


FIGURE 26

RATIO OF MALES AGED 25-34 TO FEMALES AGED 20-29, AND PERCENTAGE OF LATTER MARRIED: FOREIGN-BORN WHITE POPULATION, 1890-1930



SOURCE: Table C-7.


The relevant series are plotted in Figure 26 for the decennial census dates 1890-1930. The close similarity between the patterns traced by the two curves—a similarity which would not appear if the standard sex ratio for those aged 20-29 were used—is impressive. Apparently, the marital experience of young foreign-born white females did depend very considerably on the gyrations of our rather unorthodox sex ratio, which in turn arose from the impact of both earlier and current immigration on the age-sex structure of the foreign-born population.¹⁶

In Figure 27, this line of reasoning is pushed a step further. Here, at five-year intervals, the series for foreign-born white fertility

¹⁶ An interesting by-product of the sharp decline in the marriage-relevant sex ratio during the 1920's, and the corresponding reduction in the proportion of foreign-born white females aged 20-24 who were married, was an abrupt rise in the labor-force participation of this group from 37.6 to 50.1 per cent [116, Table A-4].

FIGURE 27

LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF FERTILITY RATIO; AND OF RATIO OF MALES AGED 25-34 TO FEMALES 20-29, AND OF FEMALES AGED 20-34 TO FEMALES 20-44: FOREIGN-BORN WHITE POPULATION, 1875-1930



SOURCE: Table C-8.

and our marriage-relevant sex ratio (the two solid lines) are compared, the latter being used in the absence of direct observations on the marriage proportion at mid-census dates. As the lower panel shows, while the movements in the rates of change of the two series are not perfectly consistent, there is a noticeable similarity. Both series show two trough-to-trough swings with the dates of peaks and troughs close, if not identical. This suggests that at least one element responsible for Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of foreign-born fertility was the changing proportion of males aged 25-34 to females aged 20-29 and the consequent effect of this on the marriage proportion.

The broken line in the figure brings out a second demographic feature of the foreign-born population that may have contributed to the fertility swings, namely, the proportion of women aged 20-44 in prime reproductive ages, conceived here as encompassing ages 20-34. Here too there is a suggestion of two trough-to-trough swings with reasonably consistent timing, though the amplitude of the movements is somewhat smaller for this series. However, in the beginning of the period (for which the estimates are probably less reliable), the timing relationships are somewhat off.

This brief discussion of Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of foreign-born white fertility is designed to be exploratory rather than definitive, and enough has perhaps been said to provide some support for the view that shifts in demographic composition of the foreign born associated with the changing impact of immigration were at least in part responsible for these movements. Even if one accepts this suggestion, however, there remain some troublesome discrepancies. One—of particular interest in this analysis—is that in the latter part of the period considered here, the decline in the rate of change of fertility was somewhat greater than one would have expected on the basis of the two factors so far discussed. One possible explanation, suggested in several sources and consistent with the emphasis here on compositional changes in the population, is an abrupt decline in the proportion of foreign-born women in the prime reproductive ages who came from the high-fertility countries of southern and eastern Europe. There is substantial evidence that female immigrants from this area typically had significantly higher fertility than contemporaneous im-

migrants from northern and western Europe [82, p. 108; 189, pp. 4, 10; 211]. Clearly, a sudden drop in the share of young foreign-born women from this source would tend to depress fertility.

Direct evidence to test this proposition is not available since during the period concerned the census did not regularly publish age detail for the foreign born by country of origin. However, it seems possible to form a rough impression of the validity of the argument. In the period 1890–1915, about two-thirds of all female immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe; in 1915–30, about one-third. I have attempted to estimate, therefore, for foreign-born women aged 20–34 at each of several dates, the proportion who had immigrated between 1890 and 1915, the peak period of the “new immigration.”¹⁷ The results are as follows: 1900 = 45, 1910 = 82, 1920 = 86, 1930 = 48. The figures clearly suggest a drastic decline during the 1920’s in the share of young foreign-born women accounted for by the new immigration,¹⁸ and thus appear consistent with the suggestion that the decline in the rate of change of foreign-born fertility during this decade, attributable in part to the demographic shifts previously noted, was aggravated by this factor.

