimensions of the commodity problem on producers' revenues for the UNCTAD core commodities for Latin America generally and on overall goal attainment in the case of Chile in particular. We argue that previous studies of the impact of international commodity markets on developing countries, particularly regarding fluctuations, are flawed. We therefore examined in some detail the case of copper and Chile as an example of the much more satisfactory integrated econometric model approach.

In regard to the stability dimension of the commodity problem, we conclude that a UNCTAD price-stabilizing buffer-stock Integrated Commodity Program could provide somewhat increased and more stable revenues to Latin-American producers in the aggregate, although probably not to producers of all commodities. The UNCTAD price-stabilization program may have other advantages over alternatives by creating a new international organization in which Latin-American and other developing countries have a stronger role than in most older international organizations and by macro restraints on inflation. But intensive examination of Chile suggests that international commodity price

stabilization does not unequivocally lead to better attainment of all economic goals. In this case, for example, gains in terms of growth and the foreign sector position may be obtained at the cost of distribution and short-run stability objectives. The overall impact, moreover, is not large.

In regard to the secular trend dimension of the commodity problem, increases in the secular trend of international commodity prices obviously would increase revenues for all Latin-American producers. The intensive case study of Chile, moreover, suggests that such increases lead to improvement in Chilean goal attainment in almost all respects, with the noteworthy exception of relative distribution. The problem is how to obtain such increases. An UNCTAD-style buffer-stock program could not sustain very large increases for long because of the huge financial costs of doing so (for example, the indexation example given in the second section). The characteristics of the UNCTAD core commodities are such that concerted producer cartel action to raise the price seems very difficult to arrange.

These considerations suggest that the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program and other international policies for the relevant nonpetroleum commodities are not likely to be a panacea for Latin America. Some gains may be obtained from price stabilization, but not very large ones — and there are costs as well. Participation in an UNCTAD type program quite possibly might lead to slight secular improvements with their generally, but not exclusively, positive impact on goal attainment. So might expansion of markets in Eastern Europe and in Asia, as well as limited restrictions on supply. Possibly the returns outweigh the costs for Latin America of participating in such ventures, but they are not going to be spectacular. If the costs are large in terms of diverting attention from developing new exports or guaranteeing capital market access, moreover, the net returns to Latin America may be very low.

NOTES

* The second part of this paper builds on work that Behrman undertook for the Overseas Development Council project on the New International Economic Order [18]. The third part reports preliminary results from the AID-WEFA project on an integrated econometric investigation of the commodity problem and developing country goal attainment for which Adams and Behrman are the coprincipal investigators and Lasaga is one of an international team of project economists [2 and 32]. Behrman took primary responsibility for drafting and presenting this paper. We wish to thank, but not implicate, the sponsoring organizations.

1. Elsewhere we review in much greater detail the hypothesized causes and consequences of the commodity problem on goal attainment in developing countries [2]. For recent analyses of the new international order see [16, 18, 21, 23, 30, 40, and 47] and the references therein.

2. This part of the paper builds on [7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15] which provide much more detail.

3. For example, Johnson's tradeoff does not hold if the curves are sufficiently price-inelastic, as many estimates suggest in fact is the case [7].

4. There is a long tradition of making some inferences by this method dating back at least to United Nations [45]. Another recent example is [17].

5. To see that elasticities must matter, consider the case in which one of the two curves is stable and infinitely elastic (thereby fixing the equilibrium price) and the other curve has less than infinite elasticity and shifts considerably. Even though by assumption the instability arises from the movements in the latter curve, the Lord method will give a zero correlation between prices and quantities and attribute the instability equally to shifts in both curves.

