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# MOBILE MESSAGING FOR OFFLINE GROUP FORMATION IN PROSOCIAL ACTIVITIES: A LARGE FIELD EXPERIMENT

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Mobile Messaging for Offline Group Formation in Prosocial Activities: A Large Field Experiment Tianshu Sun, Guodong (Gordon) Gao, and Ginger Zhe Jin NBER Working Paper No. 21704 November 2015, Revised February 2018 JEL No. D8,I18

# ABSTRACT

In this paper, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties and encourage offline prosocial activities in groups. In particular, we conduct a randomized field experiment with 80,000 blood donors and study how behavioral interventions and economic rewards motivate offline group formation. We find that two commonly used interventions—reminder messages and individual reward—are ineffective in motivating group formation because they do not compensate donors for the cost of bringing friends. In contrast, we find that group reward—a new reward that is contingent on a donor bringing a friend—is effective in motivating group formation. Furthermore, group reward tends to attract different types of donors, especially those who are traditionally less active in online social settings but have more local social ties. Structural estimation further reveals the underlying mechanisms, suggesting that group reward is four times more cost-effective than individual reward in driving total donation. Our study suggests that motivating offline group formation is a promising approach to boost prosocial activities.

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A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/935/history

#### **1. Introduction**

Individuals increasingly connect online and offline, influencing each other's behavior on an unprecedented scale. Given this trend, organizations are paying much more attention to social interventions that influence consumer decision-making (Godes et al. 2005, Hill et al. 2006, Valente 2012). Although much insight has been generated in online information sharing (Aral and Walker 2011, 2012, Bapna and Umyarov 2015, Burtch et al. 2017, Susarla et al. 2012), less is known about how firms can use digital interventions to improve offline social interaction. As Aral (2016) points out, "...there remains a danger in relying too heavily on digital substrates to explore human behavior. Not only are digital samples biased toward those who are more active online, potentially missing large swaths of society, but limiting inquiry to digital behaviors constrains the theoretical reach of experimental work." Hence, Aral (2016) calls for networked experiments to link online treatment with offline behaviors.

To answer this call, we study how mobile messaging can be used to motivate offline group formation to encourage prosocial behavior. Group formation can help offline activities in several important ways. First, many offline activities have inherent social elements. For example, significant utility may be derived from the shared experience of consuming the same content (Becker 1991, Gilchrist and Sands 2016, Ramanathan et al. 2013). Moreover, social image can be significantly enhanced by the presence of friends (Ariely et al. 2009, Karlan and McConnell 2014). Finally, to the extent that friends are alike (i.e., homophily, Aral et al. 2009), encouraging group formation can also be an effective way to reach latent participants.

Given the importance of group formation in prosocial behavior, a key gap in the literature concerns how to design digital interventions to motivate offline group formation (see detailed literature review in Section 2). To address this question, we expand the theoretical framework in the literature and characterize an individual by both her utility of participation and her utility of bringing a friend. We use the framework in the blood donation setting to illustrate a donor's decision between solo and donating with friends and discuss the effects of different interventions. The perceived effects are empirically tested in a large-scale randomized field experiment with 80,000 blood donors.

As an important offline prosocial behavior, blood donation provides an excellent setting to address our research question. Throughout the world, a major challenge to blood donation is low participation (Lacetera et al. 2013, WHO 2015). Blood banks may boost participation by motivating individuals to donate solo or with friend(s). Because almost all previous studies have focused on motivating solo donation (Goette et al. 2010, Lacetera et al. 2012, 2014), little is known about the benefits and costs of motivating potential donors to form a group and come to donate together (which we refer as group donation). Recent studies have examined the effects of two major interventions: reminder message and individual reward (see Lacetera et al. 2012, 2013, and 2014). Thus, the first question we aim to answer is how these two commonly used interventions affect group donation. Moreover, what new interventions can be used to motivate group

donation? We propose two new interventions designed for group donation: One is to explicitly request a potential donor to donate with a friend (referred to as a friend request), and the other is to provide a group reward contingent on a donor bringing a friend and donate together (referred to as a group reward).

With both existing and new interventions in mind, we design a randomized field experiment (1) to identify the causal effects of existing interventions (reminder message and individual reward) and new interventions (friend request and group reward) in driving group donation, (2) to understand the mechanisms by which different interventions may compensate for the varying costs of solo and group donation, and (3) to shed light on the best intervention design that will increase total donation and improve cost-effectiveness for the blood bank.

The experiment yields four main findings. First, we find that the two commonly used interventions for solo donation—reminder message and individual reward—have an insignificant effect on group donation. Second, friend requests alone do not work. Although the request reminds a donor to donate with a friend, it also increases the perceived pressure when the donor cannot find a friend to bring, which may potentially discourage the message recipient from donating alone. Third, the newly designed group reward is most effective in motivating group donation. From a donor's perspective, group reward is less desirable than individual reward. However, from the blood bank's point of view, group reward strategically removes the reward for donating alone, differentially highlights the benefits of donating in a group, and nudges donors into group donation. Finally, we find that group reward tends to attract different types of donors than other treatments. Interestingly, donors that are more responsive to group reward are less likely to be young and single<sup>1</sup> but have stronger social ties in the local area and therefore face a lower cost of recruiting friends for group donation.

Our structural estimates further unveil a negative correlation between a donor's cost of donation and her cost of bringing a friend, which further explains the effectiveness of group reward. Structural estimation also allows us to simulate the effects of the interventions that were not directly tested in our experiment. Overall, our results suggest that blood banks can leverage group formation to stimulate voluntary donation, but only with appropriate economic intervention (i.e., group reward). Based on our results, the collaborating blood bank has already implemented group reward in a range of campaigns to motivate group donation. Our study signifies the potentials of mobile messaging in boosting offline group formation, and contributes to the IS research on the better design of digital interventions.

#### 2. Related Literature and Our Contribution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> According to Pew Research (2014), young and single individuals are more likely than other demographics to be active online.

Our paper is closely related to two streams of literature: the IS literature on how firms use digital interventions to influence offline behavior and the literature on motivating prosocial behavior, especially in the context of blood donation.

## 2.1 The IS literature on how digital interventions affect offline behavior

IS researchers have actively explored the question of how to use digital interventions, especially mobile messaging, to influence user behavior (Ghose et al. 2013, Ghose et al. 2015, Luo et al. 2014). Recent studies on mobile messaging have begun to extend to the role of offline factors in driving customers' engagement and purchasing behavior. For example, a series of studies have examined the moderating effect of user geographic location (Fang et al. 2015, Fong et al. 2015, Ghose et al. 2013), local environment (Andrews et al. 2016), shopping path (Ghose et al. 2015), timing (Luo et al. 2014), and weather (Li et al. 2016) on customers' responses to digital messages. This stream of research has established the effectiveness of digital messages in influencing *individual* behavior, such as clicking on ads (Andrews et al. 2016) and purchasing tickets (Luo et al. 2014). A recent study by Aral and Nicolaides (2017) also finds that digital notifications with information about peers' exercise behavior have a positive and causal effect on a subject's exercise behavior.

Our work extends their pioneering research in two ways. First, the existing literature has largely focused on offline individual behavior, but it seldom considers offline social interaction among subjects. It has been increasingly recognized that users are not isolated individuals, but are socially connected (Choi et al. 2012, Lee and Bell 2013). Many offline activities—such as donations, shopping, and exercise—trigger shared experience (Gilchrist and Sands 2016, Ramanathan et al. 2013), social image (Ariely et al. 2009, Karlan and McConnell 2014), and other social elements. Therefore, there is a great potential to leverage group formation to improve the effectiveness of digital interventions on offline activities. Our study contributes to this underexplored frontier by examining the effects of mobile messaging on offline group formation and total blood donation. Second, previous studies have focused on self-interested behavior (i.e., blood donation). The mechanisms that influence offline prosocial behavior can be different from those that influence self-interested behavior (Dube et al. 2017), and therefore more research on prosocial behavior is warranted.

Our work is also related to the IS literature of online networked experiments (Aral 2016). Researchers in this field have examined the influence of an individual's online connections on one's own behavior, such as product adoption (Aral and Walker 2011, 2012, 2014, Bapna and Umyarov 2015) and crowdfunding contribution (Burtch et al. 2015). However, a large portion of social interactions remains offline and likely invisible online. Focusing too much on the measurable online connections and outcomes could constrain the theoretical reach of experimental work (Aral 2016). Motivated by this observation, we

examine an important offline activity—blood donation—and design interventions that motivate users to form a group through any type of social connection. We show that motivating offline group formation requires the recipient to incur a significant cost to identify and persuade a friend, but well-designed economic reward can play an important role in compensating for this cost. Furthermore, we find that people who tend to be less active online are more responsive to a mobile message that encourages them to form a group offline.

## 2.2 The literature on motivating prosocial behavior

Prosocial behaviors—such as recycling, energy saving, and blood donation—play a critical role in society; however, they are often in short supply (Meier 2007). For example, there is a worldwide shortage of blood supply due to low participation in blood donation, especially in developing countries (WHO 2015). To increase participation, two broad intervention approaches are suggested in the literature: non-monetary behavioral interventions and economic incentives. Rooted in psychology, behavioral interventions focus on influencing people's decision-making in a prosocial direction, usually by enhancing warm glow (Crumpler and Grossman 2008) or social image (Ariely et al. 2009). Commonly used behavioral interventions include reminding or asking individuals for donation (Andreoni and Rao 2011, Bruhin et al. 2015), priming altruistic values or shortage information (Sun et al. 2016), or introducing a social norm (Goldstein et al. 2008). These tactics have been widely used in blood donation and have proven to be effective, according to a systematic review of 29 studies (Godin et al. 2012). Compared to behavioral interventions, economic reward for prosocial behavior is controversial due to concerns of crowd out (Buyx et al. 2009, Glynn et al. 2013, Gneezy et al. 2011). However, recent studies have found that individual-level economic reward is highly effective in driving donation (Goette and Stutzer 2008, Iajya et al. 2013, Lacetera et al. 2012, 2014), and researchers have called for more attention to this type of intervention (Lacetera et al. 2013).

