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Gender and Assimilation among Mexican Americans

Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn

2.1 Introduction

A steady flow of new immigration has led the foreign-born share of the U.S. population to rise from 4.8 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 2000. Perhaps more dramatically, the percentage of the accumulated foreign-born population that came from Europe or Northern America fell from 70.4 to 18.5 percent between 1970 and 2000, with a corresponding increase in the Asian and Latin American share from 28.3 percent in 1970 to 78.2 percent in 2000 (see the U.S. Bureau of the Census Web site at <http://www.census.gov>). By far, the largest source of immigration in recent years has been Mexico. For instance, from 1991 to 2000, 24.7 percent (2.25 million) of the 9.095 million immigrants to the United States came from Mexico, with the next largest source, the Philippines, sending only 5.5 percent (504,000) of the total. And Mexican immigration has been growing in both absolute and relative terms as immigration from Mexico was 454,000 (13.7 percent of the total) in 1961–1970.¹ By 2003, people of Mexican heritage

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1. These figures are taken from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (2003), table 2.

comprised fully 8.2 percent of the U.S. adult population, a figure that is about 70 percent as large as the incidence of the black non-Hispanic population (11.7 percent).²

In addition to making up a large and growing portion of the U.S. population, Mexican Americans are, on average, poorer and less educated than U.S. residents of European heritage (Browne 1999; Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand 2004). Since it is well known that poverty in the United States falls disproportionately on women and children (Blank 1997), a study of gender and labor market outcomes of Mexican Americans could yield important insights into this issue. And, of particular relevance to the issues considered in this paper, Mexican Americans come from an origin country with a much more traditional division of labor in the family and lower relative and absolute female human capital levels than the United States. For example, female labor force participation rates remain considerably lower in Mexico than in the United States, although the difference has declined in recent years: the Mexican female participation rate was 15.6 percent in 1970 and 39.4 percent in 2000, compared to rates of 41.5 and 58.8 percent in the United States (see the International Labour Organization [ILO] Web site at <http://www.laborsta.ilo.org>).³ Fertility was higher in Mexico than in the United States, although, in this case, the difference has declined considerably in recent years, reflecting a sharp drop in fertility in Mexico: the total fertility rate in Mexico was 6.5 total births per woman as of 1970 and 2.8 as of 1998, compared to U.S. rates of 2.5 and 2.1. Adult illiteracy rates for women in Mexico were 22 percent in 1980 and 11 percent in 1998, compared to male rates of 14 percent and 7 percent, respectively; for the United States, illiteracy was below 5 percent in all cases (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 2002, 384–85). Moreover, according to Mexican Census data for 1990, among those age sixteen–sixty-five, men averaged 7.0 years of schooling, compared to only 6.4 for women.⁴ Educational attainment rose for both men and women in Mexico between 1990 and 2000: in 2000, men averaged 8.1 years and women 7.6 years. These are of course much lower than average U.S. schooling levels of thirteen–fourteen years for men and women according to Current Population Survey (CPS) data. And, while women's schooling in Mexico grew very slightly faster than men's between 1990 and

2. This is based on data from the March 2003 Current Population Survey.

3. Especially in developing countries, participation rates may be an incomplete measure of economic activity because they often do not count subsistence and family-based activities, although it might be argued that an indicator focusing on market-based work is not altogether inappropriate in that it is this type of involvement that is most important in the United States. A measure that implicitly adjusts for these problems (at least to the extent that they affect men and women similarly) is the ratio of female to male participation rates. It tells a similar story to the female participation rates: these ratios were .227 (Mexico) and .531 (United States) in 1970, and .472 (Mexico) and .781 (United States) in 2000.

4. We are grateful to Chris Woodruff for supplying this information from the Mexican census.

2000, a noticeable gender gap in educational attainment among Mexicans remained. In light of these large differences between the labor market status and preparedness of women in Mexico and those in the United States, Mexico represents a potentially interesting case in which to examine the assimilation of women into the U.S. labor market. Do Mexican immigrant families exhibit a more traditional division of labor than U.S. families as Mexican residents do? To what extent do gender patterns in labor market attachment and success among Mexican Americans converge to U.S.-native patterns within and across generations?

In this paper, we use the March CPS Annual Demographic Files for 1994–2003 to study the assimilation of Mexican American women and men, including both Mexican immigrants and the native born of Mexican heritage. While many analyses of immigration use the decennial censuses, we employ the CPS files because, since 1994, the Current Population Surveys contain information not only on immigration status but also on the birthplace of respondents' parents, thus allowing for intergenerational comparisons. Data on parents' birthplace have not been available in the census since 1970. The outcomes we consider include marriage and fertility, labor supply, unemployment, wages, and occupation and industry distribution. The repeated cross-sections in the CPS allow us to examine issues of assimilation among immigrants from a variety of arrival cohorts using the synthetic cohort approach proposed in Borjas (1985). Moreover, we also study assimilation across generations by analyzing these outcomes for second- and third-generation Mexican Americans. Examining progress across generations provides a more comprehensive study of assimilation than the traditional immigration literature that has, for the most part, focused on success at arrival and over time in the United States for those born in other countries. The children of immigrants may do considerably better in the United States than the immigrants themselves, and their fortunes need to be taken into account in evaluating the experience of immigrants (Card, DiNardo, and Estes 2000; Card 2004).

We begin by examining outcomes for all Mexican American adults and then consider married individuals separately. This enables us to confirm our aggregate findings for this group—one that is most likely to manifest traditional labor market patterns. Moreover, while, for the most part, research on immigrants has studied the behavior of individuals, analyzing immigrant behavior in a family context makes sense in general and may be particularly relevant to understanding women's assimilation. Baker and Benjamin (1997) propose a family investment model in which, upon arrival, husbands invest in their human capital, while wives work to provide the family with liquidity during this investment period. With increased time in the destination country, husbands' labor supply increases rapidly due to their growing skills, while wives' labor supply falls off in part because they originally took dead-end jobs upon arrival in order to finance

their husbands' investments in human capital. Baker and Benjamin provide some evidence consistent with this model using data on Canada over the 1986–1991 period. However, using data for the United States from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses, Blau et al. (2003) did not find evidence consistent with the family migration model.⁵ Specifically, they find that immigrant husbands and wives both worked less than comparable natives upon arrival and that both had positive assimilation profiles in labor supply, eventually overtaking the labor supply of comparable natives.

In the family migration model, married women are clearly secondary earners in the immigrant family. The Blau et al. (2003) results for the United States suggest more similar economic behavior of men and women within the immigrant family.⁶ Blau et al. report that labor supply assimilation patterns for men and women in the United States were very similar for each major sending region, including the Central American region defined to include Mexico. However, as a group coming from a source country with highly traditional gender roles, it is possible that patterns for Mexican immigrants would more closely approximate the family investment model than immigrants from Central America generally or other regions. Thus, we reexamine this question here. In addition, we include more recent data and study more dependent variables in the current paper, such as marriage, education, unemployment, occupational and industrial segregation, and fertility, than in this earlier work.

2.2 Recent Research on Labor Market Outcomes for Mexican Americans

Several authors have recently examined the assimilation of Mexican Americans into the U.S. labor market both within and between generations, although none has specifically studied gender differences in the assimilation process or assessed the relevance of the family migration model for Mexican Americans. Trejo (1997, 2003), for example, studied human capital and wages for men of Mexican origin versus white non-Hispanic native men for 1979 and 1989. He found that although men of Mexican origin earned considerably less than whites, most of these differences were

5. Studies by Long (1980), Duleep and Sanders (1993), and Macpherson and Stewart (1989) for the United States are all at least partially consistent with the idea that married immigrant women are more likely to work while their husbands are investing in human capital. However, unlike Blau et al. (2003), each of these studies is based on a single cross section of data.

6. In a recent paper, Duleep and Dowhan (2002) use matched Social Security earnings and 1994 CPS data to track the longitudinal earnings growth of immigrant versus native women. They find that more recent immigrant cohorts' earnings start low relative to natives' but rise quickly with time in the United States and eventually catch up to natives'. In contrast, earlier cohorts' initial earnings were at least as high as natives' but then either increased only a little or actually dropped. The results for the more recent cohorts are similar to the changes in hourly earnings reported by Baker and Benjamin (1997) for Canada and Blau et al. (2003) for the United States.

explained by the former's relatively low human capital levels. Moreover, while both the relative human capital levels and the return to investment in human capital rose between the first and second generations, this progress stalled between the second and third generations (Trejo 1997, 2003). A cross-sectional study of the wages of men and women for a sample of individuals of Mexican origin by Livingston and Kahn (2002) also found some progress of immigrants between the first and second generations that apparently stalled in the third generation.

Corcoran, Heflin, and Reyes (1999) summarize trends in labor market outcomes for Mexican American women using census data to compare outcomes for Mexican American women and white non-Hispanic women over the 1970–1990 period. They find that the relative wages and employment attachment of Mexican Americans fell over the 1980s, probably reflecting, in part, the growing immigrant share among Mexican American women. They also find that, in the cross section, long-term immigrants (i.e., those with over ten years of U.S. residence) had better wage outcomes and higher employment levels than short-term immigrants, while Mexican American women born in the United States had higher wages and employment incidence than long-term immigrants, although they still lagged considerably behind white non-Hispanic women in this regard. These findings suggest assimilation across generations and either assimilation among immigrants with more time in the United States or declining labor market success among more recent cohorts of immigrants.

Baker (1999) provides some additional descriptive information on demographic patterns using the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses. Specifically, while immigrant Mexican American women were in each year roughly equally likely as white non-Hispanic women to be married, U.S.-born Mexican American women were less likely to be married than white non-Hispanic women. Moreover, Mexican immigrants had more children than white non-Hispanics and so did U.S.-born Mexican American women. However, these Mexican-white differentials in fertility were smaller for U.S.-born Mexican Americans and also fell progressively from 1970 to 1990 for each nativity group. Relative fertility levels were thus falling for Mexican American women over time and across generations.

Unlike the earlier work that studied only men or only women, we explicitly analyze gender differences in demographic and labor market outcomes for Mexican Americans. And, in contrast to the descriptive studies, we explicitly analyze assimilation in a regression context and may thus estimate how much assimilation occurs in the first generation with exposure to the U.S. economy and labor market as well as identify the impact of measured covariates versus behavioral changes in the assimilation of Mexican Americans, both within and across generations. Moreover, unlike the Livingston and Kahn (2002) study of Mexican-origin workers, we make explicit comparisons with a native base group and also examine a much wider

array of outcomes than their focus on hourly earnings. And, in contrast to all of these studies, we also examine the family context in which these outcomes occur. This means, for example, controlling for family related variables in analyzing individual outcomes. Thus, in addition, by making explicit gender comparisons, we are able to arrive at conclusions about assimilation with respect to gender roles.

2.3 Data and Descriptive Patterns

We use the 1994–2003 March CPS Annual Demographic Supplement files to study gender and Mexican American assimilation. These files contain information on the respondent's country of birth, the country(ies) of birth of his or her mother and father, and whether the individual is of Mexican origin. We can thus construct samples of Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican Americans (defined as individuals who were born in the United States who had at least one parent born in Mexico), and U.S.-born individuals of Mexican origin whose parents were both born in the United States (the third generation). Our comparison group comprises third-generation, U.S.-born non-Hispanic whites (non-Hispanic whites). Using ten years of pooled cross-sectional data provides us with fairly large samples of Mexican Americans in each generation (see table 2A.1) and allows us to distinguish the impact of immigrant cohort from that of time in the United States (Borjas 1985).⁷

Our analyses of intergenerational mobility compare outcomes for immigrants with those of second- and third-generation Mexican Americans. Immigrants observed as of 1994–2003, the time window of our data, may not be representative of the parents of second-generation Mexican Americans also observed at that time, although there is likely to be some overlap. By using the same data to observe all three generations, we are in effect assuming that contemporary Mexican immigrants are in some sense similar to those of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when the parents of many of the second-generation Mexican Americans in our sample would have been in the prime working ages. An alternative would be to use data for an earlier period to observe outcomes for the first generation. Each approach has strengths and weaknesses, and recent research suggests they may not pro-

7. As in all analyses based on pooled cross-section data, we cannot observe return migration. Results may be biased if those who remain in the United States are a self-selected group of more or less successful immigrants. In addition, there may be recall errors and ambiguities of interpretation among respondents to the CPS question on when they arrived in the United States, as immigrants may enter and leave the United States several times. In a paper analyzing such issues using a recently developed data base that allows one to correct for such factors (the New Immigrant Survey Pilot [NISP]), Redstone and Massey (2004) find that traditional analyses of wages and years of U.S. experience yield similar results under the census and NISP definition of years in the United States.

duce the same estimates of intergenerational assimilation. For example, Smith (2003) finds more apparent progress in wages and schooling across generations among Hispanic Americans when he pools census and CPS data for the 1940–1997 period than when he bases his estimate on a single cross-section (the 1970 Census).

