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MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY
ON ASSET PRICES

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Measuring the Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Asset Prices

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ABSTRACT

I adapt the methods of Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) to estimate two dimensions of monetary policy during the 2009-2015 zero lower bound period in the U.S. I show that, after a suitable rotation, these two dimensions can be interpreted as "forward guidance" and "large-scale asset purchases" (LSAPs). I estimate the sizes of the forward guidance and LSAP components of each FOMC announcement between January 2009 and June 2015, and show that those estimates correspond closely to identifiable features of major FOMC announcements over that period. Forward guidance has relatively small effects on the longest-maturity Treasury yields and essentially no effect on corporate bond yields, while LSAPs have large effects on those yields but essentially no effect on short-term Treasuries. Both types of policies have significant effects on medium-term Treasury yields, stock prices, and exchange rates.

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1. Introduction

On December 16, 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the federal funds rate—its traditional monetary policy instrument—to essentially zero in response to the most severe U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression. Because U.S. currency carries an interest rate of zero, it is essentially impossible for the FOMC to target a value for the federal funds rate that is substantially less than zero. Faced with this zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the FOMC subsequently began to pursue alternative, “unconventional” monetary policies, with particular emphasis on forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases (defined below). In this paper, I propose a new method to identify and estimate the effects of these two main types of unconventional monetary policy.

Understanding the effects of unconventional monetary policy is an important topic for both policymakers and researchers. Many central banks around the world have found themselves constrained by the zero lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates. Central banks faced with this constraint must pursue unconventional monetary policy if they wish to affect financial markets and/or the economy. Understanding the effects of different types of unconventional monetary policy, then, allows policymakers and researchers to better understand the efficacy, strengths, and weaknesses of the various alternatives.

The effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy is also an important determinant of the costs of the zero lower bound constraint. If unconventional monetary policy is relatively ineffective, then the ZLB constraint is more costly, and policymakers should go to greater lengths to prevent hitting the ZLB in the first place—such as by choosing a higher target rate of inflation, as advocated by several authors (see Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010; *The Wall Street Journal*, 2010; and Ball, 2014). On the other hand, if unconventional monetary policy is very effective, then the ZLB constraint is much less costly and policymakers do not need to take such drastic action to avoid hitting it in the future.

In the present paper, I focus on measuring the effects of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases in particular, since those were the two types of unconventional monetary policy used most extensively by the Federal Reserve during the recent U.S. ZLB period. The term “forward guidance” refers to communication by the FOMC about the likely future path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters or years. “Large-scale asset purchases” (or LSAPs) refers to purchases by the Federal Reserve of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of longer-term assets, such as long-term U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. The goals of

TABLE 1: MAJOR UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 2009–2015

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| March 18, 2009 | FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 basis points (bp) for “an extended period”, and that it will purchase \$750B of mortgage-backed securities, \$300B of longer-term Treasuries, and \$100B of agency debt (a.k.a. “QE1”) |
| November 3, 2010 | FOMC announces it will purchase an additional \$600B of longer-term Treasuries (a.k.a. “QE2”) |
| August 9, 2011 | FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp “at least through mid-2013” |
| September 21, 2011 | FOMC announces it will sell \$400B of short-term Treasuries and use the proceeds to buy \$400B of long-term Treasuries (a.k.a. “Operation Twist”) |
| January 25, 2012 | FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp “at least through late 2014” |
| September 13, 2012 | FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp “at least through mid-2015”, and that it will purchase \$40B of mortgage-backed securities per month for the indefinite future |
| December 12, 2012 | FOMC announces it will purchase \$45B of longer-term Treasuries per month for the indefinite future, and that it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp at least as long as the unemployment remains above 6.5 percent and inflation expectations remain subdued |
| December 18, 2013 | FOMC announces it will start to taper its purchases of longer-term Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities to paces of \$40B and \$35B per month, respectively |
| December 17, 2014 | FOMC announces that “it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy” |

both policies was to lower longer-term U.S. interest rates using methods other than changes in the current federal funds rate. Both types of unconventional monetary policy were used extensively by the Federal Reserve, as can be seen in Table 1. Note that, in addition to the major unconventional monetary policy announcements listed in Table 1, there was incremental news about these policies that was released to financial markets at almost every FOMC meeting, such as updates that a policy was ongoing, was likely to be continued, or might be adjusted.

A major challenge in identifying and estimating the effects of the FOMC’s unconventional monetary policy announcements is determining the size and type of each announcement. For example, many of the statements in Table 1 were at least partially anticipated by financial markets prior to their official release. Because financial markets are forward-looking, the anticipated component of each announcement should not have any effect on asset prices; only the unanticipated component should be news to financial markets and have an effect. But determining the size of the unexpected component of each announcement in Table 1 is very difficult, because there are no

good data on what financial markets expected the outcome of each FOMC announcement to be.¹

A closely related issue is that the FOMC can sometimes surprise markets through its *inaction* rather than its actions. For example, on September 18, 2013, financial markets widely expected the FOMC to begin tapering its LSAPs, but the FOMC decided not to do so, surprising markets and leading to a large effect on asset prices despite the fact that no action was announced.² This implies that even dates *not* listed in Table 1 could have produced a significant surprise in financial markets and led to large effects on asset prices and the economy.

Determining the type—forward guidance vs. LSAP— of any given announcement can also be very difficult. For example, many announcements in Table 1 clearly contain significant news about both types of policies, which makes disentangling the news on those dates challenging. Even in the case of a seemingly clear-cut announcement, both types of policies may be at work: in particular, several authors have argued that LSAPs affect the economy by changing financial market expectations about the future path of the federal funds rate (see, e.g., Woodford, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014). To the extent that this channel is operative, even a pure LSAP announcement would have important forward guidance implications. This makes disentangling the two types of policies even more difficult than it might at first seem.

