The Impact of Permanent and Temporary Import Surcharges on the U.S. Trade Deficit

Barry Eichengreen and Lawrence H. Goulder

9.1 Introduction

External imbalances and protectionist pressures traditionally go hand in hand. The 1980s were a decade of exceptionally pronounced external imbalances for the United States. Predictably, the decade was marked by a steady stream of trade and tax policy proposals intended to reduce the trade deficit, stem foreign capital inflows, and reverse America's loss of net foreign creditor status. Examples range from the 1985 Branson-Pearce proposal for a 20 percent import surcharge to the Gephardt amendment to the recent trade bill, which would apply tariffs on imports from countries running large bilateral trade surpluses with the United States.¹

The logic for these proposals is straightforward. Tariffs raise the price of importables and shift U.S. expenditure toward domestic goods, thereby closing the trade gap. This is the implication of static analyses of the relationship between tariffs and the trade balance familiar since at least the time of Meade (1951). Several issues must be confronted, however, before leaping from this simple logic to policy recommendations. First, the standard static analysis of the effects of trade policy initiatives ignores intertemporal adjustments that influence the trade balance. Temporary tariffs, for example, tend to raise the

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¹. See Branson and Pearce (1985). Their proposal coincided with the introduction of no fewer than ten separate bills to impose some form of surcharge in the first half of 1985 (Kaempfer and Willett 1987, 27).
prices of current goods relative to future goods. This increases the consumption rate of interest facing domestic consumers, which encourages consumers to shift absorption toward the future, weakening the capital account and strengthening the trade balance. However, by reducing current absorption, temporary tariffs depress world interest rates, encouraging households to shift absorption back toward the present. The intertemporal substitution to which this gives rise may offset the impact on the trade balance of within-period substitution between importables and exportables. Thus, a temporary tariff, by reducing world interest rates, can induce domestic households to increase current spending to such an extent that the trade balance actually worsens. Because of interest rate effects, a permanent tariff can also worsen the trade balance in the short run.

Second, even if permanent and temporary import surcharges would in fact succeed in reducing the trade deficit, it still is unclear which would do so at lower cost. The answer depends in part on what produced the trade deficit in the first place. The two leading interpretations of U.S. trade deficits in the 1980s are that they were produced by private and public savings shortfalls, respectively. The private saving shortfall is typically ascribed to the combination of an autonomous fall in household savings propensities and investment-friendly tax reforms (Poole 1989; Makin 1990). The public saving shortfall is commonly traced to the tax cuts and public spending increases that produced the exceptionally large federal budget deficits of the 1980s. Which interpretation of the origins of the trade deficit one subscribes to may well have implications for the policy one recommends.

The extant literature is virtually silent on these issues. We address them in this paper by analyzing alternative trade policies designed to close the U.S. current account deficit. We start with an analytical model that can be used to sketch the impact on the trade balance and national welfare of permanent and temporary tariffs. We then incorporate these analytical relationships into a dynamic, disaggregated computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy, and simulate the effects of temporary and permanent import surcharges. Simulations are performed under different assumptions about the source of the trade deficit.

Results from the analytical model reveal that, even under restrictive assumptions, the policy initiatives have ambiguous effects on the trade balance and welfare rankings are indeterminate. This makes clear the need to impose realistic parameter values to make headway on the policy issues. The numeri-

2. The case of temporary import surcharges is probably more realistic. But the comparison with permanent surcharges is useful for bringing out some of the distinguishing features of the temporary policy.

3. The analysis of Iishi, McKibbin, and Sachs (1985) is similar to ours in its attention to intertemporal adjustments. Like ours, their analysis explores the effects of a uniform import tax. However, their model does not provide the same degree of sectoral disaggregation. Nor does it consider alternative assumptions regarding the sources of the trade deficit and the timing of the tariff.
cal simulation model employed in this paper does precisely this. The simulation model extends the analytical model by incorporating production and a government sector whose functions extend beyond merely transferring revenues to households in lump-sum fashion. In addition, the simulation model disaggregates U.S. production, permitting an assessment of the intersectoral impact of different policies. In contrast with other simulation models that examine intersectoral effects of trade initiatives, the model employed here is rigorously intertemporal, capturing the dynamic connections between import surcharges, domestic saving and investment, and the trade balance.