Until now, both behavioral interventions and economic rewards have focused on motivating solo donation.<sup>2</sup> However, little is known about the effects of these interventions on group donation. At the same time, growing evidence suggests that group formation may be an important yet underexplored approach to driving prosocial behavior. Researchers find that donors behave differently when surrounded by other donors or watched by third-party observers (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009, Ariely et al. 2009, Karlan and McConnell 2014). Such group effects usually lead to more contributions, although effectiveness depends on group size (Goes et al. 2014, Toubia et al. 2013, Zhang and Zhu 2011), group composition (Chen and Li 2009; Ren et al 2016), and information structure (Chen et al. 2010). However, these studies, which employ either researcher-controlled assignments or policy changes, focus on the group effect *after* the group

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  We find one study (Lacetera et al. 2014) examining the spillover effect of economic reward at the aggregate level. However, that study does not explicitly examine offline group formation among donors.

is formed. In reality, donor groups are often formed endogenously before the charitable event. Given the inherent costs of bringing friend(s),<sup>3</sup> there is surprisingly little research on how charities can actively motivate individuals to form their own groups.

We bridge the above two streams of literature by examining the role of behavioral interventions and economic rewards in motivating group formation. In particular, we recognize that a donor can either donate alone or donate in a group, and therefore our framework characterizes an individual by not only her utility of donation but also the extra benefits and costs she will have in bringing a friend for group donation. We also provide the first empirical test on how reminder messages and individual rewards—the two most commonly used interventions for solo donation — affect group donation. Furthermore, guided by a theoretical framework (Section 3), we design two new interventions (friend request and group reward) and compare them with the existing interventions. Our results suggest that charities can leverage group donation to stimulate voluntary donation, but only with appropriate economic intervention.

#### **3.** How Interventions Affect Solo Donation and Group Donation

In this section, we consider critical factors underlying an individual's donation choices and investigate how different interventions impact group donation. Our work focuses on motivating the subject to reach out to friends by changing the message recipient's utility via various interventions. Therefore, our model naturally focuses on the recipient's utility and decision-making. Below, we use four figures to show that commonly used interventions (reminder messages and individual rewards) are not designed for motivating group donation and may not be as effective as group reward.

A potential donor i faces three choices: not donating, donating alone, and donating with a friend. Given the importance of group donation, we characterize i's utility along two dimensions. As shown in Figure 1, the vertical axis D represents the net utility that i expects to derive from donation regardless of whether she brings a friend or not. The utility of donation may be jointly determined by altruism, warm glow (Andreoni 1989), and the cost of donation, such as transportation or remembering to donate. The horizontal axis G represents the extra utility i may obtain from group donation if she brings a friend and they donate together. As discussed in the literature review, the extra utility of bringing a friend may be determined by shared experience (Gilchrist and Sands 2016), positive social image that i may enjoy through group donation (as compared to donating alone), as well as the costs of identifying (Beaman and Magruder

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Costs of bringing friend(s) may include: a) referral cost (Beaman and Magruder 2012): a donor may need to think of potential donors in her social circle, reach out to them, and educate/persuade them about the donation; b) coordinating costs for scheduling and transportation; and c) negative peer pressure (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010): a donor may be reluctant to ask a friend to donate together if doing so amounts to asking for a favor or imposing pressure on the friend. No matter whether the lack of group donation is due to coordination failure or negative peer pressure, the design of external intervention has a potential to affect group donation decisions. Please see more discussions in Section 3.

2012), persuading (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010), and coordinating with the friend. Therefore, G can be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of associated benefits and costs.

Within our framework, all individuals in the population can be represented on this two-dimensional plane. Figure 1 distinguishes three areas: *i* will not donate in the white blank area because D < 0, D + G < 0; *i* will donate alone in the dotted area where D > 0 & G < 0; and *i* will donate with a friend in the gray area where G > 0 & D + G > 0. By expanding donor characterization from one to two dimensions, this framework naturally incorporates group donation as one choice, thus allowing us to compare effects of different interventions over both solo and group donation.

Figure 2 considers a simple intervention that increases the return of donation from *D* to  $D + \Delta D$ . This can be achieved by offering individual rewards (Lacetera et al. 2014) or by sending a reminder message to the donor and reducing her cost of remembering to donate (Bruhin et al. 2015). Compared with Figure 1, an increase in *D* leads some non-donating people to donate alone (the black-lined dotted area), and some non-donating subjects to donate with a friend (the white-lined gray area).

Similarly, on top of Figure 1, Figure 3 increases the utility of bringing a friend from G to  $G + \Delta G$ . This can be achieved either by requesting *i* to bring a friend or by offering a group reward to *i* when she brings her friend to donate together (note that the request to bring a friend can lead to social pressure, which will be considered in Figure 4). Giving rewards to the friend can also reduce the persuasion cost of the subject, thereby contributing to  $\Delta G$ . Compared with Figure 1,  $\Delta G$  encourages some non-donating subjects to donate with a friend and some existing donors to switch from solo donation to group donation (both in the white-lined gray area).

Figure 2 and Figure 3 present an interesting contrast. Compared with Figure 1, both Figures 2 and 3 convert some non-donors into group donors (represented as the white-lined area below the horizontal axis). This is because for some people group donation is more desirable than solo donation (G > 0), but the total benefits are not sufficient to overcome the associated cost (D + G < 0). The introduction of  $\Delta D$  or  $\Delta G$  helps to push them into group donation. In addition to this common effect,  $\Delta D$  brings in another group of donors who do not donate in Figure 1 but donate alone in Figure 2 (the dark-lined area). This second group of donors includes primarily those who expect a negative benefit from group donation (G < 0) but who are almost ready to donate solo ( $D < 0 \& D + \Delta D > 0$ ). In comparison, Figure 3 brings in a third group of donors who would have donated solo in Figure 1 but now donate in a group in Figure 3 (the upper white-lined gray area). These donors enjoy high utility of donation but *need a nudge to overcome the small net cost* of bringing a friend ( $G < 0 \& G + \Delta G > 0$ ). In summary, Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggest that both group and individual rewards can bring in extra donors, but they tend to attract different types of donors: those who respond to group reward tend to have a lower cost (or higher utility) of forming groups.

When an individual receives a message from the blood bank for group donation, she may feel an additional social pressure to meet the expectation and bring a friend (DellaVigna et al. 2012). Thus, donating alone needs to overcome an additional cost in social pressure (referred to as  $C^{sp}$ ), which disappears when one donates with a friend. This insight is reflected in Figure 4, which adds  $C^{sp}$  to Figure 1. Compared with Figure 1, the no-donation area expands in Figure 4 ( $D - C^{sp} < 0, D + G < 0$ ), the donation-alone area shrinks ( $D > C^{sp} \& D + G < D - C^{sp}$ , which implies  $G < -C^{sp}$ ), and the group-donation area expands ( $D + G > 0 \& G > -C^{sp}$ ). In other words, the social pressure created by the bank's request to bring a friend may lead to more group donation (the white-lined gray area) but less solo donation (the dark-lined area).

The following numerical example illustrates the different effects of solo and group rewards on donor behavior and recruitment cost. Let us assume utility of donating  $D \in [-\$5,\$5]$ , and utility of donating with friend(s)  $G \in [-\$5, \$5]$ . The plane represents 100 potential donors, uniformly distributed (later we relax the uniform distribution assumption in empirical estimation). We assume that each donor will donate 1 unit of blood, and the economic reward (either solo or group) is \$2 per donor. Therefore, if there is no reward (Figure 1), there will be 25 solo donors (dotted area) and 37.5 donors who bring a friend, leading to a total of 100 units of blood. In Figure 2, individual reward (  $\triangle D =$ \$2) leads to 10 more solo donors and 8 more group donors who would bring a friend. As a result, we have 26 extra units of blood (1\*10+2\*8), with a total reward of \$252 (as all donors receive \$2 reward, including friend donors). Now consider the group reward in Figure 3 ( $\triangle G =$ \$2). Compared with Figure 1, Figure 3 converts 10 solo donors into group donors, in addition to another 10 new group donors, resulting in 15 solo donors and 57.5 donors who bring a friend. This leads to a net increase of 30 more units of blood ((2-1)\*10+2\*10). For the blood bank, the total cost of the group reward is  $2^{2}(37.5+20) = 230$ . Compared with individual rewards, group rewards lead to 4 units more blood but \$22 less in reward costs. This clearly shows the advantage of group reward. Group reward improves effectiveness and efficiency by allocating the reward to the right margin: On the one hand, the group reward is targeted to compensate for the cost of bringing friends, therefore converting individuals from solo donors to group donors. On the other hand, unlike individual reward, group reward does not compensate those individual donors who would come to donate anyway, therefore saving the cost for solo donations.

In summary, our theoretical framework produces a few testable implications. (1) Compared to the baseline (Figure 1), an increase in individual reward (Figure 2) leads some new donors to donate alone and some other new donors to donate with a friend. (2) In comparison, an increase in group reward (Figure 3) leads to more group donation than the baseline and the use of individual reward. (3) Part of the increase comes from solo donors becoming group donors. Moreover, rewards for solo donation and group donation

motivate different types of donors: Donors motivated by group reward are likely to have relatively high utility (low cost) of bringing a friend. (4) Finally, a reminder message for group donation may create social pressure (Figure 4), which, if significant, may lead to less solo donation and more group donation than the baseline.

