Youth is the best time to be rich, and the best time to be poor.
—Euripides, Heracles

If a biotech firm developed a Ponce de León Fountain of Youth potion that would turn persons at the prime working ages of 35–55 into 25-year-olds, more older persons would buy the product than buy Viagra. Young people are generally healthier and stronger and have longer expected life spans than older people. They do not have to worry about thinning hair, expanding waistlines, and the other variegated signs of senescence. Only one thing would clearly worsen as a result of the trade: their labor market prospects.

Outside of sports or other highly physical activities, young workers almost invariably have lower wages and higher rates of joblessness than older workers. The lower wages of young workers presumably reflect their being less productive than older workers and their sacrificing some earnings potential to invest in on-the-job training. The higher rate of joblessness of young workers is due in part to their being in a transitional state, moving from the world of school to the world of work and moving from their parental families to living on their own.

In the 1970s the labor market situation of youths worsened noticeably, apparently because of the huge increase in supply resulting from the entry of baby boomers into the job market (Freeman 1979; Welch 1979; Berger 1984). Most analysts expected that the deteriorated position of youths in the job market would improve as baby boomers aged and as the youth
cohort declined in size (see OECD 1978). Most expected that increased education or training would substantially alleviate the problems of all youths save for a small hard core. The youth job market problem was expected to be a temporary one, readily curable by policy.

But to the surprise of most analysts, the traditional gap between adult and youth wages and employment rose substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. In virtually all advanced countries the youth cohort is much smaller and better educated than in the past, but the youth job market problem remains, and in most cases it has gotten worse rather than better.

In the United States the wages of less educated young men were 20 to 30 percent lower in the 1990s than at the end of the 1970s. The boom of the late 1990s raised pay and employment relative to adults but did not come close to restoring the position of youths to what it was even during the peak of the baby boomers’ entry into the job market. An extraordinary proportion of the least educated young men, particularly black young men, were incarcerated.

In much of western Europe, youth unemployment rose in the 1980s and remained high in the 1990s. Many young workers waited long periods of time before they found jobs and remained in their parental homes longer and longer. In some countries youth unemployment was at levels that two or three decades ago might have led to serious social disorders, Spain, France, and Italy being most prominent.

1. What went wrong with the rosy expectations that demographic changes and additional schooling would resolve the youth job market problem?
2. How have youths responded to the deteriorated job market facing them?
3. How have economic policies focused on youths, particularly policies to improve their skills, worked in the period?
4. Why does the youth labor market problem seem to have become a constant scar rather than a temporary blemish (to use David Ellwood’s 1982 expression)?

This volume contains 11 studies that cast light on these questions. The volume follows a long NBER tradition in studying the youth job market. In 1982 Richard Freeman and David Wise led an NBER research project that produced *The Youth Labor Market Problem*. In 1986, the NBER examined the specific problems of black youths (Freeman and Holzer 1986). This volume contains 10 studies that cast light on these questions. In 1994 Lisa Lynch led an NBER research effort, *Training and the Private Sector*, that placed particular emphasis on the training of young workers.

The 1980s research, based primarily on the U.S. experience, found that severe employment problems were concentrated among a small proportion of youths with distinctive characteristics but that for a vast majority
of youths, lack of employment is not a severe problem. Aggregate economic activity was the major determinant of the level of youth joblessness in the United States, a result this volume confirms across all countries and in ensuing decades.

The current volume provides a detailed analysis of the situation facing young workers in a variety of countries besides the United States—Germany, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada—and extends the traditional focus on wages and employment to other important outcome measures, such as living arrangements, crime, and measures of self-reported happiness. The biggest social change affecting youth since the earlier research is that a much larger proportion of youths attend school, largely full time, in all OECD countries. Concurrently, full-time entry into the job market takes longer now than it did in earlier years. Combining initial education and work is relatively more frequent in countries that have a dual-system apprenticeship program (Austria, Denmark, and Germany) or a relatively high incidence of part-time employment (Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

The volume is organized around the first three questions listed above. They are questions that careful data analysis can in principle answer. While many of the papers address more than one of these questions, we have grouped the papers according to the area where they make their primary contribution. This introduction summarizes the answers these and other recent economic studies give to the empirically answerable questions.

