During the first twenty-five years of postwar monetary history, the world operated an adjustable peg version of a fixed rate system—the Bretton Woods regime. That system began to erode in the early 1960s, and twenty-five or thirty years ago there were already calls for sweeping reform. It soon became clear that Bretton Woods was unable to facilitate the exchange rate changes and other adjustments that were necessary to achieve a stable international economy. The system collapsed at the outset of the early 1970s when the dollar became overvalued by about 20 percent, protectionist pressures rose as a result, and the regime could not cope.¹ There is a clear record of failure of that version of fixed exchange rates.

For most of the next twelve and a half years, from March 1973 until September 1985, we had a system (or nonsystem) of unmanaged flexibility of exchange rates. It is clear that this system also failed. It permitted the dollar to become overvalued by 40–50 percent, more than twice the misalignment that brought the collapse of Bretton Woods. It failed to keep trade open; pro-

¹ The "Triffin dilemma" and other liquidity/confidence issues were an underlying source of difficulty for the system but clearly did not trigger its collapse. Indeed, the intellectual and policy focus on those issues throughout the 1960s diverted attention from the shortcomings of the adjustment process, which were the primary weakness of Bretton Woods. My account of the collapse is in The Dilemmas of the Dollar (New York: New York University Press, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), 91–93.
tectionism grew throughout the 1980s, and the world trading system is still eroding. It had no meaningful effect on national economic policies and therefore failed to achieve the most rudimentary objective of any international economic system.2

The authorities have been groping for new monetary arrangements for about six years. At the Plaza in September 1985, they clearly recognized that the extant system had failed.3 At the Tokyo Summit in May 1986, they adopted a set of “economic indicators” to guide the adjustment process. At the Louvre in February 1987, they installed a system of reference ranges. The world’s monetary authorities thus decided to proceed with a two-track program, based on reference ranges and indicators, in an effort to find a new regime.4 After some backsliding in 1988–90, when the dollar was permitted to appreciate prematurely, the G7 seem to have reestablished their reference ranges in 1991: a floor was successfully placed under the dollar–deutsche mark rate in February at 1.45:1, and the dollar’s subsequent rise was capped effectively in July at about 1.85:1.

Well before these renewed efforts at the global level, most of the European countries re-created an adjustable peg system among themselves via the European Monetary System (EMS). After numerous initial doubts, the EMS is now widely viewed as a resounding success. Indeed, it has been so successful that it will probably evolve into a full Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within this decade.

We are thus in a transition to a completely new monetary system, as in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the establishment of fixed rates in Europe and reference ranges globally. The process is evolutionary, and I would guess that we are witnessing a true Hegelian synthesis. The Bretton Woods version of fixed exchange rates was too rigid and would not work. Unmanaged flexibility failed because it permitted massive and costly misalignments. We thus need to devise a system that combines the best features of both previous regimes and avoids the worst of each—an intermediate solution that will provide a more stable and effective basis for the world economy.

It is interesting to recall that, when Bretton Woods broke down and the world moved to flexible rates, there was a great deal of interest in intermediate solutions. They were then called wider bands and crawling pegs.5 The com-

3. There were numerous similarities between the Plaza Agreement and the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 that sought to pick up the pieces from the collapse of Bretton Woods: international agreement to depreciate the dollar sharply, in order to correct a huge (for the time) U.S. deficit and counter the resultant trade protectionism, and the beginnings of major systemic reform.
Combination of those two represents a close approximation to what we now call (crawling) target zones. Among the several intermediate possibilities, this is both the most promising and the most feasible. Target zones would represent a natural further evolution of the current reform process, particularly as an extension of the reference ranges implanted since the Louvre.

Moving to an effective system of target zones will require five basic changes from the way in which the reference range system was originally constructed at the Louvre, some of which are already evolving. First, the officials must agree to a set of exchange rate relationships that will achieve and maintain equilibrium in national current account positions with economies in internal balance, meaning the fastest possible economic growth without igniting new inflation. That sounds trivial, at least in principle, until we recall that the original method for setting reference ranges was to center them on whatever the level of rates was on the day that the G7 were meeting. That is obviously a rather arbitrary basis for trying to stabilize exchange rates. It is clear, and was even at the time, that the ranges set at the Louvre were decidedly premature, and several subsequent "rebasings" were soon required.

The G7 are learning, however. In 1991, they set the floor and ceiling of the new dollar–deutsche mark range sequentially rather than at one time—the floor in February, the ceiling in July. Since it is politically difficult for governments to agree on exchange rates that differ from where rates are in the market on the day they are meeting, and since any effort to do so could destabilize the markets severely, pragmatic considerations suggest that the authorities should look for a time when market rates are close to long-run equilibrium levels—and then take steps to keep them within a reasonable distance of those levels.

At present, with the exception of Japan to a modest extent, there is fairly strong evidence that rates are now reasonably close to equilibrium levels and that the time is thus ripe to systematize the currently informal reference ranges. In October 1991, the Institute for International Economics released a study by Paul Krugman entitled Has the Adjustment Process Worked? On the basis of a two-day conference held in late 1990, which considered detailed studies of the three largest imbalances of the 1980s (the United States, Japan, Germany), Krugman answered the question with an unequivocal yes. The American deficit dropped from 3.6 percent of GNP in 1987 to 0.7 percent in the first half of 1991, the Japanese surplus fell to 1.1 percent of its GNP in Japan's fiscal year 1990 (ending March 1991), and the German surplus—propelled of course mainly by unification—will probably disappear this year. Several other recent studies conclude that current rates are reasonably close to

equilibrium levels. Hence, present exchange rate relations may provide a reasonable basis for installing a full regime of target zones.

Japan may be an exception because its surplus has risen again sharply in 1991. Moreover, Yoshitomi has indicated that the last $20–$30 billion of the reduction in that surplus in 1990 could not be explained by any model and may have been produced by purely temporary factors. MITI has released a survey in which Japan’s major international companies acknowledge that they can compete fully at 120:1. Hence, a yen appreciation of 10–15 percent from the recent level of about 130:1 seems called for before the new ranges are set.

The second key change from current procedures is to have arrangements in place that will maintain exchange rates at equilibrium levels. This means that the targets must be real exchange rates, not nominal exchange rates, because inflation differentials have to be offset by currency movements. The rates would of course be stated in nominal terms, but the targets have to be real.

It will also be essential to install procedures to change the real rates to offset underlying differences in national economic developments, such as productivity differentials. For example, under a crawling target zone system, I would expect the zone between the yen and the dollar to rise by several percentage points per year (in nominal terms). Japan will probably run lower inflation rates than the United States. Its productivity growth will probably be higher. Its huge creditor position and investment earnings, contrasted to the U.S. debtor position and likelihood of growing interest payments, will probably account for a percentage point or so on the exchange rate. Keeping the rates in equilibrium is thus going to require annual appreciation of the nominal yen-dollar rate, and the system has to comprehend that. It must of course also be able to change rates whenever there are large shocks, such as a major shift in the price of oil.

Third, the target zones must be considerably wider than the Louvre ranges. These ranges have been variously reported as plus or minus 2.5 or 5 percent. That is not large enough, for three reasons. One is that we cannot know with precision the equilibrium level of rates. Another is that it is important to permit exchange rates to move a bit in order to permit continued use of monetary policy to pursue domestic targets, particularly price stability. Moreover, when the currency midpoints have to change, it is desirable that they do so within the ranges to avoid both market disturbances and political problems.

In any event, there is no need for a high degree of rate fixity. What is needed are rates that avoid the large misalignments and thus the large disequilibria of the type that have pervaded the last fifteen years. Target zones could achieve that goal.


There is new evidence that the G7 have learned this lesson too. As noted above, the new reference range for the dollar–deutsche mark rate appears to be from 1.45:1 to 1.85:1. This is the equivalent of a zone centered at 1.65:1 with margins of 12 percent on either side. Such a zone will be much more sustainable than the narrow bands adopted at the Louvre.

