Over the past decade, a major portion of empirical economic research has been based on what have come to be known as social experiments. Primary examples include a series of income-maintenance experiments, a housing-allowance demand experiment, several electricity-pricing experiments, and a health-insurance experiment. Much of our discussion in this paper is motivated by the income-maintenance experiments but it draws from our experience with the housing-allowance and electricity experiments as well.

The goal of this paper is to set forth general guidelines that we believe would enhance the usefulness of future social experiments and to suggest ways of correcting for their inherent limitations. Our conclusion and results can be summarized briefly.

Although the major motivation for an experiment is to overcome the inherent limitations of structural econometric models, in many instances the experimental designs have subverted this motivation. The primary advantages of randomized controlled experiments were often lost. In particular, in large measure it was impossible to estimate an experimental effect using straightforward analysis-of-variance methods, as a standard experimental design would suggest. Rather, a careful analysis of the results often required complicated structural models based on strong model-specification assumptions, the necessity for which an experiment should be designed to obviate. Section 5.1 provides a simple explanation of this goal and is intended to motivate the remainder of the paper.
The major complication for the analysis of the experiments was induced by an endogenous-sample-selection and treatment-assignment procedure that selected the experimental participants and assigned them to control versus treatment groups partly on the basis of an outcome variable whose change the experiments were intended to measure. To overcome at the time of the experimental results' analysis the complications caused by the endogenous sample selection and treatment assignment required rather complex statistical techniques and detracted greatly from the simplicity we believe should be a goal of experimental designs.

We propose that to overcome these difficulties, an experimental design should as nearly as possible allow analysis based on a simple analysis-of-variance model. This would mean that sample selection and treatment assignment should be based on randomization and that stratification on response variables should be avoided.

Although complexities attendant to endogenous stratification can be avoided, there are inherent limitations of the experiments that cannot be. Two major ones are self-determination of participation and self-selection out through attrition. But these problems, we believe, can be corrected for with relative ease if endogenous stratification is eliminated.

Finally, we propose that as a guiding principle, the experiments should have as a first priority the precise estimation of a single or a small number of treatment effects. The experiments to date have in general been hampered by a large number of treatments together with small sample sizes so that no single treatment could be estimated accurately.

Following the motivation in section 5.1, we have elaborated in section 5.2 these several general guidelines that we believe would enhance the effectiveness of future experiments. The problem of endogenous stratification and a way of avoiding it are set forth in section 5.3. A method of correcting for the inherent self-selection problems of social experiments is suggested in section 5.4.

5.1 Unbiased Estimates, Structural Models, and Randomization

Obtaining unbiased estimates is the major motivation for a large portion of econometric theory and for the application of econometric techniques in empirical analysis. Econometricians generally have in mind a model of the form

\[ Y = f(X, \epsilon), \]

where \( X \) represents measured and \( \epsilon \) unmeasured determinants of \( Y \). The goal is to estimate the effects of the elements of \( X \) on \( Y \). A common specification of \( f \) in equation (1) is

\[ Y = X\beta + \epsilon, \]
where $\beta$ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with each element of $\beta$ measuring the effect on $Y$ of a unit change in the corresponding element of $X$.

The guiding principle for econometricians is that simple estimation techniques (e.g., least squares) will yield unbiased estimates of $\beta$ if $X$ is uncorrelated with $\epsilon$. "Unbiased" is understood to mean and is indeed defined to mean an unbiased estimate of the "causal" effect of $X$ on $Y$—the understood definition of $\beta$ in much, but not all, of econometric analysis. But although the principle is demonstrably true in theory, it is often difficult to approximate in practice and its existence impossible to verify without reservation. Nonetheless, the goal remains.

To move toward it, econometricians use two general modes of reasoning. One is economic theory that restricts the function form of $f$, although usually only within broad bounds. The other is statistical theory that in large part prescribes methods to correct for correlation between $X$ and $\epsilon$, and thus obtaining unbiased estimates of $\beta$. The combination of economic and statistical theory often leads—at least in the abstract—to specification and estimation of structural models. Structural models can be thought of as those in which the parameters have a causal interpretation, with the concomitant property that if unbiased estimates of them are obtained they also could be given a causal interpretation. But although theoretical prescription of models and their empirical estimation can restrict the form of $f$, they can do so only within limits. The estimates must be interpreted within the constraints implicit in the assumptions that underlie them. In particular, it is usually not possible to know for sure that $X$ is uncorrelated with $\epsilon$, or if not, that corrections have been made for correlations that exist.

A response to this dilemma is to choose selected values of $X$ in such a way that they are by design uncorrelated with other determinants of $Y$, thus allowing unbiased estimation of the corresponding values of $\beta$. This technique is randomization, and it is most often employed within the context of a randomized controlled experiment. For purposes of exposition we shall henceforth use as an example an estimation of the effects of income-maintenance plans—taxes and guarantees—on earnings.

Suppose that the plan is $T$, called the treatment, and that earnings depend on $T$, on other measured variables $X$, and on unmeasured determinants $\epsilon$ according to

$$Y = \beta_1 T + f(X, \epsilon).$$

If individuals (more often families) are chosen at random from the population and assigned values of $T$, in large samples $T$ will be uncorrelated with $\epsilon$ and with $X$ as well. Then simple least-squares analysis-of-variance estimation of the model

$$Y = \beta_1 T + \eta,$$
where η is equal to f and treated as a disturbance term in this model, will yield unbiased estimates of β.

The primary motivation for this approach is to circumvent the uncertainties inherent in the assumptions of structural econometric models by constructing T in such a way that it is uncorrelated with other determinants of Y, thus by construction assuring unbiased estimation of β₁.

We have set forth these possibly oversimplified ideas to serve as background and motivation for our subsequent discussion. In particular, it is important to keep in mind the motivation for randomized controlled experiments. Although in the large social experiments we believe it is impossible to create the theoretical paradigm of such an experiment, the paradigm should serve as a guide to their designs as well as to the analysis of their results—much as the theoretical goal of Xs uncorrelated with error terms serves as a guide to empirical analysis based on nonexperimental data. We shall argue, for example, that the use of complex structural models to analyze the data from social experiments, or experimental designs that require such models or depend in large part on structural-model assumptions, are often in contradiction to the primary motivation for the experiments and thus subvert their intent; they are often inconsistent with the raison d'être of experiments. We will elaborate on this and other general propositions in the next section.

5.2 General Goals and Guiding Propositions

With the powerful advantage of hindsight, and aided by our part in the analysis of social experiments to date, we shall set forth several propositions that will enhance the value of future experiments. To do this we will explain what we believe to be the major inherent limitations of such experiments. The primary ones are self-determination of experimental participation and self-determination of withdrawal from the experiment. These limitations can be corrected for, and some suggestions for doing so are contained in the following sections. Other design characteristics of the experiments to date unnecessarily complicate their analysis and in particular make it much more difficult to correct for their inherent limitations. The primary design feature of this type is stratification on endogenous variables. We will address this question first, then turn to a discussion of inherent limitations, and then address other principles that we believe should guide future experimental designs.

5.2.1 Stratification on Endogenous Variables

As described in the previous section, the reason for an experiment is, by randomization, to eliminate correlation between the treatment variable and other determinants of the response variable that is under study. In each of the income-maintenance experiments, however, the ex-
Experimental sample was selected in part on the basis of the dependent variable, and the assignment to treatment versus control group was based in part on the dependent variable as well. In general, the group eligible for selection—based on family status, race, age of family head, etc.—was stratified on the basis of income (and other variables), and persons were selected from within the strata. In the New Jersey experiment, persons with incomes greater than 1.5 times the poverty level were excluded altogether. In the other experiments, the stratification on income was less complete, but as a result a bit more complicated. Assignment to control versus treatment group was also based in part on income. Whether the outcome of interest is income or hours worked, which is a component of income, such a procedure induces correlation between right-hand variables, including the treatment effect, and unmeasured determinants of income. Thus it is not straightforward to obtain unbiased estimates of treatment effects using simple analysis-of-variance or -covariance techniques.