The fourth question—why the youth job market problem has failed to lessen over time—is arguably the most important one, but it cannot be readily answered with tables of data. After summarizing what we know about the first three questions, we offer some speculative comments on the last question.

What's Gone Wrong with the Youth Labor Market?

The facts for young men are simple. Along a variety of dimensions the economic position of male workers in the age brackets 16–24 and 25–29 has worsened relative to that of older workers in virtually all OECD countries. In the United States the worsening has largely taken the form of a drop in the relative earnings of youths, particularly those with less than college education. But relative earnings of young workers have fallen in other advanced countries as well (Blanchflower and Freeman, chap. 1 in this volume). The surprise is that the deterioration in relative earnings of the 1980s and 1990s followed a sharp drop in relative earnings attributed to the baby boom increase in the supply of young persons on the job market, despite favorable demographic changes. As Blanchflower and Freeman and Korenman and Neumark document, the demographic shift was large.
The youth proportion of the workforce declined sizably in the United States and in virtually every other OECD country in the 1980s and 1990s. Declining youth cohort size should lead to lower unemployment rates for youth and higher relative earnings for youth, and this trend should be particularly marked in countries like Japan, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where the fall in the relative size of youth cohorts was exceptional.

But the economic position of youths worsened rather than improved. That the demographic changes failed to improve the position of youths much does not mean that shifts in supply have no effect on the youth job market—the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate with respect to relative youth cohort size is still positive (Korenman and Neumark, chap. 2 in this volume). Rather, it means that other factors such as aggregate rates of unemployment or technological changes or increased trade with less developed countries with huge numbers of young, less skilled workers may have made domestic supply considerations less important than they were in the past.

In the European Union the relative wages of youths fell in most countries, even though wage-setting institutions maintained relatively narrow distributions overall. Regardless of the wage experience, however, youth unemployment rates rose substantially, save for Germany. In France, increased minimum wages reduced the employment of young, less skilled workers, with an effect concentrated on a narrow band of young workers in the immediately affected parts of the wage distribution (Abowd et al., chap. 11 in this volume). The country that dealt most successfully with the youth problem is Germany. While some German youths have great trouble in the job market, and while the apprenticeship system has run into some problems, young, less educated Germans have done markedly better in both employment and wages than comparable Americans (Franz et al., chap. 10 in this volume).

The situation for young women is less troubling, as young women have continued to move into the job market in increasing numbers and as female pay has improved relative to male pay. Still, in the late 1990s young women earned less than seemingly comparable young men and experienced a similar twist in the age-earnings profile against them. The unemployment rate for young women workers has risen in most countries, and in the United States and United Kingdom at least, poverty has become increasingly concentrated among single-parent female-headed households.

The contrast between how less skilled American and German youths fare in the job market is particularly striking. Young, less educated American men and women are less likely to be employed than their German counterparts, have much lower earnings relative to more highly educated youth than do comparable German youths, and earn less than less educated German youth in purchasing power parity terms. Young, less educated American women are far more likely to be single parents than
young, less educated German women. Over time, the longitudinal growth rates of earnings are considerably higher for less educated Germans than less educated Americans. The large public sector in Germany was partly responsible for the economic situation of less educated youths by employing a sizable number of low-skilled youth. At the other end of the spectrum, Americans in the highest educational group outearned Germans by considerable amounts (Blau and Kahn, chap. 3 in this volume).

One simple statistic captures the overall change in the labor market position of young workers from the 1970s to the 1990s. This is the ratio of the young persons' share of labor market earnings to their share of the population of persons aged 15 and over. The share of income going to young workers depends on both their relative earnings and relative employment (and any changes in their share of non-labor-market income). Column (1) of table 1 records the share in the U.S. 15-plus population of two youth groups, ages 15–24 and 25–34, among men; column (2) gives the share of income going to those groups; and column (3) gives the ratio of shares. For both groups the share of income going to the young has fallen substantially more than the share of the population, producing a marked fall in the relevant ratios. The pattern among women in columns (4), (5), and (6) is similar. Since the relative pay of youths has fallen in other OECD countries, as well as in the United States, and relative employment of youths has trended downward rapidly as well, the findings in table 1 should generalize to other countries. Young persons are getting a proportionately smaller share of income than they did 20 or so years ago.

