

# The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market\*

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**Abstract.** Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its importance. We start by showing theoretically that the efficiency cost of adverse selection cannot be inferred from reduced form evidence of how “adversely selected” an insurance market appears to be. Instead, an explicit model of insurance contract choice is required. We develop and estimate such a model in the context of the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about risk type (mortality) as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options. We focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities. The results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first-best, symmetric information benchmark by about £127 million per year, or about 2 percent of annual premiums. We also find that government mandates, the canonical solution to adverse selection problems, do not necessarily improve on the asymmetric information equilibrium. Depending on the contract mandated, mandates could reduce welfare by as much as £107 million annually, or increase it by as much as £127 million. Since determining which mandates would be welfare improving is empirically difficult, our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest.

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# 1 Introduction

Ever since the seminal works of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a rich theoretical literature has emphasized the negative welfare consequences of adverse selection in insurance markets and the potential for welfare-improving government intervention. More recently, a growing empirical literature has developed ways to detect whether asymmetric information exists in particular insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). Once adverse selection is detected, however, there has been no attempt to estimate the magnitude of its efficiency costs, or to compare welfare in the asymmetric information equilibrium to what would be achieved by potential government interventions. Motivated by this, the paper develops an empirical approach that can quantify the efficiency cost of asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of government intervention in an insurance market. We apply our approach to a particular market in which adverse selection has been detected, the market for annuities in the United Kingdom.

We begin by establishing a general “impossibility” result that is not specific to our application. We show that even when asymmetric information is known to exist, the reduced form equilibrium relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence does not permit inference about the magnitude of the efficiency cost of this asymmetric information. Relatedly, the reduced form is not sufficient to determine whether mandatory social insurance could improve welfare, or what type of mandate would do so. Such inferences require knowledge of the risk type and preferences of individuals receiving different insurance allocations in the private market equilibrium. These results motivate the more structural approach that we take in the rest of the paper.

Our approach uses insurance company data on individual insurance choices and ex-post risk experience, and it relies on the ability to recover the joint distribution of (unobserved) risk type and preferences of consumers. This joint distribution allows us to compute welfare at the observed allocation, as well as to compute allocations and welfare for counterfactual scenarios. We compare welfare under the observed asymmetric information allocation to what would be achieved under the first-best, symmetric information benchmark; this comparison provides our measure of the welfare cost of asymmetric information. We also compare equilibrium welfare to what would be obtained under mandatory social insurance programs; this comparison sheds light on the potential for welfare improving government intervention.

Mandatory social insurance is the canonical solution to the problem of adverse selection in insurance markets (e.g., Akerlof, 1970). Yet, as emphasized by Feldstein (2005) among others, mandates are not necessarily welfare improving when individuals differ in their preferences. When individuals differ in both their preferences and their (privately known) risk types, mandates may involve a trade-off between the allocative inefficiency produced by adverse selection and the allocative inefficiency produced by the elimination of self-selection. Whether and which mandates can increase welfare thus becomes an empirical question.

We apply our approach to the semi-compulsory market for annuities in the United Kingdom. Individuals who have accumulated savings in tax-preferred retirement saving accounts (the equiva-

lents of IRA or 401(k) in the United States) are required to annuitize their accumulated lump sum balances at retirement. These annuity contracts provide a life-contingent stream of payments. As a result of these requirements, there is a sizable volume in the market. In 1998, new funds annuitized in this market totalled £6 billion (Association of British Insurers, 1999).

Although they are required to annuitize their balances, individuals are allowed choice in their annuity contract. In particular, they can choose from among guarantee periods of 0, 5, or 10 years. During a guarantee period, annuity payments are made (to the annuitant or to his estate) regardless of the annuitant's survival. All else equal, a guarantee period reduces the amount of mortality-contingent payments in the annuity and, as a result, the effective amount of insurance. In the extreme, a 65 year old who purchases a 50 year guaranteed annuity has in essence purchased a bond with deterministic payments. Presumably for this reason, individuals in this market are restricted from purchasing a guarantee of more than 10 years.

The pension annuity market provides a particularly interesting setting in which to explore the welfare costs of asymmetric information and of potential government intervention. Annuity markets have attracted increasing attention and interest as Social Security reform proposals have been advanced in various countries. Some proposals call for partly or fully replacing government-provided defined benefit, pay-as-you-go retirement systems with defined contribution systems in which individuals would accumulate assets in individual accounts. In such systems, an important question concerns whether the government would require individuals to annuitize some or all of their balance, and whether it would allow choice over the type of annuity product purchased. The relative attractiveness of these various options depends critically on consumer welfare in each alternative equilibrium.

In addition to their substantive interest, several features of annuities make them a particularly attractive setting in which to operationalize our framework. First, adverse selection has already been detected and documented in this market along the choice of guarantee period, with private information about longevity affecting both the choice of contract and its price in equilibrium (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004 and 2006). Second, annuities are relatively simple and clearly defined contracts, so modeling the contract choice requires less abstraction than in other insurance settings. Third, the case for moral hazard in annuities is arguably substantially less compelling than for other forms of insurance; our ability to assume away moral hazard substantially simplifies the empirical analysis.

Our empirical object of interest is the joint distribution of risk and preferences. To estimate it, we rely on two key modeling assumptions. First, to recover risk types (which in the context of annuities means mortality types), we make a distributional assumption that mortality follows a Gompertz distribution at the individual level. Individuals' mortality tracks their own individual-specific mortality rates, allowing us to recover the extent of heterogeneity in (ex-ante) mortality rates from (ex-post) information about mortality realization. Second, to recover preferences, we use a standard dynamic model of consumption by retirees. We assume that retirees know their (ex-ante) mortality type, which governs their stochastic time of death. This model allows us to evaluate the (ex-ante) value-maximizing choice of a guarantee period. A longer guarantee period,

which is associated with lower annuity payout rate, is more attractive for individuals who are likely to die sooner. This is the source of adverse selection. Preferences also influence guarantee choices: a longer guarantee is more attractive to individuals who care more about their wealth when they die.

Given the above assumptions, the parameters of the model are identified from the variation in mortality and guarantee choices in the data, and in particular from the correlation between them. However, no modeling assumptions are needed to establish the existence of private information about the individual's mortality rate. This is apparent from the existence of (conditional) correlation between guarantee choices and ex post mortality in the data. Given the annuity choice model, rationalizing the observed choices with only variation in mortality risk is hard. Indeed, our findings suggest that both private information about risk type and preferences are important determinants of the equilibrium insurance allocations.

We measure welfare in a given annuity allocation as the average amount of money an individual would need, to make him as well off without the annuity as with his annuity allocation and his pre-existing wealth. Relative to a symmetric information, first-best benchmark, we find that the welfare cost of asymmetric information within the annuity market along the guarantee margin is about £127 million per year, or about two percent of the annual premiums in this market. To put these welfare estimates in context given the margin of choice, we benchmark them against the maximum money at stake in the choice of guarantee. This benchmark is defined as the additional (ex-ante) amount of wealth required to ensure that if individuals were forced to buy the policy with the least amount of insurance, they would be at least as well off as they had been. Our estimates imply that the costs of asymmetric information are about 25 percent of this maximum money at stake.

We also find that government mandates do not necessarily improve on the asymmetric information equilibrium. We estimate that a mandatory social insurance program that eliminated choice over guarantee could reduce welfare by as much as £107 million per year, or increase welfare by as much as £127 million per year, depending on what guarantee contract the public policy mandates. The welfare-maximizing contract would not be apparent to the government without knowledge of the distribution of risk types and preferences. For example, although a 5 year guarantee period is by far the most common choice in the asymmetric information equilibrium, we estimate that the welfare-maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee. Since determining which mandates would be welfare improving is empirically difficult, our results suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory would suggest.

As we demonstrate in our initial theoretical analysis, estimation of the welfare consequences of asymmetric information or of government intervention requires that we specify and estimate a structural model of annuity demand. This involves assumptions about the nature of the utility model that governs annuity choice, as well as several other parametric assumptions, which are required for operational and computational reasons. A critical question is how important these particular assumptions are for our central welfare estimates. We therefore explore a range of possible alternatives, both for the appropriate utility model and for our various parametric assumptions.

We are reassured that our central estimates are quite stable and do not change much under most of the specifications we estimate. The finding that a 10 year guarantee is the optimal mandate is also robust across these alternative specifications.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model that produces the “impossibility result” which motivates the subsequent empirical work. Section 3 describes the model of annuity demand and discusses our estimation approach, and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our parameter estimates and discusses their in-sample and out-of-sample fit. Section 6 presents the implications of our estimates for the welfare costs of asymmetric information in this market, as well as the welfare consequences of potential government policies. The robustness of the results is explored in Section 7. Section 8 concludes by briefly summarizing our findings and discussing how the approach we develop can be applied in other insurance markets, including those where moral hazard is likely to be important.

## 2 Motivating theory

The seminal theoretical work on asymmetric information emphasized that asymmetric information distorts the market equilibrium away from the first best (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Intuitively, if individuals who appear observationally identical to the insurance company differ in their expected insurance claims, a common insurance price is likely to distort optimal insurance coverage for at least some of these individuals. The sign and magnitude of this distortion varies with the individual’s risk type and with his elasticity of demand for insurance, i.e. individual preferences. Estimation of the efficiency cost of asymmetric information therefore requires estimation of individuals’ preferences and their risk types.

Structural estimation of the joint distribution of risk type and preferences will require additional assumptions. We therefore begin by asking whether we can make any inferences about the efficiency costs of asymmetric information from reduced form evidence about the risk experience of individuals with different insurance contracts. For example, suppose we observe two different insurance markets with asymmetric information, one of which appears extremely adversely selected (i.e. the insured have a much higher risk occurrence than the uninsured) while in the other the risk experience of the insured individuals is indistinguishable from that of the uninsured. Can we at least make comparative statements about which market is likely to have a greater efficiency cost of asymmetric information? Unfortunately, we conclude that, without strong additional assumptions, the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence is not informative for even qualitative statements about the efficiency costs of asymmetric information. Relatedly, we show that the reduced form is not sufficient to determine whether or what mandatory social insurance program could improve welfare relative to the asymmetric information equilibrium. This motivates our subsequent development and estimation of a structural model of preferences and risk type.

Compared to the canonical framework of insurance markets used by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and many others, we obtain our “impossibility results” by incorporating two additional fea-

tures of real-world insurance markets. First, we allow individuals to differ not only in their risk types but also in their preferences. Several recent empirical papers have found evidence of substantial unobserved preference heterogeneity in different insurance markets, including automobile insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007), reverse mortgages (Davidoff and Welke, 2005), health insurance (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2006), and long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). Second, we allow for a loading factor on insurance. There is evidence of non-trivial loading factors in many insurance markets, including long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004), annuity markets (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; and Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002), life insurance (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000), and automobile insurance (Chiappori et al., 2006). The loading factor implies that the first best may require different insurance allocations to different individuals. Without a loading factor, the first best can always be achieved by mandating full coverage (unless risk loving is a possibility). This is a special feature of the canonical insurance context. In the context of annuities, which is the focus of the rest of the paper, the results will hold even without a loading factor; as we discuss later in more detail, heterogeneous preferences for annuities are sufficient to produce heterogeneous insurance allocations in the first best.

Our analysis is in the spirit of Chiappori et al. (2006), who demonstrate that in the presence of load factors and unobserved preference heterogeneity, the reduced form correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence cannot be used to test for asymmetric information about risk type. In contrast to this analysis, we *assume* the existence of asymmetric information and ask whether the reduced form correlation is then informative about the extent of the efficiency costs of this asymmetric information.

As our results are negative, we adopt the simplest framework possible in which they obtain. We assume that individuals face an (exogenously given) binary decision of whether or not to buy insurance that covers the entire loss in the event of accident. Endogenizing the equilibrium contract set is difficult when unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk types is allowed, as the single crossing property no longer holds. Various recent papers have made progress on this front (Smart, 2000; Wambach, 2000; de Meza and Webb, 2001; and Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2007). Our basic result is likely to hold in this more complex environment, but the analysis and intuition would be substantially less clear than in our simple setting in which we exogenously restrict the contract space but determine the equilibrium price endogenously.

**Setup and notation** Individual  $i$  with a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function  $u_i$  and income  $y_i$  faces the risk of financial loss  $m_i < y_i$  with probability  $p_i$ . We abstract from moral hazard, so  $p_i$  is invariant to the coverage decision. The full insurance policy that the individual may purchase reimburses  $m_i$  in the event of an accident. We denote the price of this insurance by  $\pi_i$ .

In making the coverage choice, individual  $i$  compares the utility he obtains from buying insurance

$$V_{I,i} \equiv u_i(y_i - \pi_i) \tag{1}$$

with the expected utility he obtains without insurance

$$V_{N,i} \equiv (1 - p_i)u_i(y_i) + p_iu_i(y_i - m_i) \quad (2)$$

The individual will buy insurance if and only if  $V_{I,i} \geq V_{N,i}$ . Since  $V_{I,i}$  is decreasing in the price of insurance  $\pi_i$ , and  $V_{N,i}$  is independent of this price, the individual's demand for insurance can be characterized by a reservation price  $\bar{\pi}_i$ . The individual prefers to buy insurance if and only if  $\pi_i \leq \bar{\pi}_i$ .

To analyze this choice, we further restrict attention to the case of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that  $u_i(x) = -e^{-r_i x}$ . A similar analysis can be performed more generally. Our choice of CARA simplifies the exposition as the risk premium and welfare are invariant to income, so we do not need to make any assumptions about the relationship between income and risk. Using a CARA utility function, we can use the equation  $V_{I,i}(\bar{\pi}_i) = V_{N,i}$  to solve for  $\bar{\pi}_i$ , which is given by

$$\bar{\pi}_i = \bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) = \frac{1}{r_i} \ln(1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}) \quad (3)$$

Due to the CARA property, the willingness to pay for insurance is independent of income  $y_i$ . The certainty equivalent of individual  $i$  is given by  $y_i - \bar{\pi}_i$ . Naturally, as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion  $r_i$  goes to zero,  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$  goes to the expected loss  $p_i m_i$ . The following propositions show other intuitive properties of  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$ .

**Proposition 1**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$  is increasing in  $p_i$ ,  $m_i$ , and in  $r_i$ .

**Proposition 2**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) - p_i m_i$  is positive, is increasing in  $m_i$  and in  $r_i$ , and is initially increasing and then decreasing in  $p_i$ .

Both proofs are in the appendix. Note that  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) - p_i m_i$  is the individual's "risk premium." It denotes the individual's willingness to pay for insurance above and beyond the expected payments from the insurance.

**First best** Providing insurance may be costly, and we consider a fixed load per insurance contract  $F \geq 0$ . This can be thought of as the administrative processing costs associated with selling insurance. Total surplus in the market is the sum of certainty equivalents for consumers and profits of firms; we will restrict our attention to zero-profit equilibria in all cases we consider below. Since the premium paid for insurance is just a transfer between individuals and firms, we obtain the following definition:

**Remark 3** It is socially efficient for individual  $i$  to purchase insurance if and only if

$$\bar{\pi}_i - p_i m_i > F \quad (4)$$

In other words, it is socially efficient for individual  $i$  (defined by his risk type  $p_i$  and risk aversion  $r_i$ ) to purchase insurance only if his reservation price,  $\bar{\pi}_i$ , is at least as great as the expected social

cost of providing the insurance,  $p_i m_i + F$ . That is, if the risk premium,  $\bar{\pi}_i - p_i m_i$ , which is the social value, exceeds the fixed load, which is the social cost. Since  $\bar{\pi}_i > p_i m_i$  when  $r_i > 0$  then, trivially, when  $F = 0$  providing insurance to everyone would be the first best. When  $F > 0$ , however, it may no longer be efficient for all individuals to buy insurance. Moreover, Proposition (2) indicates that the socially efficient purchase decision will vary with individual's private information about risk type and risk preferences.

**Market equilibrium with private information about risk type** We now introduce private information about risk type. Specifically, individuals know their own  $p_i$  but the insurance companies know only that it is drawn from the distribution  $f(p)$ . To simplify further, we will assume that  $m_i = m$  for all individuals and that  $p_i$  can take only one of two values,  $p_H$  and  $p_L$  with  $p_H > p_L$ . Assume that the fraction of type  $H$  ( $L$ ) is  $\lambda_H$  ( $\lambda_L$ ) and the risk aversion parameter of risk type  $H$  ( $L$ ) is  $r_H$  ( $r_L$ ). Note that  $r_H$  could, in principle, be higher, lower, or the same as  $r_L$ . To illustrate our result that positive correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage is neither necessary nor sufficient in establishing the extent of inefficiency, we will show, by examples, that all four cases could in principle exist: positive correlation with and without inefficiency, and no positive correlation with and without inefficiency. Of course, the possibility of a first best outcome (i.e. no inefficiency) with asymmetric information about risk type is an artifact of our simplifying assumptions that there are a discrete number of types and contracts; with a continuum of types, a first best outcome would not generally be obtainable. The basic insight, however, that the extent of inefficiency cannot be inferred from the reduced form correlation would carry over to more general settings.

