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**TABLE 1**  
**Social Insurance: A Summary of Existing Applied Work**

	(1) Testing for Selection	(2) Quantifying Welfare Costs of Selection	(3) Estimation of Benefits	(4) Estimation of Moral Hazard Costs	(5) Calculating Optimal Benefit Levels
Medicare / Medicaid	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
Disability Insurance				<b>X</b>	
Unemp. Insurance			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
Workers' Comp.			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>

NOTES: This table lists areas where we are aware of empirical work on the topic listed in each column for five major social insurance programs. Selected examples of this work would include the following. Column 1: Cutler and Reber (1998) on Medicare/Medicaid (more accurately: private health insurance markets). Column 2: Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) on health insurance markets. Column 3: Card et al. (2009) on Medicare and Finkelstein et al. (2012) on Medicaid; Gruber (1997) and Chetty (2008) on unemployment insurance, and Bronchetti (2012) on workers compensation. Column 4: Card et al. (2009) on Medicare and Finkelstein et al. (2012) on Medicaid; Gruber (2001) and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2012) on disability insurance, Meyer (1990) and Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) on unemployment insurance, and Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) on workers' compensation. Column 5: Gruber (1997) and Chetty (2008) on unemployment insurance and Bronchetti (2012) on workers compensation.