So far, Figures 2–4 illustrate three separate effects as denoted in  $\Delta D$ ,  $\Delta G$  and  $C^{sp}$ . In reality, a treatment may trigger multiple effects. For example, a friend request message may lower the cost of remembering to donate ( $\Delta D$ ) and lower the cost of remembering to bring a friend ( $\Delta G$ ) but introduce social pressure for group donation ( $C^{sp}$ ). Thus, the effect of friend request is a combination of Figures 2, 3, and 4. Similarly, a mobile message that contains group reward may remind the recipient to donate blood, remind her to bring a friend, introduce social pressure for group donation, and provide group reward if she donates with a friend. This treatment is another combination of Figures 2, 3, and 4 but with a different magnitude of  $\Delta G$ . Section 4 will articulate the content of our six mobile message treatments; Section 5 will elaborate on how we separately identify the effects of  $\Delta D$ ,  $\Delta G$ , and  $C^{sp}$  in structural estimation.

## 4. Background and Experiment Design

We collaborated with a centralized blood bank in a major city in China with a population of over 8 million. The blood bank is responsible for supplying blood to 18 hospitals in the city and is encouraged to be self-sufficient in blood supply. In the past 10 years, the blood bank has recruited more than 400,000 whole blood donors, who contributed more than 500,000 donation episodes. Donations are collected by 17 bloodmobiles across the city and by special drives at universities, companies, and government agencies. Our experiment focuses on donations collected by bloodmobiles.

The experiment was run in a 15-day period from late December 2014 to early January 2015. We started by choosing subjects from past donors of the blood bank based on three criteria: first, blood donated by a particular donor must have passed a battery of blood tests, which is important because the bank aims to increase supply of qualified blood; second, the donor has not donated in the last six months, as a 1998 nationwide law disallows any donor from donating whole blood twice within six months; third, the donor has made at least one donation in the past 25 months. Because donors who donated a long time ago may have moved out of the city, the last criterion is used to better capture donors who still reside in the city.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> We choose to focus on past donors for several reasons. First, there are over 400,000 past donors in the collaborating blood bank, representing a large number of eligible donors in the focal city. A significant portion of the blood supply is also contributed by repeat donors. Thus, it is important to understand the effect of interventions on their donation behavior. Second, in our experiment, the blood bank can vary the digital message to the past donors at the individual level, but the bank does not have such good control over the message when reaching new donors (usually accomplished through channels such as TV and newspaper ads). Third, detailed information on demographics and donation history may significantly strengthen our analysis, but these are only available for past donors. Finally, most blood banks in China are only able to send digital messages to previous donors who have registered their contact information. Thus, our results on past donors have immediate implications to the practice.

As discussed in the introduction, we aim to identify the effects of two commonly used interventions (reminder message and individual reward) and two newly proposed interventions (friend request and group reward) in driving solo and group donation. To accomplish this, we designed six different text messages. Message 1 (T1) only reminds subjects to donate blood; message 2 (T2) adds an explicit reward for donation (a supermarket voucher that is worth 30–50 RMB depending on the amount of blood donated, equivalent to 5–8.3 US dollars). The average daily wage in this city in 2014 was about 100 RMB, so the reward amount is non-trivial. Neither T1 nor T2 mentions group donation. In message 3 (T3), we request the subject to donate with friend(s) but do not mention any economic reward; message 4 (T4) includes both a reminder for donating with friend(s) and the economic reward. Note that in both T2 and T4, the reward is presented as reward per donor, without any condition on whether the donor comes alone or with friend(s). Message 5 (T5) is similar to T4, except that the reward is conditional on donating with friend(s) ("...if you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you may get ..."). Message 6 (T6) is similar to T4, but highlights additional gifts available for all donors that come in a group ("...upon donation, every donor may get .... If you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you may get an additional gift."). Table 1 summarizes the behavioral interventions and economic rewards in each treatment group, with the exact messages presented in Panel A.

A sample of 80,000 past donors was randomly assigned into seven test groups. The first one is the control group, with 14,000 subjects who received no message from the blood bank. Subjects in the remaining six groups, with 11,000 subjects in each, received one of six different mobile messages, as described above.

Once the subjects decided to donate and visited the bloodmobile (either alone or in a group), they first filled out a standard questionnaire on demographics and medical conditions, designed by the blood bank to evaluate their eligibility to donate. The donors then underwent a blood screening test. While waiting for the test results, they were asked to fill out an additional survey designed by the researchers. The survey collected additional demographics and social information of the donor. The nurse then collected the surveys and informed donors of the standard gifts and special rewards they would receive based on the donation amount. The donors would then decide the donation amount and make the donation.

In particular, donors who chose to donate 200ml would receive standard gifts (e.g., a souvenir such as a cup or t-shirt). Donors donating 300ml of blood were eligible for a 30RMB supermarket voucher (around \$5), and those donating 400 ml were eligible for a 50RMB supermarket voucher. In addition, group donors received an additional gift: a fruit cutting tool (worth about 10RMB) for each of them. These rewards were dispensed to all donors, regardless of whether they were in our experiment or which message they received. In other words, the only difference between treatment groups is the message they received from the blood bank, not the actual gifts upon donation.

The blood bank decided to apply the same rewards to all treatment groups due to a practical concern. Ideally, it shall adhere to the exact reward scheme as delivered in each mobile message, which is easy to do if there is only one intervention on-going. However, the goal of the experiment is to *compare different interventions at the same time* so that confounding factors are minimized across interventions. In practice, it is difficult for nurses to treat coming donors differently in a bloodmobile. Consider two adjacent donors, one with T4, the other with T5 and both donating solo. Sticking to the exact message implies a 30–50RMB reward for the first donor but zero reward for the second donor. Not only does this method require the nurse to track everyone's mobile message precisely, it may subject the bank to a claim of discrimination and create chaos. The rewards that the bank gave out are at least as good as what was promised in the mobile message, and donors in some of the test groups received a positive surprise after they came to the bloodmobile. This is a necessary tradeoff due to the complexity of the offline operation and the sensitive nature of blood donation.

Because all our messages involving economic reward described the reward as "30–50 RMB in supermarket voucher" and did not link the exact reward to a donation amount, most subjects in our experiment did not know the correlation between reward and donation amount until they came to a bloodmobile. This implies that the differential reward by donation amount should not affect a subject's decision of whether to donate (solo or with a friend); however, it will affect the subject's donation amount after they approach the bloodmobile. Throughout the paper, we refer to the decision of whether to donate as the first stage, and refer to the choice of donation amount as the second stage. Our analysis focuses more on the first stage, because the experiment generates clean, exogenous variations for the first stage, but the second stage is subject to other difficult-to-control factors.

The universal implementation of economic rewards does introduce a potential for treatment spillover. Although our experiment was run in a short time (two weeks), we cannot rule out the possibility that later donors may learn about universal rewards from earlier donors and depart from what is intended in our mobile message. This is especially a concern for the group reward treatment (T5) because some donors in T5 may choose to donate alone after they become aware of the reward for solo donation. This spillover, if it occurs at all, tends to make T5 more similar to the individual reward treatment (T4), thus leading us to underestimate the actual difference between T4 and T5. Therefore, our estimates on the effects of group reward on group donation are likely conservative.

After each donation, the nurse completed two tasks. First, if a donor donated with friend(s) or brought non-donating friend(s), the nurse recorded the donor ID of each donor in the group, as well as the number of non-donating friends with them; second, the nurse marked the donor ID on the survey form, which helps us link the survey to the donor.<sup>5</sup> All nurses went through a centralized training session before the campaign and were instructed to strictly follow the same procedures for each donor. The survey is designed to help us measure unobserved constructs, such as a donor's cost of bringing friends, including her social environment (e.g., whether her friends donated before) and her image motivation (e.g., willingness to share the donation experience).

Finally, we augment the field experiment with rich archival data, including demographics (age, gender, education, occupation, marriage status, resident status, and health indicators) and donation history (across 10 years) for the 80,000 subjects in our experiment.

## 5. Analysis and Results

In this section, we first present reduced-form analysis of the treatment effect of different mobile messages; we then build a structural model to characterize donor choice across the three choices (not to donate, to donate alone, and to donate in a group). Structural estimation is complementary to the reduced-form analysis because it sheds light on the underlying mechanisms and allows us to simulate the effects of new interventions that were not directly tested in the experiment.

## 5.1 Reduced-form Evidence

We first check the validity of randomization. As shown in Table 2, there is no detectable variation across the seven treatment groups in terms of gender, age, marriage status, residency, or the number of past donations. The t-tests on equality across groups are insignificant at the conventional level. The well-balanced sample indicates that our randomization was successful.

Table 3 summarizes key outcomes across treatment groups. Panel A focuses on the subjects' own decisions to donate. On average, the donation rate in our sample during the campaign period is about 1%, which is consistent with previous studies on blood donation (e.g., Lacetera et al. 2012, 2014). Comparing T1 to T0 shows a sizable reminder effect. Although the donation rate is 0.71% in T0, it jumps to 0.98% in T1 (t-test: p<0.05). Groups with economic rewards (T2, T4, T5, and T6) always have a donation rate greater than 1% (all significantly higher than control, p<0.05).

