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A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions
Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira, and Allan Drazen
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ABSTRACT

We propose a formal model of small campaign contributions driven by an electoral motive, that is, by the possible influence of contributions on the outcome of an election. Electoral considerations produce strategic interactions among contributors, even when each donor takes as given the actions of other donors. These interactions induce patterns of individual contributions that are in line with empirical findings in the literature. For instance, equilibrium contributions increase when the support for the two candidates is more equal—a “closeness effect”—and relative contributions for the advantaged party are smaller than their underlying advantage—an “underdog effect.” We then study the impact of different forms of campaign finance laws. We show that caps affect small donors even if they are not directly capped, and that it may be optimal to combine caps with a progressive tax on contributions. We also indicate why our results may have implications for empirical studies of campaign contributions.

Laurent Bouton
Georgetown University
Department of Economics
37th & O Streets, NW
Washington, DC 20057
and CEPR
and also NBER
boutonllj@gmail.com

Allan Drazen
Department of Economics
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
and NBER
drazen@econ.umd.edu

Micael Castanheira
ECARES, ULB CP 114
50 Av. F.D. Roosevelt
1050 Brussels, Belgium
micael.casta@gmail.com
An informed public of small contributors “would make the millions feel that it was their government […]” — Lincoln Steffens to Theodore Roosevelt, September 21, 1905 as quoted in Doris Kearns Goodwin, *The Bully Pulpit*.

1 Introduction

The role of campaign contributions in elections is a central issue in democracies. Both the popular and academic discussion have largely concentrated on large donors, but small donors account for a large fraction of total contributions. In the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign for instance, the Federal Election Commission reported that out of a total campaign spending of about $1.3 billion for the main candidates, small contributions (less than $200 each), added up to $621 million, and those between $200 and $1000 added up to another $243 million.¹ The numbers tilted further towards small contributions in the 2016 presidential race: Bernie Sanders, for example, raised 202 million dollars from small contributions, out of a total campaign budget of 223 million. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump also each had more than 2 million small donors in the 2016 race. Interestingly, towards the end of the campaign cycle, contributions come almost exclusively from small donors, as can be seen in Figure 1, which displays the distribution of the number of contributions for Clinton by dollar value over time. (In the Online Appendix, we also show the share of contributions by size.)² There thus appears to be at least a phase in the campaign when the contribution game mainly involved small donors.

Small donors are important in other countries as well. In Canada, they represent about a third of total funds raised for recent campaigns. The figure is similar in the United Kingdom, where a significant share of party funding comes from membership dues and small donations (for instance, the Labour party reported £19.2 million in donations and £9.5 million in membership dues in 2015).³ In Germany, they represent about 53% of campaign resources in the 2012 cycle, with about half of that amount reflecting party membership dues).⁴ Small contributions account for such a significant fraction of total funding because the number of small donors is enormous.

²PACs and super-PACs do provide large contributions, but one should note that they are also heavily financed by small contributions.
³http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/Api/Accounts/Documents/17488
⁴Most of the rest is public funding: medium and large contributions represent about 9% of the total.
Figure 1: Quarter-by-quarter distribution of the 3,471,316 individual contributions to Hillary Clinton’s campaign, from Q2 2015 until Q4 2016 (Source: FEC data). The data displayed here lump together the contributions above $2,700, to ease readability.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal model of small campaign contributions in the literature. So far, the focus has indeed been on large donors and a policy influence motive for contributing. For most individual donors, a consumption motive wins almost by default. The basic reasoning is that when individual contributions are small, donors cannot be motivated either by an attempt to buy influence nor by any effect their contributions may have on election outcomes—the electoral motive.

However, as we discuss at length in Section 2, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons why the electoral motive deserves closer attention. It shapes small donors’ contributions as soon as donors think that their contribution may help their candidate, or when candidates believe that money influences electoral outcomes.

This paper proposes a model of small campaign contributions driven by the electoral motive where either donors (Section 3) or candidates (Section 6) are the players of interest. By “small,” we mean that a donor must take as given both the policy of candidates (i.e., there is no motive of trading contributions for policy favors) and the behavior of other

\cite{5}The leading theoretical model is that of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996). The empirical literature finds mixed support for an influence motive (Stratmann, 1992; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003; Gordon, Hafer, and Landa 2007; Chamon and Kaplan 2013, DellaVigna et al. 2016). Hence, it is not clear to what extent large contributions “buy” policy favors or even access to elected politicians. Given our focus on small contributors in this paper, we take no stand on that empirical debate.

\cite{6}Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) have stressed this view, arguing that the “tiny size of the average contribution made by private citizens suggests that little private benefit could be bought with such donations” (p117). They support their argument with the finding that “income is by far the strongest predictor of giving to political campaigns and organizations, and it is also the main predictor of contributing to nonreligious charities” like other normal consumption goods.
donors. Yet, electoral considerations necessarily produce strategic interactions: total contributions determine the influence of money on outcomes, and hence individual best responses. As a result, the comparative statics on individual and total contributions are quite different than those implied by a model of individual choice that ignores such interactions (e.g., a basic model of contributions driven solely by the consumption motive). These differences can help explain a number of empirical observations that seem anomalous when contributions are viewed either as consumption or as an attempt to buy influence.

After laying out the base model of a two-candidate race in Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium in Section 4. We show that equilibrium contributions increase when the support for the two candidates is more even—a “closeness effect”—and that relative contributions for the advantaged party are smaller than their underlying advantage—an “underdog effect.” This is in line with a number of empirical findings on individual contributions, and contrasts with the predictions under the influence motive, which would lead to a “bandwagon effect” in contributions.

We also study the effects of income and income inequality on the contributions to the two candidates. As with a consumption motive, donations are predicted to increase in income (as well as the ideological proximity between candidates and donors). However, strategic interactions also imply that income inequality has significantly different effects if it occurs within a donor group versus between two groups, and the direction of some effects can be reversed if it affects the supporters of the leading instead of the trailing candidate.

In Section 5 we analyze the effects of various campaign finance laws. We find that a cap on individual contributions affects all donors, including those not directly hit by the cap. The cap generally favors the party with the largest number of donors and works against the party with the richest contributors, but these effects are not necessarily monotonic. In turn, caps on total campaign spending necessarily hurt the party with the largest budget, and incentivize donors from the lagging party to contribute more. This indirect effect may be so strong that total contributions increase when the cap is tightened. Finally, we also study the effects of various public subsidy and taxation schemes.

We also study welfare implications of various policies to correct the effect of contri-

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7 Hence, “small” can refer to donors who make substantial contributions in dollar terms, but who expect neither to receive policy favors in return nor to influence other donors directly. In Bouton et al. (in progress), we are considering the effect that a very large donor may have on other donors in the electoral context we present here.
butions, with a focus on how campaign finance laws may limit the influence of income heterogeneity and may help control the “arms race” of ever-higher aggregate contributions. We identify a progressive tax on contributions that, by discriminating across income levels, completely corrects the effects of income inequalities. When that tax is used, middle-of-the-road policies become suboptimal: the optimum is either to essentially ban contributions, or to let money flow freely.

At various places in the paper, we show how our findings may be relevant for empirical research. First, the different motives for contributions produce qualitatively different donor behavior, which could be leveraged to foster our understanding of donors’ motivations (see, e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2003 and Barber et al. 2017). For instance, election closeness should have no first-order effect on donors if contributions are a simple consumption good, but will affect contributions that are electorally motivated. Another example is that, ceteris paribus, electorally-motivated donors will be induced to contribute more to a candidate who is lagging behind (the underdog effect) whereas the incentive is to give to the candidate who is ahead when contributions are made in exchange for policy favors. Second, our results also show how estimates of the income elasticity of contributions (see, e.g., Gordon et al. 2007, and Bonica and Rosenthal 2018) may be influenced by aggregate, equilibrium, responses, and the direction of that influence will depend on whether the candidate is ahead or behind, or on the specifics of the income shock. Estimates of the effects of changes in campaign finance laws (such as caps on individual contributions) on electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Lott 2006, and Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006) are also subtle. Our model predicts that such effects are non-monotonic and may change sign depending on the source of the difference in popularity between candidates.

2 On the Electoral Motive

Starting with Ansolabehere et al. (2003), significant empirical effort has been undertaken to assess the true motive driving contributions, either for individual donors (see Section 4) or for corporations (see, e.g., Bertrand et al. 2014 and DellaVigna et al. 2016). An important dimension of this effort has been to measure the implicit “return on investment” of an individual contribution. High returns reveal that some contributions can be driven by the influence motive. Low—even very low for small contributions—returns are then interpreted as evidence of a consumption motive. While the electoral motive has been largely omitted
from these analyses, this was basically by default, not because there is an empirical proof that it is absent.

Our claim is instead that the electoral motive should not be dismissed out of hand, for several reasons. First, “very low” is not zero. Non-zero effects of an individual’s contribution means that an optimizing donor should take them, however small, into account. We show in Appendix 1 that the magnitude of this effect can actually be much larger than usually believed, especially in the presence of a consumption motive: the latter brings the marginal cost of contributions to zero. Second, donors may well overestimate the effect of their contribution on the electoral outcome, even more so when candidates step up their own fundraising effort. Third, even if donors only “consume” contributions, their utility should increase for races in which money matters more to the outcome—e.g. because the media cover such races more intensely. Finally, the electoral motive would operate in the same way if it is candidates who are strategic: Section 6 formally shows the equivalence between the model developed in Section 3 and a model in which “naïve” donors respond to their party’s fund-raising effort. The relevant assumption is that parties believe that money helps them win the election.

Beyond these conceptual arguments, there is also substantial empirical evidence in support of our claim. First of all, in surveys, donors overwhelmingly list “to affect an election outcome” as an important motive for giving (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Barber 2016a). Second, numerous studies find that ideological proximity is a strong determinant of contributor behavior in different types of contests (see e.g. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Claassen 2007; Bonica 2014; Barber 2016a; Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017). We will see that the distance between the ideological positions of donors and candidates does also matter for donors who only care about election outcomes. Third, and as discussed extensively in Section 4, three key predictions of our model are in line with empirical patterns in the literature: (i) *closeness effect*: donations are significantly and positively affected by the (perceived) closeness of the election; (ii) *underdog effect*: relative contributions to the front-runner are always smaller than her intrinsic advantage; (iii) *income effect*: donations are increasing in the wealth of donors. While one cannot reject that these patterns may be consistent with a sophisticated version of the consumption motive, they show that electoral considerations must be part of that theory. This is our

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8 A related observation from Barber et al. (2017) is that contributions are made to legislators who “will represent their professional interests, rather than due to expectations of legislative access or an unsophisticated response to networking.” This too is consistent with an electoral motive rather than simply a consumption motive for giving.
approach: we study how a broadly-defined electoral motive influences contributions, and identify the strategic interactions that result from it.

