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Life on the Tri-Polar Sphere

How Should Interest and Exchange Rates Realign Next?

Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber

1.1 Introduction

A useful model of the international monetary system today must recognize two important facts. First, an economically important periphery of poor countries has emerged in recent years and these countries are now large enough to have a material effect on the rest of the world. Second, the standard assumptions about domestic financial markets and capital mobility that fit the rest of the world are not useful in understanding the behavior of these countries or their interaction with the rest of the world. Our description of a framework that does recognize these facts has come to be known as Bretton Woods II.¹

In our model Asian financial markets are not integrated with international markets. One important implication is that for these countries sterilized intervention “works” in the sense that real exchange rates are influenced for extended time periods by governments’ portfolio choices. We also offer an argument for why such countries will find it in their interest to keep their real exchange rates undervalued for an extended time period as a part of a coherent development strategy.

Our conjecture is that export of domestic savings to the well-integrated capital markets in the industrial world by governments following this development strategy is driving unusual behavior of macro variables in the

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1. For the sequence of articles we have written on Bretton Woods II, see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003a, b; 2004a, b, c, d; 2005a, b).

industrial world. In particular, low interest rates in the United States and Euroland are attributed not to the behavior of savings or investment in poor countries, but to the unusual decisions of these governments to place a large share of domestic savings into the well-integrated capital markets of industrial countries. This generates historically low interest rates not just in the United States, but in all markets that are integrated with U.S. financial markets.

In this paper we also take seriously the overwhelming evidence that financial markets in the United States and Euroland are very highly integrated. To make analysis with a three region model manageable we go to the extreme assumption that assets generated in the industrial world are perfect substitutes. The important implication is that sterilized intervention in these markets does not work. A less familiar implication is that the choice of dollar or euro assets by governments in the periphery makes no difference for interest rates in Euroland and the United States and has no effect on the dollar–euro exchange rate. It follows that the dreaded diversification of reserves that is often cited as a threat to the stability of the Bretton Woods II system is not a threat at all.

Finally, our approach offers interesting predictions for the dynamic paths for interest rates, exchange rates, and current account balances. We expect the United States to absorb a disproportionate share of the savings exported by periphery governments for an extended, but finite, time period. The U.S. current account deficit will shrink as the supply of savings from the periphery is reduced and interest rates in the integrated international financial markets rise. The supply of savings from the periphery will shrink as their successful development policy results in an improvement in their domestic financial markets. We expect the dollar–euro exchange rate to follow the usual cyclical patterns but with no long-run trend. Both the dollar and the euro will slowly depreciate in real terms against the managed periphery currencies.

That our forecasts have been on target for the last three years may be a matter of good analysis or good fortune. But it has, in the nature of things, led to a more general acceptance of the view in the financial markets, to the extent that market participants now want to hear the risk scenarios around this central view. This is much less true of the academic and official sector discourse, where, even after several years, debate is dominated by the view that the system will collapse very soon, all the more so for not having collapsed already.²

Whatever the judgment that hindsight will deliver on these disputes, it is clear that the global monetary system that we have described has some legs to it. So rather than fight old battles over the probability of collapse, we

2. See Eichengreen 2004, Obstfeld and Rogoff 2004, Obstfeld 2005, and Roubini and Setser 2005.

think it is time to analyze the dynamics and evolution of the system given that its basic parameters will last for some time.

1.2 A Differing Base of Premises

In this paper we set out in greater detail how we think about the dynamic forces emanating from the emergence of China and Asia as major players in world capital and foreign exchange markets. Conventional analyses have been based for several years on the assertion that the Bretton Woods II system cannot hold together for much longer. This may or may not turn out to be correct, but it does not offer any guidance if the system does survive for an extended time period, as we believe it will. The framework developed below also provides a guide to the dynamics of the system following a variety of changes in the economic environment.

For simplicity, our framework has divided the world into three regions: emerging Asia, the United States, and Euroland.³ Euroland includes all countries outside the United States with open capital markets and market-determined exchange rates. We will use the euro to stand for the currencies of these countries since it is the dominant currency among them. Asia includes all countries with relatively closed capital markets and managed exchange rates and we use the renminbi to stand in for their currencies.

Some observers have questioned the usefulness of aggregating the managed rate countries into a single zone because of the differing incentives and constraints facing these countries. We agree, for example, that current account surpluses and reserve growth for China, oil-exporting countries, and Japan are products of quite different developments and incentives and are likely to have different degrees of persistence over time.⁴ Our forecast is that individual countries will join and exit the bloc of countries that manage their dollar exchange rates, and their management will find different degrees of success, but the bloc will nevertheless remain a lasting and economically important feature of the international monetary system.⁵

The analysis will lean on four assumptions. We believe these assumptions are realistic, and they dramatically simplify the dynamics of a three-region analysis:

3. Because there is no necessity of geographic contiguity, we have referred to these regions in other essays from the functional viewpoint as the trade account region, the center country, and the capital account region.