Several important findings emerge from our simulation analysis. Under a wide range of parameter values, both temporary and permanent import surcharges succeed initially in improving the trade balance. The temporary surcharge has a larger short-run impact, but the permanent surcharge raises domestic welfare by a greater amount. Although both policies reduce the trade deficit initially, both yield larger deficits subsequently. Under certain assumptions regarding the sources of the trade deficit, both policies delay the date at which the U.S. deficit is converted to a surplus.

The effects of the two policies are sensitive to assumptions about what produced the trade deficit in the first place and to the timing of the policy response. The short-run effects on the trade balance are also sensitive to assumptions about individual portfolio behavior.

In interpreting our results, it is important to bear in mind that we are not primarily concerned in this paper with the questions whether reducing the trade deficit should constitute a policy objective or whether tariff policies are the best means to this end. Our attention to permanent and temporary tariffs is motivated largely by the recognition that policymakers face substantial political pressures to introduce these measures. Under these circumstances, a close examination of their potential effects seems worthwhile.

### 9.2 A Simple Analytical Model

In this section we sketch the principal channels through which permanent and temporary tariffs influence the trade balance and national welfare. The vehicle is the two-period model of Gardner and Kimbrough (1989), which extends to two countries earlier work by Svensson and Razin (1983).

The attraction of the Gardner-Kimbrough framework is that it can capture the incentives for both intersectoral and intertemporal substitution produced by temporary and permanent tariffs. Because two countries are considered, it is possible to analyze meaningfully the terms-of-trade effects and international repercussions of policy initiatives. Because commodity demands derive from intertemporal optimization by utility-maximizing households, the analytical model captures the intertemporal nature of the trade balance and can be used for welfare analysis.

As always, these advantages are purchased at a cost. Production is ignored.
Consumer demands are specialized to a particular functional form. Because there are only two periods, it is not possible to distinguish meaningfully the period 1 trade balance from the period 2 net foreign asset position. Imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign financial assets is not considered. Yet even with these restrictive assumptions, indeterminacies arise.

Each economy is represented by a single consumer endowed in each period with fixed quantities of two perishable commodities: \( m \) denotes the home importable and \( x \) the home exportable. (We follow Gardner and Kimbrough's notation throughout.) It is assumed that a given country exports the same good in both periods.

Commodity and credit markets are competitive and international trade and lending are free. The nominal prices of \( m \) and \( x \) are \( p^* \) and \( q^* \) on world markets and \( p \) and \( q \) gross of domestic tariffs. The nominal discount factor \( D \) is defined as one over one plus the nominal interest rate.

The domestic consumer's intertemporal budget constraint is

\[
(1) \quad p^1 m^1 + q^1 x^1 + D(p^2 m^2 + q^2 x^2) = p^1 \bar{m}^1 + q^1 \bar{x}^1 + T^1 + D(p^2 \bar{m}^2 + q^2 \bar{x}^2 + T^2),
\]

where the superscripts 1 and 2 denote periods, \( m \) and \( x \) denote consumption of the two goods, and \( \bar{m} \) and \( \bar{x} \) denote endowments of the two goods. \( T \) denotes net government revenues, which are redistributed to consumers in lump-sum fashion. (The foreign consumer's problem is identical, except that no government revenues are collected or rebated abroad.) The government's budget constraint is

\[
(2) \quad T^1 + D T^2 = \tau p^* (m^1 - \bar{m}^1) + D \tau p^* (m^2 - \bar{m}^2),
\]

where \( \tau \) is the ad valorem rate of import taxation. The price index \( \Pi(p,q) \) is the unit expenditure function associated with consumption bundle \( c \).

The consumer maximizes lifetime utility:

\[
(3) \quad U[c^1(m^1,x^1), c^2(m^2,x^2)].
\]

The utility function is assumed to be weakly separable. In both periods, \( c \) is assumed to be linearly homogeneous. We further specialize \( c \) and \( U \) below.

The consumer's problem is solved in two steps. First, the consumer minimizes spending in each period subject to a given level of utility, yielding the expenditure function:

\[
(4) \quad \Pi(p',q') c^t = \min \{ p'm' + q'x': c'(m',x') \geq c^t \}, \quad t = 1, 2.
\]

The elasticities of the price index with respect to nominal prices are the shares of expenditure falling on importables and exportables \( \alpha \) and \( 1 - \alpha \) (see eq. [13] below).

