8 Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series

Katharine G. Abraham, James R. Spletzer, and Jay C. Stewart

8.1 Introduction

The average wage level is a key aspect of economic well-being in a society. Several alternative wage measures based on official government statistics are available to analysts. Although there always have been differences among the various measures with respect to the implied average wage level, since the mid-1970s they have diverged markedly. The present paper has several goals: to describe the various available hourly wage series, to characterize the differences in behavior among them, and to explore alternative hypotheses concerning these differences.

Figure 8.1 graphs annual average values of selected hourly wage series, all converted to 1993 dollars. Users who rely on national income accounts data

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1. Two significant hourly compensation series are omitted from fig. 8.1: the BLS Office of Productivity and Technology's (OPT's) hourly compensation measure and the hourly compensation cost series produced by the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI) program. The OPT measure is constructed in very much the same way as the series based on the NIPA shown in fig. 8.1 but is a total compensation rather than a wage and salary measure. The ECI is designed to capture changes in the employer cost of employing labor of a fixed type. Since 1987, the program also has produced hourly labor cost estimates that reflect the actual mix of employment at a point in time.
for other purposes seem likely to rely on the wage and hours information from the accounts for assessing the trend in the hourly wage. The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) series in figure 8.1 was constructed by dividing the (deflated) wages and salaries of private industry workers by total hours for the same group. To the extent that they are interested in current information regarding real wages, the business community and the press tend to focus on the average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly employer survey, the Current Employment Statistics (CES) series. In contrast, most of the academic literature on real wage trends has used data either from the March income supplements to the Current Population Survey (the March CPS series) or from the earnings questions asked of CPS outgoing rotation groups each month beginning in 1979 and, earlier, of all CPS respondents each May from 1973 through 1978 (the CPS quarter sample, or CPSQS, series); see, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992a, 1992b), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Buchinsky (1994).

These four series exhibit some significant differences in trend, particularly since the mid-1970s. Between 1973 and 1993, the NIPA real hourly wage measure rose by more than 7 percent, the March CPS and the CPSQS measures held roughly steady, and the CES measure fell by 10 percent. Although all three series that begin before 1973 show a significant slowdown in the rate of real wage growth starting in the mid-1970s, someone who looked at NIPA data

and thus conceptually are more comparable to the other series we consider. The available time series still is relatively short, and the historical rotation of sample units on an industry-by-industry basis complicates the interpretation of year-to-year changes in the hourly cost estimates.
nonetheless would have a very different picture of recent real wage trends than someone who looked at CPS data or, especially, CES data.

Because our primary interest here is to understand the significant differences in the trends implied by different sources of wage information, all of the series shown in figure 8.1 have been deflated using the same deflator, the CPI-U-X1, an experimental Consumer Price Index (CPI) series that measures inflation more consistently over time than the official CPI series. Critics have argued that the CPI is an upward-biased measure of changes in living costs. Although the questions raised by these critics are important, they are not relevant to understanding the differences in growth rates among alternative wage series that are the focus of the present paper.

Both the NIPA series and the CES series are, in effect, hours-weighted average wages; for consistency, both of the CPS series shown in the graph also have been computed as hours-weighted averages. In addition, the CPS series have been adjusted for the top-coding of reported earnings in the survey. All series cover the private sector exclusive of agriculture and private households. Although we have made every effort to report wages on a comparable basis, some differences remain. Earnings concepts differ across the four series, and the worker population covered by the CES series is less inclusive than that covered by the other data series.

The remainder of the paper is devoted to explaining the differences in the behavior of the four wage series shown in figure 8.1. All of these hourly wage measures are computed from reported annual or weekly earnings and a measure of weekly hours (further details are provided in the data appendix). Section 8.2 explores the relative contributions of earnings and hours to the behavior of the various hourly wage measures. The divergence of the CES hourly wage measure from other available wage measures reflects the very different behavior of the CES weekly earnings series. Possible reasons for that difference are examined in section 8.3. Understanding the different behavior of NIPA and CPS weekly hours turns out to be central to understanding the divergence of NIPA and CPS average hourly wages and thus is the focus of section 8.4. Concluding observations and our thoughts concerning directions for future research are offered in section 8.5.

2. Prior to 1983, the homeowners' housing component of the official CPI series was based on the cost of purchasing a home; in 1983, it was changed to reflect the value of rental services received by owners. The CPI-U-X1 uses available information to construct a "rental equivalence" measure of owners' housing costs for the pre-1983 period that is as consistent as possible with the measure for more recent years.

3. Our initial approach to adjusting for top-coding was to model the top-coded data for each year as the right-hand tail of a Pareto distribution. Although this approach generated mean earnings estimates that seemed sensible for individual years, the implied year-to-year changes in earnings, especially those surrounding the change in the CPSQS top-code from $999 in 1988 to $1,923 in 1989, were not sensible. Following Murphy and Welch (1992a), we therefore adopted the simpler expedient of multiplying all top-coded values by 1.50 prior to averaging. Others who have used a similar approach include Juhn et al. (1993) and Katz and Murphy (1992).
8.2 Trends in Weekly Earnings and Weekly Hours

One way to think about differences across the various available wage series just described is to ask whether they differ because the respondents to the underlying surveys are telling us different things about earnings or because they are telling us different things about hours of work. We begin to answer this question by looking at the trends in weekly earnings and weekly hours associated with each of the four hourly wage series. A relative increase in a particular hourly wage measure could reflect either a relative rise in the associated weekly earnings series or a relative decline in the associated weekly hours series. One complication is that, whereas both the NIPA and the CES data measure the average weekly earnings and hours associated with jobs, both the March CPS and the CPSQS data refer to the earnings and hours of individuals. In assessing the trends in the data, therefore, we include an assessment of the likely impact of these differences.

8.2.1 Weekly Earnings versus Weekly Hours Effects

One of the trend comparisons highlighted earlier was the decline in the CES hourly wage relative to the March CPS, the CPSQS, and, especially, the NIPA hourly wage. As can be seen in figure 8.2, CES weekly earnings have fallen sharply relative to all three of the other weekly earnings series. Between 1973 and 1993, CES real weekly earnings fell by 16.1 percent. Over the same period, each of the other three weekly earnings measures held relatively stable, with NIPA real weekly earnings rising by 1.8 percent, March CPS real weekly earnings falling by 0.7 percent, and CPSQS real weekly earnings rising by 0.4 percent. The decline in CES weekly earnings relative to the two CPS weekly earnings series is considerably more pronounced than the corresponding relative decline in CES hourly wages.4

Average weekly hours from all four sources are shown in figure 8.3. Not surprisingly given that the NIPA hours estimates are based principally on CES data, NIPA and CES hours have similar trends; between 1973 and 1993, average weekly NIPA hours dropped by 5.2 percent and average weekly CES hours by 6.5 percent.5 In contrast, over the same period, March CPS hours fell by just 1.4 percent, and CPSQS hours were essentially unchanged. The relative decline in CES hourly earnings as compared to CPS hourly earnings caused by the relative decline in CES weekly earnings would have been larger but for the offsetting effect of the relative decline in CES weekly hours.

4. Between 1973 and 1993, the logarithm of the CES average hourly wage fell by 0.115 relative to the logarithm of the March CPS average hourly wage and by 0.111 relative to the logarithm of the CPSQS average hourly wage. Over the same period, the logarithm of the CES average weekly wage declined 0.168 relative to the corresponding March CPS series and 0.179 relative to the corresponding CPSQS series.

5. The levels of the CES and NIPA weekly hours series differ principally because the CES series employs an hours paid concept, whereas the NIPA series employs an hours worked concept. The main difference between hours paid and hours worked is that the latter excludes paid leave.
One implication of these patterns is that any explanation for the divergence of the CES hourly wage from other available hourly wage series should focus on reported earnings rather than reported hours. A second implication is that understanding the growth in NIPA hourly earnings relative to March CPS and CPSQS hourly earnings requires that we understand the relative decline in reported NIPA weekly hours.