Rural White Fertility

The explanation investigated here for Kuznets cycles in rural fertility is a simple one; namely, that the rate of change of rural fertility varies directly with that in the economic condition of the farm population in family-building ages, approximated here by real farm income per head of the farm population (or labor force) as a whole. If the rate of growth of real farm income per head drops off, the rate of change of farm fertility would be expected to decline (algebraically). The converse is true if the rate of farm income growth increases.

¹⁷ The technique for 1930, for example, was to compare the number of survivors from the group of foreign-born women aged 5–19 in 1915, estimated by appropriate survival rates from [111, p. 23], with the number aged 20–34 enumerated in 1930.

¹⁸ Thompson and Whelpton draw an opposite conclusion, namely, that the share accounted for by the new immigration rose slightly during the decade and thus could not have contributed to the fertility decline [164, pp. 271–272]. The procedure they use to infer the share of the new immigration, however, rests primarily on figures for foreign-born women of all ages, and fails to take account of the fact that the major shift in national origins of immigration in the 1920’s particularly affected the younger foreign-born age groups, those central to the explanation of fertility.

The analysis comprises two parts, one for 1885-89 through 1925-29 based on observations at decennial intervals; and one, employing averages at quinquennial intervals, for 1920-24 through 1954-58. In the first part of the analysis, I use fertility data for the total rural white rather than native rural white population, since the earlier estimates for the former are probably somewhat more reliable for the present purpose and the bias introduced by the inclusion of the relatively unimportant foreign-born group in the rural total is probably fairly small. This series is compared with five-year averages of real gross farm income per person engaged in farming. The dates chosen for the latter allow for a lead of one to one and a half years over the fertility series. In the second part of the analysis, annual estimates of the birth rate for the total farm population (white plus nonwhite), converted to five-year averages for the first and second half of each decade, are compared with real net farm income per head of farm population, again with allowance for a lead of the latter over the former.¹⁹ Both the quinquennial and decennial farm income series are deflated by an index chosen to approximate the cost of living to farmers. The series are plotted in the upper panel of Figure 28, and the percentage change, our particular interest, in the lower.

By and large, as the lower panel shows, the data seem reasonably consistent with the hypothesis—at least as consistent as one might hope given the shortcomings of the data and the inevitable limitations of any monocausal explanation. Swings in the rate of growth of real farm income per head or per worker appear to be matched fairly closely by swings in the rate of growth of rural fertility. Reference to the adjoining scales will show that the magnitude of the income swings is substantially greater than that of fertility. This might be interpreted as suggesting an elasticity noticeably under one, a result which seems consistent with the findings of similar business cycle analyses.²⁰


If this reasoning is accepted, then the historical course of rural fertility change in this century would be conceived as reflecting in

¹⁹ The shift to the farm birth rate series is due in part to statistical convenience, but more fundamentally to the fact that the connection between "rural" fertility and farm income becomes progressively more tenuous as the rural nonfarm population grows.

²⁰ Cf. the studies of Gary S. Becker [170, pp. 209-231], Dorothy S. Thomas [73, 161], Dudley Kirk [169, pp. 84-85; 170, pp. 241-257], and Morris Silver [145a, pp. 237-255].

