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THE LIFE CYCLE OF SCHOLARS AND PAPERS IN ECONOMICS -- THE "CITATION
DEATH TAX"

Joshua Aizenman
Kenneth Kletzer

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ABSTRACT

The information content of academic citations is subject to debate. This paper views premature death as a tragic "natural experiment," outlining a methodology identifying the "citation death tax" -- the impact of death of productive economists on the patterns of their citations. We rely on a sample of 428 papers written by 16 well known economists who died well before retirement, during the period of 1975- 97. The news is mixed: for half of the sample, we identify a large and significant "citation death tax" for the average paper written by these scholars. For these authors, the estimated average missing citations per paper attributed to premature death ranges from 40% to 140% (the overall average is about 90%), and the annual costs of lost citations per paper are in the range 3% and 14%. Hence, a paper written ten years before the author's death avoids a citation cost that varies between 30% and 140%. For the other half of the sample, there is no citation death tax; and for two Nobel Prize-caliber scholars in this second group, Black and Tversky, citations took off overtime, reflecting the growing recognitions of their seminal works.

Joshua Aizenman
Department of Economics; E2
1156 High St.
University of California, Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
and NBER
jaizen@ucsc.edu

Kenneth Kletzer
University of California, Santa Cruz
Department of Economics
217 Social Sciences 1
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
kkletzer@cats.ucsc.edu

1. Introduction

An important approach for measuring the impact and diffusion of academic research is the study of the quantity and pattern of citations to published research findings. Article citations are often used as a measure of research quality in the assessment of individual researchers, university departments or academic journals. Citations to publications may also be used to trace the influence and evolution of knowledge, as for the case of patent citations in the study of the diffusion of technological knowledge.¹ The usefulness of citations for measuring research impact is the subject of a large literature in the sociology of science which emphasizes the role of academic culture and the incentives to cite. While concerns about the suitability of citations for appraising research quality abound, several studies find that cumulative citations have a significant positive effect on faculty salaries in the natural sciences and economics.² Because there are returns to being cited (perhaps, non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), researchers have an incentive to take efforts to increase citations to their past publications.

This paper considers the question of whether citations depend only on the intrinsic contribution of a publication or are influenced by the author's professional presence by estimating the impact of premature death of productive economists on their citations. Death in the midst of an active career may affect citations by eliminating the opportunity of the researcher to raise awareness of their research findings or by eliminating the incentives of others to cite for strategic reasons. If premature death leads to a drop in citations, the citations of papers written by deceased authors will be front loaded relative to other papers of the same vintage, and this effect will be larger the shorter is the time between author's death and the year of the paper's publication. We confirm these predictions for half of the authors in our sample, and find that these effects are large.

A substantial literature on the use and usefulness of citations to academic journal articles for measuring research quality and researcher productivity follows the work of Cole and Cole (1973) and Merton (1973). The use of citations in the evaluation of scientific careers and compensation of academic researchers motivates much of the interest in citations patterns and the motives to cite. Posner (2000) offers a lucid analysis of the incentives of scholars to cite the work of predecessors. He points out that citations play a key informational role in the written presentation of research and acknowledge the priority of contributions by others but can also be used strategically. While citations serve the

¹ Examples of this literature include the chapters in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002).

² Estimates of the value of citations are given by Diamond (1985, 1986), Hammermesh, Johnson and Weisbrod (1982) and Sauer (1988) among others. MacRoberts and MacRoberts (1987), Seglen (1991) and Taubes (1993) give specific critiques of research appraisal based on citations.

purpose of conveying information in academic exposition, the rewards to being cited and the role of others in the peer reviewing process affect the incentives to cite.

Citations can eliminate the replication of results, derivations and arguments that are already known. They can also be used to place new findings or ideas in context using the familiarity of readers with a literature to reduce what needs to be written and read. Because scholarship is costly, information costs may be important for understanding citation behavior.³ Networking increases the familiarity with a researcher's work, lowering the information cost to others of citing that work. Thus, the rates of citation to specific articles may depend on the promotion by the authors or more general personal networking by authors. Presenting results, providing research materials and advice, training students in one's area of expertise and similar activities can be both privately and socially productive by raising citation counts and disseminating useful information at a lower cost to its users.⁴ The rewards to being cited and the role of others in the peer reviewing process can affect the incentives to cite. Citing to curry favor with referees or editors or the use of editorial review to promote one's own work or that of colleagues are possible examples of strategic citation.⁵ Similarly, authors may cite excessively in the hope of generating quid pro quo citations.

