7.1 Introduction

The term “brain drain” appears to have gained wide usage in the late 1960s when growth in the migration of skilled personnel from developing to developed countries accelerated. The developed countries, by attracting scarce skilled labor, were widely held to be pursuing policies that were costly to developing countries, both in the short and longer run. The costs were not only in terms of output and employment, but also—depending on the way in which education was financed—through additional fiscal costs associated with public subsidies to education. A variety of policy proposals, mostly centered around taxation, were floated, although none were ultimately implemented. Part of this may be attributed to likely difficulties with implementation—measurement problems (including temporary migration and migration linked to education enrolment in developed countries) and ambiguities with respect to the welfare consequences.

Many of the same issues and debates have undergone a recent revival.
This can be attributed to a number of factors. In the first place, it is commonly believed that the emigration of skilled labor from developing countries has again accelerated over the last decade, not least in association with the growth-of-information and knowledge-intensive activities. Second, the developed economies have actively and openly set out to poach talent, using a range of incentives and institutional mechanisms for attracting skilled labor. In particular, the use of temporary skilled-migrant visas whether in the United States or, more recently, in Western Europe, has been striking.

Possible explanations for why poaching has increased are various. They include skill shortages resulting from rapid skill-biased technical change as well as educational failures. Gaining access to international competence—heterogeneity—may be another factor, while access to technical or market knowledge may be another. The first explanation generally is taken as bringing in substitutes to local human capital, although this need not necessarily be the case. The importing firm would gain through lowering wage costs, dampening any domestic-wage pressure, or both. The other explanations, however, may be consistent with complementarity (at least in static or short-run terms). By widening the talent pool, poaching may result in the selection of the best candidates and hence impart a positive productivity effect.

At the same time, there has been growing recognition not only of the global benefits of greater mobility, but also that the emigration of skilled labor may not be negative for the sending country. In the first place, emigration of talent may provide a positive signal that motivates others in the sending country to acquire more education, thereby raising human capital and possibly promoting growth. Second, emigrants may, in due course, return or, through networks and resource repatriation (such as through remittances), provide essential inputs to new businesses and activities in the sending country. Third, emigration may actively promote a more effective flow of knowledge and information. Fourth, the changing nature of mobility—in part due to major advances in communications technology—may be limiting the extent to which skills are actually lost. A network industry, like software, is possibly a case in point.

This paper has several objectives. First it attempts to take stock of our knowledge concerning the scale, composition, and direction of migration from developing to developed countries in the recent period. Second, it places that mobility in the context of the existing literature, and, third, it attempts to indicate ways in which, at both an analytical and empirical level, progress can be made in better understanding the phenomenon and, in particular, the appropriate policy implications.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief empirical survey of our knowledge concerning the scale, distribution, and composition of skilled labor flows. Section 7.3 surveys a class of models developed in the 1970s that focused primarily on the implications of emigration for labor markets in the sending countries. Section 7.4 surveys the subsequent class of dynamic models in particular, those that endogenize human-
capital decisions. We extend the analysis to take account of possible screening by developed countries. Section 7.5 then examines the empirical evidence for screening, while section 7.6 looks at the relevance of return flows, remittances, and diasporas—factors that may offset some of the negative effects associated with skilled migration. Section 7.7 then turns to examining the relevance of economic geography models for understanding the brain drain and not least the reasons for why agglomeration occurs. Section 7.8 then moves on to look in a little bit more detail at two sectors—software and health—that have features that may be helpful in understanding sectoral differences. Section 7.9 concludes.

7.2 The Facts

Quantification of the movement of skilled individuals across countries—let alone the exact measurement of any associated brain drain—remains very patchy. National authorities have maintained very limited databases on migration with highly inconsistent skill or education categories. There is a lack of data on the attributes of the individual migrants and the changing nature of migration—which is away from permanent, point-to-point migration—has itself complicated matters. Furthermore, the link between education and migration has changed over time. For example, a significant component of skilled migration is now accounted for by students that stay on after completion of degrees.

7.2.1 Skilled Migration in The Recent Period

Carrington and Detragiache (1998) provide a benchmark for skilled migration in 1990. They compiled the U.S. census and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) migration statistics for that year and then compared the immigrant stocks to the size of the educated population in the sending country using Barro and Lee’s (1996) education data for 1993. Their study has several shortcomings: In addition to possible deficiencies of the basic data they use, their figures fail to take into account skilled migration to the Middle East, which for countries like India actually accounts for a large proportion of the total migration. Also, the immigration to the United States in their study includes all types of migration, not only employment based, which is what is usually understood by brain drain.

Despite their shortcomings, the Carrington and Detragiache estimates are probably the best available estimates of brain drain. We use them to

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2. The United Nations (UN) recommends defining a migrant in terms of residence by time, short term being less than a year, and long term more than twelve months, but actual definitions vary widely, as do those for skill or education levels.

3. Many countries are not included because the lack of data and the number of educated migrants to OECD countries is estimated on the basis of the education level of migrants to the United States. The estimates of educated population by Barro and Lee are partly based on historical-enrollment data, and it is not clear whether the migrants are included in these estimates or not.
study the relationships between population, the gross domestic product (GDP), and migration. Table 7.1 provides information on population, on expenditure on tertiary education, and a measure of the intensity of migration (i.e., the share of a country’s labor force having tertiary education that has migrated). The share presented in the table is based on the assumption that the Barro and Lee estimates do not include the migrants. What emerges is that there are a significant number of small countries—principally in the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa—with very high skilled-migration rates. Figure 7.1 plots the migration rates against the country’s population while excluding some clear outliers. There is a negative correlation between the migration rates and total population. The excluded outliers confirm this observation. For large countries like India and China, which dominate in terms of absolute numbers, skilled migration does not amount to a significant share of their educated workforces. Indeed, only 1.1 and 1.4 percent of India and China’s skilled labor forces, respectively, had moved to the United States in 1990, although additional evidence suggests that these migrants come from the top end of the skill distribution. For very small countries, the migration rate is of a significant magnitude. These patterns are replicated if the reference is extended to the OECD. In Ghana, for example, over a quarter of the educated labor force lived in OECD countries in 1990, the share rises to over 60 percent for the Gambia, and approaches 80 percent for Jamaica.

Similar exercises comparing skilled-migration rates and GDP per capita also yield negative correlations. Countries where the fraction of highly educated workers and general productivity (GDP per capita) is already low also tend to lose relatively more skilled workers. Of course, this raises some difficult issues of interpretation. For instance, if the productivity of skilled labor in these countries is low because of factors—such as lack of managerial talent (Rauch 1991) and inability to achieve economies of scale that are hard, if not impossible to correct—then the emigration of skilled labor may indeed be the best outcome. We return to these questions below.

What has happened since 1990? The general consensus appears to be that skilled migration has accelerated, yet the data are limited mainly to census and labor-force surveys. Salt (1997) has arrived at some estimates for high skilled-migrant flows to selected OECD countries from a number of developing and transition countries. He draws a number of (weak) inferences to the effect that the stocks of highly skilled foreign workers in OECD countries have increased since 1990. Certainly, the flows of the highly skilled have been increasing at a higher rate than those of less-skilled migrants. With respect to the European Union as a whole, labor-force-survey data show that highly skilled migrants (International Standard of Classification of Occupations [ISCO] categories 1–3)\(^4\) in 1997 accounted

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\(^4\) The ISCO categories 1, 2, and 3 include managers, professionals, and associate professionals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Migration Rate</th>
<th>Total Expenditure on Tertiary Education, Per Student (international $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5,080.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>3,842.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18,452.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2,006.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,047.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6,572.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2,141.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>312.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1,623.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1,176.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1,567.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3,764.8</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,574.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9,066.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,573.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1,074.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8,783.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,114.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1,670.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>18.46</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,476.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4,901.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>23.24</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>24.80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>680.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>28.35</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>29.29</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>29.92</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2,325.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>40.80</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2,173.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
for around 38 percent of the total migration inflow into employment, but that inflow represented only a minute fraction of the total employment stock—no larger than 0.5 percent (Auriol and Sexton 2002).

Available evidence also points to significant variation in the sectoral incidence of skilled migration. In the 1960s and 1970s, much of the concern about a brain drain revolved around the emigration of doctors, nurses, and teachers from developing countries. Both sectors are characterized by
large externalities and developing countries, by definition, remain under-provided in such services, particularly in rural areas. The possible welfare implications of emigration are evident. In the health sector, the likely negative effects arise from the direct impact on the population's health status with associated consequences for the productivity and welfare of the population. Furthermore, the health sector has properties that require a balanced mix of skills (doctors, nurses, midwives, etc.) and technology to be effective.\(^5\) As such, loss of part of the skill chain may lead to substantial and adverse ripple effects.

In the recent period, it appears that substantial emigration of health workers has continued. For example, in the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council’s data show that the number of newly registered doctors who have obtained their qualifications overseas has remained high throughout the 1990s. The share of non–European Union doctors among new registrants has remained stable at around 40 percent. The leading country in terms of the numbers of registered doctors is India. Chanda (2001) has estimated that there are at least 60,000 doctors of Indian origin in the United Kingdom, which amounts to around 12 percent of the total stock of doctors in India and 30 percent of registered doctors in the United Kingdom.\(^6\) However, skilled emigration has become far more diversified in terms of sectoral characteristics. Indeed, much of the recent discussion has followed from the movement of skilled information and communications technology (ICT)–sector workers from developing countries.