4. See Dooley and Garber (2005, p. 158–160).

5. We have consistently argued that the system, *not its current manifestation in the orientation of particular countries to these three blocs*, would last for the foreseeable future. “Fixed exchange rates and controlled financial markets work for twenty years and countries that follow this development strategy become an important periphery. These development policies are then overtaken by open financial markets and this, in turn, requires floating exchange rates. The Bretton Woods system does not evolve, it just occasionally reloads a periphery.” (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2003b, p. 3).

1. Asian financial markets are poorly integrated with the other two regions because of capital controls and the threat of sovereign interference with capital flows. This allows Asia to manage the dollar-renminbi exchange rate so that the renminbi appreciates in real terms slowly over an adjustment period of many years.

2. The United States and Euroland financial markets, in contrast, are very well integrated and their respective assets are very close substitutes, an assumption consistent with a great deal of empirical work, especially on the inefficacy of sterilized intervention. The United States and Euroland do not manage the euro-dollar exchange rate.

3. The dominant change in the economic environment that is driving the main features of the world economy is the rapid growth of savings rates and the level of savings in Asia *and* their exportation to the rest of the world.

4. The United States and Euroland differ in their capacities to utilize Asian savings, with the United States having a much greater absorptive capacity.

Some of the significant departures of our analysis from the conventional approach include the following:

1a. Conventional analysis considers Asian financial markets sufficiently integrated with international markets so that Asian governments will not be able to manage real exchange rates at reasonable costs. In particular, they will be unable to fend off hot money inflows. Moreover, they will not want to distort real exchange rates for much longer to encourage export-led growth.

2a. Conventional analysis assumes that United States and Euroland financial markets are not well integrated. Diversification of Asian reserves is thought to have an important effect on the dollar-euro exchange rate. This assumption seems to us inconsistent with substantial evidence that intervention and reserve management by U.S. and Euroland authorities have not had a large or lasting effect on industrial country exchange rates.

3a. The conventional analysis usually identifies a fall in the U.S. household savings rate or a rise in the government fiscal deficit rate as the driving force behind the U.S. current account deficit.

4a. Interest rate movements have not been consistent with this assumption—falling instead of rising. To circumvent this contradiction, it is conventionally asserted that interest rates and asset prices are driven by incorrect expectations, a misunderstanding of the dangerous nature of the system, or bubbles.

To summarize results in the rest of the paper, following a sudden shift to a global system with a long-term rise in exports of Asian savings and an understanding that this system will persist include:

- There is a substantial *immediate* appreciation of the euro against the dollar. As one of the only key prices allowed to move freely, this is a painful overshooting.
- Real interest rates in the United States and Euroland remain low relative to historical cyclical experience but converge slowly toward normal rates as Asian markets become integrated with international markets.
- The dollar and the euro gradually depreciate relative to the renminbi but, after the initial euro appreciation versus the dollar, *remain constant relative to each other in the absence of further disturbances*.
- A shift to a more rapid expected growth in Europe would *depreciate* the euro relative to the dollar and renminbi and raise interest rates in the United States and Europe.
- More rapid expected growth in the United States would tend to *depreciate* the dollar relative to the euro and renminbi. Because the dollar–renminbi is managed, the dollar would not fall immediately but would begin to depreciate more rapidly. The euro would appreciate immediately and then match the dollar’s more rapid rate of depreciation against the renminbi.
- Shifts in currency composition of Asian reserves from dollars to euros would have *little or no lasting effect* on dollar–euro exchange rates.
- Effective protection in the United States and Euroland or a fall in the savings rate in Asia would generate a stronger dollar in the long run. The immediate effect would be less rapid dollar depreciation against the renminbi. The euro could go either way against the dollar.
- In real terms, the dollar will eventually have to depreciate relative to the renminbi, but most of the adjustment in the U.S. trade account will come as U.S. absorption responds to increases in real interest rates. Slow adjustment in the composition of U.S. output toward traded goods over an extended time period will not require unprecedented dollar depreciation.
- High oil prices and high consumption by oil exporters would generate a slower rate of dollar depreciation against the renminbi and higher interest rates in the United States and Euroland. The dollar–euro rate could go either way.

1.3 Analysis

In our framework, the fundamental shock to the system is a change in the supply of savings from Asia and a suspension of the usual home bias in allocating these savings across world markets. It may not seem all that important to decide whether it was because U.S. savings fell or Asian savings increased to drive the pattern of current accounts we now see. But it is, in fact, crucial for understanding the system and the direction it will take.

Asian real exchange rates are not market-determined prices, but are heavily and successfully managed by Asian governments. As noted above, the conventional analysis assumes this troublesome fact will soon go away. We argue that this policy behavior will *eventually* go away but is a central feature of Asian development policies and will not dissipate for a long time. It follows that if the rest of the world is to adjust now to a savings shock emanating from Asia the primary adjustment mechanism will not be changes in Asian real exchange rates.