Looking at one cross-section (or, in our case, a single ten-year period) may yield a biased estimate of intergenerational assimilation if unmeasured immigrant cohort characteristics have changed. On the other hand, as Trejo (1997) points out, the time series approach may also be problematic. Between the 1950s–1970s and 1994–2003, there were many legal and economic changes that themselves could have influenced the economic success of Mexican American immigrants. Trejo specifically mentions the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination based on national origin (as well as race and sex). Thus, part of any apparent progress of Mexican Americans in general or Mexican American women in particular across generations between earlier years and the current period may have been due to changes in the legal and social environment that impacted all generations rather than to assimilation of the second generation. Working in the opposite direction, we may note that rising returns to education and unmeasured skills probably had an independent effect lowering the relative fortunes of most Mexican Americans in the 1990s relative to the earlier period. This development would cause us to underestimate true intergenerational assimilation.⁸ Finally, the prohibition of sex discrimination by the Civil Rights Act is also relevant to our study as we are interested in gender differences in outcomes, as are the considerable changes in social norms and attitudes about gender roles that have occurred since the earlier period. These developments could have had a differential impact on Mexican American women's labor force behavior and outcomes relative to a native reference group, although the direction of this bias is unclear. Taking into account these considerations, our approach to measuring the intergenerational assimilation of Mexican Americans is to compare all three generations under the same legal, economic, and social environment: the 1994–2003 period. However, by looking at estimated immigrant cohort effects, we will be able to simulate outcomes for the immigrants from an earlier cohort and also to assess the extent to which results are sensitive to which immigrant cohort is used in the simulation.

In interpreting our findings for assimilation across generations, special caution is warranted regarding the third generation. While first- and second-generation individuals may be objectively identified in terms of their own or their parents' place of birth, third-generation Mexican Americans

8. For analyses of the returns to education and unmeasured skills in the context of immigrant assimilation, see LaLonde and Topel (1992) and Borjas (1995).

must identify themselves as of Mexican origin. If there is self-selection in reporting, results may be biased.⁹ For example, if among third-generation Mexican Americans, those who self-identify as of Mexican origin are less well assimilated than those who do not, assimilation of third-generation Mexican Americans relative to the native-born, non-Hispanic reference group will be understated.¹⁰

Table 2.1 contains some descriptive information on demographic and labor market outcomes for Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic white–third-generation Americans. The entries in table 2.1 are predicted levels of these outcomes from regressions controlling for ethnicity or generation, a quartic in age and year. We control for age even at this descriptive stage because there are age differences across samples due to past immigration patterns, and we wish to describe Mexican American–non-Hispanic white contrasts net of this compositional factor.¹¹ The following regression was estimated separately by gender:

$$(1) \quad y_{it} = b_0 + b_1 \text{age}_{it} + b_2 \text{age}_{it}^2 + b_3 \text{age}_{it}^3 + b_4 \text{age}_{it}^4 + c_1 \text{Meximm}_{it} \\ + c_2 \text{Mexsecgen}_{it} + c_3 \text{Mexthirdgen}_{it} + d_t + u_{it},$$

where i indexes individuals, and t indexes survey years, and y is a demographic or labor market outcome, age is the person's age in years, Meximm, Mexsecgen, and Mexthird are, respectively, dummy variables for Mexican immigrants, and second- and third-generation Mexican Americans, d is a year effect, and u is a disturbance term. We define a second-generation Mexican American as someone born in the United States who had at least one parent who was born in Mexico. Two versions of equation (1) were estimated: (a) one which included all immigrants and (b) one which included only those who migrated to the United States at age eighteen or older (adult immigrants).¹² We show results for adult immigrants, in addition to those for all immigrants, because those who migrated as children are likely to be more assimilated to U.S. labor markets than those who migrated as

9. Of course, as noted previously, even for immigrants biases may arise due to self-selection in return migration, recall bias, and ambiguities in defining length of residence in the United States.

10. For a fuller consideration of these issues, see, for example, Duncan and Trejo (chap. 7 in this volume), who find some indirect evidence consistent with the idea that more assimilated Mexican Americans are less likely to self-identify as having a Mexican heritage.

11. Within each of the ethnicity or generation subsamples (i.e., third-generation non-Hispanic whites, Mexican immigrants, and second- and third-generation Mexican Americans), the average age of men and women was similar, but average age varied across subsamples. Non-Hispanic whites averaged thirty-nine years of age, Mexican immigrants thirty-four–thirty-five years (thirty-eight–thirty-nine years for adult immigrants), second-generation Mexican Americans thirty-two years, and third-generation Mexican Americans thirty-four–thirty-five years.

12. Results for second- and third-generation Mexican Americans are based on regressions that include all immigrants, although the findings were similar in regressions with the immigrant sample restricted to adult migrants.

Table 2.1 Age- and year-corrected levels of demographic, human capital and wage outcomes for Mexican Americans and native non-Hispanic whites (third generation), 1994–2003

	Education		Married, spouse present		No. of children <18 yrs	
	Level	SE	Level	SE	Level	SE
	<i>Men</i>					
Native, non-Hispanic whites	13.723	0.015	0.687	0.003		
Mexican Americans						
All immigrants	9.094	0.024	0.704	0.004		
Adult immigrants	8.254	0.028	0.663	0.005		
Second generation	12.651	0.035	0.650	0.006		
Third generation	12.533	0.030	0.657	0.005		
	<i>Women</i>					
Native, non-Hispanic whites	13.856	0.014	0.705	0.003	1.458	0.007
Mexican Americans						
All immigrants	9.162	0.023	0.776	0.004	2.159	0.012
Adult immigrants	8.280	0.027	0.758	0.005	2.138	0.014
Second generation	12.670	0.031	0.670	0.006	1.845	0.016
Third generation	12.498	0.026	0.657	0.005	1.724	0.013
	Currently employed		Annual work hours		Currently in labor force	
	Level	SE	Level	SE	Level	SE
	<i>Men</i>					
Native, non-Hispanic whites	0.869	0.002	2096.81	5.17	0.909	0.002
Mexican Americans						
All immigrants	0.872	0.004	1963.80	8.03	0.933	0.003
Adult immigrants	0.863	0.004	1886.38	9.78	0.930	0.004
Second generation	0.818	0.005	1947.97	11.77	0.878	0.005
Third generation	0.818	0.004	1919.15	10.10	0.877	0.004
	<i>Women</i>					
Native, non-Hispanic whites	0.764	0.003	1463.48	5.50	0.792	0.003
Mexican Americans						
All immigrants	0.480	0.004	935.22	9.08	0.536	0.004
Adult immigrants	0.444	0.005	838.42	10.91	0.503	0.005
Second generation	0.672	0.006	1353.53	12.38	0.725	0.006
Third generation	0.687	0.005	1342.21	10.51	0.730	0.005
	Unemployed In labor force		Log wages (FT)			
	Level	SE	Level	SE		
	<i>Men</i>					
Native, non-Hispanic whites	0.047	0.001	2.985	0.005		
Mexican Americans						
All immigrants	0.070	0.002	2.468	0.007		
Adult immigrants	0.077	0.003	2.354	0.008		
Second generation	0.079	0.003	2.810	0.011		
Third generation	0.074	0.003	2.771	0.009		

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

	Unemployed In labor force		Log wages (FT)	
	Level	SE	Level	SE
	<i>Women</i>			
Native, non-Hispanic whites	0.039	0.001	2.717	0.005
Mexican Americans				
All immigrants	0.114	0.003	2.213	0.010
Adult immigrants	0.125	0.003	2.079	0.012
Second generation	0.085	0.003	2.582	0.012
Third generation	0.065	0.003	2.533	0.010

Notes: Based on pooled equations with a quartic in age, year dummies, and dummies for each Mexican American generation. Results for adult immigrants are based on regression with native non-Hispanic whites, and the three Mexican American generations pooled, where the immigrant generation includes only those who migrated at age eighteen or older. Sample for number of children under age eighteen is restricted to respondents who are age fifty or less; sample for log wages is full-time wage and salary workers. Predictions assume the mean age: thirty-nine years and year = 2003. Native, non-Hispanic whites are limited to third generation.

adults (Friedberg 1993). The sample for equation (1) includes only Mexican Americans and third-generation non-Hispanic whites who were age sixteen–sixty-five, and the entries in table 2.1 assume the sample mean for age (thirty-nine years) and the 2003 year effect. In all regressions and descriptive statistics, we use CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same weight. We consider immigrants (or adult immigrants) as a group now for comparison purposes, although later we will discuss the role of immigrant cohort and time in the United States.

The results in table 2.1 indicate that, as is well known, Mexican immigrants have much lower levels of schooling than the non-Hispanic white reference group: 4.6 to 4.7 years less for all immigrants and 5.5 to 5.6 years for adult immigrants.¹³ Assuming a 10 percent rate of return to education (approximately the rate obtained in our wage regressions reported in the following), this difference in years of schooling is responsible for a wage differential of .46 to .56 log points (i.e., 58–75 percent), a sizable effect. While less well educated than non-Hispanic white natives, Mexican immigrants appear to be somewhat positively selected relative to the Mexican population. Table 2.1 shows that among Mexican adult immigrants (who presumably had largely finished their schooling when they arrived in the United States), men and women have 8.3 years of education.¹⁴ This is

13. We mapped the CPS education categories into years of schooling using Jaeger's (1997) algorithm.

14. We confirmed the claim that adult immigrants had largely finished their schooling: controlling for age, year, immigrant cohort, and years since migration and its square, we found that years living in the United States had insignificant and small effects on current education levels for adult immigrant men and women.

higher than the reported years of schooling for men and women in Mexico obtained from Mexican census data for 1990 and 2000: 7.0–8.1 years for males and 6.4–7.6 for females. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in Mexico, Mexican men and women immigrants in the United States have the same educational attainment.¹⁵

While Mexican Americans lag behind native non-Hispanic whites, there is considerable convergence in education across generations; second-generation Mexican Americans have only 1.07 (males) to 1.19 (females) years less education than the non-Hispanic white reference group, while the differentials for the third generation are 1.19 (males) to 1.36 (females) years. The apparent cessation of convergence toward non-Hispanic whites' education levels after the second generation is consistent with earlier analyses of labor market outcomes for Mexican Americans discussed in the preceding. In both the second and third generations, the Mexican American educational shortfall relative to non-Hispanic whites is statistically significantly smaller for men than women, and this gender difference increases from the second to the third generations (from 0.07 to 0.17). However, the magnitude of the gender difference in convergence is small—only 0.1 years, and educational attainment of Mexican American men and women within each generation is virtually identical, in contrast to the 0.5–0.6 year male advantage in Mexico.

Table 2.1 shows that, overall, both immigrant men and immigrant women are significantly more likely to be married, spouse present (married) than are non-Hispanic white natives; however, among adult immigrants, men are less likely to be married than the non-Hispanic white reference group, while women are still more likely to be married. This suggests that immigration may be disruptive of marriage for Mexican men—either by delaying marriage or causing spouses to live apart—but not for women. Mexican immigrant women are 5 to 7 percentage points more likely to be married than native non-Hispanic whites. The higher marriage rates of Mexican immigrant women are consistent with a greater adherence to traditional gender roles in this population but may also be related to a tendency to migrate jointly with their husbands or to reunite families, perhaps as tied movers. By the second and third generations, however, Mexican Americans of both sexes are significantly less likely to be married than non-Hispanic whites, with differentials of 3–5 percentage points. As discussed by Angrist (2002), reductions across generations in the likelihood of marriage may be due to marital search problems and the desire to marry

15. The conclusion that Mexican immigrants are positively selected with respect to education has been challenged by Ibarra and Lubotsky (chap. 5 in this volume), who suggest negative selection. On the other hand, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find that Mexican immigrants come from the middle- and upper-middle portions of the educational distribution, suggesting mildly positive selection. For our purposes, the most interesting finding is that educational attainment of male and female Mexican immigrants is the same, while in Mexico, men have somewhat more education than women. Thus, Mexican female immigrants are *relatively* positively selected.

within one's own ethnic group.¹⁶ On the other hand, the discrepancy may be explained by measured characteristics, for example, the lower levels of education of U.S.-born Mexican Americans. The following regression analysis will shed light on this.