Another important issue is of course whether money actually matters for electoral outcomes. Candidates clearly appear to believe so. The empirical literature can be divided into two sets of studies: the first focuses on the effect of specific campaign spending (e.g., TV ads). Recent studies with a well-defined identification strategy find positive and significant effects (see e.g. Da Silveira and De Mello 2011, Kendall et al. 2015, Larreguy et al. 2017, Spenkuch and Toniatti 2017, and Bekkouche and Cage 2018). The second set of studies analyzes the effects of total spending. There, the evidence is mixed: spending by challengers appears more effective than spending by incumbents and, for the latter, there is no consensus on whether or not the effect of money is economically significant (see, e.g., Levitt 1994, Erikson and Palfrey 1998, 2000, Gerber 2004, Stratmann 2009, Bombardini and Trebbi 2011, and Kawai and Sunada 2015). A simple way to reconcile the apparent contradiction between these two sets of studies is provided by Sprick Schuster (2016): using detailed transaction-level data on candidate disbursements, he finds systematic differences in the way challengers and incumbents spend money.

3 Model

We model a contribution game in which a pre-determined set of donors simultaneously decide how much to contribute to their preferred candidate’s campaign in the anticipation that contributions increase his chances of election (we identify donors with the pronoun “she” and candidates with “he”). This captures a situation in which donors are “small” in the sense that they take both platforms and the actions of the other donors as given. Throughout, we focus on the case of perfectly informed donors.

Candidates. We consider an election with two candidates, $A$ and $B$, who need funding to finance their electoral campaign. The total amount of contributions received by a candidate $P$ is $Q_P$. We summarize through a contest success function (Tullock 1980, Hirshleifer 1989, Baron 1994, Skaperdas and Grofman 1995, Esteban and Ray 2001, Epstein and Nitzan 2006, Konrad 2007, Jia et al. 2013, Herrera et al. 2014, 2016, among others) the fact that $P$’s probability of winning the election increases in his funding. This captures the idea that these funds can finance activities such as get-out-the-vote efforts (see Enos and Fowler, 2016) or advertising (as for example in Baron, 1994, Prat, 2002, Coate 2004a,
2004b, and Morton and Myerson, 2012), which may increase a candidate’s vote totals.

Given total contributions $Q = \{Q_A, Q_B\} \in \mathbb{R}^2_+$, $P$’s probability of winning the election is given by:

$$\pi_P(Q) \equiv \frac{(Q_P)}{(Q_A) + (Q_B)}$$

with $> 0$, such that the probability of winning is strictly increasing in $Q_P$. Note that $\pi_P$ is everywhere concave in $Q_P$ for $\leq 1$. Values of $> 1$ capture the presence of setup costs: $\pi_P$ is then convex for $Q_P < \tilde{Q}_P \equiv \sqrt{\frac{1}{1+Q_P}}$. In words, $P$’s campaign must reach $\tilde{Q}_P$ for additional contributions to have maximal effect. Figure 2 illustrates the shape of $\pi_A$ for $= 1$ (in blue), $= 2$ (in red), and $= 3$ (in black) when $Q_B = 1$.

Figure 2: $\pi_A$ for $Q_B = 1$ and $= 1$ (blue), $= 2$ (red), or $= 3$ (black)

Candidates are passive in our base model: the players of interest are the donors, who contribute to each candidate’s campaign. In Section 6, we show that our results also hold in a model where donors are naïve and candidates are the players of interest.

**Donors.** A large number of donors must, simultaneously and non-cooperatively, decide how much to contribute to their preferred candidate. Each donor $i$ has a two-dimensional type $p^i, y^i \in \{a, b\} \times \mathbb{R}_+$, where $p^i \in \{a, b\}$ identifies who is her preferred candidate/party—naturally, $a$-donors support candidate $A$ and a $b$-donors candidate $B$: small and capital letters are used to avoid confusion between donors and candidates. $y^i$ represents $i$’s income, which will influence her willingness to contribute.

**Income distribution.** The $n^p$ donors of type $p$ are distributed in income classes $y^1 <
... < y^G according to some (discrete) distribution function F^p (y) with F^p (0) = 0, and F^p (y^G) = 1. The fraction of type-p donors with income y^i is denoted f^p (y^i) = F^p (y^i) / F^p (y^(i+1)) ≥ 0, and y^p is the average income across all p-donors.

**Objective function.** Given our focus on the electoral motive, we consider donors who contribute to influence the election outcome. Each donor contributes some amount q^i_P ∈ (0, q], where q is the legal contribution limit. We thus concentrate on the intensive margin.\(^{10}\) In light of the discussion in Section 2 and in Appendix 1, the marginal cost of contributing is zero at q^i_P = 0 and strictly increasing above that. Assuming isoelastic cost functions, this amounts to setting \(\theta > 1\) in the objective functions (2) and (3):

\[
U^a (q^i_A; Q_A^{i:i}) = \pi_A (q^i_A; Q_A^{i:i}) \theta^a (q^i_A)^{\theta / \rho} (y)^{-\theta / \rho}, \tag{2}
\]

\[
U^b (q^i_B; Q_B^{i:i}) = \pi_B (q^i_B; Q_B^{i:i}) \theta^b (q^i_B)^{\theta / \rho} (y)^{-\theta / \rho}, \tag{3}
\]

where \(\theta^i\) represents either the intensity of the donors’ preference for, or ideological proximity to, their candidate. \(Q^{i:i}\) is the vector of contributions by all donors other than \(i\). The parameter \(\theta\) will determine the elasticity of contributions with respect to income: for \(\theta = 0\), the cost of contributing is independent of income. For \(\theta > 0\) instead, this marginal cost is strictly decreasing in \(y^i\).

Given individual contributions, the total contributions received by party \(P\) are:\(^{11}\)

\[
Q_A = \sum_{i=1}^{n^a} q^i_A + \epsilon_A, \quad Q_B = \sum_{i=1}^{n^b} q^i_B + \epsilon_B,
\]

where \(\epsilon_A\) and \(\epsilon_B\) represent the prior contributions, personal war chest, and/or the voters’ initial support of the two candidates.\(^{12,13}\) In the core of the paper, we set them to \(\epsilon_A = \epsilon_B \to 0\). In the Online Appendix, we show how they influence contributions when we relax that assumption.

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10 Some donors could be at a corner solution, contributing exactly zero when they expect to have too low an effect on the election, and move to an interior solution when this effect increases in magnitude. This extensive margin is the one studied by the turnout models discussed in Section 4. For the sake of simplicity, and since these effects are known, we abstract from them here.

11 It is straightforward that types \(p^i = a\) want to contribute \(0\) to \(B\), and conversely for types \(b\).

12 With a focus on why money polarizes politics (i.e. on how platforms are chosen), Feddersen and Gul (2015) let the probability of winning be a combination of voter support \(V\) and monetary contributions \(Q\):

\[
\pi_A = \frac{V_A^{\lambda} Q_A}{V_A^{\lambda} Q_A + V_B^{\lambda} Q_B}.
\]

This formulation amounts to setting < 1 and considering asymmetric marginal effects of contributions.

13 Technically, winning probabilities are indeterminate for \(Q_A = Q_B = \epsilon_A = \epsilon_B = 0\). Setting \(\epsilon_A, \epsilon_B\) positive but small solves that problem.
4 Equilibrium Analysis

In this section, we abstract from potential contribution caps and show that there exists only one candidate pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this contribution game and identify sufficient conditions for existence. We also discuss in detail three empirical implications of this equilibrium: that total (and individual) contributions should increase in the (perceived) closeness of the election, that individual contributions should display an underdog effect, and that income and income inequality influence individual and total contributions.

As a first step to solve for the equilibrium we must derive a donor’s best response given contributions by the rest of the population. To this end, we take first order conditions of the utility function (2) with respect to the individual donor’s contribution, $q^i_P$:

For types $a$ : 
$$q^i_A = \left( \pi_A y^i \right)^{\theta} v^a \left( \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \right)$$
(4)

For types $b$ : 
$$q^i_B = \left( \pi_B y^i \right)^{\theta} v^b \left( \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \right)$$
(5)

The electoral motive materializes in $\pi'_P$, the marginal effect of the contribution on winning probabilities. This simply says that donors with an electoral motive contribute more when they perceive that their contribution has a higher impact on their candidate’s probability of winning. The other elements in the best response are the donor’s income $y^i$ and preference intensity/ideological distance, $v^p$—we will discuss them later.

Central to the electoral motive is the fact that it generates non-trivial strategic interactions: while contributions increase in $\pi'_P$, they will also collectively influence $\pi'_P$. For instance, small donors should realize that they are less likely to determine the election outcome if contributions are very lopsided. But this reduces contributions, which may make the race less lopsided.

To evaluate how these interactions pan out, we need to aggregate individual best responses into a total contribution, and then solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Summing up individual best responses and simplifying yields:

$$Q_P = W_P \times \left( \frac{1}{\pi'_P} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}$$
(6)

with

$$W_P \equiv \left( v^p \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}} n^p \sum_{i=1}^{G} f^p y^i \times y^i \left( \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \right)$$
(7)

We will interpret $W_P$ as the candidate’s intrinsic support. This is how much a candidate
would receive if \( \pi'_{p} \) was equal to 1. We denote by \( A \) the candidate who is *ahead* and \( B \) the candidate who is behind, in the sense that \( W_{A} \geq W_{B} \).

Using this notation, we find that:

**Proposition 1** Whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique and characterized by the aggregate contributions:

\[
(Q^{*}_{A}, Q^{*}_{B}) = \left( \sqrt[\rho]{\omega W_{A}^{\rho+1}}, \sqrt[\rho]{\omega W_{B}^{\rho+1}} \right),
\]

with \( \omega = \frac{(W_{B}/W_{A})^{(1-\frac{1}{\rho})}}{(1+(W_{B}/W_{A})^{(1-\frac{1}{\rho})})^{2}} \) representing the closeness of the election. The associated winning probabilities are:

\[
\pi_{p}^{*} = \frac{(W_{P})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}{(W_{A})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (W_{B})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}. \tag{8}
\]

Two sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium are:

1. \( \rho \leq 1 \) and, if \( \rho < 1 \), (2) \( W_{A}/W_{B} \) not too large.

The proof of the first part of the proposition is straightforward: it consists of substituting for \( \pi_{p}^{*} \) in (6), and solving for the contributions that are consistent with best responses. The second part is about ensuring that second order conditions are satisfied. What we find is that the solution to the first problem is unique, but it is only an equilibrium when either (1) the problem does not display non-convexities or (2) the race is not too lopsided.