In all cases below, we assume  $n \geq 2$  firms that compete in prices and we solve for the Nash Equilibrium. As in a simple homogeneous product Bertrand competition, consumers choose the lowest price. If both firms offer the same price, consumers are allocated randomly to each firm. Profits per consumer are given by

$$R(\pi) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \pi > \max(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H) \\ \lambda_H (\pi - mp_H - F) & \text{if } \bar{\pi}_L < \pi \leq \bar{\pi}_H \\ \lambda_L (\pi - mp_L - F) & \text{if } \bar{\pi}_H < \pi \leq \bar{\pi}_L \\ \pi - mp^* - F & \text{if } \pi \leq \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H) \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

where  $p^* \equiv \lambda_H p_H + \lambda_L p_L$  is the average risk probability. We restrict attention to equilibria in pure strategies, and derive below several simple results. All proofs are in the appendix.

**Proposition 4** *In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, profits are zero.*

**Proposition 5** *If  $mp^* + F < \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H)$  the unique equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium,  $\pi^{Pool} = mp^* + F$ .*

**Proposition 6** *If  $mp^* + F > \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H)$  the unique equilibrium with positive demand, if it exists, is to set  $\pi = mp_\theta + F$  and serve only type  $\theta$ , where  $\theta = H$  ( $L$ ) if  $\bar{\pi}_L < \bar{\pi}_H$  ( $\bar{\pi}_H < \bar{\pi}_L$ ).*

**Equilibrium, correlation, and efficiency** Table 1 summarizes four key possible cases, which indicate our main result: if we allow for the possibility of loads ( $F > 0$ ) and preference heterogeneity (in particular,  $r_L > r_H$ ) the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence is neither necessary nor sufficient for any conclusion regarding efficiency. It is important to note that throughout the discussion of the four cases, we do not claim that the assumptions in the first column are either necessary or sufficient to produce the efficient and equilibrium allocations shown; we only claim that these allocations are possible equilibria given the assumptions. Appendix A provides the necessary parameter conditions that give rise to the efficient and equilibrium allocations shown in Table 1, and proves that the set of parameters that satisfy each parameter restriction is non-empty.

Case 1 corresponds to the result found in the canonical asymmetric information models, such as Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The equilibrium is inefficient relative to the first best (displaying under-insurance), and there is a positive correlation between risk type and insurance coverage as only the high risk buy. This case can arise under the standard assumptions that there is no load ( $F = 0$ ) and no preference heterogeneity ( $r_L = r_H$ ). Because there is no load, we know from the definition of social efficiency above that the efficient allocation is for both risk types to buy insurance. However, the equilibrium allocation will be that only the high risk types buy insurance if the low risk individuals' reservation price is below the equilibrium pooling price.

In case 2 we consider an equilibrium that displays the positive correlation but is also efficient. To do so, we assume a positive load ( $F > 0$ ) but maintain the assumption of homogeneous preferences ( $r_L = r_H$ ). Due to the presence of a load, it may no longer be socially efficient for all individuals to purchase insurance. In particular, we assume that it is socially efficient only for the high risk types to purchase insurance; with homogeneous preferences, this may be true if both  $p_L$  and  $p_H$  are sufficiently low (see Proposition 2). The equilibrium allocation will involve only high risk types purchasing in equilibrium if the reservation price for low risk types is below the equilibrium pooling price, thereby obtaining the socially efficient outcome as well as the positive correlation property.

In the last two cases, we continue to assume a positive load, but relax the assumption of homogeneous preferences. In particular, we assume that the low risk individuals are more risk averse ( $r_L > r_H$ ). We also assume that it is socially efficient for the low risk, but not for the high risk, to be insured. This could follow simply from the higher risk aversion of the low risk types; even if risk aversion were the same, it could be socially efficient for the low risk but not the high risk to be insured if  $p_L$  and  $p_H$  are sufficiently high (see Proposition 2). In case 3, we assume that both types buy insurance. In other words, for both types the reservation price exceeds the pooling price. Thus the equilibrium does not display a positive correlation between risk type and insurance coverage (both types buy), but it is socially inefficient; it exhibits over-insurance relative to the first best since it is not efficient for the high risk types to buy but they decide to do so at the (subsidized, from their perspective) population average pooling price. Case 4 maintains the assumption that it is socially efficient for the low risk but not for the high risk to be insured. In other words, the low risk type's reservation price exceeds the social cost of providing low risk types with insurance, but the high risk type's reservation price does not exceed the social cost of providing the high risk type

with insurance. However, in contrast to case 3, we now assume that the high risk type is not willing to buy insurance at the low risk price, so that only low risk types are insured in equilibrium.<sup>1</sup> Once again, there is no positive correlation between risk type and insurance coverage (indeed, now there is a negative correlation since only low risk types buy), but the equilibrium is socially efficient.

**Welfare consequences of mandates** Given the simplified framework, there are only two potential mandates to consider, full insurance mandate or no insurance mandate. While the latter may seem unrealistic, it is analogous to a richer, more realistic setting in which mandates provide less than full insurance coverage. Examples might include a mandate with a high deductible in a general insurance context, or mandating a long guarantee period in the annuity context.

The first (trivial) observation is that a mandate may either improve or reduce welfare. To see this, consider case 1 above, in which a full insurance mandate would be socially optimal, while a no insurance mandate would be worse than the equilibrium allocation. The second observation, which is closely related to the earlier results, is that the reduced-form correlation is not sufficient to guide an optimal choice of a mandate. To see this, consider cases 1 and 2. In both cases, the reduced form equilibrium is that only the high risk individuals ( $H$ ) buy insurance. Yet, the optimal mandate may vary. In case 1, mandating full insurance is optimal and achieves the first best. By contrast, in case 2, the optimal (second best) mandate may be to mandate no insurance coverage. This would happen if  $p_H$  is sufficiently high, but the fraction of high risk types is low. In such a case, requiring all low risk types to purchase insurance could be costly.<sup>2</sup>

### 3 Model and estimation

#### 3.1 From insurance to annuity guarantee choice

While the rest of the paper analyzes annuity guarantee choices, the preceding section used a standard insurance framework to illustrate our theoretical point. We did this for three reasons. First, the insurance framework is so widely used, that, we hope, the intuition will be more familiar. Second, the point is quite general, and is not specific to the particular application of this paper. Finally, as will be clear soon, the insurance framework is slightly simpler. We start this section by showing how a simple model of guarantee choice directly maps into this framework. We will also use this simple model to introduce certain modeling assumptions that we use later for the baseline model that we take to the data.

Annuities provide a survival-contingent stream of payments, except during the guarantee period

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<sup>1</sup>Note that case 4 requires preference heterogeneity in order for the reservation price of high risk types to be below that of low risk types (see Proposition 1).

<sup>2</sup>This last observation is somewhat special, as it deals with a case in which the equilibrium allocation achieves the first best. However, it is easy to construct examples in the same spirit, to produce cases in which both the competitive outcome and either mandate fall short of the first best, and, depending on the parameters, the optimal mandate or the equilibrium outcome is more efficient. One way to construct such an example would be to introduce a third type of consumers.

when they provide payments to the annuitant (or his estate) regardless of survival. The annuitant's ex-ante mortality rate therefore represents his risk type. Consider a two period model, and an individual who dies with certainty by the beginning of period 2. The individual may die earlier, in the beginning of period 1, with probability  $q$ . Before period 1 begins, the individual has to annuitize all his assets, and can choose between two annuity contracts. The first contract, that does not provide a guarantee, pays the individual an amount  $z$  in period 1, only if the individual does not die. The second contract provides a guarantee, and pays the individual (or his estate) an amount  $z - \pi$  in period 1 ( $\pi > 0$ ), whether or not he is alive. The value of  $\pi$  can be viewed as the price of the guarantee. The individual obtains flow utility  $u(\cdot)$  from consumption while alive, and a one-time utility  $b(\cdot)$  from wealth after death. For simplicity, we assume also that there is no discounting and that there is no saving technology. We will relax both assumptions in the model we estimate. Thus, if the individual chooses a contract with no guarantee, his utility is given by

$$V_{NG} = (1 - q)(u(z) + b(0)) + qb(0) \quad (6)$$

and if he chooses a contract with guarantee, his utility is

$$V_G = (1 - q)(u(z - \pi) + b(0)) + qb(z - \pi). \quad (7)$$

Renormalizing both utilities, the guarantee choice is reduced to a comparison between  $(1 - q)u(z) + qb(0)$  and  $(1 - q)u(z - \pi) + qb(z - \pi)$ . This trade-off is very similar to the insurance choice in the preceding section, which compares  $(1 - p)u(y) + pu(y - m)$  to  $(1 - p)u(y - \pi) + pu(y - \pi)$ .

As mentioned earlier, there is an important distinction between the two contexts. While in the insurance context it is generally assumed that it is the same utility function  $u(\cdot)$  that applies in both states of the world, in the annuity context there are two distinct functions,  $u(\cdot)$  and  $b(\cdot)$ . Thus, while full coverage is the first best in an insurance context without load, even with preference heterogeneity in, say, risk aversion (and as long as individuals are never risk loving), in the annuity context the first best can vary with preferences, even in the absence of loads. For example, individuals who put no weight on wealth after death will always prefer to not buy a guarantee, while individuals who put little weight on consumption utility will always prefer a guarantee. This means that, when applied to an annuity context, the "impossibility results" in the preceding section do not rely on the existence of loading factors. Loading factors were introduced there only as a way to introduce a possible wedge between full coverage and social efficiency. Preference heterogeneity is sufficient to introduce this wedge in an annuity context.

### 3.2 A model of guarantee choice

We now introduce the more complete model of guarantee choice that we estimate. We consider the utility maximizing guarantee choice of a fully rational, forward looking, risk averse, retired individual, with an accumulated stock of wealth, stochastic mortality, and time separable utility. This framework has been widely used to model annuity choices (see, e.g., Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Mitchell et al., 1999; and Davidoff et al., 2005).

At the time of the decision, the age of the individual is  $t_0$ , which we normalize to zero (in our application it will be either 60 or 65). The individual faces a random length of life<sup>3</sup> characterized by an annual mortality hazard  $q_t$  during year  $t \geq t_0$ .<sup>4</sup> Since the guarantee choice will be evaluated numerically, we will also make the assumption that there exists time  $T$  by which the individual dies with probability one. We assume that the individual has full (potentially private) information about this random mortality process. As in the preceding section, the individual obtains utility from two sources. When alive, he obtains flow utility from consumption. When dead, the individual obtains a one-time utility that is a function of the value of his assets at the time of death. In particular, as of time  $t < T$ , the individual's expected utility, as a function of his consumption plan  $C_t = \{c_t, \dots, c_T\}$ , is given by

$$U(C_t) = \sum_{t'=t}^{T+1} \delta^{t'-t} (s_t u(c_t) + f_t b(w_t)) \quad (8)$$

where  $s_t = \prod_{r=t_0}^t (1-q_r)$  is the survival probability of the individual through year  $t$ ,  $f_t = q_t \prod_{r=t_0}^{t-1} (1-q_r)$  is his probability of dying during year  $t$ ,  $\delta$  is his (annual) discount factor,  $u(\cdot)$  is his utility from consumption, and  $b(\cdot)$  is the utility of wealth remaining after death  $w_t$ .

A positive valuation for wealth at death may stem from a number of possible underlying structural preferences. Possible interpretations of a value for wealth after death include a bequest motive (Sheshinski, 2006) and a “regret” motive (Braun and Muermann, 2004). Since the exact structural interpretation is not essential for our goal, we remain agnostic about it throughout the paper.

In the absence of an annuity, the optimal consumption plan can be computed numerically by solving the following program

$$\begin{aligned} V_t^{NA}(w_t) &= \max_{c_t \geq 0} [(1 - q_t)(u(c_t) + \delta V_{t+1}(w_{t+1})) + q_t b(w_t)] \\ \text{s.t. } w_{t+1} &= (1 + r)(w_t - c_t) \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

That is, we make the standard assumption that, due to mortality risk, the individual cannot borrow against the future, and that he accumulates the per-period interest rate  $r$  on his saving. Since death is guaranteed by period  $T$ , the terminal condition for the program is given by

$$V_{T+1}^{NA}(w_{T+1}) = b(w_{T+1}). \quad (10)$$

Suppose now that the individual annuitizes a fixed fraction  $\eta$  of his initial wealth,  $w_0$ . Broadly following the institutional framework, we take the (mandatory) fraction of annuitized wealth as given. In exchange for paying  $\eta w_0$  to the annuity company at  $t = t_0$ , the individual receives an

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<sup>3</sup>Not surprisingly, we can rule out a model with deterministic length of life and perfect foresight. Most individuals in the data choose a positive guarantee length and are alive at the end of it, thus violating such a model.

<sup>4</sup>In fact, we later estimate mortality risk at the daily level, and most annuity contracts are paying on a monthly basis. However, since the model is solved numerically, we restrict the model to a coarser, annual frequency, reducing the computational burden.

annual payout of  $z_t$  in real terms, when alive. Thus, the individual solves the same problem as above, with two small modifications. First, initial wealth is given by  $(1 - \eta)w_0$ . Second, the budget constraint is modified to reflect the additional annuity payments  $z_t$  received every period.

For a given annuitized amount  $\eta w_0$ , consider the three possible guarantee choices available in the data, 0, 5, and 10 years. Each guarantee period  $g$  corresponds to an annual payout stream of  $z_t^g$ , satisfying  $z_t^0 > z_t^5 > z_t^{10}$  for any  $t$ . For each guarantee length  $g$ , the optimal consumption plan can be computed numerically by solving

$$V_t^{A(g)}(w_t) = \max_{c_t \geq 0} \left[ (1 - q_t)(u(c_t) + \delta V_{t+1}^{A(g)}(w_{t+1})) + q_t b(w_t + G_t^g) \right] \quad (11)$$

$$s.t. w_{t+1} = (1 + r)(w_t + z_t^g - c_t) \geq 0 \quad (12)$$

where  $G_t^g = \sum_{t'=t}^{t_0+g} \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^{t'-t} z_{t'}^g$  is the present value of the remaining guaranteed payments. This mimics the typical practice: when an individual dies within the guarantee period, the insurance company pays the present value of the remaining payments and closes the account. As before, since death is guaranteed by period  $T$ , which is greater than the maximal length of guarantee, the terminal condition for the program is given by

$$V_{T+1}^{A(g)}(w_{T+1}) = b(w_{T+1}) \quad (13)$$

The optimal guarantee choice is then given by

$$g^* = \arg \max_{g \in \{0, 5, 10\}} \left\{ V_{t_0}^{A(g)}((1 - \eta)w_0) \right\} \quad (14)$$

Information about the annuitant's guarantee choice combined with the assumption that this choice was made optimally thus provides information about the annuitant's underlying preference and mortality parameters. A higher level of guarantee will be more attractive for individuals with higher mortality rate and for individuals who get greater utility  $b(\cdot)$  from wealth after death.

### 3.3 Econometric specification and estimation

Before we can take the model to data, additional parametric assumptions are needed. In the robustness section we revisit many of these assumptions, and assess how sensitive the results are to them.

First, we model the mortality process. Mortality determines risk in the annuity context, and therefore affects choices and pricing. We assume that the mortality outcome is a realization of an individual-specific Gompertz distribution. We choose the Gompertz functional form for the baseline hazard, as this functional form is widely-used in the actuarial literature to model mortality (e.g., Horiuchi and Coale, 1982). Specifically, the mortality risk of individual  $i$  in our data is described by a Gompertz mortality rate  $\alpha_i$ . Therefore, conditional on living at  $t_0$ , individual  $i$ 's probability of survival through time  $t$  is given by

$$S(\alpha_i, \lambda, t) = \exp \left( \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda} (1 - \exp(\lambda(t - t_0))) \right) \quad (15)$$

where  $\lambda$  is the shape parameter of the Gompertz distribution, which is assumed common across individuals,  $t$  is the individual's age (in days), and  $t_0$  is some base age (which will be 60 in our application). The corresponding hazard rate is  $\alpha_i \exp(\lambda(t - t_0))$ . Lower values of  $\alpha_i$  correspond to lower mortality hazards and higher survival rates. Everything else equal, individuals with higher  $\alpha_i$  are likely to die sooner, and therefore are more likely to benefit from and to purchase a (longer) guarantee.

