NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

OPENNESS, RELATIVE PRICES AND MACRO POLICIES

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Working Paper No. 1233

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 November 1983

The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in International Studies and project in Productivity (World Economy). Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER Working Paper #1233 November 1983

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the role of relative prices in the conduct of wage indexation and monetary policy in a small economy producing traded and nontraded goods under a flexible exchange rate regime. It is shown that the beneficial effect of using relative prices in addition to aggregate prices as indicators for the conduct of the above policies increases with openness. The response of policies to relative prices rises with openness, and has dampening effects on the volatility of deviations from purchasing power parity. The analysis demonstrates that the beneficial effect of allowing a "basket" indexation (or a money rule that responds also to relative prices) lies in mitgating the effects of foreign shocks.

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I. Introduction and Summary

One structural parameter that varies across countries is the degree of openness.¹ In a way, a larger share of traded goods implies a larger exposure to international prices, diminishing the economic relevance of the endogenous determination of the relative price of traded to non-traded goods. The consequences of the degree of openness for the conduct of macro-policies deserve further attention.² A relevant question, for example, concerns the role of relative prices in the conduct of macro-policies, and how this role depends on openness. This question arrises naturally in the context of a multi-sectoral economy, because in such an economy a macro policy can also make use of the information contained in relative prices.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the gains to be derived from allowing macro policies to depend on relative prices in addition to aggregate prices, and to analyze how these gains depend on openness. The policies considered are wage indexation and monetary policy. The framework underlying the paper is that of a small economy, producing traded and non-traded goods. The analysis focuses on the role of the relative price of non-traded goods. The labor market is characterized by a short-run wage rigidity, as in Gray and Fischer. In such a framework, wage indexation is advantageous.

The beneficial effects of indexation stem from allowing the wage to respond to current information which could not have been foreseen at the time of the wage negotiation. Once we allow for non-traded goods, the price level corresponds to a weighted average of the two sectors' prices. Indexation to the price level takes into account only the information content of the aggregate price level.³ Thus, we should expect to benefit from a "basket" indexation scheme, which will allow wages to respond differently to the price adjustment of each sector. One purpose of this paper is to derive the

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characteristics of a basket indexation, and to focus on the marginal benefit of extending the price level indexation to a basket indexation.⁴ Allowing for a basket indexation has the effect of making wages respond to both relative prices and the price level. Thus, the analysis in the paper allows one to focus on the role that relative prices might play in optimal indexation. This problem is analyzed is Section 2.

The economic role of wage indexation can, in principal, be replaced by a monetary policy which will respond to current information.⁵ Thus, one can also address the role of relative prices in conducting monetary policy in the absence of wage indexation. In such a case the analog of a price level indexation is a money feedback rule that adjusts the money supply to the price level. The analog to a basket indexation is a money feedback rule that adjusts the money supply to both the price level and relative prices. The role of monetary policy in the absence of indexation is analyzed in Section 3. Analogous to Section 2, the analysis in Section 3 investigates the role of the marginal benefit of such a policy on openness. The Appendix summarizes the notation used in the paper.

The analysis demonstrates that the beneficial effect of allowing a basket indexation (or a money rule that responds also to relative prices) lies in mitigating the effects of foreign shocks (represented by foreign prices of traded goods and foreign interest rate). The marginal benefit of allowing relative prices to enter the indexation scheme (or the conduct of monetary policy) is shown to increase with "aggregate" openness. The relevant measure of aggregate openness depends positively on the share of traded goods; the substitutability in consumption and production between traded and non-traded goods; and the volatility of foreign shocks.

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The conclusion emerging from the analysis is that openness is an important consideration in formulating macro-policies. The response of policies to relative prices (of traded/non-traded goods) rises with openness, and has dampening effects on the volatility of deviations from purchasing power parity. In a way, the more open the economy, the more damaging might be the consequences of relative price volatility, making policy response to relative prices more desirable. This finding seems to be consistent with the observation that countries with "similar" hyperinflation trends, like Israel and Argentina, differ widely in the volatility of deviations from purchasing power parity. We observe much larger deviations from purchasing power parity in the more closed economy (Argentina)⁶.

2. The Model

Let us take a two-sector economy, producing traded and non-traded goods, under floating rates and perfect capital mobility. Consumers are assumed to have identical homothetic tastes, generating a price index given by

(1)
$$P_{t} = (P_{n,t})^{\theta_{n}} \cdot (P_{z,t})^{\theta_{z}}$$

where $P_{n,t}$ and $P_{z,t}$ are money prices of non-traded and traded goods at time t, and θ_n and θ_z are the share of non-traded and traded goods.