Theoretically, an elaborate analysis of variance procedure that allowed for estimation of separate treatment effects within each strata would yield unbiased estimates. But because the strata were so numerous, the treatments so many, and the sample sizes relatively small, this method of analysis was impractical because reasonably precise estimates of treatment effects could not be obtained. Thus to correct for endogenous stratification and treatment assignment required rather complicated models (Hausman and Wise 1977, 1979, 1980).

Analysis of experimental results based on such techniques has at least two major shortcomings. First, it is relatively complicated—requiring nonlinear maximum-likelihood estimation for example. This is a shortcoming in itself, but seems especially troublesome in the context of an experiment one of whose major advantages presumably is simplicity. Second, and more important, it necessitates the imposition of functional-form constraints. The models proposed by Hausman and Wise are generally structural in spirit, and in particular require distributional assumptions against which the results may not be robust. To correct for endogenous stratification, for example, requires analysis based on truncated distributions in which the distribution assumed is necessarily a key component. Since the primary advantage of an experiment presumably is to lessen or avoid the necessity for such assumptions, it seems contradictory to design experiments whose effects cannot be evaluated accurately without them.

The elimination of stratification on endogenous variables would avoid this source of complication. The most straightforward procedure would be to randomly select an experimental group from the population and randomly assign these selected to control or treatment status, without consideration of income or other endogenous variables. Two major
objections to such a procedure are cost and political feasibility. Indeed the two are not unrelated. Most seriously considered income-support programs are intended to guarantee a minimum income to families who would otherwise have relatively low incomes. And presumably it is primarily this group whose labor supply and earnings would be affected by the plan. Nonetheless, it has been difficult to obtain funds for experimental programs that guaranteed support for higher-income families, even though under most plans payments to this group would be small, since their earnings would be unlikely to fall below the “breakeven” point at which payments are zero. In addition, if it is important to obtain a “good” estimate of the effect of the program on low-income families, then it is necessary to have a large enough number of low-income families to do so. Of course a large random sample from the population would also provide a large number of low-income families, but larger sample sizes increase the cost of the experiment.

We do not present numbers on the marginal cost of an additional experimental family. Preliminary investigation, however, suggests that it is small relative to the fixed costs of running an experiment. Suppose that, for whatever reason, it is not feasible to select a random sample from the population. We propose in this case that the sample be as random as possible. That is, randomly select persons with incomes below a given level, without endogenous stratification within this group. But what should be the measure of income that determines eligibility?

We have proposed in section 5.3—after a more detailed description of the endogenous stratification problem—a method for selecting the experimental group, based on predicted income, in such a way that the stratification is not endogenous.

5.2.2 Inherent Limitations on Random Sample Selection

We have argued that endogenous stratification procedures unduly complicate the analysis of experimental results and that procedures that avoid such stratification would be preferable. Nonetheless, there are inherent limitations on randomization in social experiments. It is surely impossible to attain the theoretical paradigm of a randomized controlled experiment. There are at least two major reason for this problem, both involving individual self-selection.

One reason is that persons cannot in general be made to participate in an experiment if selected by a random procedure. Some of those randomly selected will participate while others will not. If the individual-participation decision is related to the effect that the treatment would have on individuals, then the estimated treatment effect will be a biased estimate of the effect to be expected if the treatment were instituted as a program applying to the entire population.
The 1954 Salk-vaccine experiment provides a good example of this effect. There were two primary versions of the experimental design. In the "placebo control" areas, children who agreed to be inoculated (or, more accurately, whose parents agreed to the inoculation) were randomly assigned to the vaccine group or to the placebo group. In the "observed control" area, second-grade children who agreed to inoculation received the vaccine, while first and third graders served as the control group. Selected results are shown in table 5.1.

Children in the placebo control areas who were not inoculated contracted polio at a rate of \( \frac{54}{100,000} \). The comparable figure for children who participated in the experiment was \( \frac{81}{100,000} \), the rate for those who participated and received the placebo. Similarly in the observed control areas, second-grade children who were not inoculated had a substantially lower rate (53), than the rate for the control group (61). Thus apparently children who were more likely to contract polio, and thus more likely to be helped by the vaccine, were more likely to participate in the experiment. This tends to exaggerate the effect of the vaccine. For example, one might conclude on the basis of the vaccinated and control groups in the observed control areas that the vaccine reduced the rate from 61 to 34. But apparently the rate for all children would have been less than 61 without the vaccine. It is of course apparent from this data that the vaccine was effective, regardless of this uncertainty about the magnitude of the effect. But if the effect had been less clear, this self-determination of participation could have led to considerable uncertainty about desirability of universal inoculation.

A similar effect was apparent in the recent housing-allowance-demand experiment. Because of the nature of the primary experimental allowance, many families could benefit under the allowance plan only if they

### Table 5.1 Reported Cases of Poliomyelitis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Group</th>
<th>Study Population</th>
<th>All Reported Cases per 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Placebo control areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccinated</td>
<td>200,745</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placebo</td>
<td>201,229</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not inoculated</td>
<td>338,778</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed control areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccinated</td>
<td>221,998</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>725,173</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second graders not inoculated</td>
<td>123,605</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Meier 1978, table 2, p. 11).*
were willing to move. It seems apparent from subsequent analysis that of low-income renters who were asked to participate in the experiment, those who were less adverse to moving were more likely to participate in the experiment (see Venti and Wise 1982). Thus the estimated experimental effect tended to exaggerate the increase in rent that would be induced by the allowance where it applied to all low-income renters.

We have suggested in section 5.4 a procedure that we believe could be used to correct for this potential bias, assuming that the self-selection cannot be avoided.

The other form of self-selection is attrition from the experimental sample, once a sample has been selected. Again, the problem is that determinants of dropping out may be related to the experimental response that would otherwise be observed. For example, persons who are not affected by the treatment, possibly because they have high incomes for example, may be more likely to drop out than those who are affected and thus receive higher payments. This is the problem addressed by Hausman and Wise (1979).

If the experimental design is not complicated by endogenous stratification and assignment, then correction for self-determination of participation and attrition would be relatively simple. Indeed correction for both simultaneously is quite feasible, and this approach is taken in section 5.4. Such a correction, however, is much more complicated if the experimental design is also complicated by endogenous stratification and assignment. This reinforces the proposal that such stratification be avoided in favor of random sampling. Then analysis of experimental results can address complications that are unavoidable without having to devote extraordinary effort to correct for complications induced by the experimental design.

5.2.3 Additional Concerns

A characteristic of experiments to date has been a rather large number of treatments. The income-maintenance experiments, for example, entailed several treatments defined by different combinations of income-guarantee levels and tax rates. In none of the experiments, however, were the sample sizes large enough to obtain precise estimates of the effects of any particular treatment. Thus analysts generally resorted to estimation of a single effect that did not distinguish the various treatments, or they assumed a structural model that allowed interpolation across individuals assigned to different treatments. The more the latter procedure was followed, the less consistent the analysis was with the motivation for an experiment. That is, it subverted the major goal of using random selection and treatment assignment to circumvent the inherent limitations of hypothesized structural models.
Thus it seems to us that priorities should be ordered in such a way that the primary goals of an experiment are met first. The first goal we propose should be the estimation of an experimental effect for a treatment. Then additional treatments should be added only if each additional one can also be estimated with precision. The proposition is that precise estimation of the effect of single treatment or the effects of a few treatments is to be preferred to imprecise estimates of many. This we propose should be done in such a way that simple analysis of covariance estimates of treatment effects may be obtained, subject to the limitations on randomization discussed above and detailed more fully below. Thus we would propose an evaluation model of the form

$$Y = \alpha_1 T_1 + \alpha_2 T_2 + \ldots + \alpha_k T_k + X\beta + \epsilon,$$

where the $\alpha_k$ are treatment effects. We propose an analysis-of-covariance model because our research (Hausman and Wise 1979) has suggested that the use of exogenous control variables, represented by $X$, reduces the effect of attrition on estimated experimental effects; we presume that it would be likely to reduce the effect of self-determination of participation as well.

The reader will note the absence of a structural parameterization that attempts, for example, to describe income and substitution effects. This is because we believe that simple precise estimates of a few effects will be more readily understood by most observers and will thus carry more weight in the decision-making process. In addition, if, for policy purposes, it is desirable to estimate the effects of possible programs not described by treatments, then interpolations can be made between estimated treatment effects. If the experimental treatments are at the bounds of possible programs, then of course this calculation is easier. Although it can be argued that structural models are necessary to make interpolations, we believe that for almost any situation we can think of, the simplicity of, say, linear interpolations far outweigh the possible advantages of interpolations based on a structural model. At the same time, the spirit of the experiment is maintained.