The equilibrium winning probabilities in (8) show that a candidate can only benefit from having higher intrinsic support \( W_{P} \) among his donors.\(^{14}\) This can result from receiving contributions from more donors, from having richer donors and/or donors with more intense preferences. The effect on the size of the campaign \( (Q_{A}^{*} + Q_{B}^{*}) \) and on individual contributions is however less than straightforward. While total contributions must be increasing in \( W_{P} \), they are also increasing in \( \omega \) which is maximized in \( W_{A} = W_{B} \), that is, in the closeness of the election. Secondly, note that the elasticity of total contributions with respect to intrinsic support is less than 1: \( \partial \log Q_{P}^{*}/\partial \log W_{P} = \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} < 1 \). This is because individual contributions are affected by free-riding. Two corollaries emerge directly from Proposition 1.

\(^{14}\)In a different context, Esteban and Ray (2001) show that this is partly due to the shape of the cost function, and partly to winning the election acting as a public good. We use the qualifier “partly” because they focus on the case in which \( \rho = 1 \). For that value of \( \rho \), Esteban and Ray (2001, Proposition 3) identify that free-riding effects cannot dominate collective action when payoffs are similar to that of a purely public good, as we have here.
4.1 Election closeness

The first corollary is that, for donors who are motivated by affecting the election outcome:

**Corollary 1** Individual contributions $q^i_P$ increase in election closeness, as measured by $\pi_A \pi_B$.

The logic of this empirical prediction is similar to that in the literature on voter turnout (see e.g. Cox 1999, or Herrera *et al.* 2014, 2016): like voters, electorally motivated donors should only “turn out” when they think their effort will affect the election outcome. This is more likely when the election is close. Empirically, this effect of (perceived) election closeness appears quantitatively important: combining survey data on US donors with FEC data, Barber *et al.* (2017, p17) shows that “a standard deviation increase [in competitiveness] raises the likelihood a donor gives to that campaign by 43%.”

Jacobson (1980, 1985) studies how the expected closeness of a US congressional election, proxied by the winner’s share of the two-party vote in the last election, affected campaign contributions between 1972 and 1982. He finds that the closer the race, in line with the Corollary, the larger contributions to both the challenger and the incumbent. Using a panel of state gubernatorial elections, Ansolabehere *et al.* (2003) also finds that election closeness significantly increase campaign spending.

To control for hidden heterogeneity, Mutz (1995) and Fuchs *et al.* (2000) study the dynamics of a given campaign to see how shocks to perceived closeness and other events influencing the marginal effect of contributions affect donor behavior. They consistently find that, when the race between the front-runner and the runner-up narrows, contributions to both candidates increase.

4.2 Underdog effect

As already mentioned, equilibrium contributions are affected by free-riding. The fact that $A$ is ahead implies that free-riding is stronger among $a$-donors:

**Corollary 2** In any equilibrium, the ratio of contributions for $A$ and $B$ displays an underdog effect:

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15A prediction of such turnout models is that very few voters should turn out. This is actually borne by the facts for donations: the fraction of eligible voters who contribute money is much smaller than the fraction of those who cast a ballot—we thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
That is, relative contributions for $A$ are always smaller than $A$’s intrinsic advantage.

This underdog effect results from the fact that the effect of contributions must be lower for the candidate who is in the lead.\textsuperscript{16} It is also supported by empirical evidence on the behavior of individual donors. The most direct piece of evidence comes from the field experiment reported in Rogers and Moore (2014) and Rogers, Moore, and Norton (2017, pp1298-1300). They contacted more than 660,000 people on the fundraising list of the Democratic Governors Association and invited contributions to the campaign of Charlie Crist, the Democratic candidate for governor in Florida in 2014. They divided the sample in two, and sent two variants of an otherwise identical e-mail: one depicted the candidate as leading in the polls, the other one as trailing behind.

Their overall result is that people are more motivated to support the candidate when he is presented as losing in the polls. In particular “the losing message increased the number of donations among past donors by 33\% and raised 76\% more money” (Rogers and Moore 2014, p16) and “controlling for donor status, [recipients of the winning message] gave less money than [recipients of the losing message]” (Rogers et al. 2017, p1299). While their interpretation is that donors react to psychological, instead of instrumental, motivations, our model shows that instrumentally motivated donors would behave the same.

Another type of evidence comes from the analysis of candidates’ fundraising strategies. As explained by Mutz (1995, p1019): “Outside the context of direct-mail fund-raising, it is also common for candidates to vie for the ‘underdog’ role for similar reasons (see Adams 1983). [...] In the face of an imminent threat, [supporters] may be prompted to give money by news that their candidate is threatened or losing ground.” Rogers and Moore (2014) report similar findings in both the Obama and Romney campaigns: “when the campaign messages communicate that the race is close, the majority of those messages assert that the candidate is losing” (p24).

The underdog effect has also been identified in theoretical models of turnout—see e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and, for models that use the contest success function, Herrera et al. (2014, 2016) and Kartal (2015).\textsuperscript{17} We are not aware of a similar finding regarding

\[ \frac{Q_A}{Q_B} = \left( \frac{W_A}{W_B} \right)^{\varphi - 1} < \frac{W_A}{W_B}. \]
political contributions; to the contrary, the policy influence motive would predict that contributions to the advantaged candidate are larger. This would lead to a Bandwagon effect. However, as explained by Mutz (1995, p1019), “[i]n fact, many studies of bandwagon phenomena have ended up demonstrating strong underdog patterns rather than movement in the direction of majority opinion.”

This is not to say that there is no evidence of any bandwagon effect for other types of donors, PACs in particular (see e.g. Stratmann 1992), or for multicandidate races in which some candidates’ viability may be in doubt. In primaries for instance, most donors want to focus on the top two or three candidates (Hall and Snyder 2014). This temporarily creates significant bandwagon effects when the names mentioned for the top two or three change over the course of the campaign, while the underdog effect remains dominant for the frontrunner (Mutz 1995, Fuchs et al. 2000, Feigenbaum and Shelton 2013).18

Finally, Bonica (2016, Figure 2) compares the behavior of small donors from other donor types, in particular from Corporate PACs. Small individual contributions disproportionately flow to underdogs: depending on the election cycle, only 48 to 55% of their funds go to the winner, instead of 80-90% for Corporate PACs, to be compared to an average vote share of 60 to 65% — which should roughly proxy $W_A/(W_A + W_B)$.19

### 4.3 Income and Income Inequality

Third and last, we turn to the implications of Proposition 1 for income and income inequality. The literature typically approaches the issue of income and contributions from a different angle: the focus is on how income skews policies towards the rich and unduly favors the party with the richest supporters (see e.g. Coate, 2004, and Feddersen and Gul, 2015).

We instead focus on how income inequality influences campaign contributions when platforms have already been chosen. The following lemma identifies how contributions eventually vary with each $W_P$, and underpins the results in our next propositions:

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18 In a companion paper (Bouton et al. 2018), we analyze elections with more than two candidates, and find that the electoral motive produces a bandwagon effect for longshot candidates (these are abandoned by instrumental donors when perceived as having too low a chance of winning the election), and an underdog effect for the top-two candidates.

19 Authors’ computation based on Bonica’s dataset (Bonica, Adam. 2016. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 2.0. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Libraries. <https://data.stanford.edu/dime>). We thank Moritz Hennicke for his thorough work on these data.
Lemma 1  

In equilibrium, \( Q_A^* \) is increasing in \( W_A \) and in \( W_B \). \( Q_B^* \) is decreasing in \( W_A \) and increasing in \( W_B \).

Lemma 1 tells us, first, that a higher intrinsic support \( W_P \) for one candidate always increases his contributions. Since income increases \( W_P \), this also implies that a candidate’s total contributions will be strictly increasing in the income of his donors. Although their interpretation is different, this is in line with the empirical findings of Ansolabehere et al. (2003). Gordon et al. (2007) also report positive income elasticities for the individual contributions of executives—note that, in the absence of strategic interactions, their estimate would be a direct measure of \( \theta / (\rho \square 1) \) in our model; this would be as high as 5 according to their main estimation (Table 1).

However, due to strategic interactions between donors, a variation in \( W_P \) also has an effect on the contributions to the other candidate. The direction of this effect is different for \( A \), the candidate who is ahead, and for \( B \), the candidate who trails behind. For \( A \), an increase in support reduces election closeness, and hence \( Q_B^* \). Conversely, a higher \( W_B \) makes the election closer, which stimulates contributions both for \( A \) and \( B \).

These two forces underpin the effects of income inequality. First, we find that the effect of an increase in between-group inequality depends on how it comes about:

Proposition 2  Let \( \theta > 0 \) and \( \overline{y}^a > \overline{y}^b \), so that between-group income inequality initially favors \( A \). A further increase in inequality that results from an increase in the income of \( a \)-donors increases \( Q_A^* \) and decreases \( Q_B^* \), whereas if it results from a drop in the income of \( b \)-donors, it decreases both \( Q_A^* \) and \( Q_B^* \).

Proposition 2 has a clear empirical implication for the estimation of the wealth elasticity of contributions when comparing the contributions of a given donor over time (as in, e.g., Bonica and Rosenthal 2018). Indeed, the measured elasticity will be a function not only of the donor herself, but also of the donor group and of the income inequality within each group. Take for instance a shock that primarily increases the income of the richest \( a \) contributors. The observed aggregate reaction by rich-\( a \) contributors will be below \( \frac{\theta}{\rho - 1} \): while their contributions increase because of the direct effect, they are reduced by the resulting free-riding and reduced-closeness effects. No less crucial is to control for the contributors’ expectations of whether the candidate they support is ahead or behind: the same income shock but on \( b \)-donors would result in a higher elasticity, because of reinforced closeness.
Next, we study the effects of an increase in within-group income inequality and how these effects differ depending on which group is affected:

**Proposition 3** If and only if the income elasticity of contributions is larger than 1, a mean-preserving spread:

1. of the $\alpha$-donors’ income distribution increases $Q_A^*$ and decreases $Q_B^*$.
2. of the $\beta$-donors’ income distribution increases both $Q_A^*$ and $Q_B^*$.

The intuition is that, if and only if the elasticity of contributions to income, $\theta/(\rho \neq 1)$, is strictly larger than 1, contributions become a convex function of individual income. Increasing within-group inequality then increases intrinsic support $W_p$. However, a given increase in $W_p$ does not have the same effects if it happens in the group supporting the candidate who is ahead or behind (Lemma 1). The empirical implications are similar to the one discussed above. These two results indicate that because “income inequality” is not a sufficient statistic to capture all these effects, empirical work may benefit from carefully distinguishing between the different shocks to the overall income distribution.