Although there has apparently been greater sectoral diversity, it is likely that migration has become significantly less diversified in terms of migrant characteristics, as educational-cum-skill thresholds have risen and evidence of screening by developed countries become more apparent. This screening feature looks to be a relatively recent innovation and—as we shall see in section 7.4—has strong implications for the sending countries. We now turn to reviewing the analytical frameworks developed for understanding the brain drain.

### 7.3 Early Models of Brain Drain

#### 7.3.1 Static Analysis

The welfare implications of brain drain in static models crucially depend on the assumptions made about wage setting.\(^7\) Some of the earliest work—

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\(^5\) Services are, moreover, not very mobile although some recent developments in telemedicine have made them slightly less dependent on the location of the health workers.

\(^6\) According to the Medical Council of India there were 503,900 registered medical practitioners in India (India, Central Bureau of Health Intelligence 1999) in 1998, and the General Medical Council in the United Kingdom has a total of 193,000 doctors on their register with 5,700 overseas doctors on limited registration (General Medical Council 2000).

\(^7\) Alan Deardorff's excellent comment on this chapter offers further details of some of these models drawing explicitly on international-trade theory.
particularly Grubel and Scott (1966)—was set in the context of perfectly competitive markets. With all markets clearing, wages set equal to marginal product, and no externalities, there was evidently no welfare impact on those left behind as long as domestic wage did not rise as a result of shift in labor supply.\(^8\) This would be the case with, for example, factor-price equalization through international trade. Thus, the policy conclusion of Grubel and Scott was inevitably laissez passer. Introducing distortions (as with a gap between social- and private-marginal product, a public subsidy for education, or both) would naturally undermine these conclusions and result in a welfare loss for those who did not emigrate. Indeed, much of the subsequent literature that emerged in the 1970s was organized around precisely these two types of departures from a perfectly competitive setting.

Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) worked with a general-equilibrium framework. It was used principally to model the sending or home-country labor market and to pin down the welfare implications of skilled emigration for those who were left behind and, ultimately, for the sending country. Two sets of distortions were introduced; the first distortion to the wage setting, the second, to the financing of education. Then the implications for employment were traced through. The model, which was subsequently widely employed, can be boiled down to a fairly simple set of blocs.

The economy produces two outputs \((M_1 \text{ and } M_2)\) with standard neoclassical production functions, \(M_1 = F_1(L_1); \ M_2 = F_2(L_2)\) where \(L_1\) is the amount of skilled labor employed in production of \(M_1\), and \(L_2\) is the amount of unskilled labor involved in production of \(M_2\). The two types of labor are exclusively allocated to their respective sectors. The commodity-price ratio is exogenously fixed, \(p_1/p_2 = \pi\), and \(M_2\) is the numeraire. The real wage for skilled workers, \(w_1\), is determined by unions and includes an element of international emulation whereby skilled wages are partly related to skilled wages abroad. Minimum unskilled wages, \(w_2\), are fixed by association with the skilled wage, or “leap frogging”—a rise in skilled wage leading to an increase in the unskilled wage. In addition, the supply side reflects the incentive for education to be acquired so long as the expected wage for educated (skilled) labor exceeds the uneducated (unskilled) wage. A fixed educational cost, \(k\), is introduced. Unemployment enters the initial equilibrium. There is also an exogenous flow of educated emigrants, \(Z_1\), so that the labor-market-balance equations read \(L_1 + U_1 + Z_1 = N_1; L_2 + U_2 = N_2; N_1 + N_2 = N\).

In this model, the international integration of the skilled labor market can affect both sectors’ wages through emulation and leap-frogging, as well as expected wages through the actual foreign wage and probability of emi-

\(^8\) Johnson (1967), however, points out that the effect actually depends on how much capital the emigrants take with them. If capital is internationally mobile this argument does not hold.
igration. Insofar as the latter affects education decisions (and education in turn carries a fixed cost), the channels by which skilled emigration can have an impact on the sending-country’s labor market and on welfare, more generally, are clear.

With respect to unemployment, emigration may act directly to lower skilled unemployment, but it also exerts two other effects. First, it can raise the expected wage by lowering unemployment (and hence may have a supply-side effect), and this can be amplified if the emigration wage enters the expected wage. The net result depends on the elasticity of demand for skilled labor, which determines whether the skilled-labor-wage bill increases or not. If the elasticity is lower than unity, an $x$ percent increase in skilled wages will increase the wage bill and thus be associated with a less than $x$ percent fall in employment. Therefore, the expected wage will have increased, and the supply of skilled workers will tend to rise as a result. To the extent that the acquisition of skills through education is subsidised, this will similarly raise the cost to the sending country.

Second, if the skilled wage increases because of emigration, this may also spill over into other sectors and hence have an impact on unemployment in those other sectors. Wage leap-frogging—letting unskilled wages follow skilled wages—would simply tend to extend unemployment to the unskilled and amplify the welfare-reducing consequences of skilled-labor migration. With respect to national income, a rise in the skilled wage tends to reduce national income because of the decline in the employment of skilled labor without any offsetting effect from the unskilled sector (in the case of no associated effect on unskilled wages), while the cost of education will also tend to increase. However, with the assumption of wage leap-frogging, the implications for national income are not so clear cut. Furthermore, to the extent that emigration raises the wage of the emigrant, this implies that emigrants were receiving less than their marginal product. This surplus—as measured over the group—would be lost to the sending country in the event of emigration. The size of the loss depends on the extent to which such workers are replaceable.

Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, 1975) extended their early work by introducing a number of refinements to labor markets in the sending countries. For example, if emigration induced a ladder effect that better matched the remaining skilled workers to skilled, rather than unskilled, jobs (which reduces unskilled unemployment—a variant of Harris and Todaro 1970)—then the effects of emigration could indeed be positive. By contrast, while emigration of skilled workers, such as doctors, might reduce labor-market slack, it could also reduce the flow of doctors from urban to rural areas and limit any positive diffusion effect. There is some confirming evidence. From 1996 to 1998 the number of doctors working in rural primary-health centres in India actually decreased by 9 percent and the total number of doctors and specialists in rural areas also fell by 4 percent. Over the same
period, the number of registered medical practitioners rose by 24 percent (Government of India 1998, 2000). Finally, to the extent that the external labor market is more efficient at screening workers, the result would be the loss of the most efficient to the sending country.9

A number of dynamic models, particularly Rodriguez (1975), had similar points of departure including, inter alia, a Harris-Todaro labor market and sticky wages. In this setup, flexible wages implied the complete independence of all steady state-factor returns from the cost of migration or the foreign wage. For sticky wages, the long-run rate of unemployment would also be independent, but, in the short run, any increase in the migration cost would raise unemployment. In the Rodriguez case, this was only for unskilled labor. Other differences with respect to Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) include, education not receiving a public subsidy, so that—with some restrictions—the educational decision depends exclusively on the monetary rate of return.

In short, these early classes of models treat the demand side for migrants as exogenous and have a range of assumptions regarding education costs, with a public subsidy to education commonly assumed. At their heart lies the respective specifications of the sending-country’s labor market. Under assumptions of wage rigidity, it was generally found that emigration would tend to lower sending-country employment with the distribution over sectors being contingent on relative wage setting and ex ante employment levels.

What was lacking, however, was any systematic matching of these results to data or, indeed, any disaggregation beyond the skilled and unskilled categories. Sectoral properties were ignored, and there was no attempt to take the analysis to the level of the firm. Moreover, while the stylization was always in terms of sending- and recipient-countries characterized by a difference in income levels, there was no attention to heterogeneity between sending countries. For example, the literature clearly signals the importance of ex ante employment and skill levels. Thus, a thick labor market for skills with employment slack in the sending country could generate a very different set of welfare implications from a small, tight skilled-labor market. This points to the likely importance of size, not least at the level of the country. As we shall see, country size indeed appears to be an important factor in understanding the impact of skilled migration.

Another assumption characteristic of this literature was the dichotomy between those who emigrate and those who stay. Yet, technological change—not least the advent of modern communications—has had some radical implications for the ways in which work can be done across space. Indeed, the recent growth in software activity has been striking for its high network content, linking firms and individuals in developing and devel-

9. See also Arrow (1973) and Spence (1974).
This early literature was also notable for containing explicit policy conclusions. The possibilities to tax brain drain and for an optimal tax scheme for migrants were extensively explored (see, e.g., Bhagwati 1976a; Bhagwati and Partington 1976; Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) proposed a tax on emigrants, with that tax levied by the receiving (developed-country) party and transmitted in one form or other to the sending (developing) country. In terms of the impact on the incomes of those that did not emigrate, two channels could be identified. There is a direct revenue effect, which would depend on the elasticity of emigration with respect to taxation. The second set of indirect effects would affect employment through the impact on expected and actual wages. To the extent that this elasticity of emigration with respect to the tax was less than unity, the income of those left behind would improve. However, other work in this area (such as McCulloch and Yellen 1975) was more ambiguous in its findings. Not only could total labor earnings fall under plausible assumptions, but a tax would likely raise the relative wage of nonmigrating skilled workers at the expense of unskilled workers (and hence have distributional implications), while also affecting the relative size of modern and traditional sectors.