Table 3 Panel B turns to group donation, measured by the percentage of donors that bring one or more donating friends. Compared to T0, reminder message (T1) and individual reward (T2) do not lead to more group donation (t-test for T2=T0: p=0.379). Interestingly, friend requests (T3) are not effective in motivating donors to bring friends at all. However, when the group reward is added to the treatment (T5), there is a very large increase in donating friends (1.05% in T3 vs. 10.85% in T5, t-test p-value <0.001). In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Our survey data only cover a subset (~50%) of experimental subjects who came to donate during the experiment period. There was an initial miscommunication between the manager and the nurses in the field for the first several days, which led to missing donor IDs on the survey. However, missing data caused by this managerial miscommunication should not result in systematic differences in the survey response rate across test groups (joint t-test of response rate across groups: p=0.66).

comparison, offering an individual reward per donor (T2 and T4) achieves a result halfway in between (6.67% in T2 and 5.74% in T4, neither is significantly different from control). Offering individual reward plus a small gift for group reward (T6) yields results that are slightly worse than individual reward alone (4.03% in T6), but the difference between T4 and T6 is not significant (p=0.551). In addition, T6 has a higher rate of bringing in non-donating friends. This might be because the extra gift (the fruit cutting tool) is not attractive enough.

We further test treatment effects using regressions. Table 4 reports the reduced form estimates on three outcomes: donate or not (Column 1), bring donating friend(s) or not (Column 3), and total blood collected (Column 5). The OLS regression on the subject's first stage decision using the full sample (80,000 donors)<sup>6</sup> reveals four findings: first, aligned with previous literature (Lacetera et al. 2012, 2013, 2014), both the reminder message (T1) and individual reward (T2) have a positive and significant effect (Column 1) on a donor's decision to donate, relative to T0. However, these two commonly used interventions are not effective in driving group donation (Column 3). Second, adding a friend request to the reminder message (T3) does not lead to more group donation (Column 3), indicating that the behavior intervention is not effective. Third, once the reward is conditional on donating with a friend (T5), there is a large increase in group donation (Column 3). The comparison between T5 and T3 suggests that group reward has a significant impact on group donation (t-test between T3 and T5: p<0.001). In addition, the treatment effect of group reward is also significantly larger than that of all the other test groups (t-test: all significant). In addition, it is more than two times the effect of individual reward (T2). This is consistent with our theoretical framework; group reward is differentially compensating for the cost of bringing a friend for group donation. Finally, adding a small group gift to individual reward (T6) increases the donation rate slightly beyond individual reward alone (T2), but it does not lead to a significant increase in group donation (p=0.371). This is not surprising; individual reward may motivate donors to donate alone, but the additional small gift is not high enough to overcome the cost of bringing a friend. Columns 2 and 4 present regression results using donation amount<sup>7</sup> as an alternative to the dichotomous decision in Column 1 and 3, and we get consistent findings. Finally, we examine the robustness of the findings using logistic estimation. Although the multinomial logit estimator in discrete choice model is asymptotically unbiased, it has been shown that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The model specification is  $Outcome_i = \beta_0 + \sum \beta_k * Treatment_{ik} + \beta_c * Controls_i$ . We report estimates based on OLS (or linear probability model) in Table 4 for easy interpretation of the results. The findings are robust to alternative estimation methods, such as the logit regression and rare-event logit and with/without controls.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We code friend donation amount as 0ml if the focal donor does not bring any friend(s). One should not interpret this friend donation amount as the friend's subjective choice (i.e., actually choose to donate 0ml). Rather, here the use of friend donation amount is mainly to decompose the total donation amount and to show where the addition donation collected under the group reward comes from (i.e., more donation from a friend or more donation from the focal donor). We thank one reviewer for constructive comments on this point.

finite sample bias tends to underestimate the probability of the rare event, and therefore might downwardbias our estimates of the positive effects of the interventions (King and Zeng 2001a,b). We therefore have applied the rare-event logit proposed by King and Zeng (2001a). All results are highly similar to those obtained using the linear probability model.<sup>8</sup>

Besides the effect on forming a group in donation, we also identify the effect of different interventions on the total volume of donated blood, which is of central importance to the blood bank. Total donation is defined as the sum of the donation amounts from the subject herself and her friends (if any). As shown in Table 4, Column 5, the effect of group reward on total blood supply is significant. Compared to the average donation amount in T0 (2.49ml per message recipient), group reward leads to an increase of 2.47ml, which is almost 100% more. This increase is larger than the effect of individual reward (1.59ml) at the 10% significance level after we control for subject age, gender, and weight. The additional blood collected through group reward intervention during the 15-day experiment period can support more than 50 elective surgeries.<sup>9</sup> In fact, the blood bank has already implemented the group reward intervention in multiple campaigns (e.g., on Valentine's Day) after our experiment, demonstrating its effectiveness in driving total donation.

Table 5 turns to the donors' choice of donation amount after they arrive at the bloodmobile. We regress donation amount on whether the donor had a (donating or non-donating) friend present. The positive and significant coefficient on this binary indicator suggests that donors who donate with a friend donate about 10% (or 30ml) more blood than solo donors *regardless of* the treatments they were exposed to beforehand. This is consistent with the image motivation effect identified in the literature (Ariely et al. 2009, Karlan and McConnell 2014), and it provides another rationale for motivating people to come in a group. We do not claim causality here; our treatments may affect the choice of coming alone or with a friend, but they may not affect the donor's choice of donation amount after she comes to the bloodmobile. The positive correlation between donation amount and friend presence could pick up a positive group effect (due to social image) and/or a selection effect (i.e., those donors who bring friend(s) may be willing to donate more blood). In Table 5, we have controlled a range of donor demographics that may affect both the choice to bring friend(s) and the choice of donation amount. However, the presence of a friend may still be correlated with unobserved donor characteristics. Future research could create or explore exogenous variation in the second stage to cleanly identify the mechanism (e.g., varying visibility of peer's choice of donation amount).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Results omitted due to space limitations but available from the authors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For example, about seven units of blood are needed for brain surgery, hip replacement, and cancer treatment on average per patient (Lacetera et al. 2014). The calculation is based on comparisons between the control group and the group reward treatment on the full sample.

One concern is that group reward (T5) might suffer from cannibalization—a potential donor may bring a friend who would donate anyway so that they qualify for the group reward. If that is the case, then the effect of intervention on overall blood supply is smaller than it appears. We therefore conducted another empirical test to explore the extent of such potential cannibalization. If cannibalization did occur, then the donating friends in T5 should have a higher inherent donation propensity than friends under other treatments. Although this inherent donation propensity is not directly observable, it should be positively correlated with whether a donor has donated in the past or not. Therefore, should cannibalization occur, the donating friends under T5 would be more likely to be existing donors at the blood bank, and they would have made more donations in the past. To examine this possibility, we obtained the history for *all* donors who donated in the past 10 years from 2005 until our experiment, which includes over half a million donations from more than 400,000 donors from the blood bank. We test whether the friends under T5 are more likely to be previous donors or make more donations during the 10-year span. Our test shows that the friends under T5 are not more likely to be existing donors.<sup>10</sup> In fact, the percentage of friends with past donations is similar across all test groups, as detailed in Footnote 11. The joint test on difference between test groups reveals insignificant results, confirming that friends under T5 are similar to friends in other test groups.

With the possibility in mind that the group donation reward might cannibalize the donating friends' future donations, we further discuss several potential benefits of the group reward. First, nearly half (48%) of the donating friends are new donors (who never donated in the past ten years). This population is typically challenging for blood banks to reach and recruit. Second, for existing donors, group rewards may have accelerated their donation thereby encouraged them to donate more within the same time span. Finally, group reward can help recruit more donors and alleviate urgent short-term and seasonal blood shortages, which is common in developing countries (WHO 2015).

To further explore the mechanisms by which different interventions affect *donation behavior* in the first stage, we analyze the heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting treatment indicators with donor attributes. Table 6 looks at two outcomes: the dummy of donating or not and the total amount donated by the donor and friends. Each column includes the interaction of one donor attribute and all the treatment dummies.<sup>11</sup> These regressions provide suggestive evidence that subjects that are married, local, older, and more past donations are more responsive to group reward.<sup>12</sup> This is sensible because these people are likely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Specifically, the percentage of donating friends who are past donors is 52% for T5, similar to T1 (50% of donating friends are existing donors), T2 (38%), T4 (50%), T6 (57%), as well as the mean value across all test groups (51%).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> We do not put all demographics in one regression because many of them are highly correlated.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Raw data further confirm that donors who respond under group reward (T5) are more likely to be married, local, older, and have more donations in the past, whereas subjects who respond under individual reward (T2) are more likely to be unmarried, non-local, younger, and have fewer past donations (Table 3 Panel A). A formal test shows

to incur a lower cost for bringing a friend. Although married and older people are generally less active in online social settings (according to Pew 2014), our study suggests that with the right incentive design, digital interventions can be used to leverage their offline social connections. Furthermore, using survey data, we find evidence that donors who are motivated by group reward are more likely to hear about friends donating in the past (T5>Control: p=0.09) and more willing to share the donation experience (T5>Control, p>0.10), both of which indicate lower costs of bringing a donating friend. In addition, the donors who bring friend(s) are much more likely to hear about friends donating in the past (Group>Solo: p<0.001), much more willing to share donation experience (Group>Solo, p<0.01), and report higher willingness to donate with friends in the future (Group>Solo on "Yes": p=0.07). Interestingly, the main reasons reported for not bringing friend(s) are "few of my friends want to donate blood" (i.e., local social environment) and "I want to remain private" (i.e., willingness to share), rather than "hard to coordinate time" (i.e., coordination cost).

#### **5.2 Structural estimation**

In this subsection, we build and estimate a structural model on the donor's choice of not donating, donating alone, or donating with friend(s). We shy away from incorporating the donor's choice of donation amount on the bloodmobile because this subsequent stage is not as closely tied to our experiment design.