In this paper, I address these problems by adapting the methods of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005, henceforth GSS) to the zero lower bound period in the U.S., from 2009 to 2015. The problem GSS faced was similar to the problem I face here, in that GSS were interested in separately identifying the effects of two dimensions of monetary policy: changes in the current federal funds rate vs. changes in the FOMC’s forward guidance. In the zero lower bound environment I consider here, there are also two dimensions of monetary policy, but now those two dimensions are different: changes in forward guidance and LSAPs. (Changes in the current federal funds rate are not a significant component of monetary policy during this period because of the zero lower bound constraint on the funds rate.)

Following GSS, I look at how financial markets responded in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement between 2009 and 2015, and compute the first two principal components of those asset price responses. The idea is that forward guidance and LSAPs were

¹In contrast, for conventional monetary policy—changes in the federal funds rate—federal funds futures and other short-term financial market instruments provide very good measures of market expectations leading up to each announcement. See Kuttner (2001), Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005, 2007), and others.

²For example, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that “No Taper Shocks Wall Street,” and “Bernanke had a free pass to begin that tapering process and chose not to follow [through]... The Fed had the market precisely where it needed to be. The delay today has the effect of raising the benchmark to tapering...” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2013b,c).

by far the two most important components of FOMC announcements for financial markets, and thus their effects should be well captured by the first two principal components of the asset price responses. I then search over all possible rotations of these two principal components to find the specification in which one of the two factors has the clearest interpretation as a “forward guidance” factor, using the estimated effect of forward guidance from the pre-ZLB period (computed exactly as in GSS) as the benchmark for what the effects of forward guidance should look like. The remaining, orthogonal factor can then be interpreted as the second main dimension of monetary policy during this period. I interpret this second factor as measuring the FOMC’s LSAP announcements and present evidence that supports this interpretation. For example, I plot both of these factors—forward guidance and LSAPs—over time and show that they fit identifiable features of major FOMC announcements over the period quite well. In this way, I separately identify the size of the forward guidance and LSAP component of every FOMC announcement between January 2009 and June 2015.

Once the FOMC’s forward guidance and LSAP announcements are identified, it’s then straightforward to estimate the effects of each type of announcement on the high-frequency response of different types of asset prices around those announcements.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the analytical methods of GSS, show how to adapt them to the recent ZLB period, and describe the data. In Section 3, I perform the principal component analysis and rotate the factors as described above. I plot the estimated factors over time and discuss their relationship to identifiable features of major announcements by the FOMC over the ZLB period, showing that my estimates of forward guidance and LSAP announcements seem to be well identified and informative. In Section 4, I estimate the effects of these announcements on Treasury yields, stock prices, exchange rates, and corporate bond yields and spreads. In Section 5, I discuss the implications of my findings for monetary policy going forward.

2. Methods and Data

My methods in the present paper consist of two main steps. First, I extend the analysis of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) through December 16, 2008, which was the last time the FOMC announced a change in the federal funds rate target. (After December 16, 2008, the funds rate was essentially at a level of zero, and the FOMC was unable or unwilling to lower the

federal funds rate any further.) This allows me to identify and estimate the effects of changes in the federal funds rate and changes in forward guidance in “normal times”, before the ZLB began to bind.³ Second, I adapt the methods of GSS to the ZLB period from January 2009 through June 2015, during which the FOMC never changed the current federal funds rate target but made multiple unconventional monetary policy announcements involving forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases, as noted in Table 1. I thus use the GSS methods, applied to the ZLB sample, to identify and estimate the effects of forward guidance and LSAPs during this later period.

I extend the GSS dataset through June 2015 using data obtained from staff at the Federal Reserve Board. The combined dataset includes the date of each FOMC announcement from July 1991 through June 2015, and the change in a number of asset prices in a 30-minute window bracketing each announcement.⁴ The asset prices include federal funds futures rates (contracts with expiration at the end of the current month and each of the next five months), eurodollar futures rates (contracts with expiration near the end of the current quarter and each of the next seven quarters), Treasury bond yields (for the 3-month, 6-month and 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year maturities), the stock market (as measured by the S&P 500), and the U.S. dollar-yen and dollar-euro exchange rates.

To replicate the GSS analysis over the pre-ZLB period, I focus on the responses of the first and third federal funds futures contracts, the second, third, and fourth Eurodollar futures contracts, and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields to each FOMC announcement from July 1991 through December 2008. The two federal funds futures contracts can be scaled so as to provide good estimates of the market expectation of what the federal funds rate will be after the current and next FOMC meetings (see GSS, 2005, for details). The second through fourth Eurodollar futures contracts provide information about the market expectation of the path of the federal funds rate over the horizon from about 4 months to 1 year ahead.⁵ The 2-, 5-, and 10-year

³My results are very similar if I end the sample in December 2004, as GSS did, or in December 2007.

⁴The window begins 10 minutes before the FOMC announcement and ends 20 minutes after the FOMC announcement. The dataset also includes the dates and times of FOMC announcements and some intraday asset price responses going back to January 1990, but the data for Treasury yield responses begins in July 1991, and those data are an important part of my analysis. Also, as is standard in the literature, I exclude the FOMC announcement on September 17, 2001, which took place after financial markets had been closed for several days following the September 11 terrorist attacks. I also include the Federal Reserve Board’s announcement on November 25, 2008, that it would begin purchasing mortgage-backed securities and GSE debt (the beginning of “QE1”)—although this announcement was not made by the FOMC itself, all subsequent asset purchase announcements were made by the FOMC, so I include it with those others. However, including or excluding this announcement does not noticeably affect any of my results.

⁵The reason for focusing on some rather than all of the possible futures contract rates in the dataset is to avoid

Treasury yields provide information about interest rate expectations and risk premia over longer horizons, about 1 to 10 years.

These asset price responses to FOMC announcements can be written as a matrix X , with rows of X corresponding to FOMC announcements and columns of X corresponding to different futures rates and Treasury yields. Since there are 159 FOMC announcements from July 1991 through December 2008, and I focus on 8 asset price responses, the matrix X has dimensions 159×8 .