Second, the consumer minimizes lifetime expenditure for a given level of lifetime utility \( u \). This yields the lifetime expenditure function
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\[ e(1, \delta, u) = \min \{ c^1 + \delta c^2 : U(c^1, c^2) \geq u \}, \]

where \( \delta = \Pi^2(\cdot) D / \Pi^1(\cdot) \) is one over one plus the domestic real interest rate. The budget constraints imply that, in equilibrium:

\[ e(1, \delta, u) = \frac{\theta^1 \bar{m}^1 + \bar{x}^1 + \tau ^1 \theta^* \bar{m}^1}{\Pi^1(\theta^1, 1)} + \frac{\theta^2 \bar{m}^2 + \bar{x}^2 + \tau ^2 \theta^* \bar{m}^2}{\Pi^2(\theta^2, 1)}, \]

where \( \theta = (1 + \tau) \theta^* \) is the within-period domestic price of importables in terms of exportables (\( \theta^* = p^* / q^* \)), or the terms of trade. Commodity markets clear

\[ m^1(\cdot) + m^* 1(\cdot) = \bar{m}^1 + \bar{m}^* 1, \]

\[ m^2(\cdot) + m^* 2(\cdot) = \bar{m}^2 + \bar{m}^* 2, \]

\[ x^2(\cdot) + x^* 2(\cdot) = \bar{x}^2 + \bar{x}^* 2. \]

The assumptions of perfect capital mobility and perfect asset substitutability imply

\[ \delta = \left[ \frac{\Pi^1(\theta^1, 1) \cdot \Pi^1(\theta^* 1, 1)}{\Pi^2(\theta^2, 1) \cdot \Pi^1(\theta^1, 1)} \right] \delta^*, \]

The nominal rate of return available to foreigners in their own country must equal the nominal rate of return available to them on loans to the domestic country.

The home country’s period 1 real trade balance, at world prices, is

\[ b^1 = \frac{\theta^* 1 \bar{m}^1 + \bar{x}^1 - (\theta^* 1 m^1 + x^1)}{\Pi^1(\theta^* 1, 1)}. \]

Henceforth \( b^1 \) is assumed to be negative.

To keep the results as simple as possible, we follow Gardner and Kimbrough and limit our attention to the case where domestic and foreign consumers have identical tastes of the form

\[ U = \frac{(c^1)^{1-1/\sigma}}{1 - 1/\sigma} + \rho \frac{(c^2)^{1-1/\sigma}}{1 - 1/\sigma}, \quad c^i = (m^i)^\alpha(x^i)^{1-\alpha}, \]

where \( \sigma \) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and \( \rho \) is the subjective discount factor (\( 0 < \rho < 1 \)). From the assumptions of identical tastes and free trade equilibrium, it follows that each country’s consumption of each good in each period equals its share of world wealth. Domestic wealth is defined as
while foreign wealth is defined analogously.

9.2.1 Permanent Tariffs

Here we report Gardner and Kimbrough's results for the effect of a permanent tariff on the terms of trade, the real discount factor, and the trade balance. We start from free trade equilibrium. A permanent tariff \( d\tau_1 = d\tau_2 = d\tau > 0 \) alters the terms of trade in both periods but not the real discount factor:

\[
\hat{\theta}^* = \frac{W}{W^*}d\tau \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\delta}^* = 0,
\]

where "\(^*\)" is used to denote a percentage change. A permanent tariff imposed by the home country improves its terms of trade to the same extent in each period. By switching domestic demand away from imports, it drives down the tariff-exclusive price of the good exported by the foreign country. The magnitude of the terms of trade improvement is an increasing function of the share of the home country in world wealth. Since any shift in the intertemporal pattern of spending at home is mirrored by an offsetting shift abroad, there is no change in the intertemporal terms of trade.

The impact of the permanent tariff on the trade balance is given in the first panel of table 9.1. Note that the trade balance may either strengthen or weaken. Insofar as the permanent tariff improves the current terms of trade, higher incomes now are used to support higher spending later. Current absorption falls relative to current income, and the trade balance improves. This effect is captured by the bracketed term preceding the minus sign in the fourth row of table 9.1. Insofar as the permanent tariff improves the future terms of trade, higher incomes later are used to support higher spending now. Period 1 absorption rises relative to period 1 income, and the trade balance worsens. This effect is captured by the bracketed term following the minus sign. Since the terms of trade improve by the same amount in each period, current income rises relative to future income (the trade balance improves) when, under free trade, current imports are large relative to future imports. Hence the two \((m_i - \hat{m}_i)\) terms enter with opposite signs.