Table 2.1 also presents results for number of own (biological or adopted) children under age eighteen living in the family. While it would be more accurate to have information on number of children ever born, by restricting the age sample for this variable to women no older than fifty and evaluating the variable at age thirty-nine, we are likely to obtain a fairly good indicator of cross-group differences in fertility.¹⁷ Because children who live with only one parent are much more likely to live with their mothers than their fathers, we restrict our examination of fertility differences to women. Perhaps reflecting higher fertility rates in the source country, Mexican immigrant women have more children than non-Hispanic whites, and, although this differential declines across generations, it remains positive even in the third generation. As noted earlier, as of 1998, the total fertility rate for women in Mexico averaged 2.8, while in the United States, the fertility rate was 2.1, a difference of 0.7. While our measure is constructed quite differently, we obtain a very similar differential between Mexican immigrants and non-Hispanic whites: Mexican immigrant women average 2.14 to 2.16 children, roughly 0.7 more than the corresponding figure for white non-Hispanic women of 1.46. (The gap between the number of own children for Mexican immigrant women and all women residing in the United States was also 0.7.) The gap had fallen to 0.39 by the second and 0.27 by the third generation, suggesting an intergenerational assimilation of roughly 60 percent.

When we stratified the analysis of the number of children by marital status, we found similar patterns across the generations. For all generations, among either single or married individuals, Mexican Americans have more children, with a declining differential across generations; moreover, the magnitude of the Mexican American–non-Hispanic white differential was similar for married and single women. In addition, Mexican American women were more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be single parents, with significant differentials for immigrant (5.3 percentage points), adult immigrant (4.5 percentage points), second-generation (9.6 percentage points), and third-generation Mexican Americans (9.0 percentage points). We expect having larger numbers of children to be associated with less labor market attachment and lower wage offers for Mexican American versus non-Hispanic white women (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002; Waldfogel 1998).

16. The disproportionately high marriage incidence among immigrant women shown in tables 2.1 and 2.2 for Mexican immigrants is similar to what Angrist (2002) finds for immigrants in general.

17. Results were similar when the age range was unrestricted.

Table 2.1 contains several measures of labor force attachment, including whether one is currently employed, total hours of work in the previous year (including those who didn't work), and whether one is in the labor force. The generational patterns with respect to these three indicators are similar. Among males, immigrants and adult immigrants are roughly equally likely to be currently in the labor force as white non-Hispanics; in contrast, among females, both groups of immigrants have much lower participation rates than white non-Hispanics. The labor force participation rate was 79.2 percent for white non-Hispanic women compared to only 53.6 percent for all female immigrants and 50.3 percent for adult female immigrants. However, Mexican American men's participation decreased by about 5 percentage points between the first and second generations, while that for women rose dramatically, to 72.5 percent. There is little further change for either group between the second and third generations. Thus, by the second generation, Mexican American women have nearly caught up to non-Hispanic white women, and the Mexican American–non-Hispanic white difference in the gender gap in participation has been almost eliminated. In the next section we will consider how much of this assimilation to U.S. gender roles occurs among immigrants with time in the United States versus across generations as well as its relationship to measured characteristics.

The relative labor market attachment of female compared to male Mexican immigrants may be compared to that in Mexico. As previously noted, in 2000 the female labor force participation rate was 39.4 percent in Mexico—this was 47.2 percent of the male rate. Mexican female labor force participation rates were 30.2 percent (35.6 percent of the male rate) in 1980 and 34.0 percent (40.7 percent of the male rate) in 1990 (see the ILO Web site at <http://www.laborsta.ilo.org>). These earlier rates may be relevant for comparing immigrants who arrived during the 1980s and 1990s. The ILO figures refer to individuals fifteen years of age and older, so, for purposes of comparison, we computed raw labor force participation rates for individuals sixteen years and older in the CPS with no age cutoff at the top. For all Mexican immigrants, the participation rates were 85.7 percent for men and 46.6 percent for women, for a female-to-male ratio of 54.4 percent; and, for adult Mexican immigrants, the rates were 85.8 percent for men and 43.3 percent for women, for a ratio of 50.5 percent. These figures show that Mexican immigrant women had higher absolute and relative labor force participation than women in Mexico as of 2000, but the differences were not large. The gap between labor supply of Mexican immigrant women and women in Mexico is somewhat larger if we compare current Mexican immigrants to women in Mexico as of 1980 or 1990. As noted earlier, labor force attachment of women in the United States in general is much higher than that of women in Mexico or Mexican immigrants to the United States. In particular, as of 2000, ILO data show that women's labor force participation in the United States was 58.8 percent (81.2 percent of

the male rate). This is suggestive of a strong effect of source country patterns on Mexican immigrants in the United States. The observed differences between Mexican immigrants and source-country patterns could be a selection effect if migration is selective of relatively more market-oriented women from Mexico; alternatively, exposure to the U.S. labor market may bring Mexican immigrant women into the labor force. In the following, we pursue the latter issue in more detail.

Although all the labor supply measures show similar generational patterns, Mexican American employment-population rates are consistently lower relative to non-Hispanic white rates than are their labor force participation rates. This difference reflects the considerably higher unemployment rates of Mexican Americans, especially Mexican American women, compared to non-Hispanic whites, though here, too, there is dramatic intergenerational convergence for women. Mexican American male unemployment rates were 2.3–3.2 percentage points higher than those of non-Hispanic whites (a large differential, considering non-Hispanic white males' predicted rate of 4.7 percent), and there is no intergenerational convergence to native whites' levels. In contrast, the Mexican immigrant women's unemployment rate is 7.5 percentage points higher than non-Hispanic whites' (11.4 versus 3.9 percent), and the female adult immigrant unemployment rate is 8.6 percentage points higher; however, the Mexican American non-Hispanic white gap falls steadily across generations, reaching 4.6 percent by the second generation and 2.6 percent by the third generation. It is possible that Mexican immigrant women have relatively low levels of job seeking skills that prevent their locating a wage offer or that minimum wage floors are especially binding for them.¹⁸

The final outcome shown in table 2.1 is the log of real hourly earnings for full-time wage and salary workers.¹⁹ The immigrant wage shortfalls are very large and roughly the same size for men and women: .505 to .517 log points for all immigrants and .634 to .641 log points for adult immigrants. These fall dramatically by the second generation, to .135–.175, and then rise several log points, to .184–.213, by the third generation. Here, we again note the lack of further convergence between the second and third generations noted in previous studies. The male shortfall is 3–4 percent larger than the female shortfall for the second and third generations, implying that the gender wage differential between Mexican Americans born in the United

18. For example, the 25th percentile of hourly wages among all wage and salary workers (both full and part time) with valid wages was only \$5.27 in 2000 dollars for Mexican American immigrant women (\$5.11 for adult immigrant women) at a time when the minimum wage ranged from \$4.66 to \$5.42 in 2000 dollars; in contrast, the 25th percentile for second- and third-generation women was \$5.92 and \$6.14, respectively. Corresponding figures for Mexican American men were \$6.15 (immigrants), \$6.04 (adult immigrants), \$6.97 (second generation) and \$7.47 (third generation). Thus, the minimum wage cuts into the Mexican immigrant women's wage distribution to a much larger degree than for the other Mexican American groups.

19. See the appendix for the construction of the earnings variable.

States is somewhat smaller than among non-Hispanic whites; this is a fairly general pattern among minorities (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2002).

2.4 Assimilation within and across Generations: Basic Regression Results

One of our key objectives is to compare the degree to which Mexican American men and women assimilate to U.S. labor market and family patterns, both within and between generations. While table 2.1 provides some important descriptive information on demographic and labor market outcomes for immigrants and later generations, in this section we present the results of regression analyses for selected dependent variables that allow us to more explicitly examine assimilation by controlling for the effect of years since migration on immigrants' outcomes and by including additional covariates which control for the human capital and locational characteristics of Mexican Americans. This specification enables us to estimate how much assimilation occurs in the first generation with exposure to the U.S. economy and labor market as well as to identify the impact of measured covariates versus behavioral changes in the assimilation of Mexican Americans, both within and across generations.

Specifically, to capture the assimilation of immigrants, we augment equation (1) by replacing the immigrant dummy variable with a full set of immigrant arrival cohort dummies and an indicator of years since migration and its square. The cohort variables refer to arrival before 1961; 1961–1970; 1971–1980; 1981–1990; 1991–1996; and 1997–2002. As previously noted, because we are pooling ten years of data, we can in principle distinguish the effects of different arrival cohorts from that of time in the United States as in Borjas (1985). In our basic models, we also control for human capital (years of schooling)²⁰ and location (eight Census region dummies, a metropolitan statistical area [MSA] dummy, and dummies for California and Texas, the two states with the largest incidence of Mexican Americans in the population),²¹ in addition to a quartic in age and year dummies (as in the preceding). For comparison, we also estimate models with only the age and year controls, in effect allowing human capital and region to be endogenous.

With respect to immigrants, the two specifications allow us to compare immigrants both to third-generation non-Hispanic whites in general and also to those with similar measured characteristics, with the former comparison including both compositional and behavioral differences and the

20. Ibarra and Lubotsky (chap. 5 in this volume) suggest that the U.S. Census overstates educational attainment for Mexican immigrants. If this is true, then the results we show in figures 2.1–2.9 with full controls may be biased. However, we note that all of our estimated immigrant assimilation profiles have similar slopes whether or not we control for education. Thus, our basic conclusions about the direction and magnitude of immigrant assimilation are likely to be robust with respect to possible measurement error in immigrant education.

21. California and Texas dummies were used by Trejo (1997, 2003) in his analyses of Mexican American men.

latter attempting to isolate the effect of behavioral differences. Similarly, looking across generations, comparison of the two specifications allows us to make inferences about the degree to which assimilation in labor market and family outcomes occurs through changes in the education and location variables versus behavioral changes. Table 2.2 shows regression results controlling for education and location as well as year, while table 2A.2 shows corresponding results for models that control only for age and year. Means of the explanatory variables are shown in table 2A.3. To assist in the interpretation of the regression results, figures 2.1–2.6 show implied assimilation profiles for Mexican Americans. Immigrant outcomes are usually evaluated for the 1971–1980 arrival cohort. We chose this cohort because it likely contains a large number of the parents of second-generation Mexican Americans in our 1994–2003 sample period. However, where relevant, we also discuss other arrival cohorts, particularly the 1980s cohort, as this was a period of rapidly rising returns to education, a factor that worked against the labor market success of Mexican Americans.

Turning first to the incidence of marriage shown in table 2.2 and figure 2.1, we see that, upon arrival, Mexican immigrant men are less likely and Mexican immigrant women more likely than otherwise similar non-Hispanic white natives to be married, spouse present. There is some assimilation for both sexes, with substantial male assimilation into marriage among immigrants with time in the United States and some reduction over time in females' likelihood of being married. This pattern suggests that, for males, immigration may be disruptive of marriage (either by delaying marriage or causing a temporary separation from their wives), whereas marriage may play a positive role in immigration decision of women, with some perhaps arriving as tied movers. Despite assimilation toward the lower marriage incidence of natives with similar characteristics, female immigrants continue to be more likely to be married, spouse present, than the native reference group for all cohorts. For example, the 1971–1980 arrival cohort of immigrant women has an 18.2 percentage point higher incidence of marriage upon arrival in the United States than the native reference group and continued to have an 8.4 percentage point advantage after twenty years of residence. Given their positive assimilation, male immigrants in this cohort were projected to overtake their native counterparts after eight years and to have an 11.0 percentage point higher incidence of marriage after twenty years. Thus, both male and female immigrants are characterized by more traditional marriage patterns than natives. The regression results suggest, however, that full assimilation to the marriage patterns of otherwise similar third-generation non-Hispanic whites has occurred by the second generation in which Mexican Americans of both sexes are roughly equally likely to be married as comparable natives; by the third generation, Mexican-American women are actually slightly (3 percentage points) less likely to be married than the reference group.

