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## Agricultural Interest Group Bargaining over the North American Free Trade Agreement

David Orden

This paper focuses on the attempts of U.S. agricultural interest groups to influence the outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was approved by Congress in November 1993. Agricultural issues have loomed large in world trade discussions since the earlier inception of the Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1986, and Canada and Mexico are important agricultural trade partners of the United States. For these reasons, the agricultural provisions of NAFTA became an important component of the agreement. Moreover, agricultural interests played a crucial role in the passage of the NAFTA implementing legislation. They were able to win concessions that protect U.S. sugar from Mexican competition and provide transition-period protection to winter fruits and vegetables, and that ensnared the United States in disputes about Canadian exports of wheat and peanut butter. With these concessions, the trade liberalization achieved under NAFTA has resulted in little reform of entrenched domestic agricultural support programs in the United States (or Canada) during the lengthy tariff phaseout periods.

To develop these points, the paper is organized as follows. A brief description of U.S. agricultural trade and support policies is provided, the approaches of the agricultural interest groups toward the negotiations between 1990 and 1992 are examined, and the provisions of the negotiated agreement and estimates of its likely impacts are reviewed. The focus then turns to the side agreements negotiated by the administration of President Bill Clinton after the 1992 elections, the activities of the agricultural interest groups during the con-

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gressional debate over the implementing legislation, and the final concessions offered to obtain support from agricultural interests. The concluding section addresses some issues raised by the NAFTA outcomes for agriculture.

### 7.1 Diversity within Agriculture

Agricultural production is only 3 percent of national output but is diffused among many diverse sectors. Grains and oilseeds account for one-fifth of the value of U.S. production, and livestock and poultry products for another one-fifth (International Trade Commission [ITC] 1993). A third group of commodities, important in the NAFTA context, is made up of horticultural products, and a final group are those commodities for which the United States has traditionally imposed import quotas under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 and its extensions (dairy products, cotton, peanuts, sugar and sugar-containing products).<sup>1</sup>

Grains and oilseeds are generally exported crops, while trade has been less important for livestock and poultry products and most fruits and vegetables (an exception is seasonal winter vegetables, for which imports have a 40 percent market share). Imports of dairy products, cotton, and peanuts have been restricted to less than 2 percent of domestic production, while sugar imports have fallen to 15 percent as domestic output has increased and corn sweeteners have captured a large share of the caloric sweeteners market. Less than 2 percent of dairy products are exported but exports account for more than 40 percent of U.S. cotton and 15 percent of the value of peanut production.<sup>2</sup>

Domestic policy interventions provide high levels of support for some export crops as well as for the Section 22 commodities (see, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] 1994). Support for export crops (including cotton) is provided through supply restrictions, direct payments to producers, floor prices ("loan rates") for government-supported storage, and some export subsidies. Livestock and poultry generally receive few direct support payments and relatively low levels of protection. The support and protection levels have also been relatively low for most fruits and vegetables.

Canada and Mexico are important to U.S. agricultural trade of a number of commodities. Canada produces over one-third of U.S. grain and oilseed imports, including essentially all imported wheat, barley, and soybeans. Canada also produces over 35 percent of U.S. livestock and poultry imports, almost one-third of U.S. imports of peanuts and peanut products, and over one-fourth of imported sugar-containing products. Mexico produces over 90 percent of

1. Section 22 authorizes trade restrictions when imports "render ineffective or materially interfere with" domestic supply-control and price-support programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

2. Dairy products are priced above world levels and are exported with subsidies. Peanut exports arise from a two-tier pricing scheme that allows sales at lower world price levels of U.S. peanuts beyond a quantity produced for the domestic market.

imported winter fruits and vegetables and over 10 percent of livestock imports. Canada and Mexico each account for over 15 percent of the value of U.S. livestock and poultry exports and Mexico receives over one-third of U.S. dairy exports.

## 7.2 Interest Group Approaches to the Negotiations

When the Mexico-U.S. free trade negotiations were announced in June 1990, President Carlos Salinas and President George Bush articulated a broad mandate for reducing bilateral trade barriers and supporting Mexican reforms in agriculture and other sectors. Nevertheless, there was considerable uncertainty about the extent to which agriculture would be included under the mandate for trade liberalization. This uncertainty was created in part by the high levels of protection provided to many commodities in Mexico and the United States. The subsequent entry of Canada into the negotiations added to the uncertainty, since nontariff trade barriers had not been removed in the 1988 Canada-U.S. trade agreement, as described by Miner (1993). Finally, the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations, which had originally been scheduled to conclude in 1990, remained deadlocked on agriculture.