Our paper contributes to this literature by considering the incentives to be cited rather than to cite. By estimating the citation cost of the premature death of active scholars, we are estimating the importance of a scholar's physical presence for generating citations and, indirectly, in spreading awareness of their research or promoting a research agenda. Our findings dealing with the large cost of lost networking have several interpretations. Premature death terminates activities that help enhance the prominence of scholar's publications, such as presenting papers, pursuing follow-up research, encouraging related research by others and supervising Ph.D. students.⁶ Some of these costs may be mitigated in circumstances where the research was done jointly with active and productive scholars. The loss of some citations may result from the termination of the incentives for strategic citation. A

³ Early evidence for information costs is offered by Merton (1968, 1973) who finds that the more an article has already been cited, the more likely it is to be cited because other researchers are more readily aware of it by seeing it cited.

⁴ In the economics profession, networking has been studied in the context of citation circles based on graduate education (Stigler and Friedland (1975), gender differences in citation frequency (Ferber (1988)) and the research gains associated with co-authorship (Sauer (1988) and Laband and Tollison (2000)).

⁵ The possibility of editorial bias is examined by Laband and Piette (1994). We are unable to find empirical studies that assess whether a referee is cited or not affects recommendations to editors. The differences in referee recommendations for double-blind and single-blind refereeing found in the randomized experiment by the American Economic Review reported by Blank (1991) suggest referees are swayed by information other than just the content of submissions.

⁶ Authors also cite their own work. Fowler and Aksnes (2007) demonstrate that self citations by scientists generate citations by others.

researcher's death can also have the direct effect of reducing research activity on a particular topic. Identifying the precise importance of all these factors requires much more detailed information about various dimensions of networking and is beyond the data available and scope of the present paper.

Section 2 outlines the methodology. In the first stage, we assembled a list of the papers written by well known economists that died before reaching age 65, 1975-1997. Applying well defined criteria, we ended up with a sample of 428 papers written by 16 economists. We constructed the intertemporal path of missing citations of a paper in the sample relative to the hypothetical citations had the author been alive, and calculated for each paper the cumulative missing citations. We construct these measures using two different matching procedures. The first method matches the citations of each paper in our sample to the pattern of citations of the average paper of the same vintage, allowing for the quality adjustment (the quality adjustment is defined by the cumulative citations of the paper prior to author's death, relative to the cumulative citations during that period of the average paper of the same vintage). The second procedure identifies for each paper in the sample of the 428 papers the "closest" papers of the same vintage written by other authors (closeness of two papers is defined by the sum of the squared difference of their corresponding citation paths prior to author's death). We then match the post author's death citations of each paper with the average citations of the "closest" papers written by other authors. The ratio of the missing citations relative to the overall citations of each paper provides us with the "citation death tax rate" of each paper. Statistical analysis of the missing citation rate reveals that for half of the authors, the missing citation rate is large and significant, and this result holds for both matching procedures. We also find that for these authors, the missing citation ratio of a paper is smaller the longer the time elapsing between the paper's publication date and author's death. Section 3 discusses robustness, and possible extensions. Section 4 discusses the incentives to cite and relates these to the empirical findings.

2. The methodology

We assembled the list of well known economists that died before reaching possible retirement age (65), applying the following criteria:

- Died between 1975-1997, hence we have at least 9 years of citations record past death.
- Average citation/year in the Web of Science exceeds 2.

- The author appears in the deceased list assembled by the *IDEAS-REPEC* project [<http://ideas.repec.org/i/erip.html>], or are reviewed at the *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*.

The resultant sample includes 16 economists [see Table 1]. It covers renowned economists that died prematurely -- 2 in their 30s, 3 in their 40s, 8 in their 50s, and 3 at their early 60s (< 65). They are at varying level of prominence -- 5 economists with average citation/year between 2 and 10, 5 economists with average citation/year between 10 and 20, 4 with average citation/year between 20 and 100, and two Nobel prize-caliber scholars, with average citations/year exceeding 100 (Fischer Black and Amos Tversky). Using the Web of Science system, we assembled a panel of the annual citations of 428 papers written by the 16 economists in the sample, in the years 1957-2006.