The second key object we specify is preference heterogeneity. As already mentioned, we remain agnostic regarding the structural interpretation of utility that lead individuals to purchase guarantees. Therefore, we choose to model heterogeneity in this utility in a way that would be most attractive, for intuition and for computation. We restrict consumption utility  $u(\cdot)$  to be the same across individuals, and we model utility from wealth after death to be the same up to a proportional shift. That is, we assume that  $b_i(\cdot) = \beta_i b(\cdot)$  where  $b(\cdot)$  is common to all individuals.  $\beta_i$  can be interpreted as the weight that individual  $i$  puts on wealth when dead relative to consumption while alive. Individuals with higher  $\beta_i$  are therefore more likely to purchase a (longer) guarantee. Note, however, that since  $u(\cdot)$  is defined over a flow of consumption while  $b(\cdot)$  is defined over a stock of wealth, it is hard to interpret the magnitude of  $\beta$  directly.

To summarize our specification of heterogeneity, an individual in our data can be described by two unobserved parameters  $(\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ . We assume that both are perfectly known to the individual at the time of guarantee choice. While this perfect information assumption is strong, it is, in our view, the most natural benchmark. Higher values of either  $\alpha_i$  or  $\beta_i$  are associated with a higher propensity to choose a (longer) guarantee period. However, only  $\alpha_i$  affects mortality, while  $\beta_i$  does not. Since we observe both guarantee choices and mortality, this is the main distinction between the two parameters, which is key to the identification of the model, described below. In our benchmark specification, we assume that  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$  are drawn from a bivariate lognormal distribution

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log \alpha_i \\ \log \beta_i \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{bmatrix} \mu_\alpha \\ \mu_\beta \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_\alpha^2 & \rho \sigma_\alpha \sigma_\beta \\ \rho \sigma_\alpha \sigma_\beta & \sigma_\beta^2 \end{bmatrix} \right) \quad (16)$$

which allows for correlation between preferences and mortality rates. In the robustness section we explore other distributional assumptions.

To complete the econometric specification of the model, we follow the literature and assume a standard CRRA utility function with parameter  $\gamma$ , i.e.  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ . We also assume that the utility from wealth at death follows the same CRRA form with the same parameter  $\gamma$ , i.e.  $b(w) = \frac{w^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ . This assumption, together with the fact (discussed below) that guarantee payments are proportional to the annuitized amount, implies that preferences are homothetic, and, in particular, that the optimal guarantee choice  $g^*$  is invariant to initial wealth  $w_0$ . This greatly simplifies our analysis, as it means that the optimal annuity choice is independent of starting wealth  $w_0$ , which we do not directly observe. In the robustness section, we show that our welfare estimates are robust to an extension of the baseline model in which we allow average mortality  $\mu_\alpha$  and average preferences for wealth after death  $\mu_\beta$  to vary with a number of proxies for annuitant socioeconomic status which we observe. We also show that the results are robust to an alternative model that allows for

non-homothetic preferences in which wealthier individuals care more, at the margin, about wealth after death.

In summary, in our baseline specification we estimate six structural parameters: the five parameters of the joint distribution of  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$ , and the shape parameter  $\lambda$  of the Gompertz distribution. We use external data to impose values for other parameters in the model. First, since we do not directly observe the fraction of wealth annuitized  $\eta$ , we use market-wide evidence that for individuals with compulsory annuity payments, about one-fifth of income (and therefore presumably of wealth) comes from the compulsory annuity (Banks and Emmerson, 1999); in the robustness section we discuss what the rest of the annuitants' wealth portfolio may look like and how this may affect our counterfactual calculations. Second, as we will discuss in Section 4, we use the data to guide us regarding the choice of values for discount and interest rates. Finally, we use  $\gamma = 3$  as the coefficient of relative risk aversion.<sup>5</sup> In the robustness section we explore the sensitivity of the results to the imposed values of all these parameters.

Figure 1 presents a stylized, graphical illustration of the optimal guarantee choice in the space of  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$ . We will present our actual estimates of the optimal guarantee choices in the space of  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$  in Section 5 (see Figure 2). The optimal guarantee choices depend on the annuity prices (which we discuss in Section 4), the guarantee choice model, and the foregoing assumptions regarding the calibrated parameters. The optimal guarantee choices do not depend on the estimated parameters, except that in practice we first estimate  $\lambda$  (the shape parameter of the Gompertz hazard) using only the mortality data and then estimate the optimal guarantee choices given our estimate of  $\lambda$ . We discuss this in more detail below.

Figure 1 shows that low values of both  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$  imply a small incentive to purchase a guarantee, while high values imply that choosing the maximal guarantee length (10 years) is optimal. Intermediate values imply a choice of a 5 year guarantee. Thus, the optimal guarantee choice can be characterized by two indifference sets, those values of  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_i$  for which individuals are indifferent between purchasing 0 and 5 year guarantee, and those values that make them indifferent between 5 and 10 years.

We estimate the model using maximum likelihood. Here we provide only a general overview; Appendix B provides more details. The likelihood depends on the (possibly truncated) observed mortality  $m_i$  and on individual  $i$ 's guarantee choice  $g_i$ . We can write the likelihood as

$$l_i(m_i, g_i) = \int \Pr(m_i|\alpha, \lambda) \left( \int \mathbf{1} \left( g_i = \arg \max_g V_0^{A(g)}(\beta, \alpha, \lambda) \right) dF(\beta|\alpha) \right) dF(\alpha) \quad (17)$$

where  $F(\alpha)$  is the marginal distribution of  $\alpha_i$ ,  $F(\beta|\alpha)$  is the conditional distribution of  $\beta_i$ ,  $\lambda$  is the Gompertz shape parameter,  $\Pr(m_i|\alpha, \lambda)$  is given by the Gompertz distribution,  $\mathbf{1}(\cdot)$  is the indicator function, and the value of the indicator function is given by the guarantee choice model. Given the

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<sup>5</sup>A long line of simulation literature uses a base case value of 3 for the risk aversion coefficient (see e.g. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Engen, Gale, and Uccello, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1999; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khatri, 2003; and Davis, Kubler, and Willen, 2006). However, a substantial consumption literature, summarized in Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), has found risk aversion levels closer to 1, as did Hurd's (1989) study among the elderly. In contrast, other papers report higher levels of risk aversion (Barsky et al. 1997; Palumbo, 1999).

model and conditional on the value of  $\alpha$ , the inner integral is simply an ordered probit, where the cutoff points are given by the location in which a vertical line in Figure 1 crosses the two indifference sets. Estimation is more complex since  $\alpha$  is not observed, and therefore needs to be integrated out.

The primary computational difficulty in maximizing the likelihood is that, in principle, each evaluation of the likelihood requires us to resolve the guarantee choice model and compute these cutoff points for a continuum of values of  $\alpha$ . Since the model is solved numerically, this is not trivial. Thus, instead of recalculating these cutoffs at every evaluation of the likelihood, we calculate the cutoffs on a large grid of values of  $\alpha$  only once and then interpolate to evaluate the likelihood. Unfortunately, since the cutoffs also depend on  $\lambda$ , this method does not allow us to estimate  $\lambda$  jointly with all the other parameters. We could calculate the cutoffs on a grid of values of both  $\alpha$  and  $\lambda$ , but this would increase computation time substantially. Instead, at some loss of efficiency, but not of consistency, we first estimate  $\lambda$  using only the mortality portion of the likelihood. We then fix  $\lambda$  at this estimate, calculate the cutoffs, and estimate the remaining parameters from the full likelihood above. We bootstrap the data to obtain the correct standard errors.

### 3.4 Identification

Identification of the model is conceptually similar to that of Cohen and Einav (2007). It is easiest to convey the intuition by thinking about estimation in two steps. Given our assumption of no moral hazard, we can estimate the marginal distribution of mortality rates (i.e.,  $\mu_\alpha$  and  $\sigma_\alpha$ ) from mortality data alone. We estimate mortality fully parametrically, assuming a Gompertz baseline hazard with a shape parameter  $\lambda$ , and lognormally distributed heterogeneity in the location parameter  $\alpha$ . One can think of  $\mu_\alpha$  as being identified by the overall mortality rate in the data, and  $\sigma_\alpha$  as being identified by the way it changes with age. That is, the Gompertz assumption implies that the log of the mortality hazard rate is linear, at the individual level. Heterogeneity in mortality rates will translate into a concave log hazard graph, as, over time, lower mortality individuals are more likely to survive. The more concave the log hazard is in the data, the higher our estimate of  $\sigma_\alpha$  will be.<sup>6</sup>

Once the marginal distribution of (ex ante) mortality rates is identified, the other parameters of the model are identified by the guarantee choices, and by how they correlate with observed mortality. Given an estimate of the marginal distribution of  $\alpha$ , the ex post mortality experience can be mapped into a distribution of (ex ante) mortality rates; individuals who die sooner are more likely (from the econometrician's perspective) to be of higher (ex ante) mortality rates. By integrating over this conditional (on the individual's mortality outcome) distribution of ex ante mortality rates, the model predicts the likelihood of a given individual choosing a particular guarantee length.

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<sup>6</sup>We make these parametric assumptions for practical convenience. In principle, to estimate the model we need to make a parametric assumption about either the baseline hazard (as in Heckman and Singer, 1984) or the distribution of heterogeneity (as in Heckman and Honore, 1989; Han and Hausman, 1990; and Meyer, 1990), but do not have to make both. For our welfare analysis, however, a parametric assumption about the baseline hazard is required in the context of our data because, as will become clear in the next section, we do not observe mortality beyond a certain age. In the robustness section we show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to alternative parametric assumptions about the baseline hazard or the distribution of heterogeneity.

Conditional on the individual's (ex ante) mortality rate, individuals who choose longer guarantees are more likely (from the econometrician's perspective) to place a higher value on wealth after death (i.e. have a higher  $\beta$ ).

Thus, we can condition on  $\alpha$  and form the conditional probability of a guarantee length,  $P(g_i = g|\alpha)$ , from the data. Our guarantee choice model above allows us to recover the conditional cumulative distribution function of  $\beta$  evaluated at the indifference cutoffs from these probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned} P(g_i = 0|\alpha) &= F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda)) \\ P(g_i = 0|\alpha) + P(g_i = 5|\alpha) &= F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda)) \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

An additional assumption is needed to translate these points of the cumulative distribution into the entire conditional distribution of  $\beta$ . Accordingly, we assume that  $\beta$  is lognormally distributed conditional on  $\alpha$ . Given this assumption, we could allow a fully nonparametric relationship between the conditional mean and variance of  $\beta$  and  $\alpha$ . However, in practice, only about one-fifth of individuals die within the sample, and daily variation does not provide sufficient information to strongly differentiate ex ante mortality rates. Consequently, we assume that the conditional mean of  $\log \beta$  is a linear function of  $\log \alpha$  and the conditional variance of  $\log \beta$  is constant (i.e. when  $\alpha$  is lognormally distributed,  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are joint lognormally distributed). For the same reason of practicality, using the guarantee choice to inform us about the mortality rate is also important, and we estimate all the parameters (except for  $\lambda$ ) jointly, rather than in two separate steps.<sup>7</sup>

The joint estimation of guarantee choices and mortality has an additional conceptual advantage. While, in principle, backing out the distribution of mortality rates from mortality data alone could have led us to infer that individuals do not vary in their mortality rates,<sup>8</sup> the existing conditional correlation between guarantee choices and mortality (described in Section 4) rules out this possibility in the joint estimation. Joint estimation forces the estimated parameters to rationalize this correlation by estimating the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in mortality rates.

Our assumption of no moral hazard is important for identification. When moral hazard exists, the individual's mortality experience becomes a function of the guarantee choice, as well as ex ante mortality rate, so that we could not simply use observed mortality experience to estimate (ex ante) mortality rate. The assumption of no moral hazard seems reasonable in our context. While Philipson and Becker (1998) note that in principle the presence of annuity income may affect individual efforts to extend length of life, they suggest that such effects are more likely to be important among poorer individuals; U.K. annuitants are disproportionately wealthier than typical individuals in the population (Banks and Emmerson, 1999). Moreover, the quantitative importance of any moral hazard effect is likely to be further attenuated in the U.K. annuity market, where

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<sup>7</sup>For similar reasons, it is also important to observe the guarantee choice from three, rather than two alternatives. In principle, the model is identified from a binary guarantee choice and variation in ex post mortality. However, because the set of indifferent individuals is very close to linear (Figure 2), identification in practice relies on a third guarantee option.

<sup>8</sup>This would be the case if the model of mortality risk at the individual level replicated the shape of observed mortality in the population.

annuity income represents only about one-fifth of annual income (Banks and Emmerson, 1999). In the concluding section we discuss how our approach can be extended to estimating the efficiency costs of asymmetric information in other insurance markets in which moral hazard is likely to be empirically important.

While we estimate the average level and heterogeneity of mortality ( $\alpha_i$ ) and preferences for wealth after death ( $\beta_i$ ), we choose values for the remaining parameters of the model based on standard assumptions in the literature or external data relevant to our particular setting. In principle, we could estimate some of these remaining parameters, such as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, they would be identified solely by functional form assumptions. We therefore consider it preferable to choose reasonable calibrated values, rather than impose a functional form that would generate these reasonable values. In the robustness section we revisit our choices and show that other reasonable choices yield similar estimates of the welfare cost of asymmetric information or government mandates. Different choices do, of course, affect our estimate of average  $\beta$ , which is one additional reason we caution against placing much weight on a structural interpretation of this parameter.

Relatedly, we estimate preference heterogeneity over wealth after death, but assume individuals are homogeneous in other preferences. Some of the preference heterogeneity that we estimate in wealth after death may reflect heterogeneity in other preferences, such as risk aversion or discount rates; it might also reflect heterogeneity in annuitant characteristics that we do not directly observe. Since we are agnostic about the underlying structural interpretation of our estimated heterogeneity in  $\beta$ , this is not a problem *per se*. However, we might be concerned that allowing for other dimensions of heterogeneity could affect our estimates of the welfare costs of asymmetric information or of government mandates. Therefore, in the robustness section we show that our welfare estimates are robust to alternative models of heterogeneity in  $\beta$ , including richer heterogeneity than in the baseline specification. Since the various preference parameters are not separately identified, allowing for richer heterogeneity in  $\beta$  is similar to allowing for some heterogeneity in these other parameters.<sup>9</sup> We also show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to an alternative model in which we allow for heterogeneity in risk aversion ( $\gamma$ ) rather than in preferences for wealth after death ( $\beta$ ).

## 4 Data

We have annuitant-level data from one of the largest annuity providers in the U.K. The data contain each annuitant's guarantee choice, several demographic characteristics, and subsequent mortality.

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<sup>9</sup>To see this, consider for example possible heterogeneity in the risk aversion parameter  $\gamma$  (a case which, in fact, we explore in the robustness section). Preference heterogeneity is only identified from the guarantee choice, so that for any pair of  $\gamma_i$  and  $\beta_i$  that leads to a certain guarantee choice (for a given  $\alpha_i$ ) there is a value of  $\beta_i$  alone (and a calibrated value for  $\gamma$ ) that would lead to the same choice. Thus, allowing richer heterogeneity in  $\beta$ , with possibly richer correlation with  $\alpha$ , would fit the data just as well as allowing heterogeneity in both  $\gamma$  and  $\beta$ . Of course, the assumptions regarding heterogeneity may affect our welfare estimates. Therefore in the robustness analysis we explore several alternative models of heterogeneity and show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to these assumptions.

Annuitant characteristics and guarantee choices appear generally comparable to market-wide data (Murthi et al., 1999) and to another large firm (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). The data consist of all annuities sold between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1994 for which the annuitant is still alive on January 1, 1998. We observe age (in days) at the time of annuitization, the gender of the annuitant, and the subsequent date of death if it the annuitant died before December 31, 2005.

For analytical tractability, we restrict our sample to 60 or 65 year old annuity buyers who have been accumulating their pension fund with our company, and who purchased a single life annuity (that insures only his or her own life) with a constant (nominal) payment profile. Appendix C discusses these various restrictions in more detail; they are all made so that we can focus on the purchase decisions of a relatively homogenous subsample.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the whole sample and for each of the four age-gender cells. Sample sizes range from a high of almost 5,500 for 65 year old males to a low of 651 for 65 year old females. About 87 percent of annuitants choose a 5 year guarantee period, 10 percent choose no guarantee, and about 3 percent choose the 10 year guarantee.

Given our sample construction, we can observe mortality at ages 63 to 83. About one-fifth of our sample dies between 1998 and 2005. As expected, death is more common among men than women, and among those who purchase at older ages.