Faced with all this uncertainty, agricultural interest groups took active roles in seeking to shape the provisions of NAFTA. Among the supporters of relatively comprehensive liberalization were the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Corn Growers Association, numerous other grain, oilseed, and livestock associations, and many processing industries.<sup>3</sup>

Opponents of liberalization included the National Farmers Union, wheat producers (raising concerns about transportation subsidies and the nontransparency of the pricing policies of the monopolistic Canadian Wheat Board), and protected peanut, sugar, and citrus and other winter fruit and vegetable producers. A strong coalition emerged among the Florida sugar and fruit and vegetable interests. They developed a unified position with the Florida Farm Bureau and the Florida Cattleman's Association (both eventually broke ranks with their national organizations' support for NAFTA), and the state commissioner of agriculture became an active proponent of their concerns. No similar coalition arose among the Section 22 commodities in general because the dairy and cotton sectors (with current or potential export interests in Mexico) remained less opposed than sugar and peanuts to trade liberalization on a bilateral basis.

3. Descriptions of the positions and activities of the various interest groups are based largely on interviews with representatives of twenty-two of the groups most involved in the negotiations and congressional deliberations, as well as with negotiators and others. These interviews were conducted between August and November 1993. Some initial evaluations of NAFTA by representatives of the agricultural interests are also summarized in the reports of the Agricultural Trade Policy Advisory Committee and the Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees.

### 7.3 Agricultural Provisions of NAFTA

High-level negotiators for Mexico and the United States agreed in February 1992 that all agricultural products would be included in the long-run provisions for trade liberalization. Canada resisted participation in an agreement of such broad scope for agriculture. It agreed only to negotiate extension to Mexico of the limited provisions similar to those of the 1988 Canada-U.S. agreement.

The negotiating parties announced that they had reached a conclusion to their discussions in August. For Mexico and the United States, the agricultural tariff and market access provisions called for the conversion of all nontariff barriers to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Under the TRQs, limited quantities of commodities would receive access under low or zero duties, while imports above these quantities would be subject to over-quota tariffs set to provide initial protection equivalent to the previous nontariff measures. The over-quota tariffs were to be phased out over adjustment periods of ten to fifteen years (see U.S. House of Representatives 1993).

The long-run NAFTA provisions for agriculture accomplished the basic objectives with respect to trade barriers of the broader 1987 U.S. "zero-option" GATT proposal for elimination of trade-distorting border measures and support policies. This result led Hufbauer and Schott (1993), for example, to conclude that there was "laudable progress in the liberalization of farm trade barriers."

One cannot be as sanguine about the short-run NAFTA provisions for agriculture. For the commodities protected by import quotas or licenses, market access levels under the initial TRQs were based on 1989 to 1991 trade quantities and were scheduled to increase at only a 3 percent annual compound rate. Over-quota tariffs provided high levels of protection against additional imports in the short and medium run. Corn, dry edible beans, milk powder, and peanuts were considered particularly sensitive commodities and received fifteen-year adjustment periods.

Intense negotiations also focused on complex protective TRQ transition mechanisms for sugar: Mexico agreed to raise its external sugar tariff to the preexisting U.S. over-quota level by the seventh year of the agreement and subsequently gained potentially unlimited access to the U.S. market if it achieved a net production surplus. Special tariff phaseout and TRQ mechanisms were also developed for citrus and other horticultural products.

The influence of various producer groups on the negotiations is evident from the NAFTA transition mechanisms for agricultural trade. Within the framework of long-run liberalization, likely gainers among U.S. producers confront the lengthy adjustment mechanisms included to protect Mexican farmers. Import-competing U.S. commodities are provided with similar adjustment protection. Given these provisions, the end constraint of complete tariff elimination is crucial to the assertion that the negotiated provisions accomplished long-run bilateral trade liberalization for agriculture.