To manage real exchange rates, Asian governments must intervene in foreign exchange markets. That part of the intervention that is sterilized is, in fact, intervention in credit markets. Asian finance ministries or central banks sell domestic securities, reducing the supply of loanable funds to domestic borrowers, and buy foreign securities, thereby increasing the supply of loanable funds in the U.S. and Euroland. The resulting shift in interest differential is possible because of effective capital controls. That is, Asian governments can manage exchange rates and interest rates because their domestic assets are made imperfect substitutes for foreign assets in private portfolios by policy, if not by private preference.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the current state of the global system. Long term U.S. real rates fell to half their previous cyclical peak for two years during the rapid growth phase of this business cycle. They have recently begun to rise, but they are still substantially below their cyclical peak. This is reflective of low real interest rates throughout the industrial world. Simultaneously, the current account deficit has grown steadily as a ratio to U.S. GDP. Whatever one might think about low savings in the United States this is clear evidence that the supply of savings pushing into the United States, regardless of price, has dominated a demand pull of savings into the United States for half a decade.




Fig. 1.1 Ten year TIPS yield




Fig. 1.2 U.S. current account balance

Because Asian exchange rates are managed, adjustment must proceed through current account balances and real interest rates. To understand current accounts we have to understand savings and investment. The question is: how are savings and investment changed in the United States, Euroland, and elsewhere as Asian savings are offered to the rest of the world? In particular, can we understand why real interest rates might fall in both the United States and Euroland while current account balances adjust by very different amounts? In our view, this is a very easy case to understand.

We can illustrate our approach first with a set of figures focusing on interest rates and current accounts for Asia, the United States, and Euroland, and then with another set focusing on net foreign debt positions and exchange rates.

Figure 1.3 shows real interest rates for the United States, Euroland, and Asia on the vertical axes. The horizontal axes represent the domestic savings, investment, and current accounts for these three regions. The upward sloping curves labeled S are national savings. The curves labeled S' are national savings augmented by imports or exports of savings through horizontal shifts. The downward sloping curves labeled I are investment. For convenience, we start with balanced current accounts at a common interest rate, but any starting point for the separate economies will do as long as real rates are the same in the United States and Euroland.

A policy to divert Asian savings to the United States and Euroland reduces the supply of savings available in Asia and shifts the Asian supply curve to the left. A current account surplus is generated and interest rates in Asia rise. In this exercise, we assume that savers in Asia are paid the initial interest rate r_0 , investors are charged r_1 , and the resultant excess of savings is dumped on the global financial market for whatever rate of return it may bring. The financial markets allocate these new savings to the




Fig. 1.3 Current account and interest rates

United States and Euroland to re-equate the real rates of interest in the two zones.

In the United States and Euroland, the augmented savings supply curves shift to the right as Asian savings push in. The real interest rate in the United States and Euroland falls as we move down the investment demand curves and the financial markets distribute the added savings across the two zones. The demand curves are downward sloping because investment increases relative to domestic savings as interest rates fall. Moreover, consumption rises with a fall in interest rates, so domestic savings fall as well. The rise in consumption and investment is matched by an inflow of foreign savings and by definition the current account deficit, initially marked at zero, increases. The increase in Asia's current account surplus is matched by the sum of the increases in the current account deficits of the United States and Euroland.

In the United States, the increase in savings demanded is large because investment and savings are quite sensitive to the rate of interest.⁶ Euroland sees the same qualitative changes. But investment and the current account deficit increase only slightly because there are few profitable investment opportunities and consumption is not very responsive. The fundamental factor driving the different responses of the United States and Euroland current account deficits is the different opportunities to efficiently utilize foreign savings as the interest rate falls in both regions.

An important aspect of the adjustment process is the equalization of real rates of return on capital invested in the United States and Euroland through private arbitrage. When we turn to exchange rate determination in the following, we will use the result that real interest rates are equalized by flows of savings. It is clear, however, that expected rates of return on capital in the United States and Euroland could be equalized by expected real exchange rate changes in addition to real interest rates.

6. This means that there are many viable projects or confident consumers ready to go with a small improvement in financing costs relative to Euroland.

This apparent indeterminacy between real interest rates and expected changes in real exchange rates during the adjustment period is resolved at the end of the period. When the new equilibrium is established there is no reason to predict that the real exchange rate between the euro and the dollar will continue to change over time. Since the capital stocks must have the same expected rate of return looking forward at the end of the adjustment period, it follows that real interest rates must be the same at that time. Arbitrage across time will ensure that any capital put in place in the United States and Euroland during the adjustment period that will remain in place in a new steady state must have the same rate of return.

The preferred policy over time for Asian governments is to allow gradual real exchange rate appreciation. Over time, this reduces their intervention in credit markets and their exports of savings. By the end of the adjustment period real interest rates will have equalized across the three regions.

We now turn to the foreign exchange markets. There are three keys to understanding the three cross exchange rates.

