NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

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Working Paper 24374
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24374

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
March 2018

A special thanks to excellent research assistance from Kathleen Ryan and Eric Fein. Mackenzie Jones and Mitchell Murphy also provided helpful assistance. This project was funded by the FRSP program in the Office of Research at Notre Dame. The project was developed while professor Hungerman was working on a project funded by the John Templeton Foundation, but this paper was not funded by Templeton. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material interests that relate to the research described in this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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NBER Working Paper No. 24374
March 2018
JEL No. D72,H41,Z12

ABSTRACT

We combine a new dataset of weekly Catholic church donations with a new dataset of presidential-election campaign stops to explore the impact of stops on donations. We find that stops increase donations, with a campaign stop generating 2 percent more donations in the following week. Our results suggest that this effect is of short duration. Further, it does not appear to vary based on the political language used by the parish in its own church bulletins. However, the effect does appear to vary based on the religiosity of the candidates themselves, with Catholic candidates generating the largest increases.

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1. Introduction

The scale of US presidential campaigns has become dramatically larger than even a generation ago; in the past 20 years expenditures on presidential campaigns have increased nearly 5-fold.[1] How do these campaigns impact individuals and communities? A large body of scholarship has taken up this question. Work has especially focused on how campaigns affect political participation (see Green and Schwam-Baird, 2016, for a recent review), but scholars have also investigated whether campaigns affect communities' social engagement outside of political participation, with mixed conclusions (e.g., Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson, 2004; Banducci and Karp, 2017; Coleman and Manna, 2000).

In this paper, we explore how the electoral process impacts pro-social behavior, and in particular how campaign stops made by candidates impact religious donations. Some prior work has considered the effects of campaign activity on donations, for example, Barton, Castillo, and Petrie (2015) and Perez-Truglia and Cruces (2017). More generally, recent work in economics has considered the importance of social context (such as "the power of the ask") in motivating giving (DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, 2012; Andreoni, Rao, Trachtman, 2017). We depart from this work by exploring an example of how social context created by a political event (here, a campaign stop), affects *non-political* activity.

Exploring religious activity is a natural extension of prior work in several ways. First, religiosity remains an important form of social participation, with most Americans professing a belief in God and attending worship with some frequency (Lipka, 2013, 2015), and with religion continuing to make up by far the largest component of all charitable giving. Second, religion appears to be an institution closely related to political participation. Individuals' religiosity is an extremely strong predictor of a person's likelihood to vote and their political attitudes (Cohen-Zada, Margalit, and Rigbi, 2016; Chen and Lind, 2016); and some work

[1] Using data from the Federal Election Committee, Galka (2016) reports the 2016 campaign involved $857 million in expenditures, while the 1996 campaign had $182 million, an increase of about 470%. Barton, Castillo, and Petrie (2014) report that expenditures for the 2010 US federal election (presidential and non-presidential) were nearly $4 billion.

(Gerber, Gruber, Hungerman, 2016) has concluded that the effect of religion on voting behavior is causal.

Further, religious activity is not only relevant for both charitable giving and political participation, but it is also involves unique policy considerations. The relationship between politicking and religiosity has come under renewed discussion in regards to the current presidential administration's proposed enforcement of the Johnson Amendment, which threatens the tax-exempt status of churches if they endorse or oppose particular political candidates. Religious groups' enthusiasm for eliminating this amendment appears mixed, with some "thrilled" by the idea but many religious groups opposing it (Goodstein and Sheer, 2017).

This conflicted response mirrors the inherent uncertainty in whether campaign activity could benefit churches. The implications of past work are not entirely clear: on the one hand, if campaigns (for instance) promote tastes for social participation, or let individuals acquire information or social contacts conducive to future religiosity, then campaign activity could increase religious participation. On the other hand, as mentioned above, studies have found mixed results (including small or zero effects) of campaigns on pro-social attitudes. Campaigns could lower religious participation if, for example, individuals have limited time for socially-focused activities and campaign participation "crowds out" religious participation.[2] Moreover, recent studies have shown that other activities such as education, while itself likely important for promoting social capital, may lower religious participation (Becker and Woessman, 2017; Hungerman, 2014a; Cesur and Mocan, 2014; Mocan and Pogoreova, 2014). But in truth all of this work is tangential to our topic; we know of no extant work that explores the issue we consider here.[3]

[2]Even the authority Alexis de Tocqueville, whose extensive and nuanced writings often emphasized the beneficial aspects of religion for democracy, warns that the democratic process could undermine certain aspects of religious practices: "Another truth seems clear to me: religions must attend less to external practices in democratic times than in all others." He argues that during these times men "are naturally led to attach only a secondary importance to the details of worship" (de Tocqueville, 2012; pg 750). Tocqueville's observation specifically concerns external practices or "small observances" of faith, and whether his argument would apply to religious participation in the present day is an open question.

[3]However, we do know of important work relating relating religious participation to electoral *outcomes*, (e.g., Meyersson, 2014; Bhalotra, Cassan, Clots-Figueras, Iyer, 2014).

This may in part be explained by data limitations. Churches and other congregations typically do not report information to any federal census or survey. While well-known surveys such as the General Social Survey ask individuals questions on their religiosity, the annual periodicity and relatively small sample sizes of these surveys make them not ideal for our topic. Further, perhaps surprisingly, we also know of no available dataset with detailed information on national campaign activity even for the most recent presidential elections.

We overcome these challenges by constructing two new datasets. First, we construct a dataset of weekly church donations from a sample of hundreds of Catholic churches from across the United States. This data was obtained from the weekly service bulletins published by these churches on their websites over a period of several years. Importantly, along with a church's exact location, these bulletins almost always include weekly donations collected, which we use as our measure of religious activity. Further, they include as a potential datasource the text of the bulletin itself. Our data includes both donations made to each parish and also a measure of the political content of the words in each bulletin. We discuss this dataset more below.

Using a wide variety of sources, we then construct a dataset of presidential-campaign stops during the fall of 2015. Fortunately, the campaign featured a large number of candidates, giving us a very high amount of variation in stops across communities and across time. Our data includes all stops made by the top 11 candidates in the presidential race from September 1st, 2015, through December 31st of that year. Overall, we identify a total of 864 distinct campaign stops, where we observe the location, exact date, and candidate at the stop.

Of course, campaign stops are not randomly made but rather reflect (presumably) careful strategic thinking by candidates and campaign managers. If certain communities are more likely to get campaign stops than others, which is obviously true, then care should be taken that differences in religious behavior observed in towns receiving campaign stops are driven by the campaign stops and not the underlying characteristics of the towns. We exploit the high-frequency and years-long availability of our data to non-parametrically control for

differences between the observations that see a campaign stop and those that do not. We find evidence that campaign stops tend to occur in communities with naturally lower levels of donations, all else equal. This difference appears to be driven by cross sectional (rather than temporal) variation, and to primarily be driven by differences across states, rather than within them. We describe our methodology and these differences more below.

Controlling for these differences, we find that a campaign stop made by a presidential candidate leads to an increase in collections for nearby churches the following week. The typical increase is moderately large: about 2% of total collected weekly revenue for each campaign stop. The result does not appear to be driven by churches in any particular state. We also look at the political language used within the church bulletins, but do not find strong effects across parishes with differing political content (e.g., using words favored by Democrats or Republicans) in their bulletins. However, we do find evidence that effects vary by religiosity of the candidate, with Catholic candidates generating the largest increases in donations.

Our findings are relevant for past and future work in several ways. First, our results support the conclusion that campaigns in the short-run promote social participation beyond political participation. This matters for prior work on the effects of campaigns, and also for work on how social contexts can affect charitable behavior. Most recent work in economics in this latter area (Trachtman et al, 2015; Knutsson et al, 2013; Andreoni, Rao, Trachtman, 2017; DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, 2012) explores the costs individuals incur to avoid solicitation. But our study considers how campaign activity affects donations to a non-campaign charity, where the induced donations likely occur days afterwards and could easily be avoided. Our findings suggest that future work should consider the importance of social context in settings beyond those typically considered when studying "the power of the ask." That said, we note that the nature of our study does not allow us to identify what it is about campaigns that increases donations, although we find evidence against some plausible explanations suggested by prior work.

For example, we find little evidence that this effect endures. In this sense, our findings do not fit the same conclusions as those reached by the excellent work of Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013). Their paper shows that attendance at a Tea Party rally on Tax Day (April 15), 2009, had important impacts on social behavior. They conclude that the local, enduring effects from rallies fits Zuckerman's (2005) "social logic of politics" wherein the rallies' effects depend upon social networks, mobilization, and/or habit formation that lead to enduring effects over time. In contrast, our effects appear to be quite short-lived and become imprecise and statistically insignificant in a matter of weeks. This result also suggests that studies on campaign events and public-goods contributions (such as DellaVigna, 2010, which looks at events in the 2008 presidential campaign and monthly organ donations) should be sure to use sufficiently high-frequency data.

Beyond this, our work makes several contributions to research on campaigns and on church/state relations. First, while scholars as noted above have shown an interest in how campaigns effect social capital, we do not know of any work that looks at religious participation as an outcome; our novel focus on religion is useful to work on elections and social outcomes given the critical role of churches in fostering social cohesion and important social outcomes.[4] Second, many prior studies have focused on campaigns and self-reported measures of trust, an outcome that is certainly quite important but one that may not accurately reflect observed (rather than self-reported) outcomes. Third, we focus on an aspect of campaigns that is quite well-known to citizens but is to our knowledge typically overlooked in the vast elections literature: campaign stops. Fourth, we take both our bulletin data and our campaign data as unique and potentially useful new resources that may be of interest to scholars in the future.

The next section discusses our bulletin and campaign data. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology. Section 4 lays out results, and section 5 concludes.

[4]Examples of the important social role played by churches include Frank and Iannaccone (2014), Bentzen (2015), Dills and Hernandez-Julian (2014), Gill (2004), Hungerman (2014b), Pope, Price, and Lillard (2014), Chen and Lind (2016); see Iyer, 2016 for a discussion.

2. Bulletin and Campaign Data

2.1 Bulletin Data

Our bulletin data provides weekly information on church donations to a national sample of Catholic churches, or parishes. The term *parish*, which will be used repeatedly in what follows, refers to a local Catholic church as well as any related facilities, such as a school, under the supervision of a particular pastor.