These conclusions are borne out by more formal decompositions of the differences between each of the various possible hourly wage series pairs into a weekly earnings piece and a weekly hours piece. Consider, for example, the log difference between the CES hourly wage and the NIPA hourly wage:
\[
\ln(\text{CES hourly wage}) - \ln(\text{NIPA hourly wage}) = [\ln(\text{CES weekly earnings}) - \ln(\text{CES weekly hours})]
\]
\[
- [\ln(\text{NIPA weekly earnings}) - \ln(\text{NIPA weekly hours})]
\]
\[
= [\ln(\text{CES weekly earnings}) - \ln(\text{NIPA weekly earnings})]
\]
\[
+ [\ln(\text{NIPA weekly hours}) - \ln(\text{CES weekly hours})].
\]

The first term in brackets on the right-hand side of the second equal sign is the contribution of differences in weekly earnings derived from the two data sources to differences in the hourly wage; the second term in brackets is the contribution of differences in weekly hours. Similar decompositions of the differences between any wage series pair can be performed.

The log difference between the CES and the NIPA hourly wage, together with the contributions of weekly earnings and weekly hours to this difference, is graphed in figure 8.4A. The figure makes clear that the divergence between CES and NIPA hourly earnings is attributable entirely to the divergence in weekly earnings. As shown in figures 8.4B and 8.4C, the same is true of the divergence between CES and CPS hourly earnings, which would have been even larger but for the offsetting effect of the relative decline in average CES hours.

Another trend comparison highlighted in our earlier discussion was the growth in the NIPA hourly wage relative to both the March CPS and the CPSQS wage. Figure 8.4D focuses on the divergence between the NIPA and the March CPS hourly wage, and figure 8.4E offers a similar decomposition of the difference between the NIPA and the CPSQS hourly wage. In both cases, weekly earnings as measured by the NIPA versus the CPS have exhibited little trend relative to one another, and the trend divergence in the NIPA versus the CPS hourly wage principally reflects a trend divergence in the measures of weekly hours.6

For completeness, figure 8.4F decomposes the difference between the March CPS and CPSQS hourly wage over time. Although the two series do not move in lockstep, they also have exhibited no systematic divergence. The similarity in these two series' trends suggests that differences in earnings concepts are unlikely to explain the divergences between other hourly wage series pairs: the March CPS earnings concept is very inclusive, while the CPSQS earnings concept is relatively restrictive, yet the two earnings series have behaved similarly.

6. Between 1973 and 1993, the logarithm of the NIPA hourly wage rose by 0.064 relative to the logarithm of the March CPS hourly wage; 62 percent of this net relative growth was attributable to a decline in NIPA hours relative to March CPS hours. Over the same period, the logarithm of the NIPA hourly wage rose by 0.068 relative to the logarithm of the CPSQS hourly wage; 79 percent of this net relative growth was due to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours.
8.2.2 Adjusting for Multiple Job Holding

A remaining question is whether the findings just summarized are affected by taking into account the fact that the CES and NIPA data are reported on a job basis, whereas the March CPS and CPSQS data are reported on a person basis. Because individuals may hold more than one job, the two are not equivalent. The incidence of multiple job holding has risen since the late 1970s, and multiple job holders generally earn less and work fewer hours on their second jobs than on their first jobs. These facts imply that weekly earnings and weekly hours per person likely have risen relative to their per job values, which in turn implies that the decompositions just reported could be misleading.

The most natural approach to assessing the importance of reporting on different bases is to convert the CES and NIPA data from a job basis to a person basis, or, alternatively, to convert the CPS series from a person basis to a job basis, and then repeat our decomposition analysis. Because the only available data on multiple job holding are CPS data, we have adopted the latter approach.

Questions about multiple job holding were asked on May CPS supplements in 1962–66, 1969–80, 1985, 1989, and 1991 and have been asked as part of the basic CPS in every month since January 1994. The May 1985 and May 1989 supplements also asked about individuals’ earnings and hours on their second jobs. With some interpolation, these data provide a reasonably good time series on the aggregate incidence of multiple job holding. After generally fluctuating between 4.5 and 5.2 percent from 1962 through 1980, the multiple job holding rate began to rise, growing from 4.9 percent in May 1980 to 6.2 percent in May 1989 and remaining at or above 6.0 percent in May of all years since that time for which data are available. The available information does not allow any strong conclusions about the trend in either second job earnings or second job hours.

Were we using March CPS earnings and hours data for all employed persons, conversion from a person to a job basis would be relatively straightforward. The March CPS earnings and hours information covers all jobs an individual may have held. Ignoring jobs beyond the second job, the total job count equals the number of employed persons times one plus the multiple job holding rate (hereafter MJH). Conversion of the March CPS average weekly earnings and average weekly hours series from a person basis to a job basis then would require only that both be divided by 1 + MJH.

Because we have restricted our March CPS universe to individuals whose primary employment was a private nonagricultural wage and salary job, the

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7. The new CPS questionnaire provides information on multiple job holding in every month of the year, not just in May. Data for 1994, 1995, and 1996 suggest that multiple job holding in May is comparable to the average for the year as a whole.

8. Persons holding three or more jobs account for only a small share of all multiple job holders. In May 1994, e.g., just 7 percent of multiple job holders held three or more jobs.
appropriate adjustment to the person-based data is a bit more complex. First, the multiple job holding rate among such individuals may differ from the overall rate. In addition, some of those whose primary job is a private sector nonagricultural wage and salary position may have a second job that is not; conversely, some of those whose primary job places them outside of our universe may have a second job that we would like to include.

Conversion of the CPSQS weekly earnings and weekly hours series from a person to a job basis raises similar issues. The CPSQS series covers only the
main job held by each respondent. Were we adjusting series that covered all employed persons, average per job weekly earnings could be expressed as

$$\text{MAINEARN}_i(1 + \text{MJH}_i \ast \text{RATIO}_i)/(1 + \text{MJH}_i),$$

where MAINEARN represents average weekly earnings on the main job, RATIO equals the ratio of average weekly earnings on the second job to average weekly earnings on the main job among the population of multiple job holders, and MJH is as before. Similarly, average per job weekly hours could be expressed as

$$(\text{MAINHRS}_i + \text{MJH}_i \ast \text{SECONDHRS}_i)/(1 + \text{MJH}_i),$$
where MAINHRS represents average weekly hours on the main job, SECONDHRS represents average weekly hours on the second job among the population of multiple job holders, and MJH is as before. In this case, then, a conversion from person-based to job-based reporting would require year-by-year information not only on the multiple job holding rate but also on the earnings and hours associated with second jobs. In addition, as with the March CPS series, further complications arise as a consequence of the fact that we have restricted our CPSQS universe to individuals whose primary job is a private nonagricultural wage and salary position.

Available published information for May 1985, May 1989, May 1991, and May 1994 indicates that the multiple job holding rate for private sector nonagricultural wage and salary workers averaged about 0.33 percentage points less than the multiple job holding rate for all employed persons, with the discrepancy exhibiting no consistent trend. We subtract this amount from the published overall multiple job holding rate for all years to arrive at our estimate of the rate that applies to our samples. Based on data from the May 1985 and May 1989 supplements, we assume that earnings on the second job average 30 percent of earnings on the main job and that individuals holding second jobs work on them an average of 14 hours per week. In addition, absent published data that would allow us to do better, we assume that second jobs outside of the nonagricultural private sector wage and salary universe held by persons whose primary jobs fall within that universe are approximately offset by an equivalent number of otherwise similar second jobs that fall within the universe held by persons whose primary jobs are excluded.

By construction, conversion of the March CPS data from a person to a job basis does not affect our estimates of average hourly earnings. Conversion of the CPSQS data had a negligible effect, reflecting the assumed stability of the ratio of average second job earnings to average main job earnings and of average hours on the second job, together with the fact that reported average hours on the main job have not changed much over time.