Structural estimation is complementary to reduced-form analysis for at least three reasons. First, each mobile message may represent a different combination of  $\Delta D$  (changes in the utility of donation),  $\Delta G$  (changes in the utility of donating with a friend), and  $C^{sp}$  (social pressure of not complying with the request to bring a friend). As discussed in Section 3, these elements affect a donor's choice in a complicated way. Thus, it is difficult to completely separate each element through reduced-form comparison across treatments. To better capture the underlying mechanisms, we use a discrete choice model to characterize how different interventions fine-tune the relative payoffs across the three donation choices. Second, the structural model allows us to estimate (unobserved) individual primitives, especially the cost of donation and the cost of bringing a donating friend. By introducing random coefficients on these two cost parameters, we can identify their distribution and correlation and better capture the intuition behind donors' choices. Third, with structural estimates on individual primitives, we can simulate different combinations of behavioral interventions and economic rewards, including those that were not explicitly tested in our experiment.

## 5.2.1 Structural model

that donors who choose to come under T2 and T5 significantly differ across local (p<0.01), age (p<0.01), and total number of past donations (p=0.09), but not in terms of gender and marital status. We also examine the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of group reward on donating with friends. The interaction coefficients between moderators and T5 are positive and larger than the interaction coefficients between moderators and all other groups. Specifically, we found that subjects with more past donation are about twice as likely to donate with friends(s) under the group reward than subjects with less donations in the past (interaction coefficient: 0.00468, p<0.001). The same trend also holds for other moderators; however, the statistical test is underpowered due to the smaller number of group donations than donations.

Consider subject *i*, deciding whether to donate (*d*) and whether to donate with friend(s) in a group (*g*). She may incur cost and derive utility from donation (including warm glow or altruism, Andreoni 1989, Lacetera et al. 2013), the net of which is denoted as  $\alpha_i^d$ . If she brings a friend to donate, she may incur extra costs (including referral, persuasion, and coordination costs, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010) and extra utility (including shared experience, Gilchrist and Sands 2016, and enhanced social image, Karlan and McConnell 2014), the net of which is denoted as  $\alpha_i^g$ . In short,  $\alpha_i^d$  and  $\alpha_i^g$  aim to match the *D* and *G* axes in the theoretical framework, respectively.<sup>13</sup>

Treatments in our field experiment introduce exogenous variations in  $\alpha_i^d$  and  $\alpha_i^g$ . In particular, the key elements include sending a reminder message for donation (MSG), requesting group donation in the reminder message (GMSG), offering a reward for the message recipient's donation ( $M^{sr}$ , referred to as self reward), offering a reward for the message recipient when she brings a donating friend ( $M^{br}$ , referred to as referral reward), and offering a reward for the donating friend ( $M^{fr}$ , referred to as friend reward). It is worth noting that the three rewards affect the donor's utility in different ways:  $M^{sr}$  compensates for the donation cost of the focal donor, which, corresponding to  $\Delta D$  in Figure 2,  $M^{br}$  compensates for the donating friend and indirectly influences the focal donor by reducing her cost of persuading the friend. These correspond to  $\Delta G$  in Figure 3. Finally, our model also accounts for the cost of social pressure ( $C^{sp}$ ) (Figure 4) that a subject may incur when she receives a request for group donation but decides to donate alone (DellaVigna et al. 2012).

In short, behavioral interventions (MSG, GMSG) and economic rewards  $(M^{sr}, M^{br}, M^{fr})$  adjust the relative payoffs across no donation, solo donation, and group donation. Most of our experimental treatments (T2 to T6) combine multiple elements: T2 combines MSG,  $M^{sr}$  and  $M^{fr}$ ; T3 combines MSG, GMSG and  $C^{sp}$ ;<sup>14</sup> T4 combines MSG, GMSG,  $C^{sp}, M^{sr}$  and  $M^{fr}$ ; T5 combines MSG, GMSG,  $C^{sp}, M^{br}$ and  $M^{fr}$ ; and T6 combines MSG, GMSG,  $C^{sp}, M^{sr}, M^{br}$  and  $M^{fr}$ . T2, T4, T5, and T6 all include  $M^{fr}$ because the donating friend will receive the standard reward for donation directly. However, for a subject in T5, her reward is conditional on donating with a friend; hence her reward is counted as  $M^{br}$  rather than  $M^{sr}$ . T6 offers a small gift for donating with a friend, in addition to what is offered in T4. This implies the same  $M^{sr}$  in T4 and T6, but an extra small  $M^{br}$  for our experimental subject (equal to the value of the small gift) and a larger  $M^{fr}$  for the donating friend (equal to the value of the regular reward for individual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> To keep the model parsimonious, we focus on the message recipient's utility function, rather than explicitly modeling the friend's decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Counting T3 as both MSG and GMSG recognizes the fact that a reminder to bring a friend also serves as a reminder to donate. The same logic applies to T4, T5, and T6.

donation plus the value of the small gift). The exogenous variations in the experiment allow us to tease out each element via structural estimation.

Assuming the effect of all elements is linear (DellaVigna et al. 2012), we write the latent utility function for a donor's decision as follows,<sup>15</sup> with the utility of no donation (d = 0, g = 0) as a baseline:

$$\begin{aligned} U_{i}(g|d=1) &= \alpha_{i}^{d} + \beta^{MSG} \cdot MSG - C^{sp} \cdot GMSG \cdot (1-g) + \beta^{sr} \cdot M^{sr} \\ &+ (\alpha_{i}^{g} + \beta^{fr} \cdot M^{fr} + \beta^{GMSG} \cdot GMSG + \beta^{br} \cdot M^{br}) \cdot g + \gamma^{10} \cdot (1-g) \cdot X_{i} + \gamma^{11} \cdot g \cdot X_{i} + \varepsilon^{idg} \\ & Likelihood(d,g) = prob(U_{i}(d,g) > U_{i}(d',g')) \\ & \forall \{d',g'\} = \{\{0,0\},\{1,0\},\{1,1\}\} \end{aligned}$$

where *d* is a dummy denoting whether to donate or not, *g* is a dummy denoting whether to bring a friend and donate together, and X denotes the donor's demographics and donation history.  $\gamma^{10}$  captures how the utility of solo donation varies by donor attributes;  $\gamma^{11}$  captures how the utility of group donation varies by donor attributes; the error term follows type I extreme value distribution. In addition, we estimate the two constant terms,  $\alpha_i^d$  and  $\alpha_i^g$ , as random coefficients and allow them to be arbitrarily correlated. This way, we capture unobserved donor heterogeneity and relax the independent and irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption in a conditional logit model.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, for those donors with relatively low cost for donation and high cost of bringing a friend, not donating (d=0) may be a closer substitute for donating alone (d=1, g=0) than for donating with a friend (d=1, g=1); but for those with low donation cost and low cost of bringing a friend, donating alone and donating with a friend may be closer substitutes. The random coefficient model is the preferred approach to relax the IIA assumption and to quantify the correlation between the two unobserved donor heterogeneities (Nevo 2000, Imbens and Wooldridge 2007).

To summarize, the key structural parameters are: i) the net utility derived from donation  $(\alpha_i^d)$  and the net utility from bringing a friend  $(\alpha_i^g)$ , ii) the decrease in mental cost when receiving a reminder message  $(\beta^{MSG})$ ,<sup>17</sup> iii) the increased donation cost due to social pressure if one cannot meet the request to bring a friend  $(C^{sp})$ , iv) the decreased mental cost of bringing a friend thanks to the reminder message of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> It is possible that in the case of no donation, a donor may still have some guilty feeling for not fulfilling the request from the reminder message for donation (MSG) and the reminder message for group donation (GMSG). Thus,  $\beta^{MSG}$  in the current model should be interpreted as a sum of the reminder effect and the social pressure effect on no donation. More specifically, the reminder effect increases the donor's utility of coming to donate, and the social pressure effect decreases the utility of not coming to donate. Similarly,  $\beta^{GMSG}$  represents the sum of the reminder effect of bringing a friend and the social pressure effect of ignoring the message and not donating. Finally,  $C^{sp}$  is the additional social pressure of coming alone, but it cannot meet the request of bringing friend(s), compared to simply ignoring the message.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> We sincerely thank the AE and one of the reviewers for the comment and the suggestions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The reminder message could be interpreted as a signal of blood shortage. If the reminder message increases the altruism or warm glow that the subject feels in donation, it is captured in  $\beta^{MSG}$  as well. We thank one referee for pointing out this possibility.

group donation ( $\beta^{GMSG}$ ), v) the increased utility derived from receiving economic rewards ( $\beta^{sr}$ ,  $\beta^{fr}$  and  $\beta^{br}$ ), vi) the effect of donor attributes on the utility of self and group donation ( $\gamma^{10}$ ,  $\gamma^{11}$ ), and vii) the standard deviation of the two random coefficients ( $\alpha_i^d$  and  $\alpha_i^g$ ), as well as the correlation between them.