We are aware of a small amount of research using weekly church data, most notably the studies by Olson (2008) and by Iannaccone and Everton (2004); the former tracks Protestant churches in one Midwestern city in 2004 and the latter tracks attendance at four churches for several years in the 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, while a large literature has focused on the social importance of parishes, even annual Catholic data with financial information is difficult to find in prior scholarship.[5]

To construct our dataset, we first obtained a list of US Parish Web sites from `www.masstimes.org` and `www.thecatholicdirectory.com`. From these lists we identified 11,322 URLs for US parishes and crawled their Web sites to a depth of 3, ie, we downloaded the Parish's homepage, visited all the links on the page, all of the links of links, and all of the links-of-links-of-links. This process collected millions of Web pages but also videos, images, and pdf documents. To keep from downloading enormous files we limited restricted files to be less than 5MB in size, and discarded all non-pdf files. We ran this Web crawling process once every four weeks through January 2016, at which point our server ran out of disk space for storing documents. In total we collected 836,458 pdf documents comprising 947GBs. Further, not all Web sites had pdfs, and not all pdfs collected from Web sites were church bulletins. Non-bulletin files collected included general school/event forms, flyers, passages

[5]Much of this literature has focused on the notably better outcomes produced by Catholic schools (Evans and Schwab, 1995; Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005) and schools' impacts on economic diversity (see section 5 of Black, and Sokoloff, 2006). Other work has considered the impact of parishes on charitable activity more generally, such as Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2015). For a discussion of the challenges of obtaining Parish financial data, see Hungerman, Rinz, and Frymark (2017).

from the Bible, and speeches from pastors. It is often easy for a person to distinguish bulletins from non-bulletins, but harder for a machine to do so. We threw out pdfs that did not contain the word 'bulletin' in the filename. This resulted in 79,560 parish bulletins.

Figure 1 shows an example of a church bulletin. Names and contact information have been redacted. The figure shows the first two pages (this bulletin was in total four pages). As in this figure, most bulletins are weekly, contain parish address information, and contain information on total donations. These are the key pieces of information we required for our study. Bulletins often contain other interesting pieces of donation information, such as (here) the weekly target collection amount. Other items frequently reported include the fraction of money budgeted towards a particular project, such as a capital campaign, or the total collected throughout the year to date. However, there is little uniformity in the reporting of these other items across parishes, and so we focus on the total collected for all purposes by the parish in a given week for our variable. Also, bulletins do not typically report attendance, so that the total donations number we focus on could be driven by the number of people attending worship changing, or by the same number of people changing how much they give. We will not be able to separate these two behaviors.

Collecting information from these bulletins presented some challenges. While easy to view, the collection amount in Figure 1 is in a table that could be difficult to identify as the object of interest using machine reading.[6] To deal with these challenges, we hired workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (ie, turkers) to extract donation amounts and bulletin metadata. Based on our available funding, we began with a random sample of about 1500 bulletins and asked 75 turkers to extract information from 20 bulletins each. Entries were checked for accuracy by a research assistant prior to paying for data entry.[7] From the initial

[6]Note also that there could be two "dates" in the bulletin; the date the bulletin was published, and the date the collection was taken, which typically is from the week before. Figure 1 shows the date of collection but we have omitted the date of publication from the figure (which in this case was reported on page 3). When writing our instructions for data extraction, we paid special care to explicitly clarify how date should be recorded. We further subsequently checked entries to ensure that the "correct" date was entered. We believe virtually all bulletins in our study do not confuse these dates.

[7]We particularly thank our research assistant Kathleen Ryan for her work on this.

extraction effort we identified parish URLs with usable bulletins; we then crowdsourced all bulletins found from these parish URLs.

This left us with a "raw" dataset of 40,950 observations. We next dropped the following observations: bulletins that did not report the amount of donations, that reported donations from multiple parishes or from multiple locations within a single parish, and those that did not report weekly donations. We then re-verified the location of each parish, the dates and the donations in our data. We finally identified 712 unique parishes in 25,775 observations between May 2008 and Jan 2016.[8] For the main regression sample, we will (as discussed more below) restrict our data to a date range from 2014 and September through December of 2015 (but we report results from a larger range as well). This provides us with a dataset of 10,187 observations with 549 unique parishes.

Figure 2 shows the locations of parishes in our dataset. This sample includes 49 states, excluding only Montana. It should be kept in mind that our results come from a sample of all US parishes, and in particular from parishes that have websites (although almost all parishes have websites). Further, as discussed below, for some estimates we focus on a subset of 237 of these parishes, although we report results for the full sample as well. But whether our results would extend to other religious faiths we cannot say.

Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics by counties for (a) the entire United States, (b) the 712 parishes in the data with usable bulletins and (c) the subsample of these parishes observed in 2014 and the fall of 2015. The means are taken from the 2010 Decennial Census, and (excepting the last row) are unweighted. Standard deviations are in brackets. The first few rows show that the counties included in our sample are reasonably close to the average county in the United States in terms of the percent white, Hispanic, under 18, or over 65. The average county population of our sample is greater than the average population in the whole U.S. This is unsurprising in that larger-population counties are more likely to have more parishes and thus more likely to be sampled. The last row of means weights by population,

[8]Our dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset; not all weeks within a date range are necessarily reported for every parish.

thus comparing the population for the average *individual* in each type of county. Here the differences are a bit closer, but again suggest that the average person in the parish-sample counties lives in a more populous county than does the average person overall.

We will also explore whether campaign effects vary by the political content in the bulletins themselves. First, we converted the pdf bulletins to text files using "pdftotext" which is a command line tool for Linux/Mac. Then, we searched each file for occurrences of highly political words, as given in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).[9] Aside from being well-known, Gentzkow and Shapiro's list has the benefit of being produced independently of the current project; lessening concerns that we selected words for study with an eye to procuring a particular result. Out of 150 phrases used more often by Democrats and 150 phrases used more often by Republicans as identified by Gentzkow and Shapiro, we identified 118 political phrases in our bulletins in the full sample, 51 democratic and 67 republican. In the Appendix, we give a list of the 10 most commonly observed democratic and republican phrases in our bulletins.

2.2 Campaign Data

Our goal is to see how weekly collections reported in church bulletins change when a presidential candidate visits a community. Perhaps surprisingly, we know of no rigorous effort that tracked and collated the campaign stops of presidential candidates in the most recent election. Given this, we undertook our own collection effort.[10]

The campaign featured a large number of prospective Republican candidates and relatively few Democratic candidates. We focused on campaign stops made by any Republican candidate that polled in the top 5 of the republican field during the time period of September 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015.[11] On the Democratic side, only Hillary Clinton and Bernie

[9]Gentzkow and Shapiro identify political words by examining the text of speeches given by congressional Republicans and Democrats, identifying words that are frequently used by one party's politicians but not the other.

[10]We specifically thank our research assistant Eric Fein for his effort here.

[11]This was determined using the site realclearpolitics.com. Real Clear Politics compiles polling data from

Sanders were included as no other candidate drew significant polling numbers. In total, we use nine Republican and two Democratic candidates.[12] Here, the term "campaign stop" typically refers to public events held by one of these 11 candidates: speeches, town hall meetings, and meet and greet sessions.[13]

As no single central repository of campaign stops exists, we instead used a wide variety of sources to assemble our data. First, some regional news sources reported all stops in a given area. The New England Cable News kept track of all campaign stops made in New Hampshire, the Des Moines Register kept track of stops in Iowa, and the Governing Under the Influence Website[14] tracked all stops in both Iowa and New Hampshire. The South Carolina Republican Party Website tracked stops in South Carolina, and the Reno Gazette-Journal tracked campaign visits throughout Nevada. In a few instances we also consulted Google News to verify the locations of a particular stop on a particular day.

Next, for each candidate we also used information sources specific to that candidate's campaign to track events. Different campaigns reported their campaign stops in different ways, and in a few cases a particular form of social media was most helpful: YouTube (Trump), Instagram (Bush and Rubio), a campaign website (Clinton and Sanders), or Twitter (Christie, Paul and Fiorina). We also made candidate-specific searches in search engines and in some instances directly communicated with individuals working on campaigns to verify the details of a campaign stop. Our use of a variety of sources allowed us to cross check our efforts with the regional cites above to verify the comprehensiveness of each individual source.

Our resultant campaign database, which is reported in its entirety in the Appendix, contains 864 stops, covering 34 states and the District of Columbia. The first four states

8 sources including CNN, USA Today, Suffolk, Pew Research and Quinnipiac.

[12]The Republican candidates included are Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Chris Christie, Ted Cruz, Carly Fiorina, John Kasich, Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, and Donald Trump.

[13]Candidates also sometimes made stops at the homes of private citizens (for example, wealthy potential donors). We typically did not include visits to private homes unless these visits included events that were open to a large audience.

[14]This is a non-partisan education project of the American Friends Service Committee (a Quaker Organization that promotes lasting peace with justice as a practical expression of faith in action).

to hold primaries or caucuses, all of which took place in February 2016, saw the most visits from presidential candidates during the last four months of 2015. By far the most visited states were Iowa and New Hampshire, with 262 and 326 events, respectively. South Carolina (75) and Nevada (40) were the next most visited states. The places candidates visited most outside of this group were the District of Columbia (20) and Florida (18). This raises the issue of how the effect of campaign stops can best be studied methodologically. We turn to that question next.

3. Methodology

To motivate our methodology, suppose that parish donations could be described as:

$$\ln give_{pwc} = \alpha + \beta campaign_{wc} + \gamma X_c + \delta X_w + \rho_w + \phi_c + \theta_p + f(X_c, X_w, \mu_c, \rho_w) + \epsilon_{pwc} \quad (1)$$

where $\ln give_{pwc}$ is the log of total donations made to parish p in week w in community c. The variable $campaign_{wc}$ is a measure of campaign activity, such as the number of campaign stops made in community c in the prior week. The matrices X_c and X_w represent observable attributes of a community and week in the year that may be relevant for donations, such as population characteristics (in X_c) or an indicator for whether a certain week includes the observance of a holiday (in X_w), and the vectors γ and δ are coefficients. Beyond controlling for the linear effects of observables, there may be unobserved determinants of church activity across communities and at different times of the year, captured by the effects ρ_w and ϕ_c, as well as a fixed-effect and a time-varying residual for the parish, respectively denoted by θ_p and ϵ_{pwc}. The term $f(X_c, X_w, \mu_c, \rho_w)$ represents the possibility that community and week-of-the year characteristics, both observed and unobserved, could interact in complex ways.[15] If these interactions impact both religious donations and candidates' decisions to

[15]These interactions could further depend on parish characteristics ϕ in our methodology; this is omitted from the function f in 1 for brevity.

visit, then in a regression of donations on campaign activity and the observables X_c and X_w, the coefficient β would be biased. Note that because of the f term, even with a full set of fixed effects β could still be biased if f were not controlled for. But the functional form of f is unknown.

