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THE IMPACTS OF EXPORT TAXES ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE

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ABSTRACT

Export taxes, despite being applied by several countries, have not received the same scrutiny in multilateral trade negotiations as other trade barriers. This work seeks to provide more detail into the linkages between export taxes, trade, food prices, and poverty in the agriculture sector. We first focus on how export taxes have impacted trade and international prices, applying a dynamic econometric-based gravity framework. Results show that export taxes do not have a widespread impact on international prices, but rather that the impact is concentrated in a few goods, mainly dairy products, live plants, vegetables, oilseeds and oils. We then use a computable general equilibrium model to examine the impacts to trade and poverty if export taxes were to be removed. These results indicate that a removal of export taxes would not have a significant impact on global prices. However, regions that apply export taxes would have an increase in production and exports if they are removed. Some regions, mainly those that currently export commodities taxed in other countries, could be harmed by the removal of export taxes due to the increased competition of exports in international markets. Consumers would benefit from a fall in domestic prices.

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An Export restrictions in agriculture (ERA) database is available at http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/departamentodeeconomia/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/05/ERA-database.xlsx

1. Introduction

Governments generally encourage exports as an important source of national income and production, thus they are more likely to subsidize exports rather than to tax them. Export subsidies, however, have been declining in use and are scheduled to be eliminated in the near future (Beckman et al., 2017). Meanwhile, export restrictions, such as export taxes are still often used.² Despite this, export taxes have received less scrutiny in multilateral trade negotiations than other, more visible trade instruments such as tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and export subsidies. This could be in part because they do not actually restrict home market access, but rather, they restrict the amount of products on the world market. In addition, several decades of low and stable prices, and the desire for market access, led to a research and policy focus on other trade instruments. Finally, export taxes are only used by 36 countries; but those countries tend to be of two types: major grain exporters, and impoverished importers of agricultural commodities. In addition, the commodities that tend to have export taxes in place are rice and grains, which suggest possible linkages between export taxes, commodity price volatility, and food availability/security. In this study, we aim to analyze the effects of agricultural export taxes on trade and then simulate the economic effects of their removal.

The recent volatility in agricultural commodity prices in 2006-08 and 2010-11 reignited the debate on the response of governments to volatile and higher prices. Although academics have long argued against government intervention due to the possibility of aggravating the volatility or exacerbating shortages (Gouel, 2014), some governments do implement policies to reduce domestic prices (Poulton et al., 2006). These policies have

² Estrades et al. (2017) note that in the agriculture sector, export taxes are the most numerous of export restrictions (e.g., export bans, export quotas, export license requirements, and price references for export), with more than 400 instances of export taxes in place across the 2008-2014 time period. For this paper, we will generally focus on export taxes, except when explicitly stated.

revolved around some mixture of price insulating measures such as food subsidies, stockholding, or trade policy adjustments such as export taxes.

Countries impose export taxes for a series of other reasons: to increase public revenue, to protect an infant industry, to guarantee domestic supply of a certain product, among others. Estrades et al. (2017) show in the period 2004-2014, export taxes were mainly imposed for food security purposes. In a context of increasing food prices, export taxes are often applied in order to isolate domestic prices from the world market and thereby to prevent domestic prices from rising or to ensure food availability (i.e., food security). When a food exporting country imposes export taxes, there is an excess of domestic supply, which lowers domestic prices. If the country imposing the measure is a large exporter of the good (i.e., it has market power in the global market), the measure is expected to have an impact on international prices, as export volumes fall. The increase in international prices could also take place when many small exporters apply such measures (see Bouët and Laborde (2010) for a theoretical presentation of the partial equilibrium effects of export taxes). Globally, export taxes create distortions that have negative impacts on welfare; Laborde et al. (2013) find that removing all existing export taxes would lead to welfare gains of about 33 billion dollars per year.

The evidence on price insulating policies exacerbating commodity price volatility is not conclusive, but Gouel (2014) notes that countries that implemented these policies tended to weather the food price crisis the best. However, the countries mentioned in his work (China and India) are large agricultural producers with the ability to implement policies; countries that are dependent on food imports were not as insulated (Abbott (2010) cites Ethiopia and Malawi as examples). Demeke et al. (2009) examined short-term measures applied by 81 developing countries in the context of higher international prices (2007-2008). They found that one of the most applied policy responses was a reduction in

tariffs (more than half of the countries implemented this policy), which is not a trade distorting policy, but might produce an increase in world prices as domestic demand rises. Another popular policy was the imposition of export taxes or quantitative restrictions, with 25 countries imposing this type of trade restrictions, which might have exacerbated the increase in international prices.³

Given the effects of export taxes on global welfare, many efforts have been made in recent years to have a clear picture of the number and extent of export taxes applied during the food crisis, as well as its impact on food prices. OECD built a database that focus on the period 2007-2012, which includes all type of export restrictions (export taxes and surtaxes, export quotas, export bans, non-automatic licensing requirements, reference export price, other export measures). Their focus is on big countries that have an incidence on global prices (OECD, 2015). Another recent effort was the Panel Export Tax (PET) database, which includes information only on export taxes and on nine exporting countries (Solleder, 2013). Laborde et al. (2013) also built a database only focusing on export taxes at the exporter/HS level, which includes all countries for which there is available information. More recently, Estrades et al. (2017) built a comprehensive database which includes all type of export restrictions applied between 2004 and 2014 at the exporter/HS level, considering agricultural products and all countries in the world.

The recently developed database by Estrades et al. (2017), known as the Export Restrictions in Agriculture (ERA), indicate that export taxes were the most numerous of all export restrictions from 2005-2014. As shown in figure 1, there is a peak in the number of products affected by export taxes in 2008, and another peak in 2012 and 2013. The figure

³ Other short term policies applied in the period were releasing food stock to the market; VAT reduction; and price controls.

also shows a global average for food prices. The two lines seem to move in unison; indeed, the correlation coefficient is 0.86.