5 Campaign Finance Laws

We study three types of campaign finance laws that are widespread around the world: (1) Caps on individual contributions (used, *e.g.*, in the U.S., Canada, Chile, France, Israel, and Japan, among others); (2) Caps on total donations/spending (used, *e.g.*., in many countries in Europe, as well as Chile, Israel, New Zealand, and South Korea); (3) Public subsidies to parties (used, *e.g.*, in many countries in Europe, as well as Israel, Japan, and Mexico) either as block subsidies or as subsidies proportional to individual contributions (including tax deductibility of contributions). A policy implication will be that caps should be complemented by a tax on contributions if one wants to address the effects of income inequality.

5.1 Rationales for Campaign Finance Laws

Campaign finance laws are, very generally speaking, meant to limit the influence of money in politics (*see*, *e.g.*, Ashworth 2003, Coate 2004a,b). One rationale is that large contributions buy policy influence outside of any direct effect on voting, that is, trading contributions for policy favors in a “quid pro quo”, as discussed in footnote 5. Such a
A second rationale to limit campaign spending is that it is like an “arms race” – what is crucial is the level of total contributions relative to those of one’s opponent. Hence, the level of money ratchets up without giving either candidate a relative advantage but draining resources nonetheless. Our model, built around a contest success function in which relative contributions matter, captures well that feature of campaign spending.21

A third argument is that a donor’s influence on elections is determined by the size of her contribution, so that large contributors have undue electoral influence. In that context, contribution caps are meant to ensure that the “voices of small donors” are also heard (this is sometimes referred to as the “equalization” argument). This is central to our paper, where richer donors contribute more simply because they are richer and, all else equal, have a greater effect on election outcomes.

The debate about campaign finance in the United States, as reflected in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, has been largely framed in terms of issues of ‘freedom of speech’. In the famous Buckley v. Valeo decision, a majority held that limits on campaign spending and individual contributions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 were unconstitutional because they violated the First Amendment provision on freedom of speech, the argument being that a restriction on spending “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression”. Similarly, in the 5-4 majority decision in Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Kennedy argued that limits on corporate and union contributions to PACs should be struck down because such limits interfered with free speech, namely the “right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus.”

Arguments in favor of restrictions have also relied on such considerations. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) the court had upheld previous limits on corporate spending, writing “Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections.” Analogously, Justice Stevens, in the minority dissent in Citizens United, reiterated the “unfair influence” argument, writing that “unregulated expenditures will give corporations ‘unfair influence’

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20 Coate (2004a) considers such negative welfare effects of contributions because they buy policymaker influence. In his setup, contribution limits may increase social welfare not only because they reduce such influence, but also – and because of this – such limits increase the information value of activities that contributions finance.

21 Another important factor is the difference between $\varepsilon_A$ and $\varepsilon_B$. In particular, incumbency typically provides a substantial exogenous advantage, that a challenger may find easier to overcome with money. See e.g. Lott (2006) and Bonneau and Cann (2011).
in the electoral process and distort public debate in ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of listeners.”

5.2 Campaign Finance Laws: Positive Effects of Caps and Subsidies

In this section, we study the positive effects of campaign finance laws in the framework of our model and contrast them with the rationales discussed above. The main take away is that, due to the strategic interactions highlighted in Section 4, campaign finance laws can have unintended consequences. Among other things, small donors will be affected even if they are not directly capped, an effect almost entirely ignored in the literature. Further, the direction of the aggregate effect on contributions may be the opposite of the one on those who are directly affected by the cap. Welfare effects are discussed in Section 5.3.

5.2.1 Caps on Individual Contributions

The diversity of possible effects is illustrated in the following two propositions: the effects of contribution caps can go in exactly opposite directions, depending on whether the advantage of $A$ results from a larger number of donors (Proposition 4) or from richer donors (Proposition 5). Moreover, the effects need not be monotonic:

**Proposition 4** Consider the case of identical income distributions and preference intensity ($v^p$) for $a$- and $b$-donors, but $n^a > n^b$. In that case:

1. $\pi_A$ will be **lowest** when the cap is not binding;
2. $\pi_A$ will be **highest** when the cap constrains all donors;
3. Depending on the shape of the income distribution, the effects of varying the cap can be non-monotonic.

The main driver of the difference between (1) and (2) is the underdog effect (Corollary 2). With $n^a > n^b$, free riding implies that an $a$-donor with income $y^i$ contributes less than a $b$-donor with the same income. A binding cap must therefore constrain $b$-donors more than $a$-donors. Candidate $A$ is thus better off with a cap than with no cap, and best off when the cap is binding for all donors.

However, this does not imply that the effects of a cap are monotonic, as illustrated in Figure 3.22 The reason is that capping high-income donors stimulates contributions

22The simulation behind Figure 3 builds on a two-group income distribution with $y_l = 3$ and $y_h = 10$; while we set $\rho = 2$, and $v^p = \theta = 1$. The number of low- and high-income donors are: $n^a = 60 >$
Figure 3: Simulated effect of an individual contribution cap when $n^a > n^b$ but the income distribution is identical across donor groups.

by low-income donors and impacts closeness – remember that closer elections stimulate contributions in both groups. Thus, while the direct effect of the cap favors $A$ ($b$-donors being more constrained), indirect effects tend to work in the opposite direction, and may dominate.

In the figure, the left pane depicts the equilibrium individual contributions by each donor type (except for high-income $b$-donors who are capped throughout), for values of the cap on the horizontal axis. The right pane depicts the probability that $A$ wins as a result of these contributions. As one can tell, indirect equilibrium effects dominate for intermediate caps. In the example, this is due to the fact that small and comparatively large contributions both represent a significant fraction of the total (initially 50%), with no intermediate contributions. This proxies what we typically observe in actual data, where there is a huge number of very small contributions, and another mass at higher levels (typically bunched at legal limits). Technically, when we move from lax to tighter caps, i.e. from right to left on the figure, the cap initially binds for high-income donors only, which corrects for the underdog effect for large contributions, but also increases the weight of small contributions in the total. When the cap is intermediate (caps between 0.18 and 0.33 in the figure) the underdog effect has been fully addressed among high-income donors, but has been reinforced among low-income donors. Since the latter represent an increasing fraction of the total, tighter caps actually handicap $A$. In contrast, both lax (above 0.33) and tight (below 0.18) caps primarily reduce the underdog effect, which benefits $A$.

Now, contrast these results with the case in which the advantage of $A$ is due to higher donor income, rather than a numerically larger donor base:

$$n^b_h = 30 \text{ and } n^a_h = 20 > n^b_h = 10.$$ That is, both income classes are willing to contribute about the same amount (this proxies actual values in the 2015-16 US presidential elections), but there are twice as many $a$- as $b$-donors, implying that $W_A = 380$ and $W_B = 190$.\footnote{Donor income is a proxy for the proportion of contributors, which is a proxy for the proportion of contributors to the total campaign contribution.}
Figure 4: Simulated effect of an individual contribution cap when \( y^{i,a} = 2y^{i,b} \) but the number of donors is identical across donor groups.

**Proposition 5** Consider the case in which \( A \) and \( B \) have equal popular support (\( n^a = n^b \)) and preference intensity, but \( a \)-donors benefit from higher income, by a factor \( \alpha > 1 \) \((f^a = \alpha y^i) = f^b = y^i\), \( i = 1, ..., G \)). In that case, the effects of a cap are the opposite of the ones in Proposition 4:

1. \( \pi_A \) will be **highest** when the cap is not binding;
2. \( \pi_A \) will be **lowest** when the cap constrains all donors;
3. Depending on the income distribution, the effects can be non-monotonic.

The intuition and the mechanism of the proof are similar to those of the previous proposition, with the difference that, if \( a \)-donors are richer but no more numerous than \( b \)-donors, they must be the first constrained. Hence, there are more type-\( a \) than type-\( b \) constrained donors, and any unconstrained \( a \)-donor contributes more than the equivalent \( b \)-donor. The initial logic is the same as above, with the important difference that closeness and free-riding effects now work in the opposite direction, as illustrated in Figure 4.\(^{23}\)

The empirical literature on the effects of caps on individual contributions finds seemingly contradictory evidence. Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006) find that, for elections to US state Assemblies (lower house of a bicameral legislature) between 1980 and 2001, caps on individual contributions led to closer elections.\(^{24}\) Lott (2006) finds the op-

\(^{23}\)This numerical example also builds on two income classes in each donor group: \( y^a = 6 \) and \( y^b = 20 \), \( y^a = 3 \) and \( y^b = 10 \), \( \rho = 2 \), and \( \theta = 1 \). Thus \( a \)-donors have twice the income of \( b \)'s, while their numbers are identical: \( n^a = 30 \) and \( n^b = 10 \), \( \forall p \). Hence, as in the previous example, \( W_A = 380 \) and \( W_B = 190 \).

\(^{24}\)They also find that both the share and the absolute level of total contributions going to the incumbent decrease significantly. This is also in line with the result in Proposition 5. Stratmann (2006) find that, for the same elections, campaign spending by candidates (both incumbents and challengers) are more effective, and converge one towards the other, in elections with campaign contribution limits. This is also in line with what our model predicts when the cap on contribution has a positive (or nil) effect on the closeness of the race. Indeed, the marginal effect of contributions increase when the total contributions to both parties go down (because of the free-riding effect), and their returns become more equal when \( Q_A \rightarrow Q_B \).
posite result for elections to US state Senates (upper house) from 1984 to 2002: caps led to less close elections. Propositions 4 and 5 suggest avenues to reconcile these findings. First, empirical studies inevitably focus on the effects of “local” changes in caps on contributions. But, Propositions 4 and 5 show that such local effects need not be monotonic. Estimates as in Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006) and Lott (2006) may thus have opposite signs simply because the specific cap changes under study affect different parts of the distribution of donors. Second, these propositions also highlight how the effects of caps on individual contributions change sign depending on the main source of differences in support for the candidates. Our model thus suggests to explore in more details these sources for US state legislature elections. For instance, do we observe significant differences in the median number and value of donations for the candidates in those elections?

5.2.2 Caps on total spending

Caps on total campaign spending, either by parties or by individual candidates, are observed in several countries (Ohman, 2012). In our model, campaign spending by a candidate is equal to total contributions by his supporters, so that we could think of limits on the total size of campaign spending as a cap on total contributions. When the cap on total contributions is binding for both candidates, their total contributions are necessarily identical. We thus focus on the interesting case in which the cap only constrains $A$ (a cursory look at campaign spending by candidates in French presidential elections suggest that not all candidates are constrained by the cap on total spending):

**Proposition 6** Capping total contributions for $A$ increases contributions for $B$. Therefore, $A$’s probability of winning decreases by more than the direct effect of the cap would imply. Total contributions $Q_A + Q_B$ may increase as a result.