To address this concern, we take the 52-week difference of our data, so that outcomes in a given week one year are subtracted from the same week the next year. Letting Δ denote the 52-week difference, equation 1 then becomes:

$$\Delta \ln give_{pwc} = \beta \Delta campaign_{wc} + \Delta \epsilon_{pwc} \tag{2}$$

where all other terms are differenced out, so that we can estimate β in a way that allows for variation related to a given week, and to a given parish and community, and even to potentially complex interactions between these variables. Equation 2 represents our baseline estimation model, although we consider several extensions. These include a non-differenced OLS estimation of 2, an estimation of 2 that allows for time trends, and non-differenced fixed-effect estimation.

While we take equation 2 as a strong starting point, we note several concerns that could persist in its estimation. First, some "intermediate" time effects could be longer than a week but shorter than a year in duration during the sample. For example, if a factory opens 6 months after our first observation, and a candidate arrives 6 months later to tout the factory's successful start, and the factory raises the incomes (and hence donations) of parish-goers, then the observed campaign effect could be driven in part by the factory. For our analysis, we can further exploit the week-by-week variation in our data to see if campaign stops especially matter in the weeks closest to the stop. Enduring anticipatory increases in donations before a stop, or enduring increases after a stop, could raise the concern that our estimates are driven by intermediate dynamic effects. (Although such results could also fit certain depictions of how campaigns could impact religious behavior.) If our effects are

strongest immediately before or after a campaign stop, however, it is evidence against this sort of effect.

A related concern is that there is an unobserved transitory effect on a certain week that drives donations and campaigns. For example, perhaps a state fair is held in a given week, and this both increases donations in a parish and increases the likelihood of a candidate arriving.[16] Since such events are, by assumption, never observed to the econometrician, we cannot nor could we ever entirely rule out the possibility of their occurrence. In response to this, we first note that a result of our analysis below is that the effects of campaigns are short-lived, and this story would likely only strengthen this conclusion. Additionally, several factors give us confidence that our results are not driven by this "state-fair" type of story. First, our qualitative observation from constructing our campaign data is that most campaign stops are not timed to coincide with other standalone events.[17] Next, we observe important differences in response to candidate characteristics, for example, as shown below, Catholic candidates have stronger effects than non-Catholic candidates, for whom we often get effects indistinguishable from zero, so that our results do not seem to be driven by a general pattern wherein stops coincide with other phenomena. One could instead wonder whether the candidates we observe driving our estimates ran their campaigns differently than other candidates. We further note that we find similar estimates for candidates (in particular, for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump) whose entire campaign strategies appear to have been extraordinarily different (e.g., Bloomberg News, 2016; Sheridan, 2016). Taken together, the immediate and dynamic effects of campaign stops, the pattern of results ob-

[16]Related to this point is the issue that campaign stops could affect donations "mechanically" if they are held on Sundays (although plausibly this would work against the positive effect we find), as Sunday is a key day for worship (and making donations) for many churchgoers. In fact, almost none of the campaign stops happen on Sundays. Below we show results varying the temporal "distance" of the campaign stop to worship.

[17]We also attempted in a limited away to quantify this qualitative impression. Two of our campaign-stop sources, the Des Moines Register and the New England Cable News, provided brief descriptions of the nature of each campaign stop. While only for two states, these two sources include a large number of stops (over 500) and so we used their descriptions to identify stops that appeared to be held as part of a larger event (e.g., a parade). The vast majority of events–over 80 percent–were *not* described as related to any other event.

served across candidates and campaigns, and the qualitative nature of most campaign stops work in combination to support the robustness of our results.

To estimate equation 2, we need to combine our two datasets. In so doing, we define campaign stops as close by if they occur within 25 miles of a given parish. The pattern of results presented in our baseline estimates is not sensitive to this choice, though using shorter distances does lead to larger point estimates.

In combining our two datasets and employing the specification in equation 2, our estimates will necessarily be driven by parishes with bulletins available 52 weeks apart that see a campaign stop. Further, since our campaign data covers September through December of 2015, but not the earlier months of 2015, we omit observations from the earlier months of 2015 as we do not have campaign information. The resulting sample consists of 2,375 bulletins, from 237 parishes. The distribution of parishes in this sample is close to our larger sample–in Appendix Figure 1, we replicate the map from Figure 1 using just these 237 parishes; the two figures are similar. We also can use a larger sample by checking our results in non-52-week differenced data and we do so below.

The total number of campaign stops in the baseline sample is 349. There are 60 parishes in this sample that see at least one campaign stop, and a total of 142 parish/weeks in the data where at least one campaign stop occurs. In weeks in which a campaign stop occurs, the median number of nearby stops is 1, and the mean is about 2.45. The stops are reasonably widespread, covering 20 states, including several events in states not typically regarded as "critical" primary battlegrounds.[18] We also observe a number of stops for almost all of our different candidates.[19] In the next section we discuss how these stops affect reported

[18]The likelihood we observe a stop depends upon the likelihood of a stop as well as the likelihood that we observe a parish in a community. States with observed stops include Arizona (1 stop), California (6), Connecticut (1), Florida (1), Georgia (3), Iowa (9), Illinois (19), Indiana (1), Massachusetts (19), Maryland (22), New Hampshire (155), New Jersey (23), New York (43), Ohio (2), Pennsylvania (3), South Carolina (12), Tennessee (2), Texas (6), Virginia (15), and Wisconsin (6). We discuss below the sensitivity of our results to dropping different states; our results are not driven by any one state.

[19]An exception is Ben Carson; we only observe 4 stops by Carson in our matched data. We observe 38 for Trump, 25 for Bush, 18 for Rubio, 11 for Cruz, 100 for Clinton, 54 for Sanders, 24 for Christie, 11 for Paul, 37 for Kasich, and 27 for Fiorina. Again, we discuss effects for different candidates more below.

donations.

4. Results

Table 2 presents our baseline estimates. The dependent variable in the initial columns is logged donations, the unit of observation is a parish bulletin (ie, a parish/week), the specification is given by equation 2, and robust standard errors, clustered by city, are reported in brackets. The sample includes all parish data from 2014 and from September through December of 2015. The key dependent variable is the number of nearby campaign stops in the week prior to the Sunday when donations were made.

The coefficient suggests that, for each presidential campaign stop, donations increase by about 2 percent. The mean collection amount in the sample is 10,760 so the implied effect is a little over $200. As mentioned above, in weeks where a stop occurs the mean number of stops is about 2.5, so in the average campaign-stop week a parish's donations increase by about 5 percent or $500, a moderate but non-trivial effect. As mentioned before, this effect reflects both changes in the number of attenders and per-attender donation generosity.[20]

The next column allows for a time trend by adding back the α constant to equation 2; the results are essentially the same as before (we report more aggressive trend control results momentarily). Column 3 simply uses a dummy variable for whether any campaign stop occurred, rather than the number of stops, as the key regressor. The coefficient is slightly larger in its implied effect. In Column 4, the dependent variable is now donations in levels, rather than logs; the result is slightly smaller but nonetheless qualitatively similar to the baseline estimate, suggesting that each campaign stop raises donations by about $130.

In column 5, we report OLS results using non-differenced data. This regression returns to using total campaign stops and using logged donations (although the results are similar with levels donations). The estimates now are negative and significant. This indicates that

[20]We also of course lack information on the number of worshippers involved in any way with a campaign stop, so that we cannot interpret this result as a "treatment on the treated" style effect. In this analysis the unit of observation is best understood as a parish, rather than an individual.

campaign stops are more likely to occur near parishes with below-average donation amounts, but that this is driven by fixed differences in parish donations over time. Returning to the specification used in column 2, in the final column we redo the estimate in column 2 but now include all available years of data before 2014. (Redoing this estimate on the baseline specification yields the same result.) Observations observed in 2013 are differenced off of 2012 bulletins, so that these new observations are taken from bulletins available online several years after they were produced. There are relatively few such observations (854, raising the total sample size to 3,229) and they may come from a non-random subsample of our parishes. However, including these years does not alter our estimates.

Table 2 thus suggests that campaign stops lead to higher donations at worship the following week. Table 3 produces a number of different robustness tests for these results. In the first panel we redo the baseline estimate but show that the results are robust to dropping Iowa and New Hampshire, the two states whose primaries receive outsize political attention and who get a high number of campaign stops. As shown in the table, our results are similar, and in fact slightly larger, if we drop these estimates. (The increase in the coefficient would be consistent, e.g., with a "campaign fatigue" scenario for these states where the large volume of campaigns diminishes the impact of the marginal campaign on donations.) In the Appendix we present a histogram where we drop each state in our sample in turn; we find that our results are not driven by any one state with nearly all estimates staying quite close to our baseline 0.02 coefficient.

In Panel B of Table 3, we include a variety of fixed-effect controls. (As our data is differenced, these controls of course have a different interpretation than with non-differenced data.) The results use all years of data to help in identifying the fixed effects separately.[21] Even when including aggressive city, year, and month dummies, our result is qualitatively close to before. (Note city and year controls would subsume the state and year controls in column 2, and that the month effects are identified separately from year effects since we have

[21]Results using the baseline sample are qualitatively similar, although smaller and less precise in columns 3 and 4.

multiple years.)

In the last panel, we redo the specifications in panel B but now we report estimates from non-differenced data. The first column shows a negative coefficient, which is unsurprising given the OLS estimate shown in Table 2 earlier. Once a geographic fixed effect is included, even a state fixed effect as in column 2, the coefficient becomes positive. The similarity of column 1 to the earlier OLS, the change from column 1 to column 2, and the slightly smaller effects in columns 3 and 4, indicate that (a) campaign stops happen in places with naturally lower donations, that (b) the fixed component driving this lower donation amount is geographical rather than temporal (else column 1 here would not be negative), and that (c) this geographic variation is primarily across states, rather than within states (else the final columns would be larger in size than column 2).[22] Overall, the main takeaway from Table 3 is that the positive effect documented in the baseline is robust to a number of different samples and specifications.

All of these results have used campaign stops in the prior week as the key regressor. While a week is a natural timespan to consider, Table 4 presents results using alternate measures of time. The first row for comparison's sake presents results using the prior week. Row 2 uses stops from the past 5 days, row 3 uses 10, and row 4, 15. The first column uses the standard sample, column 2 includes a trend control, and column 3 uses all years. In all cases, the table shows a clear pattern: the strongest results are observed from stops in the past 5 days, and the results grow steadily weaker as stops from further back in time are added. This suggests that the effects of campaign stops diminish over time.