First, for some years, Asian governments can and will manage the real dollar value of their currencies. They can do so because capital controls make Asian domestic assets imperfect substitutes for United States and Euroland assets in private portfolios. Their ability to manage their real exchange rate will erode over time as capital controls become less effective and their domestic asset markets are integrated with international capital markets. Their desire to maintain the system will also erode as their surplus labor is absorbed. But they will manage rates as long as they can because undervaluation is an important part of their development strategy.

Second, in the long run, say ten years more or less, the real value of the three currencies will have to adjust to changes in the international investment positions of the three regions generated during the adjustment period. Asia's net asset position will improve while the U.S. and Euroland positions will deteriorate by relatively large and small amounts, respectively.

The relationship between the long run exchange rate and the net foreign debt position of each region is not controversial and is the centerpiece of most analyses about the ultimate depreciation of the dollar. As net foreign debt increases, larger trade balance surpluses are needed to service net debt (balance the current account). So a fall in net foreign assets is associated with a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The implication is that the dollar and the euro must depreciate against the renminbi, but the dollar must depreciate by more. Therefore, the dollar must depreciate against the euro.⁷

7. In our view, the amount of the eventual dollar depreciation is often overestimated. Recall that the primary factor driving the increase in the U.S. trade and current account deficit is the relatively strong response of U.S. investment and consumption to a decline in interest rates. Over the adjustment period interest rates will rise, thereby causing an equally strong reverse effect, and this will help reduce the U.S. deficit. The exchange rate adjustment therefore must be consistent with a slow shift in U.S. output toward traded goods.

Third, exchange rates today would normally reflect these long run expectations to some degree. But intervention by Asian governments is sufficient to strictly manage the dollar-renminbi exchange rate. Intervention will not keep the renminbi undervalued forever, but it can extend the adjustment period. As we have argued elsewhere, the preferred path (from China's perspective) for Asian real exchange rates is a gradual appreciation toward their new long run values.

In contrast, the euro cross-rates both today and along the adjustment path are determined by private investors. The relevant context for these portfolio choices is that dollar and euro assets are close substitutes.⁸ The key implication is that once the system comes to be understood the euro and the dollar must depreciate at the same rate over time relative to the renminbi. Recall that real interest rates on capital invested in the United States and Euroland are equalized by net savings flows. It follows that investors must expect the euro-dollar exchange rate to remain unchanged. Put another way, both currencies must depreciate, and be expected to depreciate, at the same rate against the renminbi.

The result of a shift in Asian savings exports is then an immediate euro appreciation against the dollar and the renminbi, followed by a constant dollar/euro rate. This means that there will be immediate, maximal political pressure for relief in a Euroland unable to absorb the shock easily, and continuous, though declining, pressure thereafter.

These results are illustrated in figure 1.4. Starting from an initial value of the renminbi-dollar rate in the top panel and a renminbi-euro rate in the bottom panel, we can follow the effects of an increase in Asian savings exports and intervention. These increases raise interest rates faced by domestic investors in Asia and lower interest rates in the United States and Euroland. Asia generates a current account surplus matched by deficits in the United States and Euroland. This continues until Asian savings exports and intervention return to normal levels. In figure 1.2, this interval is from 0–T. The eventual fall in the dollar against the renminbi from A to B is required to close the trade deficit and even to generate the trade surplus needed to service the higher level of U.S. debt at time T and after.

Without intervention, we would expect an immediate depreciation of the dollar; but this can and will be delayed by intervention.⁹ Along the adjustment path AB, the dollar is supported by a flow of intervention. Private investors know the dollar will depreciate but nevertheless are willing to

8. See Henderson and Leahy (2005) for a three country analysis of intervention where imperfect asset substitution is assumed for all three regions.

9. We could replace time with net debt on the horizontal axis and have a diagram similar to that presented in Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005). The case we present here is similar to their discussion of intervention following a shift in preferences away from U.S. goods. The interested reader is encouraged to work through their analysis of an imperfect substitutes model. Their analysis assumes that interest rates are unchanged and changes in absorption are assumed to be related to fiscal policies.




Fig. 1.4 Exchange rates

hold the stock of dollars, reduced by Asian purchases of U.S. assets.¹⁰ U.S. debt to foreigners is growing more rapidly than it would have if the fall in interest rates had been partially offset by a market-determined depreciation of the dollar.

The renminbi-euro rate starts at C and must eventually move to D, a much smaller depreciation. Like the United States, Euroland will accumulate debt (or reduce net assets below their previous path) during the adjustment period. But in this case Asian governments are not intervening to manage the exchange rate either at point C or along the adjustment path. The question is then: where will the market set euro exchange rates?