Assimilation rates are similar when we do not control for education and

Table 2.2 Selected regression results for demographic and labor market outcomes

	Marriage				No. of children <18 yrs			
	Men		Women		Women		Women	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
					No		Yes	
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-0.083	0.051	0.238	0.056	1.178	0.190	0.954	0.183
immig: 1961–70 arrival	-0.090	0.032	0.216	0.036	0.473	0.100	0.329	0.097
immig: 1971–80 arrival	-0.106	0.024	0.182	0.027	0.260	0.069	0.120	0.067
immig: 1981–90 arrival	-0.024	0.017	0.169	0.020	0.331	0.052	0.201	0.050
immig: 1991–96 arrival	-0.014	0.011	0.232	0.013	0.250	0.035	0.086	0.034
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	-0.079	0.010	0.154	0.012	0.045	0.030	-0.065	0.029
years since mig. (ysm)	0.017	0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.058	0.006	0.062	0.005
ysm squared (/100)	-0.028	0.004	-0.005	0.005	-0.184	0.017	-0.184	0.016
second-gen. Mexican American	-0.002	0.006	-0.007	0.006	0.373	0.015	0.371	0.014
third-gen. Mexican American	-0.006	0.005	-0.030	0.005	0.239	0.012	0.258	0.012
Control for marital status?					No		Yes	
	Annual work hours				Unemployment		In labor force	
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
					Men		Women	
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-187.57	99.45	-642.74	112.38	0.015	0.029	0.155	0.035
immig: 1961–70 arrival	-73.37	63.03	-653.59	73.35	0.041	0.018	0.143	0.023
immig: 1971–80 arrival	44.15	47.43	-454.92	55.59	0.006	0.013	0.103	0.018
immig: 1981–90 arrival	105.85	33.70	-463.57	39.68	-0.005	0.009	0.099	0.014
immig: 1991–96 arrival	172.72	22.20	-479.20	25.83	-0.019	0.006	0.090	0.009
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	217.77	19.32	-417.03	23.89	-0.023	0.005	0.060	0.008
years since mig. (ysm)	4.85	3.26	26.02	3.80	-0.001	0.001	-0.004	0.001
ysm squared (/100)	3.55	7.93	-23.87	9.13	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003
second-gen. Mexican American	-57.09	10.90	-13.66	11.46	0.019	0.003	0.034	0.003
third-gen. Mexican American	-105.02	9.24	-20.50	9.63	0.017	0.003	0.015	0.003
	Log wages (FT)							
	Men		Women					
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE				
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-0.150	0.080	-0.075	0.111				
immig: 1961–70 arrival	-0.162	0.048	-0.113	0.073				
immig: 1971–80 arrival	-0.166	0.036	-0.069	0.059				
immig: 1981–90 arrival	-0.282	0.026	-0.157	0.045				
immig: 1991–96 arrival	-0.246	0.018	-0.191	0.032				
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	-0.209	0.015	-0.182	0.028				
years since mig. (ysm)	0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.004				
ysm squared (/100)	-0.009	0.007	0.011	0.011				
second-gen. Mexican American	-0.130	0.010	-0.083	0.010				
third-gen. Mexican American	-0.141	0.008	-0.094	0.008				

Note: Other controls include: a quartic in age, years of schooling, eight Census region dummies, an MSA dummy, dummies for California and Texas, and year dummies.




Fig. 2.1 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: A, Marriage for men (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants); B, Marriage for women (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

location. However, as may be seen in figure 2.1 (see also tables 2.2 and 2A.2), the characteristics of Mexican Americans lower their marriage propensity. Specifically, we find that education raises the incidence of marriage, while residence in an MSA or in California or Texas lowers it, and Mexican Americans have lower levels of schooling and are more likely to live in California or Texas and in MSAs (table 2A.3). Nonetheless, as may

be seen in panel B of figure 2.1, female immigrants in the 1971–1980 arrival cohort remain more likely to be married than natives, even when these controls are omitted. (This is the case for other arrival cohorts as well.) Considering subsequent generations, it appears that education and location factors, rather than a dearth of prospective partners, are sufficient to account for the lower raw marriage rates of second- and third-generation Mexican Americans compared to third-generation non-Hispanic whites observed in table 2.1 and figure 2.1, since, as we have seen, the Mexican American–non-Hispanic white differences are virtually eliminated when we control for these factors.

Consistent with higher fertility rates in Mexico than in the United States, table 2.2 indicates that Mexican immigrant women in all cohorts are estimated to have higher fertility than otherwise comparable natives upon arrival in the United States when marital status is not controlled for. However, the immigrant-native differential upon arrival has been declining with successive arrival cohorts. This trend tracks the sharp declines in fertility that have occurred in Mexico. Some of the immigrant-native differential is due to the greater propensity of immigrant women to be married. Controlling for marital status reduces the estimated immigrant-native differential substantially. Nonetheless, with the exception of the most recent arrival cohort, immigrants continue to have higher fertility than the reference group, even controlling for marital status. Immigrant women's fertility is found to *increase* relative to natives with time in the United States: table 2.2 shows significantly positive assimilation profiles for immigrant women in both specifications (see also figure 2.2). Thus, like Blau (1992), we find evidence consistent with the notion that the immigration process disrupts or delays fertility and, thus, that immigrant women's fertility increases over time in the United States relative to comparable native women—in this case further widening the immigrant-native fertility differential over time. For the 1971–1980 arrival cohort, controlling for education and location, immigrants are estimated to arrive with .26 more children than natives, and this gap rises to .70 children after twenty years of residence. The immigrant-native differences in fertility are larger—rising from .42 to .83 after twenty years—for the model that does not control for education and location, a result consistent with a negative relationship between fertility and education. Note that, as Blau (1992) points out, if the immigration process disrupts fertility, the positive effect on fertility of years since migration does not necessarily mean that no assimilation toward native fertility levels is taking place. That is, the desired number of children could potentially have been reduced by exposure to U.S. norms and labor market opportunities, but fertility nonetheless rises over time compared to natives as desired fertility is approached. The problem is that we do not observe desired fertility.

While, consistent with more traditional gender roles, Mexican immigrant women are a high fertility group relative to the native reference group




Fig. 2.2 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: Number of children < eighteen for women (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

with no direct evidence of assimilation towards native levels, there is clear evidence of intergenerational assimilation of Mexican American fertility toward non-Hispanic white levels. Mexican American fertility does remain higher, however: .37 higher for the second generation and .24 higher for the third generation, even controlling for measured covariates. These differences relative to non-Hispanic whites are only slightly affected by whether we control for education (and location), presumably reflecting the smaller education differentials relative to non-Hispanic whites for Mexican Americans born in the United States compared to Mexican immigrants.

As may be seen in table 2.2 and figure 2.3, upon arrival, the labor supply patterns of Mexican immigrants are much more traditional than those of otherwise similar natives in the reference group. We focus here on annual work hours, including those who worked zero hours as this variable summarizes both labor force participation and work intensity. Upon arrival, immigrant women’s annual hours are considerably lower than those of the reference group, while, for cohorts arriving after 1970, men’s annual hours are somewhat higher. More recent cohorts of immigrant men increased the hours differential compared to the native reference group, *ceteris paribus*, while, consistent with rising female labor force participation in Mexico, the gap for women decreased a bit, though the pattern is much less pronounced than we found for fertility, and the shortfall compared to the native reference group remains sizable. Unlike our results for marriage and fertility, however, we find substantial assimilation of immigrant women to the native reference group’s labor supply patterns. Despite their initially higher levels, male hours show some positive assimilation as well.




Fig. 2.3 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: A, Annual hours for men (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants); B, Annual hours for women (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

Focusing on the dramatic results for women, we see that, upon arrival in the United States, the 1971–1980 cohort of immigrant women worked a highly significant 455 fewer hours than comparable white non-Hispanics, a large gap compared to the white non-Hispanic average of 1,281 hours per year. However, there is rapid assimilation: over half of this shortfall is eliminated after ten years as the gap falls to 219 hours, and nearly all of the rest after twenty years in the United States when immigrants are estimated to work only 31 hours less. In results not controlling for schooling or location,

the labor supply effects for immigrants become much more negative, but the assimilation profiles have similar slopes to those in the models with full controls (see also table 2A.2). For example, immigrant women in the 1971–1980 arrival cohort initially work 839 hours less; after twenty years, this deficit is reduced to 405 hours. Immigrants' low levels of education thus cause them to work much less than white non-Hispanic natives of the same age.

Across generations, Mexican American men appear to be progressively less work-oriented than comparable non-Hispanic whites (table 2.2 and panel A of figure 2.3), with a 105 hour shortfall by the third generation. In contrast, second- and third-generation Mexican American women work about the same number of hours as comparable white non-Hispanics: the effects range from a fourteen-hour shortfall for the second generation that is insignificant to a twenty-one-hour shortfall for the third generation that is significant although still small compared to the average white non-Hispanic female labor supply of 1,281 hours (table 2.2 and panel B of figure 2.3). As we have seen, our estimates suggest that assimilation to the labor supply patterns of otherwise similar women in the white non-Hispanic reference group essentially occurs in the first generation. As was the case for immigrants, when we do not control for education or location (see also table 2A.2), the Mexican American hours effects become more negative for the second and third generation compared to models with full controls, although the changes in these effects are smaller than for immigrants (due to later generations' higher education levels). The hours shortfalls for U.S.-born Mexican Americans range from 148 to 177 hours for men and from 112 to 122 hours for women.

The most striking findings in these results is the dramatic assimilation of Mexican immigrant women into the U.S. labor market and the relatively rapid erosion of the highly traditional labor supply pattern exhibited by Mexican immigrants upon arrival in the United States. Female immigrants begin with a large *ceteris paribus* shortfall in work hours. However, within twenty years of residence, their work hours are nearly equal to those of women with the same characteristics in the third-generation non-Hispanic white reference group, and this remains the case in the second and third generations. While male immigrants tend to work more than the reference group, *ceteris paribus*, this is no longer the case in subsequent generations. Thus, by the second generation, the labor supply patterns of Mexican Americans exhibit no more gender specialization than do those of third-generation non-Hispanic whites, all else equal. Even without controlling for education, there is still rapid assimilation of Mexican immigrant women into market work with time in the United States, although a sizable labor supply gap remains. The assimilation process continues across generations as U.S.-born Mexican origin women raise their education levels relative to the reference group. However, shortfalls remain for both men and women that are roughly constant between the second and

third generations, suggesting a lack of further convergence in annual hours beyond the second generation, a pattern noted in previous work and for other dependent variables.

Although the annual hours measure indirectly reflects Mexican American–non-Hispanic white differences in unemployment, we also examine unemployment rates explicitly because they may provide evidence on particular labor market problems facing Mexican Americans. Like the labor supply measure, the unemployment experience of Mexican immigrants differs greatly by sex (see table 2.2 and figure 2.4). For males, the immigrant-native difference, controlling for characteristics, tends to be small, and men in recent cohorts actually have a lower unemployment rate at arrival than comparable white non-Hispanics. There is no significant effect of years since migration on the unemployment rates of immigrant men, and second- and third-generation, Mexican American men actually have 1.7–1.9 percentage points' higher unemployment than comparable white non-Hispanics.

In contrast, immigrant women have a substantially higher unemployment rate than comparable natives at arrival, but this gap decreases somewhat across cohorts. The somewhat smaller unemployment gap for more recent arrival cohorts corresponds to the cross-cohort decline we found for the labor supply gap (in turn likely reflecting rising female participation rates in Mexico) and suggests that a portion of the unemployment gap reflects job seeking skills. The stronger results are for the years since migration variable, which indicate that the unemployment gap falls substantially with time in the United States. For example, in the 1971–1980 cohort, Mexican immigrant women have a 10.3 percentage point higher unemployment rate at arrival than comparable white non-Hispanic natives. After ten years in the United States, however, the gap has fallen to 6.4 percentage points and after twenty years to 3.0 percentage points. Little further assimilation occurs generations, controlling for measured characteristics: the gap is 3.4 percentage points for the second generation and 1.5 percentage points by the third generation. When we control only for age and year, the immigrant-native difference in unemployment rates for women is much larger and remains considerable even after long residence, although substantial assimilation does take place. For example, the unemployment rate of immigrants in the 1971–1980 cohort is 14.3 percentage points higher upon arrival in the United States and is still 6.5 percentage points higher after twenty years of residence. The differential decreases to 4.7 percentage points in the second generation and 2.6 percentage points in the third generation.