After conversion to a job basis, both CPS weekly earnings series and both CPS weekly hours series decline slightly over time rather than holding more or less stable. Because CES weekly hours still decline more sharply than CPS weekly hours, the weekly earnings effect continues to explain more than fully the divergence of CES from CPS hourly earnings. With both series on a job basis, however, weekly earnings are somewhat more important, and weekly hours somewhat less important, in explaining the divergences between NIPA and CPS average hourly earnings. Using adjusted rather than unadjusted data, the share of the 1973–93 growth in the logarithm of the NIPA versus the March CPS hourly wages attributable to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours falls from 62 to 47 percent (roughly a 3.0 percent hourly wage divergence), and the share of the 1973–93 growth in the logarithm of the NIPA versus the CPSQS hourly wage due to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours falls from 79 to 70 percent (roughly a 4.8 percent hourly wage divergence).
In short, putting all of the data on a per job basis alters our estimates of the precise contributions of weekly earnings and weekly hours to observed hourly wage divergences. It does not, however, change either our conclusion that understanding the anomalous behavior of CES hourly earnings requires a focus on weekly earnings rather than weekly hours or our conclusion that understanding the quite different trends in employer-reported and worker-reported hours is critical to a full understanding of the divergence of the NIPA from the CPS hourly earnings measures.

8.3 Comparison of CES against NIPA and CPS Weekly Earnings

As was noted earlier, there are marked differences in trend between the CES and the other weekly earnings series. Between 1973 and 1993, CES real weekly earnings dropped by more than 16 percent. Over the same period, NIPA weekly earnings rose by 1.8 percent; even after conversion to a job basis, March CPS weekly earnings fell by just 1.6 percent and CPSQS weekly earnings by just 0.3 percent. Put slightly differently, CES weekly earnings have declined by about 14 to 18 percent relative to the other weekly earnings measures. The very different behavior of CES weekly earnings is responsible for the significant divergence of the CES from the other hourly earnings series. In this section, we consider three possible explanations for the differences between the trend in CES weekly earnings as compared with the trends in NIPA, March CPS, and CPSQS weekly earnings. These are (1) problems related to the underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES sample, (2) differences in the earnings concepts employed across data series, and (3) differences in the worker populations covered.

8.3.1 Underrepresentation of Young Establishments in the Current Employment Statistics Sample

One possible explanation for the divergence of the CES weekly earnings series from the other earnings series is that the underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES sample could have biased its trend downward. Although this soon will change as a consequence of a major redesign of the survey announced in June 1995, the CES sample historically was not rotated on any regular schedule. Establishments that agreed to participate often remained in the sample for many years.

Making use of establishment “birth dates” that are recorded in the unemployment insurance (UI) microdata files, we have used data from five states (Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) to assess the representativeness of the CES sample with respect to the distribution of establishment age. An establishment’s birth date is the date of the last UI reporting change recorded for it, reflecting the date at which the establishment first became liable for UI tax payments or the date of any subsequent change in ownership or reporting configuration. Generally speaking, the recorded birth date
should provide a fairly accurate indication of age for single establishments, though its interpretation is considerably more problematic for establishments that are part of larger enterprises. Comparing the CES sample to the UI universe in the five states shows that, as of the second quarter of 1993, establishments under four years old accounted for just 13 percent of the total employment of singles in the CES panel, compared with 26 percent of employment in the universe of singles covered by the UI system. Single establishments four to eight years of age also were somewhat underrepresented in the CES sample, accounting for 16 percent of singles' employment there as compared with 21 percent of singles' employment in the UI universe.

These discrepancies could at least partially reflect lower CES sampling ratios in industry-establishment-size cells with a relatively large share of young establishments. Even when we weighted the CES data to account for differences in sampling ratios across industry-establishment-size cells, however, singles zero to three years old accounted for only 14 percent, and singles four to eight years old for just 17 percent, of the weighted total employment of singles in the CES panel (vs. 26 and 21 percent, respectively, of singles' employment in the UI universe).

It long has been recognized that problems with the representativeness of the CES sample might affect the monthly employment estimates. Once each year, those estimates are benchmarked to data for the universe of UI-covered establishments (and other benchmark data for the small noncovered sector). Moreover, the monthly employment estimates as reported prior to benchmarking include a so-called bias adjustment, which is designed based on historical experience to account for the likely discrepancy between the sample-based employment trend and the employment trend for the universe of establishments. The CES earnings and hours data, however, are not benchmarked, as there is no suitable source of data available for that purpose, and, for the same reason, are not subject to bias adjustment, though the CES earnings and hours aggregates are affected by the benchmarking of the employment data used in constructing the earnings and hours weights.

The problems that sample unrepresentativeness causes for the monthly estimation of employment have been well documented (see U.S. Department of Labor 1994, 1995) and, indeed, have motivated the thoroughgoing redesign of the CES program in progress at this writing. The underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES panel appears to have been the principal source of these problems. Young establishments (those up to three years old) grow more
rapidly, on average, than older establishments, so their underrepresentation in the CES panel has meant that, absent bias adjustment, estimated month-to-month employment growth would have been systematically understated.11

Problems with sample representativeness also have been cited as a potential source of bias in the CES earnings estimates (see, e.g., American Statistical Association Panel 1993; Bosworth and Perry 1994). Even if there are systematic differences in the level and growth rate of wages at younger versus older establishments, however, underrepresentation of young establishments need not bias the estimated wage trend. Consider, for example, a hypothetical situation in which wages at younger establishments start out below those paid by established firms and then catch up over time. In this scenario, wages at younger establishments will be lower and will grow faster than wages at older establishments. Unless, however, there are changes in the proportion by which new establishments’ wages initially fall short of those paid by established concerns, in the length of time it takes for young establishments’ wages to catch up, or in the shares of employment accounted for by establishments of different ages, a CES panel on which the underrepresentation of younger establishments was relatively consistent over time—even a panel that included no younger establishments—would provide a valid estimate of the trend growth in average earnings.

Problems could arise as a consequence of differences in wage levels for younger versus older establishments if the composition of the CES sample were to change significantly over time. Examination of the “link and taper” estimator used for CES weekly earnings and weekly hours estimation cells may help to make clear how this might happen. This estimator is

\[
X_c = (0.9 \ X_p + 0.1 \ x_p) + (x_c - x_p),
\]

which can be rewritten

\[
X_c = [X_p + (x_c - x_p)] + 0.1 \ [x_p - X_p].
\]

11. Another characteristic of the CES sample is that, by design, small establishments are less likely than large establishments to be included. For sample selection purposes, the universe of establishments is stratified by industry (generally at the four-digit level within manufacturing and the three-digit level outside of manufacturing) and size (generally into six employment size bands, consisting of establishments employing 0–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–99, 100–249, and 250+ employees). As documented in U.S. Department of Labor (1989), sampling ratios for the survey vary significantly with establishment size. Sample establishments are not assigned weights that reflect these sampling ratios, but the cells used for estimation are stratified by industry and, in most cases outside of manufacturing, by establishment size. Use of the same size stratification bands for estimation as for sample selection would be equivalent to weighting establishments in inverse proportion to their probability of selection. Because the size stratification bands used for estimation are coarser than those used for sample selection, larger establishments within estimation size bands tend to receive disproportionate weight. In contrast to expanding the representation of young establishments in the sample, however, the use of finer vs. coarser firm size stratification bands for estimation purposes appears to have a relatively limited effect on the employment estimates (see U.S. Department of Labor 1994, 1995).
where $X$ represents the published estimates, $x$ represents the average value for the sample of matched establishments reporting in both the current month and the prior month, $c$ denotes the current month, and $p$ denotes the prior month. In the event of a change in sample composition that leads to a systematic divergence between the sample average value and the published estimate ($x - X$), this estimator ensures that the published figures will move toward the sample average value over time (for additional details, see U.S. Department of Labor 1997). In consequence, shifts in the composition of the survey sample could affect the trend in the published estimates.

The CES sample grew from about 166,000 to about 330,000 establishments between 1980 and 1993; the increase was spread fairly evenly over that period. This expansion likely led to better representation of younger establishments, and especially small younger establishments, at least compared to their representation prior to 1980. The best information on the relative earnings of workers employed by younger versus older establishments of which we are aware derives from the UI universe files in which establishments' birth dates are recorded. As already noted, the administrative context within which these dates are recorded makes them more suitable for determining the economic age of single establishments than of establishments that are part of larger enterprises. UI data for Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania indicate that workers' earnings at young single establishments tend to be systematically lower than those paid at more established concerns. Factoring out differences in the two-digit industry and establishment size distribution of employment for establishments of different ages, monthly earnings at the youngest single establishments in the UI universe (those zero to three years old) averaged 11.8 percent lower, and monthly earnings at intermediate-aged singles in the same universe (those four to eight years old) averaged 6.4 percent lower, as of the second quarter of 1993 than those at the oldest single establishments (those nine or more years old). Under the assumption that comparisons of weekly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers (not available in the UI records) would have yielded similar differences by age of establishment, these figures suggest that, although likely improving the estimates of weekly wage levels, increased representation of young establishments in the CES sample could have contributed a downward bias to the estimated trend in those levels.