6. In work under way Lord has estimated individual Latin-American country supply and market demand price elasticities for copper and coffee within a combined time-series and cross-country framework. The long-run supply price elasticities which he obtains are more or less comparable in magnitude with his demand price elasticities. However, this does *not* provide support for his assumption in his earlier work of equal short-run supply and demand price elasticities, since these estimates are long-run (not short-run, as are of relevance for the stability issue) and the demand elasticities are with regard to the relative price of different suppliers of a given product (which makes interpretation for the stability questions that he examined in the earlier study difficult without a complete model in which the interrelations among prices from various suppliers are specified). Although in our judgment this new work does not justify his earlier assumptions, we applaud his moving from a priori assumptions regarding elasticities and lag patterns to empirical estimates. We think that when his work is completed, it will provide a very useful tool for examining the implications of international copper and coffee market changes for Latin-American export revenues. The advantages of his more efficient estimates from combined time-series and cross-section data and from greater disaggregation should result in a better analytical tool than we use in this part of this article.

7. For the results in the third part following, we use a more detailed model which captures special features of the world copper market. We do the same for coffee in work which is summarized in [2, 3, 4, and 5]. The Lord study now under way also has greater disaggregation and other advantages (see the previous note).

8. All dollar magnitudes cited in the second part are in 1975 US dollars.

9. This calculation of the gain from pooling depends upon the assumptions that capital markets are not perfect and that individual countries participating in the international commodity agreements could not do such pooling on their own. See [12] for further discussion of these issues.

10. The simulations in [13] suggest that the use of variable target price paths (or variable price bands) adjusted for actual stock accumulations can reduce substantially the financial costs—of course, at the cost of some price stabilization.

11. Tin may be an exception because the international tin agreement and US Government tin stockpile activities apparently kept prices fairly stable during the sample period [42].

12. However, remember that there is some question about the sugar model.

13. This discussion draws heavily on material in [14].

14. A better assumption would distinguish among countries on the bases of differential supply elasticities and market power (as in the Lord study to which reference is made in Note 6). We do not have such disaggregate models, however, for all of the UNCTAD core commodities. Therefore, we make this assumption here to obtain crude Latin-American country estimates.

15. In regard to the possibility of implementing and sustaining the UNCTAD program, there also is an important question regarding the gains and losses for the developed countries. The developed countries as a group are primarily importers and

consumers of these six core commodities. They account for the following percentages of world imports: coffee (90), copper (87), tin (81), cocoa (78), sugar (65), and cotton (51). They enter into production and exporting in a less extensive way, but still account for over 40 percent of world copper production and exports, over 20 percent of world sugar and cotton production and exports, and 16 percent of world tin exports [7].

In their role as consumers, benefits include more stable commodity prices per se and possibly greater assurance of access to supply. The costs include possibly somewhat higher prices for the commodities, the consumers' share of the cost of running the UNCTAD program, and the possible development of a new entity in international primary commodity markets that may have significant market power and that probably would be less responsive to the developed countries' interests than to those of the developing countries. In their secondary role as producers and exporters, of course, the effects are similar to those emphasized in the text for the developing countries.

There also may be some more important indirect macro effects. The stabilization of commodity prices may lessen inflationary pressures if there are asymmetries due to ratchet effects of private oligopsonists anywhere in the economy that use commodity prices directly or indirectly to signal adjustments or due to government responses [7]. The stabilization of producers' revenues in the developing countries also may stabilize their demand for imports from the developed countries, with a stabilizing impact on short-run fluctuations. In an increasingly interdependent world, of course, both of these effects would have some secondary benefits for developing country producers by stabilizing demands that they face and the prices that they must pay for imports from the developed countries.

16. The implications of excluding sugar are indicated because of the doubts about the underlying model that have already been mentioned.

17. In this part of the paper we sketch some of the results from the AID-WEFA project on Integrated Econometric Modeling of the Commodity Problem and Goal Attainment in Developing Countries. This project includes intensive examination of two commodity-country combinations: Coffee—Brazil, Central America, and Ivory Coast; and copper—Chile and Zambia. The results are forthcoming in [2, 3, 32, 36, 38, and 41]. For an earlier report see [4].

18. This problem is more severe if the developing country has a big enough share in the world commodity markets to have some market power.