Figure 1. Number of export taxes in place and the FAO food price index (2005-2014)

Source: own elaboration with data from FAO and ERA database

Apart from figure 1, evidence suggests that export taxes, together with other price insulating policies, contributed to an overall increase in food prices (Mitra and Josling 2009; Headey 2011; Martin and Anderson 2012; Anderson and Nelgen 2012; Solleder 2013; Jensen and Anderson 2014; Giordani et al. 2016). However, the causality is difficult to evaluate, as export taxes are usually applied in the context of volatile prices, i.e., exogenous reasons first cause an augmentation of world agricultural prices, which leads countries to implement export restrictions and taxes, and causes new augmentation of world agricultural prices. In addition, most studies focus on only a few markets (usually, grains and oilseeds).

In this paper, we seek to overcome these limitations and contribute to the literature that estimates the impact of export taxes on agricultural international prices and trade. To do so, we investigate this topic from different angles. That is, we first apply a partial equilibrium model that is based on the comprehensive and updated information of export taxes from Estrades et al. (2017). This model takes an ex-post approach to perform trade policy analysis (i.e., measuring the effect on trade flows of a past trade policy), and is wellgrounded in the empirical tradition of trade policy analysis. The 'dynamic gravity model' used in this study, accounts for endogeneity issues and provides evidence of an impact of export taxes on international prices of some agricultural products.

We then take a general equilibrium approach, which considers an ex-ante approach. This model rests on strong microeconomic theoretical foundations and provides information on the general equilibrium effects of export taxation, both at the international and at the domestic level. Because export taxes might impact the most vulnerable food consumers, we use a CGE framework capable of detailing the impacts to individual strata of income classes for several developing countries. This detailed poverty information is used to show the role that export taxes as applied to agricultural products play in the link between trade and poverty. The joint application of both methodologies has been utilized by DeRosa and Gilbert (2006) and Ivus and Strong (2007). To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study focusing on the effects of export taxes applied during the last food price crisis, contributing to the public debate about the need to introduce disciplines on export taxes at the multilateral level.

2. Impact of export taxes on international agricultural trade and prices

In order to analyze the impact of export taxes on traded volumes and international prices, we first apply a dynamic gravity model. The gravity model of trade argues that trade flows strongly depend on the distance between the two partners and the economic size of each other. The distance between countries stands for the variations in trade costs among dyads, and is often complemented with other factors affecting bilateral trade costs. We are specifically interested in the effects that trade policy costs have on traded flows, so we

include import tariffs in a typical specification for a gravity model. Lacking direct information on prices we intend to infer the effects of export taxes on prices on the basis of their effects on traded values and traded volumes. We use the ERA database, with highly disaggregated data (six- digits of the Harmonized System) for export taxes.⁴ We also include information on tariffs applied, taking information from the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). For each origin-destination-product we observe exports (values and volumes), export taxes, and import tariffs at the year level for the period 2005-2013.⁵ Trade information comes from CEPII-BACI database, measured in current U.S. Dollars.

The main difficulty that arises when estimating the effects of policy barriers on trade comes from the fact that protective measures tend to be applied in sectors and periods in which the potential trade flow is higher, producing a reverse causality problem that would make the estimations inconsistent.⁶ This is a source of endogeneity both when explaining traded volumes and traded values, but the problem should be even more serious in the case of values due to the role of prices, since an increase of international prices can have a positive impact on the probability of imposing trade policies (Giordani et al., 2016). Our strategy deals with endogeneity issues by applying the strategy proposed to dynamic panel data models by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and popularized by Arellano and Bond (1991). Seeing the model as a system of equations, one per year, they propose to instrument each equation with a variable amount of available lags (increasing as *t* grows),

⁴ The ERA database is available for free from the URL:

http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/departamentodeeconomia/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/05/ERA-database.xlsx

⁵ We have 8,297,080 origin-destination-product panel units, which pooled for a nine-year period gives a comparatively large dataset of 74,673,720 observations.

⁶ Note that the effect from export taxes to trade being presumably negative, and the reverse causality effect (trade on export taxes) being presumably positive (more protection in relevant goods), the sign of the asymptotic bias is the sign of the reverse effect, positive in our case (see e.g. Basu 2015). Thus, this asymptotic bias caused by reverse causality offsets (at least partially) the negative bias caused by unduly omitting import tariffs in the model (as done in most of the extant studies on the effects of exports taxes).

which means that all the possible orthogonality conditions may be used. The resulting estimator is known as Difference-GMM and is used in this paper to estimate the dynamic panel gravity model.

A major advantage of this strategy is that it also provides a way to deal with the endogeneity of other included explanatory variables, both with internal instruments and external instruments in case they are available. The procedure to instrument these variables can be analogous to the one used for the lagged dependent variable ("GMM style") or can instrument the variables with their own lags ("IV style"). In our case this is critical, because both export taxes and tariffs are likely endogenous because of reverse causality, since countries tend to protect themselves in products that are intensely traded.⁷ The estimated equation is:

 $\Delta X_{ijht} = \alpha_1 \Delta X_{ijh(t-1)} + \sum_{q=0}^{1} \beta_q \Delta X tax_{ijh(t-q)} + \sum_{q=0}^{1} \delta_q \Delta M tar_{ijh(t-q)} + \theta_1 \Delta X tot_{ih(t-1)} + \theta_2 \Delta M tot_{ih(t-1)} + \tau_t + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijht}^8$

Where X_{ijht} is the log of exports of product *h* from country *i* to country *j* in period *t*; $Xtax_{ijht}$ is the log of export taxes imposed by country *i* when exporting product *h* to country *j* (expressed as 1+rate before transformation); $Mtar_{ijht}$ is the log of import tariffs imposed by country *j* when importing product *h* from country *i* (expressed as 1+rate before transformation); τ_t are specific time effects, $\eta_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$ is an error term including a

(1)

⁷ Despite these advantages, two important limitations have to be signaled. On one hand, we are not fully able to introduce the recommended fixed effect in order to control for multilateral resistance terms. On the other hand, since there is no trade for 93 percent of total origin-destination-product observations in a typical year of our sample, it is worth noting that our dependent variable is strongly censored. Censoring and selection are challenging features within the framework of the dynamic panel data models.