We can make our analysis more realistic and much more transparent by assuming that U.S. and Euroland assets are close substitutes in private portfolios. This is an important departure from the usual portfolio balance model because it implies that the currency composition of Asian intervention is of secondary importance. If euro and dollar assets are close substitutes in private portfolios, Asian governments could intervene in either dollars or euros to stabilize the dollar value of their currencies. Moreover, diversification of Asian reserves would have little or no lasting effect on the dollar-euro exchange rates, contrary to a key conclusion of the conven-

10. The portfolio balance equilibrium is based on the idea that residents of all countries prefer home assets, but can be moved away from their preferred portfolio by differences in expected yields; that is, by interest differentials adjusted for expected changes in exchange rates.

tional view.¹¹ The irrelevance of Asian reserve diversification is consistent with a very large body of empirical evidence that sterilized intervention has had no lasting effect on exchange rates among industrial countries.¹²

The practical importance of this assumption is that the two adjustment paths in figure 1.2 must have the same slope. If they did not, more rapid dollar depreciation against the renminbi, relative to euro depreciation against the renminbi, implies expected depreciation of the dollar against the euro. Since interest rates in the United States and Euroland are the same, arbitrage would be profitable. Private investors would immediately bid for euros against dollars and would do so until the euro jumps to E. From this initial appreciation the euro now depreciates against the renminbi at the same rate as the dollar. Note that along this adjustment path the euro, as the key and only freely determined price in the global system, overshoots and remains overvalued relative to the dollar and the renminbi throughout the adjustment interval, although the degree of overvaluation shrinks over time.

Therefore, for senior European financial officials to claim that a small Euroland current account position means that the EU is part of neither the problem nor the solution is a divorce from reality. In particular, successfully arguing that China should not speed up the appreciation of the renminbi places maximal pressure on the euro to appreciate against the dollar, exactly the opposite of the intent.

We can now iterate through the current account analysis. The euro has appreciated against the renminbi and the dollar, so Euroland's current account deficit, already increased by the fall in interest rates, tends to widen. The dollar is unchanged against the renminbi and has depreciated against the euro, so the already increased U.S. current account deficit is reduced. These second round effects on the current account positions of the three regions would not alter our basic story assuming the reactions of absorption to interest rates is very different in the United States and Euroland.

1.4 Interest and Exchange Rates with Disturbances Along the Adjustment Path

Of course, changes in many conditions will shift the dollar-euro exchange rates along the adjustment path set out in the previous section. The

11. See Eichengreen (2005).

12. We have also explored the effects of diversification under the assumption of imperfect substitution between dollar and euro assets. Our conclusion is that it is not the interests of Asian governments to diversify, and recent data from the IMF shows that they have not done so through the end of last year. See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a). The argument presented here suggests that Asian governments can diversify if they choose to do so, but that this would have no lasting effect on dollar exchange rates.

framework developed above is useful to evaluate changes in the economic environment during the adjustment process, and the peculiar nature of the global system produces some remarkable and unanticipated results.

1.4.1 A Stronger Euroland Outlook

Suppose, for example, that at time t_1 an improved outlook for profits in Euroland generates a positive shift in the demand for investment in Euroland. Figure 1.5 suggests that Asian savings will be shifted from the United States to Euroland for the balance of the adjustment period and that interest rates in both regions will rise.

The effects on exchange rates are illustrated in figure 1.3. With more Asian savings going to Euroland and less to the United States, at the end of the adjustment period, at T, the euro will be weaker and the dollar stronger than would have been the case. If Asian intervention at t_1 keeps the dollar from jumping from its initial value at F in figure 1.3, the euro depreciates sharply at t_1 for two reasons. First, it must now reach level J at T and it must now depreciate more slowly to match the dollar's reduced rate of depreciation.

1.4.2 A Weaker Euroland Outlook

A weaker outlook for Euroland investment would have symmetric effects. In this case there would be deterioration in the final expected debt position of the United States and an improvement in the final debt position of Euroland. This would require a more rapid rate of dollar depreciation against the renminbi and another move up for the euro. Interest rates in both regions would fall).

1.4.3 A Stronger U.S. Outlook

Changes in U.S. growth and investment would have similar effects. As U.S. growth increases, so does the expected stock of U.S. debt. The greater long run depreciation would not affect the current level of the renminbi-dollar but would require a more rapid appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar for the balance of the adjustment period.

The euro would appreciate against the renminbi and the dollar for two reasons. First, its long run level would jump up as Euroland would have a higher net asset position than before, and it would have to appreciate immediately in order to match the dollar's higher expected depreciation rate against the renminbi.

This is illustrated in Figure 1.6. The expected renminbi-dollar exchange rate at T shifts down from B to G and the expected renminbi-euro rate moves up from D to K. The euro immediately jumps from H to I as again the change in the euro is amplified by arbitrage between dollar and euro assets. Interest rates in both regions would rise.




Fig. 1.5 Exchange rates, increase in Euroland growth




Fig. 1.6 Exchange rates, increase in U.S. growth

1.4.4 More War or Katrina

A larger fiscal deficit and demand for capital following destruction of U.S. capital or expanded expenditure for war increases U.S. demand for foreign savings and will lead to an increased U.S. indebtedness at T. Therefore, scenario 3 analysis applies. The euro appreciates against the dollar. Global interest rates rise.