The impact of the permanent tariff on welfare is also given in the first panel of table 9.1. Assuming that \( m_i > \hat{m}_i \) in both periods, this expression is unambiguously positive. The permanent tariff is unambiguously welfare improving since it strengthens the home country's terms of trade in both periods.

9.2.2 Temporary Tariffs

A temporary tariff \((d\tau_1 > 0, d\tau_2 = 0)\) affects both intersectoral prices (the terms of trade) and intertemporal prices (the real discount factor). It raises the
Table 9.1 Effects of Alternative Policies in the Analytical Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Effect</th>
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1. Effects of Permanent Tariff

\[ \hat{\theta}^1 = \frac{W^*}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \hat{\theta}^2 = \frac{W^*}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \delta = 0 \]

\[ \partial b_i = \left[ (1 - \beta) \left( \frac{\Theta^i(m^i - \bar{m}^i)}{\Pi(\theta^i)} + \alpha b_j \right) - \beta \delta^* \left( \frac{\Theta^i(m^i - \bar{m}^i)}{\Pi(\theta^i)} + \alpha b_j \right) \right] \frac{W}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \partial U = \left[ \beta \frac{W^*}{W + W^*} - \frac{\alpha W^*}{W + W^*} \right] d\tau \]

\[ \bar{\partial b}_i = \frac{[e^n_i + \alpha b_j](e^n_i + \delta^* e^n_j)}{\beta} - \beta \]

2. Effects of Temporary Tariff

\[ \hat{\theta}^1 = \frac{W^*}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \hat{\theta}^2 = 0 \]

\[ \delta = \frac{-\alpha W^*}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \partial b_i = \frac{W}{W + W^*} \left[ \beta (1 - \beta) \sigma \alpha \frac{W^*}{W + W^*} + (1 - \beta) \left( \frac{\Theta^i(m^i - \bar{m}^i)}{\Pi(\theta^i)} + \alpha b^i_j \right) \right] + \beta \frac{W}{W + W^*} \frac{b^i_j}{W + W^*} d\tau \]

\[ \partial U = \left[ \frac{1}{\delta^*} \frac{\Theta^i(m^i - \bar{m}^i)}{\Pi(\theta^i)} \right] \frac{W}{W + W^*} \]

\[ \bar{\partial b}_i = \frac{\alpha \beta (1 - \beta) \sigma W^* + b_j}{e^n_i + \delta^* e^n_j} \]

**Notes:**

\[ \beta = \frac{1}{1 + \delta^*(\rho/\delta^*)^\beta} \]

is the share of wealth devoted to period 1 consumption in free trade equilibrium.

\[ e^n_i = \Theta^i(m^i - \bar{m}^i)/[\Pi(\theta^i)] \]

is the "real" value of imports.

price of current consumption in terms of future consumption for residents of the home country. Domestic consumers wish to shift consumption from the present to the future. To prevent an excess supply of commodities from emerging in the first period, world real interest rates must fall. Hence \( d(\delta)/d(\tau^1) < 0 \), as shown in the second panel of table 9.1.

A temporary tariff, like its permanent counterpart, has an ambiguous effect on the trade balance. The rise in the price of current domestic consumption in terms of future domestic consumption shifts absorption toward the future,
strengthening the trade balance. The larger the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\sigma$, the larger this effect. But the decline in world real interest rates due to the fall in period 1 consumption shifts absorption back toward the present, weakening the trade balance. Moreover, if the home country is running a trade deficit in period 1, then the decline in world real interest rates reduces the cost of period 1 borrowing, increases domestic wealth, and induces a rise in period 1 consumption of both goods. The larger the period 1 trade deficit, the larger this income effect, which also serves to weaken the period 1 trade balance.

As in the case of a permanent tariff, domestic welfare rises unambiguously because of the improvement in the period 1 terms of trade.

Given the ambiguous effect of each of these policies on the period 1 balance of trade, it is difficult to say anything definitive about which policy is capable of reducing the period 1 deficit at lowest cost. But if we restrict our attention to cases in which the policies each improve the period 1 trade balance, then it is possible to make some headway on these issues.