The practical aspects of taxing nonresident citizens are also problematic. In some countries (e.g., the United States, Mexico, and the Philippines) taxation is indeed based on citizenship. Enforcing a tax on nonresidents has, however, proved difficult, and extensive assistance from the receiving countries would be required for successful implementation of the Bhagwati tax (Pomp 1989). The idea has been resurrected recently by Desai, Kapur, and McHale (2002a,b), but they also recognize the difficulties and end up suggesting a new research agenda, rather than presenting concrete conclusions about what form the tax should take.

7.3.2 Empirical Foundations

What empirical relevance do the early models have? Estimates of relative wages across countries with appropriate controls are scarce. Nevertheless, all the available (and generally biased) estimates of relative-wage differentials signal substantial wage gaps for most categories of skilled workers when comparing developing with developed countries over time. For example, for the software sector, Arora et al. (2001) have compared salaries of professionals in India and the United States. The numbers are for starting salaries in large establishments, but they do not control for characteristics like experience or education. What emerges from this biased comparison is that salaries in the United States for some occupational categories are at least ten times higher than in India, while salaries, generally, in the United States are several multiples those in India.
Indeed, other evidence confirms that skilled workers systematically earn less (adjusted for purchasing power) in developing than in developed countries. A recent study of new immigrants to the United States, for example, finds that the average immigrant realized major earnings gains over their last job abroad. Men experienced a 68 percent increase in earnings, and women a 62 percent increase. New immigrants who came primarily for work reasons experienced by far the largest increases in earnings (Jasso et al. 2000). The reasons for such persistent wage differentials are interesting, not least because skilled-wage differentials in favor of developed countries contradict the predictions of much modern growth theory.¹⁰

It is hardly surprising news that there is a substantial income differential across countries that motivates emigration. What of the impact on the sending countries’ labor market? In particular, can we find evidence of widespread emulation effects? Data concerning occupational wages of professionals in developing countries is scarce. Using Indian data, Arora et al. (2001) and Kumar (2000) have found that one of the major problems perceived by Indian ICT firms is a shortage of skilled labor. Furthermore, the late 1990s boom in the Indian software sector has clearly been associated with increased demand for engineers, and there is evidence of this forcing up skilled wages.

We lack quality data on the two sectors—software and health—that we are particularly interested in, but the limited and anecdotal evidence that we do have suggests large-order differences in wages between their last employment in a developing country and their employment in a developed country. Part of this can, of course, be attributed to differences in physical capital per worker, but much can be attributed to technology, access to high-quality capital, network externalities, and so on.

Finally, there is the central question as to whether or not human capital formation has an impact on performance. The recent empirical-growth literature has, for example, generally found that increases in educational attainment have not had any significant, positive impact on growth.¹¹ Part of this may be attributable to imprecisions in the measurement of education. In addition, there is evidence that suggests that the relatively low gains from the match between education and jobs posted in many developing countries may be at the heart of the problem. This points to possible mismatch between acquired skills and the quality of jobs on offer.

7.3.3 Cost of Education and Its Financing

The characteristics of the education system are of major importance for the potential costs and benefits in these traditional models of brain drain,

¹⁰ On the assumption that human capital is immobile, this should imply that both skilled wages and the skill premium should be higher in developing than in developed countries (Easterly and Levine 2001).

¹¹ For an overview of this literature see, Easterly and Levine (2001), also Pritchett (2001).
as well as for the possibility of a beneficial brain drain to which we turn later in section 7.4.

A cost to developing countries that has been widely highlighted concerns lost educational investment. Indeed, in most developing countries at least some part of the cost of education is borne by the government, partly because the social return from education is higher than the private one. However, in the last decade, there has been an increase in the provision of private-educational services in many developing countries where the cost is largely, if not exclusively, borne privately. However, even when this is the case, any additional social returns to education, as well as public investment in primary and secondary education, are lost when an individual emigrates.

Estimating the exact cost of education is a very difficult task and the result depends on the approach that is taken in allocating fixed costs across outputs. There are some available cost estimates. For example, the total cost of a medical degree in India has been estimated to be eight times the annual GDP per capita (Jayaram 1995), and, for an engineering degree, it is four times the annual GDP per capita (Salim 1996). World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data (reported previously in table 7.1) show that average government expenditure per student on tertiary education varies a lot, but mostly lies in the range of 1,000–3,000 (international) dollars. In both China and India the expenditure is around 2,000 dollars per student.

Yet simply assuming that the education costs in developing countries are largely publicly financed misses some important innovations in educational-services supply and financing that have occurred in the 1990s. These may in turn have been positively influenced by the emigration of the skilled. For example, in India, private institutions have begun training specialists for the software industry. According to Arora et al. (2001), while the supply of engineering graduates from the main public-educational institutions is relatively inelastic in the short run, the supply of software professionals has increased substantially due to private training, which dampens the wage effect of the demand-side changes.

In China, there are also a number of private institutions. It has been estimated that there has been a strong expansion of private education since the 1980s. According to the official figures in 1998, there were 1,274 private tertiary institutions, the majority of which prepare students for national exams rather than confer degrees. However, an estimated 4 million students study in private tertiary institutions, which are not recognized by the Ministry of Education (Dahlman and Aubert 2001).

Of course, such innovations have had little or no impact in sectors where certification and regulation have been far tighter. Both healthcare and teaching are cases in point. Indeed, it is still broadly correct to assume that the bulk of doctors, nurses, and teachers in developing countries receive
substantial public subsidy toward their training. Although the question of new methods of financing higher education has been raised strongly, in most developing countries, students’ own contributions to the costs of higher education are still small (Johnstone, Arora, and Experton 1998; Tilak 1997; Jayaram 1995).

7.4 Endogenous Growth and the Beneficial Brain Drain

7.4.1 Analytics

Recent literature has located the brain drain in explicitly dynamic models and has, on the whole, come up with significantly more optimistic results than the earlier work discussed in section 7.3. The central proposition is that if the possibility of emigration encourages more skill creation than skill loss, sending (or home) countries might increase their stocks of skills as opportunities to move or work abroad open up. If, in addition, this accumulation of skills has beneficial effects beyond the strictly private gains anticipated by those who acquire the skills, the whole economy can benefit. Examples of such benefits include enhanced intergenerational transmission of skills and education (Vidal 1998) and spillovers between skilled workers (Mountford 1997).

There are two critical features of these models. The first is the nature of the social benefit resulting from higher skills, for which several approaches are evident. In the simplest form, Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) merely assume that increasing the average skill level of the sending economy is desirable. Mountford (1997) postulates a production externality whereby the productivity of current labor depends positively on the share of the population who had education in the previous period. Beine, Docquier, and Rapaport (2001a) formalize this by allowing the average skill of one generation to pass directly to the next, who can then build on it by taking education. In all these cases, emigration has a negative direct effect by draining skilled labor from the sending economy—the drain effect—but a potentially beneficial effect in encouraging human-capital formation—the brain effect.

Vidal (1998) assumes an intergenerational transfer whereby the higher the human-capital level of one generation, the more effective is the human-capital formation of the next generation. This too would seem to be a force for divergence because skilled emigration would appear to make future human-capital acquisition cheaper in the receiving country and dearer in the home country. But, in fact, Vidal prevents this by assuming that, for the purposes of the spillover, migrants’ human capital remains at home. This makes no sense for permanent migration—the traditional and main concern of the brain-drain literature—but it may be plausible for temporary migration, an area of more recent interest. In particular, if we are interested
in modeling an ability to sell labor services at higher prices abroad while effectively maintaining domicile at home, then it may be reasonable to assume that intergenerational spillovers are likely to be at home. In this case, work opportunities abroad may exert a positive impact on developing countries’ ability to accumulate human capital.\footnote{Such temporary movement of workers is the subject of negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), at least so far as services provision is concerned (see Winters et al. 2002).}

The second critical issue for the beneficial brain drain is the mechanism that generates an increased incentive to acquire education but leaves some skilled workers back at home. All the current literature starts with wages for given levels of skills and ability being higher abroad than at home. From there, the predominant approach—taken by Mountford (1997); Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1998); Vidal (1998), and Beine, Docquier, and Rapaport (2001a)—has been to assume that there is uncertainty about the ability to migrate, so that, of the \( N \) amount who acquire education, only \( \pi N (\pi < 1) \) actually emigrate. If \( \pi \) were unity, a permanent brain drain could not be beneficial since all the incremental education would be lost. A further critical assumption is that the probability of migration is fixed and exogenously given for any individual would-be migrant. This implicitly arises because foreign firms cannot screen migrants to distinguish the able from the less able, and it is this market failure that makes it possible for the brain drain to be beneficial.