The fourth change that is required is that the participating countries accept a commitment to change their policies when needed to protect the zones. Under the Louvre system, the only pledge was to consult when the rates move a certain degree away from their midpoints.

The credibility of the system depends on the willingness of the major countries to change policies when the rates reach the edge of the zone. The authorities may not actually have to make such changes very often if the initial criteria are met correctly. If the officials do have to act, intervention (and associated jawboning) would likely be the first point of departure. Changes in monetary policy would come next. On occasion, changes in fiscal policy would be required.

A new analysis by Kathryn Dominguez and Jeffrey Frankel, using official data from the United States and Germany for the first time, suggests that intervention can be quite effective in altering market rates provided that the intervention is publicly announced. The G7 experience indicates that the cost-benefit ratio of recent intervention efforts has indeed improved dramatically: the successful defense of both ends of the new dollar–deutsche mark reference range in 1991 was achieved with very modest levels of activity. Hence, the need to resort to monetary policy, and other instruments that might run counter to domestic goals, is likely to be less than has been thought.

Dominguez and Frankel’s findings on intervention underline the need for a fifth and final emendation of the current reference ranges to achieve effective target zones: public announcement of the ranges. Once the authorities establish credibility for the new system, such announcement will promote stabilizing private capital flows and reduce the need for official intervention and other policy changes.

History tells us that the only effective efforts to achieve systematic coordination of economic policies have occurred when such efforts have been prompted by an agreed exchange rate mechanism. For all its shortcomings, the Bretton Woods system did work in that respect to a significant extent. The EMS is now working, and an EMU should do even better. There is no historical case where an effort to coordinate macroeconomic policies directly produced significant results. We should learn from the past and move to an intermediate and pragmatic system of target zones for all the major countries. If that can be done effectively, we will have learned the lessons of both Bretton Woods and its tortured aftermath.

There is one additional reason for moving in the near future to systemize

the current ad hoc international monetary regime: the likely evolution of the European Monetary System into an Economic and Monetary Union. A successful move to EMU will convert Europe from a series of small and medium-sized economies into one large and much less open economy. This change will have several effects:

- It will tend to increase the extent of currency fluctuations among Europe, America, and Japan—generating greater international financial instability and potential misalignments that would distort trade and add further to the tendencies toward trade protection.
- It will tempt Europe to practice "benign neglect" from time to time, as the other large and relatively closed economy has done, or at least to try to force the costs of adjustment onto others, as the United States has also done.
- If it fails to achieve a unified fiscal policy to go with its unified monetary policy, there will be a strong possibility of a Europe-wide repetition of Reaganomics from the early 1980s and the German policy mix of the early 1990s: large fiscal stimulus, very tight money, a sharp appreciation of the currency, large trade deficits, and resultant protectionism.
- Without a true political master, the European Central Bank will be particularly likely to foster such an outcome. This will be especially true in its early years, as it seeks to prove its fealty to the goal of price stability and to discipline recalcitrant governments into fiscal rectitude.

Moreover, achievement of EMU—even without the final step of a single currency, but especially with it—will propel the ecu to a central role in a new multiple reserve currency system. This will both reflect and produce a substantial portfolio adjustment from (mainly) dollars into ecu, reinforcing the likely appreciation of European currencies with attendant trade balance and protectionist problems. This effect would be further accelerated if the EMU pooled Europe’s monetary reserves and attempted to dispose of some of the “excess,” identified by the EC Commission as on the order of $200 billion.\(^\text{12}\)

The policy implication is that the United States and Japan should engage Europe in negotiations on the global monetary system while the latter is working out its regional arrangements—particularly as both of the basic blueprints for EMU, the report of the Delors Commission and Karl Otto Pöhl’s design for a Eurofed,\(^\text{13}\) totally ignore the external dimension thereof. American strategy in the trade area throughout the postwar period has been to engage Europe

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12. See One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, European Economy no. 44 (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, October 1990), chap. 7.

in global negotiations at each key milestone in its evolution: the Kennedy Round, when the Common Market was created; the Tokyo Round, when it expanded to bring in the United Kingdom and others; and the Uruguay Round, as it moved toward “1992.” A similar approach is needed in the monetary area to avoid the risk that EMU will destabilize global arrangements and that, once its details have been put in place, it will be too late. This should be feasible now that, by successfully placing a floor under the dollar in February 1991 and effectively capping the dollar in July 1991, the G7 seem to be returning at least de facto to reference ranges among the major currencies à la Louvre.

Stanley Fischer

The founders of the international economic system who met here in July 1944 aimed to create a system that would promote international growth. They succeeded, even though none of the three institutions that were to run the system—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Trade Organization (ITO)—operated according to plan.

I will start by discussing the role of the international institutions in the world economy and then briefly take up the issues of the convertibility puzzle and the problems of international capital flows in the 1990s.

The Fund, the Bank, and the ITO

The IMF was supposed to deal primarily with international monetary relations among the industrialized countries. This IMF role was limited even before 1973 and has been more limited since—with the 1976 British program representing the last major operational involvement of the Fund with the industrialized countries. Flexible exchange rates and the mobility of international capital have made the Fund unnecessary to the major countries, and the G7 and the G10 are less unwieldy settings in which to discuss matters of mutual concern.

The Fund still plays an informational and monitoring role in the industrialized countries, through its annual Article IV consultations. This informational role would be enhanced if the annual Recent Economic Developments reports

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The author has benefited from comments on an earlier version of his remarks delivered at the conference, particularly by Fred Bergsten and Leslie Pressnell.
on member countries were published. Publication would improve the quality of policy discussion within countries and, ultimately, the quality of economic policy. It should be possible to find some governments that both are strong enough and sufficiently value informed public discussion to agree to the publication of the reports on their countries.¹ If a few countries set an example, others will eventually follow.

The IMF now operates as an agency through which the industrialized countries deal with developing countries, including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Fund's role in the developing countries was especially important during the debt crisis, and it will be important in the early years of the economic transformation in Eastern Europe. However, there are few serious evaluations of the Fund's developing country operations, and there is surely much to learn from a careful appraisal of the historical record.

The IBRD was set up to promote private capital flows to the developing countries, mainly by providing guarantees. In fact, the World Bank has, with trivial exceptions, not operated as a formal guarantee agency. Since the Bank's direct borrowing and relending can be viewed as an efficient way of providing ironclad official guarantees, it has to be asked what difference direct guarantees would make. One possible benefit is that greater direct involvement of industrialized country banks and enterprises in the developing countries would increase the efficiency of foreign capital flows.

The commercial banks and other potential investors, both in Eastern Europe and in other developing countries, continue to press for public sector guarantees of their investments. In 1988, the Bank Group set up MIGA—the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency—to provide insurance against political risks. MIGA is still establishing itself, but, even if and when it does, there remains room for the World Bank to play an enhanced economic insurance function.

As the IMF deals increasingly with the developing countries, and the World Bank in the 1980s expanded its operations beyond project lending and into structural adjustment loans, why not merge the institutions? It is easy to see the advantages of a single agency, not least the saving that would come from having only one Board of Directors.

There are also major benefits to having two agencies. The Bank certainly, and perhaps also the Fund, is so large as to stretch the span of management’s control. Despite their overlapping responsibilities, the agencies have different tasks; at some point, the Fund may be given back its original role of dealing seriously with the industrialized countries. Most important, a merger would be a mistake as long as the agencies continue to operate with as much secrecy as they do. Each of the agencies is immensely powerful and operates in the developing countries with very few checks or balances. As separate agencies,

¹. Publication would affect the frankness of the reports, but the professional quality of the staff can be relied on to ensure that the basic message gets across.
each provides a necessary check on the activities of the other. Unless a better control mechanism can be invented, the Fund and the Bank should not be merged.