The labor market is characterized by a short-run wage rigidity. To formulate a short-run equilibrium the paper adapts the contracting approach to the Phillips curve. It should be noted that there exists a gap between a contracting approach to the Phillips curve and labor contracting theories. The contracting approach to the Phillips curve (as in Fischer and Gray) has not so far been derived from a strict micro foundation, (as Fischer (1977) has

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recognized). It is capable, however, of modeling the interaction between the money market and the Phillips curve. On the other hand, theories of labor contracting are derived from a micro foundation; but so far those theories have not been able to formulate in a satisfactory way the effects of money and financial assets on labor contracts. Because the focus of this paper is on the interaction of the money market and labor contracts, it applies to the Phillips curve the contracting specification (as used by Fischer and Gray), that has become a convention in the macro literature. These authors consider the case of an economy where nominal wage contracts are negotiated in period t-1, before current prices are known, so as to equate expected labor demand to expected labor supply. But actual employment in period t is demanddetermined, and depends on the realized real wage. These models also allow for partial indexation, which may be set according to some optimizing criteria. For a recent application of the contracting approach in an open economy see Flood and Marion (1982) and Marston (1982a).

Suppose that the labor supply is given by

(2)
$$L_t^s = Q_s \cdot \left(\frac{W_t}{P_t}\right)^{\delta}$$

where W is the money wage. Labor is the only mobile factor, and output is given by 7

N_t = Q_n · (L_{n,t})^{$$\alpha$$} exp v_t
(3)
Z_t = Q_z · (L_{z,t}) ^{α} · exp v_t ; 0 < α < 1

where $L_{x,t}$ denotes the labor employed in sector x (x = n, z) in period t, N_t and Z_t represent the output of non-traded and traded goods, and v_t is a

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multiplicative productivity shock.

As a reference point, let us start with the "non-stochastic equilibrium," i.e., the equilibrium in the economy if the value of all the random variables is zero. Let us denote by lower-case variables the percentage deviation of the upper-case variable from its value in the non-stochastic equilibrium, i.e., for a variable X_t , $x_t = (X_t - X_0)/X_0$ where X_0 is the value of X if all random shocks are zero. To simplify notation, we delete the time index. Thus (x_t, x_{t+k}) are replaced by (x, x_{+k}) . To facilitate discussion, it is useful to take a log-linear approximation of the model around its non-stochastic equilibrium, writing the model in terms of percentage deviations. This is equivalent to the use of a first order approximation of a Taylor expansion around the equilibrium.⁸

From eq. 3 we get that output is given by

(4)
$$n = \bar{h}(p_n - w) + h \cdot v$$

(5) $z = \overline{h}(p_z - w) + h \cdot v$

where $\overline{h} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$; $h = \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$.

In a fully flexible economy, w corresponds to the wage that clears the labor market, i.e., w = $(\widetilde{W}_t - W_o)/W_o$ where \widetilde{W}_t is the flexible equilibrium wage rate derived from eq. 2-3, and W_o is the equilibrium wage if all shocks are zero. Under the labor contract, the wage contract for period t is pre-set at time t-l at its expected money wage level in a fully flexible regime. Thus, the wage contract is $E_{t-1} \widetilde{W}_t$. Under a partial "basket" indexation,

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actual wage is allowed during the contract duration to respond partially to the unexpected changes in the prices of the various goods:

(6)
$$\log W_{t} = \log E_{t-1} \widetilde{W}_{t} + b_{z} \cdot \theta_{z} \cdot [P_{z,t} - P_{z,o}]/P_{z,o} + b_{n} \cdot \theta_{n} \cdot [P_{n,t} - P_{n,o}]/P_{n,o}$$

or, in terms of our shorter notation:

(7)
$$\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{b}_{\mathbf{z}} \cdot \mathbf{\theta}_{\mathbf{z}} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{z}} + \mathbf{b}_{\mathbf{n}} \cdot \mathbf{\theta}_{\mathbf{n}} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{n}}$$

 b_z and b_n define the degree of wage indexation to the "weighted" price of each sector, where the weights correspond to the share of each sector. An equivalent way of defining the basket indexation scheme is:

$$w = b \cdot p + \overline{d}(p_z - p_n)$$
, where $b = b_z \cdot \theta_z + b_n \cdot \theta_n$

(8)

$$p = \theta_n \cdot p_n + \theta_z \cdot p_z$$
 and $\overline{d} = (b_z - b_n) \cdot \theta_n \cdot \theta_z$.