If the experiment is to inform the policy-making process, we believe that a single number that can be supported can be more confidently relied on than more complex analysis. That the labor-supply effect of a known treatment is 16 percent and not 2 percent, for example, is much more important than whether the effect of a plan close to the treatment is 16 percent or 17 percent.

This is not to say that experimental data should not be used to estimate structural econometric models. These data can of course be used like other survey data for this purpose. But the experiment should be thought of in the first instance as a way to obtain accurate estimates of the effects
of particular programs. Structural models with parameters estimated on survey data could also be used to make such estimates. (Presumably this would be done to a considerable extent before an experiment were undertaken, if for no other reason than to help to inform the choice of experimental treatment or treatments.) In this sense, the experiment could be thought of as checking the accuracy of predictions based on analysis of survey data. That is, the experiments should be designed to provide a selected number of points "on" the response surface, defined for example by tax rate and guarantee levels. It is rather straightforward to check for example the degree to which alternative structural models fit these "known" points on the response surface. In short, an experiment should be used to avoid the inherent limitations of structural models in providing accurate estimates of the effects of specified programs. The major advantage of experiments should not be lost sight of in an effort to estimate models that will predict the result of any plan. A lack of confidence in such estimates is the motivation for the experiments. To use the experimental data only to provide more such estimates, or to set up the experiments in such a way that only such estimates are possible, is to travel to Rome to buy canned peas.

5.3 Endogenous Sampling and Stratification

As discussed in the introduction above, a major feature of classical experimental design is that it leads to a simple analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) model that minimizes the number of maintained assumptions implicit in the interpretation of parameter estimates. That is, the analysis is "model free" in two important aspects: (1) In the simplest cases a main-effects ANOVA specification is adequate. Questions about the need to include, for example, further right-hand variables—as in much of econometric and statistical analysis—do not arise. Correct randomization assures that disturbance terms have expectation equal to zero. Also, questions of functional form are absent because each experimental-treatment effect is measured by a parameter. (2) Distributional assumptions are kept to a minimum in estimation. While distributions of test statistics are certainly used in inference, asymptotic theory may provide a reasonably good approximation in many cases. Classical experimental design together with ANOVA offer the opportunity either to eliminate or to decrease greatly a major problem that arises in econometric studies based on observational, i.e., nonexperimental data.\footnote{We do not mean to disregard important problems that still remain. Questions of interactions may still arise, for example.}

Yet in many of the social experiments the classical approach has not been followed. Given a limited experimental budget and a "target
population," the designers of the experiments, in concentrating sample selection on that part of the population most likely to be affected by the treatment policy, induced endogenous sample selection and treatment assignment. The presence of endogenous sampling complicates the analysis of the experiment greatly and thus limits our ability to treat other problems that arise, in particular, sample self-selection and attrition. And possibly as important, it typically forces the analyst to maintain distributional assumptions about the random variables under study. These distributional assumptions are not innocuous even in large samples. Significant empirical departures from these assumptions may lead to large biases in estimation of experimental effects (e.g., Goldberger 1980). Most importantly, if the endogenous sampling is ignored in the analysis, extremely large biases may result in estimated experimental effects. In this section we will present three examples of endogenous sampling as well as techniques developed to eliminate the problems that it creates. We then propose an alternative approach that attempts to choose selectively from the target population without inducing endogenous sample selection.

The problems associated with endogenous sampling occur because a pre-experimental endogenous variable is used in sample selection and in treatment assignment. The effect on the estimated treatment effect arises because of correlation between unmeasured determinants of the response variable in the experimental and pre-experimental periods. These time effects have often been ignored in the experimental designs. \(^2\) We shall illustrate the problem within the context of an ANOVA framework, which when generalized to a random-effects specification, allows for serial correlation. We consider a single-period experiment with one period of pre-experimental data.

\[
Y_{it} = u_t + \beta_j T_{jt} + \mu_i + \eta_{it};
\]

\[t = 1, 2; \quad j = 1, \ldots, J.\]

\[E\mu_i = E\eta_{it} = 0; \quad V(\mu_i) = \sigma_\mu^2;\]

\[V(\eta_{it}) = \sigma_\eta^2, \quad \rho = \frac{\sigma_\mu^2}{\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\mu^2}.\]

We have decomposed the disturbance term into a permanent individual component \(\mu_i\), and another component \(\eta_{it}\) assumed independent across time periods. \(^3\) The indicator variable \(T_{jt}\) is 1 if the individual is receiving the experimental treatment \(j\) in period \(t\) and zero otherwise. Time effects are absorbed into the constant terms \(u_t\). The importance of the individual

\(^2\) For a further discussion of time effects in experimental design, see Hausman (1980).

\(^3\) Of course with only two periods, this assumption is only a normalization.
component $\mu_i$ is given by the correlation $\rho$ between the disturbance term in the two time periods. Such correlations often exceed .5 in econometric studies.

Suppose that the expected cost of an experimental treatment varies across individuals and treatments as a function of $Y_{it}$. Designers of experiments have for this reason used $Y_{it}$ in sample selection and in treatment assignment. Because of the presence of $\mu_i$ in both periods, the endogenous sampling and treatment assignment based on pre-experimental data carries over to the experimental period as well. A simple example will help to make the point clear. Suppose we have two experimental treatments called generous (G) and not-generous (NG). The G treatment is expected to cost more for "high $Y$" individuals because of an expected percentage reduction in work effort. Therefore, the designer forms two groups of individuals based on $Y_{it}$. Low $Y_t$ individuals are assigned either the G plan or control status; the high $Y_t$ individuals receive either the NG plan or control status. But when we use ANOVA to analyze the experimental results we see from equation (5) that $E(\mu_i \mid T_{jt}) \neq 0$. Thus, our estimates are biased for the population since we have not accounted for the presence of individual effects that persist over time. Since it is unlikely in most economic and social experiments that $\rho$ is near zero, substantial biases may arise from endogenous sample designs.

We shall now consider three experimental designs in which endogenous sampling was used. In the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment any individual whose pre-experimental income exceeded 1.5 times the government-set poverty limit was excluded from the sample. This sample truncation was used because the major effect of an NIT program was expected to be seen on low-income individuals and families. A simple rule was thus used to make the sample resemble the target population. Suppose a model like equation (5) is used to analyze the effects on hours worked. Suppose also that individuals' earnings are low in period one either because they have low $\mu$ or because $\eta_{t1}$ is negative even though $\mu$ is positive. Low $\mu$ people with positive $\eta_{t1}$ have been excluded from the sample. The analyst must maintain the assumption that the effect on hours worked for the sample combination of low $\mu$ and high $\mu$ people (with negative $\eta$) will represent the total population response. This assumption appears unlikely to hold true because we might well expect the behavioral response to differ among the low $\mu$ and high $\mu$ people. In other words, if we were to change the sample truncation point from 1.5 times the poverty limit to another level, the estimated experimental effect would be likely to change as well.

In the Connecticut Time-of-Day Electricity Demonstration (TOD; 1977), the sample was grouped into quintiles on the basis of electricity
usage in the year prior to the demonstration. Then households in the upper quintiles were disproportionately sampled since the electric utility correctly thought that their reaction to the introduction of time-of-day electricity rates would have the largest effects on system revenues.