There is also a general pattern of higher mortality among those who purchase 5 year guarantees than those who purchase 0 guarantees, but no clear pattern (presumably due to the smaller sample size) of mortality differences for those who purchase 10 year guarantees relative to either of the other two options. This mortality pattern as a function of guarantee persists in more formal hazard modeling that takes account of the left truncation and right censoring of the data (not shown). As discussed earlier, the existence of a (conditional) correlation between guarantee choice and mortality – such as the higher mortality experienced by purchasers of the 5 year guarantee relative to purchasers of the 0 year guarantee – indicates the presence of private information about individual mortality risk in our data, and motivates our exercise. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004, 2006) provide a more formal analysis of the detection of adverse selection in these data, and in other data from the same market.

The company supplied us with the menu of annual annuity payments per £1 of annuity premium. Payments depend on date of purchase, age at purchase, gender, and length of guarantee. There are essentially no quantity discounts, so that the annuity rate for each guarantee choice can be fully characterized by the annuity payment per £1 annuitized.<sup>10</sup> All of these components of the pricing structure, which is standard in the market, are in our data.<sup>11</sup> Table 3 shows the annuity payment rates (per pound annuitized) by age and gender for different guarantee choices from January 1992; this corresponds to roughly the middle of the sales period we study (1988-1994) and are roughly in the middle of the range of rates over the period. Annuity rates decline, of course, with the length of guarantee. If they did not, the purchase of a longer guarantee would always dominate. Thus,

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<sup>10</sup>A rare exception on quantity discounts is made for individuals who annuitize an extremely large amount.

<sup>11</sup>See Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for one more firm in this market which uses the same pricing structure and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) for a description of pricing practices in the market as a whole.

for example, a 65 year old male in 1992 faced a choice among a 0 guarantee with a payment rate of 13.30 pence per £1, a 5 year guarantee with a payment rate of 12.87 pence per £1, and a 10 year guarantee with a payment rate of 11.98 pence per £1. The magnitude of the rate differences across guarantee options closely tracks expected mortality. For example, our mortality estimates (which we discuss in more detail in the next section) imply that for 60 year old females the probability of dying within a guarantee period of 5 and 10 years is about 4.3 and 11.4 percent, respectively, while for 65 year old males these probabilities are about 7.4 and 18.9 percent. Consequently, as shown in Table 3, the annuity rate differences across guarantee periods are much larger for 65 year old males than they are for 60 year old females.

The firm did not change its pricing policy over our sample of annuity sales. Changes in nominal payment rates over time reflect changes in interest rates. To use such variation in annuity rates in estimating the model would require assumptions about how the interest rate that enters the individual's value functions covaries with the interest rate faced by the firm, and whether the individual's discount rate covaries with these interest rates. Absent any clear guidance on these issues, we analyze the choice problem with respect to one particular pricing menu. For our benchmark model we use the January 1992 menu shown in Table 3. In the robustness analysis, we show that the welfare estimates are virtually identical if we choose pricing menus (and corresponding interest rates, as discussed below) from other points in time; this is not surprising since the relative payouts across guarantee choices is quite stable over time. For this reason, the results hardly change if we instead estimate a model with time-varying annuity rates, but constant discount factor and interest rate faced by annuitants (not reported).<sup>12</sup>

As mentioned in the preceding section, we use the data to guide our choice of interest and discount rates in the guarantee choice model. For the interest rate we use the real interest rate corresponding to the inflation-indexed zero-coupon ten-year Bank of England bond, as of the date of the pricing menu we use (January 1, 1992 in the baseline specification). Since the annuities make constant nominal payments, we need an estimate of expected inflation rate  $\pi$  to translate the initial nominal payment rate shown in Table 3 into the real annuity payout stream in the guarantee choice model. We use the difference between the real and nominal interest rates on the zero-coupon ten year Treasury bonds on the same date to measure the (expected) inflation rate. For our baseline model, this implies a real interest rate of 0.0426 and an (expected) inflation rate of 0.0498. As is standard in the literature, we assume the discount rate  $\delta$  equals the real interest rate  $r$ .

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<sup>12</sup> Another alternative is to let annuitants' interest rate and discount rate move in lock with the time-varying risk free interest rate (which closely tracks nominal annuity rates). However, we found that this specification did not fit the data and model well. In particular, time-varying individual discount rates made the indifference sets for the optimal guarantee choice move, over time, a lot more than actual choices, creating practical estimation problems and suggesting that these assumptions were unlikely to be correct.

## 5 Estimates and fit of the baseline model

### 5.1 Parameter Estimates

Table 4 shows the parameter estimates. We allow average mortality (that is,  $\mu_\alpha$ ) and average preferences for wealth after death (that is,  $\mu_\beta$ ) to vary based on the individual's gender and age (either 60 or 65) at annuity purchase. We do this because annuity prices vary with these characteristics, presumably reflecting differential mortality by gender and age of annuitization; so that our treatment of preferences and mortality is symmetric, we also allow mean preferences to vary on these same dimensions.

We estimate statistically significant heterogeneity across individuals, both in their mortality and in their preference for wealth after death. We estimate a positive correlation ( $\rho$ ) between mortality and preference for wealth after death. That is, individuals who are more likely to live longer (lower  $\alpha$ ) are likely to care less about wealth after death. This positive correlation may help to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency caused by private information about risk type; individuals who select larger guarantees due to private information about their mortality (i.e. high  $\alpha$  individuals) are also individuals who tend to place a relatively higher value on wealth after death, and for whom the cost of the guarantee is not as great as it would be if they had relatively low preferences for wealth after death.

For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 shows random draws from the estimated distribution of  $\log \alpha$  and  $\log \beta$  for each age-gender cell, juxtaposed over the estimated indifference sets for that cell. The results indicate that both mortality and preference heterogeneity are important determinants of guarantee choice. This is similar to recent findings in other insurance markets that preference heterogeneity can be as or more important than private information about risk type in explaining insurance purchases (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2006; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2007). As discussed, we refrain from placing a structural interpretation on the  $\beta$  parameter, merely noting that a higher  $\beta$  reflects a larger preference for wealth after death relative to consumption while alive. Nonetheless, our finding of heterogeneity in  $\beta$  is consistent with other estimates of heterogeneity in the population in preferences for leaving a bequest (Laitner and Juster, 1996; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007).

### 5.2 Model fit

Tables 5 and 6 presents some results on the fit of the model. We report results both overall and separately for each age-gender cell. Table 5 shows some results on the in-sample fit of the model. The model fits very closely the probability of choosing each guarantee choice, as well as the observed probability of dying within our sample period. The model does, however, produce a monotone relationship between guarantee choice and mortality rate, while the data show a non-monotone pattern, with individuals who choose a 5 year guarantee period associated with highest

mortality.<sup>13</sup>

Table 6 compares our mortality estimates to two different external benchmarks. These speak to the out-of-sample fit of our model in two regards: the benchmarks are not taken from the data, and the calculations use the entire mortality distribution based on the estimated Gompertz mortality hazard, while our mortality data are right censored. First, the top panel of Table 6 reports the implications of our estimates for life expectancy. As expected, men have lower life expectancies than women. Men who purchase annuities at age 65 have higher life expectancies than those who purchase at age 60, which is what we would expect if age of annuity purchase were unrelated to mortality. Women who purchase at 65, however, have lower life expectancy than women who purchase at 60, which may reflect selection in the timing of annuitization, or the substantially smaller sample size available for 65 year old women. As one way to gauge the magnitude of the mortality heterogeneity we estimate, Table 6 indicates that in each age-gender cell, there is about a 1.4 year difference in life expectancy, at the time of annuitization, between the 5th and 95th percentile.

The fourth row of Table 6 contains life expectancy estimates for a group of U.K. pensioners whose mortality experience may serve as a rough proxy for that of U.K. compulsory annuitants.<sup>14</sup> We would not expect our life expectancy estimates – which are based on the experience of actual compulsory annuitants in a particular firm – to match this rough proxy exactly, but it is reassuring that they are in a similar ballpark. Our estimated life expectancy is about 2 years higher. This difference is not driven by the parametric assumptions, but reflects higher survival probabilities for our annuitants than our proxy group of U.K. pensioners; this difference between the groups exists even within the range of ages for which we observe survival in our data and can compare the groups directly (not shown).

Second, the bottom of Table 6 presents the average expected present discounted value (EPDV) of annuity payments implied by our mortality estimates and our assumptions regarding the real interest rate and the inflation rate. Since each individual's initial wealth is normalized to 100, of which 20 percent is annuitized, an EPDV of 20 would imply that the company, if it had no transaction costs, would break even. Note that nothing in our estimation procedure guarantees that we arrive at reasonable EPDV payments. It is therefore encouraging that for all the four cells, and for all guarantee choices within these cells, the expected payout is fairly close to 20; it ranges across the age-gender cells from 19.74 to 20.66. One might be concerned by an average expected payment that is slightly above 20, which would imply that the company makes negative profits. Note, however, that if the effective interest rate the company uses to discount its future payments is slightly higher than the risk-free rate of 0.043 that we use in the individual's guarantee choice model, the estimated EPDV annuity payments would all fall below 20. It is, in practice, likely

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<sup>13</sup> Almost any model of guarantee choice will have a hard time rationalizing this non-monotone pattern of mortality with guarantee choice. One possibility is that is simply a result of sampling errors, given our small sample size of 10 year guarantee annuitants.

<sup>14</sup> Exactly how representative the mortality experience of the pensioners is for that of compulsory annuitants is not clear. See Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) for further discussion of this issue.

that the insurance company receives a higher return on its capital than the risk free rate, and the bottom row of Table 6 shows that a slightly higher interest rate of 0.045 would, indeed, break even. In the robustness section, we show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to using an interest rate that is somewhat higher than the risk free rate used in the baseline model.

As another measure of the out of sample fit, we examined the optimal consumption trajectories implied by our parameter estimates and the guarantee choice model. These suggest that most of the individuals are saving in their retirement (not shown). This seems contrary to most of the empirical evidence (e.g., Hurd, 1989), although there is evidence consistent with positive wealth accumulation among the very wealthy elderly (Kopczuk, 2006), and evidence, more generally, that saving behavior of high wealth individuals may not be representative of the population at large (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004); individuals in this market are higher wealth than the general U.K. population (Banks and Emmerson, 1999). In light of these potentially puzzling wealth accumulation results, we experimented with a variant of the baseline model that allows individuals to discount wealth after death more steeply than consumption while alive. Specifically, we modified the consumer utility function as shown in equation (8) to be

$$U(C_t) = \sum_{t'=t}^{T+1} \delta^{t'-t} (s_t u(c_t) + z^t f_t b(w_t)) \quad (19)$$

where  $z$  is an additional parameter to be estimated. Our benchmark model corresponds to  $z = 1$ . Values of  $z < 1$  imply that individuals discount wealth after death more steeply than consumption while alive. Such preferences might arise if individuals care more about leaving money to children (or grandchildren) when the children are younger than when they are older. We find that the maximum likelihood value of  $z$  is 1; moreover, even values of  $z$  relatively close to 1 (such as  $z = 0.95$ ) are able to produce more sensible wealth patterns in retirement, but do not have a noticeable effect on our core welfare estimates.

## 6 Welfare estimates

We now take our parameter estimates as inputs in calculating the welfare consequences of asymmetric information and government mandates. We start by defining the welfare measure we use, and calculating welfare in the observed, asymmetric information equilibrium. We then perform two counterfactual exercises in which we compare equilibrium welfare to what would arise under symmetric information and under a mandatory social insurance program that does not permit choice over guarantee. Although we focus primarily on the average welfare, we also briefly discuss distributional implications.

### 6.1 Measuring welfare

A useful dollar metric for comparing utilities associated with different annuity allocations is the notion of *wealth-equivalent*. The wealth-equivalent denotes the amount of initial wealth that an individual would require in the absence of an annuity, in order to be as well off as with his initial

wealth and his annuity allocation. The wealth-equivalent of an annuity with guarantee period  $g$  and initial wealth of  $w_0$  is the implicit solution to

$$V_0^{A(g)}(w_0) \equiv V_0^{NA}(\text{wealth} - \text{equivalent}) \quad (20)$$

where both  $V_0^{A(g)}(\cdot)$  and  $V_0^{NA}(\cdot)$  are defined in Section 3. This measure, which is commonly used in the annuity literature (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999, Davidoff et al., 2005), is roughly analogous to an equivalent variation measure in applied welfare analysis.

A higher value of wealth-equivalent corresponds to a higher value of the annuity contract. If the wealth equivalent is less than initial wealth, the individual would prefer not to purchase an annuity. More generally, the difference between the wealth-equivalent and the initial wealth is the amount an individual is willing to pay in exchange for having access to the annuity contract. This difference is always positive for a risk averse individual who does not care about wealth after death and faces an actuarially fair annuity price. It can take negative values if the annuity contract is over-priced (compared to the individual-specific actuarially fair price) or if the individual sufficiently values wealth after death.

Our estimate of the average wealth-equivalent in the observed equilibrium provides a monetary measure of the welfare gains (or losses) from annuitization given equilibrium prices and individuals' contract choices. The difference between the average wealth equivalent in the observed equilibrium and in a counterfactual allocation provides a measure of the welfare difference between these allocations. We provide two ways to quantify these welfare difference. First, we provide an absolute monetary estimate of the welfare gain or loss associated with a particular counterfactual scenario. To do this, we scale the difference in wealth equivalents by the £6 billion which are annuitized annually (in 1998) in the U.K. annuity market (Association of British Insurers, 1999). Since the wealth equivalents are reported per 100 units of initial wealth and we assume that 20 percent of this wealth is annuitized, this implies that each unit of wealth equivalent is equivalent, at the aggregate, to £300 million annually.

While an absolute welfare measure may be a relevant benchmark for policies associated with the particular market we study, a relative measure may be more informative when considering using our estimates as a possible benchmark in other contexts. For example, if we considered the decision to buy a one month guarantee, we would not expect efficiency costs associated with this decision to be large relative to life-time wealth. A relative welfare estimate essentially requires a normalization factor. Thus, to put these welfare estimates in perspective, we measure the welfare changes relative to how large this welfare change could have been, given the observed equilibrium prices. We refer to this maximal potential welfare change as the “*Maximal Money at Stake*,” or MMS. We define the MMS as the minimum lump sum that individuals would have to receive to insure them against the possibility that they receive their least-preferred allocation in the observed equilibrium, given the observed equilibrium pricing. The MMS is therefore the additional amount of pre-existing wealth an individual requires so that they receive the same annual annuity payment if they purchase the maximum guarantee length (10) as they would receive if they purchase the minimum guarantee length (0). The nature of the thought experiment behind the MMS is that the

welfare loss from buying a 10 year guarantee is bounded by the lower annuity payment that the individual receives as a result. This maximal welfare loss would occur in the worst case scenario, in which the individual had no chance of dying during the first 10 years (or alternatively, no value of wealth after death). We report the MMS per 100 units of initial wealth (i.e. per 20 units of annuity premiums):

$$MMS \equiv 20 \left( \frac{z_0}{z_{10}} - 1 \right) \quad (21)$$

where  $z_0$  and  $z_{10}$  denote the annual annuity rates for 0 and 10 year guarantees, respectively (see Table 3). A key property of the MMS is that it depends only on prices, but not on our estimates of preferences or risk type.<sup>15</sup>

## 6.2 Welfare in observed equilibrium

The first row of Table 7 shows the estimated average wealth equivalents per 100 units of initial wealth in the observed allocations implied by our parameter estimates. The average wealth equivalent for our sample is 100.16, and ranges from 99.9 (for 65 year old males) to 100.4 (for 65 year old females). An average wealth equivalent of less than 100 indicates an average welfare loss associated with the equilibrium annuity allocations relative to a case in which wealth is not annuitized; conversely, an average wealth equivalent of more than 100 indicates an average welfare gain from the annuity equilibrium. Note that because annuitization of some form is compulsory, it is possible that individuals in this market would prefer not to annuitize.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 3 shows the distribution across different types of the welfare gains and losses in the observed annuity equilibrium, relative to no annuities. This figure super-imposes iso-welfare contour lines over the same scatter plots presented in Figure 2. It indicates that, as expected, the individuals who benefit the most from the annuity market are those with low mortality (low  $\alpha$ ) and weak preference for wealth after death (low  $\beta$ ). The former are high (survival) risk, who face better than actuarially fair prices when they are pooled with the rest of the annuitants. The latter are individuals who get less disutility from dying without much wealth, which is more likely to occur with than without annuities.

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<sup>15</sup> An analogous MMS measure in a standard insurance context would be the difference between the price (premium) of the highest level of coverage and the price (premium) of the lowest level of coverage.