In this case, the permanent tariff improves the trade deficit at lower cost than the temporary tariff when

$$e_{m1}c_{1}^{-1/\sigma} > e_{m1}c_{1}^{-1/\sigma} + \frac{e_{m1}c_{1}^{-1/\sigma}}{\alpha b_{1} + (1 - \beta)e_{m1}}.$$ 

(17)

Assuming that both the permanent and temporary tariff improve the trade balance, this inequality always holds. The permanent tariff does not distort the intertemporal pattern of consumption, so it improves the period 1 deficit at relatively low cost. The denominator of the right-hand side of equation (17) differs from its counterpart by a term that reflects the additional welfare loss attributable to distorting the intertemporal pattern of consumption.$^4$

A main conclusion of this section is that, even in a relatively restrictive analytical framework, the impact of the two policies on the trade balance is ambiguous once the scope of both intersectoral and intertemporal substitution is acknowledged. Given the difficulty of pinning down the direction, much less the magnitude, of the change in the trade balance, it is impossible to unambiguously rank the policies according to the welfare cost of a given change in the trade balance produced by their imposition. Only if it is assumed arbitrarily that within-period substitution effects dominate intertemporal substitution effects so that both the permanent and temporary tariff improve the trade balance is it possible to say anything definitive.$^5$

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4. The denominator on the right-hand side of eq. (17) differs from its counterpart by the term $\alpha\beta(1 - \beta)\sigma W^*$. This term, which is an increasing function of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\sigma$, reflects the additional welfare loss alluded to in the text.

5. With the addition of further complications such as commodity production and imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets, it becomes harder still to derive unambiguous closed-form solutions for the effects of temporary and permanent tariffs. An exogenous level
We can reach more definitive conclusions by employing numerical simulation. This is the approach we adopt in the remainder of the paper.

9.3 An Overview of the Simulation Model

Simulation enables us to represent the economy more realistically than in the analytical model, where the goal of obtaining closed-form relationships mandates simplicity. In contrast with the analytical framework, our simulation model incorporates production decisions as well as detail on the functions of the government sector. The model generalizes along the time dimension, incorporating a large number of periods and thereby illuminating real-time aspects of the adjustment process. Since the solution does not involve differentiation or linearization, experiments need not be restricted to marginal policy changes.

In this section we provide a nontechnical overview of the model. Readers requiring more information are referred to our previous papers (Goulder and Eichengreen 1989a, 1989b). The appendix provides detail on the main structural innovation not contained in the version of the model reported in these papers: namely, the extension of the treatment of government financing to allow for deficit as well as tax finance.

Our model has four features that distinguish it from other general equilibrium simulation models and render it particularly suitable for the questions at hand. First, the decisions of forward-looking households and firms are based on intertemporal optimization. This makes the model particularly useful for analyzing the impact of temporary policies and for contrasting their effects with those of permanent initiatives. We derive overall consumption and saving of each household as the solution to its intertemporal optimization problem. Holding other variables constant, increases in current interest rates induce households to save more. Critically, however, current consumption and savings decisions depend not only on current income and interest rates but also on the entire future paths of these and other variables. Once the level of current consumption expenditure is determined, households allocate this expenditure across domestic and foreign goods as a function of relative commodity prices.

Similarly, in making investment decisions, forward-looking managers consider not just current profits but future profitability as well. Their investment of commodity production would have no substantive implications for the results. But if it was assumed, as in the simulation model below, that investment and hence productive capacity were declining functions of the real interest rate, a temporary tariff, by reducing the real interest rate, could stimulate investment and production. Insofar as the sensitivity of investment varied across countries, this could modify the terms-of-trade effects described above. It is even harder to generalize about the likely impact of imperfect asset substitutability, which would hinge on the specification of portfolio behavior. Below we introduce a specification derived from optimizing assumptions and consistent with the literature on mean-variance analysis.
decisions balance the costs of new capital against the higher future revenues made possible by a larger capital stock, as in Summers (1981). Though managers' investment decisions control the evolution of future capital stocks, current capital stocks are not a decision variable. Firms combine the fixed current capital stocks with variable quantities of labor in a CES production function to produce value added. Value added combines with composite intermediate inputs in fixed proportions to produce gross output. Intermediate inputs can be obtained at home and abroad. We adopt the Armington assumption that domestic and foreign intermediates are imperfect substitutes for one another. In each industry, they are combined in a CES function to produce a composite intermediate input. In constructing the composite, firms choose the mix of domestic and foreign intermediates that minimizes costs.