The ITO was stillborn, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is widely viewed as an inferior substitute. Nonetheless, the expansion of international trade is the most striking success of the postwar economy. Deplorable as the increase in nontariff barriers has been, and important as it is to stop the trend toward voluntary trade restrictions, trade has grown more rapidly than output almost every year since the end of the war. The credit for the growth of trade must be shared between the GATT and the steady decline in restrictions on international payments.

East European experience has made clear the close link between current account convertibility and trade liberalization. The early postwar literature leaves the impression that this close connection was less well recognized then than now. If it were, the IMF and the ITO might have been designed as a single agency.

As the Uruguay Round negotiations falter, fear of the development of a three-separate-trading-bloc world grows. There is no question that a genuinely successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round talks would be better than a shift of emphasis to regional trading arrangements. It is also clear that the Uruguay Round will be in trouble unless European politicians grasp the nettle of their agricultural protectionism, which harms both many developing country exporters and Eastern Europe.

But it is unlikely that three closed regional trading blocs will develop. East Asia’s economic dependence on access to the North American market means that, with the usual shoving and hauling, transpacific trade barriers are likely to continue being reduced and the volume of trade to continue to grow. The real difficulty is with Europe, where many see the completion of the single market as an event that should benefit Europeans, not foreigners. It would be a great pity, not least for Europe, if the forces of protectionism and exclusion ultimately win out in Europe. If they do, restrictions are likely to affect not only international trade but also the flows of international capital and investment between Europe and the rest of the world, to the detriment of all. The decisions lie with European policymakers.

The Convertibility Puzzle

In the current East European orthodoxy, current account convertibility at a heavily devalued exchange rate and trade liberalization should come at the start of the reform program. If that strategy had been followed at the end of World War II, the Europeans would have devalued heavily against the dollar and removed restrictions on trade and current account payments.

Why was that not done? First, there was much less faith in the price system then than now and much more reliance on quasi planning—in which eco-
nomic policy focuses on quantities of needed inputs, using implicit input-output matrices that permit little substitution. Second, and certainly as important, it would have been virtually impossible at the end of the war to ask war-ravaged populations to make further short-run sacrifices to achieve faster adjustment. Of course, adjustment would have had to take place sooner if the United States had not provided financial assistance, including Marshall aid.

Third, in the case of Britain, there was the problem of sterling balances. These balances accumulated during the war as Britain drew on the sterling area for resources. By the end of the war, the balances were about 200 percent of exports and 50 percent of GNP, debt indicators that are about the same as those of Mexico in 1989. Today we would say that Britain had a serious debt problem, except that it also had significant external assets in 1945.

The standard prescription today would be to devalue, reschedule the debt, and adjust. Why was this not done? Skepticism about relative price changes and the perceived unfairness of requiring further hardships after those of the war have already been noted. In addition, devaluation was strongly opposed by the holders of sterling balances, including India. Britain could, however, have funded these balances and provided purchasing power guarantees. That it chose not to do so must be due partly to its desire to retain sterling’s role as an international currency. The failure to deal decisively with the balances early constrained British policy for the next twenty years; London’s role as an international financial center turns out not to require the use of sterling as an international currency.

Which approach to current account convertibility is right, the postwar West European approach or the current East European theory? Or is each right for its times? The East Europeans need the price signals that come from trade liberalization more than the West Europeans did forty years ago. No doubt, too, East European practice will be closer to West European practice than is the current theory, and that will probably be to the good since it should help mitigate declines in physical output. Still, the tentative answer is that the West Europeans adjusted too slowly.

International Capital Flows

Growth performance in the developing countries was good in the heyday of the Bretton Woods system. Since 1980, the developing world has grown on two separate tracks, the fast and medium growers of Asia and the slow and negative growers of Latin America and Africa. Much of the responsibility for these differences in performance lies with domestic policymakers, but some rests with the purveyors of international capital.

The euphoria over the successful recycling of oil revenues in the 1970s was widely shared by policymakers in the industrialized countries, bankers, the international agencies, and academic economists. Few warning voices were raised about the dangers of the growing debt, even between 1979 and 1982, when exchange rate overvaluation became the norm in the borrowing coun-
tries. There is much blame to be shared for permitting the debt crisis to develop, just as there will be much blame to share next time there is a debt crisis, as there will be.

The international system dealt much too slowly with the debt crisis and imposed too much of the burden on the developing countries. Now, ten years after the debt crisis began, some of the heavily indebted Latin American borrowers are coming back to the markets. Chile and Mexico have earned their way back. But, incredibly, private-sector loans are being extended to some countries that have not yet adjusted their internal policies or dealt with their existing debts. The private international capital markets are often said to have the memories of elephants; their memory is more like that of the crocodile, which is said to be twenty-four hours.

The lessons of the debt crisis for the international system need to be drawn and acted on. The international agencies need to ask what measures have to be taken to prevent or at least delay the next debt crisis. At a minimum, the agencies should take a far more public role not only in monitoring but also in evaluating international capital movements.

While capital flows to Latin America are beginning to resume, there is little prospect of private capital flowing to sub-Saharan Africa on an appreciable scale. Africa will have to rely on continued large-scale aid and support from the international community, including reductions in its debt burdens.

Now, at the start of the 1990s, the problem of capital flows to Eastern Europe is at the top of the international agenda. Over the longer term, the countries of Eastern Europe, and especially the former Soviet Union, should be able to attract large inflows of foreign direct investment—indeed, Hungary is already beginning to do so. But, in the immediate future, the bulk of international capital flowing to these countries will have to continue to come from the public sector, including the Bretton Woods organizations.

The two agencies successfully set up nearly a half century ago will have much to do in the next decade in the developing countries and in the reconstruction and development of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This being the preanniversary of the Bretton Woods conference, we should also ask what the agencies will be doing fifty years from now, at the Bretton Woods centennial. But that would be an academic question.

Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and the Postwar Dollar Standard

Ronald I. McKinnon

After the final breakdown of the Bretton Woods par value system in 1971–73, the unexpectedly violent fluctuations in untethered relative currency values

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greatly strengthened the tendency to form regional trading blocs—within
which more stable exchange rates can be more easily established. However,
exchange rate swings among the major blocs remain as big as ever. Over the
past four years, the yen/dollar and mark/dollar exchange rates have moved as
much as 25 or 30 percent.

From the mid-1970s onward, this exchange rate uncertainty provoked, and
is provoking, a resurgence in interbloc protectionism—mainly in the form of
quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs. Indeed, when exchange rates are
highly volatile and close to being randomly determined, much of the resulting
exchange risk cannot be effectively hedged. Consequently, governments tend
to offset some of this risk by imposing quantitative restrictions—such as im-
port quotas—on trade between currency areas. Because they insulate the
domestic economy from exchange fluctuations with lesser restraint on the vol-
ume of trade, quotas are much more efficient than "equivalent" tariffs—
whence the proliferation of quota protection for agricultural markets, "volun-
tary" export restraints in automobiles and steel, market-sharing agreements in
textiles and semiconductors, sliding-scale export subsidies, and so on.
Largely because of exchange rate instability among trading blocs, in the
1990s the industrial world is lapsing into this rather dangerous mercantilistic
rivalry.

But need commitments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and to freer global trade based on the most-favored-nation principle,
atrophy because of currency instability? History has much to tell us about
worldwide monetary standards among countries that were not tightly inte-
grated into regional groupings. Following a period of currency disorder after
World War II, virtually stable par values for exchange rates among all (non-
Communist) industrial countries from 1950 to 1970 successfully undergirded
the GATT. By the end of the 1960s, quantitative restrictions in trade among
the major industrial countries had been largely eliminated, and tariff protec-
tion was moderated. The common price level in terms of tradable goods (as
measured by WPIs) was virtually stable (see fig. 13.1). Moreover, real output
growth from 1950 to about 1973 was higher than seen before or since—what
Angus Maddison calls the "golden age" of the world economy.3

After 1971–73, tariff levels continued to drift downward under successive
GATT negotiations—but quantitative restrictions among emerging trading
blocs began to escalate. Exchange-rate and price-level volatility increased,
while real economic growth in the industrial economies slowed sharply.