We can illustrate the importance of this assumption, using a highly simplified model that nonetheless captures Mountford’s (1997) important insight. Following Beine, Docquier, and Rapaport (2001a), assume that ability is uniformly distributed between \( A_{\text{min}} \) and \( A_{\text{max}} \) and that education yields private returns that increase with ability, as in the line in figure 7.2, “with educ.” With a given private cost of education, indicated by the horizontal line, people with ability between \( A^* \) and \( A_{\text{max}} \) find it profitable to take education. At point \( A^* \), the private cost of education equals expected returns. Now, allow for the possibility of migration for educated people. If an individual can migrate, his or her private returns increase to the line “with educ. and migrn.” With a probability of migration \( 0 < \pi < 1 \), the expected returns to education lie between the domestic and emigration rates of return (around “\( E (\text{with educ. and migrn.}) \)”) and individuals between \( A^{**} \) and \( A_{\text{max}} \) will take education. Of these, however, a proportion, \( \pi \), will emigrate, leaving the domestic economy with \( (1 - \pi) (A_{\text{max}} - A^{**}) \) educated people, which may or may not exceed \( (A_{\text{max}} - A^*) \). Adding social returns to education is conceptually simple, for they have no immediate effect on private decisions. For simplicity, let social benefits be proportional to the stock of educated remaining at home, that is, \( \delta (A_{\text{max}} - A^*) \) with no migration, and \( \delta (1 - \pi) (A_{\text{max}} - A^{**}) \) with migration.
The possibility of migration raises expected welfare for anyone who takes education. Hence there is an increase in aggregate private income, although, of course, some individuals who do not manage to emigrate will regret their education decisions ex post. The uneducated see no direct change in private returns, and welfare and consequently gross private income rises when migration is permitted. What happens to aggregate welfare, of course, also depends on the social benefits of education.

Fundamental to this story is that every educated individual has probability $\pi$ of emigrating—hence all of them experience increased expected returns, so that, in our linear example, line “$E$ (with educ. and migrn.)” lies uniformly above “with educ.” But now suppose that the country or organization of immigration can screen migrants perfectly for ability. They admit immigrants, but only from the top echelons, so that if, say, they want $M$ people from our target country, they get the top $M$ lying between $A_m$ and $A_{\text{max}}$ in figure 7.3. If this is known, the incentives for individuals with ability below $A_m$ are unchanged. The private returns to education follow the thick line in figure 7.3; $(A_{\text{max}} - A^*)$ are the educated, of whom $(A_m - A^*)$ remain. The increment to total private income is larger than if the migrants had been randomly selected because the same number of migrants makes gains, but no one makes ex post education decisions that they regret. However, there is a loss of social welfare of $\delta M$, as $M$ educated people are lost and the social welfare was proportion $\delta$ of the number of educated individuals.

Clearly, perfect screening is implausible, but even with imperfect screen-
ing all that would happen is that the vertical section of the thick private-returns line would become sloped. But as long as it meets “with educ.” above $A^*$, offering migration would affect no one’s education decisions. Thus, a necessary criterion for a beneficial brain drain to have any chance of applying is that the marginal person in education has a positive probability of emigrating.

Of course, actual decisions about education are taken with respect to subjective probabilities of migration, not with ex post observed probabilities. Thus, if individuals are overly optimistic about their prospects, marginal candidates may believe they face improved expected returns even when they do not. In line with most long-run modeling, however, we discount everlasting errors of this sort and presume that eventually subjective probabilities converge to actual ones.

The importance of effective screening is also evident in Stark, Helmenein, and Prskawetz (1997), who distinguish between education and innate ability. For them, the increased incentive to acquire education among less-able workers is that, while foreign firms can recognize educational qualifications, they cannot, at first, distinguish high- from low-ability workers. As a result, for a period, they offer all migrants with a given level of education the same wage (the mean level averaged over ability for that level of education), with the consequence that less-able workers are overpaid. Over time, foreign firms may discern workers’ true ability and offer more appropriate wages, at which time the benefits of emigration erode and, at least with finite probability, the workers return home. Even if they have acquired no
skills or networks abroad, they are better educated than they would have been in the absence of migration. In this case, it is precisely the imperfections in screening—how quickly and with what probability foreign firms discern true ability—that create the incentives to acquire education.

A possible development of the screening model is that the sending or home country has some unexploited capacity for education in the sense that the returns to education are primarily determined by the demand for skilled workers rather than the ability of the population. In this case, even a perfectly screened emigration would generate net benefits. Suppose that as the workers between $A_M$ and $A_{max}$ migrated, they left openings for newly educated workers to take jobs with precisely the same returns. The net effect on the home economy would be to have the same number of educated workers as without migration and, hence, the same spillovers but with $M$ fewer uneducated workers. This would raise average incomes slightly (and average skill levels, which in some models is important). In addition, the migrants would record positive private gains.

It is also worth mentioning that the positive effects of brain drain for the sending country could also arise from a different mechanism that is related to the terms of trade as opposed to education. As Davis and Weinstein (2002) point out in their work, a technologically superior country, like the United States, is likely to experience inflow of all factors of production, including skilled and unskilled labor. This will eventually lead to deterioration of its terms of trade and consequential gains for the labor-sending country.

### 7.4.2 Empirical Extensions

An important step forward in the literature on the beneficial brain drain is due to Beine, Docquier, and Rapaport (2001a,b), who aim to test the model empirically using cross-sectional data. Their first attempt was hamstrung by data difficulties (e.g., having to use gross migration to proxy the brain drain), but it demonstrates that the probability of emigration does appear to boost human-capital formation in poor countries and that the stock of human capital does appear to influence growth positively. These are both necessary conditions for the beneficial brain drain.

Beine, Docquier, and Rapaport (2001b) advance these results in several ways. They use Carrington and Detragiache’s (1998) data set, which covers more countries, as well as a fuller set of additional explanatory variables in the equations for migration, human capital, and growth. The new estimates reinforce the earlier results except that the marginal effect of migration on human-capital formation appears to apply equally to all countries, rather than more strongly in the poorer countries, as the theory would pre-

13. This latter finding is, of course, rather different from the results of much of the empirical-growth literature, see Pritchett (2001).
dict. They also go on to use their estimates to decompose the effects of migration into a “brain” effect—human-capital accumulation—and a “drain” effect—losses due to actual emigration. They identify several countries that would benefit from a decline in 1990 stocks of skilled emigration (i.e., reducing the outflow and receiving some nationals back). These countries typically have high rates of emigration coupled with relatively ineffective education and training systems. Some would even benefit from a complete ban on skilled migration. Interestingly, however, the loss of growth due to emigration appears to be rather small, of the order of 0.05 percent per annum. The obverse of these results is that countries would typically gain from higher emigration if they currently have low rates of emigration and low levels of human capital (i.e., where the costs of further emigration are relatively low and the benefits in terms of incentives relatively high). There are limited numbers of countries in this class, but they include the larger developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India.

These results are promising. The basic finding that a beneficial brain drain is possible seems quite robust. Their subsequent translation into policy recommendations toward skilled emigration, however, is fragile and cannot be viewed as anything other than illustrative, at present. It depends on point estimates from only one functional specification. Given that theory offers so little information on how precisely to model the relationship between the variables concerned, a great deal more testing of functional forms and more attention paid to estimation and data errors will be needed.

7.5 Screening: Empirical Evidence

The discussion in section 7.4 pointed to the possible importance of screening. In addition, we have already indicated that there appear to be strong sectoral dimensions to skilled migration. What evidence—if any—is there that these features have become more important in the recent period? Certainly, a closer look at targeted visa programs established in the last decade, as well as information on the job and location choices of developing-country students who have received some part of their education in a developed country (in this case the United States), may be instructive.

The clearest example of screening is the visa program implemented by the United States since the late 1980s and known as the H1-B visa. This program admits professional and specialized workers for up to six years on the basis of employer’s declaration that U.S. workers are not available at the prevailing wage. However, although initially temporary, if an H1-B visa holder can find an employer to sponsor their certification, he or she can eventually become an immigrant. Over the 1990s, the quota for H1-B visas has increased steadily and is currently at around 195,000 per year. Table 7.2 gives the relative shares of selected major-source countries of
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total LDCs</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of visas</td>
<td>48,820</td>
<td>58,673</td>
<td>59,325</td>
<td>51,667</td>
<td>42,206</td>
<td>49,284</td>
<td>59,093</td>
<td>60,072</td>
<td>80,608</td>
<td>91,378</td>
<td>116,695</td>
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</table>

H-1\textsuperscript{14} visa issuances. It is not possible to extract the exact share of all individual developing countries in total issuances from this data, but it is obvious from the total share of developing countries that their importance as source countries has been growing steadily. In 1999, at least 58 percent of H-1 visas were granted to individuals from developing countries, and this figure has risen since the early 1990s.

The new Immigration and Naturalization Service Nonimmigrant Information System\textsuperscript{15} has detailed records on admissions of nonimmigrants into the United States since 1996. These numbers are much larger than the actual visa issuances because each entry of a visa holder is recorded, rather than the number of individuals with permission to enter the United States. These data also show that since 1996 the share of H-1 admissions of nationals from developing countries has increased from 53 percent in 1996 to 74 percent in 1999. The ratio of admissions to issuances (which in general is much higher for nationals of developed countries) has also increased for some developing countries. For example, for China the ratio was 1.88 in 1996 and 1.97 in 1999, and for Russia the ratio has increased from 1.75 to 2.16 during the same period. This may indicate a change in the nature of immigration.