The Web of Science provides us with useful information regarding the dynamics of average citations per paper written in a given year. Figure 1a provides this information for papers with at least one citation for selective years [1956, 59, 65, 71, 77, 83, 89, 95, 2001]. The samples are restricted to economics articles written in English. The Figure suggests upward rotation of the citation curves overtime: papers written more recently tend to be cited more during the citation cycle, and paper's citations tend to peak at a later stage of the citation cycle during the last twenty years. These changes may reflect both the advent of the Internet, and the impact of the growth of the size of Economics and thereby the number of papers published each year. Figure 1b controls for this size effect by deflating the citation curves by a size index $I(t)$, defined by of the number of papers published at year t relative to the number published at the base year, 1956. The index is portrayed in Figure 2, showing that the number of published papers more than tripled from 1971. The rapidly expanding size of papers in economics explains some of the patterns in Figure 1a -- the citations curves dealing with papers written in the 1950s peaked at much later years, or remain upward sloping due to the large increase in papers published in later years.

2.1 Citation death tax, definition and results

We outline a methodology to test the degree to which premature death frontloads citations of deceased author relative to other papers of the same vintage. It is convenient to adopt the following notation:

$x_{t,t+k}$, $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$, is the average citations at time $t+k$ of papers written in year t . The citation curves of papers written at time t provided in Figure 1a correspond to $x_{t,t}; x_{t,t+1}; x_{t,t+2}; \dots; x_{t,2006}$.

$z_{t,i,j}(t+k)$ = the citations in year $t+k$ of paper i , written by economist j in year t .

$t_{d,j}$ = death year of economist j .

Figure 3 provides a hypothetical example illustrating the construction of our “missing citation” measure. Suppose that an author wrote a paper i in year zero ($t = 0$), four years before the author’s death ($t_d = 4$). The actual citation index of the paper is plotted by the bold curve, C_i . The citation curve of “an average paper” written in year zero is the solid curve, AC . To start, we estimate an index of the prominence of paper i relative to the “average paper” written in $t = 0$. This is done by evaluating the position of the paper’s citations [C_i curve] relative to the average citations [curve AC] before the author’s death. Specifically, we estimate the magnification value h_i that minimizes the average squared distance between the magnified curve, $AC * h_i$ and the citation curve C_i , prior to author’s death, $t = t_d$ (i.e., we find $h_{i,j}$ that solves $MIN \sum_{k=0}^{t_{d,j}-t} [z_{t,i,j}(t+k) - h_{i,j}x_{t,t+k}]^2$). In the example outlined in Figure 3, $h_i = 2$: prior to author’s death, paper i was cited on average twice as much as an average paper written in the same year, $t = 0$. Had the author stayed alive, the predicted citations of paper i would have been twice the citations of the average paper written in year $t = 0$. We project “the predicted citation curve” had the author’s been alive by plotting the magnified average citation curve, $AC * h_i$, post the author’s death year. We denote this curve by PC_i [see the dotted top curve]. The distance between the “the predicted citation curve” and the actual citations of paper i , post author death [$PC_i - C_i$ for $t > t_d$] provides us with the “missing citations curve,” MC_i . Figure 3 portrays the case where the citations post author’s death dropped by 75%, hence curve MC_i corresponds to $AC * 1.5$ for $t > t_d$. The area below curve MC_i provides us with our estimate of the missing citations.