1. See Ronald I. McKinnon, "Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies for International Monetary
2. See Ronald I. McKinnon and K. C. Fung, "Floating Exchange Rates and the New Protec-
University Press, forthcoming).
3. Angus Maddison, The World Economy in the 20th Century (Paris: Organization for Eco-
But this presents a paradox. If the monetary order of "virtually" fixed exchange rates from 1950 to 1970 was so successful, why did it collapse? Why were academic economists—both Keynesians and monetarists—so generally hostile to the fixed rate system well before the final breakdown? The answers are important in understanding whether a common monetary standard across similarly diverse economies is feasible in the 1990s.
The Origins of the Fixed Rate Dollar Standard: Bretton Woods or the Marshall Plan?

Through common usage, economists refer to the postwar monetary order based on pegged par values for exchange rates as the "Bretton Woods system." Similarly, the collapse of the commitment to fixed par values in 1971-73 is commonly referred to as the "collapse of Bretton Woods"—as per my own usage in the first sentence of these remarks.

But this conveniently plausible shorthand terminology is deceptive. The Articles of Agreement negotiated by Britain and the United States, and then presented to an assemblage of forty countries in the legendary town of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944, were essentially different in spirit from the fixed-rate dollar standard that had evolved by 1950.

The postwar monetary order that John Maynard Keynes, the principal British negotiator, and his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White, envisaged in 1944 is summarized by the six rules in rule box 1.4

In interpreting the "spirit of the treaty" of 1944 in rule box 1, let me emphasize just two aspects:

1. Symmetry. The rules were intended to apply to all nations more or less equally, not to establish an asymmetrical key-currency regime.

2. National macroeconomic autonomy. Each country was to have free rein to determine its own level of aggregate demand and rate of price inflation unconstrained by any international monetary standard (rule 6, box 1).

Not only did the negotiators seek to escape from the discipline (fetters?) of the classical gold standard, but they had no intention of reestablishing a world monetary standard with a common price level or "nominal anchor." In particular, Keynes was adamant that each government have the macroeconomic autonomy to manage its own aggregate demand and to choose its own rate of national price inflation5—whence the concern at Bretton Woods that governments have exchange rate flexibility in the longer run (rule 2, box 1), although par values were to be stable in the short run. Changes in official par values were to compensate for differing rates of national price inflation or to help secure appropriate adjustment in "real" exchange rates. In intervals between these discrete changes, economies could remain somewhat insulated from each other by retaining capital controls on the balance of payments supplemented by generous credits from the IMF.

Beyond the IMF articles themselves, Keynes's macro views triumphed in academe as well. The primacy of national macroeconomic autonomy—and


THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT IN 1945:
THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY

All Countries

I. Fix a foreign par value for the domestic currency by using gold, or a currency tied to
gold, as the numeraire; otherwise demonetize gold in all private transacting.

II. In the short run, keep exchange rate within one percent of its par value; but leave the
long-run par value unilaterally adjustable at the behest of the country in question.

III. Free currency convertibility for current-account payments; use capital controls to
dampen currency speculation.

IV. Use national monies symmetrically in foreign transacting, including with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).

V. Buffer short-run payments imbalances by drawing on official exchange reserves and
IMF credits; sterilize the domestic monetary impact of exchange-market interventions.

VI. National macroeconomic autonomy: each member government to pursue its own price
level and employment objectives unconstrained by a common nominal anchor or price
rule.

the consequent need for exchange rate flexibility to secure international ad-
djustment—dominated, and still dominates, postwar textbooks on open-
economy macroeconomics. Beginning with James Meade's seminal Balance
of Payments, one can trace this line of thought through Fritz Machlup, W. M.
Corden, Milton Friedman, Harry Johnson, Paul Samuelson, and many other
older authors, down to the current generation as reflected in the works of
Rudiger Dornbusch and the just-published tract by Paul Krugman Has the
Adjustment Process Worked? All emphasize the importance of leaving ex-
change rates flexible ex ante in order more easily to secure adjustment in the
balance of trade ex post. Thus, the academic profession “bought” the Keynes-
ian idea of the primacy of national macroeconomic autonomy, and the corre-
spending need for flexibility in nominal exchange rates, that lay at the heart
of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement.

But, after the Bretton Woods conference, an apparent historical aberration ensued. By 1950, a highly asymmetrical fixed-rate dollar standard had evolved that, to academic observers, seemed unduly rigid. Countries other than the United States found it increasingly awkward to adjust the par values of their exchange rates. Over the next twenty years, very few exchange rate changes among the industrial economies occurred—and these were all quite modest by modern standards. Worse, the United States emerged as the only country with a truly independent monetary policy—and it provided the nominal anchor for a common price level in tradable goods. The American (and world) wholesale price index remained remarkably stable from 1951 to 1969 (see fig. 13.1 above). Other countries were inadvertently caught in a straitjacket—that is, a new and apparently unplanned international monetary standard—where the elbowroom for exercising national macro autonomy was limited. The mixture of written and unwritten rules governing this new standard is laid out in rule box 2.

Rule box 2 shows the asymmetrical rules by which the fixed-rate dollar standard actually worked. In contrast, rule box 1 displays the symmetrical and more flexible rules of the game as intended by the negotiators at Bretton Woods. This discrepancy was particularly vexing to academic economists in whose textbooks the exchange rate received center stage as an instrumental (or endogenously adjusting) variable.

How could such a discrepancy arise? What put the world on a fixed-rate dollar standard with unwritten rules so different from the spirit of the Bretton Woods treaty on which it was ostensibly based? After 1945, one could argue that the Bretton Woods Articles never came into effect! The IMF did nothing to alleviate the festering problem of currency inconvertibility in Western Europe (and Japan) in 1946–47 and the seizing up of intra-Western European trade.

Instead, a major historical-institutional event—one that the Bretton Woods negotiators did not anticipate in 1944—gave the industrial economies a tremendous push toward the fixed-rate dollar standard. The Marshall Plan was formally begun in April 1948 with the express purpose of using American financial assistance to restore intra-European trade and financial stability, which were in great disarray. But not until September 1950 was the monetary centerpiece of this great effort, the European Payments Union (EPU), finally completed for sixteen European countries.

The EPU restored multilateral current-account convertibility among Western European currencies by using the dollar as a unit of account for calculating debit and credit balances for each member and as the fundamental means of settlement. At the end of each month, debtor countries had to use up their

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7. The nature of which is discussed in McKinnon, "The Rules of the Game."

Industrial Countries Other Than the United States

I. Fix a par value for the national currency with the U.S. dollar as the numeraire, and keep exchange rate within 1 percent of this par value indefinitely.

II. Free currency convertibility for current-account payments; use capital controls to insulate domestic financial markets, but begin liberalization.

III. Use the dollar as the intervention currency, and keep active official exchange reserves in U.S. Treasury Bonds.

IV. Subordinate long-run growth in the domestic money supply to the fixed exchange rate and to the prevailing rate of price inflation (in tradable goods) in the United States.

V. Smooth the short-run domestic monetary impact of fluctuations in international payments by partial sterilization of foreign exchange interventions (Bagehot's Rule).

VI. Limit current account imbalances by adjusting national fiscal policy (government net saving) to offset imbalances between private saving and investment.

The United States

VII. Remain passive in the foreign exchanges: practice free trade with neither a balance-of-payments nor an exchange-rate target.