As in GSS, I use principal component analysis to estimate the two factors that make the most important contribution to the variation in X . The idea is that the asset price responses in X are well described by a factor model,

$$X = F\Lambda + \varepsilon, \tag{1}$$

where F is a 159×2 matrix containing two factors, Λ is a 2×8 matrix of loadings of the asset price responses on the two factors, and ε is a 159×8 matrix of white noise residuals. Letting F denote the first two principal components of X , the two columns of F represent the two components of the FOMC's announcements that have had the greatest impact on the assets in X over the period from July 1991 to December 2008.

Although the first two principal components of X explain a maximal fraction of the variation in X , they are only a statistical decomposition and typically do not have a structural interpretation. In order to associate one column of F with changes in the federal funds rate and the other column with changes in forward guidance—which is a structural interpretation—it's necessary to transform the factor matrix F so that it fits this interpretation.

Keeping this goal in mind, note that if F and Λ characterize the data X in equation (1), and U is any 2×2 orthogonal matrix, then the matrix $\tilde{F} \equiv FU$ and loadings $\tilde{\Lambda} \equiv U'\Lambda$ represent an alternative factor model that fits the data X exactly as well as F and U , in the sense that it

overlapping contracts as much as possible, since they are highly correlated for technical rather than policy-related reasons. When I conduct the principal components analysis of the data below, futures contracts that are highly correlated will tend to show up as a common factor, which would not be interesting if the correlation was generated by overlapping contracts rather than the way monetary policy is conducted. For example, FOMC announcements are generally spaced 6 to 8 weeks apart, so there is essentially no gain to including the second federal funds futures contract in addition to the first—the second contract is very highly correlated with the first fed funds futures contract, once the latter contract has been scaled to represent the outcome of the current FOMC meeting. Similarly, including the first Eurodollar futures contract would provide essentially no additional information beyond the first and third fed funds futures contracts. I follow GSS and switch from federal funds futures to Eurodollar futures contracts at a horizon of about 2 quarters because Eurodollar futures were much more liquid over this sample than longer-maturity fed funds futures, and are thus likely to provide a better measure of financial market expectations at those longer horizons (see Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2007).

produces exactly the same residuals ε in equation (1).⁶ Ideally, we would like the two columns of F to correspond to changes in the federal funds rate and changes in the FOMC’s forward guidance, as mentioned above. Although the first two principal components of X do not in general have this interpretation, we can choose a rotation matrix U such that the rotated factors \tilde{F} do have such an interpretation. In particular, we can choose U such that, if \tilde{f}_1 and \tilde{f}_2 are the two columns of \tilde{F} , then \tilde{f}_2 has *no* effect on the current federal funds rate.⁷ This implies that all of the variation in the current federal funds rate (up to the white noise residuals ε) in response to FOMC announcements is due to changes in the first factor, \tilde{f}_1 . The factor \tilde{f}_1 can thus be interpreted as the surprise component of the FOMC’s change in the federal funds rate target. The second factor, \tilde{f}_2 , then corresponds to all of the *other* information in the FOMC’s announcements, above and beyond the surprise change in the funds rate, that changed financial market expectations about the *future path* of the funds rate. Thus, \tilde{f}_2 can be thought of as “forward guidance” by the FOMC.⁸ As GSS show, the second factor \tilde{f}_2 , identified in this way, corresponds closely to important changes in the FOMC’s statements about the outlook for the future path of monetary policy, supporting the interpretation of \tilde{f}_2 as the change in the FOMC’s forward guidance.

I next adapt this methodology to the zero lower bound period in the U.S., from January 2009 to June 2015. As in GSS and discussed above, I create a data matrix X with rows corresponding to FOMC announcements between January 2009 and June 2015, and columns corresponding to the responses of different futures rates and bond yields in a narrow, 30-minute window bracketing each announcement. However, I exclude the first and third federal funds futures contracts and the second Eurodollar futures contract from this analysis, because those contracts have such short maturities that they essentially do not respond to news during the ZLB period.⁹ The matrix X that I construct for the ZLB sample thus has dimensions 52×5 , corresponding to the 52 FOMC announcements over this period, and 5 different asset price responses: the third and

⁶The scale of F and Λ are also indeterminate: if k is any scalar, then kF and Λ/k also fit the data X exactly as well as F and Λ . Traditionally, the scale of F is normalized so that each column has unit variance.

⁷In other words, $\tilde{\lambda}_{21} = 0$, where $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}$ denotes the (i, j) th element of $\tilde{\Lambda}$, so the current-month federal funds futures contract is not affected by changes in the second factor.

⁸GSS called \tilde{f}_1 the “target factor” and \tilde{f}_2 the “path factor”, because it relates to the future path of the federal funds rate, but the latter is now typically referred to as “forward guidance”.

⁹The first and third federal funds futures contracts correspond to federal funds rate expectations over the next 1 and 3 months, respectively, and the second Eurodollar futures contract corresponds to funds rate expectations from about three to six months ahead. As shown by Swanson and Williams (2014), interest rates at these short maturities essentially stopped responding systematically to news from 2009 to 2012 (the end of their sample), and this remains true through about mid-2015.

fourth Eurodollar futures contracts and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields.

As in GSS and discussed above, I extract the first two principal components from the matrix X . These are the two features of FOMC announcements between 2009 and mid-2015 that moved the five yields listed above the most. As before, these two principal components do not have a structural interpretation in general. Let F^{zlb} denote the 52×2 matrix of principal components, let U be a 2×2 orthogonal matrix, let $\tilde{F}^{\text{zlb}} \equiv F^{\text{zlb}}U$, and let \tilde{f}_1^{zlb} and \tilde{f}_2^{zlb} denote the first and second columns of \tilde{F}^{zlb} . I search over all possible rotation matrices U to find the one where the first rotated factor \tilde{f}_1^{zlb} is as close as possible (in terms of its asset price effects) to the “forward guidance factor” \tilde{f}_2 estimated previously (over the 1991–2008 sample).¹⁰ The identifying assumption is thus that the effect of forward guidance on medium- and longer-term interest rates during the ZLB period is about the same as it was during the pre-ZLB period from 1991–2008. The remaining factor, \tilde{f}_2^{zlb} , then corresponds to the component of FOMC announcements, above and beyond changes in forward guidance, that have the biggest effect on medium- and longer-term interest rates. It is natural to interpret this second factor as corresponding to the FOMC’s large-scale asset purchases.