More precisely, the missing citation curve is constructed in the following way: For a paper i written at year t by author j , we find the magnification factor $h_{i,j}$ that minimizes the average squared distance between the paper’s citations $z_{t,i,j}$, and $h_{i,j}x_{t,t+k}$, (i.e., the citation curve of papers written in year t times the magnification factor), from time t to one year past the author’s death, (between year t and year $t_{d,j} + 1$). This is akin to regressing $z_{t,i,j}$ on the average citation curve, $x_{t,t+k}$, prior to $t_{d,j} + 1$, hence

$$(1) \quad h_{i,j} = \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{t_{d,j}-t+1} [x_{t,t+k} z_{t,i,j}(t+k)]}{\sum_{k=0}^{t_{d,j}-t+1} [x_{t,t+k}]^2}.$$

The “missing citations” index for paper i , written at year t , by author j , $M_{t,i,j}$, corresponding to the area below curve MC_i , is defined by $M_{t,i,j} = \sum_{k=t_d-t+2}^{2006-t} [h_{i,j}x_{t,t+k} - z_{t,i,j}(t+k)]$. The "Avg. Missing citations of author j ," AM_j is calculated as the average of $M_{t,i,j}$ for all author's j papers in our sample, and is provided in Table 1. It varies widely; between close to 10 citations per paper, to negative numbers for authors whose research gained growing prominence after their premature death.

The sum of all the missing citations written by author j at time $t+k$ is obtained by adding vertically the “missing citations” curves, $h_{i,j}x_{t,t+k} - z_{t,i,j}(t+k)$. Figure 4 plots the average missing citation curves for four scholars. The top curves [Figure 4a] correspond to authors where the curves suggest sizeable “missing citation” effect post author's death. The bottom curves [Figure 4b] corresponds to Nobel prize-caliber authors, whose citations took off well before their death, and where the growing recognition of their seminal contributions is reflected by negative “missing citations.”

The missing citations ratio of paper i , denoted by $mcr_{t,i,j}$, is calculated as

$$(2) \quad mcr_{t,i,j} = \frac{\sum_{k=t_d-t+2}^{2006-t} [h_{i,j}x_{t,t+k} - z_{t,i,j}(t+k)]}{\sum_{k=0}^{2006-t} z_{t,i,j}(t+k)}.$$

The average missing citations ratio [amrc] is calculated as the average of $mcr_{t,i,j}$ for all author's j papers in our sample, and is reported at the last column of Table 1. It varies considerably, from more than 1 [corresponding to the case where the missing citations exceed the total citations] to negative values.

Next, we apply regression analysis to quantify the impact of the “citation death tax.” First, we run 16 author specific regressions, where we evaluated the degree to which the missing citation rate index of paper i written at time t is negatively associated with the time between paper's publication and author's death. Table 2 summarizes the 16 regression results for the following specification:

$$(3) \quad mcr_{t,i,j} = c_j + a_{1,j}(d_j - p_{i,j})$$

where $d_j - p_{i,j}$ is the death year of scholar j minus the publication year of paper i , and c_j is a constant, estimating the lost citation index for a paper published at the year of author's death. The value of $a_{1,j}$ reflects the annual cost of lost citations per paper due to premature author's death. The constant term turned out to be significant for half of the authors, having values ranging between 0.7 to about 3. These results hold both with and without self citations. Table 3 reports the results of pooled regressions, akin

to (3). Pooling the 8 authors whose “lost citations” coefficients [c_j in (3)] are significant, we find that the annual cost of lost citations per paper due to premature death for these authors is $a_1 = -0.07$, and is highly significant ($t = -5.3$). Hence, a paper written seven years before the author's death avoids a citation cost of about 50%. Similar results apply for a pooled regression of all the 16 authors, and for a pooled regression of all the authors without the two Nobel caliber scholars, Black and Tversky. In an attempt to evaluate the degree to which co-authors play a role in mitigating the death citation tax, we added controls for co-authors [the number of co-authors for each paper, and a measure of the co-authors prominence]. Intriguingly, we failed to detect any systematic co-authors effect.⁷

Our approach is based on matching the citations of each paper in our sample to the pattern of citations of the average paper of the same vintage, allowing for the quality adjustment described in the construction of the magnification factor, $h_{i,j}$. Needless to say, this is only one possible matching strategy out of wide array of possibilities. Because we deal with highly heterogeneous sample of productive economists, it seems to be a reasonable benchmark. We close this section by modifying the matching process, narrowing the reference group of each paper in the sample to the same vintage “closest papers” prior’s to author’s death. Specifically, for paper i , written by economist j at time t we define the citation distance between it and a paper x , published by another author at the same year (t), by the squared difference between the citation paths of the two papers from year t to $t_{d,j} + 1$. Next, we find the set of the papers that minimize the citation distance between them and paper i,j,t . This set defines the reference papers whose average citations post author’s j death is matched with the citation path of paper i,j,t . More formally, for each paper x written at time t by another author we define its citation distance from paper i,j,t during the years $t, \dots, t_{d,j} + 1$ by