We now turn to the results for wage assimilation in table 2.2, which, it may be recalled, show results for the log of real hourly earnings for full-time wage and salary workers. Given the deteriorating wage position of immigrants, we have evaluated the regression results for both the 1971–1980




Fig. 2.4 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: A, Unemployment rate for men (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants); B, Unemployment rate for women (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

(figure 2.5) and 1981–1990 (figure 2.6) arrival cohorts. The results for immigrant men conform to what would be expected based on the literature. There is a considerable wage gap with otherwise similar natives at arrival that tends to increase across cohorts as well as some weak evidence of positive wage assimilation with time in the United States. The wage gap for men in the 1971–1980 (1981–1990) cohort is estimated to be .17 (.28) log points on arrival and to fall to .12 (.23) log points after twenty years of res-




Fig. 2.5 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: A, Log wages for men (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants); B, Log wages for women (1971–1980 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

idence. The wage shortfall, controlling for the full set of explanatory variables, for immigrants in the 1971–1980 cohort after twenty years in the United States was comparable to the estimated wage gaps for the second and third generations of .13–.14 log points, although that estimated for the 1981–1990 cohort was about .10 log points higher.

Our assimilation results for men can be compared with the findings in Borjas and Katz’s (chap. 1 in this volume) detailed examination of Mexican




Fig. 2.6 Assimilation of Mexican Americans: A, Log wages for men (1981–1990 arrival cohort for immigrants); B, Log wages for women (1981–1990 arrival cohort for immigrants)

Note: “All” controls include age, year, education, region, MSA, California, and Texas.

immigrant men’s wage assimilation (the authors did not study women’s wages). Specifically, Borjas and Katz find that during the 1990–2000 period, which overlaps with our 1994–2003 period, some arrival cohorts and age groups experienced positive wage assimilation, while the relative wages of others fell. Our finding of a slightly positive overall rate of wage assimilation for men is within the authors’ range of estimates for individual cohorts and age groups. And the estimated shortfalls (versus natives) we find for immigrant men in our models that do not control for education of .48–.61 log points (panel A of figures 2.5 and 2.6) are similar to those found by

Borjas and Katz for 2000 in models not controlling for education, which were mostly in the .44–.73 log point range.

The arrival log wage shortfalls for women also tend to increase over time and were .07 log points for the 1971–1980 cohort and .16 log points for the 1981–1990 cohort. In general, the log wage arrival shortfalls of immigrant women tend to be smaller than for men, a pattern we noted in the preceding for later generations as well. However, in contrast to the male pattern, there is no evidence of positive wage assimilation for women immigrants. Moreover, for women, as for men, we find little further wage assimilation across generations compared to the 1971–1980 arrival cohort of immigrants, controlling for education and location, with a wage gap of .08–.09 for the second and third generations. And, similar to men, some intergenerational wage assimilation is suggested for the 1981–1990 cohort.

The absence of wage assimilation for immigrant women may reflect the lack of data on women's actual labor market experience in the CPS. Given strong positive assimilation for labor supply, the women in the wage sample in successive years-since-migration groups will include more new entrants with relatively little labor market experience and, hence, low wages. They may be a less positively selected group in other ways as well. This may be the reason for the seeming lack of wage assimilation for women, although it is also worth noting that both we and Borjas and Katz (chap. 1 in this volume) do not find strong evidence of positive wage assimilation for men either. We investigated the selection issue for women by implementing a Heckman-style (1979) selectivity bias correction for women's wages. For this analysis, we considered all those with valid wage observations (i.e., full-time and part-time workers) as the wage sample. We identified the selection equation (a probit on a variable equaling 1 if the respondent was in the wage sample) by excluding marital status, number of children less than six years old, and number of children between seven and seventeen years old from the wage equation. We interpret the selectivity-corrected results cautiously because of these strong identification assumptions.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) wage equations for women (now including both part-time and full-time workers) showed immigrant arrival effects that were negative for all cohorts except 1971–1980 and ranged from 0.035 to –0.093, with some of the negative values significant. Moreover, there was marginally significant negative female immigrant wage assimilation of a small magnitude, where wages fell 0.068 log points over twenty years, all else equal.²² When we implemented the selectivity bias correction, immigrant arrival effects ranged from –0.085 to –0.207 and were significant in almost every case, and there was some weak evidence of positive wage assimilation for women: after twenty years, wages rose a modest 0.054 log

22. The arrival effects are less negative, and the assimilation slope is more negative for the pooled full-time and part-time sample than for the full-time sample shown in table 2.2 and figure 2.5. In both cases, however, there is no evidence of positive wage assimilation among Mexican immigrant women in OLS regressions.

points, *ceteris paribus*, an effect that was similar in magnitude to the OLS estimate for men of .048; however, the women's result was not significant. Thus, the point estimate of the assimilation effect becomes more positive with the selection correction versus OLS, a difference predicted by our reasoning about the increased labor market entry of inexperienced women with time in the United States. However, the difference between the two estimates is modest and is based on strong identification assumptions. The conclusion we draw from these estimates is that neither the OLS nor the selectivity-bias corrected equations show strong evidence of positive wage assimilation for Mexican immigrant women. The quantitative similarity of the selectivity bias-corrected wage assimilation results for women and the OLS male wage assimilation results, for which selectivity bias is much less an issue, suggests that Mexican immigrants' wage offers do not improve much with assimilation beyond, of course, the normal increase in wages that all workers obtain with potential work experience.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 as well as table 2A.2 show that the wage shortfalls of each Mexican American group are much larger when the controls for education and location are omitted; this, of course, reflects the lower educational attainment of Mexican Americans relative to the reference group of third-generation non-Hispanic whites. Viewing the data in this way, however, does give a more substantial role for intergenerational wage assimilation due to the increasing educational attainment of Mexican Americans across generations. So, for example, in the 1971–1980 cohort, controlling only for age and year, even after twenty years in the United States, the pay shortfalls for immigrants are much larger than for later generations: .48 log points for immigrant men and .44 log points for immigrant women versus .18–.21 log points for men and .14–.19 log points for women for later generations. Thus, the increase in education achieved by subsequent generations of Mexican Americans relative to immigrants leads to a substantial closing of the raw pay gap relative to third-generation white non-Hispanics. However, we again note a lack of further convergence, in this case for log wages, beyond the second generation.

The results considered previously may be biased by changes in the age composition of a specific immigration cohort across successive cross sections (Friedberg 1993). Specifically, more recent cross sections will include more immigrants in the particular cohort who immigrated as children. The assimilation process is likely to be quite different for those who immigrated as children compared to adult immigrants. For this reason, we repeated the analyses in table 2.2 with the immigrant sample restricted to adult immigrants (see table 2A.4). The results were very similar. One exception was that there was somewhat more positive assimilation with time in the United States for men's annual work hours; however, even here, the relationship was much steeper for immigrant women than immigrant men.

In addition to analyzing wages and employment, we also show some evidence on the industrial and occupational progression of Mexican Ameri-

cans within and across generations. Sectoral representation can be an important indicator of the degree of integration into American society. Table 2A.5 shows the distributions of workers across occupations and industries.²³ We distinguish immigrants according to whether they migrated as adults, and we also show separate statistics for immigrants who were in the United States at least ten years. Comparing these long-term immigrants to the overall immigrant sample shows the combined effects of time in the United States as well as selective return migration and changing cohort characteristics.

Looking first at industry distribution, one of the most dramatic differences between Mexican immigrants and the white non-Hispanic reference group is that Mexican immigrants, especially men, are much more likely to work in agriculture. However, by the second generation, the Mexican American female incidence of farm work is virtually the same as for non-Hispanic whites, while that for Mexican American men is only slightly higher than that of non-Hispanic white men. And by the third generation, male agricultural employment is virtually indistinguishable from that of non-Hispanic whites. There is also a dramatic cross-generation movement of Mexican American women out of nondurable manufacturing into health and education services. A similar but less dramatic development also characterizes the movement of Mexican-American men across generations out of construction.

Regarding occupations, there is a notable movement across generations of Mexican American men out of personal service, farmworker, and operative jobs into managerial and professional jobs. For women, there is a dramatic move out of operative and personal service jobs into managerial, professional, and, especially, clerical occupations. While most of this occupational movement occurs across generations, there appears also to be some upgrading of immigrants with time in the United States, as suggested by the results for long-term versus all immigrants. Of course, these latter differences may also be due to cohort effects or selective return migration.

Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the impact of these occupational and industrial shifts on segregation indexes by gender (table 2.3) and by ethnicity (table 2.4).²⁴ Looking first at table 2.3, we see that differences in industry segregation by gender between Mexican Americans and the non-Hispanic

23. In 2003, there was a major change in CPS occupation and industry codes based on the changes in these codes adopted in the 2000 Census. Crosswalk information available at the Census Web site (<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/crosswalks.html>) was used to assign incumbents in the 2003 CPS to the 1990 Census categories employed in earlier CPSs on the basis of the category into which the largest number of individuals in their detailed occupation or industry would have been allocated.

24. The segregation index is defined, for example for gender, as the fraction of the male or female work force that would have to change jobs in order to achieve parity. It is equal to $.5 \cdot \sum_i |m_i - f_i|$, where i represents sector (occupation or industry), and m_i and f_i are, respectively, the proportions of the total male and female work force employed in sector i . As elsewhere, the reference group for the analysis by ethnicity is white non-Hispanic natives.

Table 2.3 Occupational and industrial segregation indexes, by gender

	Industry	Occupation
White non-Hispanic natives with native parents	0.337	0.360
Mexican immigrants	0.336	0.394
In U.S. at least 10 yrs	0.345	0.393
Migrated age 18 or higher	0.335	0.391
Migrated age 18 or higher, in U.S. at least 10 yrs	0.346	0.397
Second-generation Mexican Americans	0.356	0.416
Third-generation Mexican Americans	0.347	0.446

Table 2.4 Occupational and industrial segregation indexes relative to white non-Hispanic natives with native parents

	Industry		Occupation	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Mexican immigrants	0.264	0.320	0.411	0.478
In U.S. at least 10 yrs	0.218	0.270	0.378	0.435
Migrated age 18 or higher	0.280	0.373	0.447	0.580
Migrated age 18 or higher, in U.S. at least 10 yrs	0.233	0.349	0.420	0.571
Second-generation Mexican Americans	0.100	0.070	0.178	0.149
Third-generation Mexican Americans	0.079	0.062	0.185	0.122

white native reference group are not very large. The level of industry segregation by gender of immigrants is very similar to that of non-Hispanic whites, and there is actually a slight increase in gender segregation by industry across generations. The differences between Mexican Americans and the reference group in occupational segregation by gender are larger and exhibit an interesting cross-generational pattern. Among immigrants, there is only slightly more occupational segregation by gender than non-Hispanic white natives. However, the occupational segregation index *rises* steadily across generations of Mexican Americans.

The results in table 2.4, which show segregation indexes by ethnicity, shed some light on the rising gender segregation across generations for Mexican Americans. For industry and, especially, occupation, there is a more dramatic reduction across generations in segregation versus non-Hispanic whites for Mexican American women than men. Specifically, the industrial segregation index (Mexican Americans versus non-Hispanic whites) falls 25.8 percentage points for immigrants as a whole to the third generation for women but only 18.5 percentage points for men, while the occupational segregation index falls 35.6 percentage points for women but only 22.6 percentage points for men. The result is a slight increase in gender segregation by industry and a more substantial one by occupation. Focusing on the latter increase, table 2A.5 shows that Mexican American men

have moved into white-collar jobs to a lesser extent than Mexican American women. For example, table 2A.5 shows that 11.8 percent of Mexican immigrant men and 28.0 percent of Mexican immigrant women worked in managerial, professional, clerical, or sales jobs; by the third generation, these figures were 34.7 percent for men and fully 68.8 percent for women.²⁵

2.5 The Family Migration Model: Regression Results

Our data can be used to study the relevance of the family migration model for Mexican American immigrants. This exercise is additionally of interest because it enables us to ascertain whether we obtain similar findings to those in the preceding when we focus on married individuals and explicitly take into account spouses' characteristics. To address these questions, we constructed a file using the CPS data that consisted of married individuals for whom we could identify the ethnicity and nativity of both husband and wife. We restricted the sample to women (men) who were of Mexican origin and to a reference group of women (men) who were themselves third-generation white non-Hispanics and were married to third-generation white non-Hispanics. (The latter constitute the reference category in the female and male regressions.) Recall that the family migration model asserts that immigrant women upon arrival work to support their husbands' human capital investments but later reduce their labor supply. This model thus implies positive cohort arrival effects and negative assimilation profiles for women's work hours; in addition, the model suggests that women do not invest in their own human capital, implying perhaps less positively sloped wage assimilation profiles for women than men.