12. Representation of young establishments may not have increased over the period from 1980 forward, as young establishments brought into the sample at the beginning of the 1980s no longer would have been especially young by the early 1990s.

13. We use data for 1993:2 rather than annual average 1993 data because of concern that shifts in the timing of bonus payments across calendar years, from 1993:1 back to 1992:4, due to anticipated tax law changes, could have distorted the annual average figures. We control for industry and size of establishment in these calculations because the CES earnings estimates make use of UI employment weights associated with estimation cells defined by industry and establishment size, and an average difference between younger and older establishments' average earnings calculated on a similar, though somewhat cruder, basis thus seems most appropriate for our purposes.
Interestingly, when we repeated the calculations just described using monthly earnings data only for those singles that were part of the CES panel, but retaining employment weights for industry-establishment-size cells derived from the full universe of singles, we found that the difference in average earnings between singles zero to three years old and singles nine or more years old was only 70 percent as large as that based on earnings data for the full universe of singles. In other words, the earnings of workers at the youngest CES singles were somewhat closer to those of older singles’ employees than those of the typical young single’s employees. This does not, however, change the conclusion that increased representation of young establishments in the CES sample could have contributed a downward tilt to the CES earnings trend.

One still must ask how important this effect could have been. To attempt a rough answer to this question, we carried out a simple experiment. First, we estimated average monthly earnings in the CES sample using UI employment weights for industry-establishment-size cells and monthly earnings for the CES establishments in each cell. This simulates the CES estimator, which stratifies the sample by industry and size and then weights each cell’s importance using employment figures that are benchmarked to the UI universe each year. The resulting estimate should provide a crude approximation to the estimate that would be obtained by the application of CES earnings estimation procedures in this sample (assuming, as discussed above, that estimated earnings move toward the weighted sample average). We then recomputed this average, first dropping all CES singles aged zero to three years, and then dropping all CES singles less than nine years old, from the computations. Our CES-like estimate of average monthly earnings is only 1.1 percent higher than the estimate excluding the youngest establishments, and only 2.5 percent higher than the estimate excluding all establishments under nine years old. Even the larger figure is only one-sixth as large as the relative decline in CES weekly earnings we seek to explain.

The actual shift in CES sample composition, moreover, undoubtedly was less marked than that we have simulated, as even the pre-1980 CES panel would have contained some younger establishments. In short, although we suspect that the CES sample expansion had some effect on the trend in CES average weekly earnings, that effect most likely was relatively modest, perhaps no more than a percentage point, though we are unable to provide a precise quantification.  

14 The fact that the data available on employment and relative earnings by age of establishment refer only to the population of singles means that all of the calculations just described should be viewed as illustrative. To assess whether our results could have been affected by imperfect identification of the 1993:2 CES panel using the 1994:2 crosswalk file, we repeated the calculations just described using data for 1994:2. None of our findings were materially affected.

The increase in CES sample size also led to an increase in the representation of small establishments in the panel, though, due to the lower sampling ratios for small establishments, they continue to account for a smaller share of panel employment than of total employment. Because the CES program long has made use of estimation cells stratified by establishment size, however, this
### Table 8.1  Items Included in Alternative Earnings Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>NIPA</th>
<th>CES</th>
<th>March CPS</th>
<th>CPSQS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross wages and salaries, prior to deductions for such things as social security, tax withholding, insurance, and salary reduction plans</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, if earned and paid at least monthly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, if usual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonuses</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, if earned and paid each pay period</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, if usual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tips</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, if usual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments in kind</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer 401(k) contributions</td>
<td>Yes, in some states</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer contributions for such things as social security, unemployment insurance, and other insurance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### 8.3.2 Narrower Definition of Earnings in the Current Employment Statistics

A second possible explanation for the slower growth in CES average weekly earnings relative to other weekly earnings measures is that payments excluded from the CES but included in other measures have grown in importance over time. Table 8.1 summarizes the differences in the earnings concepts underlying the different available measures; additional details are provided in the data appendix. The CES earnings concept is the most restrictive of the four shown in the table. In contrast to the NIPA and March CPS measures (but not the CPSQS measure), CES average weekly earnings exclude bonus payments unless they are earned and paid each pay period; excluded bonuses have become a larger share of total compensation in recent years. Tips are included in the other earnings series but are excluded from the CES data. In principle, earnings in all of the series are reported before deductions for 401(k) and other salary reduction plans; in practice, there is evidence that some proportion of employ-
ers report earnings net of these deductions in their CES payroll reports. Because contributions to these plans have grown in importance over time, this underreporting conceivably also could have contributed to the relative decline of CES earnings, though only if one assumes that they are not similarly underreported in the NIPA and CPS data.15

Although the restrictiveness of the CES earnings concept may have contributed to the relative decline of CES weekly earnings, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the effect cannot have been very large. Consider first the potential impact of excluding from CES earnings bonuses not earned and paid routinely as part of workers' regular wages. The similar behavior of March CPS earnings (which include such bonuses) and CPSQS earnings (which do not) suggests that this exclusion does not explain the divergent behavior of CES earnings. Moreover, despite their rapid growth, such bonuses are still a small share of total earnings. According to BLS Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) figures, so-called nonproduction bonuses and other lump-sum payments added 1.4 percent to earnings received in the form of wages and salaries, commissions, and other more routine incentive payments in March 1993, compared with 1.1 percent in March 1987.16 Although published ECEC data are unavailable prior to 1987, ECI data suggest that, between 1980 and 1987, this category of payments grew no more rapidly than earnings overall.17 The exclusion of nonproduction bonuses thus would appear to account for no more than about 0.3 percentage points of the very much larger relative decline in CES weekly earnings.

Any divergence between CES weekly earnings and the other weekly earnings series attributable to changes in the reporting of tip income similarly seems likely to have been modest. In the process of preparing the national accounts, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates both the dollar amount of tips included in reported earnings of UI-covered workers (reported tips) and the dollar amount of tips not reflected there (unreported tips). Published NIPA compensation estimates incorporate an adjustment for unreported tips. The Bureau of Economic Analysis's estimates of total tip income imply that tips contributed $4.49 to average weekly NIPA earnings of $499.99 in 1993, up from $2.79 contributed to real average weekly earnings of $491.17 in 1973. These figures suggest that the relative importance of tip income has grown over this period but that the growth has been modest: NIPA weekly earnings in 1993 would have been only about 0.3 percent lower had the share of tips in average weekly earnings remained at its 1973 level.

15. This assumption may be plausible at least with respect to the NIPA data, which are derived from reports filed for unemployment compensation administration purposes; employers may have some incentive to ensure that the amounts shown on these reports are accurate.

16. The share of production and nonsupervisory workers' compensation paid as bonuses is lower than that for all employees, but the increase in share in recent years has been of a comparable magnitude.

17. ECEC and ECI data are not strictly comparable, as the former reflect the effects of shifts in industry and occupation mix that are held constant in the latter.
Another possibility we considered is that the failure of some CES respondents to include employees' 401(k) and flexible spending account contributions in reported earnings could explain why CES earnings look so different. Insofar as similar reporting problems equally well might have affected other earnings measures, there is reason to doubt that this explains the facts in question. Nonetheless, we ask whether the growth in salary reduction plans has been sufficient to explain the large divergence between the CES and the other earnings measures. Interviews with 3,400 CES respondents conducted by telephone in fall 1994 as part of an informal effort designed to improve understanding of CES reporting indicated that about 10 percent of establishments that had such plans reported earnings net of 401(k) and flexible spending deductions. Data from various sources suggest that roughly 25 percent of the workforce participated in a 401(k) plan as of the end of 1993, with perhaps half that many participating in a flexible spending plan. Participants' 401(k) contributions appear to have averaged under 10 percent of earnings; we have no data on flexible spending plan contributions, but we guess that 5 percent of earnings might be a plausible average for participants' contributions.\textsuperscript{18} Although they were written into law as part of the Revenue Act of 1978, Treasury Department regulations governing 401(k) and flexible spending plans were not issued until the early 1980s; contributions to such plans were negligible prior to that point. The impact of a 10 percent underreporting of such contributions would have been to reduce the cumulative decline of CES earnings by less than 0.3 percent between 1973 and 1993, a small fraction of the trend gap to be explained.