$$(4) \quad citation.dis_{t,i,j-x} = \sum_{k=0}^{t_{d,j}-t+1} [z_{t,i,j}(t+k) - x_{t,t+k}]^2$$

where $x_{t,t+k}$ is the citation of paper x at time $t+k$, and $citation.dis_{t,i,j-x}$ denotes the citation distance between the two papers priors to author’s j death. We denote by $X_{i,j,t}$ the set of all the x papers that are the closest to paper i,j,t -- the set of papers that solve $\underset{x}{Min}[citation.dis_{t,i,j-x}]$. We use this set to find the missing citations ratio, $mcr_{t,i,j}$. In cases where there are several papers in $X_{i,j,t}$ (“closest papers to

⁷ The absence of the co-author/s effect may be consistent with the CRS of co-authorship reported by Sauer (1988), who found that individual return from co authoring a paper with n author is $1/n$ that of a single authored paper.

i, j, t ”), we look at the path of their average citations in calculating the missing citations ratio of paper i .⁸ Hence, we replace $h_{i,j}x_{i,t+k}$ in equation (2) with the average citations of the papers in set $X_{i,j,t}$, at year $t+k$. Next, we apply the regression analysis to quantify the impact of the “citation death tax,” running the regressions (3) for the modified missing citation indexes. Table 4 report the results, where the first three columns repeat the results of the benchmark regression provided in Table 2, and the last 3 columns provide the regression results for the case where each paper is matched only with the set of comparable papers, $X_{i,j,t}$, as defined above. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance of a positive c_j coefficient, at levels of 10%, 5%, or 1% (recall that c_j is the constant estimating the lost citation index for a paper published at the year of author’s death). Comparing the two set of regressions reveals that the main results are robust to the change in the matching set. While the precise values of c_j differ between the two methodology, the set of the authors whose c_j is significant and positive is overall robust to the change in the matching methodology.⁹

3. Robustness checks and interpretations

We conducted numerous robustness checks, not reported in the paper. First, we added death year and publication year specific effects to the regressions, and found that the main results continue to hold. We also confirm that the results are not affected by controlling for the large increase over time in the number of papers in Economics [this was done by deflating the citations at time t by the intertemporal scale factor, $I(t)$]. We verified that our results hold with and without self-citations. As a reconfirmation of our methodology, we tested the degree to which the relative skewness of the citations of a paper in our sample is negatively associated with the time elapsed between paper’s publication and author’s death. This was done by running regressions similar to the one in equation (3), when the LHS variable is the skewness of the citations of a paper in our sample relative to the average citations of papers of the same vintage, properly adjusted for the quality of the paper. The results validated our prior: the citations of papers of the eight authors that were found to be exposed to sizable citation death tax are also characterized by positive skewness of their citations relative to the average citations of the same vintage papers. The size of this citation frontloading increases for papers published closer to the author’s death.

⁸ The number of papers in the minimum citation distance set, $X_{i,j,t}$ tends to be smaller for papers published earlier in author’s i career (i.e., papers with larger $t_{d,j} - t$).

⁹ The main difference is that one author is added to the group of significant “citation death tax” when we match applying the minimum distance methodology (Diaz-Alejandro).

4. Conclusion

Citations play an important role in the presentation of research and in the use of prior knowledge in written work. They are also used to evaluate the quality of research and to rate or rank the researchers, departments and journals.¹⁰ The compensation of academic research should influence citation behavior. Authors of journal articles are paid to produce research by universities and similar institutions and are not compensated by other researchers who benefit from their articles. Citations are used, to varying degrees across disciplines, to measure the contribution of a publication and adjust researcher compensation to internalize benefits produced by the researcher's time and effort. Therefore, authors have a pecuniary incentive to promote citation of their work. Our use of premature deaths of active scholars indicates that they do.