As may be seen in table 2.5, Mexican Americans of both sexes have a very high probability—82 to 83 percent—of having a Mexican American spouse. This incidence is particularly high for immigrants, with 92 percent of both men and women having a spouse who is of Mexican origin. Fully 84 percent of female immigrants and 79 percent of male immigrants have spouses who are themselves Mexican immigrants. Although we do not know when these marriages took place, the higher percentage of female than male Mexican immigrants whose spouse is a Mexican immigrant is consistent with our preceding finding that immigration tends to be a family decision for women and that the incidence of being married (spouse present) is high upon arrival in the United States. Of course, marriages to

25. Tables 2.4 and 2A.5 also show that the occupation and industry distribution of adult immigrants is more dissimilar to non-Hispanic whites than is the case for immigrants in general and that, among immigrants, there is more integration (relative to non-Hispanic whites) among long-term immigrants than for the immigrant group as a whole. (This latter pattern is especially pronounced for the "all immigrants" group.) These patterns for adult immigrants are consistent with their larger educational shortfalls, while those for long-term immigrants may be due to assimilation, cohort effects, or selective return migration.

Table 2.5 Ethnicity and nativity of marriage patterns, married Mexican American women and men

	Fraction of husbands who were:			
	Mexican immigrants	Second-generation Mexican Americans	Third-generation Mexican Americans	Mexican-American: All generations
A. Married Mexican American women (wife's generation)				
Mexican American immigrants	0.835	0.057	0.028	0.920
Second-generation Mexican Americans	0.321	0.247	0.172	0.740
Third-generation Mexican Americans	0.098	0.122	0.479	0.699
All Mexican American wives	0.540	0.106	0.181	0.827
Fraction of wives who were:				
	Fraction of wives who were:			
	Mexican immigrants	Second-generation Mexican Americans	Third-generation Mexican Americans	Mexican-American: All generations
B. Married Mexican American men (husband's generation)				
Mexican American immigrants	0.792	0.079	0.045	0.916
Second-generation Mexican Americans	0.219	0.256	0.226	0.701
Third-generation Mexican Americans	0.060	0.099	0.505	0.664
All Mexican American husbands	0.512	0.109	0.196	0.817

fellow immigrants may also occur in the United States or involve bringing a spouse to the United States from Mexico. The probability of having a spouse who is of Mexican origin declines across generations for both women and men: decreasing from 92 percent for immigrants to 74 (70) percent for second-generation women (men) and 70 (66) percent for third-generation women (men). Nonetheless, marriage outside the Mexican-origin group still characterizes only 30–34 percent of third-generation married Mexican Americans.²⁶

Table 2.6 contains selected regression results for three dependent variables that are of central importance in forming a picture of married women's assimilation and evaluating the family investment hypotheses: the number of children for married women and annual work hours and log hourly earnings for married women and married men. The explanatory variables include both own and spouse characteristics for education, age, migration cohort, and years since migration. In addition, there is a full set of shift terms for each combination of own and spouse Mexican American generation as well as dummies for spouse white non-Hispanic and spouse other non-Mexican origin. Based on these regressions, figures 2.7–2.9 show assimilation profiles for Mexican immigrant women and men with an immigrant spouse who came to the United States at the same time (relative to the reference group of third-generation white non-Hispanics who were married to third-generation white non-Hispanics).

We begin by considering the results for annual hours, which are the key variable for the family investment hypothesis, and also the variable for which we obtained the most striking evidence of assimilation for the full sample of Mexican American women. As may be seen in the table and figure 2.7, the results for married women are quite similar to those for the full female population and thus do not support the family migration model. Married immigrant women tend to have large *ceteris paribus* labor supply shortfalls upon arrival in the United States and steep positive assimilation with time in the United States. So, for example, married women in the 1971–1980 arrival cohort who have a Mexican immigrant spouse who arrived in the same period are estimated to supply 556 hours less per year when they first come to the United States; however, after ten years in the United States, the shortfall has been reduced by more than half to 265 hours, and after twenty years, to only 36 hours. Immigrant men also have an hours shortfall at arrival and positive assimilation profiles; however, these are both less dramatic than for women: for married men who migrated with a Mexican spouse, the arrival hours shortfall for the 1971–1980 cohort is 272 hours, a differential that falls to 109 hours after ten years and

26. We again note, however, that third-generation Mexican Americans must self-identify. Marriage outside the Mexican American community may reduce their propensity to self-identify as Mexican American or at least be correlated with a reduced propensity to so identify. Again, see Duncan and Trejo (chap. 7 in this volume).

Table 2.6 Selected results for demographic and employment outcomes, married couple sample

	No. of children <18 yrs		Annual work hours		Log wages (FT)	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
<i>A. Married women</i>						
education	-0.026	0.001	68.49	1.00	0.097	0.001
spouse education	0.0062	0.0006	-8.98	0.43	0.0031	0.0003
immig: pre-1961 arrival	0.476	0.250	-835.70	172.85	0.025	0.160
immig: 1961-70 arrival	-0.079	0.155	-926.21	124.09	-0.061	0.122
immig: 1971-80 arrival	-0.084	0.120	-777.13	101.22	-0.114	0.106
immig: 1981-90 arrival	0.026	0.095	-733.33	77.97	-0.187	0.085
immig: 1991-96 arrival	-0.041	0.073	-729.16	59.08	-0.217	0.065
immig: 1997-2002 arrival	-0.165	0.070	-725.28	57.72	-0.202	0.061
spouse immig: pre-1961 arrival	0.604	0.208	-38.58	155.68	0.045	0.146
spouse immig: 1961-70 arrival	0.298	0.147	89.50	123.06	0.058	0.117
spouse immig: 1971-80 arrival	0.270	0.124	220.94	103.63	0.116	0.101
spouse immig: 1981-90 arrival	0.139	0.098	135.84	79.77	0.020	0.079
spouse immig: 1991-96 arrival	0.106	0.077	161.19	63.00	0.055	0.061
spouse immig: 1997-2002 arrival	0.090	0.077	149.58	63.68	0.077	0.062
years since migration (ysm)	0.050	0.008	43.41	6.27	0.007	0.008
ysm squared (/100)	-0.141	0.023	-54.75	14.07	-0.018	0.017
spouse years since migration (sysm)	0.019	0.008	-11.17	6.01	-0.008	0.006
sysm squared (/100)	-0.064	0.017	23.68	11.15	0.019	0.012
Mex imm, spouse second-gen. Mexican	0.157	0.072	-53.79	56.94	0.016	0.052
Mex imm, spouse third-gen. Mexican	-0.012	0.089	-40.70	70.65	-0.030	0.060
second-gen. Mexican, spouse Mex immig	0.219	0.063	-70.35	51.43	-0.124	0.041
Both second-gen. Mexican	0.322	0.050	-8.49	36.69	-0.067	0.029
second-gen. Mexican, spouse third-gen. Mexican	0.340	0.055	87.72	43.75	-0.083	0.032
third-gen. Mexican, spouse Mex imm	0.304	0.072	-127.66	58.73	-0.111	0.046
third-gen. Mexican, spouse second- gen. Mexican	0.252	0.052	99.78	38.80	-0.095	0.028
Both third-gen. Mexican	0.336	0.026	-3.48	20.26	-0.124	0.016
<i>B. Married men</i>						
education			49.97	0.77	0.076	0.001
spouse education			2.37	0.34	0.0024	0.0003
immig: pre-1961 arrival			-448.36	133.57	-0.222	0.103
immig: 1961-70 arrival			-294.15	103.05	-0.282	0.075
immig: 1971-80 arrival			-141.68	86.72	-0.263	0.063
immig: 1981-90 arrival			-74.30	66.73	-0.326	0.049
immig: 1991-96 arrival			-40.52	51.68	-0.327	0.038
immig: 1997-2002 arrival			-103.89	53.14	-0.241	0.039
spouse immig: pre-1961 arrival			124.85	147.37	-0.004	0.117
spouse immig: 1961-70 arrival			-33.47	105.57	-0.008	0.078
spouse immig: 1971-80 arrival			-129.98	86.06	-0.027	0.062
spouse immig: 1981-90 arrival			-127.36	65.58	-0.099	0.048

Table 2.6 (continued)

	No. of children <18 yrs		Annual work hours		Log wages (FT)	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
spouse immig: 1991–96 arrival			–49.92	49.06	–0.060	0.036
spouse immig: 1997–2002 arrival			–61.23	48.47	–0.115	0.035
years since migration (ysm)			11.65	5.24	0.018	0.004
ysm squared (/100)			1.08	10.38	–0.033	0.009
spouse years since migration (sysm)			7.04	5.21	–0.005	0.004
sysm squared (/100)			–25.66	11.28	0.006	0.009
Mex imm, spouse second-gen Mexican			–59.82	42.86	–0.003	0.031
Mex imm, spouse third-gen Mexican			–140.93	50.28	–0.053	0.037
second-gen. Mexican, spouse Mex immig			27.05	47.90	–0.107	0.035
Both second-gen. Mexican second-gen. Mexican, spouse third gen. Mexican			–94.26	31.69	–0.146	0.024
third-gen. Mexican, spouse Mex imm			–72.14	33.45	–0.189	0.024
third-gen. Mexican, spouse second gen. Mexican			–67.38	57.66	–0.158	0.042
Both third-gen. Mexican			–171.15	36.93	–0.208	0.027
			–145.14	17.22	–0.185	0.013

Notes: Controls include age, spouse age, region, msa, calif, texas, and dummies for spouse white non-Hispanic, and spouse other non-Mexican origin. Female sample includes white non-Hispanic third-generation women married to white non-Hispanic third-generation men and married women of Mexican origin; male sample includes white non-Hispanic third-generation men married to white non-Hispanic third-generation women and married men of Mexican origin.

actually becomes a 4-hour excess after twenty years. In earlier work using 1980 and 1990 Census data (Blau et al. 2003), we showed that, among immigrants to the United States in general, married men and women had similarly steep assimilation profiles relative to average hours worked by natives. Moreover, in supplementary unpublished results for Blau et al. (2003), we found that for the Central American sending region, married immigrant women's work hours increased by about 106 with twenty years in the United States, compared to a very similar figure of 116 for married men. Mexican immigrants in the 1990s and early 2000s stand out from both the overall pattern for immigrants in general and for immigrants from the Central American region in that the profile for Mexican immigrants is much steeper for women than men. This conclusion holds both absolutely and relative to average labor supply.²⁷

27. Of course, in our earlier work, we used 1980 and 1990 Census data, and in the current paper, we use data from the more recent 1994–2003 period. But it does appear that Mexican immigrant women's work hours assimilate especially rapidly.




Fig. 2.7 Assimilation profiles for married Mexican immigrant men and women who immigrated with Mexican spouse, annual work hours, 1971–1980 arrival cohort

Second- and third-generation–Mexican American women married to second- or third-generation Mexican-American men have smaller deficits (or in some cases, slightly higher work hours) relative to comparable white natives than immigrants from the 1971–1980 cohort at arrival or after ten years in the United States—table 2.6 shows hours effects of -8 to $+100$ work hours relative to the white non-Hispanic reference group. However, as in the case of the full sample, most of the convergence in labor supply patterns to otherwise similar individuals in the white non-Hispanic reference group occurs in the first generation.

Turning to assimilation in log wages we again find similar patterns to those observed for the full sample (see table 2.6). Figure 2.8 shows results for immigrant men and women who migrated from Mexico with their spouse in the 1971–1980 or 1981–1990 period. Except for women in the 1971–1980 arrival cohort, we see large wage deficits with otherwise similar native non-Hispanic whites in the reference group, and wage profiles for the 1981–1990 cohort are considerably lower than those for the 1971–1980 cohort. As in the full sample, while men’s wages rise with time in the United States (wage assimilation is actually steeper for married men than for the full sample), there is no evidence of positive wage assimilation for women. This pattern is consistent with the family migration model in that men appear to be investing in their own human capital, while women’s wages are seemingly not affected by time in the United States. However, the same reasoning we used earlier about the potential effects of selectivity on immigrant women’s wage assimilation applies here. Specifically, it is possible that the women with longer U.S. residence in the wage sample include more recent labor force entrants with less experience and thus may be less posi-




Fig. 2.8 Assimilation profiles for married Mexican men and women who immigrated with Mexican spouse, log hourly earnings, full-time wage and salary workers, 1971–1980 and 1981–1990 arrival cohorts

tively selected than the female sample of full-time workers among more recent arrivals. However, when we implemented Heckman (1979) selectivity bias correction techniques for married women (identified this time by the exclusion of number of children under six and number of children between six and seventeen years old), we still did not find any evidence of positive wage assimilation for immigrant women.²⁸

As in the preceding, we do not find much evidence of wage convergence across generations, controlling for measured characteristics. For example, for immigrant men from the 1971–1980 (1981–1990) arrival cohort, the wage deficit relative to the white non-Hispanic reference group falls from .29 (.43) log points at arrival to .14 (.28) after 20 years. For second- and third-generation men married to U.S.-born Mexican origin women, the pay shortfall for men ranges from .15 to .21 log points, suggesting some evidence of moderate intergenerational wage assimilation only for the 1981–1990 cohort. For women in the 1971–1980 cohort, there is hardly any wage gap relative to comparable white non-Hispanics. But for women in the 1981–1990 cohort, the gaps are .17 log points at arrival and .20 log points after twenty years. Mexican American women of later generations married to U.S.-born Mexican origin men have *ceteris paribus* log wage deficits of .06 to .12 relative to white non-Hispanics. Again, little intergenerational assimilation is implied for the 1971–1980 cohort and some modest improvement across generations is suggested for the 1981–1990 cohort.