Table 5 develops the possibility of dynamic effects of campaign stops further, here including dummies for pre-stop and post-stop. For many observations, stops may occur several weeks in a row; raising a conceptual question of how to handle, e.g., a bulletin observed two weeks before a stop and two weeks after an earlier stop. The table takes several approaches

[22]The smaller coefficients in the last two columns suggest that while states are *negatively* selected for campaigns, communities within states are *positively* selected, else city effects would make the coefficients larger still. Clearly, the negative-across-state effect dominates, so that when both effects are controlled for the coefficient remains positive, unlike the OLS result.

in light of this issue. The first column reports coefficients on the lead number of campaign stops in the weeks leading up to the first stop observed by a parish, and also reports coefficients on the lag number of campaign stops in the weeks following the last campaign stop observed by a parish; "in between" treatment observations are omitted from the sample. In column 2, we include "in between" weeks and the coefficients now simply report the the lead and lag number of campaign stops, e.g., the "four weeks before" coefficient is the coefficient for a variable for observed campaign stops four weeks in the future. The difference in the columns will be driven by the inclusion of "in between" observations in column 2. The last column reports estimates from the column 1 specification, but now dummies rather than campaign-stop counts are used. (Several coefficients match across these columns, that is because there are a few weeks before the first campaign stop where all observed parishes will see one stop the first week a campaign stop occurs.) For readability, here we use * markers to denote standard statistical significance.

The story told across the columns is similar: we consistently see a significant and positive effect from "contemporaneous" campaign stops, where the "contemporaneous" week refers to stops in the 7 days before a collection is taken (as defined in the earlier tables). There are no statistically significant effects observed either before or after the week of a campaign stop, and indeed several of the post-stop coefficients are negative. Some results are highly imprecise, so that we cannot reject (for example) that the four-weeks-after coefficient in column 1 equals the contemporaneous-coefficient value. But together the results in Table 5 fail to provide any evidence that campaign effects endure over time, and instead suggest that our observed effects are short lived. This contrasts with the Tea-Party effects observed in Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013), who document strongly persistent effects over time. We discuss this more in the conclusions.

One might wonder whether the political leanings of a congregation, or of a candidate, matter for these effects. We begin our investigation of this in Table 6. The three columns of Table 6 shows results by the inferred political leaning of the parish, which we base,

as described earlier, on whether a parish (a) uses a democratic word *and* never uses a republican word ("democratic" parishes, for short) or ever uses a republican word and never uses a democratic work ("republican" parishes).[23] Overall, the first three columns show little evidence that the appearance of politically-loaded language in a bulletin is related to how donations respond to campaign stops.

The last three columns redo this analysis but break apart campaign stops by the political party of the candidate. Column 4 uses all stops; the coefficient is somewhat bigger for democratic candidates but not significantly so. Turning to the last two columns, we again fail to find any clear or compelling pattern for how political language in bulletins corresponds to the affects of campaign stops. It is perhaps noteworthy that the republican parishes have a positive coefficient for republican stops while democratic parishes have a negative coefficient, but none of these coefficients is significant and we take this observation as suggestive at best.

It is possible, however, that within political party some candidates have different effects than others. Table 7 investigates this by reporting regressions (including a time trend, as in column 2 of Table 2) where campaign stops are specific to a particular candidate. As mentioned earlier, we observe several campaign stops for most candidates, allowing this comparison across many politicians.[24] The top panel in Table 7 begins with the eventual nominees, Trump and Clinton. Although these candidates were markedly different in their policy positions, demeanor, campaign strategies, and the details of many of their campaign stops, both produce similar (and statistically insignificant) coefficients. The next three candidates in the top panel (Christie, Rubio, Bush) report the largest coefficients of all candidates, and in all three cases they are at least marginally significant.

Do these three candidates have anything in common? Yes –they are all Catholic, and they are the only Catholic candidates. The fact that the three Catholic candidates have the largest

[23]We also considered results using alternate definitions of Democratic and Republican bulletins, such as whether a parish *ever* uses a democratic word or ever uses a republican word. Those results are also statistically insignificant.

[24]Since Carson was only observed four times, we omit him from the table. The coefficient on Carson's stops is 0.248 [se = 0.005].

effects on Catholic donations suggests that, beyond particular political positions, campaign themes, or secular characteristics, the religiosity of a candidate could matter particularly for galvanizing religious activity. Returning the Johnson Amendment discussion mentioned in the Introduction, Table 7 also suggests that allowing the promotion of political activity within churches could particularly benefit faiths with a disproportionate share of political candidates, at least in the short term.

Overall the results of Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 show that a campaign stop leads to an immediate, moderately-sized, and short-lived increase in church donations the following week. Political words in bulletins do not appear to strongly predict responses to campaign stops (although this result is tempered by our smaller sample sizes), but we find that our results are the strongest for Catholic candidates. We take these results are notable for both future scholarship and policy; we turn to implications in the conclusion.

6. Conclusion

Combining a new dataset of parish donation activity with a new dataset on presidential-election campaign stops for the fall of 2015, this paper explores the impact of stops on church donations. We find that stops increase donations, with each campaign stop leading to 2 percent more donations in the following week. Our results suggest that this effect is of short duration, does not appear to vary based on the political language used by the parish, but does appear to vary based on the religiosity of the candidates themselves.

As mentioned above, our results have several implications. First, they highlight the need for further discussion of the dynamic effects of political activity on other forms of social capital. The dynamic effects identified here appear different than the strongly persistent effects identified for Tea Party rallies in Madestam, Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott's work. However, the rally they study was intended to foster a long-term political movement, while the effect we identify is incidental to the campaign stop, so that the results are potentially

harmonious. Our results do raise the possibility, however, that commonly-used outcomes such as post-election surveys of self-reported trust in the government may quickly dissipate. Whether they do, or instead endure, we cannot say but our results indicate that scholars investigating the effects of campaigns in the future should take care to consider dynamic effects.

Next, our work suggests that policy changes to allow political activity within churches could benefit some faiths more than others. Also, our results mirror at least some findings showing that election activity can increase, at least in the short term, social capital, but while prior findings often use self-reported measures we use donations collected by parishes. Our results thus suggest that self-reported results, to the extent they match the findings here, may reflect actual behavior.

Our work also highlights the possibility that, with increasingly sophisticated campaigns and the policy-driven potential for greater campaign activities within churches, candidates in the future might more closely organize their campaign activity in conjunction with religious observance. Whether religious endorsements would matter for candidates is unclear although prior work (e.g., Garthwaite and Moore, 2012) has explored the potential importance of non-political endorsements of candidates.

Next, our results document the importance of social context in affecting giving, but differs from most prior work in this area. Rather than studying how consumers avoid solicitations to give, we study how one social event affects charitable activity days later (but not weeks later). Our results suggest that further research is needed to understand the various ways that social contexts can influence charitable giving. Future work could also refine the charitable activities considered. Our results here cannot distinguish increased donations from greater attendance versus greater donative generosity of churchgoers. Moreover, while donations are obviously a critical aspect of religious life, one might wonder whether campaigns affect other, more qualitative measures of inherent religiosity. This topic, as well as the above implications, represent excellent areas for future work.

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Figure 1: Sample Church Bulletin



The above shows the first two pages from a sample bulletin. Specific names and contact information have been redacted.

Figure 2:



Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Whole U.S.	Parishes with Usable Data	Parishes Observed in 2014 & Fall of 2015
Average % Population of Whites	82.88	79.68	78.24
	[16.85]	[15.01]	[15.51]
Average % Population of Hispanics	8.28	11.05	11.66
	[13.19]	[12.31]	[12.48]
Average % Population of Persons under 18 years	23.42	23.57	23.65
	[3.38]	[2.97]	[2.97]
Average % Population of Persons 65 years and over	15.88	13.93	13.76
	[4.19]	[3.76]	[3.55]
Average Population	98,233	422,526	473,013
	[312901]	[749225]	[813604]
Weighted Average Population	1,094,601	1,747,700	1,868,129
	[1891638]	[2334891]	[2402593]
Number of Counties	3,143	396	324

The source for Table 1 is 2010 U.S. Census Summary File 1, a 100 percent sample of the whole population of the U.S., provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the means. In our sample, we identified 396 unique counties where 712 parishes are located for the usable-data sample presented in Column 2 and 324 unique counties from 549 parishes for the main-period-of-study sample presented in Column 3. The White population here refers to a person who marked only the White category on the questionnaire. The Hispanic population refers to a person of Hispanic or Latino origins regardless of race. The averages are the (unweighted) average of each county's population except for the final row, which is weighted by county's population.

Table 2--Baseline Effects of Campaigns

	Baseline	Time Trend	Campaign Dummy	Levels Collections	OLS	All Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Campaign Stops	0.0204	0.0199	0.0845	126	-0.078	0.0213
	[0.00291]	[0.00313]	[0.0425]	[32]	[0.0148]	[0.00325]
Differenced Data?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Trend Coefficient	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Dependent Variable	Logs	Logs	Logs	Levels	Logs	Logs
Key Regressor?	Count of Campaign Stops	Count of Campaign Stops	Campaign Stops Dummy	Count of Campaign Stops	Count of Campaign Stops	Count of Campaign Stops
All Years?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

The table shows regressions of weekly church collections, logged, on a count variable for the number of nearby political campaigns in the prior week. Standard errors, clustered by city, are in brackets. The mean of the dependent variable is 10,797 and the mean number of campaign stops is 0.14 and in a week with a campaign stop the mean number is about 2.5.

Table 3--Alternate Specifications

Panel A: Dropping Iowa and New Hampshire

	From Table 2	No New Hampshire	No Iowa	No New Hampshire & No Iowa
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Campaign Stops	0.0204	0.0283	0.0205	0.0294
	[0.00291]	[0.0158]	[0.00297]	[0.0167]

Panel B: Alternate Controls

	Month Dummies	Month & State Dummies	City & Year Dummies	Month, City & Year Dummies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Campaign Stops	0.0176	0.02	0.0201	0.0173
	[0.00301]	[0.00359]	[0.0115]	[0.0113]

Panel C: Alternate Controls on Undifferenced Data

	Month Dummies	Month & State Dummies	City & Year Dummies	Month, City & Year Dummies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Campaign Stops	-0.0366	0.0543	0.016	0.015
	[0.0194]	[0.0103]	[0.00925]	[0.00917]

The tables shows regressions of weekly church collections on a count variable for the number of nearby political campaigns in the prior week. Standard errors, clustered by city, are in brackets. The first panel shows results from the baseline regression in Table 2, dropping Iowa and/or New Hampshire. In panel B, month, state, and year dummies are added (as the data is 52-week differenced, these variables have a different interpretation than in levels data). In the final panel these specifications are repeated for data that is not differenced.