A cap affecting only $A$ increases elections closeness, which stimulates contributions for $B$, further favoring the latter. This crowding-in effect on $Q_B$ can be so strong that total contributions $Q_A + Q_B$ (where $Q_A = Q$) actually increase when the cap $Q$ is tightened. This typically happens when $A$’s lead is initially large (see Appendix 2).

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25 Similarly, Bonneau and Cann (2011) find that, in US state supreme court elections from 1990 to 2004, campaign finance restrictions (more broadly defined) hurt challengers more than incumbents.

26 Electoral districts for state house and senate are different. In the vast majority of cases, state senate electoral districts are more populated than house ones. Another difference between state representative and senators is the term length: it is usually longer for senators.

27 This effect is different from the one in Che and Gale (1998a,b), who consider an all pay auction. In that auction, expected total contributions are everywhere (weakly) increasing in the cap, except at a point
5.2.3 Campaign subsidies

Finally, consider the effects of campaign subsidies. We study two types of subsidies: (i) a block subsidy, where the government gives a lump-sum of $s$ dollars to both candidates’ campaigns; and (ii) a matching subsidy, where for each dollar of contributions, the government adds $m$ dollars. In the presence of both types of subsidies, total contributions become:

$$
Q_A = \sum_{i=1}^{n^b} (1 + m) q_A^i + s + \varepsilon_A; \quad \text{and} \quad Q_B = \sum_{i=1}^{n^b} (1 + m) q_B^i + s + \varepsilon_B. \tag{9}
$$

Consider first a block subsidy $s$ alone, so that $m = 0$ in (9):

**Proposition 7** Set $\rho = 2$. Block subsidies then increase the relative voluntary contributions for $A$, but decrease the probability that $A$ wins: $\frac{d(Q_A/Q_B)}{ds} > 0 > \frac{d\sigma_A}{ds}$.

A block subsidy has a direct negative effect on the probability that the most popular party, $A$, wins. This should not be surprising, since an equal subsidy to both candidates “levels the playing field”. However, this direct effect is attenuated by the different reactions of $a$-donors and $b$-donors. Somewhat surprisingly, a block subsidy can have a crowding-in effect on individual donations by $a$-donors. This happens when the induced effects of closeness are strong enough, as illustrated by the following example: we consider the case of a single level of income: $y^a = 10 = y^b$ but there are 10 times more $a$-donors than $b$-donors: $n^a = 100 > n^b = 10$ (like in the other examples, $\rho = 2$ and $\theta = 1$). As one can see on Figure 5, $Q_A$ increases in $s$ when $s$ is low, and decreases in $s$ when $s$ is large.\(^{28}\)

One direct implication of this proposition is that, neither crowding-in nor crowding-out effects of public subsidies may compensate the direct (negative) effect of the subsidy on the probability that $A$ wins. Moreover, for both parties, the sum of total individual contributions plus the block subsidy always increases with the size of the subsidy.

Consider now a matching subsidy $m$ (which may be negative, that is, a tax on contributions) with no block subsidy ($s = 0$ in (9)):
Figure 5: Simulated effect of a block subsidy on total individual contributions when \( y^a = y^b \) and \( n^a = 100 \) and \( n^b = 10 \).

**Proposition 8** A matching subsidy \( m \) that applies to all contributions has no effect on the behavior of donors, nor on the outcome of the election.

The first part of the proposition may not be entirely surprising, given the form of our contest success function. Since the matching subsidy increases each (and hence total) contributions by the same fraction \( m \) for both candidates, it has no effect on the relative position of the two candidates, and hence no effect on election probabilities. Matching subsidies may affect outcomes for other specifications of the contest success function, but the mechanism behind Proposition 8 makes clear why a general matching subsidy will not have a major effect as it has little or no effect on relative candidate positions. Analogously, there is no reason to anticipate that it should either systematically increase or systematically decrease individual contributions.

A matching subsidy that only applies to contributions below a certain level,\(^{29}\) on the other hand, will generally have an effect. If the aggregate amount of matched contributions (contribution plus matching funds) rises, contributions of those above the matching threshold will decrease. The overall impact on the election could however go either way.

Turning to taxes on contributions, making them dependent on the size of the contribution acts like a negative size-dependent matching subsidy. Since contributions depend positively on income, this would be like a differential tax on contributions, that is a function of income. Such a tax has the possibility of reducing or even eliminating the effect of income on contributions:

\(^{29}\) In New York City campaigns, for example, donations up to $175 from New York City residents are matched at a rate of 6:1. In 2013, small donations and matching funds accounted for 71 percent of the individual contributions in the city’s elections. See https://nyccfb.info/program/impact-of-public-funds
**Proposition 9** A tax on contributions equal to \( \left[ \frac{y^i}{\gamma^i} \right]^{\theta/l} \) removes the effect of income inequalities from equilibrium contributions.

The tax considered in Proposition 9 increases with income in such a way that all donors, rich and poor, eventually face the same marginal cost of contribution. As a consequence, the size of individual contributions depends only on preference intensity (and the features of the electoral environment, such as the closeness of the race).

Though such a tax seems distant from what is observed in existing campaign finance regulations across countries, a regulation broadly mimicking such a policy is technically feasible. Moreover, it is in line with existing tax laws, for example in the U.S., in the following sense. Suppose campaign contributions were deductible from income tax liabilities (including perhaps a subsidy as in the previous footnote, that is, “negative deductibility”), but where the allowed deduction was a decreasing function of income. In the United States, for example, allowed itemized deductions as a whole fall with income for high income taxpayers, with deductions in specific categories differentially limited by income. Suppose further that an income-adjusted deductibility specifically for political contributions as described in the sentence above were combined with an increase in tax rates overall. The net effect would be a tax on campaign contributions which increased with the size of the contribution.

Of course the political feasibility of such a change is a separate question. Any proposal framed as a tax on contributions that increases with income would have little prospect of being adopted in the U.S. In contrast, deductibility of contributions that gets phased out as income increases seems far more politically viable, especially since such income-based phase-outs are an accepted part of the U.S. tax code.

### 5.3 Campaign finance laws: welfare considerations

We now consider the implications of campaign finance laws for aggregate donor utility (as these are the only agents specifically considered in the model).\(^{30}\) As discussed in Section 5.1 above, a key rationale for such restrictions is that unlimited contributions give rich donors disproportionate influence on election outcomes. Another argument was to

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\(^{30}\)Typically, donors only represent a relatively small fraction of the total number of supporters for a party. The wider set of citizens favoring a given candidate also contains supporters who do not make contributions, both those who turn out to vote and those who do not. The results presented in this section generalize to the welfare of the wider population when donors are a sufficiently representative sample of that population. Still, they ought to be treated carefully.
limit the overall explosion of the size of campaign spending. As we show here, these two arguments can directly be formalized in the framework of our model.

Focusing on donors’ utility, we could consider the following objective function for the social planner (SP):

$$U^{SP} = n^a v^a \pi_A \sum_{i \in a} \frac{(q_i^a)^{\rho}}{(y_i^a)^{\rho}} + n^b v^b \pi_B \sum_{i \in b} \frac{(q_i^b)^{\rho}}{(y_i^b)^{\rho}}.$$ 

In light of the above arguments, however, such a welfare function seems inappropriate: contribution costs being lower for richer donors would produce the result that they deserve disproportionate influence on the election outcome. Correcting this bias requires setting $\theta = 0$ in the social welfare function:

$$U^{SP} = n^a v^a \pi_A \sum_{i \in a} \frac{(q_i^a)^{\rho}}{(y_i^a)^{\rho}} + n^b v^b \pi_B \sum_{i \in b} \frac{(q_i^b)^{\rho}}{(y_i^b)^{\rho}} = \left(n^a v^a \pi_A \sum_{i \in a} \frac{(q_i^a)^{\rho}}{(y_i^a)^{\rho}} \right) \pi_A \sum_{i \in b} \frac{(q_i^b)^{\rho}}{(y_i^b)^{\rho}} + n^b v^b. \quad (10)$$

The free-speech argument amounts to saying that the group, $a$ or $b$, with the largest $n^a v^a$ “deserves” winning, either because they are more numerous (larger $n^a$) or because they have more intense preferences (a larger $v^a$; presumably an influence meant to be protected under the First Amendment). However, this requires allowing them to contribute to the campaign of their candidate, which has a cost $\sum_i [(q_i^a)^{\rho} + (q_i^b)^{\rho}] / \rho$ in the social welfare function. There may thus be a trade-off between limiting campaign spending and allowing donors to reveal information about their preferences.

### 5.3.1 Contribution caps

Caps on individual contributions need not produce any such trade-off. To simplify the argument, we focus our attention on the case of no significant exogenous advantage for either candidate: $\varepsilon_A = \varepsilon_B \rightarrow 0$.

First, consider the simple case in which preference intensities are symmetric among the two groups, that is, $v^a = v^b$. When all individual donors care equally about election outcomes, differences in group preferences reflect size and/or income (which we treat as uncorrelated with one another). We find that, in this case, individual contribution caps are an appropriate instrument:
Proposition 10 When individual preferences are symmetric \( (v^a = v^b) \), a tight cap on individual contributions necessarily increases social welfare as defined in (10).

An interesting aspect of this result is that restricting individual contributions actually increases the weight of donor preferences \( n^a v^a / n^b v^b \) on the election outcome. This stems from the combination of two effects. First, tightening the cap erases the influence of income differences: all donors end up contributing a same amount, the legal maximum. Second, when the advantage of a candidate is driven by a larger group of supporters, individual caps correct the underdog effect, which works against group \( a \). In other words, a tight cap brings us back to the “one man, one vote benchmark,” which is the implicit objective in the first term of (10) when \( v^a = v^b \). On top of this, individual caps produce a second dividend: they also decrease “waste,” measured by the absolute size of the campaign. This result sheds a new light on campaign finance laws that essentially restrict campaign financing to membership dues (Germany is a case in point).

Another case is when the groups have the same size, \( n^a = n^b \), but different preference intensities, \( v^a \neq v^b \). Consider first the case in which the income distribution is the same in both groups. Then, contribution differences only reflect preferences intensities, and the same cap as above would now reduce the donors’ capacity to convey useful information. On the other hand, it still reduces waste. Intuitively, for \( v^a \gg v^b \), the social planner will prefer sufficiently lax caps—the free speech argument. For \( v^a \approx v^b \) instead, the benefit of reducing waste must dominate the cost of a less precise measurement of preferences. It remains to consider the more difficult case in which the differences in contributions stem both from income and preference differences. In this case, capping contributions is simply too blunt a tool because it cannot separate “signal” \( (v^a) \) from “noise” \( (v^b) \). But this can be addressed by combining a cap with a tax on contributions.