The results are consistent with both the informational and strategic incentives for citation (articulated clearly by Posner (2000)). The informational model of citations is consistent with the life-cycle pattern of citations to the articles in our dataset. The initial rise can be attributed to gestation and publication lags in research that builds on the contribution of an article, as well as to network externalities in citation. The gradual decline in citations with age fits the exhaustion of opportunities to use the paper's content in original ways or the role of creative destruction as the ideas or techniques in the paper are superseded.¹¹

The premature death of an author should lead to a drop in strategic citations to the author's work. However, there can be a reduction in informational citations due to the death of an author as well. To the extent that an author encourages priority citations to his own work, citations may decline. The author's death may contribute to a decline in research on the same topics through the cessation of the author's research and training of students. These are all examples of networking effects. Researchers play a role in promoting their own research simply by being visible to the research community and continuing to press a current research agenda through presentations and follow-up papers.¹² The empirical results of this paper may evidence either the importance of networking or of strategic behavior in citation in economics or a combination of both, although strictly strategic citation may end more quickly than informative citations after an author's death. The results do reveal that being there matters for some prominent economists.

¹⁰ Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) consider foundations for such rankings and provide references to this literature in part.

¹¹ The age profile of citations was noted by Price (1965). McDowell (1982) uses the diminishing citation profiles of papers in his study of the depreciation of researcher knowledge in economics.

¹² The literature on citations and networking includes work that studies how networking affects the frequency of citation. Ferber (1988) finds gender differences in citation practices that may be related to networking.

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Table 1 -- The sample

Author	Birth year	Death year	Age	First year with citation	Sum of time cited (until the end of 2006)	Avg. citations per active year ¹	# of Papers in sample ²	Avg. Missing citations/paper ³	Avg. Missing citations ratio [amcr] ⁴
Aiyagari, Rao	1951	1997	46	1986	414	19.71	19	-1.46	-0.14
Balassa, Bela	1928	1991	63	1959	1586	33.04	90	1.36 (-0.76) ⁵	0.53 (0.52) ⁵
Black, Fischer	1938	1995	57	1972	4149	118.54	21	-59.14	-0.17
Bruno, Michael	1932	1996	64	1963	636	14.45	30	4.85	0.42
Díaz-Alejandro, Carlos	1937	1985	48	1966	261	6.37	12	-3.6	0.77
Eckstein, Otto	1927	1984	57	1958	470	9.59	17	15.34	0.91
Farrell, Michael James	1926	1975	49	1961	1505	32.72	14	9.66 (-76.79) ⁵	1.09 (0.95) ⁵
Goldfeld, Stephen	1940	1995	55	1968	395	10.13	24	3.02	0.42
Johansen, Leif	1930	1982	52	1961	316	6.87	26	6.57	1.5
Johnson, Harry	1923	1977	54	1957	1133	22.66	91	9.25	1.22
Nedungadi, Prakash	1956	1995	39	1985	290	13.18	8	-6.27	0.59
Nelson, Daniel	1959	1995	36	1991	1057	66.06	10	-20.57	-0.24
Okun, Arthur	1928	1980	52	1962	145	3.22	17	6.19	1.35
Phillips, Alban W H	1914	1975	61	1957	758	15.16	14	5.82	1.03
Rader, Trout	1938	1991	53	1969	110	2.89	13	-0.11	0.14
Tversky, Amos	1937	1996	59	1977	5779	192.63	14	-1.46	0.06

Notes

1. avg.citation rate per active year is defined as the total citations divided by the years starting from his first citation. e.g, people start to cite Aiyagari's paper from 1986, therefore the value we used is the total citation 414 divided by 21 and equals 19.71.
2. For "# of Papers in sample" we only include the cited papers which is published before or just one year after the author's death.
3. "Avg. Missing citations" is calculated as the average $M_{t,i,j}$ of all author's j papers in our sample (see section 2 for further details).
4. "amcr" is calculated as the average $mcr_{t,i,j}$ for all j's papers in our sample (see section 2 for further details).
5. This author wrote one outstanding paper cited more than 350, a paper that has not been subject to "death citation tax," skewing the average missing citations from positive to negative. The first number reports the average without this paper, the second with that paper. There are only two authors in our sample whose Average missing citations are considerably affected by the exclusions of one outstanding paper.