FIGURE 28

LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF RURAL WHITE FERTILITY RATIO (R.F.R.) AND REAL GROSS FARM INCOME PER ENGAGED (Y_w), 1885-1929; AND OF FARM BIRTH RATE (F.B.R.) AND REAL NET FARM INCOME PER HEAD (Y_p), 1920-58



SOURCE: Tables C-9 and C-10.

significant measure the pattern of major surge and relapse which has characterized farm income growth. The accelerated rate of decline of farm fertility in the 1920's and early 1930's would be attributed to the drastic setback to the growth of farm income in the period following World War I, a decline so great that the absolute level itself was substantially reduced. The subsequent baby boom in rural areas would be explained by the corresponding resurgence in farm income growth in the late 1930's and 1940's associated particularly with the war and postwar booms. And finally, the decline in the rate of growth of fertility in the 1950's, which in terms of absolute level meant a leveling off, would be explained by the tapering off of the farm boom and substantial drop in farm-income growth. The data suggest that the adverse effect on fertility in this most recent period has been somewhat less than might have been expected. A number of possible reasons for this come to mind, such as compositional changes, the increased significance of nonfarm sources in the total income of farm families [152, pp. 48-49], and the progressive rise in the proportion of the "farm" population (1950 census definition) not engaged in agriculture [198]; but it is not possible to pursue these questions here.

From what has been said, it should be clear that the fertility trend for the *total* white population has been subject to substantial variation as a result of major fluctuations in the fertility of the foreign-born and rural white components. The fluctuations for these groups in turn appear to have been caused by the impact of the rise and fall of immigration on the age, sex, and nationality composition of the foreign-born, and of major swings in agricultural conditions on the economic condition of the farm population. It would seem to follow that generalizations based on the fertility record of the total white population (or of the entire population, whose behavior is of course dominated by the total white) would be extremely hazardous.

Consider, for example, the experience of the 1920's. If the foregoing analysis is correct, the striking decline in total white fertility that occurred in this decade was caused largely by the conjuncture of two exceptional circumstances—namely, major shifts in the demographic composition of the foreign-born population arising from the effect on immigration of World War I and the subsequent imposition of restrictions, and, second, a major slump in agricultural conditions. When

added to the continuous depressing influence of the rural-urban shift, these circumstances created a decline in white fertility noticeably out of line with previous experience. Knowing this, one is inclined to view with some reserve statements such as that quoted previously, which cites the sharp fertility decline for the *total* population in the prosperous 1920's as a reason for discounting the effect of economic conditions on fertility.

It is nevertheless true that even urban native white fertility declined in this decade, though the decline of under 6 per cent for this group is rather less impressive than the almost 20 per cent decline for the white population as a whole. It is time, therefore, to see what might explain the fertility pattern for this group.

Urban Native White Fertility

As in the rural analysis, the aim here is to explore the relation between Kuznets cycles in fertility and in the economic condition of the population of family-building ages. For the rural population, it seemed reasonable to assume that the economic experience of those in family-building ages could be inferred from the income experience of the farm population as a whole. Such an assumption, however, does not seem plausible for the urban group, with its much more varied distribution of industrial and occupational attachments. In the absence of direct information on the situation of those in family-building ages, therefore, I have attempted to infer the state of the labor market for young persons from two indicators, conceived as reflecting respectively the demand and supply sides of the market. The first is the unemployment rate for the labor force as a whole. A low rate is taken as reflecting a generally favorable state of demand for labor, young and old; a high rate, an unfavorable situation. The second is the rate of change of the total white male population, aged 20-29, taken as a crude index of the rate of entry of young persons into the labor market. Other things equal, a decrease in the rate of entry would make for a favorable labor market for young persons because of their scarcity; an increase, an unfavorable market. Thus the hypothesis is that the rate of change of urban native white fertility varies directly with that of aggregate labor demand (read "inverted unemployment rate") and

inversely with that of the rate of labor market entry of young persons (read "rate of change of white male population, aged 20-29").²¹