What makes the deterioration of the job market for young workers

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Declining Share of National Income Accruing to the Young in the United States by Sex, 1980–97</th>
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<td>Men</td>
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<td>Age Group</td>
<td>Share of Population (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ages 15–24</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>Ages 25–34</td>
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puzzling is that most of the basic economic forces that affect youth employment prospects operated to raise their relative position. In addition to the demographically induced decline in the number of young workers, the industrial composition of employment shifted toward sectors that hire relatively many workers, retail trade and services such as hotels and restaurants. This change should have increased the employment if not the wages of young workers. And the technological factor that many analysts cite as underlying the long-run rise of inequality and higher premium to skills—computerization—should have benefited the young, who have grown up with computers, relative to older workers, who have not. Finally, the increased years of schooling and skill of younger workers relative to those of older workers should have raised their relative pay and employment. In short, things did not work out as expected in the youth job market, creating a major puzzle for analysts of this market.

How Did Youths Respond to the Deteriorated Job Market FacingThem?

Perhaps the most important and positive way in which young persons can respond to poor labor market conditions is by postponing entry into the job market and remaining in school. Without a family to support, youths can invest in human capital rather than struggle to make a living in a difficult market.

In virtually all OECD countries, enrollments in school rose from the 1980s through 1990. The deterioration in the youth job market seems to have contributed to particularly large increases in enrollments in higher education. Among Americans the proportion of young men enrolled in college and university fell in the 1970s then rose from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s. The increase in college going was steady for women, so that by the 1990s approximately 25 percent more women were graduating with bachelor’s degrees than were men. Figure 1 shows the rise in U.S. enrollments in college from 1980 to 1997. Enrollments increased even more rapidly in other OECD countries, so that the United States has lost much of its edge in producing college and university graduates. Partly as a result of the response of Canadian youths to high joblessness, enrollment rates in Canada, which traditionally had been lower than in the United States, came to exceed those in the United States.

In addition to enrolling in school, young persons shifted among fields of study and occupations. In the United States more students rejected sciences and liberal arts in favor of business-related areas, and Ph.D. degrees in favor of professional degrees (Bok 1993). The flow of students toward higher paying fields should have increased the earnings of young workers relative to the earnings of older workers, but even so the earnings of young, educated workers at best stayed even with those of older, educated workers.
A second important adjustment has been that young persons stay longer in their parents' homes or postpone setting up their own families. In Canada and the United States low youth wages increase the likelihood that young women remain living with their parents and attend school, while low employment rates raise the chances that women remain in their parents' homes but only marginally affect their rate of school attendance. Between 1971 and 1994, the proportion of 16–24-year-old American men who were heads or spouses in their own families fell from 22 to 11 percent, while in Canada the proportion dropped from 16 to 8 percent. Among women the trends were similar: a drop from 36 to 24 percent in the United States and a drop from 30 to 17 percent in Canada (Card and Lemieux, chap. 4 in this volume).

Taken together, increased schooling and residence in parental homes have elongated the period of youthful preparation for the job market and family formation. The "young" are older than they were several decades ago.

But this volume also documents another, more deleterious response of youths to the deterioration in their economic opportunities that is most marked in the United States. This response is increased involvement in crime. Large numbers of young American men committed sufficiently serious crimes in the 1980s and 1990s to make "prisoner" just about the fastest growing occupation. Young criminals come largely from disadvantaged backgrounds, including single-parent homes, have low AFQT scores,
often suffer from child abuse, spend time in foster homes, have relatives who end up incarcerated, and have friends who are also involved in criminal activity. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, young men who have trouble with the police score low on academic tests, were disproportionately from single-parent homes, and were disproportionately placed in care. Many young persons involved in crime are employed before their arrest, suggesting that they have reservation wages for both legal and illegal work (Freeman, chap. 5 in this volume; Gregg and Machin, chap. 6 in this volume). While it is difficult to determine the supply elasticity of youths to crime, given the absence of good data on criminal earnings, the best evidence suggests that it is reasonably high, both to legitimate wages and unemployment (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 1998; Grogger 1995; Freeman, chap. 5 in this volume) and to criminal sanctions (Freeman 1999).