Table 2 Lost citations OLS regressions

$m_{i,i,j}$ is the ratio of the projected missing citations of paper i , written by economist j at time t , as a fraction of the total citations of that paper [see section ... for the detailed definition]. The table reports the coefficients of $m_{i,i} = c + a_1(d - p)$, where $d - p$ is the death year minus publication year. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance of a positive “ c ” coefficient at the 10% (+), 5% (*) or 1% (**) level.

Author	Include All cites			Exclude self cites		
	C (t value)	d_p (t value)	Number of obs.	C (t value)	d_p (t value)	Number of obs.
Aiyagari, Rao	-0.372 (-1.58)	0.0437 (1.23)	19	-0.536* (-2.48)	0.0607+ (1.87)	19
	1.124**	-0.0395**		1.100**	-0.0391**	
Balassa, Bela	(6.59)	(-4.11)	90	(6.21)	(-3.86)	87
Black, Fischer	-0.361* (-2.18)	0.0152 (1.4)	21	-0.360* (-2.18)	0.015 (1.38)	21
	0.754**	-0.0205+		0.761**	-0.0209+	
Bruno, Michael	(3.61)	(-1.81)	30	(3.6)	(-1.82)	30
Díaz-Alejandro, Carlos	0.905 (1.49)	-0.0155 (-0.27)	12	0.905 (1.49)	-0.0155 (-0.27)	12
	2.007+	-0.0726		2.003+	-0.0724	
Eckstein, Otto	(2.03)	(-1.27)	17	(1.96)	(-1.20)	16
	3.006*	-0.186*		3.006*	-0.186*	
Farrell, Michael James	(2.98)	(-2.27)	14	(2.98)	(-2.27)	14
	0.929**	-0.0319*		0.812**	-0.0265+	
Goldfeld, Stephen	(3.88)	(-2.38)	24	(3.16)	(-1.85)	24
	2.826*	-0.136		1.314+	-0.0496	
Johansen, Leif	(2.69)	(-1.65)	26	(2.06)	(-1.01)	25
	2.400**	-0.135**		2.404**	-0.140**	
Johnson, Harry	(4.83)	(-2.91)	91	(4.81)	(-3.00)	90
Nedungadi, Prakash	0.783 (0.84)	-0.0337 (-0.24)	8	0.798 (0.85)	-0.0355 (-0.25)	8
	-0.451 (-1.15)	0.117 (0.88)		-0.606* (-2.37)	0.118 (1.36)	
Nelson, Daniel	1.853+	-0.0659		1.854+	-0.0655	
Okun, Aurthur	(2.09)	(-0.68)	17	(2.09)	(-0.67)	17
	2.746 (1.45)	-0.146 (-1.04)		2.746 (1.45)	-0.146 (-1.04)	
Phillips, A W H	0.0769 (0.22)	0.00387 (0.19)		-0.246 (-0.56)	0.019 (0.76)	
Rader, Trout	0.148 (0.47)	-0.0195 (-0.48)	13	0.0139 (0.04)	-0.00941 (-0.20)	12
Tversky, Amos			14			14

Table 3 Pooled regressions

$m_{t,i,j}$ is the ratio of the projected missing citations of paper i , written by economist j at time t , as a fraction of the total citations of that paper [see section ... for the detailed definition]. The table reports the coefficients of pooled regressions of $m_{t,i} = c + a_1(d - p)$, where $d - p$ is the death year minus publication year.

Author	Include All cites			Exclude self cites		
	c (t value)	d_p (t value)	Number of obs.	c (t value)	d_p (t value)	Number of obs.
Pooling regression without author dummies						
With 8 authors (the authors reported in table 2 with significant citation death tax, "c")	1.83 (8.98)	-0.08 (-5.64)	309	1.64 (8.69)	-0.07 (-5.34)	303
With 14 authors (without Black and Tversky)	1.45 (8.31)	-0.06 (-4.78)	385	1.28 (7.82)	-0.05 (-4.34)	378
With all 16 authors	1.29 (8.01)	-0.05 (-4.52)	420	1.13 (7.46)	-0.04 (-4.04)	413
Pooling regression with author dummies						
With the 8 authors (the authors reported in table 2 with significant citation death tax, "c")	Not report	-0.07 (-4.69)	309	Not report	-0.06 (-4.48)	303
With 14 authors (without Black and Tversky)	Not report	-0.07 (-4.87)	385	Not report	-0.06 (-4.59)	378
With all 16 authors	Not report	-0.06 (-4.78)	420	Not report	-0.05 (-4.46)	413

Table 4 Lost citations OLS regressions, papers are matched with “comparable papers”:
 paper i , written by economist j at time t is matched with the average citation path of all the papers written at time t with comparable citation path from time t to $t_{d,j} + 1$ [see the text for further details]. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance of a positive “ c ” coefficient at the 10% (+), 5% (*) or 1% (**) level.