In the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, (SIMEDIME), the Conlisk-Watts framework was used for treatment assignment. It allowed the expected cost of an experimental treatment $c_j$ for treatment $T_j$ to vary with "normal income," which in practice was closely related to pre-experimental income. Consider the Conlisk-Watts framework in the regression form.

\begin{equation}
Y = X\beta + \epsilon; \quad X_j = (0, \ldots, 0, 1, 0, \ldots, 0); \quad j = 1, J; \quad E\epsilon = 0; \quad V(\epsilon) = \sigma^2 I.
\end{equation}

Here $X_1$ denotes the control observations and $j = 2, \ldots, J$ denotes the $J - 1$ experimental treatments and normal-income classifications. The Conlisk-Watts design uses as an optimization criterion the minimization of the variance of linear function $P\hat{\beta}$ of the estimated coefficients, subject to a budget constraint. We want to choose $n_j$, $j = 1, J$ (the number of individuals in a given row of the design matrix) in an optimal manner. Let $D = P'P$. The complete problem is an integer programming problem with a convex objective function subject to linear constraints.

\begin{equation}
\min q(n_1, \ldots, n_m) = \text{tr}[D \sum_{j=1}^{J} n_j x'_j x_j^{-1}], \quad n_j \geq 0 \text{ for all } j.
\end{equation}

For large $N = \sum n_j$, a suitable approximation is to treat the $n_j$ as continuous and to round off the results to the nearest integer. To estimate the experimental effects in each class via the contrasts, $\hat{\beta}_j - \hat{\beta}_1$, the appropriate $P$ matrix is an $(m - 1) \times m$ matrix with the first column $-1$s and each of the remaining columns all zeroes and a single 1. Thus $P_j = [-1, 0, \ldots, 0, 1, \ldots, 0]$. We solve equation (7) to find

\begin{equation}
n_1 = C \left(\frac{(J - 1)/c_1}{E}\right)^{1/2}, \quad n_j = C(c_j^{-1}E^{-1}), \quad E = [(J - 1)c_1 + \sum_{j=2}^{J} c_j]^{1/2}.
\end{equation}

The optimal design thus increases the probability of inclusion in the
sample for low \( c_j \) individuals. But since \( c_j \) is a function of pre-experimental income, we see that \( E(\mu_j | X_j) \neq 0 \) which will lead to bias in the estimation of experimental effects.

We do not want to give the erroneous impression that endogenous sampling destroys the possibility of experimental analysis. In fact, we have written several papers addressing the problem (Hausman and Wise 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981). And endogenous sampling can reduce the cost of an experiment considerably. But we emphasize the model functional form and distributional assumptions that endogenous sampling requires.

To illustrate the nature of these assumptions, we consider again the three examples, and for each we discuss possible model specifications.

1. Sample truncation. In Hausman and Wise 1976 and 1977, models to correct for sample truncation are developed. The approach taken assumes that the earnings conditional on personal attributes are distributed log normal. A two-period model is necessary since sample truncation was performed on the pre-experimental data. But since the correlation of the disturbances across years (\( \rho \) in equation 5) is not zero, truncation on pre-experimental data will affect the analysis of the experimental results. Therefore, we define a model of the form

\[
y_{it} = Z_{it}' \gamma + \epsilon_{it}; \quad t = 1, 2; \quad \epsilon_{it} = \mu_i + \eta_{it};
\]

with the usual stochastic assumptions. We assume that \( f(y_{i1}, y_{i2} | Z_{i1}, Z_{i2}) \) is bivariate normal. The \( Z_{it} \)'s include experimental treatments as well as individual characteristics. Then the likelihood can be written

\[
L = \prod_{i=1}^{N} f(y_{i1}, y_{i2}) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\tilde{\Phi}(y_{i1}, y_{i2})}{\Phi[(L_i - Z_{i1}\beta)/\sigma]},
\]

where \( \tilde{\Phi} \) is the bivariate normal density and \( \Phi \) is the univariate normal distribution. For the New Jersey NIT experiment we estimate \( \hat{\rho} = .85 \), which demonstrates the potential importance of correcting for truncation. The log normal is a convenient distribution that leads to a likelihood function that is quite tractable using modern computers. Still, if the choice of log normal is not correct, it represents a specification error.

An even more difficult problem arises if we want to analyze hours rather than earnings. Since truncation takes place on earnings we must analyze hours and wages jointly, and the four-equation model that results leads to a likelihood function considerably more complicated than equation (10) (Hausman and Wise 1976, 432). Furthermore, given the identity between earnings and the product of wages and hours, we must now assume that both wages and hours are distributed log normally. Almost no other assumptions lead to a tractable likelihood function, even though

some evidence exists that hours might be better represented by a conditional normal distribution. And lastly, because of the complications induced in the likelihood function by truncation, our ability to handle other problems, like sample attrition or taxation, are limited. Thus the analysis has been greatly complicated by what seems to be a reasonable design criterion, concentrating on the target population of the proposed policy.

2. **Stratification on the endogenous variables.** To keep the analysis simple we here assume that income has been grouped into two intervals, even though in the Gary NIT experiment as well as the Connecticut TOD demonstration quintiles were used. Assume that below some level $L$, an unknown proportion of a random sample of the population is sampled, $P_1$, and above $L$, a proportion $P_2$. Then the density function is

\[
 h(y) = \begin{cases} 
 \frac{P_1 f(y)}{P_1 \cdot Pr[y \leq L] + P_2 \cdot Pr[y > L]}, & \text{if } y \leq L \\
 \frac{P_2 f(y)}{P_1 \cdot Pr[y \leq L] + P_2 \cdot Pr[y > L]}, & \text{if } y > L, 
\end{cases}
\]

where $f$ is the normal-density function $N(Z\beta, \sigma^2)$. Only the ratio $P = P_2/P_1$ can be identified. Therefore, we divide through the expressions in equation (11) by $P_1$. Again using normality assumption for $y$, and assuming $N_1$ persons with $y \leq L$ and $N_2$ with $y > 1$, the log likelihood function is

\[
 L = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \ln f(y_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \ln \left[ \Phi_i + P(1 - \Phi_i) \right] \\
 + \sum_{i=1}^{N_2} \ln P + \sum_{i=1}^{N_2} \ln f(y_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{N_2} \ln \left[ \Phi_i + P(1 - \Phi_i) \right] \\
 = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ln f(y_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ln (P + (1 - P)\Phi_i) + N_2 \ln P,
\]

where $\Phi_1 = \Phi [(L - Z_i\beta)]$. Again, a maintained distributional assumption is necessary and a rather complicated maximum-likelihood problem is presented. Furthermore, when we want to do a two-period analysis or consider other problems, our ability to do so is limited by the rapidly increasing complications induced by the stratification on the endogenous variable.

3. **Treatment assignment using an endogenous variable.** Our last example is the SIME-DIME NIT experimental design. Here seven income

5. The opportunity to do any type of nonparametric analysis is severely limited here because we do not have observations on the part of the sample that was truncated.

6. If $P_1$ and $P_2$ are known, the analysis can be simplified somewhat. See Hausman and Wise (1981).
intervals, called "E-levels," were used to define rows in the Conlisk-Watts design framework of equations (6)–(18). The costs \( c_j \) were then derived as a function of E-level. The expected cost of a treatment was presumed to rise with E-level because it was assumed that tax revenues would decline and that NIT payments would increase. The result was that no one in the highest E-level interval was assigned treatment status; all were assigned to be controls where, of course, the cost does not grow with E-level. Furthermore, in general, persons with higher E-levels were more likely to be assigned to experimental treatments with more generous support levels. Thus, treatment assignment was based on an endogenous variable—pre-experimental income—which was highly correlated with the response variable during the experiment.

Treatment assignment using endogenous variables does not in theory prevent the use of ANOVA in the analysis phase of an experiment. What is needed, however, is an elaborate specification allowing a separate \( \beta \) in equation (5) for each E-level and treatment or control assignment. But in the SIME-DIME experiment, for example, including manpower treatments, there would be \( J = 59 \) columns in the \( X \) matrix. In fact, if full ANOVA were done without deleting higher-order interactions as did the design model, \( J \) would exceed 200. Thus even for the comparatively large sample sizes as in the SIME-DIME, we cannot hope to obtain precise estimates of experimental effects. And when other factors such as race and city are added to the analysis, full ANOVA estimation becomes hopeless. Thus we are left with estimating ANOVA specifications with many fewer parameters than the experimental design requires. One approach is to enter E-level as a right-hand-side variable in linear form. But we immediately lose the model-free aspect of ANOVA since correctness of functional form becomes an issue. In fact, a linear specification of E-level is not totally appropriate since it does not remove all correlation between the treatment variable and the stochastic disturbance.