However, what is particularly striking is the rapid growth in that period of H1-B visa holders coming from just one developing country, India. Since 1995, Indians have accounted for over 40 percent of all H1-B visas. Needless to say, these migrants have accounted for a minute share of the total receiving- and sending-labor forces, but a nontrivial share of their respective sectors, particularly at the sending end. A very rough estimate suggests that the stock of Indian H1-B visa holders at the end of the 1990s may have accounted for around 30 percent of the India-based software labor force.\textsuperscript{16} Other advanced economies—particularly in the European Union—have also begun to operate visa programmes designed to attract skilled workers for the ICT sector.\textsuperscript{17}

The growth of the H1-B visa category has a great deal to do with the overall growth of the ICT sector and the software industry, in particular. A recent estimate has put the new immigrant share of ICT workers at around a sixth.\textsuperscript{18} But it would be misleading to view this as simply the long-run

\textsuperscript{14} The H-1 visas include H-1A and H-1B visas, H-1A being the visa type issued to registered nurses. The number of H-1A visas has been very small after 1995.

\textsuperscript{15} The numbers of admissions from the system are reported in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) \textit{Statistical Yearbook}; 1997 records were not published because of reengineering of data entry and database management components.

\textsuperscript{16} This estimate is based on the sum of H-1B visa issuances in 1997–1999 and an estimate of total professional employment in software sector in India, presented by Rajetva Ratna Shaath from the Ministry of Information Technology 23 October, 2001 (available at http://www.nasscom.org/events/india_eu_it_summit/shah_srr.ppt).

\textsuperscript{17} See OECD (2002).

\textsuperscript{18} Of course, this includes new immigrants from other developed countries (see Guellec and Cervantes 2001).
movement of skilled labor away from developing countries. Indeed, it is precisely in this period that ICT sectors—including software—have grown in India and China. Particularly in the former case, this has been associated with the advent of tightly networked communities of firms and individuals that have spanned continents and have been enabled by advances in communications technology. Saxenian (2001) has argued that these new networks of highly mobile professionals, and linked firms operating over a range of spatial locations violate a more simplistic view of knowledge and asset transfer. However, such networks, although enabled by advances in communications, may still be associated with divisions of labor that may not necessarily work to the advantage of the developing country or firm.

Turning now to the education channel, over the 1990s, there has been strong growth in the numbers of students from developing countries pursuing education in developed countries. The proportion of students who were foreign in the OECD countries rose by 4.6 percent between 1995 and 1998 (OECD 2002), with as much as half of these being from developing countries. For example, by 1998–1999 just over 10 percent of all international students enrolled in U.S. higher education were from China, and a further 8 percent were from India. At a doctoral level, between 80–90 percent of these students were enrolled in science and engineering faculties. Clearly, a significant share of such students has tended to stay on, but the proportion that do return home is unclear. Guochu and Wenjun (2001) hazard the view that roughly one-third of Chinese students return home upon completion of their studies, but for those Chinese who have studied in the United States the rate of return has been lower at under 15 percent. One survey found that only 19 percent of the 160,000 Chinese students who studied in the United States between 1978 and 1998 had returned home.

Other examples of return migration exist. Following a large outflow of students from Taiwan to the United States in the 1960s to the 1970s, returnees increased dramatically in the 1980s and have indeed played a central role in subsequently developing that country’s ICT sector. This is partly reflected in a National Science Foundation study of doctoral students’ work intentions covering the period 1988–1996. Of those surveyed, between 80–85 percent of Indian and Chinese doctoral students intended to try and stay in the United States. This figure falls to under 50 percent for Taiwanese students (see table 7.3). The share of Chinese and Indian doctoral students with firm plans to stay was around 50 percent and for the Taiwanese under 30 percent. Clearly, there are several factors at work here. One is the ability to secure employment in the United States; another is the

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19. See the OECD Education Database; different countries have slightly varying definitions of foreigners, and thus exact numbers cannot be given.
average income level in the developing country as well as the ability to absorb returnees.\(^{22}\)

The relationship between screening, talent, and relative earnings still poses major empirical challenges. However, it is interesting that, in a relatively small sample of members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering, foreign-born scientists have tended to earn significantly more on average than native ones (Guellec and Cervantes 2001). This might suggest that they represent the higher end of the ability scale (if we assume that abilities have the same distribution in all countries), that they have the incentive to put more effort into their work, or both. Of course, selection in abilities can occur through selection in the initial emigration decision, screening by employers in the receiving country, or selection occurring through return migration. Whatever the channel, if screening is efficient, the result will be that the developing country

\(^{22}\) Bratsberg (1995) has studied the determinants of the return rate of students from different countries in the United States. Returns to education in the source country are inversely related to the rate of staying in the United States, as might be expected.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region and Country</th>
<th>Foreign S&amp;E Doctoral Recipients</th>
<th>With Plans to Stay</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>With Firm Plans to Stay</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total: Selected countries</td>
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<td>63.0</td>
<td>21,779</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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</table>

loses some access to its best talent, the portion of which depends in part on the sector. To the extent that the best talent leaves, there may be nontrivial implications for the developing country’s ability to implement technological progress and move activities up the value chain.

7.6 Remittances, Diasporas, and Return Flows

It has long been recognized—but not explicitly modeled in this literature—that any adverse consequences of skilled emigration might be partly or wholly offset by remittances and return migration. Return migrants could come back with enhanced skills.

As usual, the data limitations are severe. Concerning remittances, aside from considerable imprecision in the aggregate numbers, it is not possible to separate out the volume of remittances coming from migrants of different skill groups.\footnote{Remittances are discussed in detail and existing research reviewed in Puri and Ritzema (2000).} Such information that is available confirms that remittances vary systematically with respect to income, conditions in the sending country, planned duration of stay, and household attributes.\footnote{For example, Straubhaar (1986) for a study of remittances to Turkey.} It is likely that remittances from highly skilled migrants follow a very different pattern from those of low-skilled migrants.

As to return migration, a positive channel would occur when migrants return with experience, financial resources, links to networks, and skills from a stay abroad that are then productively deployed at home. Of course, these effects are not fixed but interrelated with each other, as well as with remittances, incentives to remit, and desires to save, and depend on the planned duration of migration, which in turn depends on migration and visa policies as much as individual intentions. In general, individuals can decide to return if the migrant prefers consumption in the sending or home country, if prices are lower there or if human capital acquired in the receiving country is more valuable in the sending country (Dustmann 1996).

There is some evidence that return migrants tend to choose self-employment or entrepreneurial activity because their savings diminish credit constraints. For example, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) have studied returning Turkish migrants and their choice of activity and migration duration as a simultaneous decision. They find that most returnees choose self-employment or nonemployment and that highly educated individuals are more likely to be active after return. Ilahi (1999) has studied occupational choices on return and finds that the level of savings is positively correlated with the choice of self-employment on return. Similarly, McCormick and Wahba (2001) use survey data to investigate links between savings, overseas work experience, and choice of activity after re-
They find that duration of stay overseas along with savings increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur for literate return migrants, which would suggest that skills obtained overseas have are useful on return. Positive effects from return migration obviously in turn depend on a variety of factors, including government policy in the sending or home country (see Castles 2000; Dustmann 1996).

Another important aspect of return migration is the possibility that it is a result of screening of the migrants. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) have studied the outmigration decisions of foreign-born people in the United States, and conclude that return migration accentuates the type of selection that generated the immigrant flow. In other words, if emigrants represent the high end of the skill distribution in the source country, the returnees are the least skilled of the emigrants. Cohen and Haberfeld (2001) also find that Israeli immigrants returning from the United States are likely to be negatively selected from those Israelis who emigrated in the first place. Reagan and Olsen (2000), on the other hand, do not find any skill bias in return migration in their study on the National Longitudinal Survey, when skill is measured with Armed Forces Qualifying Test.

In sum, studies of return migration suggest that those who return may be those that have performed relatively poorly when abroad; the best migrants tend to stay. Of course, these observations do not necessarily hold true for all different migrant groups or countries. Furthermore, other related research suggests that aspects that do not require return migration of skilled individuals can be of major importance. Such channels for beneficial effects are exports and business and network links related to diaspora populations. There is evidence that such diaspora can have very beneficial effect on exports (Rauch 1999; Rauch and Trindade 2002). Similarly, foreign direct investment and venture capital—particularly in the recent period—have often been related to ethnic networks. An example of this is the Hsinchu Science park in Taipei, where a large fraction of companies have been started by returnees from the United States (Luo and Wang 2001). There is some evidence of these types of networks effects being quite powerful in the Indian software industry.

### 7.7 Economic-Geography Models

We now turn to the recent economic geography literature (Krugman 1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999) that brings together in a formal way two of the key elements of the brain drain story—labor mobility and a tendency for uneven development (core-periphery outcomes). The unique contribution of this literature has been to show that uneven outcomes are possible even when countries have identical starting points and when there are no direct spillovers between mobile workers or market failures in the labor market. Rather, their unevenness stems from the pecu-
niary externalities implicit in the interactions between imperfectly competitive firms. The appendix attempts a relabelling exercise to see how far geography can help us to understand high-skilled migration. Here we summarize the main points.