VIII. Keep U.S. capital markets open to foreign governments and private residents as borrowers or depositors.

IX. Anchor the dollar (world) price level for tradable goods by an independently chosen American monetary policy.

X. Maintain position as a net international creditor (in dollar denominated assets) by limiting fiscal deficits.

As the more financially stable “outsider,” the United States alone had the monetary independence to provide a nominal anchor for the group. To improve the credibility of their domestic monetary stabilization plans, the Western Europeans could then conveniently lean on the United States after 1950.
Ronald I. McKinnon

(much like the anchoring role Germany played vis-à-vis the other EMS members after 1979)—whence the fixed-rate dollar standard that underpinned the unprecedented world growth of the 1950s and 1960s and the reduction of protectionist barriers to trade.

But the commitment to fixed exchange rates eventually broke down because the unwritten rules of the game necessary to keep the dollar standard going differed too much in spirit from its legal cover, that is, the 1945 Bretton Woods articles, and from the principle of national macroeconomic autonomy. When, following the advice of most academic economists, President Nixon devalued the dollar in August of 1971 and continued to inflate the American price level at a higher rate than America's trading partners would tolerate, he was only exercising the American "right" to exchange flexibility and national macroeconomic autonomy promised in the 1945 Bretton Woods Agreement.

However, dollar devaluation violated the unwritten rules (understandings) by which the fixed-rate dollar standard had successfully operated for the previous twenty years. To continue with dollar-based par values for exchange rates after 1970, those rules would have required disinflation of the American economy (coupled with the demonetization of gold) in order to provide a stable nominal anchor for the system as a whole. As much as any other, the American economy would have been the principal beneficiary from avoiding the monetary disorder of the 1970s and 1980s.

The general lesson is clear enough. To curb interbloc protectionism in the world economy, a global monetary standard is both feasible and desirable. But, to return to some kind of par-value system for exchange rates in the 1990s, the rules should be more explicit and likely more symmetrical than those prevailing under the highly successful fixed-rate dollar standard.

Robert Mundell

At this "Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System," organized on the twentieth anniversary of its breakdown, my assignment is to draw lessons from our experience. I shall accordingly discuss (1) the special characteristics of the Bretton Woods "system," (2) the steps that would have averted its breakdown

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10. See McKinnon, "The Rules of the Game."
11. See Williamson, "Keynes and the International Economic Order."
in 1971, (3) the defects of the flexible exchange rate system that succeeded it, and (4) measures that I believe would assist in making the present system more effective.

An Agreement, not a System

There never was a "Bretton Woods system." The Bretton Woods Agreement accommodated the rest of the world to an international monetary system that already existed. After the Tripartite Agreement among the United States, Britain, and France in 1936, the essential structure of the gold-dollar standard was already determined. This tendency was reinforced by the outbreak of World War II, the resulting inconvertibility of the European currencies, and the increased dependence on the dollar as the international medium of settlement and standard of value. The Fund's 1944 gold dollar, equivalent to one-thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold, was adopted as the unit of account of the IMF.

The dollar was the only gold-convertible currency in the postwar system. This was an outcome of several factors: the Gulliver-in-Lilliput position of the United States in the immediate postwar world economy; the importance of the dollar in every foreign exchange market; the maldistribution of gold in the world (over two-thirds in the United States); and the link between gold reserves and the money supply in the United States (the U.S. gold reserve ratio was lowered from 40 percent to 25 percent in 1945).

The asymmetry of the position of the dollar was compatible with the Agreement because of an enabling clause inserted at U.S. behest. The first sentence of Article IV-4 (b) states, "Each member undertakes . . . to permit within its territories exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of other members only within the limits prescribed under Section 3 of this Article" (i.e., 1 percent of parity). But this would have required the United States to control (or close) its foreign exchange market when U.S. practice was not to intervene in the market at all.

Accordingly, at U.S. prompting, a second sentence was added to Article IV-4 (b): "A member whose monetary authorities, for the settlement of international transactions, in fact freely buy and sell gold within the limits prescribed by the Fund under Section 2 of this Article shall be deemed to be fulfilling this undertaking." Curiously, it was not until 1949 that the U.S. secretary of the Treasury confirmed, in a letter to the managing director, that the United States was "in fact freely buy[ing] and sell[ing] gold."\(^1\) Only then was U.S. practice brought into conformity with the letter of the treaty.

Otherwise—apart from the enabling insertion of the gold clause—the Bretton Woods Agreement failed to anticipate the asymmetrical position of the dollar as the intervention currency. The concept of an intervention currency did not then exist, nor is it implied, in the Agreement. To keep the letter of the Agreement on exchange rates, every country not using the gold clause would be required to intervene in every single exchange market whenever
exchange transactions threatened to move outside the prescribed exchange rate limits. Such an arrangement was tantamount to doing without a numeraire. A third sentence should have been added to Section IV-3 (b) to accommodate nongold countries. The Fund Agreement had to be stretched, by a bylaw, to permit, as a “multiple exchange practice,” other exchange rates to diverge from the prescribed limits if a country was keeping its own exchange rate fixed, within the required limits, to a convertible currency. This meant in practice that, as long as a country was pegging the dollar within the prescribed limits, it would be absolved from the need to intervene in any other exchange market on its territory. The major countries elected to peg the dollar, and, by so doing, they exempted themselves from the other provisions of Article IV-4 (b).

An analogous bylaw relating to multiple-exchange practices proved to be necessary to finesse the problem of exchange rates moving outside the prescribed limits in the case of dependent currencies; if, say, currencies of the franc and sterling areas were pegged to those currencies within the prescribed 1 percent limits and the French and British each pegged their currencies to the dollar within 1 percent limits, swings in the exchange rate between the upper and lower limits of the two dependent currencies could be many times larger than the prescribed limits.

Inside the Fund, it was necessary to cope with another problem that resulted from the failure of the architects to anticipate the asymmetrical nature of the actual system. In Article V-3 (a) (i), dealing with the use of the Fund’s resources, it was required that “the member desiring to purchase the currency represents that it is presently needed for making in that currency payments which are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.” But it was the dollar that was needed for fixing exchange rates. Even when the dollar came under attack in the late 1950s and early 1960s, deficit countries needed to draw dollars from the Fund, aggravating the dollar’s weakness.

Theoretically, the IMF was supposed to be a revolving credit system, with unchanged total assets that were always maintained in value. Thus, when a country devalued, it was required to increase the quantity of its currency to the Fund to maintain its gold value. It soon became clear, however, that the convertible currencies held by the Fund were of no use for other members to draw. To this extent the Fund became illiquid. When the dollar became weak, the Fund’s liquidity became inadequate. The 1961 General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) reflected this illiquidity without correcting it. The resources of the Fund proved of little use for the United States itself.

To summarize, then, although the international monetary system that had developed in the late 1930s and that characterized the postwar period was not anticipated by the architects of the Fund Agreement, that Agreement was stretched to make it conform to the monetary system as it continued to evolve. The system was in effect an anchored dollar standard that broke down in 1971. The Bretton Woods Agreement, with its two amendments, is still in force.
Could the 1971 Breakdown Have Been Averted?

When, on 15 August 1971, President Nixon announced the suspension of the external convertibility of the dollar, many of the major countries reacted by dropping their peg to the dollar. Although the European countries preferred fixed exchange rates, they were reluctant to peg an inconvertible dollar and unable to coordinate actions for a joint European float. For a few months, exchange rates floated.

The float came to an end with the new system adopted at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971. The new arrangements were in effect an unanchored dollar standard because the United States was no longer buying and selling gold at the new $38.00 an ounce price. The formal creation of what amounted to an unanchored paper dollar standard broke a precedent because it imposed obligations on the rest of the world but not on the United States. With no convertibility requirement for the United States, the system broke down within two years.

The architects of the Smithsonian Agreement misconceived the major problem of the anchored dollar standard, and they lost a golden opportunity to rectify its defects. The anchored dollar standard broke down because of the undervaluation of gold. An excess demand for gold had developed in the aftermath of World War II inflation, the external convertibility of European currencies, and the decision of European countries to accumulate gold reserves at the expense of the United States (as was their right under the system).