Again, a model of treatment assignment can be constructed, as specified by Hausman and Wise 1980. But since treatment assignment is a zero-one outcome, a probit model (or logit model) is required along with the necessary distributional assumptions. An additional complication arises here because we must specify the partly unknown model of treatment assignment correctly. Thus, both distributional assumptions and functional-form assumptions are required for model estimation. The resulting likelihood function used in estimation is even more complicated than equations (10) and (12). And as emphasized above, additional complications like sample attrition are almost impossible to treat jointly with the sample-assignment issues.

7. The unknown aspect arises because there does not exist a straightforward model for assignment of E-level. Part of the assignment procedure involved qualitative judgments.
A simple solution exists to these design and analysis problems. Randomize over pre-experimental income. Then problems of endogenous assignment or stratification do not occur, so ANOVA specifications again are appropriate. But in making such a choice, we give up the notion of a target population; so the precision of our analysis for a particular group may decrease, given size and experimental budget. Or to state the problem in an alternative manner, for a given level of precision in estimation, the necessary budget for an experiment might increase substantially.

An alternative approach is to stratify on exogenous variables only and to approximate the goals of endogenous stratification by using predicted values of the endogenous variable.\(^8\)

We shall consider the first example, sample truncation, since the issues can be seen quite clearly. Figure 5.1 represents the density of earnings with a truncation point \(T\).\(^9\) Suppose our aim is to sample people in the area of the distribution marked I. Now instead of using pre-experimental income with its associated problems, consider the use of "exogenous" income stratification, based on income predicted on the basis of exogenous variables, say from the regression equation

\[
(13) \quad \hat{Y}_i = Z_i \delta + \epsilon_i,
\]

where the prediction is

\[
\hat{Y}_i = Z_i \delta = Z_i \delta + Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'\epsilon.
\]

Note that \(\epsilon_i\) still enters the last term through the product \(Z_i' \epsilon_i\). But for a sample of size \(N\) this term is of order \(1/N\), so it quite rapidly disappears as the sample becomes large. The variables included in \(Z_i\) would be education, training, union membership, age, etc. We could then base truncation, so problems that arise from the individual effect \(\mu_i = \epsilon_{it} - \eta_i\) being present in both periods no longer occur.

If the covariance between \(y_i\) and \(\hat{y}_i\) were very high, we would have solved the problem. Then the predicted value would do almost as well as the actual endogenous variable. But for log earnings the \(R^2\) of the regression is around .25; multiple correlation coefficients in the range of .25 to .60 are quite common for many cross-sectional regressions in econometrics. Thus, if we use \(\hat{y}_i < F\) as the truncation point, we expect on average to do about 1.2 as well as pure random sampling in selecting \(y_i < L\).

While this is an improvement, we might do even better by choosing a point \(k < L\) as our sample truncation point. Perhaps a useful approach to

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\(^8\) This approach was employed in the design of a survey for electricity use in Vermont by Hausman and Trimble (1981).

\(^9\) We are assuming a common truncation point, although in the NIT experiment it depended on family size, which partly defines the poverty limit. But we can add varying truncation points to our analysis with no added complications.
the choice of $k$ can be constructed as follows. Assume the benefit to estimation of the experimental effect has expected value of the form $V(y_i) = \beta / (y_i - \bar{y})^2$. That is, we expect to learn little about labor-supply response from low-income or high-income individuals. On the other hand, cost is expected to grow linearly with income $c(y_i) = cy_i$. Suppose we want to solve for the optimum truncation point $k$, given our knowledge that since we are using predicted income $\hat{y}_i$, the actual $y_i = \hat{y}_i + \epsilon_i$ will differ. The optimization problem is

$$\max_k \beta / (y_i - \bar{y})^2, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \Sigma c y_i \leq C, \quad \hat{y}_i = y_i - \epsilon_i \leq k.$$  

We solve the corresponding expected value problem

$$\max_k L = E(\beta / (\hat{y}_i + \epsilon_i - \bar{y})^2) + \lambda_1 E(C - \Sigma c (\hat{y}_i + \epsilon_i)) + \lambda_2 (k - \hat{y}_i).$$  

The form of the solution can be seen by assuming that the variable has been transformed to make the residuals approximately normal and that we center the data to set $\bar{y} = 0$. Then we choose $k$ to

$$\max_k L' = \beta / \left[ \text{var}(\hat{y}_i) + 1 - \frac{(k/\sigma) \phi(k/\sigma)}{\Phi(k/\sigma)} - \left( \frac{\phi(k/\sigma)}{\Phi(k/\sigma)} \right)^2 \right] + \lambda (C - c \Sigma \hat{y}_i - \sigma \frac{\phi(k/\sigma)}{\Phi(k/\sigma)}),$$
where \( \sigma \) is the standard deviation of the residual distribution. The first-order conditions of equation (16) are straightforward, and the problem can be solved straightforwardly on a computer since the constraint will be satisfied with equality and all the functions are monotonic in \( k \). In this problem the gains over random sampling increase as the variance of the residuals decreases, so \( \hat{y}_i \) and \( \hat{y}_j \) are more highly correlated as we would expect. If the correlation becomes very small, we will be quite close to random sampling. But in many cases random sampling may be preferable to endogenous sampling, which as we have attempted to show, can lead to difficult problems in the analysis phase of an experiment.

5.4 Self-Determination of Participation and Attrition

We have addressed in the previous sections a problem largely induced by experimental design, a problem that should be avoided. In this section we will address a major potential problem that cannot in general be avoided but that can be corrected for without undue complication, as long as it is not accompanied by induced endogenous stratification.

Suppose it were possible to select a random sample of families from the population, or from a subset of the population (say with predicted income below a certain level). Of the families selected at random, some, when asked to participate in the experiment, will do so, while others will elect not to participate. Even though a random sample is identified, those who choose to participate may not represent a random sample. In experiments to date no systematic record has been kept of who, when asked, participates and who does not. Thus it has not been possible to identify systematic differences (and in particular unmeasured ones) between those who participate and those who do not; of course, if differences existed, there has been no way to correct for them. In the income-maintenance experiments, for example, a procedure like the following was used. Each experiment was conducted within a single city or a small number of cities. All families within the city or within some section of the city were canvassed to locate those with a few predetermined characteristics. In these experiments, income, race, age of family head, and number of dependents were attributes that determined eligibility. Those who were found to meet the eligibility criteria were asked to enroll in the experiment. Of those who did enroll, some were assigned to a treatment group and others to a control group. It is the enrollment decision that concerns us here.

Suppose that instead of using a procedure like the above, we were to begin with an external source of data on families. The U.S. census is a logical choice. Census data provide information on family income, race, one or two parents in a family, education of family head, number of dependents, etc. Suppose that the known family attributes are repre-
presented by a vector of characteristics $X$. From families surveyed by the Census Bureau, a random sample could be chosen.

For simplicity, suppose the goal is to estimate a single-treatment effect. Ideally we would like to randomly assign part of this randomly selected sample to a control group and others to the treatment group. Then after some time period, we would like to compare controls and experimentals, with $Y$ the outcome of interest, using a simple analysis of variance model of the form

$$ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \epsilon_i, $$

where $T_i$ is an indicator variable with the value 1 for experimentals and 0 for controls.

But suppose not all of the random sample agrees to participate. Suppose participation depends on $X$ and a random disturbance term $\eta$ in the following way:

$$ P_i = X_i \alpha + \eta_i, $$

where $P_i$ is an unobserved index variable with the property that individual $i$ agrees to participate if $P_i > 0$. If $Y_i$ and $P_i$ are jointly normal with correlation coefficient $\rho$, and $\eta$ is normalized to have variance 1, we know that the expected value of $Y_i$, given that individual $i$ enrolls is given by

$$ E(Y_i \mid P_i > 0) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \rho_{\epsilon\eta} \frac{\phi(X_i \alpha)}{\Phi[X_i \alpha]}, $$

Suppose that $\beta_1$ is estimated by least squares using the sample of participants and ignoring the last term in equation (3). Let the inverse Mills ratio $\phi(\cdot) / \Phi[\cdot]$ be represented by $M_i$. According to standard excluded-variable arguments, if $M$ is correlated with $T$, the least-squares estimate of $\beta_1$ will be biased. As the sample of participants becomes large, the least-squares estimate goes to

$$ \beta_1 + \rho_{MT} \rho_{\epsilon\eta} \frac{\sigma_M}{\sigma_T}, $$

where $\rho_{MT}$ is the correlation between $M$ and $T$. If the treatment indicator $T$, however, is assigned randomly, then it will be uncorrelated with $X$ and thus with $M$ which is a function of $X$. Under these simple assumptions, the least-squares estimate of the treatment effect will be consistent, as long as the assignment to control versus treatment groups is random. Each participant could be randomly assigned, or each of those in the census sample could be randomly assigned prior to enrollment, as long as at the time of enrollment, prospective participants did not know their assignment.