A second distinguishing feature that makes the model particularly well suited to analyze trade deficits and international financial flows is its integrated treatment of the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments. Households select the optimal portfolio shares of domestic and foreign assets as a function of relative rates of return. Changes in asset supplies and demands alter asset prices and rates of return as necessary to equilibrate financial markets. Financial capital is treated as perfectly mobile internationally (there are no impediments to exchanging assets in international markets), but assets denominated in domestic and foreign currencies are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in portfolios. Supplies of foreign (domestic) assets available to domestic (foreign) investors change over time through the capital account of the balance of payments. Exchange rates, interest rates, prices, and quantities adjust to bring about balance-of-payments equilibrium in each period.

The determination of current and capital account balances as a function of household and firm decisions can be understood in the following way. Savings and portfolio decisions of domestic and foreign households determine supplies of loanable funds in each country. Investment decisions of firms at home and abroad determine the demand for loanable funds in each country. Interest rates at home and abroad adjust in each period to clear the market for loanable funds in each country. The excess of saving over investment in a country is the current account surplus (the capital account deficit).

The third distinguishing feature of our model is its detailed treatment of the public sector. The model includes a government at home and abroad. Both governments collect taxes, distribute transfers, and purchase goods and services. The model is flexible regarding the financing opportunities of each government: as described in the appendix, marginal increases in government spending are financed through taxes or bonds, depending on the specification desired.

6. Costs of investment include both the acquisition costs of the new capital (net of investment tax credits) and adjustment costs incurred in the course of installation.

7. Labor is immobile internationally but perfectly mobile across sectors within a country. Aggregate labor supply of each country grows at a constant exogenous rate.
A fourth distinguishing feature, closely related to the previous three, is the model's symmetric treatment of the domestic economy and the foreign economy (rest of the world). The formal specifications for household, producer, and government behavior are the same in both economies. Thus, foreign consumption decisions (including demands for U.S. exports of consumer goods and financial assets) stem from intertemporal utility maximization, and foreign production decisions (including demands for U.S. exports of intermediate inputs) reflect intertemporal profit maximization. Supply prices of imports to the United States are based on foreign factor costs and production technologies. This is in contrast with the approach often adopted in trade models, in which upward-sloping supply functions are simply posited for the foreign country rather than derived from profit-maximizing production decisions.

The model incorporates considerable detail on U.S. individual and business taxes. Source- and residence-based features of the U.S. tax system are recognized, so that tax obligations depend both on the location of factors and the residence of their owners. This tax detail is important for analyzing effects of government policy on saving and investment decisions, both of which critically influence the dynamics of the current account.

The model is benchmarked to 1983. The benchmark data set distinguishes ten U.S. industries. In this paper, we organize these ten industries into three producing sectors: the exportables sector, which includes the export-oriented industries agriculture, machinery, miscellaneous manufacturing, and services (except housing services); the importables sector, containing the import-competing industries oil refining, textiles, metals, and motor vehicles; and the nontradables sector, consisting of the construction and housing services industries. Table 9.2 compares the three sectors in terms of their orientation toward exports and the extent to which they compete with imports for the domestic market.

9.4 Design of the Policy Experiments

9.4.1 The Revised Baseline

In previous applications of the model, we analyzed the impact of policy initiatives by comparing a steady-state baseline simulation with a revised-case simulation generated in response to the policy initiative. Along the steady-state baseline, all quantities grow at the same rate, and relative prices remain unchanged. Critically for present purposes, the U.S. capital account, current account and trade balance are all zero along the steady-state baseline path. The U.S. net foreign asset position is also zero all along this path.

Clearly, a steady state in which trade is balanced is not an appropriate baseline from which to consider the effects of trade policies designed to reduce the

8. In our benchmark data set, the housing services industry does not engage in international trade. The construction industry exports a very small share of its output and does not import.
Table 9.2  Industry Characteristics (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Producing Sector</th>
<th>Export Intensity$^a$</th>
<th>Import Substitution$^b$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exportables</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importables</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nontradables</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Share of exports in total demand for gross output.
$^b$Imports as share of total domestic demand for output of corresponding sector.

trade deficit. In this paper we introduce a revised baseline incorporating external imbalances; policy shocks are then superimposed on this revised baseline.