An example may clarify the reasoning. If the economy is experiencing a Kuznets-cycle expansion, the rate of growth of labor demand would increase and, other things remaining unchanged, one would expect this to lead, through its effect on income and employment conditions, to a favorable response in fertility of the native population by encouraging marriage and childbearing. However, under conditions of free immigration, the increased rate of growth of labor demand would also provoke an influx of immigrants. The resulting rise in the rate of additions to the labor market would tend to counteract the tendency toward tightening and thus offset in some measure the stimulus to fertility of the native born. Note, in this connection, that immigrants are typically concentrated in exactly those age groups in which we are interested for the analysis of fertility. Conversely the tendency toward an adverse impact on native-born fertility of a decreased rate of growth of labor demand during a Kuznets-cycle contraction would be moderated by a decrease in the rate of immigration. Thus Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of labor demand would tend to be compensated by swings in the rate of entry into the labor market owing to immigration, and the consequent impact on native-born fertility would be counteracted in some degree.²²


Figure 29 presents the relevant series; as before, the upper panel shows the levels of the variables, the lower, their rates of change. To facilitate inferences from the graph, the curve for each of the explana-

²¹ Although the view that variations in the general unemployment rate primarily reflect changes in aggregate demand seems most consistent with formal theory, it is not essential to the analysis. Alternatively, one might think of movements in the general unemployment rate as indicating the average course of employment conditions, i.e., the net outcome of aggregate demand and supply, and changes in the rate of entry as indicating variations in the deviation from the average of the situation for young persons. However, the fact that for most of the period covered here a rise in the rate of entry accompanied a reduction in unemployment seems consistent with the emphasis on aggregate demand (Table C-11, cols. 2, 3).

²² Some may note a similarity between this reasoning and Francis Walker's analysis emphasizing the adverse influence of immigration on the fertility of the native population [212, 213]. Walker, however, was concerned with the primary trend, whereas the present analysis refers only to Kuznets cycles, and in addition takes account of the stimulating influence to native fertility of the very conditions which encourage a rise in immigration.

FIGURE 29

LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF URBAN NATIVE WHITE FERTILITY RATIO (U.F.R.),^a UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (U), AND RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL WHITE MALE POPULATION AGED 20-29 (s), 1885-1958



SOURCE: Table C-11. ^a Total white, 1925-29 on.

tory variables has been plotted inverted so that an upward movement would be expected to cause an upward movement in the fertility curve, other things remaining unchanged.

If we first consider variations in the decade rates of change through 1935-39, the most interesting feature is the inverse movements of the two explanatory series. As the lower panel shows, whenever the rate of growth of aggregate labor demand (the lower solid line) moves in a way favorable to fertility, the change in the rate of entry of young persons into the labor market (the broken line) moves adversely, and vice versa. In the early part of the period the swing in supply conditions reflects chiefly movements in immigration—exactly the situation described in the example above. Later, the supply movement reflects primarily variations arising from demographic sources. For example, the increase in the decade from 1915-19 to 1925-29 compared with that in the decade preceding reflects an exceptional rise in the rate of increase of native white males aged 20-29, which traces in turn to a corresponding movement in the total white birth rate earlier in the century.

So far as directions of movement of the explanatory series during this period are concerned, therefore, they carry no clear implication regarding the expected behavior of the rate of change of fertility—a plus in one is accompanied by a minus in the other. And, indeed, the fertility curve fails to exhibit the fluctuations of either of the two explanatory series. Rather, one finds simply one extended swing from the beginning through the period 1925-29 to 1935-39. The 1920's, with a relatively small decline in the rate of change of fertility, form a consistent part of this picture, a favorable movement in demand conditions being offset by an adverse one in supply. Interestingly, if one were to smooth out fluctuations in the two explanatory curves by, say, a simple two-item moving average, both, and particularly the unemployment rate, would show an extended swing rather similar to that of the fertility curve. An average of the two explanatory curves would produce the same effect.

Still more intriguing is the behavior of the three series after 1935-39. In this period, the rate of change of labor demand continues its pattern of rise and fall, with a swing of noticeably greater amplitude than previously. In striking contrast to the preceding pattern, however,

the change in the rate of entry into the labor market levels off instead of fluctuating inversely. And, for the first time, the rate of change of fertility exhibits a Kuznets-cycle movement, reproducing with remarkable similarity the fluctuation in the rate of change of labor demand. The inference suggested by these movements seems clear. With immigration restricted and without a surge in the rate of labor market entry from the native-born population caused by demographic processes, the favorable impact of a swing in the rate of growth of demand—itself much larger than heretofore—was felt with much greater force by the young native whites in the labor market. As a result, the rate of change of fertility of this group reproduced the swing in labor demand in significant measure for the first time.