The situation after World War II had much in common with that after World War I. In both cases, wartime inflation had lowered real gold balances relative to trade and output, creating a gold scarcity that was temporarily averted by the use of foreign exchange reserves in lieu of gold. In both cases, there was sufficient gold for an anchored dollar standard, but not enough to fulfill the needs for substantial gold holdings on the part of the rest of the world. And, in both cases, the real value of gold appreciated in the crisis stage.

The experiences part company, however, in the manner in which the problem was dealt with. When the crisis emerged in the early 1930s, the gold scarcity was dealt with in the United States and France by deflation, within the context of the prevailing gold parities. (Sterling countries, however, wisely opted out of the deflation in 1931.)

The postwar system did not repeat the mistake of deflation and depression. Instead, the market price of gold was decontrolled in 1968, and gold transactions came to a standstill between central banks. That solution, however, had the defect of changing the system from an anchored to an unanchored one.

Raising the price of gold was an alternative, advocated by Sir Roy Harrod, Jacques Rueff, and others. A provision was made in Article IV (7) of the Articles of Agreement: "The Fund by a majority of the total voting power may make uniform proportionate changes in the par values of the currencies of all members, provided each such change is approved by every member which has
ten per cent or more of the total quota.” The voting restriction gave the United States a veto.

It is necessary to understand that the gold undervaluation problem involved both stocks and flows. The flow problem had been dealt with by the agreement to create gold-guaranteed special drawing rights (SDRs), enacted in the First Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. The first allocation of the SDRs had been made in 1970, and further regular allocations would have provided for reserve growth over time, permitting the gradual phasing out of the dollar and gold as the principal reserve assets. Of course, dollars would still be needed for working balances as long as the asymmetrical exchange system lasted. But the paper gold SDR had a fair chance of working if the system had been in equilibrium to start with.

This was, however, an excess stock demand for gold. There were two ways to meet this problem: (1) a very substantial initial increase in the amount of paper gold or (2) an increase in the price of gold. But a very substantial allocation of SDRs—perhaps as much as $40 billion worth, probably combined with the much-discussed Gold Substitution Fund—was not politically negotiable. Neither was an increase in the price of gold.

Defects of the Unanchored Systems

The unanchored dollar standard created at the Smithsonian Institution broke down because of the inflationary monetary policies of the United States. Following the second devaluation of the dollar in February 1973, Europe tried again to organize a joint float. Again, no consensus could be reached, mainly because of the problem of how to settle intra-area balances. In June 1973, the Committee of Twenty abandoned the pursuit of international monetary reform for a regime of flexible exchange rates.

The floating exchange rate system shifted the responsibility for inflation from the center country to individual countries. But abandoning the system did not improve matters. The world money supply became highly elastic. Countries adopted more passive monetary policies, accommodating price increases initiated from the side of costs. Within six months of the adoption of flexible exchange rates, the price of oil quadrupled.

The soaring oil prices created huge balance-of-payments deficits in oil-dependent countries and an explosion of liquidity as receipts of oil-rich countries were recycled to deficit countries in the Eurodollar market. The explosion of liquidity, which had been accommodated by easy money on the part of the Federal Reserve, not only ratified the increase in the price of oil but spread it to the entire commodity structure. In 1974, the price of gold hit $200.

A few years later, in 1979, the problem was repeated, and the unanchored international monetary system again permitted the supply of liquidity to meet the demand. Inflation under the unanchored flexible exchange rate regime was greater than every previous experience in peacetime.
In the 1980s, the inflationary policies of the 1970s were reversed; the rate of inflation was brought down to moderate levels by the middle of the decade. Nevertheless, the cost of the inflationary error and its correction was huge, much larger than realized. Macroeconomic stability was undermined as the overshooting downward of the exchange rate raised costs that were never reversed in the appreciation phases; the ratchet effect came into play, raising the "core" rate of inflation.

The debt problems of the 1980s have their roots in the gyrating and overshooting exchange rates. In the buildup of the inflation rate, real interest rates became very low and even negative, leading to a huge buildup of debt in the late 1970s by the developing countries. With the rising interest rates brought about by the anti-inflation program, many of the developing countries became insolvent. Growth in the developing countries came to a standstill. The international debt problem was a child of the unanchored flexible exchange rate system.

But that child had a twin. The twin was the domestic financial system of the United States. The instability of the level and structure of interest rates played havoc with the banking system and especially the savings-and-loan associations. Bank failures and saving-and-loan bailouts now promise to cost the taxpayer hundreds of billions of dollars. The unsound condition of American financial institutions can be traced directly to the instability of the level and structure of real interest rates associated with the breakdown of the anchored fixed exchange rate system.

Not only have unanchored flexible exchange rates been responsible for accommodating monetary excesses, but they can also be blamed for the collapse of fiscal discipline. Under the fixed exchange rate systems of the past—the gold standard, the gold exchange standard, or the anchored dollar standard—countries have been forced to maintain fiscal discipline. Absence of discipline would quickly result in adverse speculation, reserve losses, and a convertibility crisis. But, under the flexible exchange rate system, deficits in most countries have exceeded 3 percent of GNP and in some countries have attained more than 10 percent of GNP. Under flexible exchange rates, deficits can be accommodated, if necessary, by the monetary authorities even if that accommodation results in depreciation of the currency.

The gyrations in exchange rates between 1973 and 1988 have not been conducive to stability. Tighter money would have reduced the rate of inflation and the depreciation of the dollar in the late 1970s, reduced the need for excessively tight money in the early 1980s when the dollar was soaring, and eliminated the need for the Plaza Agreement to depreciate the dollar. The excessive swings in the dollar were manifested also in excessive swings in the price of gold, which often serves as an early indicator of incorrect monetary policies. The unanchored regime of flexible exchange rates proved to be even worse than the unanchored fixed exchange rate system because it created spurious fluctuations in real exchange rates that later had to be reversed.
Steps to Improve the International Monetary System

The G7 countries took a positive step toward restoring stable exchange rates at the Louvre meeting in February 1987; they agreed to try to stabilize rates around "current levels." Had the G7 not recognized the need for a mechanism to determine the burden of adjustment, this would have been just another exercise in establishing an unanchored fixed exchange rate system. But the Louvre Agreement was an improvement over the Smithsonian system because it tried to meet the problem of assigning responsibility for adjustment. Should strong currencies loosen monetary policies, or should weak currencies tighten?

The use of an inflation index was considered as a means of determining how the burden of adjustment should be distributed. If the index indicated excessive deflation in the world economy, it would be necessary for surplus countries to expand and deleterious for deficit countries to contract, whereas, if the index indicated excessive inflation in the world economy, it would be necessary for deficit countries to contract and harmful for surplus countries to expand.

At the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in September 1987, in Washington, D.C., Secretary of the Treasury James Baker III announced his support for such an index, which, he said, "should include gold." This promising approach was, unfortunately, cut short by the stock market crash, the latter itself a victim of renewed exchange rate uncertainty. In the confused aftermath of the crash, plans were scrapped, and, since that time, international monetary leadership has been lacking.

Meanwhile, the monetary ball has passed to Europe. If Europe moves toward a complete monetary union, the character of the international monetary system will be profoundly affected. But the prospect of monetary union in Europe does not reduce the need to reestablish an effective international monetary system. If the European Monetary Union cannot be brought about, the main European countries will be more eager to reform the international monetary system. If, on the other hand, Europe achieves monetary union, the rest of the world will still benefit from the establishment of an international system with or without the new Europe.

Parameters of Reform

As at Bretton Woods, any agreement must be consistent with the economic and political parameters of the system. A solution that fails to accommodate the interests of the major countries will not be negotiable. The important decisions have to be compatible with the interests of the G7 countries and should, perhaps, include Russia as a future great economic power.