#### **7.4 Estimated Impacts of the Agreement**

Among the quantitative studies of the long-run effects of NAFTA on Mexican-U.S. agricultural trade, Grennes and Krissoff (1993) estimated that U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico (primarily grains, oilseeds, and livestock products) would increase by \$485 million annually, and agricultural imports from Mexico by \$164 million (primarily horticultural commodities and live cattle). The USDA Office of Economics (1993) asserted a more positive view of NAFTA's potentially beneficial impacts. Incorporating projected demand effects resulting from an increase due to NAFTA of 0.5 percent in Mexico's annual economic growth, the USDA concluded that agricultural exports to Mexico were likely to be more than \$2.5 billion higher annually with NAFTA by the end of the fifteen-year adjustment period, while imports of agricultural products from Mexico would increase by \$500 to \$600 million.

#### **7.5 Side Agreements and Implementing Legislation**

After the November 1992 election, the Clinton administration followed through on its campaign pledge to negotiate supplemental (side) agreements with respect to the environment, labor, and import surges. The change in administration gave the agricultural commodity groups that had sought limits on NAFTA's trade-liberalizing provisions the opportunity for a second hearing. In particular, the concerns of the sugar producers were acknowledged by the designated United States trade representative, Mickey Kantor. As early as his January 1993 preconfirmation hearings, he pointed out that the side agreement on import surges would "affect agriculture and particularly be protective, we hope, of the sugar industry" (U.S. Senate 1993). Despite such assurances, the side agreement on import surges that was negotiated by the Clinton administration did not achieve the types of changes in the initial NAFTA provisions sought by some agricultural producer groups.

Faced with growing opposition, President Clinton used a September 1993 signing ceremony for the side agreements to launch an intense campaign for passage by Congress of implementing legislation for NAFTA. Agricultural interest groups played an active role in the ensuing congressional debate.

Among supporters of the agreement, an umbrella support organization called Ag for NAFTA was formed and eventually claimed over 140 member organizations. In addition, the American Farm Bureau Federation and many of the specific commodity associations devoted staff and resources to support passage of the implementing legislation. However, the scale of their activities was relatively modest compared to the widespread efforts among interested parties (see, for example, Grayson 1993). Ag for NAFTA had an initial budget of about \$10,000 and its final budget for publicity, advertising, and other expenses was less than \$100,000.

The commodities receiving Section 22 protection pursued separate ap-

proaches to the implementing legislation based on the particular circumstances of each sector. The National Milk Producers Federation adopted a position of support for the agreement during the summer of 1993 and the National Cotton Council of America endorsed NAFTA in October.

Opponents of NAFTA also continued to mobilize around the implementing legislation. The National Farmers Union made defeat of NAFTA one of its top priorities and was a founding member of the opponents' Citizens Trade Campaign. While not formally aligned with third-party presidential aspirant Ross Perot, who was an active NAFTA opponent, representatives of the farmers union believed he had reduced the prospects for the approval of the agreement.

Among specific commodity groups opposing the agreement, wheat producers continued their break with the other export-oriented grains and held out for resolution of the issues of Canadian transportation subsidies and Wheat Board price transparency.<sup>4</sup> In exchange for their support for NAFTA, the wheat producers sought emergency action under Section 22. This would have allowed the Clinton administration to impose immediate quotas or tariffs on grain imported from Canada rather than await the outcome of an investigation and ruling by the ITC.

Peanut and sugar producer groups also remained opposed to the NAFTA provisions. The sugar producers sought two modifications of the initial agreement: inclusion of corn sweeteners in determining the balance of production and consumption affecting Mexican access to the U.S. sugar market and a ceiling on Mexico's access for the full fifteen-year adjustment period. The sugar producers lobbied the USDA and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and pressed their case through the Senate sweeteners caucus. They viewed the USTR as sympathetic to their interests but nevertheless committed \$500,000 to a campaign to "go hell bent to defeat NAFTA" if the agreement was not revised. Their demands, of course, brought into sharp focus the competing interests of different commodity groups within U.S. agriculture, as well as the relative strength of the Mexican and U.S. negotiating positions.

The Florida coalition, working along commodity lines and through the unified position among agricultural groups within the state, also pressed for further accommodations for sugar, citrus, and other winter fruits and vegetables. The Florida agricultural producers, worked closely with the state's congressional delegation of ten Democrats and thirteen Republicans, which throughout the congressional deliberations almost entirely remained on record as opposed to the agreement.