1.4.5 Protectionism Surges; Oil Exporters Start Consuming Asia's Surplus Savings

It turns out that all of these have the same impacts on interest and exchange rates. For example, effective protection against Asian exports in both the United States and Euroland would forcibly reduce net savings transfers to the United States and Euroland from Asia by forcing a reduction in Asia's net trade surplus. Similarly, a decline in net Asian savings exported to the United States and Euroland would occur if a larger share of U.S., Euroland, and Asian income is transferred to oil exporters via terms of trade shifts. As the oil exporters start to consume a high fraction of this transfer, fewer excess savings are available to accumulate U.S. and Euroland debt. Each of these developments can be analyzed as illustrated in Figure 1.7.

In these events expected U.S. net debt at T is reduced, which raises the terminal exchange rate from B to G. Euroland net debt also falls, which raises the renminbi-euro rate from D to K. We assume that on its new path the renminbi-dollar rate does not jump up at t_1 , but the rate of dollar depreciation is reduced so that the new path for the renminbi-dollar rate is FG. The renminbi-euro rate must reach K at T and the path from t_1 must have the same slope as FG; that is, the renminbi-euro rate must have the same expected rate of depreciation as the renminbi-dollar rate. The conclusion is that the euro can either depreciate or appreciate immediately against the dollar depending on the relative change in debt stocks in response to the new environment. There is no necessary direction of effect for this key exchange rate. Interest rates will rise both in the United States and Euroland because of the reduction in available savings.

A useful rule of thumb is that events that change expected U.S. and Euroland debt stocks and real exchange rates in opposite directions generate large and immediate changes in the dollar-euro rate when expectations change. The market rate changes in the same direction as the change in the expected future rates. Events that move both expected debt stocks in the same direction have ambiguous effects on the exchange rate at the point where expectations change.




Fig. 1.7 Exchange rates

1.5 Further Thoughts on Asset Markets

The apparent failure of dollar exchange rates to respond to unprecedented recent and projected U.S. current account deficits is an important challenge for economic analysis. It is generally agreed that a substantial increase in projected debt levels should be associated with expectations that the real exchange rate will eventually depreciate. If private investors regard financial assets denominated in different currencies and issued by residents of different countries as perfect or very close substitutes, then the current exchange rate should be tied to the expected future exchange rate through the interest parity condition. Taken together, these ideas suggest that the dollar should have declined several years ago against the floating currencies when expectations about future U.S. debt levels were revised.

Suppose, for example, that some event generates a forecast that U.S. debt will increase from zero to sixty percent of U.S. GDP and then stabilize at that level at some arbitrary future date, T. Most analysts would agree that a real depreciation of the dollar by time T will be a part of the adjustment required to service this higher level of debt.¹³ If the dollar is expected to be lower at T, if interest parity holds, and if real interest rate differentials are not affected by the shock that generated the increase in expected debt, then

13. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) for discussion and evidence.

the real exchange rate must depreciate immediately and by the same amount as the long run expected value when expectations change.

Research on exchange rates since the early 1970s has been dominated by attempts to reconcile the data to this elementary notion. In the early years of floating rates the question was why exchange rates were much more variable than reasonable estimates of long run expected values. The current debate asks why market rates now are so stable in the face of strong presumption that the long run expectation has changed by a large amount.

To be sure, the market could have gotten it wrong then and could be getting it wrong now. If so, a crisis with sharply rising interest rates and sharply falling dollar exchange rates could be imminent, as conventional analysts predict. But it seems prudent to carefully consider alternative possibilities that are *currently* consistent with the salient evidence.

1.6 An Attempt to Reconcile Current Exchange Rates and Expectations

Market exchange rates need not move in lock step with expected exchange rates if interest rates change or if interest rate parity does not hold. An approach that was popular in the early 1980s to explain excess volatility of market exchange rates explored the assumption that interest parity may not hold if assets denominated in different currencies or issued in different countries are not close substitutes.¹⁴ That is, if residents of a country for some reason prefer domestic assets, they would have to be compensated with higher expected yields to move away from their preferred portfolio. If rates of change toward a stable long-run equilibrium varied, it follows that current exchange rates could be much more variable than long run expected exchange rates. Moreover, sterilized intervention alters relative supplies of securities and could have some influence on expected rates of change and the levels of exchange rates.

In the current context, the implications of this portfolio balance approach are straightforward. If foreign residents prefer home securities and those preferences are unchanged, U.S. residents must pay a premium to finance a current account deficit. If we assume domestic interest rates are not affected by the shock that increases U.S. foreign debt, foreign investors must be induced to hold the growing stock of dollar-denominated claims on the United States by an extra expected return in the form of expected appreciation of the dollar. Since at T the dollar has to be below its current level because of increased U.S. indebtedness to foreigners, and since it must be expected to appreciate from now to T, the dollar must depreciate by even more now.

At first glance, this does not seem to help much in understanding the current situation where, it is argued, the dollar has not depreciated enough.