5.3.2 Combining caps with taxes on contributions

Although a tax on contributions has not been considered in practice as part of campaign finance legislation, we show it can help address the problem just raised.\(^{31}\) Under the tax on contributions set out in Proposition 9, equilibrium behavior actually leads to contributions that are independent of income. However, there is still a trade-off between the cost of campaign contributions and the revelation of information about preference intensity. The

\(^{31}\) Cotton (2009) shows that a tax on contributions is also socially desirable in a model of lobbying, when politicians can either sell policy favors or access.
following proposition shows how the combination of such a tax with a cap on individual contributions may be used to address that trade-off:

**Proposition 11** Fix $\rho = 2 = \rho$, set $n^a \simeq n^b$ and let contributions be taxed like in Proposition 9. Then, (1) equilibrium contributions are the same as if $\theta = 0$; (2) when the population of donors is sufficiently large ($n^a = n^b > v^b/(v^a - v^b)$), the social welfare function (10) displays two local optima: one is with $\bar{q} \to 0$ and minimal campaign costs. The other one is with $\bar{q} = \max_i \left[ q_{i}^{\theta} \right]$ and, effectively, free speech. But any cap in between these two levels must be welfare inferior to one of these two extreme solutions.

The intuition for this result is that, thanks to the tax, a cap constrains contributions of all donors in the same group in the same way. With $v^a > v^b$, the cap first constrains all $a$ donors. If it is tightened further, there is a level, call it $\chi$, for which both $a$ and $b$ donors are capped. It follows immediately that, for any cap $\bar{q} < \chi$, winning probabilities are constant. Any cap tightening is then a Pareto improvement.

For $\bar{q} > \chi$ instead, tightening a cap reduces the probability that $A$ wins, which reinforces the initial underdog effect. The question is whether this negative impact of the cap is more than compensated by the decrease in the costs of the campaign. When the number of donors is large, free-riding among $a$-donors is already severe. This means that the social planner would prefer to increase $q_A$ and reduce $q_B$. The cap does exactly the opposite, which reduces social welfare. By contrast, we find that, when the number of donors is small, this free-riding effect need not dominate.

Proposition 11 has a simple policy implication: when differences in candidate support stem mostly from differences in preference intensities, and candidates do not benefit from other extraneous advantages ($\varepsilon_A \simeq \varepsilon_B \to 0$), caps on individual contributions should either limit considerably the presence of money in politics, or let it flow freely. Middle-of-the-road policies are suboptimal.

### 5.3.3 Matching subsidies and caps on total contributions

From the results in Section 5.2.3, it is immediate that matching subsidies and caps on total contributions are dominated from a welfare standpoint. The former are costly without any effect on election outcomes. The latter reduce the role of money but in a too blunt way: (i) it does so both when money it desirable (when the candidate with the higher $n^P v^P$ is supported by relatively poor donors) and undesirable (when the differences in
intrinsic support stem from preferences or number of supporters), and (ii) it cannot revert differences in intrinsic support when it should. Adding insult to injury, such caps do not necessarily address the “arms race” problem with campaign contributions: they may actually lead to an increase in total contributions.

6 A Model of Naïve Donors and Party Fund-Raising

One may argue that modeling donors as highly calculating and perfectly informed actors lacks realism. In particular, small donors may miscalculate the impact of their contribution, or be responding to basic psychological motivations or to the requests of their candidates (Mutz 1995, Rogers et al. 2017). For example: (1) donors may mechanically react to media attention and/or party fund-raising efforts—it is the media or parties that focus more on tighter races; (2) free-riding effects could be rationalized by individual donors enjoying “feeling important”—they would therefore contribute less if other donors contribute more (note that “herding” effects in consumption would produce the opposite result); (3) candidates may intensify their fund-raising effort on small donors when large donors cut back their contributions—this would also be consistent with a free-riding result.32

In this section, we show that our key results can be fully consistent with such behavioral motivations. Comparative statics go in the same direction or can even be identical. We show that a reasonable functional representation of behavioral responses lead to the same first-order conditions, and hence identical results. Hence, whether individual behavior is driven by calculating, instrumental, donors, or by another type of behavioral motive, the implications for electorally motivated contributions as identified in the previous sections are similar.

To formalize this point, we assume in this section that small donors mechanically respond to party requests for contributions. Parties, on their side, need to exert a costly effort in order to induce their supporters actually to contribute to their campaign. This change in perspective transforms our model into a “demand-side” model in which parties are the strategic actors, rather than a “supply-side” model in which donors were the strategic actors.

Such an alternative model could run as follows. As in the base model, consider $n^p$

---

32 We thank Debraj Ray for drawing our attention to such issues.
donors of type $p$, distributed in income classes $y^1 < ... < y^G$ according to some distribution function $F^p(y^i)$, that satisfies the same assumptions as in Section 3. We assume that donor $i$ reacts mechanically to her party’s (costly) fund-raising effort, denoted $e^i_P$. Her contribution $q^i_P$ is increasing and concave in both $e^i_P$ and $y^i$. We represent this functionally by:

For types $a$ : 
$$q^i_A = \left( \frac{y^i}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\theta} v^a e^i_A \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (11)$$

For types $b$ : 
$$q^i_B = \left( \frac{y^i}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\theta} v^b e^i_B \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (12)$$

where $\theta$ parameterizes the donors’ elasticity of contributions exactly like in the instrumental model. The Cobb-Douglas specification is chosen both for simplicity and to relate with the main model.

Parties choose $e^i_P$ to maximize their probability of winning net of the cost of fund-raising (where, for simplicity, we let the cost of soliciting a donor be $e^i_P$):

$$P \text{ maximizes } : \quad \frac{Q_P}{Q_A + Q_B} \sum_i e^i_P,$$

s.t. $Q_P = \sum_i q^i_P$.

It follows that:
$$e^i_P^* = \left( \frac{\pi^i_P}{2} \frac{y^i}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\theta} v^P.$$

Substituting these equilibrium levels of party effort into the donors’ contribution functions (11) and (12) yield:

$$q^i_A^* = \frac{\pi^i_A}{2} \frac{y^i}{\bar{y}} \theta v^a,$$
$$q^i_B^* = \frac{\pi^i_B}{2} \frac{y^i}{\bar{y}} \theta v^b,$$

which is identical (but for the factor $\frac{1}{2}$) to (4) and (5) when $\rho = 2$.

In other words, there exists some form of response by behavioral donors and strategic parties such that the equilibrium level of individual and aggregate contributions are the same as with strategic donors and passive candidates. Hence, although it is a perfectly valid empirical question to ask, “How rational are small donors?”, allowing them to be “behaviorally motivated” rather than fully rationally instrumental does not qualitatively change our findings on how electoral motives (here on the part of parties) influence indi-
individual contributions, nor on how economic variables and legal constraints would influence total contributions and the feedback loops between aggregate and individual contributions.

7 Conclusions

Small contributions to political campaigns have become increasingly relevant. Conventional wisdom is that such contributions are a consumption good to the donors. In large part this is a conclusion by default, the basic reasoning being that because each donation is so small relative to total campaign donations, small donors cannot be motivated either by an attempt to buy influence nor by any effect they may have on election outcomes. In this paper, we argue that contributions by small donors are shaped in a significant way by an electoral motive. Our approach should be seen as an analysis of small donors’ behavior when the electoral motive plays a role, either on the part of donors (for instrumental or behavioral reasons), or on the part of candidates.

Our model predicts patterns of contributions that are in line with a number of empirical findings in the literature, and that contrast with explanations of contributions relying on a simple consumption motive or on an influence motive. There is for instance a “closeness” effect in which equilibrium contributions increase when the support for the two candidates is more even, as well as an “underdog effect”, whereby equilibrium relative contributions for the advantaged party are smaller than their underlying advantage. (These are in contrast to a “bandwagon” effect in an influence motive, and no predicted effect in the simple consumption motive.) The model also makes novel predictions about the effects of increases in income inequality on campaign contributions and probable election outcomes depending on the source of inequality.

Our model gives insights into the effects of campaign finance laws, both positive and normative. We find for instance that a cap on individual contributions may end up increasing the influence of donors on the outcome of the elections. Such a cap may also affect the behavior of donors who are not directly constrain by it. The latter introduces complications for empirical analyses. We also show that such caps may be too blunt an instrument from a welfare standpoint. They can be usefully complemented by an income-based tax on contributions to lessen the undesired (pure income) effects of money in politics.

We view this paper as a first step in better understanding small political contributions by moving away from the common view that they must be a consumption good for the
donors. As discussed in the paper, we believe an electoral motive for such contributions can better explain some empirical regularities, as well as providing some guidance to further empirical work—for example, on the effect of income inequality on political outcomes. The next step, in our opinion, is to understand the interaction of small and large donors—for example, the latter “jump starting” a campaign by giving small donors greater incentive to give. Only by looking at such interactions can one better choose optimal campaign finance restrictions on large donations. Hence, any analysis based on the desire to limit the influence of large donors must be based on a model that considers small donors. This is the next step in our research agenda.
References


Appendix

Appendix 1. Combining the Electoral and Consumption motives

We argued in Section 2 that, from a theoretical perspective, “very low” returns should be treated differently from zero returns, in particular in the presence of a consumption motive. Indeed, a consumption motive implies that a donor should contribute up to the point in which the marginal utility of consumption \( C \) is equal to that of contributions \( q \):

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial C} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial q}.
\]

The marginal utility cost of increasing \( q \) above that level is therefore essentially zero. The gist of the argument is now straightforward: any non-zero effect of the contribution on the election outcome \( (\partial \pi_p/\partial q > 0 \text{ in the model}) \) will drive additional contributions.

The magnitude of this effect is of course another question. Here, we provide an example with a CARA utility function in which citizens consume private and public goods, but not contributions per se—stacking the deck against our argument. The upshot is that contributions display strong responses to apparently small changes in the effectiveness of the contribution: individual contributions increase by $600 if the marginal effect of contributions on the election probability increases from \( 10^{-12} \) to \( 10^{-9} \). While the effect is much smaller with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, this shows that even purely instrumental donors would react to electoral considerations.

A numerical example: an individual has preferences over private consumption \( C \) and public goods \( G \). That is, we are stacking the deck against our base model by assuming here that she does not derive any direct utility from contributing (no consumption motive for contributions) nor from influencing the electoral outcome: her preferences can be written as

\[
U(C; G) = e^{\rho G} + e^{\beta C},
\]

where the semi-colon is meant to make clear that she takes the proposed supply of public goods as a given; she has no influence motive since she cannot induce politicians to modify their policy platform. This is thus a standard model of consumption between two types of goods: those that are purchased privately, and those that are publicly provided.