⁸ The complete set of orthogonality conditions for equation (1) when instrumenting first differences in policy variables with their lags in levels, is given by: $E[X_{ijh(t-s)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijht}] = 0$ for s = 2, ..., t - 1; t = 3, ..., T; $E[Xtax_{ijh(t-q-2)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$ for q = 0, 1; $E[Mtar_{ijh(t-q-2)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$ for q = 0, 1; $E[Xtot_{ih(t-1)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$; $E[Mtot_{jh(t-1)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$; $E[\Delta\tau_t\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$ for t = 3, ..., T. Alternatively, when first differences in policy variables are instrumented using GMM style, the second and third equations have to be replaced by: $E[Xtax_{ijh(t-q-s)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$ for q = 0, 1; s = 2, ..., t - 1; t = 3, ..., T; and $E[Mtar_{ijh(t-q-s)}\Delta\varepsilon_{ijt}] = 0$ for q = 0, 1; s = 2, ..., t - 1; t = 3, ..., T.

pair-product specific time-invariant unobserved effect and a reminder disturbance term assumed to be clustered at the pair-product (i, j, h) level. As a gravity model of trade, our specification requires the inclusion of the economic size of the partners in each specific sector. Since production and consumption data are unavailable at any disaggregated level for our country sample, we compute total exports in sector *h* from each origin $(Xtot_{iht})$ and total imports in sector *h* for each destination $(Mtot_{iht})$.⁹

Our preferred set of instruments varies by sector, according to their performance in terms of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982) and the lack of serial correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In some cases we use GMM style with a shorter span of lags as instruments, in other cases we use IV style with closer or farther lags as instruments, or we even use no instruments for policy variables when specification tests indicate so.

Three other variations are used to reach an adequate performance of each regression. In some cases we use forward orthogonal deviations instead of the first differences transformation. In other cases we allow for a longer dynamic structure in the model (two lags of the dependent variable). Finally, for some sectors we had to collapse the matrix of instruments in a way that makes the instrument count to increase linearly with the total number of periods.¹⁰

⁹ Total exports of product h from country i to all destinations are a proxy of i's production of h, the variable that must be included in the gravity model for product h. Total exports coincide with production as long as domestic sales of h are zero, or if the exported and domestic varieties can be considered different goods (no substitution between sales in the domestic market and abroad). Similarly, total imports by j of product h from all sources are a proxy of j's expenditure in h, the variable needed by the gravity model. They coincide with expenditure if j's expenditure in a domestic variety of j are zero or if the imported and domestic varieties can be considered different goods (no substitution between imports and domestic purchases).

¹⁰ This method is equivalent to projecting the explanatory variables onto the full Arellano-Bond set of instruments, while constraining the coefficients on certain lags in the projection to be null (Roodman, 2008). All the estimations were done using the command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009) in Stata 14 MP. The computations were performed at University of Geneva on the Baobab cluster.

Microeconomic foundations of the gravity model of international trade show that a structural identification of the parameters requires controlling for the outward multilateral resistance of the origin and the inward multilateral resistance of the destination country. Multilateral resistances enter as a way of weighing each bilateral trade cost in terms of the (weighted) average trade costs with alternative sources (in case of the destination) or alternative destinations (in the case of the source country). It is customary to control for multilateral resistances by means of origin and destination fixed effects, which in this case would be time and product-specific (as origin-product-year and destination-product-year). We are not fully able to introduce the recommended fixed effects, as they have to be added as instruments, which causes a problem known as 'instruments proliferation' that ultimately invalidate the results. Thus, we only include year fixed effects in the main specifications, and then tested for robustness to the inclusion of the necessary fixed effects (although we cannot longer control for endogeneity). However, the use of first differences absorbs any unobservable effects across panel units (origin-destination-product), presumably controlling for some variation in the countries multilateral resistances. The aggregation for our estimation is a compromise solution that makes most of the highly disaggregated information on trade and trade policy variables (Harmonized System 2002, six-digit), while allowing to separately estimate the effects of trade policies at the two-digit sector level. Thus, all the products in a sector are assumed to share the same effects of policy measures.

2.1 Estimation results

In table 1 we present a summary of our baseline results, reporting the degree in which we have evidence of a price effect of each policy measure. The details of the estimated coefficients for each policy variable are presented in Estrades et al. (2017). The main conclusion is that the expected price effects are not observed in many sectors, and when

there is some evidence it is generally weak. We refer hereafter as "strong evidence" of a price effect when we find that an export tax reduces traded volumes more than traded values (which could even increase) or when volumes are not affected but values increase. In order to compare the elasticity of a policy measure on values and quantities, we compute a simple test for equality of means of the two estimated coefficients. In some cases there is no statistically significant difference between the two coefficients, but a seemingly contradictory result shows that one of them is statistically equal to zero, while the other is not. We will refer to these cases as having "weak evidence" of a price effect. Almost 75 percent of the price effects we detect fall in this last category. A final situation is when both the effect on quantities and values are significant, we fail to reject equality of the two coefficients, but there is a noticeable difference between the two of them, and we refer to these cases as giving "very weak evidence" of a price effect.

All sorts of evidence of price effects are signaled in table 1 shadowed cells. Our main results show that export taxes have a negative effect on traded volumes and a positive effect on prices for Dairy products; Edible vegetables; Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits; Fats and oils; Sugar; Miscellaneous edible preparations; Beverages and spirits; and Residues and waste from the food industry.

For some of these sectors, only few countries imposing export taxes explain the impact on prices. In some cases, as few as one or two: Argentina for Live trees and plants; Pakistan for Sugar, Argentina for Dairy products; Kenya and Nepal for Edible preparations; and Kenya and Russia for Beverages and spirits. In the case of Edible vegetables, three countries imposed export taxes in the period: Argentina on various vegetables; Nepal on lentils; and Pakistan on leguminous and potatoes. Then, for Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits; Fats and oils; and Residues and waste from the food industry, many different countries apply export taxes on various products: five countries apply export

taxes on Fats and oils; seven countries on Residues and waste from the food industry; and ten countries apply export taxes on Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits.