Economic-geography models show how economies of scale and transaction costs can combine to determine the level of industrial concentration. The former are necessary for concentration to emerge at all, whereas the latter curtail concentration because they increase the benefits of locating production close to demand. The simplest geography model formalizes the notion of cumulative causation in the industrial sector. Imagine an initial expansion of industry in one country. This draws industrial labor into the country from elsewhere, and this labor increases the country’s demand for industrial output. This, in turn, is met by local producers because, being local, they avoid the transportation costs (and tariffs) faced by overseas producers. Thus, higher sales stimulate output which in turn stimulates labor demand, and so on. The constraint on this process in Krugman (1991) is the existence of an agricultural sector that cannot move and as a consequence generates demand for industrial goods that cannot be concentrated. In extreme versions of the model, with two identical countries, two sorts of outcome are possible: the complete concentration of industry or an equal split between the two countries. At very high transportation costs, perfect diversification rules, whereas, at low costs, perfect concentration does. In-between there is a range where both equilibria are stable. Precisely where this lies depends in part on the relative sizes of demand from mobile and immobile workers. If demand from the latter is large, agglomeration may not be possible, and certainly will not occur until trade costs have fallen very substantially. When economies of scale are not too strong and there are many countries in the world, the model generalizes to create several agglomerations, as indeed are observed.

If we think of industry as being the high-technology sector and agriculture as the rest of the economy, we have a potential model of the brain drain as industrial (high-skill) labor migrates in the process of concentration. Moreover, if we add in some further frictions to the model—such as congestion costs—in which industry agglomerates and there is an unwillingness by some high-technology workers to move, outcomes between the two extremes are possible.

Reinterpreted geography models suggest three significant conclusions. First, the pressure for a brain drain may vary as the parameters of the world economy change. In particular, the pressure for the agglomeration of industry, and thus of the factors of production used in industry, depends on the costs of international trade of final goods. If the latter are very high, production is constrained to locate close to demand, and, provided the latter starts off relatively dispersed over space, agglomeration never gets un-
derway. As trade costs fall, for either policy reasons (lower barriers) or with technological advance, agglomeration may become more feasible and so pressure for a brain drain may emerge. Such developments could lie behind the apparent recent revival in skilled-labor mobility in certain sectors.

Second, geography models suggest that uneven development—and hence brain drain pressure—is a natural and inevitable phase of global development, even if countries start off from identical positions. Third, the simplest geography models suggest that a brain drain will be detrimental to those left behind in the brain-exporting (sending or home) country even in the absence of the labor-market failures (including in the absence of direct spillovers between skilled workers) that we have discussed so far. That is, the advantages of agglomeration stem from the fact that proximity economizes on transactions and transportation costs, making real wages higher in the core and lower in the periphery than they would be under more even development. This effect could be additive to any of the direct spillovers discussed so far.

The previously presented geography models offer a return to an earlier vintage of brain-drain models (albeit in more sophisticated form), because they admit none of the more recently identified developments that could generate a beneficial brain drain. They have no mechanism for stimulating return migration, have no network or diaspora effects, and, because they take the world’s stock of skilled labor as given, are unable to consider the education-incentives version of the brain drain.

If, however, there are positive direct spillovers between skilled workers, agglomeration will increase average productivity and world aggregate output. This raises the possibility that even workers in the brain-exporting country gain from the brain drain because world output increases. At least in simple models, however, one can show that, as transportation costs fall from infinity, the workers in the nonindustrial country are worse off when agglomeration first starts. They start to gain only as transportation costs fall far enough that they can more cheaply buy the goods from the concentration of industry in the other country (see Baldwin and Forslid 2000).

A strength of the economic-geography approach is its general equilibrium nature, which endows it with a strong internal consistency. On the other hand, this makes it a poor predictor of sectoral effects. There is clearly a general equilibrium dimension to the brain drain. In particular, very small economies just may not be able to generate the density of demand necessary to make the application of high levels of skill profitable. However, there are equally clear differences between sectors regarding the extent of and incentives for agglomeration. These cannot be due to the demand linkages that are central to Krugman’s geography model, for these are completely general across all industrial sectors. The alternative pecuniary externality found in the geography literature—(that is, input-output
linkages when intermediate demand relocates with firms [Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999])—could conceivably offer an explanation, but it entails no labor mobility.

We conclude, therefore, that, while geography provides useful insights into the general position of nations in the brain drain cycle, it cannot be the complete story behind the movements that we observe in areas such as health and ICT. For these, direct and sector-specific spillovers must also be at work too.

7.8 Sectoral Dimensions

The available evidence points to skilled migration having strong sectoral properties. At the same time, technology itself has had an impact on the structure of demand and the spatial distributions of skilled labor. Two examples stand out: health and software. Both have been subject to skilled emigration but with different durations and dynamics at both the sending and receiving ends.

Skilled migration of health-care workers appears to be the starkest and most persistent form of brain drain (our future research will try to quantify these costs carefully). Health care is generally underprovided in developing countries, and provision also tends to be skewed towards urban and relatively privileged consumers. As highly regulated activity, there are long lags on the supply side of healthcare, while educational financing tends to have a strong public component in most developing countries. Furthermore, health care work generally has a strong team component; doctors have complementary inputs from nurses and ancillary staff. Advances in medical technology have, if anything, accentuated the team component. As such, loss of some part of this chain may have large, knock-on effects. Among other things, this suggests that relatively narrow interventions that might seek to raise some part of the chain's incentives for staying (or penalize them for leaving) will have limited efficacy. Indeed, the organization of the industry suggests sector-wide solutions. On the demand side, it appears to be largely public health care systems in the developed economies that are the main sources of demand, thereby raising the public-policy dimension directly.

The growth of a highly mobile software sector is of more recent origin. Furthermore, the sector has a far smaller public-sector involvement. Clearly, an important factor behind its growth has been the falling cost of communications. Thus, the use of satellites (VSATs) has become central to the growth of software firms in India by enabling firms in that country to work effectively with partners or clients in developed countries. In addition, there are clear educational thresholds. It is no accident that software sectors in developing countries have mostly emerged in countries with ex
The sector has everywhere then been characterized by agglomeration, which can be attributed to gains from knowledge sharing, teamwork, and demand-and-supply (backward-and-forward) linkages. This also appears to be associated with positive spill-overs, including learning by doing, and hence positive productivity effects.

One possible channel for productivity gain is likely to be the reduction in skill-technology mismatch in the developing country. Increased investment in human capital will raise skill levels in turn allowing firms to match workers to new-generation technologies more easily. Certainly, anecdotal evidence from the software sector shows workers in developing countries working with very similar technologies as their counterparts in the advanced economies. Over time, this should reduce the productivity and wage gap. This, in turn, will lower income differences across countries. By contrast, within-country inequality in incomes may well rise, as returns to the skilled increase relative to the unskilled returns.

This potentially very positive picture does, however, need qualification. Available evidence suggests that the most highly skilled personnel have moved (with screening) to firms located in advanced economies (i.e., the Silicon Valley). This may be less on account of outright technology differences than on account of differences in the ability to network, in the business environment, and so on. One possible outcome would be that the skills available to developing-country firms then result in them choosing to work lower down the value chain, for example, by concentrating more on outsourced coding than conceptualizing. Yet even this is far from clear. Movement of skilled workers across borders has often been temporary, and—at least in India—there is widespread evidence of high integration in activity between firms in the developing- and developed-country agglomerations.

What are the welfare implications for the sending or home country in this type of arrangement? Clearly, the sending country gains from the matching of domestic skilled workers to relatively high-productivity jobs, particularly if—as indicated in section 7.4—there is an associated and positive shock to the supply of skills. However, it loses the top end of the skill distribution and with it, embodied education costs (although there is increasing evidence of greater private-education finance). That loss will be potentially qualified by such movers retaining or developing business links at home and by any associated networking effects. It also partly depends on the labor market and the presence or absence of slack. With ex ante slack, emigration may lead to better matching at home. Absent such slack, emigration would directly affect relative wages and, ultimately, the factor mix.

25. We noted previously that such factors might explain part of the wage gap across countries for skilled labor.
27. See Desai (2000).
Faced with the high turnover associated with poaching, firms may simply make production and technology decisions that match to skill levels with lower poaching probabilities. Note also that high poaching probabilities will exacerbate the problem of firms’ refusing to internalize training costs.

What might be the longer-run implications? On the assumption that developed-country firms continue to poach talent, a key question relates to the incentive properties that screening-cum-cherry-picking imparts for others. As the analysis in section 7.4 shows, if the human-capital-acquisition incentives could then be absent or minimal, the long-run effect may be adverse for the sending country. Equivalently, it may affect the way in which talent is distributed. To the extent that the education taken abroad is privately financed (against some public-financing component for those that get recruited later), there will be a fiscal saving. However, there are also likely to be negative externalities from the loss of the best students that may ultimately have an impact on the quality of instruction and graduates. Certainly, these questions require further investigation and more formal treatment—tasks that we reserve for later.

Finally, we should signal that the size of a country (and hence the size of its skill pool) is likely to matter. Small developing countries will find it difficult to retain skills; they lack the mass for agglomeration and other scale effects to set in. This makes them particularly prone to skills poaching.

7.9 Conclusion

In this paper, we have surveyed the literature and some of the evidence on the brain drain. A body of early work concentrated on modeling the sending countries’ labor markets in the presence of a range of distortions, particularly of the labor market in the sending country. The gist of this analysis was that skilled migration lowered welfare for the population remaining behind in the sending country, but this was highly sensitive to assumptions regarding wage setting and ex ante employment levels. (There was never any case that the migrants themselves did not gain.) In the main, migration exacerbated the efficiency losses caused by the various distortions—for example, the subsidy to public education or the underemployment of skilled or other labor arising from distorted wage setting. This literature led to calls for the prevention or taxation of skilled migration from developing countries, although, as history shows no concrete action ever resulted.