## **5.2.2 Structural estimates**

Table 7 reports our structural estimates.<sup>18</sup> Panel A reports the estimates for alternative-invariant coefficients, with the net utility from donation ( $\alpha^{d}$ ) and net utility for bringing friends ( $\alpha^{g}$ ) based on a small and representative baseline group (female, education>9 years, weight in lower half, under 35, non-married, non-local). Panel B reports the alternative-specific coefficients of  $\alpha^{d}$  and  $\alpha^{g}$  in other demographic groups. We can use them to further calculate the net utility for every subject in the experiment. For instance,  $\alpha^{d}$  and  $\alpha^{g}$  is precisely estimated as -6.20 and -3.75 in Panel A, which we interpret as the average utility of donating and bringing in a friend for a donor with the baseline demographics; Then, for a donor with similar demographics but local and less educated (education<=9 years), the estimate of her utility of donating is -5.52 (-6.20+0.51+0.17) and the utility of bringing in a friend is -4.22 (-3.75-0.97+0.50). By repeating the process for every subject and averaging across all subjects, we found the average cost of donation to be -5.10 and the average cost of bringing friends which is -2.90. They are largely consistent with the insights from the baseline group.<sup>19</sup>

In comparison with the population average of donation cost (-5.10), the most effective behavioral intervention (reminder message) and economic reward  $(M^{br})$  only lead to an increase of utility by 0.31 and 1.12, respectively. These estimates are unitless, but their relative values suggest that the most effective interventions can only overcome 6–22% of the huge donation cost facing an average message recipient. Moreover, the net utility of bringing a donating friend ( $\alpha^g$ ) is estimated to be -2.90, suggesting that many donors face extra cost in bringing a donating friend, but this extra cost is only 57% of the average cost of donation. This makes group reward attractive to the blood bank because it is less costly for an existing donor to bring a friend (-2.90) than for the bank to recruit a donor from scratch (-5.10). In addition, the standard deviations of the two random coefficients are also significant, suggesting non-trivial unobserved heterogeneity in the cost of donation and the cost of bringing in a friend. The negative correlation between these two costs suggests that more donors are distributed in the upper left and lower right quadrants of Figure 1. Thus, group reward, which by design compensates for the *sum* of the two costs, can take advantage of this negative correlation and effectively drive group donation. Behavioral interventions and economic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For comparison, we also estimate a conditional logit model. Point estimates from the random coefficient model are similar to those in the conditional logit model. For the random coefficient logit model, we have also tested different specifications, such as including random coefficients for interventions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We thank the AE for this insightful suggestion.

rewards can help overcome these costs. The reminder message for donation is effective in reducing the cost of donation by 0.31 (roughly 6% of the average cost of donation in our population). However, the friend request has little extra impact on either solo donation or group donation. Turning to economic rewards, reward for self donation ( $M^{sr}$ ) contributes relatively little value beyond the reminder message (0.11 for one unit of reward, insignificant). Thus, it seems inefficient to allocate funding to reward self-donation. In contrast, referral reward significantly increases the utility of group donation (by 1.11 for one unit of reward, roughly 21.7% of the typical cost of donation). The effect of friend reward is comparable in reducing the cost of bringing a donating friend (by 1.02 for one unit of reward).

Overall, structural estimates allow us to measure individual-level primitives and understand the effects of different elements in driving donation choice. Compared to reduced-form analysis, they provide several additional insights: (1) the cost of bringing friend(s) is smaller than the average cost of donation; thus, it is more effective to encourage existing donors to bring their friends than to directly reach out to new donors. The negative correlation between these costs further suggests that the blood bank may stimulate more donations at a lower cost by motivating group donation; (2) the cost of bringing a friend is still substantial, thus external interventions are needed; (3) referral reward (to the subject) and friend reward (to the subject's friend) are more effective in increasing a donor's utility than self-reward, and therefore they may serve as more cost-effective ways to encourage donation. We observe significantly more group donation in T5, because T5 includes both referral reward and friend reward.

Finally, our results also show that utility structure may vary across demographic groups. As reflected in Table 7 Panel B, the three types of heterogeneity, namely age, marriage and local residence, may positively affect the utility of donation and bringing friends in the same direction. On the other hand, gender and education affect the two utilities in opposite directions. Less educated males have lower cost for donation than more educated females, but have a higher cost to bring friends. Such heterogeneity has important implications to the blood bank. For example, compared to the less educated males (utility of donation – utility of bringing friends = -0.42), the cost advantage of motivating group donation become more salient for less educated females (-1.31), more educated males (-1.56), and educated females (-2.45). Therefore, blood banks can use individual award more effectively on past donors who are male and less educated. On the other hand, if blood banks wish to take advantage of group effect and motivate group donation, they should target past donors who are female and more educated. A direct simulation based on our structural estimates shows that for 10,000 female subjects, group reward may lead to about 113 donors, which is more than 30% increase than targeting individual reward (86 donors). The majority of the increase comes from additional increase in the number of group donors (18 versus 1).

## 5.2.3. Counterfactuals

Equipped with structural estimates, we perform a series of policy simulations to compare different combinations of behavioral interventions and economic rewards (Table 8). Specifically, different policies correspond to different reward scheme as defined by a set of  $\{M^{sr}, M^{fr}, M^{br}\}$ . For instance, under group reward T5,  $M^{sr} = 0$  but  $M^{fr} = 1$  and  $M^{br} = 1$ , whereas under reminder message T1,  $M^{sr} = 0$  and  $M^{fr} = M^{br} = 0$ . For each policy, we can calculate the utility that a donor can derive from each option using expression in 5.2.1 and then directly use the random coefficient model to predict the probability of the donor choosing a certain option. Finally, we aggregate the probability of choosing a certain option across all users, which would give us the percentage of users for each option (not donate, donate alone, donate with friends) under a specific policy.<sup>20</sup>

The counterfactuals reveal several insights that are not directly observable in the reduced-form analysis. First, group reward—modeled as referral reward  $(M^{br})$  plus friend reward  $(M^{fr})$ —is much more cost-effective than the commonly used individual reward (modeled as self-reward  $M^{sr}$  plus friend reward  $M^{fr}$ ). The last column of Table 8 shows the average reward per donor under different reward schemes. In the individual reward scheme, because each donor gets one unit of reward, the reward per donor is naturally 1. In the group reward scheme, rewards are only promised to those who donate together (there are 0.13%\*2 = 0.26%). Therefore, on average, the blood bank's recruitment cost as measured by the 'unit of reward per donor' is only 0.21 unit (= 0.26% divided by 1.21%). This suggests that group reward can be more than four times as cost effective as individual reward. This is because group reward would only occur if donors donate in a group. Thus, in the majority of cases in which donors donate alone, the blood bank does not need to pay any group reward; those donors are willing to donate anyway. The funds saved could then be used to increase group reward. As shown in Table 8, at the same level of reward (2 units), group reward would lead to almost 100% more donors (2.88% vs. 1.46%) at a significantly lower cost per donor (1.34 vs. 2 unit per donor, or about 33% lower).

Second, we simulate a series of new interventions that were not directly tested in the field experiment, such as friend reward only  $(M^{fr}$ , which only rewards the donors that are brought by a subject, but not to the subject herself) and referral reward only  $(M^{br}$ , which only rewards the subject that brings a friend but offers no reward to her donating friend). These interventions require special implementation procedures<sup>21</sup> and are difficult to test in separate experiments. However, our simulations shed light on their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Recall that the bank had to give out universal rewards to different treatments in our experiment, because the six treatments were run at the same time. We believe this design is unlikely to affect our structural estimates, but even if there is spillover between our experimental treatments, our estimates tend to underestimate the effect of group reward hence the counterfactual results presented here are likely conservative.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> For instance, referral reward to donors who bring friend(s)  $(M^{br})$  can be implemented by sending a secret message with a reward voucher to the focal donor after donation. We thank one reviewer for comments on its implementation.

potential impact on the blood supply as well as their cost-effectiveness. Specifically, friend reward  $(M^{fr})$  and referral reward  $(M^{br})$ , when used alone, are not very effective in driving total blood supply (around 0.01 - 0.02% increase in both solo and group donation rate, as compared to the effect of reminder only). However, when we combine the two rewards  $(M^{fr} + M^{br})$ , corresponding to group reward in T5), group donation increases by 0.11 percentage points. The above comparison reveals that the joint use of friend reward  $(M^{fr})$  and referral reward  $(M^{br})$  is important in that referral reward motivates the focal donor to bring a friend, whereas the friend reward helps her to persuade and compensate her friend. Finally, when the three rewards are used together  $(M^{sr} + M^{fr} + M^{br})$ , we see an increase in both solo and group donations, but no further synergy effect. This finding is consistent with the prediction that reward for solo donation and reward for group donation tend to motivate two different types of donors in the population.

Overall, our simulations demonstrate the effect of alternative interventions that were not tested in the experiment and provide additional insights on why group reward works. We acknowledge that the above policy simulations are based on parameters derived from our experiment. Therefore, the magnitude of the simulated intervention is influenced by how the recipients perceive and interpret the mobile messages.

## 6. Conclusion

In this study, we examine how charities can take advantage of offline group formation to encourage prosocial activities. We find evidence of substantial costs in association with offline group formation. We further show that group reward designed to compensate for a donor's cost of bringing friends can be effective in driving group formation. Interestingly, our study suggests that individuals who are traditionally less active in online social interactions may have a lower social cost in the offline setting. Thus, organizations can take advantage of this comparative strength and use digital interventions to leverage their offline social connections.

This study provides both a framework for and large-scale evidence of the effectiveness of group reward, which are significant contributions to the literature on how to motivate pro-social activities. It contributes to the growing literature of prosocial behavior and motivation (e.g., Jabr et al. 2014, Goes et al. 2014, Lacetera et al. 2012, 2014; Andreoni and Rao 2011; DellaVigna et al. 2012). Although various economic and non-economic behavioral interventions have been examined in the literature, they mostly focus on solo donation. Building on the existing studies, we are among the first to extend the scope of the study to examine how to motivate a donor to bring her friends to donate together. Based on the effectiveness of the mobile messaging in this study, we also call for more studies in the IS discipline on how to use digital interventions to boost user offline social interactions, an area that has been under-explored (Ghose et al 2015; Luo et al 2014).

Our new framework reveals interesting mechanisms underlying group donation (Figures 1-4) and potential rich heterogeneity among users in the costs of group formation versus the cost of donation. This

framework could help organizations decide how to design optimal interventions and what sub-populations to target using different rewards. Our study highlights motivating group donation as an alternative effective approach to recruit participants in prosocial activities (Lacetera et al. 2013). Charity organizations could focus more on a donor's social capital and design innovative intervention strategies to unleash such potential.