Table 4--Alternate Durations for Campaigns

	2015-2014	2015-2014, with Trend	All Years, with Trend
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Campaigns Stops	0.0204	0.0199	0.0213
	[0.00291]	[0.00313]	[0.00325]
Campaigns Stops-past 5 days	0.0231	0.0225	0.0241
	[0.00319]	[0.00335]	[0.00346]
Campaigns Stops--Past 10 days	0.0168	0.0166	0.0175
	[0.00182]	[0.00204]	[0.00213]
Caompaigns Stops--past 15 days	0.0143	0.0141	0.0149
	[0.00122]	[0.00148]	[0.00151]

The table shows regressions of weekly church collections on different count variables for the number of nearby political campaigns in the prior week. Standard errors, clustered by city, are in brackets. Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Row 1 reports the basline results using total compaign stops in the prior week.

Table 5--Before and After Campaign Stops

	(1)	(2)	(3)
4 Weeks Before	0.106	0.0185	0.106
	[0.0852]	[0.0393]	[0.0852]
3 Weeks Before	-0.00375	-0.00359	-0.00375
	[0.0558]	[0.0338]	[0.0558]
2 Weeks Before	-0.028	-0.0244	-0.028
	[0.0582]	[0.0352]	[0.0582]
1 Week Before	0.0431	0.0194	0.0353
	[0.0374]	[0.0317]	[0.0398]
Campaign Stops	**0.0167*** **	**0.0107*** **	**0.0845** **
	[0.00326]	**[0.00376]**	**[0.0425]**
1 Week After	-0.0238	0.0223	0.0713
	[0.0441]	[0.0326]	[0.0556]
2 Weeks After	-0.0602	0.0432	0.0376
	[0.0533]	[0.0481]	[0.108]
3 Weeks After	-0.000434	0.0305	-0.0184
	[0.0490]	[0.0368]	[0.0540]
4 Weeks After	-0.00831	0.0148	-0.00178
	[0.0643]	[0.0390]	[0.0558]

The first column reports the lead and lag number of campaign stops in the weeks leading up to the first campaign stop observed by a parish and the weeks following the last campaign stop observed. In column two, lead and lag number of campaign stops are used for all weeks and all campaign stops, eg., the "four weeks before" coefficient is the coefficient for a variable for observed campaign stops four weeks in the future. The difference in the columns will be driven by the inclusion off "in between" observations in column 2. The last column uses a set of dummies for the weeks before the first campaign stop observed at a parish, and a set of dummies for the weeks following the last campaign stop (rather than a variable for the number of stops). For ease of interpretation, stars are included to denote 10 (*), 5(**), and 1 (***) percent significance.

Table 6--Effects by Political Words in Bulletins and Political Party of Candidate

	All Bulletins	Democratic Bulletin	Republican Bulletin	All Bulletins	Democratic Bulletin	Republican Bulletin
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Campaign Stops	0.0204	-0.0315	0.0154	-	-	-
	[0.00291]	[0.0849]	[0.0102]			
Democratic Stops	-	-	-	0.0326	0.00136	0.0168
				[0.0189]	[0.141]	[0.0189]
Republican Stops	-	-	-	0.0168	-0.069	0.0125
				[0.00286]	[0.0585]	[0.0157]
Observations	2,375	180	581	2,375	180	581

In columns 1, 2, and 3, each coefficient is from a different regression where logged donations is th dependent variable. In each column, the sample changes based on whether all bulletins are used (column 1), from parishes that use democratic words but never use republican words (2), or ever use republican but never democratic (3). In the last three columns the regressions are repeated but now the coefficient on campaign stops is broken apart by whether stops were made by a democratic candidate or republican candidate.

Table 7--Results by Candidate

	Trump	Clinton	Christie	Rubio	Bush
Campaign Stops	0.0329	0.05	0.16	0.122	0.0815
	[0.0420]	[0.0305]	[0.00674]	[0.0750]	[0.00833]

	Cruz	Sanders	Kasich	Paul	Fiorina
Campaign Stops	0.0319	0.0618	0.0544	0.00857	0.0394
	[0.0385]	[0.0265]	[0.00607]	[0.0443]	[0.00654]

The table shows the effects of campaign stops on parish collections by specific candidate. Each cell is from a separate regression. Results are differenced as in other tables and standard errors are in brackets. The top panel includes the two eventual nominees, Trump (a Presbyterian), Clinton (Methodist), the three Catholic candidates. The bottom panel includes other non-Catholic and non-nominee candidates.

Appendix Table 1: Political Phrases used Most Often in Bulletins

Rank	Democratic Words	Frequency	Republican Words	Frequency
1	senior citizens	1150	boy scouts	1600
2	credit card	696	human life	1515
3	african american	296	ten commandments	236
4	low income	243	post office	215
5	poor people	140	third time	108
6	civil rights	107	stem cell	95
7	living in poverty	57	natural gas	78
8	million americans	36	embryonic stem	75
9	child labor	33	immigration reform	72
10	minimum wage	32	food program	68

Appendix Table 2--Campaign Stops by Candidate, Date, and Location

Date	Trump	Trump2	Bush	Bush2	Bush3	Rubio	Rubio2	Rubio3	Date
9/1/2015	Norwood, NH					Carson City, NV	Fallon, NV	Yerrington, NV	9/1/2015
9/2/2015						Oklahoma City, OK			9/2/2015
9/3/2015			Hampton, NH	Laconia, NH		Chattenooga, TN			9/3/2015
9/4/2015									9/4/2015
9/5/2015						San Juan, Puerto Rico			9/5/2015
9/6/2015									9/6/2015
9/7/2015						Charleston, SC	Milford, NH		9/7/2015
9/8/2015						Hooksett, NH	Keene, NH		9/8/2015
9/9/2015	Washington, DC								9/9/2015
9/10/2015			Exeter, NH	Salem, NH					9/10/2015
9/11/2015			Manohester, NH	Londonderry, NH		Ankeny, IA			9/11/2015
9/12/2015	Boone, IA					Iowa City, IA	Ames, IA		9/12/2015
9/13/2015									9/13/2015
9/14/2015	Dallas, TX								9/14/2015
9/15/2015									9/15/2015
9/16/2015	Simi Valley, CA (Debate)					Simi Valley, CA (Debate)			9/16/2015
9/17/2015	Rochester, NH								9/17/2015
9/18/2015						Mackinac Island, MI			9/18/2015
9/19/2015	Des Moines, IA		Athens, GA			Mackinac Island, MI			9/19/2015
9/20/2015									9/20/2015
9/21/2015			Mason City, IA			Atlanta, GA			9/21/2015
9/22/2015			Cedar Falls, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA					9/22/2015
9/23/2015	Columbia, SC		Gladbrook, IA						9/23/2015
9/24/2015									9/24/2015
9/25/2015	Oklahoma City, OK	Washington, DC				Washington DC			9/25/2015
9/26/2015									9/26/2015
9/27/2015									9/27/2015
9/28/2015	New York, NY					The Villages, FL			9/28/2015
9/29/2015			Portsmouth, NH						9/29/2015
9/30/2015	Keene, NH		Manchester, NH	Bedford, NH					9/30/2015
10/1/2015						Cedar Falls, IA			10/1/2015
10/2/2015			Greenville, SC			Dubuque, IA			10/2/2015
10/3/2015	Franklin, TN								10/3/2015
10/4/2015						Dubuque, IA			10/4/2015
10/5/2015									10/5/2015
10/6/2015			Davenport, IA			Bedford, NH	Manchester, NH		10/6/2015
10/7/2015	Waterloo, IA		Oskaloosa, IA			Wolfeboro, NH	Dover, NH		10/7/2015
10/8/2015			Indianola, IA			Las Vegas, NV	Summerlin, NV		10/8/2015
10/9/2015						Las Vegas, NV	Enterprise, NV		10/9/2015
10/10/2015	Norcross, GA		Knoxville, TN			North Las Vegas, NV	Boulder City, NV		10/10/2015
10/11/2015	Knoxville, TN								10/11/2015
10/12/2015	Manchester, NH								10/12/2015
10/13/2015			Manchester, NH	Keene, NH					10/13/2015
10/14/2015	Richmond, VA		Concord, NH	Lebanon, NH		Derry, NH	Porsmouth, NH		10/14/2015
10/15/2015			Concord, NH			Philedelphia, PA	Pittsburg, PA		10/15/2015
10/16/2015	Tyngsborough, MA					Salem, OH			10/16/2015
10/17/2015			Portsmouth, NH			Portsmouth, NH			10/17/2015
10/18/2015									10/18/2015
10/19/2015	Anderson, SC								10/19/2015
10/20/2015						Salt Lake City, UT			10/20/2015
10/21/2015	Burlington, IA		Reno, NV	North Las Vegas, NV					10/21/2015
10/22/2015									10/22/2015
10/23/2015	Miami, FL		Mount Pleasant, SC						10/23/2015
10/24/2015	Jackson, FL								10/24/2015
10/25/2015									10/25/2015
10/26/2015	Atkinson, NH								10/26/2015
10/27/2015	Sioux City, IA		El Dorado Springs, CO						10/27/2015
10/28/2015	Boulder, CO (Debate)		Boulder, CO (Debate)			Boulder, CO (Debate)			10/28/2015
10/29/2015	Reno, NV		New London, NH	Portsmouth, NH					10/29/2015
10/30/2015			Portsmouth, NH			Orange City, IA	Sioux City, IA		10/30/2015
10/31/2015	Norfolk, VA		Des Moines, IA			Des Moines, IA	Mason City, IA		10/31/2015
11/1/2015			Wolfboro, NH						11/1/2015
11/2/2015			Orlando, FL						11/2/2015
11/3/2015	New York, NY		Rye, NH	Raymond, NH					11/3/2015
11/4/2015	Concord, NH		Manchester, NH	Hollis, NH	Wolfeboro, NH	Nashua, NH	Manchester, NH		11/4/2015
11/5/2015			North Conway, NH	Somersworth, NH		Concord, NH			11/5/2015
11/6/2015									11/6/2015
11/7/2015									11/7/2015
11/8/2015									11/8/2015
11/9/2015	Springfleild, IL					Burlington, WI			11/9/2015
11/10/2015	Milwaukee, WI (Debate)					Milwaukee, WI (Debate)			11/10/2015
11/11/2015	Manchester, NH		Johnston, IA	Atlantic, IA	Waukee, IA	Davenport, IA			11/11/2015
11/12/2015	Fort Dodge, IA		Tuftonboro, NH			Columbia, SC			11/12/2015
11/13/2015	Orlando, FL		Franklin, NH	Orlando, FL		Orlando, FL			11/13/2015
11/14/2015	Beaumont, TX								11/14/2015
11/15/2015									11/15/2015
11/16/2015	Knoxville, TN								11/16/2015
11/17/2015			Florence, SC	Charleston, SC					11/17/2015
11/18/2015			Bedford, NH						11/18/2015
11/19/2015	Newton, IA		Manchester, NH	Londonderry, NH					11/19/2015
11/20/2015	Spartanburg, SC					Des Moines, IA			11/20/2015
11/21/2015	Birmingham, AL					Des Moines, IA			11/21/2015
11/22/2015									11/22/2015
11/23/2015	Columbus, OH								11/23/2015
11/24/2015	Myrtle Beach, SC		Gaffney, SC						11/24/2015
11/25/2015						Charleston, SC			11/25/2015
11/26/2015									11/26/2015
11/27/2015									11/27/2015
11/28/2015	Sarasota, FL		Starkville, MS						11/28/2015
11/29/2015									11/29/2015
11/30/2015	Macon, GA		Goose Lake, IA			Laconia, NH	Rye, NH		11/30/2015
12/1/2015	Waterville Valley, NH		Waterloo, IA			Guntersville, AL			12/1/2015
12/2/2015	Manassas, VA		Goose Lake, IA						12/2/2015
12/3/2015	New York, NY		Waterloo, IA	Newton, IA					12/3/2015
12/4/2015	Raleigh, NC		Dubuque, IA			Greenland, NH	Concord, NH		12/4/2015
12/5/2015	Davenport, IA	Spencer, IA							12/5/2015
12/6/2015									12/6/2015
12/7/2015	Mount Pleasant, SC								12/7/2015
12/8/2015			Hooksett, NH	Manchester, NH					12/8/2015
12/9/2015			Manchester, NH						12/9/2015
12/10/2015	Portsmouth, NH		Milford, NH			Ames, IA	West Des Moines, IA		12/10/2015
12/11/2015	Des Moines, IA					Iowa City, IA			12/11/2015
12/12/2015	Aiken, SC		Derry, NH			Greenville, SC			12/12/2015
12/13/2015									12/13/2015
12/14/2015	Las Vegas, NV					Green Valley, NV			12/14/2015
12/15/2015									12/15/2015
12/16/2015	Mesa, AZ					Ankeny, IA	Manchester, NH		12/16/2015
12/17/2015						Knoxville, IA	Muscatine, IA		12/17/2015
12/18/2015						Dubuque, IA			12/18/2015
12/19/2015	Cedar Rapids, IA		Exeter, NH	Contoocook, NH	Windham, NH	Spartanburg, SC	Anderson, SC		12/19/2015
12/20/2015			Nashua, NH						12/20/2015
12/21/2015	Grand Rapids, MI		Alton, NH			Bartlett, NH	Rochester, NH		12/21/2015
12/22/2015			Conway, MA	Berlin, NH	Littleton, NH	Berlin, NH	North Conway, NH		12/22/2015
12/23/2015						Littleton, NH	Franklin, NH		12/23/2015
12/24/2015									12/24/2015
12/25/2015									12/25/2015
12/26/2015									12/26/2015
12/27/2015									12/27/2015
12/28/2015	Nashua, NH		Ocala, FL						12/28/2015
12/29/2015	Council Bluffs, IA					Clinton, IA	Waterloo, IA		12/29/2015
12/30/2015	Hilton Head, SC		Lexington, SC			Newton, IA			12/30/2015
12/31/2015	Biloxi, MS								12/31/2015