The reaction of youths to the deteriorated job market in terms of school enrollments, residence in parental homes, and criminal behavior indicates that the young have substantial supply responsiveness to economic incentives. The more responsive young people are to market conditions, the more likely is it that they undertake actions that bring about economic improvement for them and move the workforce into new areas. But this volume also shows that socially desirable supply responsiveness such as enrolling for additional education can be difficult for youths from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Gregg and Machin exploit a unique body of data for Great Britain to trace out the effects of early disadvantaged background on economic outcomes. The British survey has followed the social and economic progress of a cohort of persons born in a particular week in 1958. Young persons from disadvantaged backgrounds, as reflected by family income, living in a single-mother family, and, most striking, having been placed in a foster care home at some time, have lower employment and earnings even at age 33. An important transmission mechanism for the link between early childhood disadvantage and adult economic outcomes is educational attainment. In the United States a similar pattern is found in data on the family composition of youths going on to college. The huge rise of enrollments in college is concentrated among young persons from high-income families and has been minimal among those from families in the bottom quintile of the income distribution (Kane 1995).

The British data also show that children from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to get into trouble with the police at age 16, which in turn adds to the probability that they end up incarcerated (if male) or as a single parent (if female) as they mature. The math and reading scores of the children of parents in the 1958 cohort who are disadvantaged are also relatively low, suggesting that the pattern of disadvantage replicates itself across three generations.

Thus this volume finds truth both in the economists' model of young
people responding in economically sensible ways to market conditions and in the sociologists' model of young people being greatly affected by their family backgrounds.

**How Have Economic Policies to Help Youths Worked in the Period?**

There are three major sorts of programs designed to help youths in the job market. On the supply side are programs that link schooling to work before youths encounter difficulties in the market and second-chance programs that try to increase the skills of youths having trouble in the job market. On the demand side are programs that raise youth wages, for instance through the minimum wage, or that direct some employment opportunities toward youths. The research in this volume examines German apprenticeships as the most highly developed school-to-work transition program, assesses Swedish active labor market programs, and assesses American JTPA training programs.

On the basis of aggregate outcomes, German apprenticeships seem to be a highly successful supply-side program. Less educated young workers have lower unemployment rates and higher relative earnings in Germany than in the United States. In the first five or so years of work, many fewer young Germans are jobless than young Americans. Apprenticeships offer a good return for most young persons. But the German apprenticeship system has its problems. The number of apprenticeship contracts has fallen, as more youths have chosen higher education. Youths who do not find jobs immediately after their apprenticeships face comparatively long periods of nonemployment, and those who fail in apprenticeship programs suffer long-term reductions in earnings. The apprenticeship system does not ameliorate the effects of family background: children of blue-collar and white-collar workers were more likely to be employed subsequently than children of nonemployed parents (Franz et al., chap. 10 in this volume).

By contrast, second-chance programs, including Sweden's much heralded active labor market programs, do not seem to be overly effective. For many years Sweden was viewed as having solved the problem of joblessness and economic inequality. During the 1970s and 1980s young workers fared reasonably despite sharply increasing youth relative wages. But the recession of the early 1990s proved that Sweden was not immune to substantial unemployment or to a major youth joblessness problem. In the 1990s youth unemployment has risen sharply, and the state has expanded youth participation in active labor market programs. This has reduced employment somewhat without solving the joblessness problem. Indeed, the increase in unemployment has been roughly proportional by age and education, implying that these programs have not altered the relative distribution of unemployment. The proportional growth of joblessness
suggests that aggregate factors were more important in Sweden's joblessness than disaggregate shifts in demand for labor among different skill groups.