Our study offers significant practical value. In recent years, the need for better policies to motivate voluntary donation in healthcare has been emphasized due to increasing shortages in human blood, organs, and tissues (Kessler and Roth 2012, WHO 2015). Our study shows that the additional blood collected through a group reward strategy can support a good number of additional surgeries. In addition, group reward is four times as cost effective as rewarding individual donors. Given the value of one unit of blood to patients and to the healthcare system, group reward represents a particularly efficient strategy. Using mobile messaging to leverage a donor's social network, our study opens a new path to address the challenge of blood shortages in healthcare, and should particularly benefit those organizations that are constrained by financial resources and face difficulty recruiting new donors.

We would like to acknowledge several limitations, which represent opportunities for future research. First, our experiment focuses on a donor's group donation decision in the first stage and is not designed to draw causal inferences on the effect of friend presence on donor's choice of donation amount. Future research could create exogenous variation in the second stage to cleanly identify the mechanism. Second, our experiment targeted past donors. Past donors in general are more likely to have friends who are willing to donate (homophily) and have a lower cost to persuade friends (using their own experience); thus, they might be more likely to respond to interventions and bring friend(s) to donate together. First time donors might respond to the incentives differently, which warrants further exploration. Third, because our experiment lasted two weeks, it is possible that later donors might learn from earlier donors that actual rewards may exceed what is promised in the mobile message, especially in the group reward treatment (T5). This spillover, if it occurs at all, tends to make T5 more similar to the individual reward treatment (T4), thus leading us to underestimate the actual difference between T4 and T5. Therefore, our estimates of the effects of group reward are likely conservative. Fourth, our study focuses on the short-term impact of the interventions. Future work can examine how the long-term donation behavior of focal donors and their friends is affected, especially whether the group rewards might crowd out future donations. In addition, readers and practitioners should be aware of the potential negative effect of monetary incentives, as specified by Heyman and Ariely (2004). Finally, our findings are based on blood donation in China. Although we believe that blood donation is a typical pro-social activity, and social connection and friendship are prominent in pro-social activities in both Eastern and Western cultures, readers are advised to be cautious in extending the findings beyond the original context.

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
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/// reduced solo donors due to social pressure in Figure 4

Table 1 Panel A: Mobile Messages Used in the ExperimentMobile messages to the subjects in the experiment (across one control group and six treatment groups) are as follows:

	Control	T1	T2	Т3	T4	T5	T6
Test Group	No message	Reminder message	Reminder message + Individual reward	Reminder message + Request to bring friend(s)	Reminder message + Request to bring friend(s) + Individual reward	Reminder message + Request to bring friend(s) + Group reward	Reminder message + Request to bring friend(s) + Individual reward + Small group gift
Sample Size	14000	11000	11000	11000	11000	11000	11000
Mobile Message Content		Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03.	Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03. Upon donation, every donor may get a supermarket coupon worth 30–50 RMB.	Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03. You are also welcome to bring friend(s) to donate with you.	Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03. You are also welcome to bring friend(s) to donate with you. Upon donation, every donor may get a supermarket coupon worth 30– 50 RMB.	Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03. You are also welcome to bring friend(s) to donate with you. If you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you may get a supermarket coupon worth 30–50 RMB.	Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Please donate blood when it is suitable for you before Jan. 03. You are also welcome to bring friend(s) to donate with you. Upon donation, every donor may get a supermarket coupon worth 30–50 RMB. If you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you may get an additional gift (a fruit cutting tool).

Table 1 Panel B: Experimental Design

Test Group	Commonly-use	Commonly-used Interventions		ed Interventions
Elements in Mobile Message	Reminder to donate	Individual reward (for every donor)	Reminder to bring friend	Group reward (for group donors)
T0 (Control)				
T1 (Reminder to self)	Х			
T2 (Reminder to self + Individual reward)	Х	Х		
T3 (Reminder to self + Reminder to bring friend)	Х		Х	
T4 (Reminder to self + Individual reward + Reminder to bring friend)	Х	Х	X	
T5 (Reminder to self + Reminder to bring friend + Group reward)	Х		X	Х
T6 (Reminder to self + Reminder to bring friend + Individual reward + Small group gift)	Х	Х	X	$\mathbf{X}^{*}$

\* In T6, the small group gift is a fruit cutting tool worth about 10 RMB.

# Table 2: Randomization Check

Test Group	Number of subjects	Male	Age (as of 2014)	Married	Local resident	Number of past donations
TO	14000	60.6%	27.87	39.3%	38.3%	1.43
T1	11000	60.6%	27.93	39.3%	38.4%	1.44
T2	11000	60.2%	27.96	39.3%	37.8%	1.42
Т3	11000	60.9%	27.84	39.7%	37.9%	1.42
T4	11000	60.0%	28.01	39.6%	38.8%	1.44
T5	11000	60.9%	27.85	39.6%	37.9%	1.44
T6	11000	60.8%	27.73	38.6%	38.3%	1.44
p-value of joint t-test		0.774	0.327	0.852	0.891	0.481

# Table 3: Summary Statistics

			Donor Demographics						
Test Group	Total	Donate (%)	Male	Age>=35 <sup>#</sup>	Married	Local	Number of Past Donations		
Т0	14,000	99 (0.71%)	70.71%	37.37%	59.72%	21.21%	2.13		
T1	11,000	108 (0.98%)	60.19%	36.11%	63.41%	19.44%	2.42		
T2	11,000	120 (1.09%)	65.00%	30.83%	57.45%	16.67%	1.92		
T3	11,000	95 (0.86%)	72.63%	36.84%	71.83%	25.26%	2.07		
T4	11,000	122 (1.11%)	66.39%	31.97%	53.68%	24.59%	2.22		
T5	11,000	129 (1.17%)	63.57%	46.51%	65.31%	31.01%	2.55		
T6	11,000	124 (1.13%)	73.39%	28.23%	50.52%	20.97%	2.26		
Total	80,000	797	67.25%	35.38%	59.77%	22.84%	2.23		
			t-test (	p-values reported	below)				
T1=T0		0.0299**	0.107	0.849	0.640	0.762	0.292		
T2=T0		0.00242***	0.371	0.313	0.766	0.425	0.417		
T4=T0		0.00149***	0.497	0.402	0.429	0.552	0.733		
T5=T0		0.000234***	0.255	0.152	0.462	0.0807*	0.107		
T6=T0		0.000899***	0.672	0.155	0.226	0.966	0.629		
T1=T5		0.154	0.581	0.0948*	0.796	0.0348**	0.598		
T2=T5		0.541	0.810	0.00969***	0.266	0.0071***	0.0104**		
T3=T5		0.0210**	0.153	0.134	0.392	0.311	0.0704*		
T4=T5		0.635	0.633	0.0159**	0.0991*	0.226	0.181		
T6=T5		0.734	0.0964*	0.00236***	0.0350**	0.0572*	0.233		
T1=T3		0.377	0.0597*	0.913	0.288	0.324	0.211		
T1=T6		0.277	0.0328**	0.209	0.079*	0.783	0.536		
T3=T6		0.0490**	0.906	0.185	0.00539***	0.453	0.487		

Panel A: Summary Statistics of Donation Rate and Donor Demographics

## Note:

\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1. We report t-test for pairs with statistically significant difference in at least one outcome across all the outcomes. #: the median age is 35 among donors.

	Aı	nong all subjects in th (unconditional prob	<b>e</b> 1	Among all donors in the test group (conditional probability)			
Test group	Solo donation (%)	Donate with donating friend(s) (%)	Donate with non-donating friend(s) (%)	Solo donation (%)	Donate with donating friend(s) (%)	Donate with non-donating friend(s) (%)	
ТО	0.621%	0.0286%	0.0571%	87.88%	4.04%	8.08%	
T1	0.873%	0.0182%	0.0909%	88.89%	1.85%	9.26%	
T2	0.918%	0.0727%	0.1000%	84.17%	6.67%	9.17%	
T3	0.773%	0.0091%	0.0818%	89.47%	1.05%	9.47%	
T4	0.955%	0.0636%	0.0909%	86.07%	5.74%	8.20%	
T5	0.982%	0.1273%	0.0636%	83.72%	10.85%	5.43%	
T6	0.927%	0.0455%	0.1546%	82.26%	4.03%	13.71%	
			t-test (p-values re	ported below	)		
T1=T0	0.0322**	0.719	0.377	0.835	0.474	0.768	
T2=T0	0.0114**	0.126	0.262	0.434	0.379	0.781	
T4=T0	0.00452***	0.224	0.377	0.701	0.568	0.976	
T5=T0	0.00212***	0.000620***	0.865	0.373	0.0206**	0.489	
T6=T0	0.00913***	0.558	0.0108**	0.233	0.998	0.146	
T1=T5	0.380	0.000351***	0.500	0.257	0.00175***	0.306	
T2=T5	0.608	0.0739*	0.368	0.920	0.133	0.304	
T3=T5	0.0921*	0.000108***	0.653	0.224	0.00101***	0.297	
T4=T5	0.826	0.0370**	0.500	0.826	0.0656*	0.445	
T6=T5	0.660	0.00734***	0.0246**	0.660	0.0138**	0.0220**	
T2=T3	0.241	0.0370**	0.653	0.269	0.0632*	0.938	

Table 3 Panel B: Summary Statistics of Group Donation Behavior

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1. We report t-test for pairs with significant difference in at least one outcome across all the outcomes.