Appendix Table 2--Campaign Stops by Candidate, Date, and Location, Continued

Date	Cruz	Cruz2	Clinton	Clinton2	Clinton3	Clinton4	Date
9/1/2015	Seabrook, NH	Concord, NH					9/1/2015
9/2/2015	Houston, TX						9/2/2015
9/3/2015	Fort Worth, TX	Tyler, TX					9/3/2015
9/4/2015			San Juan, Puerto Rico				9/4/2015
9/5/2015			Portsmouth, NH				9/5/2015
9/6/2015			Newton, IA				9/6/2015
9/7/2015			Cedar Rapids, IA				9/7/2015
9/8/2015	Grayson, KY						9/8/2015
9/9/2015	Washington, DC		Washington, DC				9/9/2015
9/10/2015			Columbus, OH	Milwaukee, WI			9/10/2015
9/11/2015							9/11/2015
9/12/2015							9/12/2015
9/13/2015			Washington, DC				9/13/2015
9/14/2015			Decorah, IA				9/14/2015
9/15/2015							9/15/2015
9/16/2015	Simi Valley, CA		Staten Island, NY				9/16/2015
9/17/2015			Nashua, NH	Laconia, NH	Concord, NH		9/17/2015
9/18/2015			Durham, NH	Portland, ME	Plymouth, NH		9/18/2015
9/19/2015	Des Moines, IA		Manchester, NH				9/19/2015
9/20/2015	Urbandale, IA						9/20/2015
9/21/2015			Baton Rouge, LA	Little Rock, AK			9/21/2015
9/22/2015			Des Moines, IA				9/22/2015
9/23/2015							9/23/2015
9/24/2015							9/24/2015
9/25/2015	Washington, DC						9/25/2015
9/26/2015	Thompson, IA	Hampton, IA					9/26/2015
9/27/2015	Urbandale, IA		Los Angeles, CA				9/27/2015
9/28/2015			San Francisco, CA				9/28/2015
9/29/2015			Charlotte, NC				9/29/2015
9/30/2015			New York, NY				9/30/2015
10/1/2015			Belmont, MA	Boston, MA			10/1/2015
10/2/2015	Nashua, NH	Salem, NH	Davie, FL	North Palm Beach, FL	Fort Lauderdale, FL	Miami Beach, FL	10/2/2015
10/3/2015	Hooksett, NH	Laconia, NH	Washington, DC				10/3/2015
10/4/2015	Wolfeboro, NH						10/4/2015
10/5/2015	Kalamazoo, MI		Manchester, NH				10/5/2015
10/6/2015			Davenport, IA	Muscatine, IA			10/6/2015
10/7/2015			Mt. Vernon, IA	Council Bluffs, IA			10/7/2015
10/8/2015			Washington, DC				10/8/2015
10/9/2015	Nashua, NH		Washington, DC				10/9/2015
10/10/2015							10/10/2015
10/11/2015							10/11/2015
10/12/2015							10/12/2015
10/13/2015			Las Vegas, NV				10/13/2015
10/14/2015			Las Vegas, NV				10/14/2015
10/15/2015			San Antonio, TX	Houston, TX			10/15/2015
10/16/2015			Keene, NH	Nashua, NH			10/16/2015
10/17/2015	Contoocook, NH		Birmingham, AL	Hoover, AL			10/17/2015
10/18/2015							10/18/2015
10/19/2015							10/19/2015
10/20/2015							10/20/2015
10/21/2015							10/21/2015
10/22/2015			Washington, DC				10/22/2015
10/23/2015	Glenwood, IA	Council Bluffs, IA	Washington, DC	Alexandria, VA			10/23/2015
10/24/2015	Marshalltown, IA	Waterloo, IA	Des Moines, IA				10/24/2015
10/25/2015			New York, NY				10/25/2015
10/26/2015							10/26/2015
10/27/2015			Morristown, NJ				10/27/2015
10/28/2015	Boulder, CO		Manchester, NH	Bartlett, NH	Meredith, NH		10/28/2015
10/29/2015			Berlin, NH	Littleton, NH			10/29/2015
10/30/2015			Atlanta, GA	Charleston, SC			10/30/2015
10/31/2015	Des Moines, IA	Akron, IA	Charleston, SC				10/31/2015
11/1/2015							11/1/2015
11/2/2015			Chicago, IL	Evanston, IL			11/2/2015
11/3/2015			Coralville, IA	Grinnell, IA			11/3/2015
11/4/2015			Sacramento, CA	Los Angeles, CA			11/4/2015
11/5/2015			Los Angeles, CA	St. Helena, CA			11/5/2015
11/6/2015	Des Moines, IA		Rock Hill, SC				11/6/2015
11/7/2015			Orangeburg, SC	Columbia, SC			11/7/2015
11/8/2015							11/8/2015
11/9/2015			Windham, NH	Nashua, NH			11/9/2015
11/10/2015	Milwaukee, WI		Derry, NH	Hanover, NH	Buffalo, NY		11/10/2015
11/11/2015	Kingston, NH		New York, NY				11/11/2015
11/12/2015	Concord, NH						11/12/2015
11/13/2015							11/13/2015
11/14/2015	Greenville, SC		Des Moines, IA				11/14/2015
11/15/2015	Myrtle Beach, SC		Ames, IA				11/15/2015
11/16/2015	Okatie, SC	Charleston, SC					11/16/2015
11/17/2015			Dallas, TX				11/17/2015
11/18/2015							11/18/2015
11/19/2015			New York, NY				11/19/2015
11/20/2015	Des Moines, IA		Louisville, KY	Memphis, TN	Nashville, TN		11/20/2015
11/21/2015	Clear Lake, IA		Charleston, SC				11/21/2015
11/22/2015			Clinton, IA				11/22/2015
11/23/2015			Reno, NV	Carson City, NV			11/23/2015
11/24/2015			Boulder, CO	Denver, CO			11/24/2015
11/25/2015							11/25/2015
11/26/2015							11/26/2015
11/27/2015							11/27/2015
11/28/2015	Creston, IA	Lamoni, IA					11/28/2015
11/29/2015	Des Moines, IA	Bettendorf, IA	Boston, MA	Manchester, NH			11/29/2015
11/30/2015	Coralville, IA	Clinton, IA	Washington, DC	Chevy Chase, MD			11/30/2015
12/1/2015			Montgomery, AL	Miami Beach, FL			12/1/2015
12/2/2015			Orlando, FL	Thonotosassa, FL	Windermere, FL	Jacksonville, FL	12/2/2015
12/3/2015			Nashua, NH	Manchester, NH	Dover, NH	Boston, MA	12/3/2015
12/4/2015	Johnston, IA		Sioux City, IA				12/4/2015
12/5/2015	Des Moines, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA					12/5/2015
12/6/2015			Washington, DC	Alexandria, VA			12/6/2015
12/7/2015	Greenville, SC		Washington, DC	Owings Mills, MD			12/7/2015
12/8/2015			Salem, NH				12/8/2015
12/9/2015			Waterloo, IA	Urbandale, IA			12/9/2015
12/10/2015			New York, NY				12/10/2015
12/11/2015			Tulsa, OK	St. Louis, MO			12/11/2015
12/12/2015							12/12/2015
12/13/2015							12/13/2015
12/14/2015			Brooklyn, NY				12/14/2015
12/15/2015			Minneapolis, MN				12/15/2015
12/16/2015	Las Vegas, NV		Omaha, NE	Iowa City, IA	Mason City, IA	New York, NY	12/16/2015
12/17/2015	Summerlin South, NV						12/17/2015
12/18/2015							12/18/2015
12/19/2015			New York, NY	Manchester, NH			12/19/2015
12/20/2015							12/20/2015
12/21/2015							12/21/2015
12/22/2015			Keota, IA				12/22/2015
12/23/2015							12/23/2015
12/24/2015							12/24/2015
12/25/2015							12/25/2015
12/26/2015							12/26/2015
12/27/2015							12/27/2015
12/28/2015							12/28/2015
12/29/2015			Portsmouth, NH	Berlin, NH			12/29/2015
12/30/2015							12/30/2015
12/31/2015							12/31/2015