The cases of no evidence of a price effect come from two different situations. In most occasions we have clearly similar effects on values and quantities, which means that prices are stable. In other sectors we find that export restrictions lead to a fall in prices (a significant negative effect on values accompanied by no effects on quantities) or tariffs produce an increase in prices. These results are counterintuitive and opposed to the predictions of a basic partial equilibrium model. However, different stories could explain this kind of pattern. One possible explanation is a composition effect, where a restriction applied to an eight-digit product leads to an increase in exports of another eight-digit product which pertains to the same six-digit category and has a higher unit value. A related rationalization would be a general equilibrium effect, where the restrictions make exporters to switch to other products in a different six-digit category in which some eight-digit products are also facing restrictions. A third motive is a substitution of one restriction with another, like the replacement of an export tax with an export quota which would affect the estimation of both coefficients, since the reduction of export taxes is not followed by an increase in volumes and the quota does not necessarily produce a further decrease in exports.¹¹

The use of a dynamic model allows to describe different time patterns of the price effects, which could be observed immediately (in t) or with some delay (in t+1). Also, an immediate effect can be reinforced in the following period, or contrarily, it could be a

¹¹ Note that blank cells do not mean that there ares no price effects. In these cases the identification of the effects was not possible, because of lack of observations of the particular measure for the particular product. This can happen because measures have not been applied by any country, or they have been but very early in our time sample (and the first observations are lost because of the lags required by the model), or they have been in place but stayed unchanged during the whole period (and our model identifies this parameters on the basis of variations). Our database has some missing values in the tariff variables, which forces to drop these observations and some export taxes could be also lost for this reason.

transitory effect that is quickly reverted. With the exception of Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, in which there is a delayed effect of export taxes, in all cases the impact takes place in the same year the measure is implemented. Among Fats and oils, the effect takes place the same year the measure is implemented, and the effect is reinforced the following year.

			EXPORT TAXES	
	SECTOR	evidence of price effects	expected sign (increase)	dynamic pattern
1	Live animals			
2	Meat and edible meat offal	none		
4	Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, NES	weak	yes	in t
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	weak	yes	in t
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	none		
9	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	none		
10	Cereals	weak	no	in t
11	Products of milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	none		
12	Oil seeds, oleaginous fruits; grains, seeds, fruit; ind or med plants; fodder	weak	yes	in t+1
13	Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable saps & extracts			
15	Animal/vegetable fats & oils & their cleavage products; edible fats; waxes	weak	yes	in t reinf in t+1
16	Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates	none		
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	weak	yes	in t
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	weak	no	in t
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch/milk; pastrycooks' products	none		
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	none		
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	weak	yes	in t
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	weak	yes	in t
23	Residues & waste from the food industry; prepared animal fodder	very weak	yes	in t
33	Essential oils & resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic/toilet preparations			

Table 1. Summary of the evidence of price effects of export taxes by sector, GMM Estimations

Source: own results

Our model also finds a positive impact of tariff reductions on prices in fewer agricultural sectors, and the effect is verified the same year the reduction takes place. These results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.

3. Impact of export taxes on agricultural trade and prices, welfare and poverty

The complex interactions between agricultural commodity markets and trade policies, and the prominence of food in household budgets and real income determination, justifies the economy-wide, global approach of an applied general equilibrium (AGE) analysis, which offers a useful analytical framework to study the effects of export taxes. Further, the use of such trade instruments is far-reaching, affecting all sectors of the economy and trade, which creates potential market feedback effects. To capture how these affect households, we use a global CGE model, in particular, the GTAP-POV model (Hertel et al., 2015).

3.1 Experimental design

The GTAP-POV model features a macro-modeling framework that nests a poverty module within the GTAP modeling framework. This allows users to assess the impact of global trade on poverty across seven different 'strata' or sub-populations within focus countries. The GTAP-POV version substantially extends the standard GTAP model, in order to explore the linkages between agricultural reforms under the WTO and the distribution of income among farmers in rich and poor countries. Key modifications made by Hertel et al. (2015) include:

- Incorporation of factor supply and demand features from GTAP-AGR (Keeney and Hertel, 2005)
- Incorporation of AIDADS demand system for modeling consumer demand in each country
- Incorporation of additional tax replacement instruments that could impact poverty

• A farm household income module with a detailed livestock-feed nesting structure; and the poverty module for looking at poverty impacts in 15 focus countries.

The GTAP data base used here (v.6) is benchmarked to 2001, which is not very suitable for scenario analysis, but it does provide a nice platform for validating the model. To do so, we undertake a historical update experiment following Beckman et al. (2011) to update the model to 2008, a year in which the number of export taxes was high. See Appendix 1 for information on this validation/updating work.

The focus of this section of the paper is to better understand the impacts from export taxes. To do so, we first evaluate the model's ability to replicate commodity price changes through export taxes, using the export restriction database from Estrades et al. (2017), and shocking the model for the changes in export taxes from 2001-up to 2008.¹² Doing so gives us two measures of the model's ability to replicate price changes: a model with only the exogenous shocks; and a model that adds changes in export taxes to those exogenous shocks. The results for the historical validation are also available in Appendix 1.

3.2 Impacts of removing export taxes

Then, we investigate how removing export taxes might alter agricultural markets, looking at changes to production, prices, trade, and poverty. Table 2 shows the export taxes in place in 2008, for those regions which had those barriers in place. Several regions had no export taxes in 2008.¹³ Of those regions that did have export taxes, most were less than 10 percent of the value of exports, and most regions that did apply exports taxes had them on

¹² The baseline for the model is 2001, while the Estrades et al. (2017) database is from 2004-2014. To reconcile the two, we take the baseline taxes and apply any changes that Estrades et al. report for 2008.
¹³ Japan (JPN), Korea and Taiwan (DVDASIA), Philippines (PHL), Thailand (THA), Bangladesh (BGD), India (IND), Canada (CAN), United States (USA), Mexico (MEX), Brazil (BRA), Colombia (COL), Peru (Per), Venezuela (VEN), EU-EFTA (EUEFTA), Rest of Europe (XER), South Africa (ZAF), Malawi (MWI), Mozambique (MOZ), Tanzania (TZA), Uganda (UGA). Australia/New Zealand (AUSNZL) had a very small (0.001 percent) tax on wheat. We assume that this is essentially zero in our model.