19. Current government revenues and expenditures and government savings increase in 9 of the first 11 years. However, fairly large declines below the base paths in years 9 and 10 cause the averages over years 6–10 for current government revenues and expenditures to be negative and that for credit to the public sector to be slightly positive. Over a longer period the latter is negative, and the large declines in the first five years outweigh the increases in years 9 and 10 in regard to the impact on the monetary base.

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Comment on "Commodity Exports and NIEO Proposals for Buffer Stocks and Compensatory Finance"

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The Adams-Behrman-Lasaga (A-B-L) paper is an empirical analysis of two separate, though interrelated, classic issues in the export instability literature: the first part deals with the effect of price stabilization on export earnings, and the second with the impact of export instability on growth and development. I shall treat these two issues in that order.

IMPACT OF PRICE STABILIZATION ON REVENUE

A-B-L begin by criticizing the a priori analysis of the impact of price stabilization on export earnings, specifically Harry G. Johnson [4] for using an algebraic proof to demonstrate that the impact of price stabilization will depend on the source of the market disruption for the average level of export earnings; and, for the degree of earnings, that instability will additionally depend on the price elasticity of supply and demand. Furthermore, if instability is due to demand disturbances, price stabilization will reduce the level of earnings below what they would be in an unrestricted market; and if instability is due to supply disturbances, price stabilization will increase the level of earnings.

Next they criticize the paper I presented at the first of this conference series [10] for regressing detrended quantum exports against prices as a method of identifying the source of the disturbance in order to deduce the impact of price stabilization on earnings, in accordance with Johnson's results. The basis of their criticism of Johnson's and my approach is the implied elasticities; they argue that the demand elasticities at the national level are very high, if not infinite, in which case Richard C. Porter [14] has demonstrated that these approaches will bias the results toward supply-dominated disturbances.

As an alternative approach, A-B-L simulate the operation of buffer stock arrangements. Adams and Behrman were among the first to attempt a rigorous


measurement of the impact of the NIEO proposals for commodities on the export earnings of developing countries. The starting point of their studies of stabilization policy alternatives is a set of simple structural econometric models developed earlier [1, 2, and 3]. They fit the data for commodities included in the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities to a common model specification that assumes competitive market behavior, even though most of the products simulated operate in an oligopolistic market structure. Furthermore, their multiplier simulations show that the model price responses to stocks tend to be sluggish, whereas price sensitivity in models designed for buffer stock simulations is essential if the objective is to avert price volatility. Consequently, such models tend to generate different results from those of other model formulations [8].

Because they reject an a priori analysis, the results of their paper are only as good as the models. Difficulties therefore arise. Thus, when sugar stabilization is found to cause a sharp increase in buffer stock funding, they remove it from the analysis on the grounds that the model used for simulations is poor, but they reintroduce it later when sugar, cotton, and coffee producers are found to achieve large gains in earning from price stabilization. Worse still, without an a priori analytical framework, A-B-L cannot seem to derive any substantive or policy-oriented conclusions. When price stabilization is found generally to improve the earnings of agriculture and worsen those of minerals, they attribute this result solely to the particular period chosen for the simulation. At this point, some allusion to the vast literature on the consequences of supply- versus demand-dominated sources of instability would certainly be warranted. But because A-B-L rely solely on quantitative analysis, they are unable to draw general conclusions.

Despite these limitations, A-B-L's results provide important quantitative evidence of the direction of the potential effects of price stabilization on the *world markets* for primary commodities. But not for the Latin-American economies. In examining the benefits and costs of price stabilization for the Latin-American economies, they rely on simplistic assumptions that result in misleading and erroneous conclusions. Thus, they assume that the distribution of benefits or losses to exporters is proportional to their respective shares in world production.