Most of the other countries would accept an international monetary agreement that was negotiated by the G7 or G8. Europe, however, is a question
mark. If Europe's agenda excludes the rest of the world, it will not put the same effort into international monetary reform; in the medium-term future, international and European monetary reform are alternatives, not complements. If, for that reason, Europe drags its feet on international monetary reform, the United States, Japan, Russia, and Canada should proceed without Europe, bringing into the discussions developing powers like India, Brazil, Mexico, and others.

Fixed exchange rates will not work in a vacuum. It is necessary to have either an anchor or an alternative arrangement that assigns responsibility for adjustment policies between deficit and surplus countries. As already noted, the burden of adjustment (monetary deceleration) should be on deficit countries when there is global inflationary pressure, and the burden of adjustment (monetary acceleration) should be on the surplus countries when there is global deflationary pressure.

Perhaps in an ideal world it would be possible to develop a common commodity basket that each country could use for determining price indexes, after which it would use a weighted average of such indexes of prices in national currencies to determine the burden of adjustment. Another possibility, along the lines of numerous proposals for commodity reserve currencies, would be for each country actually to buy and sell such a basket of commodities. Such a proposal would meet a typical criticism of the gold standard, that the real price of gold is not constant. None of these proposals are free from defects, however, and no one has yet come up with a formal plan that is negotiable. In the meantime, it is worth considering workable second-best solutions.

Could the special properties of gold be used as a signal for dividing adjustment measures? If gold were stable relative to other commodities, it would be a good signal. Over the very long run, gold has been stable against commodities, or at least more stable than any other single commodity. Gold was not, however, very stable in the 1970s. The soaring gold price was due to a concatenation of several factors: inflationary monetary policies pursued since 1971; correction for undervaluation since 1934; the appreciation that resulted when the gold prohibition was lifted from American citizens in 1974; and the special connection between the price of oil and the price of gold.

In recent years, gold seems to have stabilized around a fairly narrow range of three hundred SDRs per ounce. With annual production in the range of fifty million ounces and an outstanding stock of three billion ounces (composed of official stocks, speculative hoards, and jewelry), normal variations in annual production have only a minor effect on price.

The main fluctuations in the price of gold now result from changes in inflationary expectations. That gives gold, more than any other single commodity, special properties useful for the international monetary system. Changes in inflationary expectations are as quickly reflected in the price of gold as they are (in the opposite direction) in the price of long-term bonds.

On an experimental basis, the United States, Japan, and Europe could es-
tablish informal reference ranges for the prices of gold in terms of the national currencies. Suppose that a gold parity were set for each country with action points at ranges of, say, seven and a half cents above and below the gold parity. At the lower action point, the country would ease monetary policy; and at the upper point, it could tighten monetary policy.

There are two ways of dealing with changes in the long-run equilibrium real price of gold. One approach would be to adjust the informal central gold parity of each currency to compensate for the change in the real price of gold. This procedure has the advantage of simplicity; its disadvantage is that new parities have to be renegotiated periodically and that variable parities increase uncertainty about future monetary policy.

An alternative is to establish a Gold Stabilization Fund to stabilize the real price of gold. Such a fund would use central bank stocks to stabilize the market and operate somewhat like the Gold Pool organized by eight central banks in the 1960s. Each country could contribute part of its gold stocks to the Fund in exchange for gold-value guaranteed SDRs. The Gold Stabilization Fund could exchange gold against SDRs with the member countries and gold against currencies in the private market, supplying gold to the market when it is rising relative to commodities and taking it from the market when it is falling.

The central banks and the official institutions (the IMF and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund [EMCF]) hold about 1.1 billion ounces of gold, equivalent to a twenty-two years’ annual supply at current rates of production. Under the Gold Index Plan I am proposing, gold is used only as a guidepost for monetary policy; countries do not actually buy and sell gold. But part of the gold could be used for helping stabilize its real price.

The proposed system could be started on a pragmatic and informal basis, with the major countries experimenting with the implications of using the gold points as signals to change monetary policy. As experience with the system develops, countries may elect to narrow the margins. To the extent that the system is successful, more formal arrangements could be made and the Gold Stabilization Fund established under the auspices of the IMF.

Most of the other countries would fare better within a framework for anchored fixed exchange rates. The parity system established at Bretton Woods failed to anticipate the problems of the asymmetrical anchored dollar standard, but it is, ironically, better suited to modern conditions than the Fund Agreement after the enactment of the Second Amendment establishing managed flexible exchange rates. For the new members of the IMF, as well as for most of the smaller countries, an anchored parity system would be more conducive to better policy than the unstructured arrangements now in effect.

In the not-too-distant future, it would be desirable to consider a Third Amendment to the Articles of Agreement to establish a new framework for exchange rate parities and steps to allow the SDR to evolve into a genuine international currency.
Lessons of the Bretton Woods Experience
Martin Feldstein

The agreement devised at Bretton Woods in 1944 was supposed to create a system of “fixed” exchange rates that could be adjusted when a country experienced a “fundamental disequilibrium” in its balance of payments. Under this system, currencies were supposed to be fully convertible into both dollars and gold. Controls on international capital movements were expected to permit international differences in interest rates and to avoid capital flight when a currency’s devaluation looked likely. The International Monetary Fund was created to manage this system, with the power to authorize exchange rate adjustments and the ability to provide liquidity to member countries that experienced temporary (and presumably not “fundamental”) balance of payments deficits.

Although the Bretton Woods Agreement was accepted by the United States and all the other major nations of the non-Soviet world, the system never worked the way that it was designed to do. Several papers at the conference discussed why the Bretton Woods system eventually broke down and was totally abandoned. I want to comment instead on the more basic question of why the world economy never followed the Bretton Woods rules.

Such an analysis has useful lessons for anyone who today thinks about changing the current system in which the dollar, the Japanese yen, the German mark, and a number of other currencies float freely with little more than “verbal intervention” by governments. It may also be useful for those who are considering the desirability of shifting from the current European Monetary System to a monetary union with a single currency.

After summarizing the differences between actual experience and the Bretton Woods rules, I will discuss three basic reasons why the Bretton Woods rules were never followed: (1) changes in economic conditions, (2) changes in professional opinion about the most appropriate system of international monetary arrangements, and (3) an unwillingness of major countries to accept the constraints imposed by the Bretton Woods Agreement when it conflicted with national interests.

A System That Never Was

Although a fundamental principle of the Bretton Woods system was supposed to be the convertibility of national currencies into dollars and gold, the European countries did not accept current account convertibility in practice until 1958 and capital account convertibility until even later. Prior to that time, they argued that their individual shortages of foreign exchange and the fragil-
ity of their exchange rates made it impossible to accept the requirement of convertibility.

Actual practice appeared to conform most closely to the system described at Bretton Woods during the nine years between the establishment of convertibility in 1959 and the end of the international Gold Pool in 1968. But even in those years there were significant departures from the Bretton Woods principles. The major countries showed an unwillingness to adjust exchange rates even when there were large and eventually unsustainable trade imbalances. The surplus countries, particularly Germany, were reluctant to revalue their currencies because of the adverse effects on their export industries. The deficit countries also frequently delayed devaluations until exchange crises developed and resorted to periods of overly tight policy aimed at reducing imports before accepting the need for an exchange rate adjustment.

In addition, the major countries broke the explicit Bretton Woods rules when it suited their own national interests. Britain had a major devaluation without appropriate IMF authorization. France adopted a multiple exchange rate system. The value of the Canadian dollar was allowed to float.

This occurred against a background in which the increase of world trade and of the overseas holding of U.S. dollars was creating a rising probability of a run on the U.S. gold supply. It became increasingly clear that, since the stock of gold was not increasing in proportion to the value of world trade, a revaluation of gold in terms of all currencies might be needed at some time in the future. Foreign holders of dollars would lose in such a revaluation relative to those who had previously converted their dollars into gold. As confidence in the ability to maintain the dollar price of gold declined, the risk of a run on the dollar increased. In addition, those who feared that the dollar would cease to be convertible into gold also had a strong incentive to convert their holdings from dollars into gold. The low rates of interest on Treasury bills during this period provided only a small inducement to stay in dollars.