				<i>,</i> 1	
		Amount of			
Dependent	Donate or not	subject's	Bring donating	Amount of friend	Amount of subject +
Variable		donation (ml)	friend(s)	donation (ml)	friend donation (ml)
T1	0.00274**	00274** 1.071**		-0.0868	1.020**
	(0.00127)	(0.454)	(0.000289)	(0.152)	(0.508)
T2	0.00379***	1.479***	0.000438	0.103	1.582***
	(0.00127)	(0.454)	(0.000289)	(0.152)	(0.508)
Т3	0.00171	0.686	-0.000192	-0.0942	0.592
	(0.00127)	(0.456)	(0.000290)	(0.152)	(0.511)
T4	0.00399***	1.611***	0.000345	0.112	1.723***
	(0.00127)	(0.454)	(0.000289)	(0.152)	(0.508)
Т5	0.00478***	1.929***	0.00100***	0.503***	2.469***
	(0.00127)	(0.455)	(0.000290)	(0.152)	(0.510)
T6	0.00427***	1.697***	0.000174	0.143	1.877***
	(0.00127)	(0.454)	(0.000289)	(0.152)	(0.508)
Male	0.00101	-0.0156	-0.000405**	-0.0733	-0.0928
	(0.000891)	(0.319)	(0.000203)	(0.107)	(0.357)
Age	0.000399***	0.177***	2.47e-05***	0.00980**	0.189***
	(4.12e-05)	(0.0148)	(9.39e-06)	(0.00493)	(0.0165)
Weight	0.000118***	0.0521***	2.34e-06	0.000889	0.0534***
	(4.03e-05)	(0.0144)	(9.20e-06)	(0.00483)	(0.0162)
			Test of equivalence	e (p-value)	
T1=T5	0.129	0.0748*	0.000306***	0.000248***	0.00723***
T2=T5	0.462	0.350	0.0656*	0.0130**	0.100*
T3=T5	0.0228**	0.0102**	0.000106***	0.000220***	0.000528***
T4=T5	0.556	0.510	0.0322**	0.0152**	0.167
T6=T5	0.706	0.630	0.00688***	0.0252**	0.272
T3=T4	0.0902*	0.0552**	0.0804*	0.201	0.0362**
T3=T6	0.0567*	0.0361**	0.234	0.142	0.0174**
N of obs	80000	80000	80000	80000	80000
R2	0.0020	0.0028	0.0004	0.0003	0.0026

Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Treatment Effect on the Decision of Self-Donation, Group Formation, and Amount of Blood Donated

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All results are robust under alternative models (e.g., logit).

Dependent Variable	Amount of Subject's Donation					
[Sample Average]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
T1	17.21*	13.57	12.31			
	(10.42)	(9.459)	(9.006)			
T2	20.28**	22.36**	19.57**			
	(10.17)	(9.212)	(8.778)			
Т3	14.37	11.06	10.90			
	(10.76)	(9.741)	(9.285)			
T4	26.55***	27.81***	24.81***			
	(10.13)	(9.174)	(8.740)			
T5	28.18***	25.15***	24.51***			
	(10.01)	(9.075)	(8.649)			
Т6	22.90**	26.36***	22.68***			
	(10.10)	(9.147)	(8.715)			
1(if come with friend)	29.14***	31.85***	26.53***			
	(7.626)	(6.930)	(6.630)			
male		-22.44***	-22.80***			
		(6.247)	(5.956)			
current_age		2.552***	2.083***			
		(0.246)	(0.321)			
weight		1.204***	1.291***			
		(0.276)	(0.264)			
local_resident			4.306			
			(5.895)			
married			-9.454			
			(7.078)			
Observations	797	797	797			
R2	0.032	0.211	0.288			

Table 5: The Impact of Friend Presence on a Subject's Donation AmountSample = Subjects who donated in the experiment

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

Dependent Var.		Donate	or Not			Amount of Self -	+ Friend Donation	on
Demographic Dummy	Married	Local	Age>=35	Past donation>2	Married	Local	Age>=35	Past donation>2
ž			<u> </u>					
T1	0.00151	0.00272**	0.00238*	0.00150	0.439	1.024*	0.879	0.595
T2	0.00276*	0.00404***	0.00397***	0.00387***	1.110*	1.574***	1.564***	1.683***
Т3	8.40e-07	0.000993	0.00129	0.00143	-0.0503	0.336	0.388	0.581
T4	0.00351**	0.00322**	0.00401***	0.00309**	1.450**	1.372**	1.718***	1.310**
T5	0.00270*	0.00294**	0.00235	0.00259*	1.362**	1.744***	1.448**	1.441***
T6	0.00397***	0.00386***	0.00458***	0.00327**	1.657***	1.598***	1.786***	1.526***
Demo Dummy	0.00574***	0.00447*	0.00647***	0.0145***	2.232***	1.825*	2.607***	6.596***
T1 x demo	0.00429	0.000174	0.00161	0.0122***	2.032*	-0.0151	0.632	4.137**
T2 x demo	0.00374	-0.00136	-0.000582	-0.000274	1.738	0.284	0.203	-0.834
T3 x demo	0.00529*	0.00439	0.00135	0.00223	2.009*	1.586	0.744	-0.127
T4 x demo	0.00169	0.00597	-1.92e-05	0.00964**	0.970	2.750*	0.0822	4.458**
T5 x demo	0.00665**	0.0123***	0.0107***	0.0217***	3.592***	4.812***	4.467***	10.22***
T6 x demo	0.000901	0.00251	-0.00154	0.00994**	0.663	1.794	0.364	3.371*
N of Obs	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000
R2	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.006

Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Based on the Subject's Marital Status, Locality, Age, and Past Donation History

Notes: Columns for married control for the dummy variable that indicates missing values in *Married*. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1. Standard errors not reported due to space limit.

Table 7: Structural Estimates for First Stage Decision (Not Donate, Solo, Group Donation)

(Base outcome: not donate)

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Net utility from donation ( $\alpha^d$ )	-6.20	0.27
Net utility for bringing friend(s) ( $\alpha^g$ )	-3.75	0.84
Reminder for self donation ( $\beta^{MSG}$ )	0.31	0.13
Social Pressure for solo donation after receiving reminder for bringing friend(s) $(C^{sp})$	0.023	0.08
Reminder for bringing friend $(\beta^{GMSG})$	-0.52	0.42
Reward to subject for self-donation ( $\beta^{sr}$ )	0.11	0.08
Reward for subject's friend donation $(\beta^{fr})$	1.02	0.46
Reward to subject for group donation $(\beta^{br})$	1.12	0.42
Standard dev. of random coefficient ( $\alpha^d$ )	2.37*	
Standard dev. of random coefficient ( $\alpha^{g}$ )	0.85**	
Covariance between $(\alpha^d)$ and $(\alpha^g)$	-1.86**	

Panel A: Individual Primitives and the Effect of Interventions (Alternative-Invariant Coefficient)

Panel B: Individual Demographics (Alternative-Specific Coefficient)

Solo Donation Alternative $(\gamma^{10})$	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and weight in upper half	0.08	0.09
Female and weight in upper half	0.59	0.14
Male	0.52	0.10
Age >=35	0.24	0.09
Married	0.57	0.10
Local resident	0.51	0.09
Education <=9 years	0.17	0.10

Group Donation Alternative ( $\gamma^{11}$ )	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and weight in upper half	-0.20	0.49
Female and weight in upper half	0.67	0.45
Male	-0.37	0.41
Age >=35	0.23	0.42
Married	0.45	0.44
Local resident	0.50	0.38
Education <=9 years	-0.97	0.62

Table 8: Policy Simulation of Different Combinations of Interventions

	Average Prob. of Subject Coming for Solo Donation (1)	Average Prob. of Subject Coming for Group Donation (2)	Total Number of Donors (1)+(2)*2	Total Unit of Reward to the Donors <sup>4</sup>	Reward per Donor
No treatment	0.69%	0.02%	0.73%	0.00%	0.00
Reminder for self donation	0.93%	0.03%	0.98%	0.00%	0.00
Reminder for self donation + Reminder for bringing friend(s)	0.95%	0.02%	0.99%	0.00%	0.00
Reward to subject for self donation (SR)	1.04%	0.03%	1.09%	1.07%	0.97
Reward for subject's friend's donation $(FR)^1$	0.95%	0.04%	1.04%	0.04%	0.04
Reward to subject for bringing a friend $(BR)^2$	0.95%	0.05%	1.05%	0.05%	0.04
Individual reward treatment: SR + FR	1.06%	0.05%	1.16%	1.16%	1.00
Group reward treatment: $FR + BR^3$	0.95%	0.13%	1.21%	0.26%	0.21
SR + BR	1.06%	0.05%	1.15%	1.15%	1.00
SR + FR + BR	1.06%	0.14%	1.34%	1.48%	1.10
SR (2 Unit) + FR (2 Unit)	1.18%	0.14%	1.46%	2.92%	2.00
FR (2 Unit) + BR (2 Unit)	0.95%	0.97%	2.88%	3.86%	1.34

Note:

1. Under FR (friend reward only), the blood bank offers a reward to the donors that are brought by the subject, but not to the subject herself. This is potentially useful, as the subject's willingness to donate plus the friend reward might persuade the friend(s) to donate together in a group. The friend reward only policy may also remove friend(s)' concern about whether the subject has any conflict of interest and enhance the social image of the subject.

2. Under BR (referral reward exclusively for donors who bring a friend), the blood bank secretly offers a reward only to the donors that bring friend(s), but not to those friend(s). The policy can be implemented by sending a secret message with the reward voucher to the subject donor after donation.

3. FR+BR is group reward; SR+FR is individual reward; SR only, FR only, BR only, and SR+BR are counterfactual policies that are not tested in the experiment. 4. As introduced in our experiment design and empirical analysis, one unit of reward equals 50 RMB.