Appendix Table 2--Campaign Stops by Candidate, Date, and Location, Continued

Date	Sanders	Sanders2	Sanders3	Sanders4	Christie	Christie2	Christie3	Paul	Paul2	Paul3	Paul4	Date
9/1/2015								Jefferson, NH	Berlin, NH	North Conway, NH		9/1/2015
9/2/2015								Freedom, NH	Wolfboro, NH	Laconia, NH		9/2/2015
9/3/2015	Grinnell, IA	Ottuma, IA	West Burlington, IA		Littleton, NH	Lancaster, NH	Berlin, NH	Manchester, NH				9/3/2015
9/4/2015	Muscatine, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA			North Conway, NH	Contoocook, NH	Concord, NH					9/4/2015
9/5/2015	Altoona, IA											9/5/2015
9/6/2015												9/6/2015
9/7/2015	Manchester, NH	Amherst, NH	Milford, NH									9/7/2015
9/8/2015					Rye, NH							9/8/2015
9/9/2015												9/9/2015
9/10/2015												9/10/2015
9/11/2015	Atlanta, GA							Indianola, IA	Ames, IA			9/11/2015
9/12/2015	Columbia, SC	Rockhill, SC						Marshalltown, IA	Nevada, IA	Ames, IA		9/12/2015
9/13/2015	Greensboro, NC				Hampton, NH	Dover, NH						9/13/2015
9/14/2015	Lynchburg, VA	Manassas, VA			Manchester, NH							9/14/2015
9/15/2015												9/15/2015
9/16/2015												9/16/2015
9/17/2015								Carson City, NV	Las Vegas, NV	Reno, NV	Ely, NV	9/17/2015
9/18/2015	New York, NY							Henderson, NV				9/18/2015
9/19/2015	Manchester, NH	Goffstown, NH										9/19/2015
9/20/2015	Seabrook, NH	Portsmouth, NH	Exeter, NH	Durham, NH								9/20/2015
9/21/2015												9/21/2015
9/22/2015												9/22/2015
9/23/2015								Rock Hill, SC	Columbia, SC	Spartanburg, SC		9/23/2015
9/24/2015												9/24/2015
9/25/2015	Portsmouth, NH				Nashua, NH			Manchester, NH	Hudson, NH	Salem, NH		9/25/2015
9/26/2015	Des Moines, IA	Newton, IA			Loudon, NH	Concord, NH	Derry, NH	Henniker, NH	Brookline, NH			9/26/2015
9/27/2015	Waukee, IA	Des Moines, IA	Fort Dodge, IA	Mason City								9/27/2015
9/28/2015	Chicago, IL				Alden, IA							9/28/2015
9/29/2015					Des Moines, IA							9/29/2015
9/30/2015												9/30/2015
10/1/2015												10/1/2015
10/2/2015												10/2/2015
10/3/2015	Springfield, MA	Boston, MA										10/3/2015
10/4/2015												10/4/2015
10/5/2015												10/5/2015
10/6/2015												10/6/2015
10/7/2015					Hampstead, NH	Raymond, NH						10/7/2015
10/8/2015					Manchester, NH	Belmont, NH						10/8/2015
10/9/2015	Tucson, AZ				Henniker, NH			Manchester, NH	Nashua, NH			10/9/2015
10/10/2015	Boulder, CO											10/10/2015
10/11/2015												10/11/2015
10/12/2015	Henderson, NV				Manchester, NH			Cedar Rapids, IA	Mt. Vernon, IA	Iowa City, IA		10/12/2015
10/13/2015	Las Vegas, NV							Davenport, IA	Dubuque, IA	West Des Moines, IA	Cedar Falls, IA	10/13/2015
10/14/2015	Los Angeles, CA							Sioux City, IA	Storm Lake, IA	Des Moines, IA		10/14/2015
10/15/2015					Newport, NH							10/15/2015
10/16/2015					Manchester, NH	Bedford, NH		Manchester, NH				10/16/2015
10/17/2015								Hooksett, NH	Contoocook, NH	Ashland, NH		10/17/2015
10/18/2015	Iowa City, IA	Fort Madison, IA						Dalton, NH				10/18/2015
10/19/2015	Oskaloosa, IA											10/19/2015
10/20/2015												10/20/2015
10/21/2015					Newton, IA	Des Moines, IA						10/21/2015
10/22/2015												10/22/2015
10/23/2015	Washington, DC	Davenport, IA										10/23/2015
10/24/2015	Des Moines, IA											10/24/2015
10/25/2015	Des Moines, IA											10/25/2015
10/26/2015	New York, NY											10/26/2015
10/27/2015	New York, NY											10/27/2015
10/28/2015	Fairfax, VA	Washington, DC										10/28/2015
10/29/2015												10/29/2015
10/30/2015	Manchester, NH	Nashua, NH	Derry, NH		Council Bluffs, IA	Orange City, IA		Des Moines, IA				10/30/2015
10/31/2015	Concord, NH	Warner, NH	Lebanon, NH		Des Moines, IA			Newton, IA	Des Moines, IA			10/31/2015
11/1/2015												11/1/2015
11/2/2015								Durham, NH				11/2/2015
11/3/2015												11/3/2015
11/4/2015												11/4/2015
11/5/2015	Concord, NH				Nashua, NH	Somersworth, NH						11/5/2015
11/6/2015	Rock Hill, SC				Concord, NH	Hanover, NH		Spartanburg, Sc				11/6/2015
11/7/2015	Rock Hill, SC	Columbia, SC	Aiken, SC		Plymouth, NH	Bedford, NH						11/7/2015
11/8/2015	Las Vegas, NV											11/8/2015
11/9/2015	Las Vegas, NV											11/9/2015
11/10/2015												11/10/2015
11/11/2015	Lebanon, NH				Bettendorf, IA	Muscatine, IA	Coralville, IA	Council Bluffs, IA	Des Moines, IA	Ames, IA		11/11/2015
11/12/2015					Cedar Rapids, IA	Anamosa, IA	Robins, IA	Johnston, IA	Altoona, IA	Winterset, IA		11/12/2015
11/13/2015					Cedar Falls, IA	Johnston, IA	Nevada, IA	Concord, NH	Somersworth, NH	Portsmouth, NH		11/13/2015
11/14/2015												11/14/2015
11/15/2015	Des Moines, IA	Indianola, IA						Des Moines, IA				11/15/2015
11/16/2015	Cleveland, OH											11/16/2015
11/17/2015												11/17/2015
11/18/2015												11/18/2015
11/19/2015	Washington, DC											11/19/2015
11/20/2015	Charleston, SC							Des Moines, IA				11/20/2015
11/21/2015	Charleston, SC	Columbia, SC	Orangeburg, SC		Stratham, NH	Windham, NH	Manchester, NH	Iowa City, IA				11/21/2015
11/22/2015	St. Helena, SC	Savannah, GA			Bedford, NH							11/22/2015
11/23/2015	Atlanta, GA											11/23/2015
11/24/2015												11/24/2015
11/25/2015												11/25/2015
11/26/2015												11/26/2015
11/27/2015												11/27/2015
11/28/2015												11/28/2015
11/29/2015	Manchester, NH											11/29/2015
11/30/2015					Concord, NH	Loudon, NH						11/30/2015
12/1/2015					Londonderry, NH	Concord, NH						12/1/2015
12/2/2015												12/2/2015
12/3/2015												12/3/2015
12/4/2015					West Des Moines, IA	Jefferson, IA	Fort Dodge, IA	Waukee, IA	Fort Dodge, IA	Mason City, IA	Cedar Falls, IA	12/4/2015
12/5/2015	Keene, NH	Plymouth, NH			Mason City, IA	Iowa Falls, IA		Waterloo, IA	Cedar Falls, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA		12/5/2015
12/6/2015	Washington, DC											12/6/2015
12/7/2015												12/7/2015
12/8/2015	Baltimore, MD											12/8/2015
12/9/2015												12/9/2015
12/10/2015												12/10/2015
12/11/2015					Wolfeboro, NH			Keene, NH	Rindge, NH			12/11/2015
12/12/2015	Anamosa, IA	Clinton, IA	Dubuque, IA	Waterloo, IA	Weare, NH			Nashua, NH	Concord, NH	Manchester, NH		12/12/2015
12/13/2015	Waterloo, IA	Mount Vernon, IA	Davenport, IA									12/13/2015
12/14/2015	Nashua, NH	Hollis, NH										12/14/2015
12/15/2015	Rochester, NH	Hampton, NH	Dover, NH									12/15/2015
12/16/2015	Washington, DC							Reno, NV	Las Vegas, NV			12/16/2015
12/17/2015												12/17/2015
12/18/2015												12/18/2015
12/19/2015	Manchester, NH				Exeter, NH	Derry, NH	Bedford, NH					12/19/2015
12/20/2015					Manchester, NH	Peterborough, NH						12/20/2015
12/21/2015	Sioux City, IA				Hollis, NH	Pelham, NH	New London, NH					12/21/2015
12/22/2015	Storm Lake, IA	Carroll, IA	Harlan, IA	Council Bluffs, IA	Portsmouth, NH							12/22/2015
12/23/2015	Chicago, IL											12/23/2015
12/24/2015												12/24/2015
12/25/2015												12/25/2015
12/26/2015												12/26/2015
12/27/2015	Reno, NV											12/27/2015
12/28/2015	North Las Vegas, NV											12/28/2015
12/29/2015	Muscatine, IA	Davenport, IA			Muscatine, IA	Iowa City, IA						12/29/2015
12/30/2015	Burlington, IA	Keokuk, IA	Ottumwa, IA									12/30/2015
12/31/2015	Knoxville, IA	Des Moines, IA										12/31/2015