Finally, we may consider evidence of assimilation in fertility. As was the

28. In both table 2.6 and in the selectivity-bias corrected results, there was a modestly negative, insignificant wage profile for immigrant women who migrated with their husbands.

case for the full sample, married Mexican immigrant women (who migrated with a Mexican spouse) tend to have more children than their counterparts upon arrival in the United States, though this difference has been declining with successive cohorts and has recently become negative. Fertility compared to otherwise similar individuals in the white non-Hispanic reference group then increases further with time in the United States. (Note the own and spouse cohort and years-since-migration (YSM) effects must be summed to make this comparison.) For example, in the 1971–1980 cohort, women have somewhat more (.19) children than comparable white non-Hispanic women upon arrival, a gap that rises to .76 after 20 years in the United States. The 1997–2002 cohort that begins with .075 fewer children than comparable white non-Hispanics is estimated to have .50 more children after twenty years. The fertility difference falls across generations, but the fertility of second- and third-generation–Mexican-American women in Mexican American families is still a bit higher than the native reference group: .22 to .34 (second generation) and .25 to .34 (third generation). However, based on the declining relative fertility of newer cohorts of immigrants, we might expect excess fertility of future second- and third-generation–Mexican American women to be even smaller than this.

The positive relationship between fertility and time in the United States that we obtain for immigrants is illustrated in figure 2.9 for the 1971–1980 arrival cohort. This relationship could be consistent with the family investment model: fertility may be deferred while wives' focus on the labor market in order to support their husband's human capital investments.




Fig. 2.9 Assimilation profile for married Mexican immigrant women who immigrated with Mexican spouse, number of children under eighteen, 1971–1980 arrival cohort

However, this is unlikely given the strong *positive* assimilation that we have found for wives' labor supply. In light of this, we believe that the pattern of fertility most likely represents a disruption of fertility due to immigration. One factor leading the family to defer fertility may be a desire to postpone at least some childbearing to a time when the family is on a firmer financial footing. But, again, given the labor supply patterns we observe, this is likely to be a time when both spouses are faring better in terms of labor market incomes.

2.6 Conclusions

This paper has examined gender and the labor market and demographic assimilation of Mexican Americans, both within and across generations. Published data show a much more traditional gender division of labor in the family in Mexico than in the United States, with women in Mexico having considerably lower labor force participation and higher fertility than those in the United States as well as lower education both absolutely and relative to Mexican men. Our data suggest that these source country patterns strongly influence the outcomes and behavior of Mexican immigrants on arrival in the United States. Both male and female immigrants have much lower levels of education than the native reference group (third-generation non-Hispanic whites), although immigrants of both sexes have somewhat higher levels of education than the average for Mexico and gender differences in educational attainment among immigrants are minimal. Educational attainment of Mexican American men and women increases substantially between the first and second generations, but not beyond. Controlling for education and other characteristics including location on arrival in the United States, immigrant women are more likely to be married with spouse present and have higher fertility and much lower labor supply than the native reference group. The key question then is how these patterns change with time in the United States of immigrants and over the second and third generations.

Our most striking finding is the dramatic assimilation in labor supply for female immigrants with time in the United States. For example, upon arrival in the United States, the 1971–1980 cohort of Mexican women had a *ceteris paribus* shortfall of 455 hours relative to non-Hispanic whites; this fell to 219 hours after ten years of residence and 31 hours after twenty years. The gap remained small in the second and third generations. Consistent with a more traditional division of labor in the first generation, immigrant men's annual hours tended to be somewhat higher than those of non-Hispanic whites upon arrival, all else equal, and showed moderate positive assimilation with time in the United States. In contrast, Mexican American men in later generations actually have somewhat lower labor

supply than natives. Taking the male and female results together, Mexican American–non-Hispanic white differences in gender specialization in labor supply are very small for long-term immigrants and are entirely eliminated by the second generation.

When we do not control for education and other characteristics, however, immigrants, as a low education group, have hours shortfalls relative to non-Hispanic whites for both men and women; the gaps are quite sizable for women and remain large, even with positive assimilation in hours. In the case of women, particularly, there is assimilation between the first and second generation, due to rising educational attainment, but no further progress between the second and third generation.

Wage differences between female immigrants and non-Hispanic whites, controlling for other factors, are far less marked than labor supply differences and tend to be smaller than the immigrant–non-Hispanic white wage gap for men, though both show a deteriorating wage position of immigrants beginning in the 1980s. While male wage gaps decline modestly with exposure to the U.S. labor market, in contrast to the labor supply results, we find no evidence of positive wage assimilation for women. This may reflect the limitations of the synthetic cohort approach. Positive assimilation in employment means that, as years since migration increase, the wage sample likely includes more new labor market entrants and may be less positively selected in other ways as well. We present some evidence based on a correction for selectivity bias that is consistent with this reasoning, although wage assimilation, even based on these analyses, is quite moderate. For both men and women, rising educational attainment in subsequent generations contributes to a considerable narrowing of the raw wage gap with non-Hispanic whites, but we again find no evidence of convergence beyond the second generation. The lack of further assimilation between the second and third generation thus characterizes our findings for education, labor supply, and wages and mirrors results from some earlier studies of Mexican Americans.

Results for assimilation on the demographic outcomes are also mixed. Over time in the United States, female immigrants assimilate toward the native reference group but remain more likely to be married, *ceteris paribus*. While male immigrants are actually less likely to be married with spouse present than otherwise similar non-Hispanic whites upon arrival, their marriage incidence increases with time in the United States and, after long residence, they are predicted to be more likely to be married than natives. Across generations, both male and female immigrants assimilate to the patterns in the native non-Hispanic white reference group, controlling for characteristics including education, and are no more likely to be married. When controls for education and other characteristics are omitted, second- and third-generation–Mexican-American men and women are both less likely to be married than non-Hispanic whites.

While immigrant women have higher fertility than non-Hispanic whites, all else equal, the immigrant-native differential upon arrival has been declining with successive arrival cohorts, reflecting sharp declines in fertility in the source country. In contrast to the findings for marriage, however, we find no evidence that the higher fertility of Mexican immigrant women on arrival assimilates toward native levels. Rather, the gap tends to increase still further with time in the United States; this is consistent with the hypothesis that that immigration disrupts or delays immigrant women's fertility, causing their relative fertility to rise with residence in the United States and counterbalancing or obscuring whatever assimilation might have otherwise taken place. These disruptions may be due to men arriving in the United States before their wives, delayed courtship, or delayed marriage. Unfortunately we don't have data on the time of marriage that might allow us to distinguish among these explanations. While the size of the Mexican American–non-Hispanic white fertility differential declines across generations, it is not eliminated.

Finally, we separately examined results for married men and women and confirmed our findings based on the full sample, including the dramatic assimilation in labor supply of immigrant women, for this group. This means further that we did not support the family investment model, which has recently been proposed as a model of the immigrant assimilation process in a family context (e.g., Baker and Benjamin 1997). This view holds that, upon arrival, immigrant husbands invest in their human capital, while wives work to provide the family with liquidity during the investment period. The model predicts rapid positive assimilation in labor supply for husbands and decreases in wives' labor supply over time relative to the native reference group. On the contrary, we found positive assimilation in labor supply for both immigrant husbands and wives, with dramatically faster assimilation for wives.

Appendix

Creation of Hourly Earnings Variable

To analyze hourly earnings, we restrict our sample to wage and salary workers who were employed full time (defined as those with at least thirty-five usual weekly work hours). Wage and salary workers were defined as those with zero self-employment and zero farm self-employment income in the prior year who were wage and salary workers for their longest job during that year. The CPS reports two wage and salary income variables: one for the main job and one for all other jobs. The main job values were top-coded at \$99,000 for 1994 and 1995; \$150,000 for 1996–2002; and \$200,000

for 2003. The values for all other jobs were topcoded at \$99,999 for 1994 and 1995; \$25,000 for 1996–2002; and \$35,000 for 2003. For the main job earnings variables, we used the following conventions for topcoding: for 1994–2002, we multiplied the topcoded value by 1.45, and for 2003, we forced all topcoded values to equal $\$150,000 \times 1.45$. For the other jobs variable, we forced all values above \$25,000 to equal \$25,000 and then multiplied this by 1.45. We then added the adjusted variables to form annual wage and salary earnings. These were converted to hourly earnings by dividing by weeks worked times usual hours per week. We then defined hourly earnings in 2000 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. We kept only those values between \$2 and \$200 in 2000 dollars. Results were not sensitive to alternative assumptions about topcoding.

Table 2A.1 Sample sizes for basic regression analyses

Group	Men	Women
Third-generation white, non-Hispanics	286,531	300,008
Mexican Americans		
Immigrants	20,733	18,858
Second generation	7,456	8,214
Third generation	11,348	12,664

Table 2A.2

Selected regression results for demographic and labor market outcomes, controlling only for age and year

Dependent variable	Marriage				No. of children <18 yrs			
	Men		Women		Women			
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE		
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-0.171	0.051	0.189	0.056	1.319	0.190		
immig: 1961-70 arrival	-0.191	0.033	0.158	0.036	0.598	0.100		
immig: 1971-80 arrival	-0.208	0.024	0.125	0.027	0.417	0.069		
immig: 1981-90 arrival	-0.117	0.017	0.116	0.020	0.477	0.052		
immig: 1991-96 arrival	-0.095	0.011	0.186	0.013	0.396	0.034		
immig: 1997-2002 arrival	-0.157	0.010	0.115	0.012	0.184	0.030		
years since mig. (ysm)	0.017	0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.058	0.006		
ysm squared (/100)	-0.028	0.004	-0.005	0.005	-0.188	0.017		
second-gen. Mexican American	-0.038	0.005	-0.035	0.005	0.386	0.014		
third-gen. Mexican American	-0.031	0.005	-0.048	0.005	0.266	0.012		
	Annual work hours				Unemployment		In labor force	
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-482.3	101.2	-949.3	114.4	0.052	0.029	0.191	0.036
immig: 1961-70 arrival	-438.0	64.1	-1000.9	74.6	0.086	0.018	0.179	0.023
immig: 1971-80 arrival	-340.3	48.1	-839.0	56.4	0.055	0.013	0.143	0.018
immig: 1981-90 arrival	-234.4	34.1	-835.0	40.2	0.038	0.009	0.139	0.014
immig: 1991-96 arrival	-130.8	22.4	-839.2	26.0	0.019	0.006	0.127	0.009
immig: 1997-2002 arrival	-82.8	19.4	-751.5	24.0	0.012	0.005	0.092	0.008
years since mig. (ysm)	6.6	3.3	26.9	3.9	-0.001	0.001	-0.004	0.001
ysm squared (/100)	1.2	8.1	-25.9	9.3	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003
second-gen. Mexican American	-148.2	10.7	-111.8	11.3	0.032	0.003	0.047	0.003
third-gen. Mexican American	-177.2	9.0	-122.2	9.3	0.027	0.003	0.026	0.002
	Log wages (FT)							
	Men		Women					
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE				
immig: pre-1961 arrival	-0.402	0.087	-0.335	0.126				
immig: 1961-70 arrival	-0.459	0.052	-0.394	0.084				
immig: 1971-80 arrival	-0.548	0.039	-0.432	0.068				
immig: 1981-90 arrival	-0.606	0.028	-0.553	0.051				
immig: 1991-96 arrival	-0.573	0.019	-0.560	0.036				
immig: 1997-2002 arrival	-0.541	0.016	-0.563	0.032				
years since mig. (ysm)	0.006	0.003	-0.004	0.005				
ysm squared (/100)	-0.011	0.007	0.015	0.012				
second-gen. Mexican American	-0.175	0.010	-0.136	0.011				
third-gen. Mexican American	-0.214	0.008	-0.185	0.009				