4. While the wheat growers were clamoring about Canadian policies, the flow of wheat into the United States resulted as much from the U.S. export subsidies discussed by Bruce Gardner in chapter 6 of this volume.

## 7.6 End Game Concessions

With the fate of NAFTA uncertain as the November 17 vote in the House of Representatives approached, the agricultural commodity groups were positioned to win various concessions. Unlike organized labor and others committed to the defeat of the agreement, most of the agricultural commodity groups had limited their opposition to specific provisions. Moreover, a relatively large number of congressional votes rested at least in part on satisfying the concerns of the agricultural producers.

The end game exploded into public view in early November. Concessions obtained for agriculture in the last two weeks of the debate are summarized in table 7.1.

### 7.6.1 Initial Concessions

An initial November 3 letter from the U.S. trade representative to Mexico's secretary of commerce indicated that the United States would seek a mutual agreement on accelerated tariff reductions for wine and brandy (USTR 1993). A second and more significant letter confirmed the USTR's understanding that the two parties had recognized that substitution of corn syrup for sugar could "result in effects not intended by either Party" and therefore agreed that consumption of corn syrup would be included in the determination of Mexico's net production surplus. The letter also indicated that notwithstanding previous provisions, Mexican sugar sales in the United States under NAFTA would be capped at 250,000 metric tons through a fifteen-year adjustment period. In short, Mexico had conceded to the demands of the U.S. sugar producers. Subsequently, the sugar industry indicated that it had withdrawn its opposition to NAFTA, a decision expected to influence at least a dozen votes in the House of Representatives.

A third letter between the U.S. and Mexican negotiators addressed the issues raised by the Florida citrus industry. It specified an explicit price-based tariff snapback for citrus. Under the snapback, the United States would apply the prevailing most-favored-nation (MFN) rate of duty on imports from Mexico in excess of specific quantities if the price of fresh concentrated orange juice dropped below an average based on the preceding five years for five consecutive days.

In addition to this modest change from the original NAFTA text, the citrus producers had bargained for several other concessions: that tariffs on all forms of fresh and processed citrus products would receive the minimum 15 percent cut under the still-pending Uruguay Round GATT, that non-NAFTA citrus juices would be reclassified as perishable commodities under U.S. law (expediting future injury claims by the industry), and that foreign citrus products would not receive additional special status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The board of direc-



**Table 7.1** Final NAFTA Concessions and Assurances to Agricultural Interests

Wine/brandy	United States to seek mutual agreement to accelerated tariff reductions
Sugar	Consumption of corn sweeteners included in the determination of net production surplus Mexican TRQ capped at 250,000 metric tons for the seventh through fourteenth years of the agreement
Citrus	Most-favored-nation rate of duty on imports from Mexico in excess of 70 million gallons annually through 2002 (90 million gallons during 2003–2007) if the price of fresh concentrated orange juice drops below an average based on the preceding five years for five consecutive days GATT tariff cuts on fresh and processed citrus products limited to 15 percent Non-NAFTA citrus juices to be reclassified as perishable commodities to expedite injury claims Citrus products not to receive additional special status under the GSP or the CBI
Fruits and vegetables	Early warning import-surge mechanism GATT tariff cuts limited to 15 percent on tomatoes, peppers, lettuce, cucumbers, celery, and sweet corn Sensitive products not to receive additional special status under the GSP or the CBI Postponement of decertification of methyl bromide for use as a soil fumigant until 2000 Funding for soil and postharvest fumigant research; completion and funding for U.S. Horticultural Research Station, Fort Pierce, Florida Doubled purchases of fresh tomatoes and new purchases of sweet corn for school lunch programs Trade representative assurance of effective price-based and volume-based tariff snapback provisions for fresh tomatoes and peppers
Wheat	End-use certificates to prevent subsidized reexport of Canadian wheat and barley Bilateral consultations to address transportation subsidies and Canadian Wheat Board pricing practices and an ITC investigation of whether imports interfere with the domestic wheat program within sixty days unless the consultations were successful
Peanuts	Bilateral consultations to address the increase in imports of peanut butter/paste from Canada and an ITC investigation of whether imports interfere with the domestic peanut program within sixty days unless the consultations were successful Secretary of agriculture assurance to work vigorously to limit the volume of imports from Canada
Transshipment	Commissioner of customs assurance of at least ten investigations and 350 positions, including 100 new hires, to enforce rules of origin

tors of Florida Citrus Mutual voted to withdraw their opposition to the agreement on November 10 based on these concessions.