The crucial assumption underlying this identification is that forward guidance has essentially the same effects on medium- and longer-term interest rates before and after the ZLB. This assumption is subject to debate, but it provides a natural starting point for my analysis and in fact seems to work very well, as I show below. Thus, for every FOMC announcement from January 2009 through June 2015, I can separately identify the forward guidance component and the LSAP component of that announcement. Once I’ve separately identified the two components, it’s straightforward to estimate the effects of each component on asset prices using ordinary least squares regressions.

3. The FOMC’s Forward Guidance and LSAP Announcements

I now report the results of these methods applied to the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods.

3.1 Federal Funds Rate and Forward Guidance Factors before the ZLB

Table 2 reports the rotated loading matrices $\tilde{\Lambda}$ from the estimation procedure described above. The first two rows report results for the pre-ZLB period, July 1991 to December 2008. Each factor,

¹⁰In other words, I choose the rotation matrix U that matches the factor loadings $\tilde{\lambda}_{11}^{\text{zlb}}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{12}^{\text{zlb}}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{13}^{\text{zlb}}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{14}^{\text{zlb}}$, and $\tilde{\lambda}_{15}^{\text{zlb}}$ to $\tilde{\lambda}_{24}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{25}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{26}$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{27}$, and $\tilde{\lambda}_{28}$ as closely as possible, in the sense of minimum Euclidean distance.

TABLE 2: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON INTEREST RATES BEFORE AND AFTER DEC. 2008

| | MP1 | MP2 | ED2 | ED3 | ED4 | 2y Tr. | 5y Tr. | 10y Tr. |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------|
| July 1991–Dec. 2008: | | | | | | | | |
| (1) change in federal funds rate | 8.55 | 6.23 | 5.88 | 5.59 | 4.81 | 3.79 | 1.91 | 0.68 |
| (2) change in forward guidance | 0.00 | 1.18 | 4.23 | 5.42 | 6.12 | 5.08 | 5.20 | 4.02 |
| Jan. 2009–June 2015: | | | | | | | | |
| (3) change in forward guidance | — | — | — | 3.18 | 4.15 | 3.33 | 4.24 | 2.35 |
| (4) change in LSAPs | — | — | — | −0.73 | −0.99 | −1.27 | −4.90 | −7.46 |
| memo: | | | | | | | | |
| (5) row 3, rescaled | — | — | — | 4.68 | 6.11 | 4.89 | 6.24 | 3.45 |

Coefficients in the table correspond to elements of the loading matrix Λ from equation (1), in basis points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument (except for row 5, which is rescaled). MP1 and MP2 denote scaled changes in the first and third federal funds futures contracts, respectively; ED2, ED3, and ED4 denote changes in the second through fourth Eurodollar futures contracts; and 2y, 5y, and 10y Tr. denote changes in 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields. See text for details.

\tilde{f}_1 and \tilde{f}_2 , is normalized to have a unit standard deviation over this sample, so the coefficients in the table are in units of basis points (bp) per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. A one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate over this period is estimated to cause the current federal funds rate to rise by about 8.6bp, the expected federal funds rate at the next FOMC meeting to rise about 6.2bp, the second through fourth Eurodollar futures rates to rise by 5.9, 5.6, and 4.8bp, respectively, and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields to increase by 3.8, 1.9, and 0.7bp, respectively. The effects of a surprise change in the federal funds rate are thus largest at the short end of the yield curve and die off monotonically as the maturity of the interest rate increases.

The effects of forward guidance, in the second row, are quite different. By construction, a shock to the forward guidance factor has *no* effect on the current federal funds rate. At longer maturities, however, the forward guidance factor’s effects increase, peaking at a maturity of about one year, and then dying off slightly for longer maturities. Thus, changes in forward guidance have a roughly hump-shaped effect on the yield curve. For longer-term yields, such as the 5- and 10-year yields, changes in forward guidance are a far more important source of variation than are changes in the federal funds rate, as originally emphasized by GSS.

3.2 Forward Guidance and LSAP Factors during the ZLB Period

The third and fourth rows of Table 2 report the rotated loadings $\tilde{\Lambda}$ for the ZLB period from

January 2009 through June 2015. The third row reports the effects of a one-standard-deviation change in forward guidance on the third and fourth Eurodollar futures contract and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields, respectively. By construction, these coefficients match those in the second row as closely as possible, up to a constant scale factor, so the effect of forward guidance is hump-shaped with a peak at intermediate maturities of about 1 year. (For reference, the fifth row of Table 2 rescales the coefficients in row 3 so that their correspondence to the second row can be seen more easily.)

The fourth row reports the effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in the FOMC’s asset purchases. I normalize the sign of this factor so that an increase in purchases causes interest rates to fall. The effect on yields is relatively small at short and medium horizons but increases steadily with maturity—exactly the opposite of changes in the current federal funds rate. At a horizon of one year, the effect of LSAPs is only about 1bp, but for the 10-year Treasury yield, the effect is more than seven times larger, about 7.5bp.


3.3 Correspondence of Factors to Notable FOMC Announcements

In Figure 1, I plot the time series of estimated values of the forward guidance and LSAP factors for each FOMC announcement from January 2009 to June 2015. The dashed blue line depicts the forward guidance factor, and the solid orange line the LSAP factor. To make the interpretation of the LSAP factor more intuitive, I scale it by -1 in the figure, so that an increase in LSAPs appears as a *negative* value; this sign convention implies that positive values in the figure correspond to monetary policy tightenings and negative values to monetary policy easings. The figure also contains brief annotations that help to explain some of the larger observations in the figure.