Appendix Table 2--Campaign Stops by Candidate, Date, and Location, Continued

Date	Carson	Carson2	Carson3	Carson4	Kasich	Kasich2	Kasich3	Kasich4	Fiorina	Fiorina2	Fiorina3	Fiorina4	Date
9/1/2015													9/1/2015
9/2/2015					Henniker, NH	New London, NH	West Lebanon, NH						9/2/2015
9/3/2015													9/3/2015
9/4/2015													9/4/2015
9/5/2015									Amherst, NH	Manchester, NH	Sandown, NH		9/5/2015
9/6/2015									Derry, NH	Bedford, NH			9/6/2015
9/7/2015					Rye, NH	Milford, NH	Salem, NH		Concord, NH	Milford, NH	Salem, NH		9/7/2015
9/8/2015					Concord, NH	Brookline, NH							9/8/2015
9/9/2015													9/9/2015
9/10/2015													9/10/2015
9/11/2015													9/11/2015
9/12/2015	Aiken, SC				Manchester, NH	Raymond, NH	Dover, NH	Stratham, NH	Chichester, NH	Stratham, NH	Dover, NH		9/12/2015
9/13/2015									Alton, NH	Pembroke, NH	Glen, NH		9/13/2015
9/14/2015													9/14/2015
9/15/2015													9/15/2015
9/16/2015													9/16/2015
9/17/2015													9/17/2015
9/18/2015													9/18/2015
9/19/2015													9/19/2015
9/20/2015													9/20/2015
9/21/2015													9/21/2015
9/22/2015									Charleston, SC	Myrtle Beach, SC			9/22/2015
9/23/2015									Lexington, SC	Rock Hill, SC			9/23/2015
9/24/2015									Spartanburg, SC				9/24/2015
9/25/2015					Hilton Head Island, SC				Davenport, IA	Dubuque, IA			9/25/2015
9/26/2015					Sioux City, IA	Council Bluffs, IA			Iowa City, IA	Arlington, IA			9/26/2015
9/27/2015													9/27/2015
9/28/2015													9/28/2015
9/29/2015													9/29/2015
9/30/2015	Exeter, NH	Durham, NH	Portsmouth, NH	New Castle, NH	Davenport, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA							9/30/2015
10/1/2015	West Des Moines, IA												10/1/2015
10/2/2015	Des Moines, IA	Ankeny, IA			Concord, NH	Goffstown, NH	Manchester, NH		Aiken, SC	Mt Pleasant, SC			10/2/2015
10/3/2015									Hooksett, NH	Hudson, NH	Portsmouth, NH		10/3/2015
10/4/2015									Rye, NH	Windham, NH			10/4/2015
10/5/2015									Manchester, NH	Nashua, NH	Bedford, NH		10/5/2015
10/6/2015													10/6/2015
10/7/2015													10/7/2015
10/8/2015													10/8/2015
10/9/2015					Stratham, NH								10/9/2015
10/10/2015	Columbia, SC												10/10/2015
10/11/2015													10/11/2015
10/12/2015					Manchester, NH								10/12/2015
10/13/2015					Bow, NH	Tilton, NH	Littleton, NH						10/13/2015
10/14/2015					Plymouth, NH	Tuftonboro, NH							10/14/2015
10/15/2015					Nashua, NH				Spencer, IA	Windsor Heights, IA			10/15/2015
10/16/2015									Pleasant Hill, IA	Grinnell, IA			10/16/2015
10/17/2015									Cedar Rapids, IA	Waterloo, IA	Monticello, IA		10/17/2015
10/18/2015													10/18/2015
10/19/2015													10/19/2015
10/20/2015													10/20/2015
10/21/2015													10/21/2015
10/22/2015					Hanover, NH	Newport, NH							10/22/2015
10/23/2015					Manchester, NH	Milford, NH	Concord, NH		Beaufort, SC	Hilton Head, SC			10/23/2015
10/24/2015	Ames, IA	West Des Moines, IA	Waterloo, IA	Dubuque, IA									10/24/2015
10/25/2015													10/25/2015
10/26/2015													10/26/2015
10/27/2015													10/27/2015
10/28/2015													10/28/2015
10/29/2015													10/29/2015
10/30/2015									Orange City, IA				10/30/2015
10/31/2015									Sioux City, IA	Des Moines, IA	Indianola, IA		10/31/2015
11/1/2015									Oskaloosa, IA				11/1/2015
11/2/2015					Des Moines, IA				Oskaloosa, IA				11/2/2015
11/3/2015					Dubuque, IA								11/3/2015
11/4/2015													11/4/2015
11/5/2015					Durham, NH	Londonderry, NH			Concord, NH	Newport, NH			11/5/2015
11/6/2015					Concord, NH	Hopkinton, NH			Manchester, NH	Milford, NH	Dover, NH		11/6/2015
11/7/2015									Franklin, NH	Bedford, NH	Londonderry, NH		11/7/2015
11/8/2015													11/8/2015
11/9/2015													11/9/2015
11/10/2015													11/10/2015
11/11/2015					West Columbia, SC	Hilton Head Island, SC							11/11/2015
11/12/2015					Exeter, NH	Concord, NH			Onawa, IA	Harlan, IA			11/12/2015
11/13/2015	Greenville, SC				Hudons, NH	Laconia, NH			Council Bluffs, IA	Corning, IA	Greenfield, IA		11/13/2015
11/14/2015													11/14/2015
11/15/2015	Las Vegas, NV												11/15/2015
11/16/2015	Green Valley, NV								Plymouth, NH				11/16/2015
11/17/2015									Concord, NH				11/17/2015
11/18/2015									Henniker, NH	Keene, NH			11/18/2015
11/19/2015	Columbia, SC				Spartanburg, SC	Charleston, SC							11/19/2015
11/20/2015	Concord, NH				Hollis, NH				Des Moines, IA				11/20/2015
11/21/2015	Des Moines, IA	Tipton, IA	Wilton, IA	Davenport, IA	Berlin, NH	Sanbornville, NH	Dover, NH		Dike, IA				11/21/2015
11/22/2015									Wilton, IA				11/22/2015
11/23/2015	Pahrump, NV								Des Moines, IA	Council Bluffs, IA	Sioux City, IA		11/23/2015
11/24/2015													11/24/2015
11/25/2015													11/25/2015
11/26/2015													11/26/2015
11/27/2015													11/27/2015
11/28/2015													11/28/2015
11/29/2015													11/29/2015
11/30/2015					Ames, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA			Greenville, SC	Anderson, SC			11/30/2015
12/1/2015									Columbia, SC	West Columbia, SC	Charleston, SC		12/1/2015
12/2/2015	Rock Hill, SC	Spartanburg, SC											12/2/2015
12/3/2015					Salem, NH								12/3/2015
12/4/2015					Manchester, NH	Lebanon, NH							12/4/2015
12/5/2015	Waterloo, IA	Cedar Rapids, IA			Claremont, NH	New London, NH			Cedar Rapids, IA				12/5/2015
12/6/2015									Coon Rapids, IA				12/6/2015
12/7/2015									Cedar Rapids, IA				12/7/2015
12/8/2015					Myrtle Beach, SC				Des Moines, IA				12/8/2015
12/9/2015									Lebanon, NH				12/9/2015
12/10/2015					Manchester, NH	Merrimack, NH			Concord, NH	Bedford, NH	Derry, NH		12/10/2015
12/11/2015	Burlington, IA	Moravia, IA			Keene, NH	Peterborough, NH	Bedford, NH		Manchester, NH	Nashua, NH	Exeter, NH		12/11/2015
12/12/2015													12/12/2015
12/13/2015													12/13/2015
12/14/2015													12/14/2015
12/15/2015													12/15/2015
12/16/2015	Elko, NV	Las Vegas, NV	Carson City, NV		Ankeny, IA				Reno, NV				12/16/2015
12/17/2015	McGregor, IA	Mason City, IA			Waterloo, IA	Des Moines, IA							12/17/2015
12/18/2015	Storm Lake, IA	Orange City, IA	Sioux City, IA						Clinton, IA	Dubuque, IA	Davenport, IA		12/18/2015
12/19/2015	Carroll, IA	Harlan, IA	Council Bluffs, IA						Burlington, IA	Washington, IA			12/19/2015
12/20/2015	Nashua, NH				Manchester, NH	Portsmouth, NH							12/20/2015
12/21/2015	Manchester, NH	Concord, NH			Greenland, NH	Rochester, NH	Concord, NH		Mt. Pleasant, SC	Pawleys Island, SC			12/21/2015
12/22/2015	Summerville, SC								Florence, SC				12/22/2015
12/23/2015													12/23/2015
12/24/2015													12/24/2015
12/25/2015													12/25/2015
12/26/2015													12/26/2015
12/27/2015													12/27/2015
12/28/2015					Manchester, NH	Derry, NH							12/28/2015
12/29/2015					Nashua, NH	Keene, NH							12/29/2015
12/30/2015													12/30/2015
12/31/2015													12/31/2015

Note: this list contains all recorded campaign including those not matched to our own sample of parish bulletins. There are multiple columns for candidates as candidates sometimes made more than one stop in a day.

Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of Parishes in Baseline Estimates



Appendix Figure 2: Results Dropping Each State, Except New Hampshire



The figure presents a histogram of coefficients from a regression of church collections on campaigns with each state dropped. All regressions difference data and include bulletins from 2014 and 2015 and include a constant. The y axis shows the number of regressions that produced a campaign coefficient in a given bin. The baseline coefficient, including all states, is 0.0204. All coefficients from this exercise are statistically significant. Results dropping New Hampshire are reported in Table 3 and produce a coefficient of 0.0273, which would be to the right of the above picture.