Knowing that the US federal government budget per capita was $20600 in 2016, whereas the US median income was $52000 in 2014, and that donors’ incomes are typically above that level, we set the parameters of the utility function to \( \rho = .04 \), and \( \beta = .01 \). The 4-to-1 ratio between \( \rho \) and \( \beta \) ensures that individuals value private goods consumption more than public goods consumption, whereas their absolute values imply that the marginal utility of either consumption is relatively small.

Now, assume that party \( A \) proposes a level of public good spending $1000 above the observed level, and party \( B \) a level $1000 below it: \( g_A = $21600, \ g_B = $19600 \). Then, for \( d\pi(q)/dq = 10^{-12} \), the optimal contribution is \( q^* = \text{max}[0, y \square $80703] \). That is, even though the probability of affecting \( \pi \) with an extra dollar of contribution is vanishingly small, someone with about 1.5 times the median US income would make a non-negligible contribution. The entire contribution locus increases by about $600 if \( d\pi(q)/dq = 10^{-9} \). As argued in Section 2, these contributions would be even higher if donors also had a
implies that $\partial U / \partial q > 0$.

To be clear, this CARA example cannot be interpreted as an actual calibration of actual voters’ and donors’ preferences. It instead shows that the space of “reasonable” parametrizations for utility functions is so large that it provides very few constraints to produce (too) high predicted levels of contributions.

**Appendix 2. Proofs of the Propositions.**

**Proof of Proposition 1.** We are focusing on pure strategies. Even when the pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, there must be a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), since payoff functions are continuous and bounded above. We are not interested in such MSE, because they are not realistic in our context.

Differentiating the probability of winning (1) with respect to an individual contribution $q^i_p$ yields:

$$
\pi_A' = \frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial q^A} = \frac{\pi_A}{Q_A} \pi_A \left(1 - \pi_A\right) = \frac{\pi_A}{Q_A} \pi_B \text{ and,}
$$

(13)

$$
\pi_B' = \frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial q^B} = \frac{\pi_B}{Q_B} \pi_B.
$$

(14)

Plugging (13) and (14) into (6), then taking the ratio between $Q_A$ and $Q_B$ shows that $Q_A / Q_B = \left(\frac{W_A}{W_B}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}$ in a pure strategy equilibrium. Substituting for $Q_B$ when we solve for the equilibrium value of $Q_A$ as a function of the parameters $W_A$, $W_B$, and , we have:

$$Q_A = W_A \times (\pi_A')^{1/(\rho - 1)} = W_A \times \left(\frac{Q_A}{Q_A + Q_B} \times \frac{Q_B}{Q_A + Q_B}\right)^{1/(\rho - 1)}$$

$$= W_A \times \left(\frac{Q_A}{Q_A + \left(Q_A (W_B / W_A)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}\right)} \times \frac{Q_B \left(W_B / W_A\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}}{Q_A + \left(Q_A (W_B / W_A)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}\right)}\right)^{1/(\rho - 1)}$$

$$= W_A \times \left(\frac{Q_A \left((W_B / W_A)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}\right)}{1 + \left((W_B / W_A)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}\right)}\right)^{1/(\rho - 1)} = W_A \times \left(\frac{Q_A \times \omega^{1/2}}{Q_A + \left((W_B / W_A)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}\right)}\right)^{1/(\rho - 1)} = \left(\omega W_A^{\rho - 2}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

$Q_B$ is derived following the same steps, and from the fact that $\frac{\pi_B^x}{(1 + x)^y} = \frac{\pi_A^x}{(1 + x)^s}$. The latter implies that $\omega$ is identical for $A$ and for $B$.

Second, equilibrium existence of a pure strategy equilibrium depends on the second order conditions being satisfied for this vector of total contributions. After some simplifications, the SOC for type-a donors can be expressed as:

$$\Box \frac{\pi_A^x \pi_B^y}{Q_A^2} (1 + (\pi_A^x - \pi_B^y)) < (\rho - 1) \frac{\Box q_A^y (y - 1)}{(y')^\rho},$$

37
which is always satisfied since \( \pi_A^* \geq \pi_B^* \). A similar condition must hold for \( b \) donors:\(^{33}\)

\[
\left[ \begin{array}{c}
\frac{\pi_A^* \pi_B^*}{Q^2_B} (1 + (\pi_B - \pi_A^*)) < (\rho \oplus 1) \frac{q_B^{\rho + 2}}{(y^*)^2}.
\end{array} \right]
\]

Noting that \( \pi_A^* \pi_B^* = \omega \), we can rewrite this condition as follows:

\[
\omega \left( (\pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^*) \oplus 1 \right) < (\rho \ominus 1) \frac{\left( \frac{\omega}{\omega} \left( \frac{1}{\pi_A^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\pi_B^*}} \right)^2}{(y^*)^{\gamma - 1}} Q^2_B = (\rho \ominus 1) \frac{\left( \frac{\omega}{\omega} \left( \frac{1}{\pi_A^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\pi_B^*}} \right)^2}{(y^*)^{\gamma - 1}} \left( \omega \right)^{\frac{2}{\gamma}} W^2_B.
\]

\[
\omega \left( (\pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^*) \oplus 1 \right) < (\rho \ominus 1) \frac{\left( \frac{\omega}{\omega} \left( \frac{1}{\pi_A^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\pi_B^*}} \right)^2}{(y^*)^{\gamma - 1}} \left( \omega \right)^{\frac{2}{\gamma}} W^2_B = (\rho \ominus 1) \frac{\omega W_B}{(y^*)^{\gamma - 1}}.
\]

\[
\left( \ominus 1 \right) \left( (\pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^*) \oplus 1 \right) < (\rho \ominus 1) \frac{\sum_{n \in \mathbb{R}^+} f(p, y^*) (y^*)^{\gamma - 1}}{(y^*)^{\gamma - 1}} (\geq (\rho \ominus 1)).
\]

This is automatically satisfied for \( \rho \geq (since \pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^* \leq 1) \), and when \( \pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^* \leq 1/ \) for any other value of \( \rho \) and . \( \blacksquare \)

**Proof of Lemma 1.** From Proposition 1 and the definition of \( \omega \), we have:

\[
Q^*_A = \left( \omega W^\rho_A \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad \text{and} \quad Q^*_B = \left( \omega W^\rho_B \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}.
\]

Taking derivatives and simplifying yields:

\[
\frac{\partial Q^*_A}{\partial W_A} > 0 \iff \pi_A^* < \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{\rho}{\gamma} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial Q^*_B}{\partial W_B} > 0 \iff W_A^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\gamma}} > W_B^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\gamma}}.
\]

The latter is always satisfied. \( \frac{\partial Q^*_A}{\partial W_A} \) is necessarily positive for \( \leq \rho \). For \( > \rho \), we need to invoke the second order condition for equilibrium existence: we saw that it can be approximated by: \( \pi_A^* \ominus \pi_B^* < 1/ \) in the proof of Proposition 1. Substituting for \( \pi_B^* \), this condition becomes: \( \pi_A^* < \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \). Since \( \rho > 1 \), condition guarantees that \( \frac{\partial Q^*_A}{\partial W_A} > 0 \).

\(^{33}\)Second order condition amounts to looking at different points of the contest function for \( a \) and for \( b \) donors. Since \( a \) donors perceive a higher winning probability than \( b \), their SOC is automatically satisfied: they are in the concave part of the CSF. Instead, \( b \) donors may be in a spot in which the CSF is convex. That is, a slight decrease in their contribution base would also decrease their individual incentives to contribute. For sufficiently high values of \( \rho \), this would reinforce the drop in individual incentives so markedly that total contributions may be driven to 0. In that case, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The proposition shows that this can never happen if \( \rho \) is no larger than \( \rho \), or –for larger– if the contribution bases are not too asymmetric.

38
Next,
\[
\frac{\partial Q_B^*}{\partial W_B} \propto W_A^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (\rho + \ ) + W_B^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} (\rho - \ ) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial Q_B^*}{\partial W_A} \propto W_B^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \square W_A^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}},
\]
where the former is always positive and the latter always negative. 

Proof of Proposition 2. Using the effects of income on \( W_P \) in (7), follow the logic of the proof of Lemma 1.

Proof of Proposition 3. Remember that \( W_P = (v^p)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} n^p \sum_{i=1}^{G} f^p \square y^i \times y^i \). A mean-preserving spread of the income distribution is such that \( \sum_{i<p} \Delta f^p \square y^i \times y^i = \sum_{i>p} \Delta f^p \square y^i \times y^i \).\( y^i \), where \( y^p \) is the subgroup with mean income in group \( p \), and \( \Delta f^p \square y^i \times y^i \) is the change in density of each income class. If and only if \( \frac{\theta}{p^0-1} > 1 \), this implies that \( \left| \sum_{i<p} \Delta f^p \square y^i \times y^i \right| < \left| \sum_{i>p} \Delta f^p \square y^i \times y^i \right| \) and hence that \( W_P \) increases. Applying the proof of Proposition 1 then demonstrates the result.

Proof of Proposition 4. Remember that \( y^i \in [y, \bar{y}] \) with \( y > 0 \) and \( \bar{y} \) positive and finite. In that case, there exist two cutoffs \( q_0 \) and \( q_1 \) for the cap on individual contributions \( \bar{q} \), such that: \( \forall \bar{q} > q_1 \), no donor is constrained and \( \forall \bar{q} < q_0 \) all donors are constrained. By Proposition 1, for \( \bar{q} > q_1 \), the ratio of total contributions must be:
\[
\frac{Q_A}{Q_B} = \left( \frac{W_A}{W_B} \right)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} = \left( \frac{n^a}{n^b} \right)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}},
\]
and winning probabilities are the ones in Proposition 1. For \( \bar{q} < q_0 \), all donors contribute \( \bar{q} \). Therefore, \( Q_A = n^a \bar{q} \) and \( Q_B = n^b \bar{q} \). The contribution ratio is then \( \frac{n^a}{n^b} \), and it is immediate to derive that \( A \)'s winning probability is then \( \pi_A^\bar{q} = \left( \frac{n^a}{n^b} + \frac{n^b}{n^a} \right) \).

For \( \bar{q} \in (q_0, q_1) \), \( Q_A \) must always be strictly larger than \( Q_B \), otherwise \( q_A \square y^i \geq q_B \square y^i \), \( \forall y^i \), with a set of income levels such that \( q_A^i > q_B^i \), a contradiction. If follows that:

(1) there is a (possibly empty) set of income levels \( y^i \) such that neither \( a \) nor \( b \)-donors are capped: \( q_A^i < q_B^i \)
(2) there is a non-empty set of income levels \( y^i \) such that \( a \)-donors are uncapped and \( b \)-donors are capped: \( q_A^i < q_B^i = \bar{q} \)
(3) there is a (possibly empty) set of income levels \( y^i \) such that both \( a \) and \( b \)-donors are capped, \( q_A^i = q_B^i = \bar{q} \).