But the model as set out above hides by omission a potential major source of self-selection bias. Suppose that if the treatment were given to
all persons in the population, the responses would vary among them. It is clear that this is indeed the case (even after controlling for measured family characteristics). It seems plausible that the decision to participate will depend on the potential response. For example, it is often hypothesized that persons whose behavior is most likely to be affected will be most likely to participate, even though they do not know prior to enrollment whether they will be in the treatment or in the control group. This is the essence of the examples given in section 1.2.2.

The idea may be represented by a random-effects model of the form

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + (\beta_1 + b_i)T_i + \epsilon_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + b_i T_i + \epsilon_i, \]

where from the perspective of the analyst, \( b \) is random with mean 0. Using (21), the expected value of \( Y_i \) among participants is given by

\[ E(Y_i | P_i > 0) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + (\rho_{b\epsilon} \sigma_b T_i + \rho_{e\epsilon} \sigma_e) \frac{\phi(\cdot)}{\Phi(\cdot)}. \]

In this case, it is clear that the least term will be correlated with \( T_i \), and a least-squares estimate of \( \beta_1 \) would be biased.

Joint maximum-likelihood estimation of (18) and (21), however, could be used to obtain a consistent estimate of \( \beta_1 \). The procedure is similar to the one proposed by Hausman and Wise (1979), except that the equations pertain to the response variables and participation, rather than to the response variable and attrition. In this case, there are two possible outcomes: Individual \( i \) doesn’t participate with probability,

\[ 1 - \Phi[X_i\alpha] = P_{1i}, \]

or individual \( i \) participates with response \( Y_i \), with likelihood

\[ \Phi \left[ X_i\alpha + \frac{\rho_{b\epsilon} \sigma_b T_i + \rho_{e\epsilon} \sigma_e}{\sigma_b^2 T_i^2 + \sigma_e^2} \cdot (Y_i - \beta_0 - \beta_1 T_i) \right] \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{(\rho_{b\epsilon} \sigma_b T_i + \rho_{e\epsilon} \sigma_e)^2}{\sqrt{\sigma_b^2 T_i^2 + \sigma_e^2}} \right)^{1/2} \cdot \frac{1}{(\sigma_b^2 T_i^2 + \sigma_e^2)^{1/2}} \cdot \phi \left( \frac{Y_i - \beta_0 - \beta_1 T_i}{(\sigma_b^2 T_i^2 + \sigma_e^2)^{1/2}} \right) = P_{2i}. \]

The likelihood function

\[ L = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} 1n P_{1i} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_2} 1n P_{2i} \]

can easily be maximized to obtain estimates of \( \beta \) along with the other parameters of the model.
The other component of self-selection that seems unavoidable in social experiments is attrition. Some participants will inevitably drop out of the experiment before the treatment response is measured. To take advantage of individual specific characteristics that persist over time, it is advantageous to observe participants for some period of time before the treatment becomes effective. This will lead to four equations of the form

\begin{align*}
P_i &= X_i \alpha + \epsilon_{1i}, \\
Y_{1i} &= X_{1i} \delta + \epsilon_{2i}, \\
Y_{2i} &= X_{2i} \delta + \beta T + \epsilon_{3i}, \\
A_i &= X_i \gamma + \epsilon_{4i},
\end{align*}

Where \( Y_1 \) pertains to the response variable before the treatment period, \( Y_2 \) to the response variable during the experimental period, and \( A \) is an unobserved indicator variable with the property that individual \( i \) leaves the experiment, if \( A_i < 0 \). This system of equations can also be estimated readily with available maximum-likelihood techniques (see Venti and Wise 1981).

Comment

John Conlisk

Endogenous stratification is the main issue discussed by Hausman and Wise. I have little to say about it because they have said things well. Regarding endogenous stratification that can be avoided, as when negative-tax experimenters stratify on actual pre-experiment earnings rather than on an exogenous earnings-capacity measure, the Hausman and Wise advice is very simple: Don’t do it. In my view, the advice is feasible and very important—perhaps the best message of the conference. Regarding endogenous stratification that cannot be avoided, as when subjects self-select through nonparticipation or attrition, Hausman and Wise describe the applicable statistical techniques.

In addition to analyzing endogenous stratification, Hausman and Wise devote substantial attention to other design issues. This other material is less clear and less well developed. Roughly speaking, Hausman and Wise advocate the simplest kind of classical design—a fully randomized design intended for a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). I have a long comment about the randomization advice, a shorter comment about the ANOVA advice, and a short concluding comment.

Randomization

Consider the kind of textbook example associated with a classical ANOVA design. Suppose a large number of planting boxes are to be

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soiled, seeded, cultivated, harvested, and measured in a uniform manner. Some of the boxes, however, are to be selected at random for application of a chemical whose effect the experimenter wishes to estimate. If we think of the plants in a given box as analogous to a family in a social experiment, what complications to the example would we add to make it more like the social experiment? Here are some possibilities.

Suppose that the plants are at substantial and different stages of maturity when the experiment begins, that the number of plants per box and the sizes of boxes vary, that the soil and other nutritional history varies, that the experimenter is allowed to apply the chemical and measure the effect over only a short duration, that the cost per box varies greatly, and that plant biology leads us to expect interaction between the treatment (the chemical) and the covariates (plant age, box size, and so on). If plants could walk out on the experimenter, we could add self-selection to the list of horrors.

Before the conference, my reading of the Hausman and Wise advice was that, despite the complications just listed, the experimenter should stick to the simple strategy of full randomization—that is, no use should be made of the exogenous covariate information in assigning boxes to treatment. My intuition balked at this notion because it sounded like throwing away information. Why not use the covariates at the design stage, especially covariates expected to interact with the treatment? At the conference, however, I was told that this was a misreading of the Hausman and Wise paper. They did not object to categorizing the boxes into strata, or blocks, according to the exogenous covariates. The advice was merely that there should be full randomization of treatment assignment within a given stratum. This advice, however, leaves me puzzled. If a stratum is defined broadly, so that the covariates have a substantial range within the stratum (especially covariates expected to interact with treatment), my original question remains. Is there no use to be made of these covariates in assigning boxes to treatment? If a stratum is defined narrowly so that important covariates are essentially held fixed within a stratum, then the estimated treatment effect may be so stratum-specific that nothing important can be learned without experimenting at several different strata. In this case, the design advice is thoroughly incomplete without a discussion of strata selection and data pooling.

Whatever the truth about Hausman and Wise's meaning, the issues need clarification. To address the issues more formally, consider a version of Hausman and Wise's equation (3), plus an interaction effect.

\[
(1) \quad Y = \beta_1 T(1 + \beta_2 Z)^{-1} + \beta_3 Z + \beta_4 X + \epsilon .
\]

Here \( T \) is the treatment variable; \( X \) and \( Z \) are scalar exogenous variables. Consider first the case \( \beta_2 = \beta_3 = 0 \). Then \( Z \) drops out, and the model becomes like the one Hausman and Wise use to make the following case
for randomization. For a sizable sample, random assignment of subjects to levels of $T$ leaves $T$ independent of $X$ and $e$; hence the treatment effect $\delta Y / \delta T = \beta_1$ can be estimated from a simple regression of $Y$ on $T$. No serious assumptions about $X$ and $e$ need be made; indeed no data on $X$ are needed. $X$ can be viewed as an extraneous nuisance variable whose potential for creating econometric problems is neutralized by randomization.