The largest and most striking observation in Figure 1 is the negative 5.5-standard-deviation LSAP announcement on March 18, 2009, near the beginning of the ZLB sample. This observation corresponds to the announcement of the FOMC’s first LSAP program, often referred to as “QE1” in the press.¹¹ The key elements of this program are listed in Table 1, and the announcement seems to have been a major surprise to financial markets, given the huge estimated size of the factor on that date. Note that my identification procedure for forward guidance vs. LSAP announcements described above attributes the effects of this announcement to the LSAP factor. Given that this

¹¹The “QE1” program began on November 25, 2008, when the Federal Reserve Board announced it would purchase \$600 billion of mortgage-backed securities and \$100 billion of debt issued by the mortgage-related government-sponsored enterprises. The term “QE1” typically refers to both this earlier program and the huge expansion of that program announced on March 18, 2009.

FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED FORWARD GUIDANCE AND LSAP FACTORS, 2009–2015



Plot of estimated forward guidance (dashed blue line) and LSAP (solid orange line) factors, \tilde{f}_1^{zlb} and \tilde{f}_2^{zlb} , over time. Notable FOMC announcements are labeled in the figure for reference. The LSAP factor is multiplied by -1 in the figure so that positive values in the figure correspond to interest rate increases. See text for details.

FOMC announcement placed such a large emphasis on asset purchases, my identification seems to be working well so far.

It's also interesting that the FOMC's subsequent "QE2" program, described in Table 1, does not show up as a major event in Figure 1, perhaps because it was anticipated by financial markets in advance. Looking at Figure 1 around the November 3, 2010, announcement date of the program, there is essentially no estimated effect, because the interest rates included in the estimation responded very little to the announcement. Thus, even though the QE2 announcement was roughly one-half as large as the earlier QE1 announcement in terms of the quantity of purchases, the surprise component of that announcement appears to have been dramatically smaller.

The next major event in Figure 1 is the negative 3-standard-deviation forward guidance announcement on September 23, 2009. On this date, the FOMC stated it would extend its asset purchase program by an additional three months, through 2010Q1 rather than 2009Q4. From the text of the FOMC statement alone, it's unclear whether the announcement should be regarded as forward guidance or LSAPs, or both. However, my identification characterizes this announcement as forward guidance, based on the way financial markets responded (i.e., shorter-term interest rates responded more than longer-term interest rates). It's important to bear in mind that the U.S. economy was beginning to recover by late 2009 and financial markets expected the FOMC to begin raising the federal funds rate in just a few quarters (Swanson and Williams, 2014), but not until a few meetings after completing its asset purchase program. Thus, an extension of the end date of the LSAP program was taken by markets to imply a correspondingly later liftoff date for the federal funds rate.

August 9, 2011, is another interesting date in Figure 1. That announcement marked the first time the FOMC gave explicit (rather than implicit) forward guidance about the likely path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters. In that announcement, described in Table 1, the FOMC stated that it expected the current (essentially zero) level of the federal funds rate would be appropriate "at least through mid-2013", a date almost two years in the future. Reassuringly, I estimate the announcement on this date as a negative 2-standard-deviation surprise in forward guidance, with essentially no LSAP component.

The next FOMC announcement, on September 21, 2011, corresponds to "Operation Twist", described in Table 1, a program where the FOMC sold about \$400 billion of short-term Treasury securities in its portfolio and used the proceeds to purchase a like quantity of long-term Treasuries. As can be seen in Figure 1, this announcement is estimated to have both LSAP and

forward guidance components: a negative 1.3-standard-deviation LSAP effect (which is intuitive), and a *positive* 2-standard-deviation forward guidance effect, which is perhaps surprising. This latter effect is due to the fact that shorter-maturity interest rates rose in response to the FOMC announcement—presumably due to a change in risk premia on those securities resulting from the large increase in expected sales by the Fed. Although this is probably not an example of forward guidance by the FOMC per se, it nevertheless looks like forward guidance in the data because of the unusual implication of the announcement for short-term Treasury yields. Thus, even though my identification is arguably missing this subtle distinction on this particular date, the estimates coming out of the identification are intuitive and sensible.

On June 19, 2013, I estimate a substantial, 2-standard-deviation decrease in the LSAP factor (which is positive in Figure 1 because it represents a monetary policy tightening). There is little change in the FOMC statement on that date, but as reported by *The Wall Street Journal*, the FOMC released economic projections along with the statement that showed a substantial increase in the FOMC’s economic outlook. Given earlier remarks by then-Chairman Ben Bernanke that the FOMC could begin tapering its asset purchases soon, markets interpreted this as a signal that a tapering was imminent: for example, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that “Bond prices slumped, sending the yield on the 10-year Treasury note to its highest level in 15 months, as the Federal Reserve upgraded its growth projections for the U.S. economy... Stronger U.S. growth is widely perceived in the market as heralding an earlier end to the Fed’s program of purchasing \$85 billion in bonds each month...” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2013a). Thus, this episode fits into the “taper tantrum” period during the summer of 2013, and appears to be correctly identified by my procedure as an increase in interest rates due to the LSAP factor.

The flip side of this announcement occurred on September 18, 2013, when the FOMC was widely expected to begin tapering its asset purchases but opted not to do so. *The Wall Street Journal* reported that “No Taper Shocks Wall Street,” and “The move, coming after Fed officials spent months alerting the public that they might begin to pare their \$85 billion-a-month bond-buying program at the September policy meeting, marks the latest in a string of striking turnabouts from Washington policy makers that have whipsawed markets in recent days” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2013b,c).¹² The surprise decision by the FOMC not to taper its asset purchases seems to be correctly identified in my estimates as an increase in LSAPs (depicted as

¹² *The Wall Street Journal* also reported that “Bernanke had a free pass to begin that tapering process and chose not to follow [through]... The Fed had the market precisely where it needed to be. The delay today has the effect of raising the benchmark to tapering...” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2013b,c).

a negative value in Figure 1 since it is a monetary policy easing).

Near the end of my sample, on December 17, 2014, markets expected the FOMC to remove its statement that it would keep the federal funds rate at essentially zero “for a considerable time”. Not only did the FOMC leave that phrase intact, it announced that “the Committee judges it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy,” which was substantially more dovish than financial markets had expected.¹³ This announcement thus appears to be correctly identified by my estimation as a large, negative 2.5-standard deviation decrease in forward guidance by the FOMC.