only a handful of commodities. The exceptions are: China (Chn), Vietnam (Vnm), Rest of South America (XSM), and the former USSR (FrmUSSR). Our analysis breaks the world into two parts: those which had export taxes (exptax) and those which did not (others).¹⁴

	CHN	IDN	VNM	XSE	PAK	XSA	XCA	XSM	FrmUSSR	MENA	ZMB	XSS
Rice	4.83		3.00					0.35		0.98		
Wheat	18.60							6.26	15.00			
Crsgrns	5.31		2.11					6.44	6.52			
Oilseeds	1.80	12.82				0.49		6.65	15.00		11.32	
Sugar												
Cotton								3.34			13.73	
OthCrps			1.49		1.86	10.82	0.25	1.95				1.25
Milk								5.59				
Cattle							3.88	4.76	1.26			
NRumin			10.49		0.20			3.78	0.27			
Fish												
Forest		6.03	1.72					2.34				
PrDairy								5.59				
PrBeef								6.27				
PrNRumn								3.05				
PrSugar					2.33							
PrRice	4.83		3.00			0.62		4.79		0.93		
PrOilsd	0.18	8.97		0.33		0.27		9.83	0.25			
OthFdBev	0.08		0.01		0.33			0.91	0.38			0.79

Table 2. Export taxes in place in 2008

Source: own results

Table 3 presents the results on production, market prices, export and imports, by region across all agricultural commodities. The largest increases in production are to the commodities that tended to have the largest export taxes in place: wheat and oilseeds (raw and processed). China had a sizeable export tax for wheat, its change in production is 0.59 percent. Former USSR also had an increase in wheat production (5.07 percent). For raw oilseeds, the increase in production is driven by Indonesia (8.07 percent) and the Rest of South America (7.72 percent). Both of these regions have quite large industries in the

¹⁴ We aggregate into these two parts by taking a weighted share of each result. We also mention the main region that drives each result, especially for the export tax group.

baseline. The increase in oilseeds production, combined with a fall in export taxes applied to processed oilseeds, leads to an increase in processed oilseeds production (PrOilsd). This result suggests that these regions are choosing to crush their own oilseeds rather than exporting the raw product.¹⁵ Processed oilseeds had export taxes in place across several regions, but they tended to be of a smaller magnitude than those for oilseeds.¹⁶

	Produ	uction	Market Price		Exp	Exports		Imports	
	ЕхрТах	Others	ЕхрТах	Others	ЕхрТах	Others	ЕхрТах	Others	
Rice	-0.02	-0.11	0.55	-0.67	0.59	-0.06	0.36	1.81	
Wheat	1.28	-1.17	0.11	-0.01	35.63	-3.68	5.37	1.22	
Crsgrns	0.38	-0.20	0.06	0.00	5.89	-0.95	0.65	0.35	
Oilseeds	2.51	-0.81	0.06	-0.01	6.66	-1.46	0.92	0.01	
Sugar	-0.07	0.11	-0.01	0.06	-0.55	0.26	0.05	-0.21	
Cotton	-0.07	0.08	0.25	-0.20	-0.25	0.19	-0.02	0.03	
OthCrps	0.01	0.03	0.39	-0.36	1.16	-0.05	0.99	0.14	
Milk	0.14	0.00	0.36	-0.19	-0.47	0.53	1.45	-0.17	
Cattle	0.12	-0.05	1.26	-0.39	0.94	-0.10	0.08	-0.02	
NRumin	0.03	0.03	0.18	-0.12	0.27	0.02	0.18	0.02	
Fish	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.15	0.24	-0.01	-0.05	0.05	
Forest	0.01	-0.04	0.18	-0.17	0.88	-0.29	0.65	0.19	
PrDairy	0.07	-0.01	0.29	-0.16	5.13	-0.15	0.24	0.24	
PrBeef	0.17	-0.06	0.41	-0.17	10.76	-0.50	0.68	0.47	
PrNRumn	-0.16	0.05	0.08	-0.14	-0.17	0.16	0.43	0.03	
PrSugar	0.02	0.09	-0.01	0.08	-0.28	0.28	0.21	-0.05	
PrRice	0.07	-0.13	0.06	-0.03	6.86	-1.85	0.98	1.66	
PrOilsd	1.51	-0.93	0.24	-0.06	12.51	-4.36	3.86	3.67	
OthFdBev	0.02	0.04	0.51	-0.08	0.12	0.06	0.20	0.03	

Table 3. Model results for removing export taxes

Source: own results

The increase in production for those commodities subject to export taxes draws

resources (land, labor, capital) away from other commodities. Thus, we see a small

¹⁵ This point is further made by noting that the change in exports of processed oilseeds (12.27 percent) is greater than the change in exports of oilseeds (5.62 percent).

¹⁶ This phenomenon is known as Differential Export Taxes: some countries choose to apply lower export taxes along the production chain in order to promote production of higher value added products. Our results indicate that the removal of export taxes would have the same effect: higher production and exports of produced oilseeds than of oilseeds. However, we should be cautious when analyzing this result, as we are not including the full production chain. The result for the Rest of South America (XSM) is mainly explained by Argentina, which has a larger export tax in the baseline on Produced oilseeds (9.83) than on Oilseeds (6.65).

decrease in production for several commodities in the ExpTax group that did not have export taxes in place. The Others group has changes in production that essentially mirror those of the ExpTax group. There is a decrease in wheat, oilseeds, and processed oilseeds production (production in Canada and the U.S. is harmed substantially compared to the others), but there is a small increase in production in some other commodities. In particular, there are increases in some of the livestock categories (the percentage changes are small, but these are very big sectors in the baseline), indicating that many regions in the Others group shift land to livestock production. For example, the U.S. has a decrease in crop production (rice, wheat, coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar, cotton, other crops) of -0.20 percent, and an increase in livestock production (milk, cattle, nonruminants) of 0.01 percent. Because U.S. crop production has a slightly higher value than livestock, this result indicates that removing export taxes hurts regions that compete with those who previously had export taxes.