	Papers are matched with the citations of the average paper of the same vintage, adjusted by the scale factor h			Papers are matched with the citations of the average paper in the set of “closest papers” [defined by the min. squared citations distance]		
	C	d_p	Number of obs.	C	d_p	Number of obs.
	(t value)	(t value)		(t value)	(t value)	
Aiyagari, Rao	-0.37 (-1.58)	0.04 (1.23)	19	0.47* (2.24)	-0.06+ (-1.79)	19
Balassa, Bela	1.12** (6.59)	-0.04** (-4.11)	90	0.90** (5.1)	-0.04** (-3.93)	90
Black, Fischer	-0.36* (-2.18)	0.02 (1.4)	21	-0.28 (-1.62)	0.01 (0.78)	21
Bruno, Michael	0.75** (3.61)	-0.02+ (-1.81)	30	0.44* (2.65)	-0.02+ (-1.93)	30
Díaz-Alejandro, Carlos	0.90 (1.49)	-0.02 (-0.27)	12	0.94+ (2.19)	-0.04 (-1.04)	12
Eckstein, Otto	2.01+ (2.03)	-0.07 (-1.27)	17	2.30** (3.96)	-0.11** (-3.19)	17
Farrell, Michael James	3.00* (2.98)	-0.19* (2.27)	14	1.09+ (1.91)	-0.07 (-1.45)	14
Goldfeld, Stephen	0.93** (3.88)	-0.03* (-2.38)	24	0.54* (2.73)	-0.02* (-2.10)	24
Johansen, Leif	2.83* (2.69)	-0.14 (-1.65)	26	3.08** (3.44)	-0.17* (-2.36)	26
Johnson, Harry	2.40** (4.83)	-0.14** (-2.91)	91	2.97** (8.06)	-0.21** (-6.12)	91
Nedungadi, Prakash	0.78 (0.84)	-0.03 (-0.24)	8	0.42 (0.51)	-0.015 (-0.12)	8
Nelson, Daniel	-0.45 (-1.15)	0.12 (0.88)	10	0.68 (1.56)	-0.20 (-1.40)	10
Okun, Aurthur	1.85+ (2.09)	-0.07 (-0.68)	17	1.30* (2.23)	-0.09 (-1.39)	17
Phillips, A W H	2.75 (1.45)	-0.15 (-1.04)	14	2.43+ (1.8)	-0.15 (-1.48)	14
Rader, Trout	0.07 (0.22)	0.00 (0.19)	13	-0.45 (-1.32)	0.02 (1.08)	13
Tversky, Amos	0.15 (0.47)	-0.02 (-0.48)	14	-0.26* (-2.59)	0.02 (1.31)	14

Figure 1a Average citations per paper written in year t , for papers with at least one citation, cited by papers written in year T , $T+1$, $T+2$ for selected years. The samples are restricted to economics articles written in English, appearing in the SSCI database.




Figure 1b Average citations per paper written in year t , for papers with at least one citation, cited by papers written in year T , $T+1$, $T+2, \dots$ for selected years, normalized by size index $I(t)$




Figure 2: Publication size index $I(t)$, number of papers in economics publish in year t /the number of papers in economics published in 1956




Figure 3: Stylistic illustration of constructing the missing citation curve





Figure 4a: “Average missing citation” curves for two scholars.





Figure 4b: “Average missing citation” curves for two Nobel Prize-caliber scholars – no “citation death tax” effect

Estimated missing citations/published papers at year T for author j: $\sum_{i=1}^n [h_{i,j} \cdot x_{t,T} - z_{t,i,j}(T)] / n$ [see section 2 for the detailed definition].