Yet where supply or supply/demand instability dominates, it is only the large producers that are likely to gain; the nonmajor producers suffer declines in their export earnings under price stabilization. As the chart illustrates, a price stabilization scheme that responded to supply changes in the market would have a direct effect only on the source of the disturbance. This effect would be to raise the level of earnings of the country. For those producers that respond to external supply-induced market surplus or deficit conditions, the extent of the impact of price stabilization measures would be determined by demand-

EXAMPLE OF PRICE STABILIZATION EFFECT ON SUPPLY-INDUCED DISTURBANCES IN THE COFFEE MARKET



shift disturbances. Nonmajor producers could not, of course, benefit from their own supply disturbances, since a change in their export quantum would not be sufficient to trigger stabilization measures. Hence, the impact of supply-induced market disturbances on national export earnings cannot be directly ascertained from the effect of price stabilization on aggregate producer earnings.

In order empirically to verify the conclusions reached in the paper I presented to the first of this conference series and to show the distributional inequality of price stabilization missed in the A-B-L paper, I have simulated two of the dynamic disequilibrium trade flow models recently estimated for the commodity exports of the Latin-American economies [11]. These models are for the two products so far dealt with in the WEFA project of Adams and Behrman: coffee in Brazil and copper in Chile. They are two good products because, in coffee, the market has been dominated by supply disturbances and Brazil is a price-setter, while the rest of Latin America is a price taker; and because, in copper, the market has been dominated by demand disturbances and the Latin-American exporters are price-takers in the market.

Before my buffer stock simulation results are compared with those in the paper, it is first necessary to correct A-B-L's erroneous assertion that national export demand elasticities are very high, if not infinite. Since space does not allow me to summarize the literature on models estimating demand functions for primary commodities based on produce differentiation, I refer the authors to George W. Ladd's 1979 review [9]; and, product differentiation as an important factor determining international trade flows, to the recent work of Paul R. Johnson, Thomas Grennes, and Marie Thursby [5]. The estimates derived from my model also show that marketing and other nonphysical differentials significantly influence export demand elasticities so that export demand and supply elasticities do tend to approximate one another. These estimates are based on pooled regression analysis using cross-section and time-series data, since

aggregate time-series estimates were found to bias the results downward. The average elasticity of substitution for the Latin-American producers of coffee and copper were estimated to be .9 and .3 respectively, compared with a mean elasticity of export supply of .6 for coffee and .2 for copper. (A-B-L nevertheless argue that my estimates are long-run and therefore not relevant to the stability issue. In fact, of the nine Latin-American coffee producers, only Haiti's elasticity of supply is calculated from the long-run response; all the others are short-term elasticities. In copper, Chile's elasticity of supply is calculated from a one-year lag, which is usually not considered long-run. On the demand side, only Ecuador's price elasticity of substitution is calculated from a one-year time lag, all the other elasticities being measured in the current time period.)

The table compares the results of the A-B-L paper with those of my own model simulations. The most important differences are those for revenue changes among coffee-producing countries. In the A-B-L paper, all producers gain, since it assumes that the distribution of benefits or losses to exporters is shared proportionately.

Dissaggregation at the producer level in my models produces quite different results. As stated earlier, the supply-induced nature of instability in this market implies an increase in the level of earnings under a price stabilization scheme. But it is Brazil that has historically been the major source of instability, and it is therefore Brazil that obtains the revenue gains. In contrast, the earnings of the other Latin-American countries worsen. Even for Colombia, the world's second largest producer, the revenue loss rate is only 10 percent below the average for the other Latin-American producers. In the world market, the

COMPARISON OF NONINTERVENTION AND BUFFER STOCK SIMULATIONS OF ADAMS-BEHRMAN-LASACA (A-B-L) AND LORD AT + 15 PERCENT BANDWIDTH AROUND REFERENCE PRICE^a

	Percentage change in revenue		Change in earnings instability ^b	
	A-B-L	Lord	A-B-L	Lord ^b
COFFEE				
Brazil	2.4	0.8	.71	.38
Other Latin-American countries	2.4	-1.0	.71	.30
World	2.4	0.0	.71	.25
COPPER				
Chile	0.6	-7.4	.94	.21
Peru	0.6	-7.0	.94	.16
World	0.6 ^c	-6.1	.94	.17

^aThe reference price is assumed to be the secular trend.