Finally, on March 18, 2015, the FOMC revised its projections for U.S. output, inflation, and the federal funds rate substantially downward, significantly below what markets had expected. The revised forecast was read by financial markets “as a sign that the central bank would take its time in raising borrowing costs for the economy...” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2015a,b). Again, my estimation appears to correctly identify this announcement as a substantial, negative 3-standard-deviation change in forward guidance.

3.4 Scale of Forward Guidance and LSAP Factors

The forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated above and plotted in Figure 1 are normalized to have a unit standard deviation over the sample. Similarly, the loadings in Table 2 are for these normalized factors and thus represent a basis points per standard deviation effect. For practical policy applications, however, it’s more useful to convert these factors to a scale that is less abstract and more tangible.

For forward guidance, it’s natural to think of the factor in terms of a 25bp effect on the Eurodollar future rate one year ahead, ED4. Note that a forward guidance announcement of this size would be very large by historical standards, equal to about a 6-standard-deviation surprise during the ZLB period, or a 4-standard-deviation surprise in the pre-ZLB period.¹⁴ To estimate the effects of a forward guidance announcement of this magnitude, we can multiply the coefficients in the third row of Table 2 by a factor of about 6, which implies that the effects on the 5- and

¹³For example, “U.S. stocks surged... after the Federal Reserve issued an especially dovish policy statement at the conclusion of the FOMC meetings,” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2014).

¹⁴Interestingly, I estimate that the FOMC’s forward guidance announcements were larger on average before the ZLB than during the ZLB, as can be seen in Table 2. One explanation for why this may be is that, once the FOMC issued its “mid-2013” forward guidance, there were essentially no updates or news about that guidance for many meetings. Similarly, after the FOMC revised the guidance to “late 2014”, there were again no updates or news about that guidance for many more meetings, and so on.

10-year Treasury yields would be about 25.5 and 14.2bp, respectively. The interpretation is that, if the FOMC gave forward guidance for the federal funds rate that was about 25bp lower one year ahead than financial markets expected, then the 5- and 10-year Treasury yields would decline by about 25.5 and 14.2bp on average.

For LSAPs, we would like the units to be in billions of dollars of purchases, which is a more difficult transformation than a simple renormalization of the coefficients in Table 2. Nevertheless, a number of estimates in the literature suggest that a \$600 billion LSAP operation in the U.S., distributed across medium- and longer-term Treasury securities, leads to a roughly 15bp decline in the 10-year Treasury yield (see, e.g., Swanson, 2011, and Table 1 of Williams, 2013). Using this estimate as a benchmark implies that the coefficients in the fourth row of Table 2 correspond to a roughly \$300 billion surprise LSAP announcement. Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret the coefficients in that row of Table 2 as corresponding to a \$300 billion change in purchases. The interpretation is thus that, if the FOMC announced a new LSAP program that was about \$300 billion larger than markets expected, the effects would be about as large those provided in the fourth row of Table 2.

4. The Effects of Forward Guidance and LSAPs on Asset Prices

Once we've identified the forward guidance and LSAP components of the FOMC's announcements from 2009 through 2015, it's relatively straightforward to estimate the effects of those announcements on asset prices, using ordinary least squares regressions, as follows.

4.1 Treasury Yields

Table 3 reports the responses of 6-month and 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year Treasury yields to the forward guidance and LSAP components of the FOMC's announcements. As in previous tables and figures, the coefficients here are in units of basis points per standard deviation surprise in the announcement. Each column of the table reports estimates from an OLS regressions of the form

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha + \beta \tilde{F}_t^{\text{zlb}} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (2)$$

where t indexes FOMC announcements between January 2009 and June 2015, y denotes the corresponding Treasury yield, Δ denotes the change in a 30-minute window bracketing each

TABLE 3: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF FORWARD GUIDANCE AND LSAPs ON
U.S. TREASURY YIELDS, 2009–2015

| | 6-month | 2-year | 5-year | 10-year | 30-year |
|----------------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| change in forward guidance | 0.53*** | 3.33*** | 4.24*** | 2.35*** | 0.30 |
| (std. err.) | (.092) | (.217) | (.252) | (.263) | (.737) |
| [t-stat.] | [5.75] | [15.33] | [16.82] | [8.91] | [0.40] |
| change in LSAPs | -0.08 | -1.27*** | -4.90*** | -7.46*** | -5.78*** |
| (std. err.) | (.080) | (.077) | (.556) | (.453) | (.493) |
| [t-stat.] | [-0.99] | [-16.48] | [-8.82] | [-16.47] | [-11.71] |
| Regression R^2 | .47 | .93 | .94 | .97 | .77 |
| # Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 |

Coefficients β from regressions $\Delta y_t = \alpha + \beta \tilde{F}_t^{\text{zlb}} + \varepsilon_t$, where t indexes FOMC announcements between Jan. 2009 and June 2015, y denotes a given Treasury yield, \tilde{F} denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated previously, and Δ is the intraday change in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement. Coefficients are in units of basis points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; t -statistics in square brackets; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. See text for details.

FOMC announcement, \tilde{F}^{zlb} denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors as estimated above, ε is a regression residual, and α and β are parameters.

The point estimates for the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields in Table 3 are the same as those in Table 2. However, Table 3 also reports Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and t -statistics for each coefficient, from which we can see that the responses of these yields to both forward guidance and LSAPs are extraordinarily statistically significant, with t -statistics ranging from 8.8 to almost 17. The regression R^2 values are also quite high, over 93 percent, so these two factors explain a very large share of the variation in those yields around FOMC announcements.