<sup>16</sup> Our average wealth equivalent is noticeably lower than what has been calculated in the previous literature (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1999; Davidoff et al., 2005). The high wealth equivalents in these papers in turn implies a very high rate of voluntary annuitization, giving rise to what is known as the “annuity puzzle” since, empirically, very few individuals voluntarily purchase annuities (see Brown et al. (2001) for a review). Our substantially lower wealth equivalents – which persist in the robustness analysis (see Table 8) – arise because of the relatively high  $\beta$  that we estimate. Previous papers have calibrated rather than estimated  $\beta$  and assumed it to be 0. If we set  $\log \alpha = \mu_\alpha$  and  $\beta = 0$ , and also assume – like these other papers – that annuitization is full (i.e., 100 percent vs. 20 percent in our benchmark), then we find that the wealth equivalent of a zero year guarantee for a 65 year old male rises to 135.9, which is much closer to the wealth equivalent of 156 reported by Davidoff et al. (2005).

### 6.3 The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information

In the counterfactual symmetric information equilibrium, each person faces an actuarially fair adjustment to annuity rates depending on her mortality. Specifically, we offer each person payment rates such that the EPDV of payments for that person for each guarantee length is equal to the equilibrium average EPDV of payments. This ensures that each person faces a risk-type specific actuarially fair reductions in payments in exchange for longer guarantees. Note that this calculation is (expected) revenue neutral, preserving any average load (or subsidy) in the market. Figure 2 may provide a visual way to think about this counterfactual. In the counterfactual exercise, the points in Figure 2, which represent individuals, are held constant, while the indifference sets, which represent the optimal choices at a given set of annuity rates, shift. Wealth equivalents are different at the new optimal choices both because of the direct effect of the different annuity rates and because these rates in turn affect optimal contract choices.

The second panel of Table 7 presents our estimates of the welfare cost of asymmetric information. The first row shows our estimated wealth-equivalents in the symmetric information counterfactual. As expected, welfare is systematically higher in the counterfactual world of symmetric information. For 65 year old males, for example, the estimates indicate that the average wealth equivalent is 100.74 under symmetric information, compared to 100.17 under asymmetric information. This implies that the average welfare loss associated with asymmetric information is equivalent to 0.57 units of initial wealth. For the other three age-gender cells, this number ranges from 0.14 to 0.27. Weighting all cells by their relative sizes, we obtain the overall estimate reported in the introduction of annual welfare costs of £127 million, or about 2 percent of annual annuity premiums. This also amounts to 0.25 of the concept of maximal money at stake (MMS) introduced earlier.

What is the cause of this welfare loss? It arises from the distortion in the individual's choice of guarantee length relative to what he would have chosen under symmetric information pricing. Despite preference heterogeneity, we estimate that under symmetric information all individuals would choose 10 year guarantees (not shown). However, in the observed equilibrium only about 3 percent of individuals purchase these annuities. This illustrates the distortions in optimal choices in the observed equilibrium.

To illustrate the impact on different individuals, Figure 4 presents contour graphs of the changes in wealth equivalents associated with the change to symmetric information. That is, as before, for each age-gender cell we plot the individuals as points in the space of  $\log \alpha$  and  $\log \beta$ , and then draw contour lines over them. All the individuals along a contour line are predicted to have the same absolute welfare change as a result of the counterfactual. Figure 4 indicates that, while almost all individuals benefit from a move to the first best, there is significant heterogeneity in the welfare gains arising from individual-specific pricing. The biggest welfare gains accrue to individuals with high mortality (high  $\alpha$ ) and high preferences for wealth after death (high  $\beta$ ).

Two different factors work in the same direction to produce the highest welfare gains for high  $\alpha$ , high  $\beta$  individuals. First, a standard one-dimensional heterogeneity setting would predict that symmetric information would improve welfare for low risk (high  $\alpha$ ) individuals relative to high risk

(low  $\alpha$ ) individuals. Second, the asymmetric information equilibrium involves cross-subsidies from higher guarantees to lower guarantees (the EPDV of payout decreases with the length of the guarantee period, as shown in Table 6);<sup>17</sup> by eliminating these cross-subsidies, symmetric information also improves the welfare of high  $\beta$  individuals, who place more value on higher guarantees. Since we estimate that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are positively correlated, these two forces reinforce each other.

A related question concerns the extent to which our estimate of the welfare cost of asymmetric information is influenced by re-distributional effects. As just discussed, symmetric information produces different welfare gains for individuals with different  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . To investigate the extent to which our welfare comparisons are affected by the changes in cross-subsidy patterns, we recalculated wealth-equivalents in the symmetric information counterfactual under the assumption that each individual faces the same expected payments for each option in the choice set of the counterfactual as she receives at her choice in the observed equilibrium. The results (which, to conserve space, we do not present) suggest that, in all the age-gender cells, our welfare estimates are not, in practice, affected by redistribution.

#### 6.4 The Welfare Consequences of Government Mandated Annuity Contracts

Although symmetric information is a useful conceptual benchmark, it may not be relevant from a policy perspective since it ignores the information constraints faced by the social planner. We therefore consider the welfare consequences of government intervention in this market. Specifically, we consider the consequences of government mandates that each individual purchases the same guarantee length, eliminating any contract choice; as noted previously, such mandates are the canonical solution to adverse selection in insurance markets (e.g. Akerlof, 1970).<sup>18</sup> To evaluate welfare under alternative mandates, we calculate average wealth equivalents when all people are forced to have the same guarantee period and annuity rate, and compare them to the average wealth equivalents in the observed equilibrium. We set the payment rate such that average EPDV of payments is the same as in the observed equilibrium; this preserves the average load (or subsidy) in the market.

The results are presented in the bottom panels of Table 7. In all four age-gender cells, welfare is lowest under a mandate with no guarantee period, and highest under a mandate of a 10 year guarantee. Welfare under a mandate of a 5 year guarantee is similar to welfare in the observed equilibrium. The increase in welfare from a mandate of 10 year guarantee is virtually identical to the

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<sup>17</sup>The observed cross-subsidies across guarantee choices may be due to asymmetric information. For example, competitive models of pure adverse selection (with no preference heterogeneity), such as Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978), can produce equilibria with cross-subsidies from the policies with less insurance (in our context, longer guarantees) to those with more insurance (in our context, shorter guarantees). We should note that the observed cross subsidies may also arise from varying degrees of market power in different guarantee options. In such cases, symmetric information may not eliminate cross-subsides, and our symmetric information counterfactual would therefore conflate the joint effects of elimination of informational asymmetries and of market power. Our analysis of the welfare consequences of government mandates in the next subsection does not suffer from this same limitation.

<sup>18</sup>We do not consider other potential government interventions – such as taxation of insurance products or mandates with residual choice – as these would require that we model the supply side of the private market.

increase in welfare associated with the first best, symmetric information outcome reported earlier. This mandate involves no allocative inefficiency, since we estimated that a 10 year guarantee is the first best allocation for all individuals. Although it does involve transfers (through the common pooled price) across individuals of different risk types, these do not appear to have much effect on our welfare estimate.<sup>19</sup> Consistent with this, when we recalculated wealth-equivalents in each counterfactual under the assumption that each individual faces the same expected payments in the counterfactual as she receives from her choice in the observed equilibrium, our welfare estimates were not noticeably affected (not shown). As with the counterfactual of symmetric information, there is heterogeneity in the welfare effects of the different mandates for individuals with different  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . Not surprisingly, high  $\beta$  individuals benefit relatively more from the 10 year mandate and lose relatively more from the 0 year mandate, while welfare effects of the 5 year mandate are relatively similar for different individuals (not shown).

Our findings highlight both the potential benefits and the potential dangers from government mandates. Without estimating the joint distribution of risk type and preferences, it would not have been apparent that a 10 year guarantee is the welfare-maximizing mandate, let alone that such a mandate comes close to achieving the first best outcome. Were the government to mandate no guarantee period, it would reduce welfare by about £107 million per year, achieving a welfare loss of about equal and opposite magnitude to the £127 million per year welfare gain from the optimal ten year guarantee mandate. Were the government to pursue the naive approach of mandating the currently most popular choice (5 year guarantees) our estimates suggest that this would raise welfare by only about £2 million per year, foregoing most of the welfare gains achievable from the welfare maximizing ten year mandate. These results highlight the practical difficulties involved in trying to design mandates to achieve social welfare gains.

## 7 Robustness

In this section, we explore the robustness of our findings. In particular, we focus on the robustness of our estimated welfare cost of asymmetric information and welfare consequences of mandated guarantee lengths to various assumptions. Table 8 provides a summary of the main results. Our welfare estimates are reasonably stable across a range of alternative assumptions. The finding that the welfare maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee, and that this mandate achieves virtually the same welfare as the first best outcome, persists across alternative specifications, as does the discrepancy between the welfare gain from a 10 year guarantee mandate and the welfare loss from mandating no guarantee. The welfare cost of symmetric information, which is £127 million per year (i.e. two percent of annual premiums) in our baseline specification, ranges from £111 million

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<sup>19</sup>We estimate that welfare is slightly higher under the 10 year mandate than under the symmetric information equilibrium (in which everyone chooses the 10 year guarantee). This presumably reflects the fact that under the mandated (pooling) annuity payout rates, consumption is higher for low mortality individuals and lower for high mortality individuals than it would be under the symmetric information annuity payout rates. Since low mortality individuals have lower consumption in each period and hence higher marginal utility of consumption, this transfer improves social welfare (given the particular social welfare measure we use).

to £144 million per year (or from 1.85 to 2.4 percent of annual premiums) across all but one of a wide range of alternative specifications. The biggest change in our welfare estimates comes when we modify the baseline case to assume that, in addition to the 20 percent of wealth in a private annuity, 50 percent of wealth is in a publicly provided annuity; under this scenario our estimate of the efficiency cost of asymmetric information increases to £256 million per year (4.3 percent of annual premiums). We discuss possible intuition for this finding below.

The general lack of sensitivity of our welfare estimates to particular assumptions is worth contrasting with the greater sensitivity of other estimated quantities (e.g., the magnitude of the average  $\beta$ ) to these alternative assumptions. The fact that our estimated parameters change as we vary certain assumptions means that it is not a priori obvious how our welfare estimates will change (in either sign or magnitude). For example, although it may seem surprising that welfare estimates are not very sensitive to our assumption about the risk aversion parameter, recall that the estimated parameters also change with the change in the assumption about risk aversion.

The change in the estimated parameters across specifications is also important for the overall interpretation of our findings. As noted earlier, one reason we hesitate to place much weight on the structural interpretation of the estimated parameters (or the extent of heterogeneity in these parameters) is that their estimates will be affected by our assumptions about other parameters (such as risk aversion or discount rate). This is closely related to the discussion of identification in Section 3. However, the fact that our key welfare estimates are relatively insensitive across specifications suggests that our parameter estimates adjust in an offsetting manner in response to changes in other assumptions. Thus, the main message of our robustness analysis is that while some of our assumptions may be important for the structural interpretation of the estimated parameters, they are less important for our welfare analysis, which is the focus of the paper.

## 7.1 Parameter choices

Following our discussion of identification in Section 3, although we estimate the average level and heterogeneity in mortality ( $\alpha_i$ ) and in preferences for wealth after death ( $\beta_i$ ), we choose values for a number of other parameters based on external information. While we could, in principle, estimate some of these parameters, they would be identified solely by functional form assumptions. Therefore, we instead chose to explore how our welfare estimates are affected by alternative choices for these parameters.

**Choice of risk aversion coefficient ( $\gamma$ )** Our baseline specification (reproduced in row 1 of Table 8) assumes a (common) CRRA parameter of  $\gamma = 3$  for both the utility from consumption  $u(c)$  and from wealth after death  $b(w)$ . Rows 2 and 3 of Table 8 show that the results are quite similar if instead we assume  $\gamma = 5$  or  $\gamma = 1.5$ . For example, the welfare cost of asymmetric information falls from £127 million per year in the baseline specification to £111 million when  $\gamma = 5$  and rises to £133 million when  $\gamma = 1.5$ .

Rows 4 and 5 report specifications in which we hold constant the CRRA parameter in the utility

from consumption (at  $\gamma = 3$ ) but vary the CRRA parameter in the utility from wealth after death. Specifically, we estimate the model with  $\gamma = 1.5$  or  $\gamma = 5$  for the utility from wealth after death  $b(w)$ . Once again, the estimated welfare cost of asymmetric information remains within a relatively tight band of the baseline.

A downside of these last two specifications is that they give rise to non-homothetic preferences and are therefore no longer scalable in wealth, so that heterogeneity in initial wealth may confound the analysis. Therefore, in row 6, we also allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth. As in row 5, we assume that  $\gamma = 3$  for utility from consumption, but that  $\gamma = 1.5$  for the utility from wealth after death. This implies that wealth after death acts as a luxury good, with wealthier individuals caring more, at the margin, about wealth after death. Such a model is consistent with the hypothesis that bequests are a luxury good, which may help explain the higher rate of wealth accumulation at the top of the wealth distribution (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). To allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth, we calibrate the distribution of wealth based on Banks and Emmerson (1999) and integrate over this (unobserved) distribution.<sup>20</sup> We also let the means (but not variances) of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  to vary with unobserved wealth. The welfare estimates, which are normalized to be comparable with the other exercises, remain similar.

**Choice of other parameters** We also reestimated the model assuming a higher interest rate than in the baseline case. As already mentioned, our estimates suggest that a slightly higher interest rate than the risk free rate we use in the individual's value function is required to have the annuity company not lose money. Thus, rather than the benchmark which uses the risk free rate as of 1992 ( $r = \delta = 0.043$ ), we allow for the likely possibility that the insurance company receives a higher rate of return, and reestimate the model with  $r = \delta = 0.05$ . This in turn implies an average load on policies of 3.71 percent. The results (in row 7 of Table 8) suggest similar welfare effects of asymmetric information and government mandates.

Rows 8 and 9 report results under different assumptions of the fractions of wealth annuitized in the compulsory market (we tried 0.1 and 0.3, compared to 0.2 in the baseline model). Finally, since the choice of 1992 pricing for our benchmark model was arbitrary, row 10 reports results for a different set of prices, from 1990, with the corresponding inflation and interest rates. In all these cases the welfare estimates remain fairly stable.

## 7.2 Parameterization of heterogeneity

**Different distributional assumptions of heterogeneity** We explored the sensitivity of our welfare estimates to the parameterization of unobserved heterogeneity. One potential issue concerns our parametric assumption regarding the baseline mortality distribution at the individual level. As previously discussed (see the discussion of identification in Section 3), our assumption about the shape of the individual mortality hazard affects our estimate of unobserved mortality

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<sup>20</sup>Banks and Emmerson (1999) report that the quartiles of the wealth distribution among 60-69 pensioners are 1,750, 8,950, and 24,900 pounds. We assume that the population of retirees is drawn from these three levels, with probability 37.5%, 25%, and 37.5%, respectively.

heterogeneity (i.e.  $\sigma_\alpha$ ). To explore the importance of our assumption, row 11 presents results under a different assumption about the mortality distribution at the individual level. In particular, we assume a mortality distribution at the individual level with a hazard rate of  $\alpha_i \exp(\lambda(t - t_0)^h)$  with  $h = 1.5$ , which increases faster over time than the baseline Gompertz specification (which has the same form, but  $h = 1$ ). This, by construction, leads to a higher estimated level of heterogeneity in mortality, since the baseline hazard is more convex at the individual level. However, the average welfare is similar.

We also investigated the sensitivity of the results to alternative joint distributional assumptions than our baseline assumption that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are joint lognormally distributed. Due to our estimation procedure, it is convenient to parameterize the joint distribution of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  in terms of the marginal distribution of  $\alpha$  and the conditional distribution of  $\beta$ . It is common in hazard models with heterogeneity to assume a gamma distribution (e.g., Han and Hausman, 1990). Accordingly, we estimate our model assuming that  $\alpha$  follows a gamma distribution. We assume that  $\beta$  is either log-normally or gamma distributed, conditional on  $\alpha$ . Specifically, let  $a_\alpha$  be the shape parameter and  $b_\alpha$  be the scale parameter of the marginal distribution of  $\alpha$ . When  $\beta$  is conditionally log-normally distributed, its distribution is parameterized as follows:

$$\log(\beta)|\alpha \sim N(\mu_\beta + \rho(\log(\alpha) - \log(b_\alpha)), \sigma_\beta^2) \quad (22)$$

When  $\beta$  is conditionally gamma distributed, its shape parameter is simply  $a_\beta$ , and its conditional scale parameter is  $b_\beta = \exp(\mu_\beta + \rho(\log(\alpha) - \log(b_\alpha)))$ . These specifications allow thinner tails, compared to the bivariate lognormal baseline. Rows 12 and 13 show that the baseline results do not change by much.

In unreported specifications, we have also experimented with discrete mixtures of lognormal distributions, in an attempt to investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to the one-parameter correlation structure of the baseline specification. These mixtures of lognormal distributions almost always collapsed back to the single lognormal distribution of the baseline estimates, trivially leading to almost identical welfare estimates.