As the anti-NAFTA Florida coalition collapsed, other Florida fruit and vegetable producers also sought accommodations. The administration agreed to a range of concessions that included the use of an early warning import-surge mechanism; limits for certain commodities with respect to GATT, the GSP, and the CBI similar to those offered for citrus; an environmentally controversial postponement of decertification and methyl bromide for use as a soil fumigant;

funding for research on soil treatment and postharvest fumigation; and an agreement to increase purchases of fresh tomatoes and sweet corn for school lunch programs. The board of directors of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association withdrew its opposition to NAFTA on November 11.

### 7.6.2 Final Deals

Passage of the implementing legislation remained uncertain less than a week before the scheduled congressional vote, so the administration and its supporters could not relax their efforts. Ag for NAFTA brought fifty to sixty leaders of various member organizations to Washington to lobby, but the real action was with the groups that had been or remained opposed to NAFTA.

The wheat producers engaged in tense late-deal bargaining. Their hope for emergency Section 22 quotas or tariffs was scuttled when, by several accounts, the administration determined that they could not influence many votes. On November 15, however, the president agreed to partially accommodate the producers: he asked that the ITC investigate whether imports from Canada were interfering with U.S. wheat support programs, unless there were successful bilateral negotiations on Canadian policies within sixty days. With this concession, the National Association of Wheat Growers announced, less than thirty-six hours before the House vote, that it would “now work for congressional approval of NAFTA.” Five congressmen cited the Wheat Growers’ position in support of their final decisions to vote for the implementing legislation.

One of these representatives, Representative Glenn English, was also concerned about illegal transshipment of peanuts and beef through Mexico. To address the continuing opposition to NAFTA by peanut producers and English’s concerns, the president committed the administration to bilateral consultations on imports of peanut butter from Canada and to a second ITC investigation within sixty days if necessary. English was assured by the commissioner of customs that there would be “at least ten visits to agricultural processing sites in Mexico,” and that “350 positions, including 100 newly hired employees,” would be assigned to enforce the NAFTA rules of origin.

Final critical decisions were made by the Florida congressional delegation, which held a closed-door meeting on November 16. Although there may already have been several closet votes for NAFTA, an Associated Press poll had counted only five of the twenty-three members of the delegation as supporting or leaning toward supporting the agreement on the previous day. A pivotal senior member of the Florida delegation was Representative Tom Lewis, who served on the House Committee on Agriculture. To assure Lewis about his concerns required an additional letter from Mickey Kantor specifying that NAFTA contained “effective price and volume-based snapback provisions to deal with increased imports of fresh tomatoes and peppers.” The next day, Lewis and twelve other members of the Florida delegation voted with the ad-

ministration. The NAFTA implementing legislation passed in the House of Representatives by a 234 to 200 majority.<sup>5</sup>

### 7.7 Conclusions from the NAFTA Outcomes

In drawing inferences about the political economy of trade protection on the basis of the influence of U.S. agricultural groups on the NAFTA negotiations and implementing legislation, a crucial issue is the extent to which a mechanism was provided for overcoming established protection among agricultural sectors and expanding international markets. The decision to seek long-run liberalization of Mexican-U.S. agricultural trade under NAFTA established a strong objective compared to the limited provisions for agriculture in previous bilateral trade agreements and the significant weakening of the U.S. zero-option proposal in the Uruguay-Round GATT negotiations.<sup>6</sup> The subsequent NAFTA provisions for long-run trade liberalization remained largely intact even with the grueling congressional debate. Many of the concessions offered to U.S. agricultural interest groups weaken the NAFTA transition-period provisions only marginally, and other acknowledged concessions to the interest groups are also relatively minor.

This said, the notion that a trade agreement can serve as an avenue for reform of entrenched domestic U.S. agricultural programs fared poorly under NAFTA. Among the protected U.S. commodities, dairy and cotton came to support the Mexican-U.S. agreement only when strong rules of origin were adopted and the absence of any threat to their domestic markets became apparent. Peanut producers fought hard against the agreement and battled in the end for several concessions to sustain their protection.