Later more truly dynamic models of the brain drain focused on the motivation for human-capital accumulation and noted how these were affected by the introduction of a nontrivial probability of emigration. Thus although migration drained talent out of a country, in this class of model, it also encouraged the creation of skills, and the latter effect could be the dominant one. The mechanisms through which this occurred relied on in-
formation failures—most commonly the assumption that, after taking education, developing-country residents had an equal, exogenous, and less-than-unity probability of migrating. Implicit in the first condition is the assumption that the receiving country cannot screen potential migrants effectively; it merely chooses randomly among the educated cohort of the developing country. But, in fact, it appears that recipients screen immigrants quite actively—for example, via recruitment effort, the offer of temporary visas during which workers reveal themselves, and via their local education establishments. In this case, however, the beneficial brain drain can evaporate, for if the recipients can choose only the most able among developing-country residents, the incentives for the marginal student to acquire education will not be affected since they will have no possibility of emigrating. This disappointing outcome may be moderated if screening is imperfect or if there is some ex ante underemployment of skilled labor in the sending country. In the latter case, the employment ratchet effect resulting from screened emigration could eliminate the social losses while still permitting the strong positive private gains for the migrants themselves.

A third stream of some relevance is the literature on economic geography. This has not (so far) been concerned directly with brain-drain issues, but its models can be massaged to offer an alternative view of skilled migration. Doing so provides a number of insights into the factors behind agglomeration—including that in skills—and some likely implications for developing countries. From these extensions, it appears that the brain drain is likely to be a temporary phenomenon, arising only as the transactions costs for talent-intensive activity decline through falling communications costs, and the situation will possibly reverse itself as they decline even further. While it occurs, however, the brain drain will have negative welfare implications for the “periphery” (the brain-exporting home countries) as, inter alia, its mobile labor emigrates to the “core.” This is likely to be especially true of very small countries, which are unable to achieve the mass required to exploit talented labor efficiently. The economic-geography explanation of the brain drain is explicitly general equilibrium, which is a conceptual and also empirical strength for these very small economies. However, among economies large enough to support agglomerations in principle, it is a potential weakness because it precludes explaining the different experiences of different high-technology sectors.

Indeed, casual observation suggests that, in the 1990s, multiple sites for agglomeration, including those in the periphery, have developed. For example, there is clear evidence of agglomeration in the software industry in India, as in the United States. This might point to some evolving division of labor and associated distribution of skills across space. As such, this may indeed be where the main welfare implications of a particular type of skilled migration lie, and this in turn implies closer attention to the properties of specific sectors and skills.
Overall, our conclusion has to be that, while there is clearly a possibility that the brain drain is beneficial to the residents left behind in the home countries, there are reasons—some of them of recent origin—to be suspicious of that conclusion. It is not even certain that there is an overall global-welfare gain from the brain drain, although given the apparently large private benefits of the migrants themselves and their higher productivity in their new locations, it seems highly likely. Like all good academic surveys, we conclude that much more research is needed to pin down the relevant magnitudes. These are likely to vary by sector, and so this work will need to be at a detailed level.

Appendix

Reinterpreting the Economic Geography Model

The standard geography model postulates a simple, costlessly traded, competitive-numeraire sector, agriculture ($A$), distributed uniformly and immobile across space. In addition, it has a differentiated manufacturing sector ($M$), which is costly to trade and which uses industrial labor ($L$). The latter is internationally mobile but fixed in global supply. Krugman assumes that labor relocates to eliminate real-wage differences, and, although it does so only gradually, he is ultimately concerned only with the final outcomes. Assuming two identical countries, the latter comprise two possibilities—a diversified symmetric equilibrium, in which labor earns the same real wage in both locations, and a concentrated one, in which manufacturing clusters in one country and its workers earn more than they could in the other country even if a few manufacturing firms were to set up there. Which of these equilibria arises depends on, inter alia, the importance of manufacturing in demand (and hence in production and income generation), the costs of transportation, fixed costs, and the degree of product differentiation in manufacturing (the last two of which determine the extent of economies of scale). It also depends on history. One of the fundamental insights of this literature is that there is an area of the parameter space in which both sorts of equilibria exist and are stable, so that which one prevails depends on which prevailed as the economy entered that area. In the concentrated equilibrium, agriculturists also have higher real incomes in the industrialized country than they would under symmetry because, although agricultural nominal wages are fixed and equal across locations, the price of manufactures is lower in the industrialized country. The opposite applies to agriculturists in the deindustrialised country. It is important to note that this clustering depends on pecuniary externalities not technological spillovers.
If we reinterpret $A$ as the base economy (including agriculture and immobile, basic manufacturing and services), $M$ as foot-loose activities including the skill intensive, and $L$ as foot-loose and skilled labor, we would appear to have a potential model of a brain drain. It explains the existence of a brain drain, as well as its consequences, and does so without recourse to the technological spillovers between skilled workers usually assumed in brain drain models.

There are, however, a number of reservations to be noted. It is not clear why foot-loose goods should be subject to trading costs while basic ones are not, and, although the model can be adapted to allow the latter to have such costs (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999), doing so seems quite likely to make the concentrated (i.e., brain drain) equilibrium infeasible. Similarly if the high-skilled part of the economy is small, most demand is generated by the basic sector that is assumed to be immobile, and concentration is less likely. Additionally, the division between basic and foot-loose parts of the economy is problematic. If the latter is drawn narrowly in order to capture the high-skill element of the brain drain, it may be too small to generate agglomeration, while it is not obvious that the basic part of the economy will be free from tendencies to agglomerate. Agriculture may be “nailed down,” but basic manufacturing and services are not, and, as Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) show, agglomeration is feasible even without migration through backward- and forward-linkages among industrial firms. If, on the other hand, the foot-loose sector is large, the mobile labor flows will not be particularly highly skilled, and hence we start to lose the brain component of the brain drain story.

In sum, the economic-geography framework is too rarefied to be applied directly. Nonetheless, it offers a number of insights that may be of use in thinking about the brain drain. The critical parameter in exploring possible outcomes is the cost of trading $M$, which is now the skill-intensive sector. At very high costs, production must be located near consumption, and the world economy has a symmetric, diversified equilibrium. As trade costs fall, the concentrated equilibrium becomes feasible, at first, and then, at lower costs, unique. In the simple model, concentration remains the unique outcome right down to zero trade costs, but in more complex variants with diminishing returns (e.g., if $A$ also has trade costs or if there are additional locationally fixed factors), the concentrated equilibrium gives way to the symmetric one at positive levels of trade costs (possibly again with a range in which both types are feasible). If countries were initially perfectly identical, the model cannot predict which will end up with the concentration, but it is easy to see that tiny advantages for one country (technological, size, or historical) would make it the preferred location and leave it with all

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28. When the trade costs of $M$ are zero, location ceases to matter, so any other location equilibrium would be equally feasible.
the $M$ industry. Thus, if the world were characterized by improving communications for skill-intensive sectors, we could see a tendency for a brain drain from less- to more-favored countries to emerge and then eventually to reverse.

Of course, these are parables and possibilities rather than predictions. At present we have no feeling for what the critical values of trade costs are or where actual costs lie in the world. In addition, the models really need to be extended before they can be fitted to the real world. In particular, migration is unlikely to denude one country of skilled labor completely. One can avoid this in a number of modeling ways, but prominent among them would be to recognize that not everyone wants to move. Second, it is desirable to recognize the possibility of direct externalities in the agglomeration of skilled labor. Fortunately, extensions exist in both these dimensions. Third, the lags assumed in migratory flows are not consistent with fixed global supplies of skilled labor. Relaxing the last constraint is necessary for examining the training-incentive version of the beneficial brain drain, and it awaits attention.

Ludema and Wooton (1997) add preferences over location to the standard geography model. Not surprisingly, doing so makes the symmetric, diversified, equilibria more likely (feasible and unique for a larger range of trade costs) and allows the concentrated equilibrium to stop short of 100 percent concentration of $M$. This is clearly more realistic than the extremes we saw previously and increases the legitimacy of considering whether a brain drain can occur even in the absence of spillovers between skilled workers.

Externalities between skilled labor have not, to our knowledge, been explicitly added into the standard economic-geography model, but Baldwin and Forslid (2000) take a step in the right direction. In keeping with our interpretation of manufacturing as the skill-intensive sector, they postulate that each manufacturing enterprise needs a unit of capital, which is produced with skilled labor using a technology that involves positive learning-by-doing externalities. This combines geography with endogenous growth and thus comes closer to the traditional approach to the brain drain. It makes concentrated equilibria more likely but raises the possibility that a concentrated equilibrium is beneficial even for the deindustrialized country. The static losses (from geography) may be offset by the increase in the global growth rate resulting from the concentration of skilled workers in one place. For this to happen, one needs the technological spillovers to be (largely) national—if they were perfectly international, skilled workers would have equal productivity in capital goods wherever they were lo-

29. This capital lasts only one period, so it as if each manufacturing firm needs an extra input of skilled labor, but that input declines through time according to how much has been used for that purpose previously.
cated—and trade costs to be relatively low. Interestingly, in this model, the level of trade costs at which the growth effects offset the static losses is lower than that at which concentration occurs and hurts the deindustrialized country. That is, as trade costs fall, the deindustrializing country first experiences falls in welfare from losing its skilled labor and only subsequently benefits from the higher world-growth rate.