**Allowing heterogeneity in other parameters** While we allow for heterogeneity in mortality ( $\alpha$ ) and in preference for wealth after death ( $\beta$ ), our baseline specification does not allow for heterogeneity in the imposed parameters (risk aversion and discount rate). As in our discussion of identification in Section 3, since the various parameters  $\delta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\beta$  are not separately identified in our model (except by functional form), more flexible estimation of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  is analogous to a specification which frees up these other parameters.

One way to effectively allow for more flexible heterogeneity is to allow the mean of  $\beta$  and  $\alpha$  to depend on various observable covariates. In particular, one might expect both mortality and preferences for wealth after death to vary with an individual's socioeconomic status. We observe two proxies for the annuitant's socioeconomic status: the amount of wealth annuitized (i.e. the annuity premium) and the geographic location of the annuitant residence (his or her ward) if the annuitant is in England or Wales (about 10 percent of our sample is from Scotland). We link the

annuitant's ward to ward-level data on socioeconomic characteristics of the population from the 1991 UK Census; there is substantial variation across wards in average socioeconomic status of the population (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006). Row 14 shows the results of allowing the mean of both parameters to vary with the premium paid for the annuity and the percent of the annuitant's ward that has received the equivalent of a high school degree or higher; both of these covariates may proxy for the socioeconomic status of the annuitant. The results are virtually the same.

We also report results from an alternative model in which – in contrast to our baseline model – we assume that individuals are homogenous in their  $\beta$  but heterogeneous in their consumption  $\gamma$ . Row 15 reports such a specification, with  $\beta$  fixed at its estimated conditional median from the baseline specification (see Table 4) and  $\alpha$  and the coefficient of risk aversion for utility from consumption assumed to be heterogeneous and (bivariate) lognormally distributed. The  $\gamma$  coefficient in the utility from wealth after death  $b(w)$  is fixed at 3. As in row 6, this specification gives rise to non-homothetic preferences, so we use the median wealth level from Banks and Emmerson (1999) and later renormalize, so the reported results are comparable. The welfare estimates do not change much.

### 7.3 Wealth portfolio outside of the compulsory annuity market

In our baseline specification we assumed that 20 percent of the annuitants' financial wealth is in the compulsory annuity market, and the rest is in liquid financial wealth. In row 16, we instead assume that 50 percent of wealth is annuitized (at actuarially fair prices) through the public Social Security program.<sup>21</sup> We then consider the welfare cost of asymmetric information for the 20 percent of wealth annuitized in the compulsory market. This alternative assumption has by far the biggest effect on our estimate of the welfare cost of asymmetric information, raising it from £127 million per year (or about 2 percent of annual premiums) in the baseline specification to £256 million per year (or about 4 percent of annual premiums). By way of comparison, the next largest estimate of the welfare cost in an alternative model is only £144 million per year.

As we noted at the outset of this section, it is difficult to develop good intuition for the comparative statics across alternative models since the alternative models also yield different estimated parameters. However, one potential explanation for our estimate of a larger welfare cost when 50 percent of wealth is in the public annuity may be that the individual now only has 30 percent of his wealth available to “offset” any undesirable consumption path generated by the 70 percent of annuitized wealth.

More generally, a natural question concerns the extent to which annuitants' ability to adjust their non-annuitized financial wealth portfolio affects our estimates of the efficiency cost of the

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<sup>21</sup>On average in the UK population, about 50 percent of retirees' wealth is annuitized through the public Social Security program, although this fraction declines with retiree wealth (Office of National Statistics, 2006). Compulsory annuitants tend to be of higher than average socio-economic status (Banks and Emmerson, 1999) and may therefore have on average a lower proportion of their wealth annuitized through the public Social Security program. However, since our purpose is to examine the sensitivity of our welfare estimates to accounting for publicly provided annuities, we went with the higher estimate to be conservative.

current asymmetric information equilibrium or the welfare consequences of government mandates. For example, if individuals could purchase actuarially fair life insurance policies with no load, and without incurring any transaction costs in purchasing these policies, they could in principle undo much of the efficiency cost of annuitization in the current asymmetric information equilibrium. As such, our welfare estimates of the efficiency costs of asymmetric information – or of the costs or gains from alternative mandates – may be viewed as an upper bound. Of course, in practice the ability to offset the equilibrium using other parts of the financial portfolio will be limited by factors such as loads and transaction costs. It will also be limited by the fact that much of individuals' wealth outside of the compulsory annuity market is tied up in relatively illiquid forms such as the public pension, and housing. Indeed, the data suggest that for individuals likely to be in the compulsory annuity market, only about 10 to 15 percent of their total wealth is in the form of liquid financial assets (Banks et al., 2005). A rigorous analysis of this is beyond the scope of the current work, and would probably require better information than we have on the asset allocation of individual annuitants. More generally, this issue fits into the broader literature that investigates the possibility and extent of informal insurance to lower the welfare benefits from government interventions or private insurance (see, e.g., Golosov and Tsyvinski, forthcoming).

## 7.4 Departing from the neoclassical model

Our baseline model is a standard neoclassical model with fully rational individuals. It is worth briefly discussing various “behavioral” phenomena that our baseline model (or extensions to it) can accommodate.

A wide variety of non-standard preferences may be folded into the interpretation for the preference for wealth after death parameter  $\beta$ . As previously noted, this preference may reflect a standard bequest motive, or some version of “regret” or “peace of mind” that have been discussed in the behavioral literature (see, e.g., Braun and Muermann, 2004).

Another possibility we considered is non-traditional explanations for the high fraction of individuals in our data who choose the 5 year guarantee option. One natural possibility that can be ruled out is that this reflects an influence of the 5 year guarantee as the default option. In practice there is no default for individuals in our sample, all of whom annuitized at age 60 or 65. Individuals in this market are required to annuitize by age 70 (for women) or 75 (for men). To annuitize before that age, they must actively fill a form when they decide to annuitize, and must check a chosen guarantee length. Failure to complete such an active decision would simply delay annuitization until the maximum allowed age.

Another natural possibility is that the popularity of the 5 year guarantee may partly reflect the well-known phenomenon in the marketing literature that individuals are more likely to “choose the middle” (e.g. Simonson and Tversky, 1992). We therefore estimated a specification of the model in which we allow for the possibility that some portion of individuals “blindly” choose the middle, that is the 5 year guarantee option. We allow such individuals to also differ in the mean mortality rate. Row 17 summarizes the results from such a specification and shows that the welfare estimates

do not change much.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we assumed throughout that individuals know perfectly their ex ante risk type. This is consistent with empirical evidence that individuals' perceptions about their mortality probabilities co-vary in sensible ways with known risk factors, such as age, gender, smoking, and health status (Hamerhoff, 1985; Hurd and McGarry, 2002; Smith et al., 2001). Of course, such work does not preclude the possibility that individuals also make some form of an error in forecasting their mortality. We could accommodate an alternative approach in which individuals have some error in their mortality perceptions, but this would require an arbitrary assumption about the nature of this error. Similarly, we could also allow for heterogeneity across individuals in the nature of their errors, but this would be identified separately from  $\beta$  only by a functional form assumption. In this sense, we view a model with no errors or biases as the most natural baseline.

## 7.5 Estimates for a different population

As a final robustness exercise, we re-estimated the baseline model on a distinct sample of annuitants. As mentioned briefly in Section 4 and discussed in more detail in Appendix C, in our baseline estimates we limit the annuitant sample to the two-thirds of individuals who have accumulated their pension fund with our company. Annuitants may choose to purchase their annuity from an insurance company other than the one in which their funds have been accumulating, and about one-third of the annuitants in the market choose to do so. As our sample is from a single company, it includes those annuitants who accumulated their funds with the company and stayed with the company, as well as those annuitants who brought in external funds. Annuitants who approach the company with external funds face a different pricing menu than those who buy internally. Specifically, the annuity payment rates are lower by 2.5 pence per pound of annuity premium than the payment rates faced by "internal" annuitants.<sup>23</sup> Annuitants who approach the company with external funds may also be drawn from a different distribution of unobserved risk type and preferences, which is why we do not include them in our main estimates. The estimated parameters for this population are, indeed, quite different from the estimates we obtain for the internal individuals (not shown).

Row 18 shows the results of estimating the model separately for this distinct group of individuals, using their distinct pricing menu. The welfare costs of asymmetric information are quite similar: £137 in this "external" annuitant sample, compared to our baseline estimate of £127 in our sample of annuitants who are "internal" to our firm. We also continue to find that the welfare minimizing mandate is of no guarantee and that the welfare maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee, and it can get very close to the welfare level of the first best outcome. This gives us some confidence

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<sup>22</sup> Welfare of individuals who always choose the middle is not well defined, and the reported results only compute the welfare for those individuals who are estimated to be "rational" and to choose according to the baseline model. For comparability with the other specifications, we still scale the welfare estimates by the overall annuitized amount in the market.

<sup>23</sup> We found it somewhat puzzling that payout rates are lower for individuals who approach the company with external funds, and who therefore are more likely to be actively searching across companies. According to the company executives, some of the explanation lies in the higher administrative costs associated with transferring external funds, also creating higher incentives to retain internal individuals by offering them better rates.

that our results may be more broadly applicable to the UK annuitant population as a whole and are not idiosyncratic to our particular firm and its pricing menu.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper represents the first attempt, to our knowledge, to empirically estimate the welfare costs of asymmetric information in an insurance market and the welfare consequences of mandatory social insurance. We began by showing that to estimate these welfare consequences, it is not sufficient to observe the nature of the reduced form equilibrium relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. If, however, we can recover the joint distribution of risk type and risk preferences, as well as the equilibrium insurance allocations, then it is possible to make such inferences.

We have performed such an exercise in the specific context of the semi-compulsory U.K. annuity market. In this market, individuals who save for retirement through certain tax-deferred pension plans are required to annuitize their accumulated wealth. They are allowed, however, to choose among different types of annuity contracts. This choice simultaneously opens up scope for adverse selection as well as selection based on preferences over different contracts. We estimate that both private information about risk type and preferences are important in determining the equilibrium allocation of contracts across individuals. We use our estimates of the joint distribution of risk types and preferences to calculate welfare under the current allocation and to compare it to welfare under various counterfactual allocations.

Our results suggest that, relative to a first-best symmetric information benchmark, the welfare cost of asymmetric information along the dimension of guarantee choice is about 25 percent of the maximum money at stake in this choice. These estimates account for about £127 million annually, or about 2 percent of annual premia in the market. The estimates are quite stable across a range of alternative assumptions.

We also find that government mandates that eliminate any choice among annuity contracts do not necessarily improve on the asymmetric information equilibrium. We estimate that a mandated annuity contract could increase welfare relative to the current equilibrium by as much as £127 million per year, or could reduce it by as much as £107 million per year, depending on what contract is mandated. Moreover, the welfare maximizing choice for a mandated contract would not be apparent to the government without knowledge of the joint distribution of risk type and preferences. Our results therefore suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory would suggest.

Although our analysis is specific to the U.K. annuity market, the approach we take can be applied in other insurance markets. As seen, the data requirements for recovering the joint distribution of risk type and preferences are data on the menu of choices each individual faces, the contract each chooses, and a measure of each individual's ex-post risk realization. Such data are often available from individual surveys or from insurance companies. These data are now commonly used to test for the presence of asymmetric information in insurance markets, including automobile insurance (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Cohen and Einav, 2007), health insurance (Cardon and Hendel,

2001), and long term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), as well as annuity markets. This paper suggests that such data can now also be used to estimate the welfare consequences of any asymmetric information that is detected.

Our analysis was made substantially easier by the assumption that moral hazard does not exist in annuity markets. As discussed, this may be a reasonable assumption for the annuity market. It may also be a reasonable assumption for several other insurance markets. For example, Cohen and Einav (2007) argue that moral hazard is unlikely to be present over small deductibles in automobile insurance. Grabowski and Gruber (2005) present evidence that suggests that there is no detectable moral hazard effect of long term care insurance on nursing home use. In such markets, the approach in this paper can be straightforwardly adopted.

In other markets, such as health insurance, moral hazard is likely to play an important role. Estimation of the efficiency costs of asymmetric information therefore requires some additional source of variation in the data to separately identify the incentive effects of the insurance policies. One natural source would be exogenous changes in the contract menu. Such variation may occur when regulation requires changes in pricing, or when employers change the menu of health insurance plans from which their employees can choose.<sup>24</sup> Non-linear experience rating schemes may also introduce useful variation in the incentive effects of insurance policies (Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet, 2003a; Abbring et al., 2003b; Israel, 2004). We consider the application and extension of our approach to other markets, including those with moral hazard, an interesting and important direction for further work.

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<sup>24</sup>See also Adams, Einav, and Levin (2007) for a similar variation in the context of credit markets.

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## Appendix

### A Proofs

**Proposition 1:**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$  is increasing in  $p_i$ ,  $m_i$ , and in  $r_i$ .

**Proof.**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$  is given by

$$\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) = \frac{1}{r_i} \ln(1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i})$$

where  $r_i > 0$  and  $p_i \in (0, 1)$ . It is straight forward to verify that it is increasing in  $m_i$  and in  $p_i$  (since  $r_i m_i > 0$  so  $e^{r_i m_i} > 1$ ). The more complicated part is to show that  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i)$  is increasing in  $r_i$ . To see this, note that

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}}{\partial r_i} = \frac{1}{r_i} \left[ \frac{p_i m_i e^{r_i m_i}}{1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}} - \frac{1}{r_i} \ln(1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}) \right] \quad (23)$$

This implies that

$$\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}}{\partial r_i} \right) = \text{sign} [r_i p_i m_i e^{r_i m_i} - (1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}) \ln(1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i})] \quad (24)$$

To simplify, we drop  $i$  subscripts and denote  $\theta \equiv e^{rm} - 1 > 0$ . Then we can rewrite equation (24) as

$$\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}}{\partial r} \right) = \text{sign} [p(\theta + 1) \ln(\theta + 1) - (1 + p\theta) \ln(1 + p\theta)] \quad (25)$$

Let  $f(p, \theta) \equiv p(\theta + 1) \ln(\theta + 1) - (1 + p\theta) \ln(1 + p\theta)$ . We will show that  $f(p, \theta) > 0$  for any  $\theta > 0$  and  $p \in (0, 1)$ . First, note that  $f(0, \theta) = 0$  and  $f(1, \theta) = 0$ . Second, note that  $\frac{\partial f}{\partial p} = (\theta + 1) \ln(\theta + 1) - \theta - \theta \ln(1 + p\theta)$  which is positive at  $p = 0$  (for any  $\theta > 0$ )<sup>25</sup>. Finally, note that  $\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial p^2} = -\frac{\theta^2}{1 + p\theta} < 0$  so  $f(p, \theta)$  is concave in  $p$  and therefore can cross the horizontal axis only once more. Thus, since  $f(p, \theta) = 0$  for  $p = 1$ , it has to be that  $f(p, \theta)$  lies above the horizontal axis for all  $p \in (0, 1)$ . See appendix. ■

**Proposition 2:**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) - p_i m_i$  is positive, is increasing in  $m_i$  and in  $r_i$ , and is initially increasing and then decreasing in  $p_i$ .

**Proof.**  $\bar{\pi}(p_i, m_i, r_i) - p_i m_i$  is given by

$$f(p_i, m_i, r_i) = \frac{1}{r_i} \ln(1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}) - p_i m_i$$

where  $r_i > 0$  and  $p_i \in (0, 1)$ . From proposition 1, we know that it is increasing in  $r_i$ .

To see that it is increasing in  $m_i$ , note that

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial m_i} = \frac{1}{r_i} \frac{p_i r_i e^{r_i m_i}}{1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}} - p_i = \frac{p_i (e^{r_i m_i} - 1)(1 - p_i)}{1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}} > 0 \quad (26)$$

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<sup>25</sup>To see this, let  $g(\theta) \equiv (\theta + 1) \ln(\theta + 1) - \theta$ .  $g(0) = 0$  and  $g'(\theta) = 1 + \ln(\theta + 1) - 1 = \ln(\theta + 1)$  which is positive for any  $\theta > 0$ .