As eq. 8 reveals, allowing for a basket indexation enables wages to adjust to both aggregate price level and relative prices. The case where the wage indexation responds only to the price level can be obtained for $b_z = b_n$. Real output, Y, is given by:

(9)
$$Y_t = (N_t \cdot P_{n,t} + Z_t \cdot P_{z,t})/P_t$$

where N and Z represent the output of non-traded and traded goods. The demand for non-traded goods is given by

(10)
$$(P_{z,t}/P_{n,t})^{a} \cdot Y_{t} \cdot exp(\bar{c} - c(i_{t} - \pi_{t})).$$

a is the compensated demand elasticity; i is the money interest rate, and π is the expected inflation:

(11)
$$\pi_t = (E_t P_{t+1} - P_t)/P_t$$

where E_t is the conditional expectation operator which corresponds to the use of information available at period t. A higher real interest rate discourages current consumption, and c is the interest rate semi-elasticity of demand for non-traded goods. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the information set at time t contains the structure of the model and all variables dated t and earlier.

The demand for money balances is given by:

(12)
$$Y_t \cdot P_t \cdot exp(-k \cdot i_t)$$
.

The country operates under a floating rate regime, and the law of one price is assumed to hold for traded goods:

(13
$$P_{z,t} = S_t \cdot P_{z,t}^*$$

where S_t is the exchange rate at time t (domestic money price of one unit of foreign exchange) and P_z^* is the international price of traded goods. Under conditions of perfect capital mobility, and the absence of risk aversion, an arbitrage condition links the domestic and foreign interest rates:

(14)
$$i_t - i_t^* = (E_t S_{t+1} - S_t)/S_t$$

To close the model, let us specify the stochastic structure. The supply of money and foreign prices is given by

(15)
$$M_t = \vec{M} \cdot \exp m_t$$

(16)
$$P_{z,t}^* = \exp p_{z,t}^*$$
.

To simplify exposition, let us neglect trends in the variables, assuming that m, v, i^{*}, p_z^* are uncorrelated random variables, generated by white noise processes:

(17)
$$x_t \sim N(0, \sigma_x^2)$$
 for $x = m, v, i^*, p_z^*$.

It is assumed that by the choice of units prices in the "non-stochastic" equilibrium are given by $P_n = P_z = S = 1$.

To be able to derive some normative aspects of indexation, it is useful to consider as a benchmark the real output attained in a fully flexible economy. Let us denote by \tilde{x} the value of x in a fully flexible economy. Following Gray we adapt the loss function:

(18)
$$H = E_0 (y - \tilde{y})^2$$

where E_0 stands for the unconditional expectation operator. The loss function indicates that we wish to choose the wage indexation scheme so as to minimize deviations from output's fully flexible level (\tilde{y}). Minimizing H is

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equivalent to minimizing the welfare loss in the labor market. 9

In a flexible economy, the labor market clearing condition implies that

(19)
$$\widetilde{w} = \widetilde{p} + \frac{h}{\delta + h} v$$

(20)
$$\widetilde{y} = h \cdot v - \overline{h} \frac{h}{\delta + h} v.$$

From eq. 4-7 we get that

(21)
$$y = \overline{h}[(1-b_z)\theta_z \cdot p_z + (1-b_n)\theta_n \cdot p_n] + hv$$

Thus the value of our loss function is:

(22)
$$H' = (\bar{h})^2 E_0 ((1-b_z)\theta_z p_z + (1-b_n)\theta_n p_n + \frac{h}{\delta + h} v)^2.$$

Optimal indexation is chosen so as to make the real wage in a contracting economy "closest" to real wage in a flexible economy.

To obtain the value of goods prices, we make use of all the building blocks of our model.

Equilibrium in the non-traded sector implies that:

(23)
$$n = -a(p_n - p_z) + y - c(i + p)$$
.

Equilibrium in the money market is given by:

(24) $m - p = y - k \cdot i;$ $i = i^* - s$.