More egregious than the dairy, cotton, and peanut provisions, NAFTA initially created a trade-diverting common sugar market between Mexico and the United States. The subsequent concessions to U.S. sugar interests exacerbated

5. In addition to the confirmed concessions, there were rumors in the press that the administration would back away from its intention to raise grazing fees on federal lands and that the proposed increase in the cigarette tax to finance health care reform might be scaled back in exchange for support for NAFTA (*Wall Street Journal* 1993a, 1993b). A possible deal that did not seem to be under consideration (despite the importance of the Florida delegation) would have linked the NAFTA vote to stalled negotiations between the government and sugar and fruit and vegetable producers as they sought an out-of-court settlement on a program to restore the Everglades by reducing agricultural runoff. Whatever the NAFTA deals, health care reform failed to come to a vote in the 103rd Congress and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt withdrew his proposal to raise grazing fees in December 1994.

6. The Uruguay Round GATT negotiations were finally concluded in December 1993 and Congress approved legislation implementing the agreement in December 1994. The final agreement for agriculture includes provisions for replacing quantitative restrictions, such as Section 22 quotas, with TRQs and for lowering all tariffs by an average of 36 percent over six years. The agreement also reduces but does not eliminate export subsidies, and caps some domestic support payments to farmers. See Sanderson (1994) and International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (1994) for further discussion.

the initial distortion by essentially stealing from the Mexican producers some of their potential market opportunity while enhancing the potential demand facing U.S. producers. The concessions obtained gutted the agreement for freer bilateral trade, albeit within a protected common market, for at least the next fifteen years. They also raise the question of whether the agreement to allow unrestricted trade in sugar between Mexico and the United States after fifteen years is ultimately credible.

The differences in the NAFTA outcomes with Mexico compared to Canada are also telling. The U.S. export producer groups were successful with respect to Mexico, which has opened itself to substantial reform of its agricultural policies. Mexican agricultural producer groups that might have benefitted from a stronger agreement in terms of their own export opportunities had only limited countervailing power against the pressure for concessions by import-protected U.S. producers. To insure NAFTA's approval, the U.S. government succeeded in pressing these concessions on the Mexican government.

With Canada the story is different. Throughout the NAFTA process, import-competing Canadian agricultural producers were more effective in defending their established protection than the Mexican producers. Canada's participation in NAFTA was largely ignored in the United States except by a few special interests. But to insure passage of the implementing legislation, the Clinton administration made unilateral promises to several U.S. agricultural commodity groups about their perceived grievances over imports from Canada. Thus one outcome of the process was that it prolonged the disputes between the United States and Canada over wheat, peanut butter, and other products.

Given the focus on Mexico in the public NAFTA debate, the unresolved issues with Canada are a surprising outcome. Subsequent to NAFTA's enactment, the United States offered to settle the agricultural trade disputes with Canada by adopting bilateral free trade in agricultural products. When this offer was declined, the United States reached a bilateral agreement with Canada for temporary trade restrictions on wheat and imposed a global TRQ on peanut butter in its final Uruguay Round GATT tariff schedule. Thus, post-NAFTA agricultural trade between Canada and the United States ends up more laded with barriers than before.

On a somewhat different theme, the bargaining power that agricultural groups held toward the end of the NAFTA debate is striking. The agricultural interest groups were well positioned to bargain for concessions because they sought modifications of specific provisions but did not oppose the entire agreement. The concerns of sugar, the Florida coalition, peanuts, or wheat mattered to the outcome of close to thirty congressional votes.

The question that arises is why other groups didn't do more to put themselves in such a position. The concessions made to agriculture toward the end of the debate were not the only concessions offered by the Clinton administration. One wonders, for example, why the AFL-CIO didn't approach the president

with concerns about specific industries and seek additional transition-period protection in these areas in exchange for delivering their support for the agreement. One can imagine a very different coalition having been put together to pass the implementing legislation in such circumstances. Agricultural interests could have found themselves irrelevant to the congressional vote, leaving the sugar and wheat producers to make their case elsewhere. Curiously, one doubts these parties to last-minute concessions were the intended beneficiaries of organized labor's political efforts.

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