The evidence on U.S. second-chance programs is, if anything, even less positive for young men, though they seem to have benefited young women. Indeed, the argument over Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs for disadvantaged young men focuses on whether they reduce the earnings of trainees rather than whether they have a benefit-cost ratio above one. U.S. studies of JTPA programs are particularly valuable because they are based on experimental evaluations of training programs. The 1995 evaluation of JTPA programs produced the startling result that youth training actually reduced the earnings of young male workers, inducing Congress to cut funding for the youth component of JTPA. But experimental evaluations involving humans are often imperfect. Some of the negative results appear due to details of the evaluation procedure: the specific way evaluators handled dropouts from the program, differences among sites, treatment of outliers, construction of earnings variables, and other technical decisions that could readily have gone differently. In addition, the fact that some youths in the "control sample" seek training outside of the program means that comparisons of the control and experimental groups give a downward bias to estimates of the effect of training per se (Heckman and Smith, chap. 8 in this volume).

France has a wide variety of youth programs and indeed leads the advanced countries in the proportion of youths employed under some special program. France also has relatively high minimum wages, which can be expected to adversely affect youth employment: the real minimum hourly wage in France (the SMIC) has risen steadily since 1967, and approximately 28 percent of French workers are in the range of the minimum—roughly 10 percent more than in the range of the U.S. minimum. In chapter 11 Abowd et al. find that young workers paid around the minimum wage in France were more likely to become unemployed or move out of the labor force than those paid over the minimum wage. But employment effects in France are mitigated somewhat by participation in employment promotion programs that seem to shield workers from some of the effects of the increasing real SMIC. When this eligibility ends, the probability of subsequent nonemployment rises sharply.

In sum, the only policy that seems to have been effective in helping youths to make a successful transition into the job market is the highly structured German apprenticeship system. Whether this reflects the specifics of the apprenticeship system or the fact that the policy affects youths before they enter the job market is uncertain. OECD (1997) data on literacy skills show that the bottom quintile of Germans have much higher reading, writing, and math skills than the bottom quintile of Americans, suggesting that the big U.S.-German difference is in premarket skills. But
several other EU countries have more skilled bottom-quintile workers than the United States while still suffering from major youth job market problems.

Why Has the Youth Labor Market Problem Become a Constant Scar Rather Than a Temporary Blemish?

This volume examines some differences in how countries prepare youths for the job market and institutionalize the transition from school to work. In the United States, young workers shift jobs often as they search for a good match: spells of joblessness are short but frequent. In Italy and Spain, young workers wait extended periods of time to obtain permanent jobs: spells of joblessness are long, but youths eventually obtain fairly secure permanent jobs. In Germany and Austria, apprenticeship programs smooth the transition from school to work, which tends to shift forward the period where unemployment peaks. These institutions affect outcomes, but a consistent pattern of special "youth" differences remains, as does—save in Germany—a consistent worsening of the position of youths.

Why did the relative economic position of youths deteriorate despite their increased education and smaller cohort sizes? One reason is that aggregate unemployment was relatively high in OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The demand for young workers is highly sensitive to aggregate economic conditions (Blanchflower and Freeman, chap. 1 in this volume; Clark and Summers 1982). As new entrants to the job market, young workers lack the specific training or seniority that buffers older workers from swings in market conditions. Their employment is highly dependent on the aggregate state of the labor market. High rates of unemployment in the European Union thus go a long way to explaining the prevailing rate of youth joblessness. The fall in joblessness in the United States in the late 1990s produced some rise in youth wages, as well as employment, after two decades or so of decline, but it did not come close to restoring the relative position of young workers (Freeman and Rodgers 1999).

The influx of women into the job market may also have affected the economic position of young workers. Many women workers are new entrants or reentrants into the job market who might fill jobs that younger workers would otherwise hold. But female pay has increased as the supply of women to the workforce has grown. Since we would expect the effects of an increase in the supply of women to be greater on women than on substitute young workers, this makes any cherchez la femme story difficult to sustain.