Finally, to see that it is initially increasing and then decreasing in  $p_i$ , note that

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial p_i} = \frac{1}{r_i} \frac{e^{r_i m_i} - 1}{1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i}} - m_i = \frac{(e^{r_i m_i} - 1)(1 - m_i r_i p_i) - r_i m_i}{r_i (1 - p_i + p_i e^{r_i m_i})} \quad (27)$$

Let  $\theta \equiv r_i m_i > 0$ , and note that  $\text{sign}\left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial p_i}\right) = \text{sign}(g(\theta, p_i))$  where  $g(\theta, p) = (e^\theta - 1)(1 - \theta p) - \theta$ . Then note that  $g(\theta, 0) = e^\theta - 1 - \theta > 0$  for all  $\theta > 0$  since  $g(0, 0) = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial g(\theta, 0)}{\partial \theta} = e^\theta - 1 > 0$ , and that  $g(\theta, 1) = (e^\theta - 1)(1 - \theta) - \theta < 0$  since  $g(0, 1) = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial g(\theta, 1)}{\partial \theta} = -e^\theta \theta < 0$ . Finally, note that  $\frac{\partial g}{\partial p} = -\theta(e^\theta - 1)$  is always negative. ■

**Proposition 4** In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, profits are zero.

**Proof.** Let  $\pi_j$  be the equilibrium price set by firm  $j$ . If firm  $j$  makes negative profits, it has a profitable deviation to  $\pi_j > \pi_k$  where it does not sell and makes zero profits. If firm  $j$  makes positive profits then it has to be the case that  $\pi_k \geq \pi_j$  (otherwise firm  $j$ 's profits are zero). In such a case, firm  $k$  has a profitable deviation to  $\pi_j - \epsilon$  for  $\epsilon > 0$  sufficiently small. This will make firm  $k$  earn higher profits. ■

**Proposition 5** If  $mp^* + F < \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H)$  the unique equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium,  $\pi^{Pool} = mp^* + F$ .

**Proof.** We only need to consider other zero-profit prices. Any such price must sell to either type  $L$  or type  $H$  but not to both. However, since  $\pi^{Pool} < \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H)$  then setting  $\pi^{Pool} + \epsilon$  for  $\epsilon > 0$  sufficiently small will attract all consumers and make positive profits, which would constitute a profitable deviation. ■

**Proposition 6** If  $mp^* + F > \min(\bar{\pi}_L, \bar{\pi}_H)$  the unique equilibrium with positive demand, if it exists, is to set  $\pi = mp_\theta + F$  and serve only type  $\theta$ , where  $\theta = H$  ( $L$ ) if  $\bar{\pi}_L < \bar{\pi}_H$  ( $\bar{\pi}_H < \bar{\pi}_L$ ).

**Proof.** The pooling price cannot attract both types, and therefore it (generically) cannot make zero profits and constitute an equilibrium. without loss of generality, suppose that  $\bar{\pi}_L < \bar{\pi}_H$ . In such a case, any price that attracts type  $L$  will also attract type  $H$ . Therefore, the only possible equilibrium is to sell insurance to type  $H$  for the zero profits price,  $mp_H + F$ . If  $mp_H + F > \bar{\pi}_H$  then there is no equilibrium with positive demand. ■

**Proposition** For each case described in Table 1, the set of parameters that satisfy the parameter restrictions is not empty.

**Proof.** The proof relies on Table A1, which provides the parameter restrictions for all cases.

Consider case 1. For simplicity, suppose  $F = 0$  and no preference heterogeneity ( $r_H = r_L$ ). Since the risk premium is always positive, all we need is that  $\bar{\pi}_L < p^* m$ . Since  $p^*$  is an increasing function of  $p_H$  and  $\lambda_H$  but  $\bar{\pi}_L$  is not, it is easy to see that with  $p_L$  sufficiently low and  $p_H$  and  $\lambda_H$  sufficiently high, the inequality will be satisfied.

Consider case 2. Suppose that  $F > 0$  is small enough that  $\bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p_H m$  is still satisfied (e.g. because  $r_H$ , and therefore the risk premium for  $H$ , is high). It is easy to see that for any  $F > 0$  there exists  $r_L$  sufficiently small below which the risk premium for  $L$  is lower than  $F$ .

Consider case 3. Suppose  $r_H$  is small, so the risk premium for  $H$  is lower than  $F$ , and suppose that  $r_L$  is high enough so the risk premium for  $L$  is greater than  $F$ . It is easy to see that if  $p_H$  is sufficiently greater than  $p_L$  (e.g. think of  $p_H$  close to 1 and of  $p_L$  close to 0), there is an intermediate

value for  $r_H$  that will make  $H$  still buy insurance at the pooling price (despite  $F$ ) and  $r_L$  sufficiently high that will still make  $L$  buy.

Consider case 4. Suppose that  $r_H$  is sufficiently low and  $F > 0$  is high enough, that  $H$  will not buy insurance even for a price of  $p_L$ . ■

## B Computation details

### B.1 Likelihood

This section describes the details of the likelihood calculation. As we describe in more detail in Section 4, our observation of annuitant mortality is both left-truncated and right censored. The contribution of an individual's mortality to the likelihood, conditional on  $\alpha_i$ , is therefore:

$$l_i^m(\alpha) = \frac{1}{S(\alpha, \lambda, c_i)} (s(\alpha, \lambda, t_i))^{d_i} (S(\alpha, \lambda, t_i))^{1-d_i} \quad (28)$$

where  $S(\cdot)$  is the Gompertz survival function,  $s(\cdot)$  is the Gompertz hazard rate,  $d_i$  is an indicator which is equal to one if individual  $i$  died within our sample,  $c_i$  is individual  $i$ 's age when they entered the sample, and  $t_i$  is the age at which individual  $i$  exited the sample, either because of death or censoring. Our incorporation of  $c_i$  into the likelihood function accounts for the left truncation in our data.

The contribution of an individual's guarantee choice to the likelihood is based on the guarantee choice model above. Recall that the value of a given guarantee depends on preference for wealth after death,  $\beta$ , and annual mortality hazard, which depends on  $\lambda$  and  $\alpha$ . Some additional notation will be necessary to make this relationship explicit. Let  $V_0^{A(g)}(\beta, \alpha, \lambda)$  be the value of an annuity with guarantee length  $g$  to someone with Gompertz parameters  $\lambda$  and  $\alpha$ . Conditional on  $\alpha$ , the likelihood of choosing a guarantee of length  $g_i$  is:

$$l_i^g(\alpha) = \int \mathbf{1} \left( g_i = \arg \max_g V_0^{A(g)}(\beta, \alpha, \lambda) \right) p(\beta|\alpha) d\beta \quad (29)$$

where  $\mathbf{1}(\cdot)$  is an indicator function. Clearly, if  $\beta = 0$  no guarantee is chosen. Holding  $\alpha$  constant, the value of a guarantee increases with  $\beta$ . Therefore, we know that for each  $\alpha$ , there is some interval,  $[0, \bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda))$ , such that the zero year guarantee is optimal for all  $\beta$  in that interval.  $\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda)$  is the value of  $\beta$  that makes someone indifferent between choosing a zero and five year guarantee. Similarly there are intervals,  $(\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda), \bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda))$ , where the five year guarantee is optimal, and  $(\bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda), \infty)$ , where the ten year guarantee is optimal.<sup>26</sup>

We can express the likelihood of an individual's guarantee choice in terms of these indifference

<sup>26</sup>Note that it is possible that  $\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda) > \bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda)$ . In this case there is no interval where the five year guarantee is optimal. Instead, there is some  $\bar{\beta}_{0,10}(\alpha, \lambda)$  such that a zero year guarantee is optimal if  $\beta < \bar{\beta}_{0,10}(\alpha, \lambda)$  and a ten year guarantee is optimal otherwise. This situation only arises for high  $\alpha$ s that are outside the range relevant to our estimates.

cutoffs as:

$$l_i^g(\alpha) = \begin{cases} F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda)) & \text{if } g = 0 \\ F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda)) - F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{0,5}(\alpha, \lambda)) & \text{if } g = 5 \\ 1 - F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{5,10}(\alpha, \lambda)) & \text{if } g = 10 \end{cases} \quad (30)$$

Given our lognormality assumption, this can be written as:

$$F_{\beta|\alpha}(\bar{\beta}_{g_1, g_2}(\alpha, \lambda)) = \Phi\left(\frac{\log(\bar{\beta}_{g_1, g_2}(\alpha, \lambda)) - \mu_{\beta|\alpha}}{\sigma_{\beta|\alpha}}\right) \quad (31)$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the normal cumulative distribution function,  $\mu_{\beta|\alpha} = \mu_\beta + \frac{\sigma_{\alpha, \beta}}{\sigma_\alpha^2}(\log \alpha - \mu_\alpha)$  is the mean of  $\beta$  conditional on  $\alpha$ , and  $\sigma_{\beta|\alpha} = \sqrt{\sigma_\beta^2 - \frac{\sigma_{\alpha, \beta}^2}{\sigma_\alpha^2}}$  is the standard deviation of  $\beta$  given  $\alpha$ . The full log likelihood is obtained by combining  $l_i^g$  and  $l_i^m$ , integrating over  $\alpha$ , taking logs, and adding up over all individuals:

$$\mathcal{L}(\mu, \Sigma, \lambda) = \sum_{i=1}^N \log \int l_i^m(\alpha) l_i^g(\alpha) \frac{1}{\sigma_\alpha} \phi\left(\frac{\log \alpha - \mu_\alpha}{\sigma_\alpha}\right) d\alpha \quad (32)$$

We calculate the integral in equation 32 by quadrature. Let  $\{x_j\}_{j=1}^M$  and  $\{w_j\}_{j=1}^M$  be  $M$  quadrature points and weights for integrating from  $-\infty$  to  $\infty$ . Person  $i$ 's contribution to the likelihood is:

$$L_i(\mu, \Sigma, \lambda) = \sum_{j=1}^M l_i^m(e^{x_j \sigma_\alpha + \mu_\alpha}) l_i^g(e^{x_j \sigma_\alpha + \mu_\alpha}) \phi(x_j) w_j \quad (33)$$

We maximize the likelihood using a gradient based search. Although we could simply use finite difference approximations for the gradient, greater accuracy and efficiency can be obtained by programming the analytic gradient.

## B.2 Guarantee Indifference Curves

As mentioned in the main text of the paper, the most difficult part of calculating the likelihood is finding the points where people are indifferent between a  $g$  and  $g+5$  year guarantee,  $\bar{\beta}_{g, g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)$ . To find these points we need to compute the expected utility associated with each guarantee length.

**Value Function** The value of a guarantee of length  $g$  with payments  $z_t^g$  is:

$$V(g, \alpha, \beta) = \max_{c_t, w_t} \sum_{t=0}^T s_t(\alpha) \delta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta f_t(\alpha) \delta^t \frac{(w_t + G_t^g)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

s.t.  $0 \leq w_{t+1} = (w_t + z_t^g - c_t)(1+r)$  (34)

where  $\delta$  is the discount factor,  $r$  is the interest rate, and  $G_t^g = \begin{cases} \sum_{s=t}^g \frac{z_s^g}{(1+r)^{s-t}} & \text{if } t \leq g \\ 0 & \text{if } t > g \end{cases}$  is the present discount value of guaranteed future payments at time  $t$ . Also,  $s_t(\alpha)$  is the probability of being alive at time  $t$  and  $f_t(\alpha)$  is the probability of dying at time  $t$ . Note that a person who dies at time  $t$ , dies before consuming  $c_t$  or receiving  $z_t^g$ . Technically, there are also non-negativity

constraints on wealth and consumption. However, these constraints will never bind due to the form of the utility function.

We used the first order conditions from (34) to collapse the problem to a numerical optimization over a single variable, consumption at time zero. The first order conditions for (34) are:

$$\delta^t s_t(\alpha) c_t^{-\gamma} = \lambda_t \quad \forall t \in \{0..T\} \quad (35)$$

$$\delta^t f_t(\alpha) \beta (w_t + G_t^g)^{-\gamma} = -\lambda_t + \frac{1}{1+r} \lambda_{t-1} \quad \forall t \in \{1..T\} \quad (36)$$

$$(w_t + z_t - c_t)(1+r) = w_{t+1} \quad \forall t \in \{0..T-1\} \quad (37)$$

where  $\lambda_t$  is the multiplier on the budget constraint at time  $t$ . Initial wealth,  $w_0$  is taken as given. It is not possible to completely solve the first order conditions analytically. However, suppose we knew  $c_0$ . Then from the budget constraint (37), we can calculate  $w_1$ . From the first order condition for  $c_0$  (35), we can find  $\lambda_0$ .

$$\lambda_0 = s_0(\alpha) \delta^0 c_0^{-\gamma} \quad (38)$$

We can use the first order condition for  $w_1$  to solve for  $\lambda_1$ .

$$\lambda_1 = -m_1(\alpha) \delta^1 \beta (w_1 + G_1^g)^{-\gamma} + \frac{1}{1+r} \lambda_0 \quad (39)$$

Then,  $\lambda_1$  and the first order condition for  $c_1$  gives  $c_1$ .

$$c_1 = \left( \frac{\lambda_1}{\delta^1 s_1(\alpha)} \right)^{-1/\gamma} \quad (40)$$

Continuing in this way, we can find the whole path of optimal  $c_t$  and  $w_t$  associated with the chosen  $c_0$ . If this path satisfies the non-negativity constraints on consumption and wealth, then we have defined a value function of  $c_0$ ,  $\tilde{V}(c_0, g, \alpha, \beta)$ . Thus, we can reformulate the optimal consumption problem as an optimization problem over one variable.

$$\max_{c_0} \tilde{V}(c_0, g, \alpha, \beta) \quad (41)$$

Numerically maximizing a function of a single variable is a relatively easy problem and can be done quickly and robustly. We solve (41) using a simple bracket and bisection method. To check our program, we compared the value function as computed in this way and by our initial discretization and backward induction approach. They agreed up to the expected precision.

**Computing the Guarantee Indifference Curves** The guarantee indifference curves,  $\bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)$ , are defined as the solution to:

$$V(g, \alpha, \bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)) = V(g+5, \alpha, \bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)) \quad (42)$$

For each  $\alpha$ , we solve for  $\bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)$  using a simple bisective search. Each evaluation of the likelihood requires  $\bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha(x_j), \lambda)$  at each integration point  $x_j$ . Maximizing the likelihood requires searching over  $\mu_\alpha$  and  $\sigma_\alpha$ , which will shift  $\alpha(x_j)$ . As mentioned in the main text, rather than recomputing  $\bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha(x_j), \lambda)$  each time  $\alpha(x_j)$  changes, we initially compute  $\bar{\beta}_{g,g+5}(\alpha, \lambda)$  on a dense grid of  $\alpha$  values and log-linearly interpolate as needed.

## C More Details about the Data

As mentioned in the text, we restrict our sample in several ways:

- As is common in the analysis of annuitant choices, we limit the sample to the approximately sixty percent of annuities that insure a single life. The mortality experience of the single life annuitant provides a convenient ex-post measure of risk type; measuring the risk type of a joint life policy which insures multiple lives is less straightforward (Mitchell et al., 1999, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004, 2006).
- We also restrict the sample to the approximately eighty percent of annuitants who hold only one annuity policy, since characterizing the features of the total annuity stream for individuals who hold multiple policies is more complicated. Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) make a similar restriction.
- We focus on the choice of guarantee period and abstract from a number of other dimensions of individuals' choices.
  - Individuals can choose the timing of their annuitization, although they cannot annuitize before age 50 (45 for women) or delay annuitizing past age 75 (70 for women). We allow average mortality and preferences for wealth after death to vary with age at purchase (as well as gender), but do not explicitly model the timing choice.
  - Annuitants may also take a tax-free lump sum of up to 25 percent of the value of the accumulated assets. We do not observe this decision – we observe only the amount annuitized – and therefore do not model it. However, because of the tax advantage of the lump sum – income from the annuity is treated as taxable income – it is likely that most individuals fully exercise this option, and ignoring it is therefore unlikely to be a concern.
  - To simplify the analysis, we analyze policies with the same payment profile, restricting our attention to the 90 percent of policies that pay a constant nominal payout (rather than payouts that escalate in nominal terms). As an ancillary benefit, this may make our assumption that individuals all have the same discount rate more realistic.
  - We also drop the less than 1 percent of guaranteed policies which choose a guarantee length other than 5 or 10 years.
- We limit our sample of annuitants to those who purchased a policy between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1994. Although we also have data on annuitants who purchased a policy between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1998, the firm altered its pricing policy in 1995. An exogenous change in the pricing menu might provide a useful source of variation in estimating the model. However, if the pricing change arose due to changes in selection of individuals into the firm – or if it affects subsequent selection into the firm – using this variation without

allowing for changes in the underlying distribution of the annuitant parameters (i.e. in the joint distribution of  $\beta$  and  $\alpha$ ) could produce misleading estimates. We therefore limit the sample to the approximately one-half of annuities purchased in the pre-1995 pricing regime. In principle, we could also separately estimate the model for the annuities purchased in the post-1995 pricing regime. In practice, the small number of deaths among these more recent purchasers created problems for estimation in this sample.

