Health Care Report Cards May Fail Patients

Health care quality report cards — such as New York’s list of physician and hospital coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery mortality rates — have been the focus of an extensive policy debate. Supporters of report cards argue that they enable patients to identify the best doctors and hospitals, while simultaneously giving providers of care incentives to improve quality. Skeptics counter that report cards may give providers incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients, in order to improve their ranking. Whether these report cards are good for patients, and society, depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their costs in terms of the quantity, quality, and appropriateness of the medical treatment they induce.

In Is More Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers (NBER Working Paper No. 8697), authors David Dranove, Daniel Kessler, Mark McClellan, and Mark Satterthwaite examine the consequences of the CABG report cards adopted by New York (NY) and Pennsylvania (PA) in the early 1990s. They find evidence that report cards had both beneficial and harmful effects. On one hand, report cards increased the proportion of sicker cardiac patients who were treated at teaching hospitals, which may be better equipped to handle such complex cases. On the other hand, report cards led providers of medical care to shift surgical treatment for cardiac illness toward healthier and away from sicker patients. On net, though, report cards led to higher levels of resource use and worse health outcomes, especially for sicker patients. Thus, the authors conclude that — at least in the short run — these report cards decreased patient and social welfare.

To assess competing claims about the efficacy of report cards, the authors estimate the effects of report cards on essentially all U.S. elderly heart attack (acute myocardial infarction, or AMI) patients and all elderly patients receiving CABG surgery from 1987 through 1994. They compare the trends in treatments, cost, and quality of care after the introduction of report cards in NY and PA to the trends in other states.

The authors document an important benefit from report cards: increased sorting of patients to providers on the basis of the severity of their illness. Hospitals in NY and PA experienced declines in within-hospital variation in their patients’ health status, with those two states’ teaching hospitals picking up an increasing share of patients with more severe illness. However, they also find an important cost: substantial selection by providers. Report cards led to a decline in the illness severity of patients receiving CABG in NY and PA relative to patients in states without report cards, as measured by hospital utilization in the year before surgery. In addition, report cards led to substantial declines in other intensive cardiac procedures for both relatively healthy and sick AMI patients.

For healthier patients, then, doctors and hospitals substituted CABG for other cardiac surgical treatments. This shift increased expenditures, but failed to produce any measurable health benefits. For sicker patients, doctors and hospitals avoided performing cardiac surgical treatments of all types. These changes were particularly harmful, leading sicker patients to have substantially higher frequencies of heart failure and repeated heart attacks, and ultimately higher costs of care.

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The design of report cards offers a distinctive challenge: how to take advantage of the benefits to patients of enhanced information, while avoiding the adverse incentives for doctors and hospitals that the publication of the information may create. Because report cards are not unique to health care — school performance reports raise the same issues — the authors conclude that the debate over report cards is likely to continue.
Favorable Effects of Imprisoning Drug Offenders

The number of Americans incarcerated on drug-related offenses rose 15-fold between 1980 and 2000, to its current level of 400,000. Despite this enormous increase, there has been no systematic, empirical analysis until now of the implications of the new, tougher drug laws for public safety, drug markets, and public policy.

In *An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders* (NBER Working Paper No. 8489), authors Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven Levitt find that the increase in the prison population held on drug-related offenses led to reductions in time served for other crimes, especially for less serious offenses. This phenomenon is primarily attributable to the limited space available at penal institutions. However, despite this reduction in time served, other crimes did not increase more than a few percent.

The authors also find that incarcerating drug offenders was almost as effective in reducing violent and property crime as was incarcerating other types of offenders. Furthermore, as a consequence of increases in punishments for drug-related crimes, cocaine prices are 10-15 percent higher today than they were in 1985. This jump in price implies that cocaine consumption fell, perhaps as much as 20 percent.

The reduction in cocaine use begins to address the long-standing question of whether the enormous costs related to tougher punishment for drug offenses yield similarly large benefits to society. Previous studies suggest that the costs of current levels of incarceration across all crime categories far exceed societal benefits. However, in the case of drug offenders, the authors find that the cost-benefit calculations might be more favorable, because incarceration not only lowers crime, but also drug consumption. Annual expenditures of approximately $10 billion on drug incarceration almost pay for themselves through reductions in health care costs and lost productivity attributable to illegal drug use, even ignoring any crime reductions associated with such incarceration.

The authors stress that their figures are speculative and may not include other relevant costs and benefits. They also do not explore other, potentially more effective ways of reducing drug usage rather than incarceration.

— Les Picker

Incomes and Mortality Patterns

A new study of mortality rates in Britain and the United States finds no simple relationship between income growth, patterns of income inequality, and the substantial declines in mortality rates in the two countries since 1950. In *Mortality, Income, and Income Inequality Over Time in Britain and the United States* (NBER Working Paper No. 8354), NBER Research Associates Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson cast doubt on the idea that income trends explain mortality trends in the post-war period, and that rising income inequality is associated with higher mortality. Rather, the researchers highlight the importance of advances in medical technology in explaining death rates as well as the important differences in the health care systems in the two countries.

Deaton and Paxson exploit the similarities and differences in patterns of income in the United States and Britain. The two countries have experienced different patterns of income growth: the growth rate of family income in the United States was high from 1950 to the early 1970s, low during the 1970s and 1980s, and high again in the 1990s. In contrast, incomes in Britain grew fairly steadily during the second half of the twentieth century, with little slowdown in the 1970s and 1980s.