In sum, there are several types of payments that are at least partially excluded from CES earnings and that have become a more important part of the earnings captured in the other earnings series since the late 1970s. Although the exclusion from the CES of payments in each of these categories may have accounted for a small part of the divergence between CES weekly earnings and the other weekly earnings measures, the evidence we have examined suggests that, taken together, they account for no more than a small share—perhaps a percentage point—of the roughly 14 to 18 percentage point divergence over the period from 1973 to 1993 that we seek to explain.

8.3.3 Different Worker Coverage in the Current Employment Statistics

A final possibility is that the CES earnings series diverges from the NIPA and CPS earnings series because it covers different workers. The NIPA series and both of the CPS series cover workers in all occupations; in contrast, the CES series is defined to cover only production and nonsupervisory workers.

\textsuperscript{18} Estimated 401(k) participation and contribution rates and estimated flexible spending plan participation rates, based on the May 1988 and April 1993 CPS benefit supplements and Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Form 5500 data, are reported in Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Briefs nos. 141 (September 1993), 144 (December 1993), and 155 (November 1994) and Reno (1993).
The fact that the CES weekly earnings series lies below the others is not surprising in view of its more limited coverage: one would expect the average earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers to be lower than the overall average. For the difference in coverage to explain the divergent trend in CES earnings, however, either the production and nonsupervisory share of total employment must have fallen sharply over time, so that the gap between production and nonsupervisory and overall average earnings has grown, or the earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers must have fallen—indeed, fallen significantly—relative to the earnings of nonproduction and supervisory workers. CES data provide little if any evidence that a falling production and nonsupervisory share of employment has contributed to the divergent wage trend. The production and nonsupervisory share of employment fell from 82.8 percent in 1973 to 80.7 percent in 1982, but over the period since 1980 when the divergence between the CES and the other earnings series has been most pronounced, the production and nonsupervisory share of employment has hovered between 80.7 and 81.4 percent, exhibiting some cyclical variation but no trend.

Is there any evidence, then, that the earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers have risen less rapidly than the earnings of other workers? Or, to put the question somewhat differently, had the data from other sources been restricted to information for the CES production and nonsupervisory population, would average weekly earnings from those sources have looked more like the CES series? Given the well-documented and dramatic growth in the inequality of earnings during the 1980s, it seems reasonable to suppose that they might have.

As one approach to providing a more rigorous answer to this question, we attempted to identify those in the CPSQS whose reported occupations were consistent with their employers' classifying them as production or nonsupervisory; then we looked at the trend in those workers' earnings.19 As shown in figure 8.5, individuals in this group (labeled "CES Replication 1") had lower wages than the average for all private nonagricultural wage and salary workers, but the trends in the two groups' earnings were very similar—and very different from the trend in actual CES earnings.20

A possible explanation for our failure to reproduce the trend in CES weekly

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19. The classification scheme we used is essentially that underlying the ECI and ECEC series for production and nonsupervisory workers. Briefly, all who were reported to be employed as managers were excluded from the production and nonsupervisory group. Professional, technical, sales, and clerical workers were excluded if employed in mining, construction, or manufacturing, but included otherwise.

20. The ECI and the ECEC wage and salary series for production and nonsupervisory workers also have moved similarly to the corresponding series for all private sector workers. As we noted earlier, the ECEC data conceptually are more comparable than the ECI data to the series on which the present paper focuses. Over the period from 1987 forward, the ECI data exhibit a trend similar to that of the CPSQS data, and the ECEC data register real wage declines that are comparable in magnitude to those in the CES data. The behavior of the ECI and ECEC series is a subject that merits further study.
earnings using this first approach is that the employers who supply CES data commonly report for a group different than that called for by the CES definitions. Particularly outside of the goods-producing sector, the production and nonsupervisory classification is not one that employers would use for any other purpose. At least some employers might, for example, be supplying earnings data for hourly paid workers instead.21 Interestingly, as can be seen in figure 8.5, average weekly earnings of CPS respondents paid on an hourly basis have tracked CES earnings more closely than those of the replication 1 group. Between 1973 and 1993, CES weekly earnings fell by 16.1 percent; over the same period, CPSQS weekly earnings for those paid by the hour fell by 10.5 percent. Hourly paid workers, however, account for only about 60 percent of total private nonagricultural wage and salary employment, whereas the CES production and nonsupervisory group accounts for about 80 percent.

Another possibility is that some employers are reporting the earnings of nonexempt workers, a larger group that includes hourly paid workers and, moreover, a group that they would need to be able to identify for other purposes. To assess this possibility, we attempted to identify those CPS respondents whom employers would classify as being nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which is the law that established the minimum wage and governs eligibility for overtime payments.22 As a check on whether this could be the group for whom employers were reporting, we compared the industry-by-industry data for replication 1 with actual CES earnings.

21. The best direct evidence on this comes from a response analysis survey of CES respondents conducted in 1981. Whether an employee was hourly paid or salaried was used by 18 percent of establishments to distinguish between production and nonsupervisory employees and other employees for CES reporting purposes. Fewer than half of establishments reported that their payroll records contained sufficient information to allow production and nonsupervisory status to be determined based on the nature of the work an employee performed. See U.S. Department of Labor (1983).

22. There are several important differences between our first production and nonsupervisory classification and this second nonexempt classification. First, we categorized everyone paid by the hour as nonexempt, regardless of their industry and occupation. Second, for those not paid by the hour, classification as nonexempt is based purely on occupation, rather than on industry and occupation. Outside of manufacturing, professionals generally were included in our synthetic nonsupervisory group but excluded from our synthetic nonexempt group.
proportions of employment both in our synthetic production and nonsupervisory group and in our synthetic nonexempt group with the actual CES production and nonsupervisory employment proportions. These comparisons suggested that, although goods-producing employers more likely were reporting data for production workers, employers outside the goods-producing sector could have been reporting for nonexempt rather than for nonsupervisory employees. We therefore proceeded to identify in the CPS data, as best we were able, production workers in the goods-producing sector and nonexempt workers outside of the goods-producing sector. As can be seen in figure 8.5, weekly earnings for this hybrid group (labeled “CES Replication 2”) came closer to tracking actual CES weekly earnings than did earnings of our first synthetic CES group, falling by 9.9 percent over the 1973–93 period as compared with the 16.1 percent decline over the same period in the CES series.\footnote{Because the March supplements do not include a question about whether individuals were paid hourly, no similar calculations could be carried out using March CPS data.}

As already noted, both the expansion of the CES sample during the 1980s and the relative narrowness of the CES earnings concept likely have made modest contributions to the relative decline of CES weekly earnings. Taking all of the available evidence into account, however, the most important factor causing CES weekly earnings to diverge from the other available weekly earnings measures appears to have been that the CES earnings cover a different worker population, a population that has experienced substantial relative earnings declines, though perhaps not precisely the production and nonsupervisory group specified by the formal CES definitions.

\subsection*{8.4 Comparison of NIPA against CPS Weekly Hours}

Between 1973 and 1993, the NIPA workweek fell from 34.7 to 32.9 hours, a decline of 1.8 hours. Over the same period, the March CPS workweek fell from 40.4 to 39.8 hours, and the CPSQS workweek held steady at about 38.5 hours. The fact that NIPA data are reported on a job basis and CPS data on a person basis explains part of the difference in trends. Even converted to a job basis, however, the March CPS workweek declined by only half as much as the NIPA workweek (0.9 hours), and the CPSQS workweek dropped by just 0.2 hour over the 1973–93 period.