Table 3 also reports results for the 6-month and 30-year Treasury yields, which were not included in the estimation of the factors themselves.¹⁵ LSAPs do not have a statistically significant effect on the 6-month Treasury yield, and the effect of forward guidance on this yield is statistically significant but small, amounting to only about 0.5bp per standard deviation surprise, less than one-sixth the size of the 2-year Treasury yield response. This is likely due to the fact that the 6-month Treasury yield was very close to zero and largely unresponsive to news over much of this period (Swanson and Williams, 2014). To the extent that the 6-month Treasury yield was pinned

¹⁵ Results for the 3-month Treasury yield are not reported, since the 3-month Treasury yield generally did not respond to news over this period, as shown by see Swanson and Williams (2014).

TABLE 4: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF FORWARD GUIDANCE AND LSAPs ON STOCK PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES, 2009–2015

| | S&P500 | \$/euro | \$/yen |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| change in forward guidance | −0.19*** | −0.25*** | −0.20*** |
| (std. err.) | (.070) | (.037) | (.040) |
| [t-stat.] | [−2.68] | [−6.66] | [−5.04] |
| change in LSAPs | 0.20*** | 0.33*** | 0.37*** |
| (std. err.) | (.053) | (.049) | (.050) |
| [t-stat.] | [3.66] | [6.65] | [7.32] |
| Regression R^2 | .27 | .67 | .80 |
| # Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 |

Coefficients β from regressions $\Delta \log x_t = \alpha + \beta \tilde{F}_t^{\text{zlb}} + \varepsilon_t$, where t indexes FOMC announcements between Jan. 2009 and June 2015, x is the asset price, \tilde{F} denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated previously, and Δ is the intraday change in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement. Coefficients are in units of percentage points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; t -statistics in square brackets; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. See text for details.

to zero for a significant part of the sample, we wouldn't expect to see much of a response to any type of announcement.

The effect of forward guidance on the 30-year Treasury yield is also quantitatively small and, in this case, statistically insignificant. In contrast to the 6-month Treasury, the 30-year Treasury yield was not pinned to zero for any length of time during this period, so the small coefficient reflects the fact that forward guidance apparently had little effect on the longest-maturity Treasuries during the ZLB period. The effect of LSAPs on the 30-year Treasury yield, however, are large and extraordinarily statistically significant, with a t -statistic of almost 12. Interestingly, the effects of LSAPs on the 30-year yield were not quite as large as their effects on the 10-year yield, presumably because the FOMC's LSAP operations were typically concentrated around maturities closer to 10 years.

4.2 Stock Prices and Exchange Rates

Table 4 reports analogous regression results for the S&P 500 stock index and dollar-euro and dollar-yen exchange rates. The form of the regressions is the same as in equation (2), except the dependent variable in each regression is now 100 times the log change in the asset price in each column.

As can be seen in Table 4, both forward guidance and LSAPs have statistically significant

effects on stock prices and exchange rates. For stocks, a one-standard-deviation increase in forward guidance caused prices to fall by about 0.2 percent, while a one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs caused stock prices to rise by a similar amount. Both of these coefficients are highly statistically significant, with t -statistics of about 2.7 and 3.7, respectively, and both effects are in the direction one would expect from a standard dividend-discount model, given the interest rate responses reported in the previous table; that is, an increase in interest rates reduces the present value of a stock's dividends (and may reduce the size of the dividends themselves, if the economy contracts), which will tend to cause stock prices to fall. Finally, it's interesting that the R^2 for this regression is much lower than those for Treasury yields, due to the high and idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices around FOMC announcements.

The effects of forward guidance and LSAPs on the dollar are more precisely estimated. Both the dollar-euro and dollar-yen exchange rates are expressed as the dollar price per unit of foreign currency. In response to a one-standard-deviation increase in forward guidance, the dollar appreciated by about 0.2 to 0.25 percent, and the effect is highly statistically significant, with t -statistics of about 6.7 for the euro and 5 for the yen. A one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs causes the dollar to depreciate about 0.35 percent, and the effect is again highly statistically significant with t -statistics of 6.6 and 7.3. Again, the effects have the signs one would expect from uncovered interest parity, given the response of interest rates reported in Table 3. That is, an increase in U.S. interest rates makes U.S. dollar investments more attractive relative to foreign investments, and tends to drive the value of the dollar up.

4.3 Corporate Bond Yields and Spreads

Table 5 reports results for corporate bond yields and spreads. Corporate bonds are less frequently traded than U.S. Treasuries, stocks, and foreign exchange, so only daily frequency corporate bond yield data are available. Thus, the regressions in Table 5 use the one-day change in corporate bond yields or spreads around each FOMC announcement as the dependent variable. To measure corporate yields, I consider both the Aaa and Baa indexes of long-term seasoned corporate bond yields from Moody's.

As can be seen in the first row of the table, I estimate that changes in the FOMC's forward guidance had essentially no effect on corporate bond yields during the ZLB period. The point estimates for both Aaa and Baa yields are small (less than one-half of one basis point per standard deviation change in forward guidance) and statistically insignificant. Because 10-year Treasury

TABLE 5: ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF FORWARD GUIDANCE AND LSAPs ON CORPORATE BOND YIELDS AND SPREADS, 2009–2015

| | Corporate Yields | | Spreads | |
|----------------------------|------------------|----------|------------|------------|
| | Aaa | Baa | Aaa–10-yr. | Baa–10-yr. |
| change in forward guidance | 0.28 | −0.33 | −1.23** | −1.85** |
| (std. err.) | (.580) | (.755) | (.558) | (.743) |
| [t-stat.] | [0.49] | [−0.44] | [−2.21] | [−2.49] |
| change in LSAPs | −4.65*** | −5.17*** | 4.25*** | 3.74*** |
| (std. err.) | (.373) | (.577) | (.546) | (.911) |
| [t-stat.] | [−12.48] | [−8.96] | [7.79] | [4.11] |
| Regression R^2 | .44 | .49 | .56 | .55 |
| # Observations | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 |

Coefficients β from regressions $\Delta y_t = \alpha + \beta \tilde{F}_t^{\text{zlb}} + \varepsilon_t$, where t indexes FOMC announcements between Jan. 2009 and June 2015, y denotes the corporate bond yield or spread, \tilde{F} denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated previously, and Δ is the change in a one-day window bracketing each FOMC announcement. Coefficients are in units of basis points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; t -statistics in square brackets; ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See text for details.

yields rise modestly in response to a change in forward guidance, the effect on the corporate-Treasury yield spread is thus modestly *negative*, falling about 1 to 2bp in response to an increase in guidance, and this effect is moderately statistically significant, with t -statistics of 2.2 and 2.5.