Market prices increase for almost all commodities in the ExpTax region as there is now more competition for these commodities (i.e., domestic versus export uses). Prices tend to rise higher for those commodities that had the largest production increases. The opposite occurs in the Others category, as more commodities on the global market means more imports and lower domestic prices. The biggest increase in exports (by magnitude) is to wheat for the ExpTax group. China is a small wheat exporter, but the Former USSR is a large exporter. Exports in those two regions increase by 266.87 and 143.67 percent.

Interestingly, the ExpTax group has increases in imports for many commodities, especially those in which they had big export gains. Some of this is trade with each other (e.g., China is the world's largest importer of oilseeds and processed oilseeds). But some of this is exports displacing domestic consumption, hence the need for imports. For example,

although they are not a very importer of wheat, the Former USSR has an increase in wheat imports of 63.47 percent in this scenario.

Finally, we examine how removing export taxes impacts poverty. Two pieces of information that will be useful in understanding changes to poverty are the share of poverty in each strata¹⁷ and the share of imports in food consumption for each region. This information is given in table 4 for those regions with detailed poverty information from Hertel et al. (2015). The share of poverty in agriculture is useful in understanding how the reduction in production could impact various regions. Of course, those employed in agriculture could actually be better suited to weathering the production reduction and export tax increase, as the other strata are demanders of food. To provide a flavor of that aspect, the second column of data provides information on the share of imports in food consumption: those with a greater percentage will likely be impacted by the removal of export taxes.

	in agriculture (%)	food consumption (%)
BGD	15	5.56
BRA	1	3.54
CHL	0	6.53
COL	10	6.51
IDN	42	7.11
MWI	54	10.74
MEX	9	3.2
MOZ	41	21.18
PER	31	5.98
PHL	11	7.73
THA	6	17.57
VEN	8	1.56
VNM	4	23.84
ZMB	34	8.46

Table 4. Strata information and the share of imports in food consumptionShare of povertyShare of imports in

Source: Share of poverty in agriculture is from Hertel et al. (2015); the share of imports in food consumption is from the GTAP-POV database.

¹⁷ Along with agricultural self-employment, the other strata (or sub-populations) are: non-agricultural self-employment, rural wage labor, urban wage labor, transfer payments, rural and urban diversified.

Table 5 presents information on the changes in poverty for those regions with detailed information by strata. The results across all strata indicate that poverty does not change by much across both types (\$1.25/day and \$2/day) in all regions if export taxes are removed. The only region that has a meaningful impact (greater than a tenth of a percent) is Indonesia (IDN), which, along with Vietnam, is the only region that was included in the ExpTax scenario. Vietnam (VNM) had the second largest decrease in poverty.¹⁸ This result shows that policies that isolate domestic prices are not necessarily effective in protecting the poorest population, not even in the agriculture strata, as poverty in Indonesia also falls among this strata. Among some countries that do not change export taxes, poverty increases slightly, which could be explained by the increased competition in agricultural markets of products such as wheat, oilseeds and produced oilseeds.

Table 5. Percent change in poverty levels by region						
	Across all	Agriculture strata				
	Below	Below	Below	Below		
	\$1.25/day	\$2/day	\$1.25/day	\$2/day		
BGD	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0		
BRA	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01		
CHL	0	0	0	0		
COL	0	-0.01	0	0.01		
IDN	-0.07	-0.14	-0.02	-0.01		
MWI	0	0	0	0		
MEX	0	0	0	0		
MOZ	0	0	0	0		
PER	0	0	0	0		
PHL	0	0.01	0	0		
THA	0	0.02	0	0		
VEN	0	0	0	0		
VNM	0	-0.07	0	-0.01		
ZMB	0	0	0	0		

Source: own results

¹⁸ These changes in poverty might seem small, but the model does not naturally generate big changes in poverty. For example, the research introducing this model has changes in poverty of only -0.19 percent under the proposed Doha tariff liberalization scenario.

4. Conclusions

Most major types of trade barriers on agricultural products have been reduced since the formation of the World Trade Organization. Globally, tariffs have been reduced, export subsidies are scheduled to be eliminated, and the Trade Facilitation Agreement holds some promise on addressing non-tariff measures. However, export restrictions, such as export taxes have remained prolific, and in fact, have been increasing in number over the last ten years. Perhaps it is because they are only used by a subset of countries or commodities, but export taxes have not received the same scrutiny in multilateral trade negotiations as other trade barriers. This is despite the fact that export taxes often occur when food prices are high and/or volatile. While export taxes have received attention in the academic literature, these studies tend to examine only a single commodity or country.

Our work seeks to provide more a detailed investigation of the linkages between export taxes, trade, and food prices. To do so, we utilize both a partial equilibriumeconometric framework, and a global general equilibrium model, which, in tandem, capture different aspects of these linkages. Our results show that export taxes applied during the food crisis had a positive effect on world prices of some agricultural commodities. This result is validated by both models, although the commodities affected vary in each methodology. This could be explained by the fact that the time frame applied is not the same. Our results also show that removing export taxes in place in 2008 would benefit certain regions (those that have export taxes in place), but hurt countries competing for these countries' exports. The overall impact on global prices is not significant, and the impact on poverty is also slight, with some reduction of poverty in countries that had export taxes in place in the baseline. Our approach shows that the general equilibrium effects of trade barriers such as export taxes are significant and should be considered when discussing the removal of such barriers.

In this paper, we only investigate the linkages between export taxes, trade, and prices. However, there are several other export barriers that could be examined in future research. Some examples include export bans, export license requirements, and price reference for exports. While Estrades et al. (2017) indicate that they are not as numerous as export taxes, they could have different impacts that could affect trade and prices. For example, export taxes only apply a surcharge to any exports; however, an export ban completely prohibits any of the products from leaving the country. It is likely that such a drastic measure would have different impacts from export taxes.