14. See Branson and Henderson (1985) for a survey.

But this can be rationalized by assuming the initial shock was a spontaneous increase in preferences for dollar assets (Blanchard et al. 2005). If foreigners want dollar assets, they can obtain them through current account surpluses and in the interim will accept a lower expected yield on the dollar assets they do hold. It follows that even though the dollar is expected to be lower at T , it may not fall much initially because an expected depreciation is consistent with an otherwise unsatisfied demand for dollars during the adjustment period.

1.7 Is Intervention a Plausible Driver of the System?

Identifying plausible reasons for a shift in preferences toward dollars remains a serious problem.¹⁵ As one explanation, if changes in governments' balance sheets are not systematically offset by private investors the shift in currency preferences could be associated with government policies. In particular, sterilized intervention could account for expected increases in U.S. net international debt but only gradual adjustment in dollar exchange rates.

But there are a number of reasons that the portfolio balance approach was placed on a back burner of the profession's research agenda. First, a very large empirical literature was unable to find any lasting effect of intervention on interest rates or exchange rates. Second, imperfect substitution is usually modeled as aversion to exchange rate volatility. But sensible estimates of the degree of risk aversion needed to match exchange rate data seemed implausible. Third, imperfect substitution could be related to default risk or capital controls, but this has generally been assumed to be irrelevant for industrial countries.

Finally, Dornbusch (1976) showed that monetary policy and associated changes in real interest rate differentials could account for exchange rate volatility with perfect substitution and stable long run expected values for real exchange rates. In an era when monetary policies were quite variable, this solved the theoretical puzzle of the day and moved portfolio balance models to the history of thought reading list.

Nevertheless, it is clear that home bias in goods, equities, and other financial assets remains a central fact and puzzle for international economics.¹⁶ Obstfeld (2004) presents a thoughtful review of these issues and offers a guess that a new theoretical basis for the portfolio balance approach will emerge from his work with Ken Rogoff on the implications of imperfect goods market integration. This would be welcome, but in the interim we re-

15. Cooper (2001, 2004) offers a compelling argument for a change in private preferences for U.S. assets. We agree that this is part of the story, but focus here on governments' portfolio choices.

16. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).

main largely in the dark about the source of home bias for assets and the implications for models of portfolio behavior.

Our own home bias in these matters is that capital controls and the threat of sovereign interference with foreign investment is the most compelling argument behind a portfolio balance framework.¹⁷ It follows that the portfolio balance approach is more likely to be useful in understanding the behavior of countries or groups of countries whose governments dominate private portfolio decisions through controls and intervention and manage their exchange rates.

In our framework, the shift in preferences toward dollars is not just *qualitative*, but is *measured* by increases in international reserves of governments managing their exchange rates. Moreover, sterilized intervention is effective in altering interest differentials and exchange rates *between* managed economies and an integrated international capital market. But shifts in the composition of reserves do not change exchange rates *within* the larger integrated market.

While we use China/Asia and the renminbi as shorthand for the managed fixed rate region and its currency, we do not argue that China alone is large enough to dominate international interest and exchange rates. However, we estimate that countries that actively manage their exchange rates comprise about one third of world GDP and savings. The shock to the global system that we model is a substantial increase in savings rates and levels among this group. These are coupled with a decision of governments in the region to put a large share of the increase, about half, into foreign assets.

We could extend the portfolio balance model as well to economic relationships within the international capital market, that is, to the relations between the United States and Euroland, but we do not do so for two reasons. First, the reasons for rejecting this model in the past are still very powerful. Second, a three-zone portfolio balance model is very difficult to work with, particularly when we are interested in studying the endogenous responses of exchange rates and real interest rates to various shocks. Since such models have a low insight to equation ratio, we stick with the perfect substitutes model for the United States and Euroland. Our guess is that introducing a little bit of home bias in these portfolios will do little violence to our results.

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17. See Dooley and Isard (1980).

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Comments John Simon

This chapter by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber deals with their contentious model of the international monetary system and their explanation, based on the saving and intervention behavior of Asian countries, for the current pattern of interest and exchange rates around the world. At the beginning of the paper the authors state, “rather than fight old battles over the probability of collapse, we think it is time to analyze the dynamics and evolution of the system given that its basic parameters will last for some time.” The paper then provides a diagram in figure 1.1 and discusses some of the implications of moving around the lines representing their model for future interest and exchange rate movements.

Assuming that everything is as the authors have said would lead to a rather short discussion from me. The framework the authors provide in the paper is short and uncomplicated. Indeed, it is little more than their set of assumptions. And, if all the authors’ assumptions are true, you get the results they do. So hopefully the authors will forgive me if I, in an effort to stimulate some interesting discussion, do not agree with everything they say.

The authors set out four assumptions: Asian financial markets are poorly integrated and, so, can manage their exchange rate; the United States and Euroland are well integrated, so sterilized intervention here is ineffective; the dominant driver of the world economy is the pattern of Asian savings; and the United States has a greater absorptive capacity for Asian savings than the Euro area. I am happy, for the purposes of this discussion, to take these as given. I will focus, however, on part of their first assumption where they state, “This allows Asia to manage the dollar-renminbi exchange rate

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so that the renminbi appreciates in real terms slowly over an adjustment period of many years.” China *can* do this. But will it want to?