Now consider the case of $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_4 = 0$. Here $X$ disappears and the exogenous variable to contend with is $Z$. The treatment effect

$$\delta Y / \delta T = \beta_1 (1 + \beta_2 Z)^{-1}$$

is a function of $Z$; for a reason given below, $\delta Y / \delta T$ is constructed to go to zero as $Z$ gets large (hence the nonlinearity is $\beta_2$). Since $\delta Y / \delta T$ depends on $Z$, then $Z$ is not simply a nuisance variable. Rather it is a central part of the object of study. It is not surprising that the case for randomization unravels when it is $Z$ rather than $X$ at issue. Random assignment of subjects to treatment levels makes $T$ independent of $Z$ and $e$, but this independence does not buy much. It does not buy off the need for $Z$ data, nor does it neutralize econometric problems caused by $Z$. For example, measurement error in $Z$ or correlation of $Z$ with $e$ will, through the algebraic interaction of $Z$ and $T$, prevent consistent regression estimation of the treatment parameters $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$. That is, randomization will not prevent the need for strong assumptions about $Z$ and $e$.

It is thus important to ask whether the exogenous variables in a social experiment are more like $X$ or more like $Z$. To be concrete, consider a negative-tax interpretation of equation (1). Suppose the response variable $Y$ is an earnings variable (perhaps in logs); suppose $T$ is a guarantee level (with the negative-tax break-even point fixed and suppressed); and suppose the major exogenous variable is some measure of earnings capacity (perhaps constructed as the predicted value from a regression of pre-experiment earnings on schooling, age, and other exogenous variables). Since we expect the treatment effect to decline toward zero as earnings capacity gets to and beyond the break-even income, earnings capacity acts like $Z$ in the treatment effect

$$\delta Y / \delta T = \beta_1 (1 + \beta_2 Z)^{-1}.$$

That is, earnings capacity is better represented by $Z$ than by $X$ in equation (1). From the viewpoint of economic behavior, the difference is crucial. To omit the interaction between treatment $T$ and earnings capacity $Z$ would be to assume that a negative tax has the same expected influence on a surgeon as on an unskilled laborer. More generally, to omit the interaction would be to assume that an agent's expected response to an economic stimulus is independent of his economic circumstance. Suppose then that $Z$ represents earnings capacity and that $X$ represents some
other exogenous variable. It appears to me that all the social experiments involve important exogenous variables that, like $Z$ in equation (1), interact with treatments. Since the potential of $Z$ for creating econometric problems cannot be neutralized by randomization, how should we interpret the Hausman and Wise advice about randomization? There seem to be two cases.

Case 1

Perhaps Hausman and Wise are merely saying that, at a fixed value of $Z$, one should randomize so as to neutralize the potential nuisances of $X$ and $\varepsilon$. That is, define a stratum by a fixed value $Z = Z_0$ (in practice, a narrow range for $Z$), randomize within the stratum, and estimate the stratum-specific treatment effect

$$(\delta Y/\delta T)_0 = \beta_1 (1 + \beta_2 Z_0)^{-1}$$

by a simple regression of $Y$ on $T$. If this is the advice, it appears to be perfectly logical, but not very helpful. The hard design problems are in dealing with $Z$. Is knowledge of the treatment effect at a single $Z$ value enough information to justify the experiment? Probably not. Then how many $Z$ values (how many strata) should be chosen, and what should they be? Will continuity of response across $Z$ values be assumed, as in equation (1), to lay a foundation for data pooling across strata? If so, then the standard sort of assumptions about $Z$ (independence of $\varepsilon$ and so on) must be made, despite Hausman and Wise’s desire to avoid them. If continuity in $Z$ is not assumed, as Hausman and Wise would probably advise, then each stratum is in effect a separate experiment; and the multiplicity of experiments fragments the effective budget and sample for each.

Case 2

Perhaps Hausman and Wise are advising not just randomization at a given $Z$, but rather randomization across the full range of $Z$, either in the population or at least up to some sizeable truncation point. Advocacy of such “full” randomization is the way their paper clearly reads to me, despite discussion at the conference. As noted above, however, the independence of $T$ and $Z$ resulting from full randomization will not prevent the need for data on $Z$ or the need for assumptions about $Z$ (such as independence of $\varepsilon$). This absence of a positive case for full randomization should be coupled with the presence of a negative case. Let $C(T, Z)$ be the expected cost of one observation at treatment level $T$ for a subject with earnings capacity $Z$. The form of $C(T, Z)$ may be such that cost efficiency in design leads to a correlation between $T$ and $Z$. In addition, if a continuous-response function is assumed, as in equation (1), efficient exploitation of the geometric placement of available $(T, Z)$ points may lead to designs with correlation between $T$ and $Z$. 
In summary, Hausman and Wise have argued that proper randomization will lead to simple designs and a much reduced need for econometric structure. Their argument is not convincing, primarily because it neglects interactions between treatments and exogenous variables. Such interactions are typically central to the behavior studied in social experiments. When these interactions, along with cost and geometric considerations, are accounted for, I see no reason to suppose that a good design will be the sort of simple design Hausman and Wise have in mind, nor do I see a useful way to substitute simple rules of thumb (like randomization and ANOVA response functions) for a full-blown, optimal design analysis specific to the context at hand.

Response Functional Form

The issue here is the disagreement between designers who favor some sort of continuous response function and those who favor an ANOVA response function (a separate parameter for every point on the response function considered). In the many discussions I have heard about the response-functional-form issue, I have never heard anyone claim that true response functions are likely to be other than continuous and fairly smooth. For example, Hausman and Wise remark in the paper that they are willing to estimate unknown points on a response surface by linear interpolation between known points. People's reluctance to impose continuity of response seems to be based on the fear that the only way to do it is to make a commitment to some specific functional form, and thus to risk an inaccurate outcome if the specific functional form is wrong.

This reasoning, in my opinion, is incorrect. It is possible to impose continuity and a degree of smoothness in a way that is robust to a great variety of specific functional forms (see Conlisk 1973). Handled properly, continuity of response is not to be thought of as an assumption in the same league with, say, normality of residuals. Residual normality is a very strong assumption which nearly everyone would have doubts about; it is understandable that Hausman and Wise wish to avoid a normality assumption when they can. Response continuity, however, is a relatively weak assumption which everyone believes in; it is not so understandable why Hausman and Wise wish to avoid it. The advantage of a response-continuity assumption is greater design efficiency. If an optimal design model is "told" that response information gathered at one design point is partially transferable to adjacent design points, then the model can pick and choose among design points and can thereby get more out of the given design budget.

In the design phase of the New Jersey experiment, there was a disagreement between the Mathematica group, which favored an ANOVA response function, and the University of Wisconsin group, which favored response-continuity assumptions. On this issue, Hausman and Wise are a
curious cross, having the Mathematica assumptions and the Wisconsin conclusions.

The New Jersey design involved nine combinations of negative-tax parameters at each of three earnings-capacity levels—a total of twenty-seven treatments. Under the response-continuity assumptions favored by the Wisconsin group, the optimal design model (used by both groups) led to a concentration of observations at many fewer than twenty-seven treatments. The design model in effect advised the designers to observe the response at a few well-chosen treatments and to infer the response at other treatments by fitting a response function. Under the ANOVA assumption favored by the Mathematica group, the design model led to a more even distribution of observations across all twenty-seven treatments; all treatments have to be handled separately when there is no response continuity.

The Hausman and Wise advice might be paraphrased as follows: By all means, assume an ANOVA response function (the Mathematica assumption); continuity of response would be uncomfortably restrictive. However, to promote precision, keep the number of treatments small; one can always interpolate to other treatments at the experiment’s end (the Wisconsin conclusion). Is this more like the Mathematica position or more like the Wisconsin position? The answer, I think, is unclear until Hausman and Wise complete their advice by describing how they would choose their small number of treatments. If their choice depended in part on the ultimate interpolations that data users would surely make, then I would view them as assuming response continuity without admitting it. If their choice ignored this ultimate use of the data, I would wonder why.

Conclusion

The Hausman and Wise analysis of endogenous stratification is well grounded in formal models presented in this paper and in their other papers. The major piece of design advice, to avoid endogenous stratification when possible, is persuasive and important.