Notice that an unexpected price level rise (p > 0) induces an expectation that prices will fall next period by p, implying that the real interest rate is i + p. Eq. 23 and 24 provides the short-run equilibrium conditions which together with eq. 21 can be used to solve for p_n, p_z . Obtaining the values of goods prices allows us to solve for the values of optimal indexation parameters. Those parameters are solved by minimizing our loss function, resulting in:

(25)
$$b_n = 1 - \frac{1 + k \frac{\Phi}{c}}{1 + \delta + \frac{V_m}{V_v} \frac{(\delta + h)}{h^2}}$$

(26)
$$b_{z} = 1 - \frac{1 + \frac{k}{\theta_{z}} + \frac{k\phi}{c} \cdot \frac{\delta n}{\theta_{z}}}{1 + \delta + \frac{V_{m} (\delta + h)}{V_{v} \cdot h^{2}}}$$

where $\phi = c + (a + \theta_z \cdot \overline{h})/\theta_n$, and V_x is the variance of x.

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Openness can be measured either by the share of traded goods (θ_z) or by the substitutability in consumption (a) and production (\bar{h}) of traded and nontraded goods.¹⁰ An increase in openness, as measured by any of the above parameters will increase $\phi - c$, which can be used as an openness measure. From eq. 25-26 it follows that:

(27)
$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{b}_n}{\partial \theta_n} > 0 ; \frac{\partial \mathbf{b}_z}{\partial \theta_z} > 0.$$

Inspection of eq. 25-26 reveals that both indexation measures increase with the relative importance of monetary to real shocks. Furthermore, an

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increase in the share of traded goods has the effect of increasing the degree of wage indexation to traded goods prices, and reducing the degree of wage indexation to non-traded goods. Notice that from the definition of the indexation parameters (eq. 7), an increase in the prices of sector x would raise wages by $\theta_x \cdot b_x$. Thus, the elasticity of wage response to p_x is $\theta_x \cdot b_x$. Consequently, a greater share of traded goods $(d\theta_z > 0)$ increases the desired wage response to dp_z at a rate that exceeds the rise in θ_z .

The case where indexation is only to the price level corresponds to $b_z = b_n = b$ (See Aizenman (1983)), yielding

(28)
$$b = 1 - \frac{k+1}{\psi+1-\delta}$$
 where ψ is defined by

(29)
$$\psi = (\frac{\delta + h}{h^2}) \left[\frac{V_m}{V_v} + k^2 (1 - \frac{c}{\phi})^2 \frac{V_{i*} + V_{p_z}}{V_v}\right].$$

To find the marginal benefit of allowing a "basket" indexation, it is useful to compare the value of our loss function under each indexation regime. Subject to an optimal basket indexation, we get a loss of

(30)
$$H' = \left(\frac{\vec{h} \cdot h}{\delta + h}\right)^{2} \cdot V_{v} \left[1 - \frac{h^{2} \cdot V_{v}}{h^{2} \cdot V_{v} + V_{m}}\right],$$

whereas subject to a price level indexation we get a loss of

(31)
$$H = \left(\frac{\bar{h} \cdot h}{\delta + h}\right)^{2} V_{v} \left[1 - \frac{h^{2} \cdot V_{v}}{V_{m} + h^{2} \cdot V_{v} + \left[k\left(1 - \frac{c}{\phi}\right)^{2}\right] V_{(i} + p_{z}^{*})}\right]$$

Comparing the two reveals that allowing a basket indexation has the effect of shielding the labor market from foreign shocks (i^*, p_z^*) . In our framework, a basket indexation eliminates the effects of foreign shocks completely. Inspection of eq. 30-31 reveals that the marginal benefit allowing a basket indexation increases with "aggregate openness" measured by:

(32)
$$\left[k(1 - \frac{c}{\phi})\right]^2 V_{(i + p)}$$

The benefit of allowing a basket indexation increases with the share of traded goods (θ_z) , the substitutability in production and consumption between the two sectors (\bar{h}, a) , and the volatility of foreign shocks.

3. Relative Prices and Monetary Policy

Let us consider the case where current wages are not free to respond to current information and analyze the role of monetary policy in such an environment. The terms of our framework imply that all the indexation parameters are now set to equal zero. Using a method analogous to that of Section 2, we now consider the case where there is a money feedback rule which adjusts the money supply in response to both the price level and relative prices. The money supply is now given by:

(33)
$$m - g \cdot p - \overline{g}(p_z - p_n).$$

m is the stochastic component of the money supply defined in Section 2. g and \overline{g} are parameters that determine the response of monetary policy to the price

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level and the relative prices, respectively. Finding the values of both g and \overline{g} is the topic of this section.

The money market equilibrium is now given by

(24')
$$m - g \cdot p - \overline{g}(p_z - p_n) - p = y - k(i^* - s)$$

where

(34)
$$y = \overline{h} \cdot p + h \cdot v$$
.