Parts (1) and (2) imply that \( \pi_A (\bar{q}) \) must be strictly less than \( \pi_A^0 \). The fact that proportionately more \( b \)-donors than \( a \)-donors are capped when \( \bar{q} > q_0 \) implies that their joint contribution capacity is reduced more than \( a \)'s. This amounts to letting \( W_B \) drop because of a reduction in top \( b \) incomes. Following Proposition 1, this increases \( \pi_A (\bar{q}) \) above \( \pi_A^\bar{q} \). The proof of non-monotonicity is provided by the example in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5. Define $y^{i,a} = ay^{i,b}, \forall i = 1,...,G$. Remember that, for any two donors $i$ and $j$ who support the same candidate and are unconstrained by the cap, we must have: $
abla^p y^{i,p} / q^{p} y^{i,p} = y^{i,p}/y^{i,p})^\theta$. The equilibrium is thus fully characterized by two income cutoff levels $\bar{y}^a(\bar{q})$ and $y^b(\bar{q})$ and two “lowest contribution levels” $q^a y^{i,a}$ and $q^b y^{i,b}$ such that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{for } y^{i,p} < \bar{y}^a(\bar{q}), & \frac{q^p y^{i,p}}{y^{i,p}/y^{i,1,p}} = (y^{i,p}/y^{i,1,p})^\theta, \\
\text{for } y^{i,p} > \bar{y}^b(\bar{q}), & q^p y^{i,p} = \bar{q}.
\end{align*}
\]

First, we show that $q^a y^{i,a} > q^b y^{i,b}$ for all unconstrained donors of some income group $i$, and hence that more $a$- than $b$-donors will be constrained. To prove this, note that a necessary condition for the fraction of constrained $a$-donors to be smaller than that of $b$-donors is to have $\bar{y}^a(\bar{q}) > \alpha \bar{y}^b(\bar{q})$. This would require that $q^b \bar{y}^b(\bar{q}) > q^a \alpha \bar{y}^b(\bar{q}) = q^a \bar{y}^b(\bar{q})$, and thence $q^b \bar{y}^b(\bar{q}) > q^a \alpha \bar{y}^b(\bar{q})$ for any $y^i < \bar{y}^b(\bar{q})$. But this leads to a contradiction: such contributions would aggregate into $Q_A(\bar{q}) < Q_B(\bar{q})$, which would produce best-response contributions $q^b \bar{y}^b(\bar{q}) < q^a \alpha \bar{y}^b(\bar{q})$, because of free riding.

This establishes that $q^a y^{i,a} > q^b y^{i,b}$ for all $i = 1,...,G$, and the inequality must be strict for some $i$. Then, following the same steps as for the proof of Proposition 4 leads to Proposition 5. □

Proof of Proposition 6. Applying the same logic as for the proof of Proposition 5, a reduction in $Q_A$, whether it is the result of a drop in $v^a$ or of a legal constraint, must increase contributions $q^b_p$. The impact on winning probabilities follows immediately.

We use numerical simulations to prove that total contributions may increase or decrease: consider the following example, again with $\rho = 2$ and $\theta = 1$, two income groups and the same number of $a$- and $b$-donors at each level of income: $n^a = 30 = n^b$, and $n^h = 10 = n^b$. The difference with the previous examples is that the high-income $a$ are much richer than the high-income $b$: $y^a = 10$, $y^b = 100$, $y^a = 1$, and $y^b = 10$. Figure 6 displays total contributions: one can readily see that relaxing a tight cap produces the expected effect of increasing total contributions $(Q_A + Q_B)$. However, the effect is reversed for $\tilde{Q} > 13.75$: it is then a tightening of the cap that increases total contributions. □

Proof of Proposition 7. The Marginal Effect of $i$’s Contribution to $P$ can now be written as (for $\varepsilon_A, \varepsilon_B \to 0$):

\[\pi' = \frac{\pi_A(Q,s) \pi_B(Q,s)}{Q_P + s} = \frac{\pi_A(Q_A + s) \pi_B(Q_B + s)}{Q_A + Q_B} \quad (16)\]

Thus, for any $s$, the two FOCs give:

\[\frac{Q_A Q_A + s}{Q_B Q_B + s} = \frac{W_A}{W_B} > 1 \quad (17)\]

This requires that $Q_A > Q_B$. Note also that $\left(\frac{Q_A + s}{Q_A} \right) = \pi_A = \frac{\pi_A}{1 + \pi_A} > 1$, and hence that
Figure 6: Simulated effect of a cap on total contributions when \( y_t^A = 10, y_t^B = 100, y_t^b = 1, \)
and \( y_h^b = 10, \) and \( n_t^o = 30 = n_t^b, \) and \( n_h^o = 10 = n_h^b. \)
the former and the latter must move in the same direction as \( \pi_A. \) Note also that \( \text{sign} \left( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} \right) \neq \text{sign} \left( \frac{d\pi_B}{ds} \right) \) since \( \pi_A > 1/2. \)
Now, we show that \( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} < 0 \) by contradiction. From (17), we have: \( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} < 0 \iff \frac{d\pi_A^{++}}{ds} > 0 \)
with:
\[
\frac{d\pi_A^{++}}{ds} = \frac{(Q'_A + 1)(Q_B + s) \Box (Q_A + s)(Q'_B + s)}{(Q_B + s)^2}, \quad \text{and} \quad (18)
\]
\[
\frac{d\pi_A}{ds} = \frac{Q'_A Q_B \Box Q'_B Q_A}{(Q_B)^2}
\]
\( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} < 0 \) would impose:
\[
Q'_A Q_B < Q'_B Q_A, \quad (19)
\]
and we have two cases: (1) \( Q'_B < 0, \) which would then require that \( Q'_A < 0 \) as well (since \( Q'_A < Q'_B \frac{Q_A}{Q_B} < 0, \)), and (2) \( Q'_B > 0, \) which would then require that \( (0 \leq) Q'_A < Q'_B \frac{Q_A}{Q_B}. \)

Case (1): by (18), \( \frac{d\pi_A^{++}}{ds} > 0 \) iff
\[
0 > Q'_A Q_B \Box Q'_B Q_A > Q_A \Box Q_B + s(Q'_B \Box Q'_A)
\]
by (19)
To show the contradiction, we prove that the RHS is positive. Since \( Q_A \Box Q_B > 0, \) a SC is:
\( Q'_B > Q'_A. \) By (19):
\[
Q'_A < Q'_B \frac{Q_A}{Q_B},
\]
which is thus more negative than \( Q'_B. \) Hence: \( Q'_A < Q'_B \frac{Q_A}{Q_B} < Q'_B. \)
Case (2): Remember that, by (16),
\[ Q_B = \frac{W_B}{Q_B + s} \pi_A \pi_B. \]

Hence,
\[ \frac{dQ_B}{ds} = \Box Q_B \frac{dQ_B}{ds} + 1 + \frac{W_B}{Q_B + s} \frac{d(\pi_A \pi_B)}{ds}, \]
where the first term is necessarily negative when \( \frac{dQ_B}{ds} > 0 \), and so is the second term if \( \frac{d(\pi_A \pi_B)}{ds} < 0 \), i.e. if \( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} > 0 \).

This contradicts that \( \frac{d\pi_A}{ds} \) can be positive (or zero), for any value of \( \frac{dQ_B}{ds} \).

Proof of Proposition 8. For \( \varepsilon \to 0 \), we can rewrite these total contributions as functions of the total contributions without the matching subsidies:
\[ \hat{Q}_P = (1 + m) \sum_{i=1}^{n^P} q_i^P = (1 + m) Q_P. \]

Plugging that into party \( P \)'s probability of winning the election, we get
\[ \pi_P(\hat{Q}) = \frac{(1 + m) Q_P}{((1 + m) Q_A) + ((1 + m) Q_B)} = \frac{Q_P}{Q_A + Q_B} = \pi_P(Q). \]

As a consequence, incentives, and therefore the equilibrium, are the same for any \( m \leq 0 \).

Proof of Proposition 9. With this tax, the cost of contributing \( q_i^P \) for a donor with income \( y^i \) becomes:
\[ \left( q_i^P + \left[ y^i \right]^{\theta/p} \Box 1 \right) q_i^P \bigg/ \left[ y^i \right]^{\theta} = \left( q_i^P \right)^{\rho} / \rho. \]

Proof of Proposition 11. Given the tax, there are exactly two contribution levels: \( q_A^* = q_A, \forall p^i = a \) and \( q_B^* = q_B, \forall p^i = b \). Denote their unconstrained levels \( q_A^+ \) and \( q_B^+ \). Call \( \chi \) the threshold such that, for all \( \bar{q} \in (\chi, q_A^+) \), \( q_B \) remains unconstrained \((q_B(\bar{q}) < \bar{q}) \) whereas \( q_A \) is constrained \((q_A(\bar{q}) = \bar{q}) \) and such that \( q_B(\bar{q}) = \bar{q} \forall q < \chi \) (because of the closeness effect, \( \chi > q_B^+ \)).

For any \( \bar{q} < \chi \), and for \( \varepsilon_A = \varepsilon_B, \pi_A = 1/2 \). Therefore, social welfare becomes:
\[ U^{SP} = \frac{n^a v^a + n^b v^b}{2} \left( n^a + n^b \right) \bar{q}^A \rho, \]
which is unambiguously decreasing in \( \bar{q} \).
For $\bar{q} \in (\chi, q^*_A)$, we have that:

\[
U^{SP} = \frac{n \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot \sqrt{v^a \cdot \sqrt{v^b \cdot \sqrt{\bar{q}}}}}{\bar{q}^2 + \left(\sqrt{\bar{q}} \left(\sqrt{\frac{2}{n} \cdot v^b \cdot \sqrt{\bar{q}}}\right)\right)^2} n \cdot \frac{\bar{q}^2}{2} - n \cdot \frac{\left(\sqrt{\bar{q}} \left(\sqrt{\frac{2}{n} \cdot v^b \cdot \sqrt{\bar{q}}}\right)\right)^2}{2} + nv^b
\]

\[
= \frac{n}{2} \sqrt{\frac{2}{v^b}} \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \cdot v^b \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \cdot v^a + n \cdot v^b}} + n \cdot v^b.
\]

Differentiating with respect to the cap then yields:

\[
\frac{dU^{SP}}{dq} = \frac{\sqrt{n}}{\sqrt{2v^b}} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{2v^a \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot (n + 1) \cdot v^b}}{v^a \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot (n + 1) \cdot v^b},
\]

which is strictly positive for any $n > v^b/(v^a \cdot v^b)$. $\blacksquare$