Although these income growth patterns differ, changes in income inequality are similar in the two countries. Inequality changed relatively little until the early 1970s; it then started to increase in the United States and, in the late-1970s,
As many developing countries have tied their currencies to the U.S. dollar (in varying degrees), some analysts believe that exchange rate volatility among industrialized nations is at least partially to blame for the financial crises that plague emerging markets. Those analysts argue that the Group of 3 — the United States, Japan, and collectively the 12 nations that have adopted the Euro — could reduce such shocks on dollar pegs or quasi-peg systems in emerging markets by adjusting interest rates so that their currencies trade within certain “target zones.”

But when co-authors Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart examine almost 30 years of capital flows, currency valuations, interest rate shifts, and economic growth in both emerging and industrialized nations, they uncover no evidence that limiting exchange rate volatility among the G-3 would provide significant benefits for emerging markets. In What Hurts Most? G-3 Exchange Rate Or Interest Rate Volatility? (NBER Working Paper No. 8535), they find “no obvious

no gain from reducing G-3 currency volatility

No Gain from Reducing G-3 Currency Volatility

in the United Kingdom. The increase in income inequality accelerated in both countries in the mid-1980s, and leveled off in the 1990s.

Despite sharp differences in patterns of income growth, the two countries exhibited similar patterns of mortality decline. Furthermore, the sharpest declines in mortality were coincident with the productivity slowdown in the United States. Therefore it is not plausible that mortality declines are driven by changes in income levels. Furthermore, there is no evidence that changes in income inequality affect changes in mortality. Adult and elderly mortality rates declined most rapidly during the period when income inequality increased.

The patterns of declining mortality in both countries vary across age and gender groups. Men always have higher mortality rates than women in the same age group. Younger groups experienced a more rapid mortality decline before 1970, and much less rapid mortality declines and, in some cases, notably for young men, mortality increases, in the later years. Deaths from AIDS account for almost all of this increase in mortality for young men. For those over age 40, there is a rapid decline in mortality throughout the period with the trend accelerating after 1970. British mortality is lower for those younger than age 65, but the schedules cross at age 65, after which mortality rates are lower for elderly U.S. citizens.

If changes in incomes and income inequality do not explain mortality patterns, then what does? Two likely candidates are technological advances in health care and differences in the health care systems in the two countries. The researchers show that declines in mortality in the United States are mirrored by mortality declines in Britain that occur after a lag of about four years. It may be that medical innovations are introduced first and diffuse more quickly in the United States than in Britain. The authors speculate that the centralized health care system in Britain may impede the adoption of expensive new technologies. In the competitive U.S. health care industry, there may be greater pressure to adopt new technologies as soon as they are feasible, regardless of cost.

Differences in the health care systems also may be responsible for differences in the age patterns of mortality in the two countries. The United States has largely private provision of health care until the age of 65, but not all citizens have access to health services until they are eligible for Medicare. Although Britain has universal access to all ages, less is spent on health care in the United States, and access to health care is rationed, particularly by age. British elderly are frequently denied access to expensive technologies from which they are likely to benefit. These institutional features are consistent with the observed patterns in mortality, in which the U.S. mortality is higher than Britain’s for younger age groups, but lower after retirement. Because this pattern was established well before the Medicare program began, and because the differences in mortality rates between the two countries begin to narrow with age prior to Medicare eligibility, rationing of care by age likely has more effect on the mortality of British elders than does Medicare on American elders.

— Andrew Balls
bonuses to smaller countries should G-3 central banks damp the fluctuations of their currencies” and it could possibly hurt.

In this vein, the authors note that a policy that seeks to limit currency fluctuations could end up fostering more instability in emerging markets because it relies so heavily on swapping exchange rate uncertainties for interest rate uncertainties. The authors do not deny that exchange rates are an important part of the relationship between developed countries in the “North” and emerging markets in the “South,” where governments often show a commitment to low inflation by tying their currencies to the dollar. And they acknowledge that, historically, financial crises have “been more frequent when G-3 exchange rates are more volatile.” But they note that the situation is not that simple. They argue that a closer look at how money flows to emerging markets — for example, foreign direct investment tends to be higher in times of currency instability among the G-3 — shows that over the past 27 years, buying exchange rate predictability among the G-3 with greater uncertainty in international interest rates “would have been a bad bet.”

Reinhart and Reinhart agree that keeping G-3 exchange rates in target zones could indeed lead to more stable prices in emerging markets. However, they point out that the effect on interest rates could make debt-servicing costs much more unpredictable, while producing “income volatility” in developed countries that could decrease demand for emerging market exports. “To the extent that high world interest rates trigger balance sheet problems in emerging markets, the consequences of the tradeoff implied by a target zone among G-3 currencies may be considerable,” the authors write. The important thing to bear in mind, according to Reinhart and Reinhart, is that the relationship between developed and emerging economies is a complex one and focusing on a single issue or set of issues cannot capture their interdependence.

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“The consequences for the developing ‘South’ of interest rate, exchange rate, and income volatility in the ‘North’ are only one particular aspect of myriad North-South links,” they write. “As such, issues related to G-3 exchange rate variability should be viewed within the much larger panorama of how economic outcomes in developed countries influence those in less developed economies.”

— Matthew Davis