If one considers magnitudes of the variables rather than simply rates of change, the argument seems reasonably well borne out, though the correlation is not perfect. In Table 2, each of the seven observations on the rate of change in fertility is classified according to the accompanying values of the rate of change in the unemployment rate and in the percentage change in white males aged 20-29. One finds that, holding the change in rate of entry into the labor market constant (that is, examining each row in the table separately), the rate of change of fertility varies directly with the rate of change in demand (inversely with the rate of change in the unemployment rate). Conversely, holding demand conditions constant (examining each column

TABLE 2. OBSERVATIONS ON PERCENTAGE RATE OF CHANGE PER DECADE IN URBAN NATIVE WHITE FERTILITY, CLASSIFIED BY CONCURRENT CHANGE PER DECADE IN PERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED AND IN PERCENTAGE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL WHITE MALES, AGED 20-29, 1885-1958

Change per Decade in Percentage Rate of Change of Total White Males, Aged 20-29 (percentage points)	Change per Decade in Percentage Unemployed (percentage points)				
	-16	-8	-2 to +2	+7	+14
+8 to +10		+2	-6		
-2 to -5	+42		+18	-8	-22
-18			0		

SOURCE: Table C-11.

separately), there is a tendency for the rate of change of fertility to vary inversely with the change in the rate of entry into the labor market, though in this case there is one inconsistency (the +18 and 0 entries being out of order vertically). Whether this discrepancy primarily reflects a fundamental deficiency in the analytical scheme or an inadequate approximation to the economic condition of those of family-building age provided by the explanatory series used here, it is not possible to say.

A comprehensive measure of the income and employment experience of young persons for the period covered here remains tantalizingly out of reach. Yet such additional evidence as I have been able to assemble supports the view that the income experience and labor market situation of young persons were exceptionally favorable in recent years. Consider the following:²³

1. In the 1940's, earnings in the lower-income occupations rose much more rapidly than those in the higher, and then, in the 1950's, at about the same or a slightly lower rate [180, No. 33, Jan. 15, 1960, pp. 6-7, and No. 35, Jan. 5, 1961, p. 52]. Since young people are more highly concentrated in lower-income occupations than older people, they must have particularly benefited from the movement of the 1940's. The very fragmentary evidence available suggests no corresponding development in the 1920's.

2. The shift of young persons into higher-earning occupations proceeded at a much greater rate in the 1940's than in the two preceding decades. In 1940, 17 per cent of males aged 15-24 in nonfarm occupations were in the three highest income classes (professional, technical, and kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm, and craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers). By 1950, 41 per cent of this same group of males (now aged 25-34) were in these classes, an improvement of 24 percentage points. From 1920 to 1930, the improvement for the cohort moving through the same ages was 17 points,

²³ In the examples cited, the typical movement from the 1930's through the 1950's is consistent with the pattern shown by the rate of change of fertility—that is, the abrupt break with past experience, in a direction reflecting a particularly favorable situation for young persons, occurs between the 1930's and the 1940's. The movement from the 1940's to the 1950's suggests a slowing or even reversal of the process. It is likely that between the first and second halves of the 1950's this pattern would be still more apparent (cf. Chapter 5).

and from 1930 to 1940 it was 12 points. Corresponding figures for the cohorts aging 25–34 to 35–44 in the three successive decades are 7, 4, and 14 points. Other things being equal, this more rapid shift to higher-income occupations points to a significantly higher rate of income growth for young persons in the 1940's than in the two preceding decades.²⁴

3. Expansion of government transfer payments provided a new bulwark to income in the 1940's and 1950's, especially in the form of veterans benefits and unemployment compensation for younger persons.