Understanding why NIPA and CPS weekly hours have diverged is important for understanding why NIPA and CPS hourly earnings have trended differently. Several possible explanations can be suggested. The NIPA hours series rests on CES data, which are derived from employer payroll records. The CES data cover only production and nonsupervisory workers; in the construction of the NIPA series, it is assumed either that supervisors work a 40-hour workweek (within manufacturing) or that they work the same number of hours as nonsupervisory workers in their industry (outside of manufacturing). Problems with
the hours data reported by CES respondents or with the assumptions used in constructing an all-employee hours series from the CES data thus might account for the NIPA versus CPS discrepancies. Alternatively, the source of the discrepancies might lie with misreporting of CPS hours by household respondents.

We have little to say about potential problems with the CES hours data related to changes in the representativeness of the CES sample. As with CES earnings, the trend in CES hours could have been distorted by changes over time in the representation of young establishments in the CES panel, though there is no clear basis for having any particular prior expectation as to whether workers at younger establishments should work more or fewer hours than their counterparts at more established concerns. Unfortunately, we also know of no comprehensive alternative source of data on average hours at younger versus older establishments that would allow us to evaluate how important any distortion in the estimated CES hours trend attributable to changes in the composition of the CES sample conceivably might be. The fact that sample representativeness appears to explain so little with respect to CES earnings, however, suggests that it may be fair to suppose that it has not greatly affected the behavior of CES hours.

Another question to be considered is whether the hours recorded in employers' payroll records, which serve as the principal source for CES reporting, accurately reflect what actually occurs in the workplace. CES hours paid numbers are converted to an hours worked basis for use in the NIPA. The conversion of hours paid to hours worked uses information from the BLS Hours at Work Survey, which defines hours at work to be equal to hours paid minus hours of recorded paid leave. If, however, employees are expected to perform significant amounts of "off the clock" work, the NIPA series could be misleading. For the purpose of assessing wage trends, the resulting error would be unimportant so long as off-the-clock work had not become more or less important over time but would matter if it had grown or shrunk in importance. While there are some who believe that off-the-clock work increasingly has become expected of employees, we know of no hard evidence bearing on the level of such activity or, more important, on its trend.

The assumptions concerning nonproduction and supervisory hours as compared to production and nonsupervisory hours that underlie the NIPA hours series also could be questioned. Any upward trend in nonproduction workers' hours in manufacturing, or in supervisory hours relative to nonsupervisory hours outside of manufacturing, would be missed by the NIPA calculations. This could have led to a spurious downward drift in NIPA average weekly hours. A quick-and-dirty check on whether this might have occurred may be carried out by examining the trends in average weekly hours for workers categorized as production or nonexempt versus nonproduction or exempt using CPSQS data, where the former consists of the CES replication 2 group discussed in the previous section of the paper and the latter of its obverse.
Figure 8.6 displays average weekly hours for these groups constructed using CPSQS data. For reference, the figure also plots overall CPSQS average weekly hours. The hours of non-CES individuals, as best we can identify them in the CPS, appear to have risen relative to the hours of those covered by the CES hours questions. Between 1973 and 1993, the average weekly hours of CPS production or nonexempt workers declined by 0.7 hours, while the average weekly hours of CPS nonproduction or exempt workers rose 0.9 hours.

Assuming that the discrepancies in the hours trends for workers reported on and not reported on by CES respondents are of a similar magnitude, the assumptions that underlie the NIPA hours calculations could impart a significant bias to the NIPA hours trend. We have carried out some simple calculations intended to give a rough idea of the possible magnitude of this bias. Our approach is to use the CPS data to replicate the NIPA hours calculations, imposing the assumptions that non-CES workers in manufacturing work 40 hours per week and that non-CES workers outside of manufacturing work the same hours as do CES workers in their one-digit industry, and then to compare the synthetic NIPA series to the actual CPSQS series. Over the period 1973–93, the synthetic NIPA average hours series fell from 37.2 to 36.8 hours per week, a decline of 0.4 hours. In contrast, overall CPSQS average weekly hours, reported comparably on a person basis, held steady at 38.5 hours. All of this assumes, of course, that workers’ reporting of their hours is accurate. As we will discuss shortly, there is some evidence that individuals tend to overreport their hours of work, that this tendency may be more pronounced among exempt than among nonexempt workers, and that it may have worsened over time. If so, the NIPA assumptions may be more accurate than these calculations suggest. Still, our admittedly crude calculations suggest that problems with the underlying assumptions could have imparted a spurious downward drift to NIPA hours.

Could this fully explain the divergence between NIPA and CPS hours? Actual NIPA hours fell from 34.7 to 32.9 hours per week over the period 1973–93, a decline of 1.8 hours. Measured on a job basis, as is most appropriate for direct comparison with the NIPA series, the March CPS average hourly work-
week declined by only 0.9 hours over the 1973–93 period and the CPSQS average hourly workweek declined by just 0.2 hours. The total divergence between the NIPA and the CPS hours series to be explained thus is about 0.9 hours for NIPA versus the March CPS and 1.6 hours for NIPA versus the CPSQS. Even taking our calculations regarding possible spurious drift in the NIPA measure at face value, problems with the assumptions used in its construction account for only a fraction of the 0.9 to 1.6 hour growth in the discrepancy between NIPA and CPS hours. We conclude, therefore, that this cannot be the whole story and turn to the possibility that the trend in CPS hours might be biased.

For some time, it has been recognized that there is considerable noise in CPS hours estimates. Errors arise in the case of the March estimates because of imprecision both in the reporting of weeks worked per year and in the reporting of hours worked per week, and in the CPSQS because of imprecision in the reporting of usual weekly hours. In order for misreporting of CPS hours to explain the divergence between the NIPA/CES and CPS hours series, however, it would have to be the case that any such problems had become more serious over time. In particular, it would have to be the case that there had been an increasing tendency for CPS respondents to overreport their hours.

There are some reasons to think that overreporting of hours might indeed have worsened. Intuitively, it seems plausible that workers in factory or similarly structured jobs should be better able to report their hours accurately than workers on jobs where hours of work are more flexible or more variable. It also seems plausible that persons on jobs with less rigid and less stable schedules might be more likely to overreport their hours. An individual who typically arrived at work at 9:00 A.M. and left for home at 7:00 P.M., for example, might say that she worked a 50-hour workweek, even though she commonly ran errands or engaged in other personal business during that period of time. On certain types of jobs, there may be an ethic that says that good employees work more hours; persons in such jobs also may tend to overreport their hours. Changes in the occupational mix of employment, away from production jobs and toward managerial and professional jobs, or a shift toward greater flexibility in work-scheduling practices more generally, thus might have produced increased overreporting of hours.

There is some direct evidence that workers report working more hours than their employers say they work. Mellow and Sider (1983) examine data from a CPS sample matched with employer records so that individuals' answers to a question concerning their usual weekly hours could be compared to their employers' answers to the same question. On average, the CPS respondents report working 3.9 percent more hours than their employers say they work. Interestingly, this discrepancy varies across worker groups. Among workers

24. This is one reason why the BLS does not publish hourly wage estimates constructed using CPS annual or weekly earnings responses combined with information on hours of work.
paid by the hour, the hours reported by the individual and by the employer are very close. Among managers and professionals, however, worker-reported hours exceed employer-reported hours by nearly 11 percent. A question about these numbers, of course, is whether the worker-reported or the employer-reported numbers are more accurate.

Another source of evidence on biases in workers' reports of their hours comes from a comparison of worker-reported hours with time diary data. Hamermesh (1990) analyzes data for 1975 and 1981 from the University of Michigan Time Use Study. The data for each year consist of individuals' answers to a question about how many hours they worked last week, together with time diary data for four days—two weekdays, a Saturday, and a Sunday—collected at roughly three-month intervals. A group of about 310 employed individuals provided usable data in 1975; about 80 of these same people were reinterviewed and provided usable data in 1981. Hamermesh uses the diary data for each individual in each year to construct a synthetic workweek. He then compares reported weekly hours to the estimated hours based on the time diary data. His results are striking. First, respondents report working more hours (44.0 hours per week, on average, in 1975) than are recorded in their time diaries (42.5 hours per week, on average, again in 1975). Second, and more important, the data show a growing discrepancy between reported and recorded hours over time. By 1981, in answer to a CPS-like hours question, employed respondents in the reinterviewed subsample reported working an average of 43.3 hours; their time diaries, however, recorded only 39.7 hours of work, a discrepancy of 3.6 hours, more than twice as large as in the 1975 data.