Together with eq. 23 we obtain that

(35)
$$p = \frac{m - hv + (p_z^* + i^*)[k(\frac{\phi - c}{\phi}) - \frac{g \cdot c}{\theta_n \cdot \phi}]}{1 + k + h + g}$$

Optimal values of g and \overline{g} are obtained by minimizing our loss function (eq. 18), with the following results:

(36)
$$\overline{g} = k(\theta_z \cdot \overline{h} + a)/c$$

(37)
$$g = \frac{V_m}{V_v} \left(\frac{\delta + h}{h^2}\right) + \delta - k.$$

 \overline{g} describes the responsiveness of monetary policy to relative prices. It increases with openness, as measured by the share of traded goods (θ_z) and the substitutability in production (\overline{h}) and consumption (a) of traded and non-traded goods. As can be seen from eq. 35, \overline{g} is set such as to nullify the effects of foreign shocks (i^{*}, p_z^*) on the price level. This has the

consequence of shielding the labor market from foreign shocks. g is a measure of the responsiveness of monetary policy to price level surprises. As is evident from eq. 37, it increases with the relative importance of monetary to real shocks.

The case where we allow monetary policy to respond only to the price level is where $\overline{g=0}$. In such a case optimal g is given by:

(38)
$$g = \left\{ \left[k \left(\frac{\phi - c}{\phi} \right) \right]^2 \cdot \frac{V_p \star}{v} + \frac{V_{\downarrow} \star}{v_v} + \frac{V_m}{v} \right\} \frac{\delta + h}{h^2} + \delta - k$$

Notice that because we do not now allow monetary policy to respond directly to relative prices g depends on elements of foreign shocks, which have the effect of raising the responsiveness of monetary policy to price level surprises. The magnitude of the resulting increase rises with aggregate openness.

To compare monetary policy with indexation, it is useful to evaluate the loss function subject to monetary policy. It turns out that under the use of both the price level and relative prices as indicators for monetary policy the resulting loss is equal to the loss generated by a "basket" indexation, given by eq. 30. On the other hand, a monetary policy that uses only the price level as an indicator generates a loss which is equal to the loss generated by price level indexation (eq. 31). Thus, we can view wage indexation as a close substitute for active monetary policy. ¹¹ Furthermore, all the conclusions relating to the benefit to be derived from allowing a basket indexation instead of a price level indexation (See Section 2) also hold for allowing monetary policy to respond to relative prices. Thus, we can conclude that the benefit from allowing monetary policy to respond to relative prices in addition to aggregate prices increases with openness. A similar conclusion applies also to the magnitude of the desired monetary response to monetary

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policy: it increases with openness.

A possible measure of deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP) is

 $p - p_z^* - s$. Such a measure describes deviations of the domestic price level from the prices of traded goods. From eq. 23 and 34 we get:

(39)
$$p - p_z^* - s = -(i^* + p_z^*)\frac{c}{\phi} = -(i - \pi)\frac{c}{\phi - c}$$
.

Notice that our measure of deviations from PPP depend on openness and exogenous considerations affecting the real interest rate, and is independent of productivity and monetary shocks. This is because, in assuming homothetic tastes, we made the relative price of non-traded goods independent of scale consideration such as output and income. A simple way to introduce broader considerations is to generalize the demand specification, making the demand for non-traded goods:

$$(40) - a(p_{-} - p_{-}) + \varepsilon \cdot y - c(i + p), \varepsilon \leq 1.$$

The novelty here lies in allowing non-unitary elasticity of demand for non-traded goods (ε). Notice that such a formulation is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which implies that only a fraction of the transitory income (y) will be spent. This modification does not change the essence of the results reported here. Using the procedure described in the paper, we get that subject to the optimal use of both price level and relative prices as indicators for monetary policy:

(41)
$$\frac{\mathrm{d}g}{\mathrm{d}\phi} > 0, \quad \frac{\mathrm{d}g}{\mathrm{d}\phi} = 0.$$

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We also find that for a general demand elasticity (ε), allowing for using both the price level and relative prices as policy indicators mitigates the effects of foreign shocks (whereas for $\varepsilon = 1$ it eliminates them completely). As before, openness has the effect of increasing the policy response to relative prices. Deviations from PPP are now given by:

(42)
$$p - p_z^* - s =$$

$$- \frac{(1-\varepsilon)[v(1+g+k)h + m\bar{h}] + (i^* + p_z^*)[k\bar{h}(1-\varepsilon) + c(\bar{h} + 1 + g + k)]}{\phi(1+g+\bar{h} + k) + (1-\varepsilon)\bar{h}(\frac{\bar{g}}{\theta_n} + k)}$$

Notice that for $\varepsilon = 1$ eq. 42 collapses into eq. 39. Unlike the case of homothetic tastes, relative prices and PPP depend on all the disturbances that affect the scale of economic activity in the short run. From eq. 42 we conclude that

(43)
$$\frac{\mathrm{d}^{\nabla}[\mathbf{p} - \mathbf{p}_{z}^{*} - \mathbf{s}]}{\mathrm{d}\phi} < 0.$$

Openness therefore dampens deviations from PPP. Among other things this result reflects the fact that openness increases the policy response to relative price surprises.