4. Labor force participation rates in the 1940's showed a marked break with previous trends in a manner strongly suggesting a shortage of young workers. The sharp downtrend in participation of white males aged 14–19 which had prevailed since 1900 was completely reversed. A similar movement appears even to have characterized those aged 10–13 [111, pp. 364–367]. The long-term rise in labor force participation of older women was greatly accelerated because jobs that would ordinarily have been filled by young persons were left open. And while, for young women as a whole, labor force participation declined slightly as a larger proportion married and had children, the rates for wives, even those with preschool-age children, rose substantially. Finally, while it is not possible to cite figures on the long-term trend, part-time employment rose substantially after 1940, and it seems likely that this too stemmed at least in part from a shortage of young workers. In the 1950's the rise in labor force participation of older women continued virtually unabated, but the rate for those aged 14–19 resumed its long-term decline.²⁵

5. Since 1940, home ownership among young persons has risen to levels markedly higher than had previously prevailed. The following figures for nonfarm household heads show, for each age group, the percentage of dwelling units which were owner-occupied at each date: ²⁶

²⁴ The figures for 1930–50 are computed from [94, Appendix Table 1]; for 1920, from unpublished estimates comparable to [94] kindly provided by W. Lee Hansen. Data for armed forces as reported in the census were included with the 1940 and 1950 figures.

²⁵ The evidence cited in this paragraph is from the excellent census monograph by Gertrude Bancroft [12, pp. 29–31, 58, 77–82, and Ch. 4]. See also Part III below.

²⁶ The data through 1940 are from the census reports; for 1949 and 1959, from

Age	1890	1900	1930	1940	1949	1959
15-24	14	10	11	12	21	16
25-34	24	21	26	22	35	42
35-44	35	34	44	37	53	63

There is a marked advance in the situation of young persons after 1940, part of which must be due not only to a great increase in credit availability but to a substantially improved income position as well which encouraged taking on long-term commitments.

6. Finally, there are the characteristics of the baby boom itself. A recent study [82] has shown that a major factor in the boom has been the significant decline since 1940 in age at marriage. From 1890 to 1940, age at marriage drifted irregularly downward, the decline in the median for all females amounting to only one-half year. In the next decade, a period one-fifth as long, the reduction was twice as great [186, Series A-229]. In addition, wives have had children much sooner after marriage. These two factors, earlier marriage and earlier child-bearing, rather than mothers having substantially more children, accounted for most of the rise in the fertility rate through 1954 [82, pp. 365-371].²⁷ The central role of young families in the baby boom is obvious. It would be difficult indeed to account for this unless their income and employment experience had been exceptionally good.

CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS

The most striking feature of the baby boom—and thus the one calling most urgently for explanation—is the apparent abrupt break with historical experience. However, reconciliation of present and past becomes

[91, p. 1107, Suppl. Table 1]. (Data for those aged 18-24 from the latter source were adjusted to 15-24 on the assumption that no heads of households under 18 own their own homes.) The 1930 and 1940 estimates are for male heads of household only, which biases them slightly upward compared to the figures for the other dates.

²⁷ The draft law policy of deferring fathers doubtless encouraged earlier marriage and childbearing, but without an income situation that favored expansion of the family beyond the first child, it is doubtful that it could have produced a baby boom of the type experienced. There is now reliable evidence that the average number of children per mother has also risen in the postwar period. This development is of course consistent with the analysis presented here. The longer the exceptional labor market situation prevails, the more likely the fertility response will take this form in addition to earlier marriage and earlier childbearing.