Much of the discussion in the paper is focused on the international environment and treats the individual countries as somewhat of a black box. It is tempting to assume that, just because China has been managing its exchange rate for a while, it will continue to do so regardless of future developments. But in addressing the question of whether China will want to continue its current arrangements for the indefinite future, it is worth looking inside the black box. At this stage it is also worth commenting that a similar observation could be made about the United States and Euroland. They have many more policy tools at their disposal than sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market. Thus, even assuming, as this paper does, that sterilized intervention doesn’t work, that doesn’t mean they are completely powerless to influence interest and exchange rates. Consider, for example, the likely effects of trade policy or, indeed, the effect that the color of Greenspan’s tie could have on interest and exchange rates in days gone past.¹

The basic story is fairly well known. China has been intervening heavily to maintain the level of its exchange rate, which has led to large accumulations of foreign reserves and significant bond issues to sterilize the intervention. Figure 1C.1 shows the growth in China’s foreign exchange reserves.

As can be seen, reserves have been growing at around 35 to 50 percent per year since 2003. This alone has been cause for some to question the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate arrangements. The internal consequences of this can be seen in the growth in the People’s Bank of China’s bond liabilities (figure 1C.2).

China has had to issue significant quantities of bonds to sterilize its foreign exchange intervention. Despite this, the economy is still awash with liquidity. Figure 1C.3 shows the growth rate of money and credit in China. Much of this strength can be traced to the increased export earnings that are a direct consequence of China’s currently preferred exchange rate.

This strong monetary growth, despite the best attempts of the government to constrain it, is the most obvious sign of the internal stresses that the economy is dealing with. One consequence of this liquidity is the high rate of investment in China. As can be seen in figure 1C.4, it is over 40 percent of GDP and growing. This is a sign of an economy that is facing significant imbalances. While other Asian countries have occasionally experienced this level of investment before, it has invariably been followed by a sharp contraction.

In addition to the monetary stresses, there are a number of other stresses

1. See, for example, the opening statement of Senator Dodd during Greenspan’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on July 18, 1996.




Fig. 1C.1 China—Forex reserves, year-ended percentage change




Fig. 1C.2 China—PBC bond liabilities

evident in the Chinese economy. A consequence of the export oriented policies of the government is that labor markets are undergoing significant structural change. The strength of export oriented industries has led to significant labor demand from these industries—which are predominantly located in the coastal areas of China. The wages in these areas have increased




Fig. 1C.3 China—Credit and money supply, year-ended percentage change




Fig. 1C.4 Fixed asset investment, share of GDP

Sources: CEIC; RBA

rapidly and induced significant internal relocation of workers. Consequent to this relocation have been significant stresses on urban infrastructure and housing prices that have increased rapidly.

In response, the government of China has implemented a number of policies to try to contain these pressures. It has increased lending rates to limit borrowing, it has raised reserve ratios on banks to restrict lending, it has enforced capital gains taxes on housing and implemented other re-

strictions to limit house price appreciation, and it has provided support for rural wages to limit the flow of labor. Indeed, a number of these policies have been implemented in quick succession quite recently. These are not the signs of a stable economy.

In predicting the outcome of these circumstances, the experience of industrialized countries under monetary targeting may be instructive. Such targeting was invariably associated with quite detailed controls on the actions of banks. These controls, however, had limited effectiveness because economic activity tended to move to the less regulated areas of the financial system rather than being completely suppressed. It is somewhat like squeezing on a balloon. You can restrict one area of the economy, but the fundamental pressures still bubble out in other areas. Thus, in China's case, there are fundamental pressures in its economy that need to be addressed. And the current policies deal not so much with the causes as with the symptoms.

Given this environment, it seems that an obvious question is how long China will be willing to maintain its current policies. As I indicated above, even if we assume that China can maintain a gradually appreciating exchange rate, it is still an open question as to whether it will want to. As such, my fundamental comment on the paper by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber is that they treat the various economic blocs too much like black boxes. It may well be that Bretton Woods II survives for many years, but even if it does, an appreciation of the risks around that forecast is important for understanding its evolution.

So, to conclude on a rhetorical note, perhaps it is worth asking how good a label is Bretton Woods II for the current situation? Bretton Woods II invokes the spirit of an agreement that sought to bind countries into a fixed exchange rate regime. While countries are not renowned for their selfless spirits when making international agreements, unless one makes the assumption that Bretton Woods had no effect on its signatories it seems misleading to put the current situation in the same category. No countries have agreed to do anything, and the current arrangements have no more permanence than China gives them. As such, a prediction of the likely future path of interest and exchange rates that doesn't consider the motivations behind China's current policy, and the chance these may lead to different policies, would significantly understate the inherent risk of the forecast—if not change the forecasts themselves.

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