Table 2A.3 Means of explanatory variables, by group

Explanatory variable	Non-Hispanic whites				Mexican Americans					
	Third generation		Immigrants		Second generation		Third generation			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
age	38.90	39.18	34.20	35.21	31.58	31.82	34.14	34.85	34.14	34.85
age squared	1,687.5	1,710.7	1,298.6	1,379.9	1,190.9	1,207.0	1,324.7	1,372.4	1,324.7	1,372.4
age ³	79,370.5	80,928.9	54,159.1	59,350.8	52,102.3	52,987.5	56,966.0	59,629.1	56,966.0	59,629.1
age ⁴	3,959,187	4,058,389	2,444,970	2,755,546	2,535,968	2,581,753	2,647,491	2,792,618	2,647,491	2,792,618
education	13.240	13.220	8.670	8.667	11.718	11.683	11.913	11.847	11.913	11.847
immig: pre-1961 arrival	0	0	0.020	0.023	0	0	0	0	0	0
immig: 1961-70 arrival	0	0	0.060	0.068	0	0	0	0	0	0
immig: 1971-80 arrival	0	0	0.215	0.218	0	0	0	0	0	0
immig: 1981-90 arrival	0	0	0.351	0.323	0	0	0	0	0	0
immig: 1991-96 arrival	0	0	0.218	0.248	0	0	0	0	0	0
immig: 1997-2002 arrival	0	0	0.135	0.120	0	0	0	0	0	0
years since mig. (ysm)	0	0	14.34	14.69	0	0	0	0	0	0
ysm squared (/100)	0	0	3.1	3.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
year = 1994	0.102	0.102	0.085	0.086	0.093	0.087	0.089	0.085	0.089	0.085
year = 1995	0.102	0.102	0.094	0.090	0.093	0.094	0.084	0.085	0.084	0.085
year = 1996	0.102	0.101	0.092	0.093	0.097	0.093	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089
year = 1997	0.100	0.100	0.099	0.093	0.099	0.095	0.092	0.089	0.092	0.089
year = 1998	0.100	0.100	0.099	0.097	0.105	0.096	0.099	0.096	0.099	0.096
year = 1999	0.100	0.101	0.095	0.097	0.093	0.099	0.110	0.109	0.099	0.109

year = 2000	0.100	0.100	0.103	0.090	0.102	0.108	0.109
year = 2001	0.099	0.102	0.106	0.097	0.107	0.102	0.112
year = 2002	0.098	0.117	0.116	0.115	0.111	0.112	0.109
year = 2003 (omitted category)	0.097	0.118	0.120	0.118	0.115	0.117	0.116
lives in metropolitan area	0.762	0.905	0.912	0.900	0.901	0.856	0.861
lives in California	0.079	0.460	0.493	0.456	0.450	0.286	0.294
lives in Texas	0.057	0.200	0.213	0.284	0.302	0.421	0.431
New England Census Division	0.055	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
Middle Atlantic Census Division	0.133	0.032	0.023	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.005
East North Central Census Division	0.190	0.190	0.071	0.073	0.069	0.053	0.050
West North Central Census Division	0.092	0.018	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.022	0.018
South Atlantic Census Division	0.173	0.058	0.038	0.022	0.023	0.025	0.023
East South Central Census Division	0.071	0.073	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.005
West South Central Census Division	0.099	0.099	0.218	0.290	0.309	0.431	0.441
Mountain Census Division	0.065	0.064	0.112	0.116	0.109	0.156	0.145
Pacific Census Division (omitted category)	0.122	0.121	0.516	0.474	0.465	0.300	0.311
Sample size	286,531	300,008	18,858	7,456	8,214	11,348	12,664

Table 2A.4

Selected regression results for demographic and labor market outcomes (adult immigrants only)

Dependent variable	Marriage				No. of children <18 yrs			
	Men		Women		Women		Women	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
immig: pre-1961 arrival	0.036	0.085	0.146	0.088				
immig: 1961–70 arrival	–0.054	0.046	0.184	0.051	0.706	0.199	0.583	0.192
immig: 1971–80 arrival	–0.100	0.032	0.138	0.035	0.314	0.090	0.197	0.087
immig: 1981–90 arrival	–0.077	0.023	0.100	0.025	0.172	0.066	0.082	0.063
immig: 1991–96 arrival	–0.052	0.015	0.191	0.016	0.150	0.044	0.011	0.043
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	–0.116	0.012	0.132	0.014	–0.005	0.036	–0.103	0.034
years since mig. (ysm)	0.022	0.003	–0.002	0.003	0.088	0.008	0.091	0.008
ysm squared (/100)	–0.046	0.008	–0.006	0.008	–0.344	0.031	–0.346	0.030
second-gen. Mexican								
American	–0.0002	0.006	–0.006	0.006	0.377	0.015	0.373	0.014
third-gen. Mexican								
American	–0.005	0.005	–0.030	0.005	0.241	0.012	0.260	0.012
Control for marital status					No		Yes	
	Annual work hours				Unemployment In labor force			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
immig: pre-1961 arrival	–79.6	165.0	–378.5	178.4	0.014	0.055	0.151	0.060
immig: 1961–70 arrival	–135.2	90.4	–692.9	102.8	0.085	0.025	0.054	0.032
immig: 1971–80 arrival	–29.1	62.4	–453.2	70.9	0.033	0.017	0.084	0.023
immig: 1981–90 arrival	–20.7	45.2	–471.9	51.4	0.018	0.012	0.087	0.018
immig: 1991–96 arrival	27.1	29.2	–551.5	33.1	–0.009	0.008	0.091	0.012
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	96.4	22.8	–486.1	27.7	–0.019	0.006	0.055	0.009
years since mig. (ysm)	17.7	5.0	29.8	5.6	–0.002	0.001	–0.004	0.002
ysm squared (/100)	–22.2	15.2	–27.7	16.9	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.006
second-gen. Mexican								
American	–54.2	10.9	–12.4	11.5	0.019	0.003	0.034	0.003
third-gen. Mexican								
American	–103.5	9.3	–20.6	9.7	0.017	0.003	0.015	0.003
	Log wages (FT)							
	Men		Women					
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE				
immig: pre-1961 arrival	–0.079	0.178	–0.185	0.223				
immig: 1961–70 arrival	–0.191	0.071	–0.051	0.102				
immig: 1971–80 arrival	–0.172	0.046	–0.007	0.076				
immig: 1981–90 arrival	–0.341	0.034	–0.170	0.059				
immig: 1991–96 arrival	–0.303	0.023	–0.220	0.042				
immig: 1997–2002 arrival	–0.247	0.018	–0.243	0.032				
years since mig. (ysm)	0.002	0.004	–0.004	0.007				
ysm squared (/100)	0.002	0.012	0.013	0.019				
second-gen. Mexican								
American	–0.127	0.010	–0.082	0.010				
third-gen. Mexican								
American	–0.138	0.008	–0.093	0.008				

Note: Other controls include: a quartic in age, years of schooling, eight Census region dummies, an MSA dummy, dummies for California and Texas, and year dummies.

Table 2A.5 Industrial and occupational distribution, by gender

Industry	White, non-Hispanic native parents		Mexican immigrants		Mexican immigrants, in U.S. at least 10 years		Mexican immigrants (mig. age ≥18)		Mexican immigrants (mig. age ≥18, in U.S. at least 10 years)		Second-generation Mexican Americans		Third-generation Mexican Americans	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	Agriculture	0.034	0.015	0.149	0.066	0.138	0.053	0.163	0.080	0.160	0.071	0.047	0.016	0.035
Mining	0.009	0.002	0.006	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.005	0.000	0.009	0.001	0.014	0.002
Construction	0.117	0.016	0.179	0.008	0.170	0.007	0.181	0.007	0.164	0.005	0.117	0.011	0.126	0.011
Mfg. nondurable	0.068	0.048	0.105	0.151	0.102	0.145	0.109	0.179	0.110	0.186	0.074	0.042	0.072	0.038
Mfg. durable	0.132	0.052	0.116	0.086	0.128	0.095	0.115	0.087	0.131	0.100	0.090	0.043	0.099	0.044
Transportation	0.057	0.024	0.036	0.012	0.046	0.014	0.031	0.010	0.041	0.012	0.068	0.022	0.062	0.022
Communication utilities	0.035	0.017	0.007	0.005	0.009	0.005	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.029	0.016	0.033	0.025
Wholesale trade	0.051	0.025	0.043	0.036	0.048	0.038	0.043	0.037	0.048	0.041	0.051	0.028	0.052	0.023
Retail trade	0.160	0.210	0.208	0.247	0.185	0.219	0.202	0.235	0.176	0.197	0.216	0.268	0.200	0.245
Finance, real estate and insurance	0.051	0.083	0.015	0.031	0.019	0.039	0.014	0.022	0.020	0.026	0.030	0.073	0.033	0.071
Business and repair services	0.073	0.050	0.070	0.062	0.068	0.058	0.070	0.063	0.067	0.055	0.080	0.046	0.072	0.053
Private household services	0.001	0.009	0.004	0.065	0.003	0.056	0.004	0.079	0.004	0.072	0.002	0.016	0.002	0.012
Other personal services	0.006	0.021	0.006	0.038	0.006	0.037	0.007	0.043	0.006	0.045	0.007	0.022	0.008	0.021
Entertainment and rec. services	0.022	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.010	0.016	0.008	0.017	0.009	0.024	0.019	0.020	0.020
Health services	0.032	0.141	0.011	0.061	0.013	0.077	0.008	0.052	0.010	0.070	0.032	0.122	0.030	0.138
Education services	0.049	0.130	0.014	0.058	0.020	0.073	0.013	0.042	0.019	0.053	0.044	0.128	0.047	0.130

(continued)

Table 2A.5
(continued)

	White, non-Hispanic natives with native parents		Mexican immigrants		Mexican immigrants in U.S. at least 10 years		Mexican immigrants (mig. age ≥ 18)		Mexican immigrants (mig. age ≥ 18 , in U.S. at least 10 years)		Second- generation Mexican Americans		Third-generation Mexican Americans	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Other professional services	0.038	0.040	0.005	0.008	0.006	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.014	0.031	0.019	0.024
Social services	0.016	0.057	0.006	0.044	0.008	0.048	0.006	0.042	0.008	0.044	0.016	0.056	0.017	0.062
Public administration	0.047	0.040	0.005	0.012	0.007	0.016	0.003	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.050	0.041	0.058	0.047
<i>Occupation</i>														
Manager	0.159	0.144	0.031	0.037	0.040	0.045	0.025	0.026	0.031	0.030	0.084	0.093	0.085	0.108
Professional & technical	0.163	0.223	0.024	0.045	0.032	0.052	0.017	0.031	0.020	0.028	0.087	0.130	0.094	0.142
Clerical	0.052	0.245	0.025	0.108	0.032	0.133	0.017	0.060	0.021	0.067	0.080	0.303	0.077	0.292
Sales	0.122	0.136	0.038	0.090	0.044	0.092	0.032	0.064	0.037	0.066	0.108	0.168	0.091	0.146
Personal service	0.058	0.125	0.166	0.304	0.138	0.273	0.170	0.351	0.145	0.320	0.102	0.151	0.092	0.160
Protective service	0.026	0.006	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.031	0.008	0.038	0.007
Health service	0.003	0.029	0.002	0.032	0.002	0.041	0.001	0.030	0.001	0.043	0.005	0.038	0.005	0.045
Farm manager	0.014	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001
Farmworker	0.023	0.006	0.151	0.075	0.136	0.063	0.168	0.092	0.160	0.087	0.049	0.014	0.038	0.008
Craft	0.194	0.019	0.231	0.049	0.243	0.050	0.235	0.052	0.247	0.055	0.192	0.021	0.216	0.022
Operative, exc. transportation equip.	0.063	0.036	0.136	0.200	0.137	0.195	0.141	0.233	0.150	0.248	0.076	0.042	0.076	0.040
Transportation equipment operative	0.067	0.009	0.066	0.006	0.080	0.007	0.060	0.005	0.074	0.004	0.075	0.010	0.088	0.009
Laborer	0.056	0.016	0.121	0.051	0.104	0.045	0.127	0.053	0.104	0.049	0.108	0.023	0.098	0.022

Note: Sample includes all workers with a reported occupation and industry for the previous year.

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