Although various "agreements" were reached among the major countries to avoid such a run, by 1968 the gold-dollar system could no longer be sustained, and the Bretton Woods system became a pure dollar system rather than a gold-dollar system. In 1971, the United States formally closed the gold window and declared that dollars were no longer convertible into gold. By early 1973, the adjustable peg system had disappeared. The current period of floating exchange rates had begun.

As several of the papers at the conference noted, the final collapse of the Bretton Woods system reflected a combination of the fundamental flaws in the gold exchange system itself (the difficulty of adjustment to eliminate undesired trade imbalances and the threat of a gold-dollar convertibility crisis) and the specific problems associated with the inflationary monetary and fiscal policy pursued by the United States after 1965 at a time when the dollar was supposed to provide the nominal anchor for all major currencies.

While this explains why the Bretton Woods system did not persist, there is
perhaps a more fundamental question of why the system never worked as its
designers had intended.

Why the World Economy Never Followed the Bretton Woods Rules

Even the most carefully crafted system of state controls and international
rules cannot hope to persist in a world in which economic conditions and ideas
are changing and in which national governments have both the moral obliga-
tion and the political incentive to act in the interests of their own citizens.
Although the end of World War II seemed like a natural time to think about
the future of the international economy, it was also a time of rapid change in
economic conditions that made it particularly unlikely that any complex sys-
tem of international rules drawn up at that time would be suitable for the
actual economy as it evolved.

The fundamental mistake at Bretton Woods was not in the particular rules
of the system but in the very idea that a detailed system of rules could be
crafted that would be applicable to a rapidly changing world. Instead of ac-
cepting an arrangement in which exchange rates were determined in the mar-
ket and national governments had responsibility for sound domestic policies,
the architects of the system created rules that appeared to be logically attrac-
tive but that were inapplicable in practice.

It is not at all surprising therefore that the system of detailed international
economic rules developed at Bretton Woods never described the operation of
the world financial arrangements and had eventually to be totally scrapped. In
a dynamic world governed by real political actors, any system of detailed
international economic rules cannot last for more than a very short period of
time.

It was no doubt particularly difficult for the political leaders and economic
officials who designed the Bretton Woods system in the final years of World
War II to anticipate correctly the way that the world economy would evolve in
the decades ahead. The economy had been in depression or war for nearly two
decades, virtually destroying world trade. Economic controls had become a
way of life in both Europe and the United States. The specter of Communism
once again hung over the European continent, threatening to substitute state
planning for a market economy. The dynamic changes in international bank-
ing and finance that would be brought about in the coming decades by changes
in telecommunications and in financial theory could not possibly be foreseen.

At a previous NBER conference, Guido Carli, the former head of the Italian
Central Bank, explained that he and other Europeans were eager at the end of
World War II to strengthen international trade as a way of preventing national
economic planning of the type then being advocated by the Communists in
Italy and other Western European nations. Many economists like Carli re-
garded stable exchange rates as a necessary condition for the expansion of
trade. The need for capital controls in such a system was not considered to be
technically difficult (because such controls were already in place) or economically disadvantageous. The lack of real exchange rate flexibility was not regarded as important for macroeconomic stabilization by a generation of economists that believed in the power of discretionary Keynesian domestic policies.

Economic growth and trade both flourished in the postwar period. Private international capital markets developed in magnitude and character in ways that were never anticipated. Because the international capital markets were able to supply funds to countries with temporary balance of payments problems, the IMF stabilization lending became unnecessary, and the IMF lost its most powerful lever on national economies. In addition, developments in the capital markets made it harder and harder to enforce capital controls and therefore to maintain an adjustable peg system.

The thinking of professional economists also changed substantially over the years since Bretton Woods. The original Keynesian pessimism about the prospects for full employment in the postwar period melted quickly in the light of experience. Attitudes changed also about the importance of permitting capital flows and of using nominal exchange rate adjustments to achieve real exchange rate changes. Although professional thinking is always in a state of flux, floating exchange rates are now more generally favored than they had been at the time of Bretton Woods. Economists recognized the difficulty of a system that linked the supply of international reserves to the stock of gold and that could not revalue gold in terms of the dollar without creating runs on the reserve currency.

The changing global conditions in product and financial markets and the changing attitudes of economists would have been enough to cause frequent changes in the Bretton Woods system and its eventual abandonment. But in addition the Bretton Woods system failed to operate as it had originally been designed to because the major governments of the world refused to accept the constraints and responsibilities implied by the Bretton Woods Agreement.

As I already noted, countries with trade surpluses did not appreciate their currencies, and deficit countries tried to avoid devaluations for too long. Canada floated its currency. France used a multiple exchange rate system. And the United States unilaterally brought the gold convertibility feature to an end by closing the gold window.

Under the gold-dollar and dollar standards, the world depended on a low rate of inflation in the United States to achieve low rates of inflation elsewhere. It is important to note therefore that the inflationary policies of the United States after 1965 were pursued despite restrictions that would in principle prevent such inflationary policies: the requirement that there be one dollar of gold for every four dollars of currency and that the United States stand prepared to provide gold for dollars at a fixed rate. When President Lyndon Johnson found that the combination of the Vietnam War and the "great society" programs would be inflationary unless he was prepared to accept an un-
popular tax increase or higher real interest rates, he chose to disregard his international obligations.

Government pursuit of national self-interest is an inevitable and fundamental political fact. So too is the pursuit of political self-interest by politicians. Foreign obligations and the well-being of foreign countries come a distant third, even for a country like the United States that takes pride in its international role.

Although detailed rules and a system of sanctions can be used to enforce narrow microeconomic agreements like the GATT rules on dumping and tariffs, macroeconomics is both too vague and too important to be subject to such a control process.

Recent G7 experience with attempts to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies shows just how futile such activities are. There is no unambiguous way to monitor the efforts that countries make to expand or contract aggregate demand and no way to hold a government responsible for promises that must be accepted by a parliament, a congress, or a central bank that it does not control.

The basic implication of this is that an international monetary system is fundamentally flawed if it depends on governments to subordinate their national interests in the management of macroeconomic policy in favor of international goals. Similarly, the only sure guardian of a low rate of inflation is a disciplined domestic monetary authority.

Four Lessons

The experience with the Bretton Woods Agreement suggests four basic lessons.

First, any system of specific rules for controlling international macroeconomic relations is likely to be short lived because of fundamental changes in economic conditions.

Second, a realistic international monetary system cannot be based on the idea that governments will subordinate national interests to international cooperation. Even if short-term trades are possible, it is unlikely that a government will accept a current sacrifice of national interests in exchange for the prospect that other nations will make sacrifices that benefit it in the future. Macroeconomic issues are too important to countries and too vague to be subject to a system of effective international controls and sanctions.

Third, if nominal exchange rates are fixed, necessary real exchange rate adjustments require changes in domestic wages and prices that can be slow, painful, and costly to the national economy. It is generally important therefore to permit nominal exchange rates to adjust. Even if some groups of countries constitute an optimal currency union area within which exchange rates should be fixed, the international economy as a whole is definitely not an optimal currency area. Unfortunately, international agreements like the Bretton Woods
system and the G7 attempts at macroeconomic coordination focus on nominal exchange rates and emphasize stability over adjustment. A system of managed real exchange rates is not likely to be operational in practice.

Fourth, no international agreement can guarantee domestic price stability. The gold-dollar system failed to provide low inflation in the world economy when the United States abrogated its obligation to tie the dollar to gold and permitted rising inflation in the United States. The European Monetary System as it operates today will assist participating countries to keep inflation low only as long as the “anchor currency” achieves a low rate of inflation. The proposed European Monetary Union will provide low inflation for the member countries only if the European central bank is sufficiently disciplined. A country can guarantee a low rate of inflation only by the prudent management of its own monetary policy.