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Appendix

Table A1. Summary of the evidence of price effects of i	import tariffs by sector, GMM
Estimations	
	IMPORT TARIFFS

		IMPORT TARIFFS		
	SECTOR	evidence of price effects	expected sign (decrease)	dynamic patter
1	Live animals	weak	yes	in t
2	Meat and edible meat offal	none		
4	Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, NES	none		
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	weak	yes	in t
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	none		
9	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	none		
10	Cereals	very weak	yes	in t
11	Products of milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	none		
12	Oil seeds, oleaginous fruits; grains, seeds, fruit; ind or med plants; fodder	none		
13	Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable saps & extracts	none		
15	Animal/vegetable fats & oils & their cleavage products; edible fats; waxes	none		
16	Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates	none		
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	none		
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	weak	yes	in t
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch/milk; pastrycooks' products	none		
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	none		
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	none		
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	none		
23	Residues & waste from the food industry; prepared animal fodder	very weak	yes	in t
33	Essential oils & resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic/toilet preparations	none		

Source: own results

A1.1. Validating the CGE Model

From Jorgenson's (1984) insight into the importance of utilizing econometric work in parameter estimation, to more recent calls for rigorous historical model testing (Kehoe, 2003; Grassini, 2004), it is clear that CGE models must be adequately tested against historical data to improve their performance and reliability. The article by Valenzuela et al. (2007) showed how patterns in the deviations between CGE model predictions and observed economic outcomes can be used to identify the weak points of a model and guide development of improved specifications for the modeling of specific commodity markets in a CGE framework. More recent work by Hertel and Beckman (2011) and Beckman et al. (2012) has focused on the validity of the GTAP-E model for analysis of global energy markets. Accordingly, we begin our work with a similar historical validation exercise. In particular, we examine the model's ability to reproduce observed price changes in global commodity markets. Those authors show that by shocking population, labor supply, capital, and investment (see Table A2), along with the relevant energy price shocks, the result is a reasonable approximation to key features of the more recent economy. The shocks shown in the table are generally positive, as economic and population expansion helped drive some of the agricultural commodity price increase over the time period. There are some negative values, primarily to Japan (see Appendix table 2 for the regional mapping) for investment and labor; and to XER (Rest of Europe) for population and labor.

The energy price shocks are not presented in the table, but they are (U.S. prices, as reported by the Energy Information Agency): Oil: 225 percent, Natural Gas: 75 percent, and Coal: 100 percent. Note that we do not directly shock agricultural commodity prices, as these are the measure with which we use to validate the model.

	Population	Investment	Labor	Capital	GDP
AUSNZL	12.36	46.66	17.23	28.18	26.80
CHN	4.26	20.41	7.88	119.48	107.44
JPN	1.07	-6.14	-0.73	5.46	8.75
DVDASIA	4.98	-2.20	8.94	36.46	37.70
IDN	10.51	43.11	13.02	34.02	44.57
PHL	13.96	-4.12	12.96	24.03	42.14
THA	4.94	21.25	9.37	29.44	42.01
VNM	6.90	20.69	12.99	103.57	67.66
XSE	12.97	51.21	19.38	25.39	51.11
BGD	9.83	6.59	15.13	60.28	49.13
IND	10.87	30.78	14.87	82.31	64.77
PAK	13.72	32.71	28.10	45.91	42.63
XSA	15.16	20.97	16.19	42.55	52.20
CAN	7.69	18.57	13.52	27.42	17.87
USA	6.65	-6.35	6.44	24.09	16.11
MEX	9.14	12.20	17.95	26.91	20.57
XCA	11.75	20.65	19.40	30.52	37.89
COL	11.33	52.34	19.12	38.33	38.75
PER	8.54	41.57	14.89	22.47	57.86
VEN	13.07	-6.61	21.66	15.91	38.01
BRA	8.36	14.10	17.56	16.58	31.34
CHL	7.62	19.12	24.04	35.28	34.83
XSM	8.97	21.12	16.52	22.47	41.60
EUEFTA	3.33	5.18	7.58	16.51	14.74
XER	-2.22	44.70	-5.72	30.90	47.69
FrmUSSR	-0.21	32.75	6.83	4.04	62.05
MENA	13.43	34.03	22.74	33.10	48.49
ZAF	10.45	55.80	18.74	21.97	35.68
MWI	21.64	76.38	19.72	44.21	40.07
MOZ	21.17	-16.12	17.37	53.45	66.18
TZA	21.37	75.55	20.78	54.49	62.94
ZMB	20.21	12.94	17.23	41.32	44.26
UGA	26.67	21.41	26.43	87.59	71.67
XSS	20.23	17.19	22.29	24.54	50.85

Table A2. Exogenous shocks to update the model to 2008

Source: Foure et al., 2013

Regions	-	Sectors	-
Short Name	Description	String	String
AUSNZL	Australia + New Zealand	Rice	Rice
CHN	China	Wheat	Wheat
JPN	Japan	Crsgrns	Coarse Grains
DVDASIA	Korea + Taiwan	Oilseeds	Oilseeds
IDN*	Indonesia	Sugar	Sugar
PHL*	Philippines	Cotton	Cotton
THA*	Thailand	OthCrps	V_F, Other crops
VNM*	Vietnam	Milk	Dairy Farms
XSE	Rest of South + East Asia	Cattle	Ruminant (Other than dairy)
BGD*	Bangladesh	NRumin	Non Ruminants
IND	India	Fish	Fisheries
РАК	Pakistan	Forest	Forestry
XSA	Rest of South Asia	PrDairy	Dairy Products
CAN	Canada	PrBeef	Processed Ruminants
USA	United States	PrNRumn	Processed Non Ruminants
MEX*	Mexico	PrSugar	Refined Sugar
XCA	Rest of Central Am + Carrib	PrRice	Processed Rice
COL*	Colombia	PrOilsd	Vegetable Oils and Fats
PER*	Peru	OthFdBev	Other food, beverages, tobacco
VEN*	Venezuela	TextAppl	Textiles, Apparel and Footwear
BRA*	Brazil	Autos	Autos and parts
CHL*	Chile	HvyMnfcs	Heavy industry
XSM	Rest of South America	Electron	Electronic equipment
EUEFTA	The European Union + EFTA	OthMnfcs	Other Manufactures
XER	Rest of Europe	WRtrade	Wholesale/Retail Trade
FrmUSSR	Former Soviet Union	TransCom	Transport, Communication
MENA	MENA	FinSvce	Financial and business serv
ZAF	South Africa	HsEdHe	Housing, educ, health, public
MWI*	Malawi	Utility	Uitlities
MOZ*	Mozambique	Petrol	Petroleum
TZA	Tanzania	Constrct	Construction
ZMB*	Zambia		
UGA	Uganda		
XSS	Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa	_	

Table A3. Regional and Sectoral Mapping of the CGE Model

* indicates a region that has poverty information Note: Our results only focus on agricultural sectors. Results for the non-agricultural sectors are available upon request.