Footnote

- A crude measure of openness is the GNP share of (exports + imports)/2. A more appropriate measure should depend on elasticities of substitution in production and consumption between various classes of goods. A popular way of modelling openness is to distinguish between traded and non-traded goods (See, for example, Salter(1959)).
- One of the first to consider the effects of openness on macro-policies is McKinnon (1963). See also Kenen (1969) and Frenkel and Aizenman (1983).
- 3. A previous analysis (Aizenman 1983) studied indexation to the price level, showing that openness has the effect of increasing wage indexation. This paper extends the above study to analyze the role of relative prices in the conduct of monetary policy and wage indexation.
- 4. For a study of the price index appropriate to the indexation formula see Marston (1982b). His study considers the case of an economy producing one type of goods, which is an imperfect substitute for foreign goods. The current study analyzes a related question in the context of nontraded goods, and extends the discussion to a monetary policy.
- On the trade-off between various macro-policies see Aizenman and Frenkel (1983).
- 6. These empirical observations have been studied by De Grauwe and Janssans (1983). In 1977 the GNP share of (exports + imports)/2 was 44.3% for Israel, and 11.45% for Argentina [See World Tables (1980)].
- 7. To make the model manageable it is assumed that in the short run, output/labor elasticities are equal for both sectors. Allowing for different elasticities has no systematic effect on the results.
- 8. It is assumed that the variances of the shocks are small enough to make such approximations useful.

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9. Let *i* denote the labor employed in a frictionless, fully flexible economy, where *l* is the labor employed in an economy under a contracting agreement. From eq. 2,3 we get that the welfare loss in the labor market, as measured by the triangle between the supply and demand can be approximated by

$$\overline{a}(\frac{1}{\delta}+1-\alpha)(\widetilde{\ell}-\ell)^2 = \frac{\overline{a}}{\alpha^2}(\frac{1}{\delta}+1-\alpha)(\widetilde{y}-y)^2,$$

where

$$\overline{a} = \exp \left[(\delta + 1) \log \alpha / (1 + (1 - \alpha)\delta) \right]$$

and $l = \theta_z \cdot l_z + \theta_n \cdot l_n$, where l_x is the labor employed in sector x(x = z, n). Thus, minimizing the loss function H is equivalent to minimizing the welfare loss in the labor market. H is also the loss function used by Flood and Marion (1982).

- 10. Notice that $\frac{d \log N/Z}{d \log P_n/P_z} = \bar{h}$
- 11. On the trade off between wage indexation and monetary policy see Aizenman and Frenkel (1983).

Upper case variables denote levels, lower case letters denote the logarithmic deviation of the upper case variable from the "non-stochastic" equilibrium.

P t	=	price level at time t
P n,t	=	price of non-traded goods at time t
P _{z,t}	=	price of traded goods at time t
Y _t	=	real output at time t (deflated by P)
N _t	=	output of non-traded goods
Zt	=	output of traded goods
i [*] t, i _t	=	foreign and domestic money interest rate
πt	=	expected inflation at time t
s _t	=	domestic money price of one unit of foreign exchange at time t
P [*] z,t	-	international price of traded goods at time t
W _t	-	money wage rate at time t

$$v_t$$
 = white noise productivity disturbances
 m_t = white noise monetary disturbances
 p_t^* = white noise foreign price disturbances
 $q_x^2 = \overline{v}_x$ = variance of x
 E_0 = unconditional expectation operator
 E_t = expectation operator conditional on information
available at time t
 X_0 = the level of variable X that corresponds to the
equilibrium when $v = m = p^* = i^* = 0$
 $x = (X_0 - X_0)/X_0$ = the percentage deviation of X at time t from its
"non-stochastic" level X_0 , X being any upper-case
variable defined above
 b = wage indexation parameter
 g = the value of X in a fully flexible equilibrium, X being
any variable defined above.

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