Increased trade with developing countries is another potential determinant of the deteriorated economic position of young workers. On a world scale the share of youths in the working age population is much larger than in advanced countries. Thus trade with less developed countries
might be expected to reduce the relative position of young workers. But again, the sectors that compete most with less developed countries are those such as apparel that traditionally employ women workers, so one would expect trade to have devastated their wages or employment rather than that of young men.

All told, while the increased supply of competitive workers due to women or trade may have affected the position of young workers, these forces do not seem powerful enough to counteract the demographic and demand factors that favored young workers. To explain the observed deterioration in terms of labor supply, we must argue that workers in the baby boom generation are highly substitutable with younger workers so that the baby boom cohort reduced not only their own earnings but those of ensuing, smaller cohorts as well (Macunovich 1998). As the baby boom cohort gets older and older, however, and the economic position of young workers remains depressed, this becomes an increasingly tenuous claim.

Yet another supply-side possibility may resonate with those who need the Ponce de Léon potion: that young workers are simply not as good as older workers. Test scores for younger and older workers on the OECD international adult literacy survey reject this explanation save for the United States and Ireland. This survey, conducted in 1994, gave adults in several countries the same test of their literacy skills—prose, document, and literacy. The figures for all countries except the United States and Ireland show that younger workers are more skilled than older workers (OECD 1997). Because the survey does not include college students on campuses, however, it probably understates the skill level of younger Americans. Even if a decline in youth skills can help to explain the problems of young American workers, it cannot explain the fall in the relative position of youths across the OECD.

In sum, it is difficult to make a case that measurable market forces beyond high aggregate unemployment caused the worsened job market for young workers.

The Absence of Youth Protest

Given that the relative economic position of youths has declined, in some countries sharply, why have youths not protested collectively as their counterparts did in the late 1960s and early 1970s? With the sole exception of French youths, who protested a proposed youth subminimum wage in 1995 and demanded low pupil-teacher ratios and higher school quality in 1998, there has been virtually no collective youth response to worsened job prospects. High youth joblessness in Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom has not generated Danny the Reds, mass student movements, or the conflict of the generations that marked the 1960s. In the United States the
American Association of Retired Persons raises the battle cry for the old, but there is no countervailing force on behalf of young workers.

One explanation this volume suggests is that, economics aside, youths are happier than in the past. Blanchflower and Oswald document that youths report greater happiness or life satisfaction than in the past. Perhaps sex, drugs, the end of the cold war, postponement of family responsibilities, and improved consumption have offset the fall in relative earnings and employment. But the increased happiness of youths is not evinced in one hard statistic: the relative number of suicides by young people, which have trended differently across countries. Suicide rates among young men rose between the 1970s and 1990s in English-speaking countries and Norway; fell in Japan, Sweden, Austria, and West Germany; and show little change elsewhere (Blanchflower and Freeman, chap. 1 in this volume). The increase in happiness occurs largely among the rising number of young persons who are unmarried, perhaps because they enjoy more personal freedom and greater social tolerance than similarly unmarried young persons in the past. But it leaves open the question of why youth suicide rates remain high.

Another explanation is that the worsened employment and earnings opportunities of young workers is a temporary state that simple aging will eliminate. Perhaps an extra year to find a permanent job or a drop in starting pay are transitional glitches with little or no consequences for lifetime income prospects. What matters is permanent income—the discounted present value of lifetime income—not transitory income. But if “temporary glitch” means that the lifetime income of young workers is unaffected by their entering the world of work in a depressed job market, this explanation is false. Cohorts who start off in worsened conditions historically do not recover from the initial adverse shock to their economic prospects. A cohort that enters the job market in a bad period will not “catch up” to the position it would have held had it entered in a good period. At best, the lifetime income profile of the cohort will follow a “normal” path, beginning at a lower starting point.