^bMeasured by the ratio of the index of earnings instability with market intervention to that in an unrestricted market.

^c-188 million 1975 dollars in terms of present discount value.

net effect of price stabilization on earnings is virtually nullified by the divergent individual producer effects.

As anticipated, the total revenue loss for copper producers in my model simulations is substantial and approximately similar across countries, while in the A-B-L paper there is a small gain, which becomes negative on a present discount basis. The Latin-American producers' differential from the world total effect is somewhat higher, but price stabilization in coffee has a near-uniform impact on the level of export earnings of the individual producers.

As for the change in earnings instability, both my simulations and those of A-B-L point to a decline. However, for coffee and copper, the reduction in my simulated results is much greater. This may be due to either (1) the inclusion of an additional three years in my simulation (1962-78, compared with 1962-75); (2) the model specification; or, what is more probable (3) the estimation of price elasticities in my paper on the basis of cross-sectional and time-series data, and in A-B-L's paper on the basis of aggregate time-series data.

Thus, Johnson's strong criticism of the trade-off between the level and stability of revenues does seem warranted, especially in the case of the nonmajor exporters of a product.

EFFECT OF STABILIZATION ON DEVELOPMENT

A-B-L begin the second part of their paper by stating that the approach used in the first part is only suggestive and partial, and that what follows is a more satisfying way of examining the issue of export instability. However, Part 2 deals with the impact of stabilization on development, whereas Part 1 is centered on the effect of price stabilization on export earnings. To assert that these are two approaches to the same issue is to disregard the vast literature on the relation between export instability and development. I need only refer here to the seminal work of A. MacBean [12], whose results were later corroborated by Peter B. Kenen and C. S. Voivodas [6], O. Knudsen and A. Parnes [7], and also Benton F. Massell, Scott R. Pearson, and James Finch [13] who used a country-by-country approach for Latin America and found no clear relation between export instability and development. I therefore strongly disagree that these two issues should be treated as one, at least in the way the paper is presently formulated.

Nevertheless, the results obtained in Part 2 are more satisfying to me because of the greater disaggregation of the copper market and Chilean economy models; it is far more difficult to comment on because the models are not elaborated except in extremely general terms and, according to A-B-L, are unrelated to their earlier published models on copper and Chile. My comments can, therefore, only refer to their conclusions and to possible areas for further research.

Multiplier analysis is used to evaluate the effect of a one-period 10 percent increase and later of a one-period 10 percent decrease in world copper prices on various components of the Chilean economy. The two effects are assumed to be additive, and the results of the individual simulations are summed to evaluate their combined effect. A-B-L find minor and divergent changes in the economy. Next a 1 percent increase in the average annual growth trend of prices is used to evaluate the effect of a secular change in copper prices on the Chilean economy. The expected results are obtained: all economic indicators improve except, not surprisingly, income distribution. This scarcely makes exciting reading.

One of the major difficulties in this part of the paper is the nature of the market. Since Chile is a price-taker in the international copper market, the transmission mechanism between the product and national models is recursive. Thus an interesting avenue of research when both the models of Chile and Zambia are linked to the copper model would be the feedback effects between the market and the national economies. Because Chile and Zambia together account for about 37 percent of copper exports, the simultaneity inherent in the models could provide more accurate results for the commodity-country simulation results.

This part of A-B-L's research provides one of the most fruitful approaches to examining the issue of export instability and development. The authors deserve particular credit for their contribution in this area. After a decade of controversy over the proper sample size and period to be used in cross-national analysis of this issue, it is a relief finally to leave the forest and see the trees. A return to generalizations will be possible when the present approach moves from deterministic to stochastic simulation analysis.

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