- Annuitants may choose to purchase their annuity from an insurance company other than the one in which their fund has been accumulating, and about one-third of annuitants market-wide choose to do so. As our sample is from a single company, it includes both annuitants who accumulated their fund with the company and stayed with the company, as well as those annuitants who brought in external funds. We limit our main analysis to the approximately two-thirds of individuals in our sample who purchased an annuity with a pension fund that they had accumulated within our company. In the robustness section, we re-estimate the model for the one-third of individuals who brought in external funds, and find similar welfare estimates.
- The pricing of different guarantees varies with the annuitant's gender and age at purchase. We limit our sample of annuitants to those who purchased at the two most common ages of 60 or 65. About three-fifths of our sample purchased their annuity at 60 or 65. Sample sizes for other age-gender cells are too small for estimation purposes.

Table 1: Examples of four main cases

Key assumptions		Efficient allocation	Equilibrium allocation	First best?	Positive correlation?
1	$F=0, r_L=r_H$	$H$ and $L$ both insured	Only $H$ insured	No	Yes
2	$F>0, r_L=r_H$	Only $H$ insured	Only $H$ insured	Yes	Yes
3	$F>0, r_L>r_H$	Only $L$ insured	$H$ and $L$ both insured	No	No
4	$F>0, r_L>r_H$	Only $L$ insured	Only $L$ insured	Yes	No

The table provides four cases to illustrate that a positive correlation between coverage and risk occurrence is neither sufficient nor necessary for inference about the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion.

$F$  refers to the fixed load on the insurance policy.  $H$  and  $L$  refer to risk type (high or low).

$r_L$  and  $r_H$  refer to the risk aversion of the high risk type and low risk type, respectively. Thus,  $r_L > r_H$  indicates that the low risk type is more risk averse than the high risk type.

“Positive correlation?” refers to whether the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence exhibits a positive correlation.

Table 2: Summary statistics

	60 Females	65 Females	60 Males	65 Males	All
No. of obs.	1,800	651	1,444	5,469	9,364
Fraction choosing 0 year guarantee	14.0	16.0	15.3	7.0	10.2
Fraction choosing 5 year guarantee	83.9	82.0	78.7	90.0	86.5
Fraction choosing 10 year guarantee	2.1	2.0	6.0	3.0	3.2
Fraction who die within observed mortality period:					
Entire sample	8.4	12.3	17.0	25.6	20.0
Among those choosing 0 year guarantee	6.7	7.7	17.7	22.8	15.7
Among those choosing 5 year guarantee	8.7	13.3	17.0	25.9	20.6
Among those choosing 10 year guarantee	8.1	7.7	16.1	22.9	18.5

Recall that we only observe individuals who are alive as of January 1, 1998, and we observe mortality only for individuals who die before December 31, 2005.

Table 3: Annuity payment rates

Guarantee Length	60 Females	65 Females	60 Males	65 Males
0	0.1078	0.1172	0.1201	0.1330
5	0.1070	0.1155	0.1178	0.1287
10	0.1049	0.1115	0.1127	0.1198

These are the rates from January 1992, which we use in our baseline specification. A rate is per pound annuitized. For example, a 60 year old female who annuitized X pounds and chose a 0 year guarantee will receive a nominal payment of  $0.1078X$  every year until she dies.

Table 4: Parameter estimates

		Estimate	Std. Error
$\mu_\alpha$	60 Females	-5.76	(0.165)
	65 Females	-5.68	(0.264)
	60 Males	-4.74	(0.223)
	65 Males	-5.01	(0.189)
$\sigma_\alpha$		0.054	(0.019)
$\lambda$		0.110	(0.015)
$\mu_\beta$	60 Females	9.77	(0.221)
	65 Females	9.65	(0.269)
	60 Males	9.42	(0.300)
	65 Males	9.87	(0.304)
$\sigma_\beta$		0.099	(0.043)
$\rho$		0.881	(0.415)
No. of Obs.		9,364	

These estimates are for the baseline specification. As discussed in the text, the baseline specification uses the following values for other parameters in the model:  $\gamma = 3$ ,  $r = \delta = 0.043$ , and  $\pi = 0.05$ . Standard errors are in parentheses; as the value of  $\lambda$  is estimated separately in a first stage, we bootstrap the data to compute standard errors using 100 bootstrap samples.

Table 5: Within-sample fit

	60 Females		65 Females		60 Males		65 Males		Overall	
	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed	Predicted
Fraction choosing 0 year guaranteee	14.00	14.42	15.98	15.32	15.30	14.49	6.99	7.10	10.24	10.22
Fraction choosing 5 year guaranteee	83.94	83.16	82.03	83.21	78.67	80.27	89.98	89.75	86.52	86.57
Fraction choosing 10 year guaranteee	2.06	2.42	2.00	1.47	6.03	5.25	3.04	3.15	3.24	3.22
Fraction who die within observed mortality period:										
Entire sample	8.44	7.56	12.29	14.23	17.04	19.73	25.56	25.80	20.03	20.20
Among those choosing 0 year guaranteee	6.75	6.98	7.69	13.21	17.65	18.32	22.77	23.14	15.75	18.60
Among those choosing 5 year guaranteee	8.74	7.63	13.30	14.39	16.99	19.86	25.87	25.31	20.60	20.31
Among those choosing 10 year guaranteee	8.11	8.48	7.69	16.05	16.09	21.67	22.89	27.88	18.48	22.37

This table summarizes the fit of our estimates within sample. For each age-gender cell, we report the observed quantity (identical to Table 2) and the corresponding quantity predicted by the model. To construct the predicted death probability, we account for the fact that our mortality data is both censored and truncated, by computing predicted death probability for each individual in the data conditional on the date of annuity choice, and then integrating over all individuals.

Table 6: Out-of-sample fit

	60 Females	65 Females	60 Males	65 Males	Overall
Life Expectancy:					
5th percentile	87.4	86.7	79.4	81.4	79.8
Median individual	88.1	87.4	80.0	82.1	82.2
95th percentile	88.8	88.2	80.7	82.8	88.4
U.K. mortality table	82.5	83.3	78.9	80.0	80.5
Expected value of payments:					
0 year guarantee	19.97	20.34	20.18	21.41	20.63
5 year guarantee	19.77	20.01	19.72	20.64	20.32
10 year guarantee	19.44	19.49	19.12	19.61	19.45
Entire sample	19.79	20.05	19.74	20.66	20.32
Break-even interest rate	0.0414	0.0430	0.0409	0.0473	0.0448

This table summarizes the fit of our estimates out of sample. The top panel report life expectancies for different percentiles of the mortality distribution, using the parametric distribution on mortality to predict mortality beyond our mortality observation period. The bottom row of this panel presents the corresponding figures for the average pensioner, based on the PFL/PML 1992 period tables for “life office pensioners” (Institute of Actuaries, 1992). While the predicted life expectancy is several years greater, this is not a problem of fit; a similar difference is also observed for survival probabilities within sample. This simply implies that the average “life office pensioner” is not representative of our sample of annuitants. The bottom panel provides the implications of our mortality estimates for the profitability of the annuity company. These expected payments should be compared with 20, which is the amount annuitized for each individual in the model. Of course, since the payments are spread over a long horizon of several decades, the profitability is sensitive to the interest rate we use. The reported results use our baseline assumption of a real, risk-free interest rate of 0.043. The bottom row provides the interest rate that would make the annuity company break even (net of various fixed costs).

Table 7: Welfare estimates

	60 Females	65 Females	60 Males	65 Males	Average
<b>Observed equilibrium:</b>					
Average wealth-equivalent	100.24	100.40	99.92	100.17	100.16
Maximum Monet at Stake (MMS)	0.56	1.02	1.32	2.20	1.67
<b>Symmetric information counterfactual:</b>					
Average wealth-equivalent	100.38	100.64	100.19	100.74	100.58
Absolute welfare difference (M pounds)	43.7	72.0	82.1	169.8	126.5
Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS)	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.25
<b>Mandate 0 year guarantee counterfactual:</b>					
Average wealth-equivalent	100.14	100.22	99.67	99.69	99.81
Absolute welfare difference (M pounds)	-30.1	-53.2	-73.7	-146.1	-107.3
Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS)	-0.18	-0.17	-0.19	-0.22	-0.21
<b>Mandate 5 year guarantee counterfactual:</b>					
Average wealth-equivalent	100.25	100.42	99.92	100.18	100.17
Absolute welfare difference (M pounds)	2.8	6.0	1.7	1.6	2.1
Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS)	0.02	0.02	0.004	0.002	0.006
<b>Mandate 10 year guarantee counterfactual:</b>					
Average wealth-equivalent	100.38	100.64	100.19	100.74	100.58
Absolute welfare difference (M pounds)	43.7	72.1	82.3	170.0	126.7
Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS)	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.25

The first panel presents estimated average wealth equivalents of the annuities under the observed equilibrium, based on the baseline estimates. The column labeled average is an average weighted by sample size. Wealth equivalents are the amount of wealth per 100 units of initial wealth that we would have to give a person without an annuity so he is as well off as with 20 percent of his initial wealth annuitized. The second row presents our measure of MMS as defined in equation (21).

The second panel presents counterfactual wealth equivalents of the annuities under the symmetric information counterfactual. That is, we assign each individual payments rates such that the expected present value of payments is equal to the average expected payment per period in the observed equilibrium. This ensures that each person faces an actuarially fair reductions in payments in exchange for longer guarantees. The absolute difference row shows the annual cost of asymmetric information in millions of pounds. This cost is calculated by taking the per pound annuitized difference between symmetric and asymmetric information wealth equivalents per dollar annuitized (20, given the model) and multiplying it by the amount of funds annuitized annually in the U.K., which is six billion pounds. The relative difference uses the MMS concept as the normalization factor.

The third panel presents the same quantities for counterfactuals that mandate a single guarantee length for all individuals, for the actuarially fair pooling price. Each set of results investigates a different mandate.

Table 8: Robustness

Specification	Average wealth equivalent	Average absolute welfare difference			Mandate 10
		Symm. info.	Mandate 0	Mandate 5	
<b>1 Baseline specification</b>	100.16	126.5	-107.3	2.1	126.7
<b>Different choices of <math>\gamma</math>'s:</b>					
2 Consumption $\gamma=5$ , Wealth after death $\gamma=5$	100.51	111.0	-117.0	0.0	111.0
3 Consumption $\gamma=1.5$ , Wealth after death $\gamma=1.5$	99.92	133.2	-102.0	0.6	133.2
4 Consumption $\gamma=3$ , Wealth after death $\gamma=5$	100.47	120.0	-123.0	3.0	120.0
5 Consumption $\gamma=3$ , Wealth after death $\gamma=1.5$	99.94	135.3	-96.9	2.1	135.3
6 Row 5 + allow heterogeneity in initial wealth <sup>a</sup>	101.18	127.4	-148.3	-32.9	128.8
<b>Other parameter choices:</b>					
7 $r=0.05$ and $\delta=0.05$	99.29	119.4	-97.5	5.7	119.4
8 Fraction annuitized ( $\eta$ ) = 0.3	100.65	114.0	-118.0	0.0	114.0
9 Fraction annuitized ( $\eta$ ) = 0.1	99.93	135.0	-108.0	-4.2	135.0
10 January 1990 annuity rates	100.16	123.0	-112.5	0.0	123.0
<b>Parametrization of heterogeneity:</b>					
11 Non-Gompertz mortality distribution <sup>b</sup>	100.06	144.0	-100.8	6.0	144.0
12 $\alpha$ dist. Gamma, $\beta$ dist. Lognormal	100.20	132.0	-111.6	3.0	132.0
13 $\alpha$ dist. Gamma, $\beta$ dist. Gamma	100.14	123.0	-105.6	3.0	123.0
14 Allow covariates <sup>c</sup>	100.17	132.0	-110.1	3.0	132.0
15 $\beta$ fixed, Consumption $\gamma$ heterogeneous <sup>d</sup>	100.55	129.3	-110.0	2.1	129.4
<b>Wealth portfolio outside of compulsory annuity:</b>					
16 Half of initial wealth in public annuity <sup>e</sup>	99.95	255.6	-426.3	-34.2	243.6
<b>Departure from neo-classical model:</b>					
17 Some individuals always "pick the middle" <sup>f</sup>	100.22	132.0	-99.9	9.0	132.0
<b>Different sample:</b>					
18 "External" individuals <sup>g</sup>	95.40	137.4	-134.4	-16.8	137.7

The table reports summary results – average wealth equivalent and average welfare effects – from a variety of specifications of the model. Each specification is discussed in the text in more detail. Each specification is shown on a separate row of Table 8 and differs from the baseline specification from Table 7 (and reproduced in the first row of Table 8) in only one dimension, keeping all other assumptions as in the baseline case.

<sup>a</sup> See text for the parameterization of the unobserved wealth distribution. For comparability, the average wealth-equivalent is normalized to be out of 100 so that it is on the same scale as in the other specifications.

<sup>b</sup> This specification uses hazard rate of  $\alpha_i \exp(\lambda(t - t_0)^h)$  with  $h = 1.5$  (Gompertz, as in the baseline, has  $h = 1$ ).

<sup>c</sup> Covariates (for the mean of both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ) consist of the annuity premium and the education level at the individual's ward.

<sup>d</sup>  $\beta$  is fixed at the estimated  $\mu_\beta$  (see Table 4). Since the resulting utility function is non-homothetic, we use the average wealth in the population and renormalize, as in row 6. See text for more details.

<sup>e</sup> We assume the public annuity is constant, nominal, and actuarially fair for each person.

<sup>f</sup> The welfare estimates from this specification only compute welfare for the "rational" individuals, ignoring the individuals who are assumed to always pick the middle.


<sup>g</sup> "External" individuals are individuals who did not accumulated their annuitized funds with the company whose data we analyze. These individuals are not used in the baseline analysis (see Appendix C).

Table A1: Parameter restrictions for each case

	<i>Efficient Outcome</i>	<i>Equilibrium Outcome</i>	<i>Binding Constraints</i>	<i>Necessary Conditions</i>
1	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L \geq F + p_L m \\ \bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L < F + p^* m \\ \bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\bar{\pi}_L - p_L m \in [F, F + \lambda_H(p_H - p_L)m]$ $\bar{\pi}_H - p_H m \geq F$	—
2	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L < F + p_L m \\ \bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L < F + p^* m \\ \bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\bar{\pi}_L - p_L m < F$ $\bar{\pi}_H - p_H m \geq F$	$F > 0$
3	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L \geq F + p_L m \\ \bar{\pi}_H < F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L \geq F + p^* m \\ \bar{\pi}_H \geq F + p^* m \end{cases}$	$\bar{\pi}_L - p_L m \geq F + \lambda_H(p_H - p_L)m$ $\bar{\pi}_H - p_H m \in [F - \lambda_L(p_H - p_L)m, F]$	$F > 0$
4	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L \geq F + p_L m \\ \bar{\pi}_H < F + p_H m \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_L \geq F + p_L m \\ \bar{\pi}_H < F + p_L m \end{cases}$	$\bar{\pi}_L - p_L m \geq F$ $\bar{\pi}_H - p_H m < F - (p_H - p_L)m$	$F > 0$ $r_L > r_H$


The table provides precise parameter restrictions for each of the cases presented in Table 1. The table is used in the proof of Proposition A.

Figure 1: Schematic indifference sets



The figure provides a stylized illustration of the pairs of points  $(\alpha, \beta)$  which would make individuals indifferent between choosing 0 year guarantee and 5 year guarantee (lower left curve) and between 5 year guarantee and 10 year guarantee (upper right curve). We later compute these sets using the baseline guarantee choice model, the calibrated values of the parameters that we do not estimate (see Section 3), and the observed annuity rates (Table 3); the sets are not a function of the estimated parameters (except that in practice we first estimate  $\lambda$ , the shape parameter of the Gompertz hazard, and present the indifference sets for our estimated  $\lambda$ ; see text for more details). Individuals are represented as points in this space, with individuals between the curves predicted to choose 5 year guarantee, and individuals below (above) the lower (upper) curve predicted to choose 0 (10) year guarantee. In Figure 2 we present the empirical counterpart of this stylized figure.

Figure 2: Estimated distributions



The figure presents the estimated indifference sets, providing an empirical analog to Figure 1. It also presents scatter plots from the estimated joint distribution of  $(\log\alpha, \log\beta)$ ; each point is a random draw from the estimated distribution in the baseline specification. The estimated indifference sets for the 65 year old males are given by the pair of dark dashed lines, for the 60 year old males by the pair of lighter dashed lines, for the 65 year old females by the pair of dotted lines, and for the 60 year old females by the pair of solid lines.

Figure 3: Welfare contours





Figure 4: Welfare change contours (symmetric information)



The figure presents Figure 2, with contour lines that present the change in welfare (wealth equivalent) from the counterfactual exercise of symmetric information. Individuals with positive (negative) welfare change are estimated to gain (lose) from symmetric information, compared to their welfare in the observed asymmetric information equilibrium. Each panel represents a different age-gender cell: 60 year old females (upper left), 65 year old females (upper right), 60 year old males (lower left), and 65 year old males (lower right).