The effect of LSAPs on corporate bond yields was much larger and more significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs caused the Aaa and Baa yields both to fall about 5bp, and the effect was extraordinarily statistically significant. However, the effect of LSAPs on the 10-year Treasury yield was larger than the effect on corporate bond yields, so the spread between corporate bonds and Treasuries actually *increased* in response to the LSAP program.¹⁶ This result echoes findings by earlier authors, such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Swanson (2011), that the Fed’s LSAP programs—which tend to be concentrated in U.S. Treasury securities—push down Treasury yields more than they do private-sector yields. Nevertheless, the effect on corporate bond yields that I estimate here is a bit bigger than those authors found in their studies. For example, Swanson (2011) estimated corporate bond yields fall by about 4–5bp

¹⁶The 10-year yield response in Table 2 is estimated to be about −7.5bp, while the effect implied in Table 5 is a bit larger, about −8.9bp. There are two reasons for this difference: first, the responses in Table 2 are 30-minute responses, while those in Table 5 are one-day responses. Second, Table 2 uses the on-the-run coupon-bearing 10-year Treasury bond, while in Table 5 I use the 10-year zero-coupon yield estimate by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007). The latter yield has a longer duration than the coupon-bearing 10-year security, which should be a better match to the long-term corporate bonds in the Moody’s indexes.

in response to a \$600 billion Treasury LSAP, while the estimates in Table 5 are closer to 9–10bp for the same size operation (assuming this is a roughly two-standard-deviation announcement, as discussed earlier). One reason for the larger estimates here may be because the FOMC’s recent LSAP programs often included a substantial quantity of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as well as Treasuries. Those MBS are likely to be closer substitutes for corporate bonds than are Treasuries, so we should expect purchases of MBS to have a relatively larger effect on corporate bond yields than purchases of Treasuries alone. The earlier estimates in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Swanson (2011) were for the case of a Treasury-only LSAP, and thus could be expected to have smaller effects on private yields than the MBS-and-Treasury LSAPs conducted by the FOMC between 2009 and 2015.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, I show how to identify and estimate the forward guidance and large-scale asset purchase component of every FOMC announcement between 2009 and 2015, the U.S. zero lower bound period. Building on earlier work by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), I estimate a time series for each type of unconventional monetary policy announcement, and show that these series correspond to identifiable characteristics of important FOMC statements during this period.

I use these identified forward guidance and LSAP announcements to estimate the effects of each type of policy on Treasury yields, stock prices, exchange rates, and corporate bond yields and spreads. I find that forward guidance affected Treasury yields at all but the very longest maturities, with a peak effect at a maturity of about one to five years. In contrast, I find that the effects of LSAPs increased with maturity, with LSAPs having their peak effect on the longest maturities, 10 and 30 years. LSAPs had essentially no effect on the shortest-maturity Treasuries.

I estimate that forward guidance had no effect on corporate bond yields during the ZLB period. In contrast, LSAPs had substantial and highly significant effects on those yields. Nevertheless, the effects of LSAPs on corporate debt was smaller than their effects on Treasuries, so corporate bond spreads actually *increased* after an increase in the FOMC’s asset purchases. This finding is consistent with others in the literature, and probably reflects the fact that the Fed’s LSAP programs focused largely on purchases of Treasury securities.

Stock prices responded about equally to changes in forward guidance and LSAPs over the zero lower bound period. This is perhaps surprising, given that forward guidance seems to have been relatively unimportant for other long-duration assets, such as the 30-year Treasury and

corporate bonds. Forward guidance certainly had much smaller effects than LSAPs on these other long-duration assets.

Finally, I estimate that forward guidance and LSAPs both had significant effects on exchange rates, with LSAPs moderately more important. An increase in U.S. interest rates due to either forward guidance or LSAPs caused the U.S. dollar to appreciate, consistent with a standard uncovered interest parity channel.

Looking forward, it's natural to ask which policy is more effective. The answer is, it depends. First, it's difficult to compare the scale of the two different types of policies—for example, is a \$100 billion LSAP operation large or small, and is it larger or smaller than a 25bp change in forward guidance about the federal funds rate one year ahead? One natural way of comparing magnitudes across the two types of policies is in terms of their historical importance: over the 2009–2015 period, a one-standard-deviation change in forward guidance by the FOMC corresponded to a change of about 6bp in federal funds rate expectations one year ahead, while a one-standard-deviation change in LSAPs corresponded to a roughly \$300 billion change in bond purchases. Using these estimates as a basis for comparison, a one-standard-deviation (6bp) change in forward guidance appears to have been about as effective at changing medium-term Treasury yields, stock prices, and exchange rates as a one-standard-deviation (\$300B) change in LSAPs. However, LSAPs were much more effective at changing long-term Treasury yields and corporate bond yields, while forward guidance was more effective at moving shorter-maturity Treasury yields.

Finally, the analysis in this paper suggests at least three important avenues for future research. First, it's important to investigate the *persistence* of the effects estimated above. Wright (2012) does not distinguish between forward guidance and LSAPs, but finds that unconventional monetary policy as a whole had effects that died out with a half-life of just 2–3 months between November 2008 and September 2011. In ongoing research, I am studying the persistence of the effects of forward guidance and LSAPs on financial markets between 2009 and 2015. Second, the time series of forward guidance and LSAP announcements estimated above can be used to investigate the effects of these announcements on macroeconomic as well as financial variables, which I am also pursuing in ongoing work. Third, the analysis above sheds no light on the relative *costs* of forward guidance vs. LSAPs. Obviously, whether one type of policy should be preferred to the other in practice depends on its costs as well as its effects, which makes the former an important avenue for future research as well as the latter.

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