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Volume Title: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't

Volume Author/Editor: Frederic S. Mishkin, editor

Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Volume ISBN: 0-226-53188-0

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/mish01-1>

Conference Date: January 13-15, 2000

Publication Date: January 2001

Chapter Title: List of Contributors, Indexes

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Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10765>

Chapter pages in book: (p. 357 - 368)

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