easier when one recognizes that even before the 1940's the historical record was characterized by fluctuations of significant magnitude and duration, and that the record for the total white population is a composite of the varying experience of several component groups, subject in part to quite different influences. Major swings in agricultural conditions, on the one hand, and Kuznets cycles in nonagricultural activity with accompanying immigration fluctuations, on the other—each with their peculiar historical timing—gave rise to distinctive fertility responses on the part of the rural white, foreign-born white, and urban native white populations. When one unravels these differing strands of experience and considers their underlying influences, the impression emerges that the recent fertility behavior of the urban native white population, the group of central significance for explanation of the baby boom, is not as inconsistent with its earlier character as was heretofore believed. In the first three decades of the century, the fertility of this group, instead of exhibiting a declining trend, showed reasonable stability. And in the recent period the effect on the labor market of a Kuznets-cycle expansion—an expansion stronger, according to our data, than any preceding ones considered here—was for the first time not accompanied by an offsetting rise in the rate of labor-market entry due to a significant increase in either immigration or the native-born population in young working ages. The unprecedented concurrence of these three circumstances—a Kuznets-cycle expansion in the economy, restricted immigration, and a low rate of labor force entry from the native population resulting from demographic processes—created an exceptional job market for those in family-building ages and as a result drastically accelerated the founding of families.²⁸ This

²⁸ With regard to the causes of the exceptional labor market for young persons in the 1940's and 1950's, the present chapter emphasizes quantitative scarcity to the exclusion of relative quality. The following figures on median school years completed by young and middle-aged males at various dates may partially right the balance (see also Figure 19):

<i>Age at Specified Date</i>	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970 (<i>projected</i>)
(1) 25-29	8.4	8.7	10.1	12.0	12.3	12.5
(2) 45-54	8.1	8.2	8.4	8.7	10.0	12.0
(3) (1)-(2)	0.3	0.5	1.7	3.3	2.3	0.5

Note the immense gain in the educational advantage of young over middle-aged workers in the 1940's, a change which sharply improved their competitive position

process was further abetted by a concurrent boom in agricultural conditions, which evoked a similar fertility response on the part of the rural white population.

In conclusion, some of the implications of the preceding analysis for the past and future may be set forth.

With regard to the past, it was noted earlier in the discussion that while Kuznets cycles in the rate of population growth are not a new phenomenon in our history, the shift in the source of these movements from immigration to fertility raises a question whether the recent cycle bears any logical connection to its predecessors. The implication of the present analysis is that indeed such a connection does exist. As long as we permitted free immigration, the rise and fall of immigration in response to swings in labor demand associated with Kuznets cycles in this country acted as a buffer to moderate the impact on the urban native white population. With the restriction of immigration, however, the urban native white population felt the impact of a Kuznets-cycle swing in labor demand with unprecedented force, and the result was an unparalleled response in fertility and thus again in the rate of population growth.

The implications of the present analysis for the longer-term future of fertility change are in contrast with that likely to be suggested by the typical demographic discussion of our fertility history. The customary emphasis of demographers on the long-term secular decline in the past would suggest a view of the current fertility decline as a resumption of the primary trend.²⁹ The interpretation suggested by the present analysis, however, would be that for the group whose

at just the time that labor demand was booming. The timing is fortuitous, stemming from the abrupt advance in the diffusion of high-school education that occurred in the 1920's and especially the 1930's. (The figures are from [176, pp. 236, 238] and [182, pp. 6-7]. The 1920 and 1930 values were assumed the same as those reported by the corresponding cohorts in 1940, the first time that data on educational attainment were collected.)

The sequence of change in the educational differentials calls to mind the recent pronounced convergence in income distribution by size. One wonders to what extent the change in the size distribution in the past forty years may reflect changing income differentials by age associated with variations in both the relative number and quality of young workers.

²⁹ Clearly the present analysis suggests that a reexamination of the primary trend itself in terms of the differing patterns of the groups distinguished here might prove fruitful.

experience is of central significance for the future, the urban native white population, the nature of the primary trend in this century—whether upward or downward—is not readily apparent, and the recent behavior of this group may be largely explained as a Kuznets-cycle phenomenon. If this is correct, then substantial fertility variation, up or down, may occur again over the longer run.