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\textbf{Comment}\hspace{1cm} Alan V. Deardorff

I learned a lot from this paper, which does an excellent job of providing an overview of the literature on the brain drain from less developed countries. Indeed, the paper by Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters does a better job than you might know from the presentation here, because Alan did not have time to cover all of it. I encourage all of you to read the paper, especially the sections that he was not able to get to. You will find it valuable.

I do not myself know much of this literature, and so I have to assume that the paper is complete in its coverage. I was struck, however, by the absence from the paper of a couple of things, things that I presume are also absent from the brain-drain literature.

First, I did not find in the paper, at least explicitly, two of the more obvious models that one might expect to be used to analyze a brain drain. I did not see, first, any use of the simplest supply-and-demand analysis of a labor market, even though I would have thought that to be the place to start in understanding a change in labor supply. No doubt this is implicit in the paper, and perhaps explicit in some of the papers reviewed, for I found it nec-

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necessary to keep such a model in my mind in order to understand many of the conceptual points that the paper made. Second, I saw no explicit reference to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade model, even though this too seems an obvious place to start for understanding a change in a labor endowment in general equilibrium. I will therefore devote my comment to relating some of the points of the paper to what these two sorts of model can help us with.

One thing that these models provide is a reminder of some of the market effects that a brain drain might be expected to have, and that also seemed to be neglected in the paper. The first, and presumably most important, is the effect of a brain drain on the local wage rate in the country of emigration. The second is the effect on world prices of traded goods, and thus on the terms of trade of that country. I will touch on both of these in turn.

**Effect on the LDC Wage**

To start then, consider figure 7C.1, which shows the simple supply and demand for skilled labor in a country, yielding in equilibrium the skilled wage, $w_s$. A brain drain is the departure from that market of a portion of the supply, shown as $\Delta M$, which migrates abroad presumably in expectation of a higher wage. The effect is to shift the supply curve to the left, as shown, raising the equilibrium wage. The standard welfare analysis of this change includes a gain to the remaining domestic workers of area $a$, but also a loss to everyone else in the country, whose concerns enter the market through the demand curve, as the larger area $a + b$. Thus, while the brain

![Fig. 7C.1 Brain drain in a competitive labor market](image-url)
drain in this case benefits the skilled workers who stay behind, the country as a whole loses.

All of this depends, of course, on the wage’s being able to rise. The paper’s first dip into the theory of the brain drain refers to Grubel and Scott (1966). This paper is not listed in the papers references, but it apparently disagrees with this result, perhaps for a reason I will get to below. Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters then turn with somewhat more detail to an analysis by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), who explicitly depart from this by assuming that the wage is set not by a market but by a labor union. If the union holds the wage fixed at above the market-equilibrium level, then the story is the different one shown in figure 7C.2. Here, the wage remains fixed at \( \bar{w}_s \), and although the brain drain again shifts the supply curve to the left, the effect now is simply to reduce unemployment, presumably generating no cost and only a benefit. This was only a starting point for Bhagwati and Hamada, however, who went on to allow, among other things, for the union to raise its wage demand so as to “emulate” the higher wage earned by the migrants. Thus, even while denying that the labor market clears, they included something like the market effect of raising the wage. I suspect that other stories could also be told to account for unemployment while also giving some scope for this market effect. I therefore view the simple message of figure 7C.1 as still worth retaining, even though LDCs do typically have lots of unemployment.

Another variation on the theme arises, however, if we imbed the labor

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Fig. 7C.2  Brain drain with a fixed union wage
market in a HO general equilibrium. Here, with given world prices and diversification, the factor-price-equalization (FPE) theorem implies a demand for labor that is not downward sloping throughout, but rather has a flat portion as shown in figure 7C.3. The limits of this flat are the bounds of the diversification cone, signifying that as long as the country remains diversified, then the withdrawal of labor due to the brain drain will not raise the equilibrium wage.

I suspect that this was the story told by Grubel and Scott (1966), but it clearly depends on much more than just perfect competition, with labor being paid its marginal product. It depends also on the remaining labor’s being reallocated across sectors so as to keep that marginal product constant in the face of the increased scarcity of skilled labor, something that is of course possible under the assumptions of the standard HO model with diversification. Unfortunately, it is also true under those assumptions that skilled labor would be earning the same wage abroad as it is at home, so that the simple economic motivation for the brain drain is lost. If instead we relax those assumptions enough to get a higher wage for skilled labor abroad than at home, perhaps by introducing an international difference in technologies, the implication of a flat portion in the labor demand curve may be lost as well. Thus again I find the simple analysis of figure 7C.1 to be worth retaining.

The Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters paper also discusses, in some detail, a model of heterogeneous labor supply in which a brain drain...
may induce additional workers in the LDC to acquire skill. This then has further dynamic implications for the country that are favorable in the context of an endogenous growth model, leading to the idea of a “beneficial brain drain.” In fact, one need not depart far from the picture of figure 7C.1 to get much of what that model suggests. First, the upward sloping labor supply curve in figure 7C.1 can easily represent heterogeneous workers, with more and more workers acquiring skill and thus supplying skilled labor as the wage rises. Thus the fact of heterogeneous labor does not interfere with the implication of the labor market that the departure of some skilled workers will raise the wage. Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters do not acknowledge that effect, either because they neglect the labor market or, more likely, because they assume that wages are fixed by one of the mechanisms above. But if in fact those mechanisms are absent or do not fully prevent wages from changing, then an increase in the wage is what we should expect. This is especially true in the case the authors stress, that of a brain drain with “selection” where only the most able workers are invited abroad. In their analysis of this case, this selection removes the incentive for other workers to acquire skill. However, without those lost workers, the market for skilled labor will not clear, the skilled wage will rise, and this rise in the wage will itself motivate more workers to become skilled. So their result of zero additional skill acquisition depends again on the implicit assumption that wages are somehow constant.

If wages rise, we do get more workers acquiring skill, but the welfare effects of this have several components. These include the gains to the workers and the losses to labor demanders noted in figure 7C.1, and in addition they may include the more dynamic benefits of skill acquisition that appear in the growth model. Without the complexity of a growth model, however, we can see the possibilities by simply adding an externality to the labor market so far considered. In figure 7C.4, suppose that every unit of skilled labor generates an externality $E$, measured up from the origin on the vertical axis. In general this externality could be negative, reflecting instead a cost of publicly subsidizing education, but I assume it here to be a benefit. This benefit could attach, as Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters discuss, to the presence of skilled labor within the country, in which case its total value is $E$ times the amount of labor actually employed. Or it could attach to the total amount of labor that has been trained, in which case it also includes $E$ times the amount of labor that has left the country down the brain drain. The additional effect of the brain drain due to the externality is therefore either for the total externality to fall from $c + d$ to $c$, or for it to rise from $c + d$ to $c + d + e$. A beneficial brain drain is therefore possible, but only if the externality is generated by the departing workers as well as remaining ones, and then only if this benefit exceeds the net loss of area $b$ already identified above.
Effect on the LDC Terms of Trade

All of this ignores another effect that a brain drain might have, especially if it involves a significant amount of skilled labor moving internationally: an effect on the terms of trade. This too is an effect that would not occur under the apparent assumptions of Grubel and Scott (1966), in the traditional HO trade model with FPE. In that model, countries need not be small in order for labor migration (or any movement of factors, for that matter) to leave world prices unchanged, so long as the movement is not large enough to move any country out of the diversification cone. Instead, outputs will expand and contract à la Rybczynski in both the country of emigration and the country of immigration by equal and opposite amounts, leaving world outputs unchanged. There will therefore be no need for world prices to change, since neither supply nor demand of any good has altered.

However, as already noted, in this world of FPE there would have been no incentive for labor to move in the first place, and we certainly would not observe the substantial differentials in wages of skilled labor between developed and developing countries that the authors document. To generate such differentials, we need to assume a different model, perhaps the HO model with specialization and/or multiple cones, or perhaps a model with different technologies in the two countries. A two-cone, two-factor, com-
A third factor could avoid this undesirable feature, but instead I will follow a very recent paper by Davis and Weinstein (2002), who note that it is not just one kind of labor, or even labor alone, that currently seems to move into the United States. Instead, there seem to be incentives for all three of the obvious factors of production—unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital—to migrate into the United States. This is consistent, they argue, only with some sort of difference in technology that makes all three factors more productive in the United States than abroad. And they go on to argue that, when a country attracts inflows of all three factors, then one should expect its terms of trade to turn against it. Indeed, they calculate, based on rather rough-and-ready estimates of parameters, that the presence of foreign-originating factors in the United States has, through terms-of-trade deterioration, cost the United States an amount that is comparable to the gains from recent trade liberalizations.

Their argument applies in reverse to countries other than the United States, including the developing countries and the brain drain. Specifically, assuming that factors are indeed more productive in the United States than in the developing world, then the outflow of skilled labor from the latter to the former will change U.S. outputs more than it changes LDC outputs, causing a net increase in world supply of goods the United States exports. This will force down the world price of U.S. exports and, conversely, raise the world price of LDC exports. Thus, once we allow for terms-of-trade effects, we do in the end find a case for a brain drain being beneficial.

References