Robinson and Bostrom (1994) report on the results of a similar study that reaches similar conclusions. The data that Robinson and Bostrom study were collected at three separate points in time: 1965, 1975, and 1985. The main difference between the Robinson and Bostrom analysis and the Hamermesh analysis is that Robinson and Bostrom construct synthetic workweeks using data for all of the individuals reporting weekly hours in particular hours intervals (generally five hours in width), rather than pooling diary data for the same individual collected at different times. Robinson and Bostrom report several interesting findings. First, on average, workers appear to overreport their hours of work when answering questions similar to those asked on the CPS. Second, this overreporting is more serious for workers who work more hours than for workers who work fewer hours. Third, the tendency to overreport appears to have worsened over the time period studied by Robinson and Bostrom. Treating their time diary estimates as "truth," workers overreported their workweeks by an average of one hour in 1965, by an average of four hours in 1975, and by an average of seven hours in 1985.

Although neither set of estimates can be treated as definitive, both of the

25. The 1975 data analyzed by Robinson and Bostrom come from the same source as those used by Hamermesh.
studies just described provide evidence both that workers tend to overreport their hours and that the tendency to overreport may have worsened over time. If this conclusion is correct and if the trend toward overreporting continued during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it implies that the CPS data may understate the growth in hourly wages.

8.5 Conclusions

Real average hourly wage growth slowed dramatically during the early 1970s. This slowdown is evident in all four of the series we have analyzed here: the CES, the NIPA, and the two CPS wage measures. Since 1973, however, these series have diverged markedly. As shown in figure 8.1, between 1973 and 1993, the NIPA real hourly wage rose by 7 percent, the two CPS real hourly wage measures held roughly steady, and the CES hourly wage fell by 10 percent.

In an accounting sense, hourly earnings may rise (fall) either because weekly earnings have risen (fallen) or because weekly hours have fallen (risen). The relative decline of CES hourly wages as compared to the other three hourly wage series is due entirely to the relative decline of CES weekly earnings. In contrast, the relative increase in NIPA hourly earnings as compared to the two CPS series is due primarily to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours.

We have considered several possible explanations for the relatively large decline in CES weekly earnings that underlies the divergence of the CES hourly wage. By leading to a better representation of younger establishments, the expansion of the CES sample during the 1980s may have imparted a downward drift to CES weekly earnings, but it does not appear that this effect could have been very large. Similarly, the exclusion from the CES of earnings components that are included in the other series (such as nonproduction bonuses and tips) can explain no more than a modest portion of the divergence of the CES from other earnings series. Our findings suggest that the principal explanation for the divergence of CES weekly earnings from the other measures is the restricted occupational coverage of the CES data: the CES earnings series is designed to cover only production or nonsupervisory workers, whereas both the NIPA and the CPS series cover almost all workers. This explanation is consistent with the large body of work on increasing income inequality by skill level. It also should be noted that, while we believe the CES provides an accurate picture of the trend in earnings of a certain population of workers, that group may well not conform to the production or nonsupervisory category specified by the formal CES definitions. In particular, outside of the goods-producing sector, there is some indication that CES respondents may be reporting wages for workers who are nonexempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act, rather than for the nonsupervisory workers called for by CES program guidelines.

We have less to say about the divergence of NIPA and CPS average weekly
hours. There is some evidence that CPS hours worked are overreported, that this overreporting may have worsened over time, and that this increased overreporting accounts for a substantial share of the divergence between NIPA and CPS hourly earnings. Given the paucity of data on hours worked, we view our conclusions on this subject as suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, any bias in the trend of weekly hours has important implications for our understanding of labor markets. For example, since productivity measures rely on hours worked as a measure of labor input, analysts should be careful when drawing inferences about productivity trends.

In view of the very different behavior of CES weekly earnings and the other weekly earnings measures, the BLS, working together with staff from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, has undertaken an evaluation of whether and how the CES might collect all-employee earnings, either instead of or in addition to production workers' weekly wages. Our findings indicate that better information on hours of work, and perhaps on time use more generally, also would be of value. One possible approach to producing such data would be to inaugurate a regular, periodic time use survey.

We conclude with two thoughts concerning future research. First, this paper has examined divergent trends in alternative real wage series only at the aggregate "topside" level. Although it currently is impossible to use establishment surveys to analyze wage trends for different demographic groups, we have not attempted a thorough investigation of any possible divergences that may exist at the industry level. This may be important, for example, for wage or other escalation contracts that are based on the trend in wages in an industry as measured by any one particular series. Second, and perhaps more important to labor economists, it would be fruitful to expand our analysis of divergences in hourly wage measures to study divergences in measures of hourly compensation. Benefits are a large and growing share of total compensation. Our preliminary explorations into this topic (not reported here) reveal that measures of various sorts of benefit expenditures differ considerably across data sources. Reconciling these different sources of information would be a valuable contribution. The BLS, in conjunction with the Bureau of Economic Analysis, recently formed a working group to analyze the concepts underlying published government benefits series; we look forward to that group's report.

Data Appendix

Two of the series we analyze are derived principally or wholly from employer-provided data (the NIPA and the CES series), whereas two are based on household reports collected as part of the CPS program (the March CPS and CPSQS series). Because CES data are used in constructing the NIPA figures, we turn first to a description of the CES program.
The Current Employment Statistics Program

The CES data come from a monthly survey of almost 400,000 nonagricultural establishments. Although the survey sample is very large and stratified in such a way as to include both large and small establishments in most industries, it is not a probability sample. Rather, the CES makes use of a quota sample stratified by industry (at the four-digit level within manufacturing and the three-digit level outside of manufacturing) and number of employees (0–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–99, 100–249, or 250+). Once an establishment agrees to participate in the survey, it typically has remained in the sample indefinitely; as a rule, fresh units have been solicited for participation only as required to meet cell quotas.

The CES program collects data on the total number of employees, the number of female employees, the number of production workers (in manufacturing, mining, and construction) or nonsupervisory workers (in other industries), the production or nonsupervisory worker payroll, and the number of hours for which production or nonsupervisory workers are paid. Because the definitions of production workers and nonsupervisory workers differ, whether workers in a particular occupation are included in the group for which employers are asked to report depends on their industry. For example, accountants and salespersons are excluded if they work in a manufacturing industry but included if they work in a service industry.

Aggregate payrolls include pay before deductions for social security, unemployment insurance, group insurance, withholding tax, salary reduction plans, bonds, and union dues. The payroll figures also include shift premiums and pay for overtime, as well as pay for holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other leave paid directly by the employer to employees for the pay period reported. The payroll figures exclude bonuses (unless earned and paid regularly each pay period), commissions and other lump-sum payments (unless earned and paid at least monthly), and other pay not earned in the pay period. Tips and payments in kind are not included.

Total hours paid during the pay period include all hours worked (both straight time and overtime hours), hours paid for standby or reporting time, and hours for which employees received pay directly from the employer for holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other leave.

The CES data on weekly earnings, weekly hours, and hourly earnings that we use come directly from published sources and refer to the total private sector, exclusive of agriculture and private households. Average hourly earnings equal the ratio of total estimated payroll, summed over the 12 annual reporting periods, divided by total estimated hours, again summed over the 12 annual reporting periods.26

26. Most respondents (90 percent or more) provide data for payroll reporting periods that are shorter than a month (weekly, biweekly, or semimonthly) and thus do not span the entire year. Note also that, to the extent hours worked vary across reporting periods, the annual value for average hourly earnings need not equal the simple average of the 12 monthly values.
The National Income and Product Accounts Data

The NIPA data are constructed and published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the Department of Commerce. The NIPA wage and salary disbursement estimates for private industry are based principally on earnings data from the BLS ES-202 program. Total wages, for purposes of the ES-202 reports, include gross wages and salaries, bonuses, tips and other gratuities, and the value of meals and lodging where supplied. In certain states employer contributions to certain deferred compensation plans such as 401(k)s are included in total wages. Total wages do not include employer contributions to social security, health insurance, unemployment insurance, worker's compensation, or private pension and welfare funds. The BEA makes several additions to these wage and salary data to account for noncoverage or inadequate coverage; these additions account for about 5 percent of total estimated wages and salaries, a fraction that has not changed much over time, and are explained more fully in U.S. Department of Commerce (1989).