The remaining design advice, in my opinion, is not well grounded in formal models; the arguments strike me as overly casual. Examples: The advice to randomize and the simple model to support that advice are of little use until the central issue of treatment-covariate interaction is formally handled. The advice to avoid restrictive assumptions is of little use without a robustness analysis to help distinguish weak from strong assumptions. The advice to keep the number of treatments reasonably small is of little use without a model, involving a cost constraint, that defines reasonable smallness. Explicit in the paper’s subtitle (“Cost versus Ease of Analysis”) and implicit in much of the discussion are trade-offs forced by the need to limit costs; but no formal model of the trade-offs is presented. The advice to avoid response-continuity assump-
tions, but to interpolate at the experiment’s end, has a flavor of self-contradiction that calls for a design model to sort out the logic. A final example: Having emphasized that nonparticipation and attrition will create a problem in the data analysis, Hausman and Wise argue that this problem is an additional reason to stick to a simple classical design. But why should a particular problem in the data argue for a design developed in contexts not involving that problem? What is needed is an extension of design theory to handle nonparticipation and attrition in an explicit way.

Comment

Figure 5.1 describes the process of social experimentation as a series of transitions. First, the population is screened to form a subject pool. Some subjects are rejected because they fail to meet the screening criteria; others are accepted but refuse to participate. Second, there may be a period of pre-experimental observation which results in some subjects being rejected and others dropping out. The retained subjects form the experimental subject pool. This completes the pre-experimental phase of the study, labeled I on the diagram. Third, the experimental subject pool is assigned treatments. The result, after further attrition, is a set of complete observations. Fourth, the experimental data are used to estimate a model of the effects of treatment. Population statistics may provide information required to compensate for refusals and attritions. Fifth, the estimated model is used to draw policy conclusions. Population statistics may be useful for correcting or augmenting statistics for the set of complete experimental observations.

Associated with the transitions in this diagram are probabilities conditioned on previous events. The likelihood of complete observations is a product of these probabilities. The analyst maintains hypotheses that place these probabilities in suitable parametric families. Then the model can be estimated by the method of maximum likelihood or the method of moments.

Design decisions are the choice of sample frame, which determines screening probabilities, and the choice of experimental design, which determines the conditional distribution of treatments. Factors in the design decision are (1) cost, (2) technical or political feasibility, and (3) the simplicity and precision of the statistical model. Given an objective function of these factors, one can in principle choose an optimal design.

Hausman and Wise have drawn four main conclusions on the design of social experiments. First, it is desirable to analyze the effects of treatments with a simple ANOVA model embodying a minimum of structural

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assumptions. Second, employment of an ANOVA requires an exogenous sample frame and random treatment assignment. Third, if cost constraints or technical/political constraints make a random sample frame infeasible, then exogenous stratification on predicted endogenous variables is preferable to endogenous stratification. Fourth, the problems of balking and attrition can be handled by straightforward methods for random designs, but are greatly complicated by endogenous designs. I will comment on each of these conclusions in turn.

Fig. C5.1
An ANOVA Model Is Desirable

I heartily endorse the criterion of designing experiments so that a simple, direct, robust statistical model like ANOVA can be used. The authors go on to argue that policy questions can be answered best by measuring the effects of a few treatments precisely and using simple linear interpolation between treatments. There are several objections to this view. First, some cases exist where policy is clearly focused on the response surface rather than on specific treatments—an example is the interest in cross-price elasticities in electric time-of-day pricing experiments. ANOVA with linear interpolation can be viewed as one way of fitting a response surface. Another way is higher-order interpolation, or splines. A third way is a traditional structural model, with maintained structural hypotheses providing the smoothing. What is best in this range depends on the application. A final comment concerns the authors' concentration on first-order treatment effects: Second-order interactions of treatments with concomitant variables such as age and education may also be of strong policy interest—economy may require some structural hypotheses in specifying these interactions.

ANOVA Models Require an Exogenous Sample Frame and Random Treatment Assignment

Hausman and Wise do not distinguish carefully the screening phase of an experiment from the treatment-assignment phase. When this distinction is made, it is clear that the key to the use of the ANOVA model is random treatment assignment, conditioned on the experimental subject pool. This is true no matter what sample frame is used to obtain the experimental subject pool. Random treatment assignment creates a "cordon sanitaire" which isolates the effects of endogenous sampling, balks, and pre-experimental attrition.

This observation has several important implications. First, the value of random treatment assignment should be emphasized. This method permits estimation of treatment and interaction effects by simple ANOVA or COVA methods with minimal structural assumptions and isolates sample biases introduced by endogenous sampling, balks, and attrition.

Second, with random treatment assignment, there is no need to require exogenous sampling. Then endogenous sampling may be a useful tool for reducing experiment cost and meeting technical and political constraints. One loses only simple consistent estimators of main and concomitant variable effects, which are unlikely to be important for policy analysis. (See note at end of "Comment.")

Exogenous Stratification on Predicted Endogenous Variables Is Preferable to Endogenous Stratification

Ceteris paribus, exogenous stratification leads to simpler and more precise estimators than endogenous stratification and is the method of
choice. The Hausman-Wise suggestion of using an exogenous surrogate for endogenous sampling is a good one. There are two caveats. First, the cost economies from endogenous stratification may not be obtainable using a surrogate. For example, in a study of locational choice, the primary economies in sampling come from actual geographical stratification. Even a good surrogate for actual location requires a different, more costly, method of contacting subjects.

Second, the whole issue of exogenous versus endogenous stratification becomes blurred when the experiment is used for different policy purposes. For example, exogenous stratification, by location in an experiment on the effects of housing subsidies on consumption patterns, becomes endogenous when location decisions are a subject of policy questions.

Problems of Balking and Attrition Have
Straightforward Solutions for Random Sample Frames, but Are Greatly Complicated by Endogenous Designs

The above discussion emphasizes that random treatment assignment isolates biases introduced by balking and attrition in the pre-experimental phase. This simplification is both substantial and desirable. It does not require an exogenous sample frame.

Even with random treatment assignment, attrition in the experimental phase can introduce bias, due to $E(Te | \text{complete observation}) \neq 0$. With maintained structural hypotheses, this bias can be corrected by maximum-likelihood methods of the sort outlined by Hausman and Wise. Alternative methods are to estimate

$$Y = \mu + T\alpha + (T \times X)\gamma + X\beta + E(\varepsilon | \text{complete observation}) + \eta$$

by NLLS or a multi-step Amemiya-Heckman procedure, or to introduce regressors spanning $E(\varepsilon | \text{complete observation})$. All these methods tend to be distribution-specific, with the last method being least so. If the sample frame is endogenous or there are pre-experimental balks or attrition, then the conditional distribution of $\varepsilon$ will be more complex and will be influenced by the structure of these effects, as the authors claim. The difference is quantitative, but not qualitative, in the complexity of model specification and estimation. Since pre-experimental balks or attrition force this problem even for exogenous sample frames, I do not consider this a strong argument against endogenous sampling.

Balking and attrition are potential sources of severe bias in social experiments and require careful treatment. It is worthwhile to attempt to correct these biases, even at the cost of additional structural hypotheses and the loss of simple ANOVA methods. I believe the focus of further research on social experimental methodology should be on robust methods for correcting self-selection biases.
Note

COVA Model: \( Y = \mu + T\alpha + X\beta + (T \otimes X)\gamma + \epsilon \).

- \( T \): Treatment-dummy vector
- \( X \): Commitment variables
- \( T \otimes X \): Second-order interactions
- \( \mu \): Main effect
- \( \alpha \): Treatment effects
- \( \beta \): Concomitant variable effects
- \( \gamma \): Interaction effects

Endogenous sample frame and/or endogenous refusal or attrition \( \Rightarrow E(\epsilon | X, \text{experimental sample pool}) \neq 0 \).

Random treatment assignment \( \Rightarrow E(T | X, \epsilon) = 0 \).

RESULTS:

1. Random treatment assignment \( \Rightarrow \) treatment and interaction effects can be estimated consistently from the regression \( Y = \mu + T\alpha + (T \otimes X)\gamma + \eta \), or treatment effects alone from the regression \( Y = \mu + T\alpha + \eta \).

2. Exogenous determination of the experimental sample pool, i.e., \( E(\epsilon | X, \text{experimental sample pool}) = 0 \), and exogenous treatment assignment \( \Rightarrow \) treatment, concomitant variable, and interaction effects can be estimated consistently from the regression \( Y = \mu + T\alpha + X\beta + (T \otimes X)\gamma + \epsilon \).

References