A1.2 Historical Validation

This section examines the performance of the model with respect to the updating scenario. The first of column in Table A4 indicates the 'historical' price change. This is based on food (or consumer) price indices from different sources listed in the regions name. This data highlights the fact that prices have been highest in Venezuela and many of the African regions. By comparison, prices were very stable in Japan (2.4 percent). The final two columns report the model-generated percentage change in commodity. These results are built on the construction of a 'food basket' price for GTAP results. This household food basket is built on the share of agricultural consumption for each region, with the Other Food and Beverages (OthFdBev) sector accounting for more than 50 percent of the share in developed countries and about 25 percent in developing countries.

The model results indicate that the exogenous shocks alone do not get us to the historical price change for food, except for a handful of countries: China (CHN), Developed Asian –countries (DVDASIA), Thailand (THA), Rest of South and East Asia (XSE), India (IND), Canada (CAN), and European countries (EUEFTA and XER). In most cases, the predicted price change is smaller than the historical shock, which reflects the fact the model cannot capture other drivers of large price changes. In very few cases, the predicted change in prices is higher than the observed, which might highlight the fact that the model might not be capturing price isolating policies applied in those countries Japan (JPN) and Indonesia (IDN).

		Model estimates	
			With
		Exogenous	export
	Historical	shocks	taxes
AUSNZL (OECD)	30.10	17.52	17.58
CHN (OECD)	52.62	55.92	55.95
JPN (OECD)	2.43	13.08	13.11
DVDASIA (OECD)	31.99	21.29	21.50
IDN (OECD)	95.02	21.15	20.91
PHL (FAO)	43.09	22.33	22.40
THA (WB)	24.26	22.11	22.22
VNM (WB)	79.06	20.97	20.74
XSE (WB)	19.79	24.94	25.09
BGD (WB)	59.53	20.10	20.29
IND (WB)	43.41	34.05	34.31
PAK (WB)	73.99	19.19	19.30
XSA (WB)	48.66	29.18	27.34
CAN (OECD)	18.12	10.07	10.13
USA (OECD)	23.51	7.44	7.48
MEX (OECD)	47.85	6.60	6.65
XCA (FAO)	69.21	15.12	15.18
COL (FAO)	72.65	18.12	18.26
PER (FAO)	22.75	28.19	28.33
VEN (WB)	326.05	17.61	17.64
BRA (OECD)	70.84	15.40	15.55
CHL (OECD)	39.99	12.99	13.14
XSM (WB)	93.07	19.91	18.86
EUEFTA (OECD)	18.72	14.12	14.18
XER (FAO)	20.25	18.12	18.18
FrmUSSR			
(OECD)*	63.16	29.03	28.95
MENA (OECD)	186.00	20.32	20.48
ZAF (OECD)	76.36	25.25	25.39
MWI (WB)	115.02	19.83	20.04
MOZ (WB)	116.12	26.66	26.88
TZA (WB)	54.44	27.04	27.19
ZMB (WB)	180.98	29.72	29.58
UGA (WB)	57.05	24.93	24.99
XSS (FAO)	44.10	89.49	89.60

Table A4. Historical and model generated food basket price changes, 2001-2008 Model estimates

Note: The parenthesis represents the source of the data. OECD is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; FAO is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; and WB is the World Bank. * refers to prices from 2004-2007.

The final column indicates the changes in the food basket price with export taxes are overlaid on the exogenous shocks. In general, export taxes increased from 2001-2008 for any region using them. These results show that export taxes do not really impact price changes for the regions in the model. There are small decreases (between -0.28 percent and -6.30 percent) in prices for those regions that use export taxes. This decrease indicates that export taxes did insulate countries from the global price changes; but the importance of the Other Food and Beverages sector in the consumption bundle is limiting the price changes that might arise from export taxes.

The next table shows global price changes across commodities. For grains and derivatives of grains, prices shown in Appendix table 4 are greater than 100 percent. The second and third column show the CGE model generated price changes. Again, the differences between the CGE predicted price increase and the historical figures highlight the fact that the model is not capturing the main driving forces behind the surge in prices, mainly for grains. When export taxes are overlaid on the exogenous shocks, most agricultural commodities have a decrease in the change in price. On the other hand, fish and forest products are not affected by export taxes.

			With
		Exogenous	export
	Historical	shocks	taxes
Rice		24.60	21.10
Wheat	169.76	33.16	23.17
Crsgrns	149.14	28.88	22.64
Oilseeds	168.62	28.76	23.29
Sugar		32.15	29.07
Cotton	48.76	32.04	29.49
OthCrps		25.03	22.96
Milk		27.94	23.76
Cattle		25.48	18.69
NRumin		27.80	20.58
Fish	67.71	56.52	60.39
Forest	10.71	20.07	23.43
PrDairy		18.32	12.42
PrBeef	25.44	21.37	13.84
PrNRumn	19.11	20.28	13.48
PrSugar	28.70	21.30	16.61
PrRice	305.43	21.53	18.82
PrOilsd	263.30	22.20	16.47
OthFdBev		19.08	13.18

Table A5. Historical and model generated commodity price changes, 2001-2008

Note: The historical price changes are: Wheat: No.1 Hard Red Winter; Crsgrns: U.S. No. 2 Yellow; Oilseeds: U.S. soybeans, Chicago futures; Cotton: Cotton Outlook 'A Index'; Fish: Farm Bred Norwegian Salmon; Forest: Soft Sawnwood; PfBeef: Australian and New Zealand 85% lean fores; PrNRumin: average of: 51-52% lean Hogs and Whole bird spot price; PrSugar: European import price; PrRice: 5 percent broken milled white rice; and PrOilsd: Rapeseed oil, crude. Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices

All of this validation work set the stage for better understanding how the model works. Clearly, the model is not able to account for all price surge drivers, but it does show that export taxes seem to have influenced commodity prices from 2001-2008 for certain

sectors.