The NIPA hours data measure aggregate hours worked, defined as hours paid less vacation time, holidays, sick days, and other paid absences. The NIPA series is based principally on BLS data. For manufacturing industries, the production worker proportion of employment from the BLS CES program is multiplied by the BEA's measure of total employment (including both full-time and part-time employees), derived mainly from ES-202 data, to obtain counts of production and salaried worker employment. CES data are used to determine manufacturing production workers' paid weekly hours; salaried workers in manufacturing are assumed to be paid for 40 hours per week. In other sectors of the economy, the paid weekly hours of nonsupervisory employees are derived from the CES, and supervisory employees are assumed to have paid hours equal to those of nonsupervisory employees in the same one-digit industry. In all cases, the NIPA data are converted from an hours-paid to an hours-worked basis, using data from the BLS Hours at Work Survey.

Our construction of the NIPA hourly wage makes use of annual NIPA data on wages and salaries, employment, and hours worked, all for private industry exclusive of agriculture. We compute average weekly earnings as total wages and salaries divided by average employment, further divided by 52, and average weekly hours as total hours worked divided by average employment, further divided by 52. Hourly earnings were computed as the ratio of weekly earnings to weekly hours.

27. The ES-202 program is a cooperative endeavor of the BLS and the employment security agencies of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Each quarter, employers report on the employment and earnings of workers covered by state UI laws. The UI system covers approximately 95 percent of private sector wage and salary employment.

28. The BLS Hours at Work Survey indicates that, at least since 1981, the ratio of hours worked to hours paid has been very steady at about 0.93. For this purpose, hours worked are defined as hours paid minus leave hours.
Construction of Current Population Survey Earnings Series

In contrast to the NIPA and CES data we use, which come exclusively from published sources, our CPS series were constructed using CPS microdata files. Average hourly earnings from both CPS sources were computed as hours weighted means, to make them more comparable to the NIPA and CES figures. The March CPS weekly earnings estimates were computed as a weeks-weighted measure, again for comparability reasons. We also restricted our CPS samples to private wage and salary workers not employed either in agriculture or in a private household.

The March CPS collects information about earnings and weeks worked in the previous year, together with information on weekly hours while employed. The earnings concept employed encompasses bonuses, commissions, and tips in addition to ordinary wage and salary payments, all prior to any deductions. Payments in kind are excluded.

The March CPS hours series refers to hours worked, rather than hours paid. Between 1964 and 1975 (covering the years 1963–74), the March CPS did not collect information on hours per week, though from 1968 onward respondents were asked whether they had worked full time or part time. When possible, we imputed hours per week during the reference year using hours worked in the week prior to the interview. For those people who did not report any hours for the previous week, we assigned a 40-hour workweek (for those who said they had worked full time), the average hours of part-time workers with similar observable characteristics (for those who said they worked part time), or the average hours of all workers with similar characteristics (in years when individuals were not asked whether they had worked full time or part time). Prior to the 1976 survey, weeks worked in the previous year was recorded only in intervals. We computed average weeks for each interval using data from the March 1977 CPS and assigned respondents to the pre-1976 surveys the appropriate interval average.29

Because the March CPS weeks worked and hours per week questions refer to all employment a person may have experienced during the previous year, including any self-employment, we included self-employment income in earnings. Average hourly earnings equal aggregate annual earnings divided by aggregate annual hours. Average weekly earnings is computed analogously, as the ratio of aggregate annual earnings to aggregate annual weeks.30

In addition to the earnings and work experience questions asked on the

29. A more detailed description of the imputation process is available from the authors on request.
30. Aggregate annual earnings equals annual earnings multiplied by the March CPS sampling weight, summed over all observations. Aggregate annual hours equals hours per week times weeks worked last year times the sampling weight, summed over all observations. Aggregate annual weeks equals weeks worked in the previous year times the sampling weight, summed over all observations.
March CPS, questions about usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours on the worker's main job last week have been asked each May from 1973 through 1978 of all households and, in each month since January 1979, of households in the outgoing rotation groups. The data pertain only to wage and salary workers, and in constructing a wage series based on these data, we excluded persons employed in either agriculture or a private household. Usual weekly earnings are defined to encompass any pay that is normally received, including tips and commissions but excluding payments in kind and irregular bonuses. It also is worth noting that, at least prior to 1994, a sizable fraction of respondents in the CPS reported net rather than gross earnings. Our average hourly earnings figures were calculated by dividing estimated aggregate earnings by estimated aggregate hours. Average weekly earnings were computed similarly, as the ratio of aggregate earnings to aggregate employment.

References


31. Testing associated with the development of the redesigned CPS questionnaire introduced in January 1994 indicated that about 30 percent of CPS respondents were reporting net earnings, rather than gross earnings. We have no way of knowing whether this number was constant over time. The redesign appears to have reduced the severity of this misreporting problem; testing indicates that only about 15 percent of those administered the new questionnaire report net earnings (see Polivka and Rothgeb 1993).

32. We computed aggregate earnings by multiplying usual weekly earnings by the earnings weight and summing over all observations. Aggregate hours were computed similarly. Aggregate employment equals the sum of the earnings weights.

Comment

Lawrence F. Katz

Katharine Abraham, James Spletzer, and Jay Stewart have produced a careful analysis of trends over the past three decades in four widely used alternative measures of average hourly wages for private sector, nonagricultural workers. The paper reflects much clever and compelling detective work.

In particular, the authors make four significant contributions in this study. First, they clearly explain the differences in earnings concepts and coverage of hourly wage series computed from the NIPA, the CES program, the March CPS, and the CPS outgoing rotation groups. Second, they document large divergences among these alternative hourly wage series starting at the end of the 1970s, with the CES series sharply declining relative to the others and the NIPA series showing the most rapid growth. Third, they convincingly show that the divergence between the NIPA series and series based on household data from the CPS arises largely from differences in trends in average weekly hours from establishment and household data. Finally, they show that the huge

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relative decline in average hourly wages from the CES arises from the behavior of average weekly earnings in the CES. The authors convincingly demonstrate that the divergence of CES average weekly earnings from other series largely arises from its limited occupational coverage (only production and nonsupervisory workers) in a period of rising wage inequality and expanding wage differentials by skill and occupation.

This paper's findings have some potentially important implications for future data collection efforts and conceptual work. The divergence in average weekly hours series from the CPS series and the establishment-based series raises serious questions concerning the accuracy of our hours measures. The measurement of hours worked is integral not only to the measurement of hourly wages but also to the measurement of aggregate labor input, which is a key ingredient in estimates of labor productivity (output per hour) and total factor productivity. Hours measurement matters here both for understanding U.S. productivity growth trends and for making cross-country comparisons of output per hour, particularly given apparent large differences in hours worked per week between the United States and European nations. The conceptual and practical issues concerning the measurement of output and price deflators have received much attention lately, but the (less glamorous) issues arising from the measurement of hours of work has been much neglected. Larger, more representative, and more frequent time use surveys are necessary to better understand trends in hours of work reported in the CPS and recorded by employers. Interesting conceptual issues also require thought on what should count in hours worked when more individuals are employed in nontraditional jobs where the margins between work and leisure and work and home may be less clear than in the past.

The authors' documentation of substantial differences in wage trends over the 1980s between exempt and nonexempt workers raises the interesting question of whether this is fully explained by well-known increases in returns to education and skills. Alternatively, changes in wage-setting institutions and practices may differentially affect exempt and nonexempt workers in a manner not fully captured by differences in education and other measured skills. This is a topic worthy of further examination.