A third possibility is that while young workers may have suffered a permanent loss in real income compared to what they might have made absent the depressed market, the likelihood that they will have higher lifetime income than earlier generations has dissipated any discontent. In a world of rising per capita income, it would take an extraordinary shock for young cohorts to end up with lower income than older cohorts. Consider two groups of workers, parents and youngsters separated by 25 years. The income of both groups consists solely of labor market earnings. With a growth rate of real earnings of 1.5 percent per year due to technological change and human and physical capital accumulation, the younger generation will have a 45 percent higher discounted lifetime income than the
older generation. Even a 20 percent permanent fall in the real earnings of
the younger cohort relative to their parents will leave them with a 25 per-
cent income advantage. Thus, if youths compare their lifetime income to
that of older workers, the fact that they are better off (though less so than
they might have been) may also dampen collective sentiments for protest.

Note also that the "rising tide" of growth argues against programs de-
signed solely to redistribute income toward younger people. As long as
the older generation provides the young with education and physical capi-
tal, the young have higher lifetime income than the old. Your local 20–
25-year-old may have problems in the job market today, but he or she
will still enjoy a higher standard of living than your local 45–50-year-old.
In some situations, moreover, improvements in technology will make the
lives of younger cohorts almost incommensurately better. Today medicine
cannot cure the wealthiest person with AIDS, certain cancers, and so
forth, but n years in the future medicine will presumably cure the poorest
person with those diseases. From this perspective, the drop in the relative
earnings of the young is an egalitarian redistribution. If you had to choose
to reduce the earnings of older or younger workers or to have older or
younger workers jobless, it is better to have the burden fall on the young.
As Euripides said, "Youth is the best time to be rich, and the best time to
be poor."

That each generation should (and will) do better than the previous gen-
eration is part and parcel of the modern economic world. To what extent
has the depressed youth job market challenged this notion? Into the late
1990s surveys in the United States reported that a growing proportion of
the population believed that their children would not enjoy the benefits of
the rising tide. Sixty-seven percent of Americans said in 1997 that they
thought the "economic situation" for their children would be worse than
for their generation (Yankelovitch 1997). Given trends in the real earnings
of median workers in the United States in the 1970s through 1990s, this
was not an unrealistic expectation for many Americans, though Ameri-
cans should have a more optimistic view as the economic boom of the late
1990s has continued.

But there is another possible comparison. Perhaps youths do not com-
pare themselves much with the preceding generation. Older persons may
remember that they had a relatively better employment situation when
they were young, but the young do not look at historical age-earnings
ratios and then take to the streets. Perhaps youths compare themselves
largely with their peers. In this case, a fall in the ratio of youth income to
that of older workers will not produce generational conflict. Everyone in
a youth cohort may have a depressed income, but those at the top of the
group might regard their situation as good rather than poor.

If the right comparison group consists of persons within a youth cohort,
there are two telling statistics. For the United States at least, inequality in
earnings has risen substantially among the young. And in the European Union, youth unemployment or inactivity has become highly concentrated in households where no other person is employed. In the majority of OECD countries for which trend data exist, moreover, the concentration of the unemployed in jobless homes has increased. From this perspective, the “real problem” in the youth job market is that society is sorting young people into two groups—the educated, skilled, and well paid and the less educated, unskilled, and unemployed or low paid.

One additional explanation for the lack of youth protest is that the weak labor market gives them little power to make demands on the rest of society. What can they do in politics or in the job market? The pre-baby boomers enjoyed a strong market that gives them a relatively good economic position. The baby boom generation, whose incomes fell relative to older workers, has the strength of numbers. The post-baby boomers have neither numbers nor a strong labor market. They cannot readily strike against more senior workers. With severe competition in the job market, who wants to risk his or her future by engaging in disruptive protests? And more skilled and educated young persons may have less in common with the less skilled and educated than they have with the older generation.

In sum, the experience of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that advanced countries can tolerate relatively high levels of youth joblessness and relatively high differentials between adult and youth earnings without risking social disorder. This does not mean that policies and programs designed to help youths fare better in the job market are not desirable—some policies may very well meet relevant benefit-cost tests—but that efforts to improve the youth job market are more likely to be successful as part of general reforms in the labor market than of more focused changes.

References


David G. Blanchflower and Richard B. Freeman

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