To produce the revised baseline, we take the following approach. We first calibrate the model to generate steady-state growth. We then introduce changes in parameters or data to generate a revised baseline that includes a growing trade deficit and increasing U.S. indebtedness to foreigners. This revised baseline serves as a reference path for measuring the effects of subsequent policy initiatives. In the absence of further shocks, the economy would continue along the revised baseline path and gradually approach a new steady state. However, in our policy experiments, we introduce an unanticipated import surcharge before the economy has reached its new steady state. Thus the import surcharge is imposed in an economy out of long-run equilibrium that is running trade deficits. We specify the policy shocks as unanticipated; hence producers and households revise their plans on imposition of the policy change. Subsequent to the policy change, economic outcomes differ from those along the projected baseline path. A major methodological innovation in this paper is the integration of an intertemporally optimizing baseline (out of long-run equilibrium) with an intertemporally optimizing path under the policy shock.

In generating a revised baseline, one must incorporate assumptions about the sources of the trade deficits and associated net indebtedness to foreigners. At issue, fundamentally, are the causes of the observed shortfall of domestic personal saving relative to domestic private investment and the observed increase (relative to GNP) in public dissaving. There is no consensus on what caused these developments in the 1980s. A complete analysis would first assess the significance of a range of domestic factors—perhaps including an

9. The calibration procedure is described in Goulder and Eichengreen (1989a).
10. The baseline path reflects behavior that is intertemporally optimizing conditional on the assumption of no future policy changes. Decisions of households and producers are guided by expectations that conform to the future economic outcomes that would obtain if no further policy shocks were introduced. The surprise policy shocks superimposed on the baseline path compel agents to revise their optimal plans. These agents display perfect foresight from the moment of the policy shock.
11. Again, for discussion of the alternatives, see Poole (1990) and Makin (1990).
autonomous decline in household savings propensities, the introduction of liberalized investment incentives (notably, acceleration of depreciation allowances), the growth of federal budget deficits, and the exchange rate effects of monetary policy—as well as behavioral and policy changes emanating from abroad. Considering the effects on the trade deficit of each of these factors and the impact of alternative policies adopted in response would yield a proliferation of simulation results. In this paper, we focus our attention on two of the most often cited explanations for the trade deficits of the 1980s: declining household savings propensities and rising government budget deficits. The U.S. personal saving rate declined more or less steadily from 7.5 percent in 1981 to 3.3 percent in 1989. The U.S. public sector budget (all levels of government) moved from balance in the late 1970s to a deficit of approximately 3.8 percent of GNP in 1989. The decision to concentrate on these factors does not reflect a belief on our part that they were necessarily the principal causes of the trade deficit. Rather, we focus on them because of their prominence in the literature and because they are a logical point of departure given that the channels through which they affect the trade deficit are relatively straightforward.

We consider these two sources of the trade deficit sequentially. Our first experiments employ a baseline generated by a shift in domestic household saving propensities. To create this baseline, we increase domestic households’ rate of time preference from its original value of .0048 to a new value of .0078. With higher time preference, domestic households increase current consumption and reduce their saving. Figure 9.1 displays the path of the U.S. trade balance along this revised baseline path. In contrast with the original steady-state baseline, in which domestic saving matched domestic investment, along the revised baseline domestic saving initially falls short of domestic investment. This precipitates a U.S. trade deficit in the short run. The deficit is financed by capital inflows which, over time, increase the nation’s net indebtedness to foreigners.

Figure 9.1 shows that, along the revised baseline path, the deficit switches to surplus after about thirteen years. Surpluses are necessary eventually to service debt to foreigners. This can be seen from the relationship between the trade balance, $B$, the interest rate, $i$, and the value of net foreign wealth, $Z$. In any given period $s$, the current account, $B_s + i_s Z_s$, determines the accumulation of foreign wealth:

$$Z_{s+1} - Z_s = B_s + i_s Z_s.$$  

12. Schultze (1990) documents the fall in the private savings rate over the period.
14. Indeed, subsequent simulation analyses provide reason for skepticism on this score.
15. In section 9.5.3 below, we add government budget deficits to the decline in household savings propensities as a second potential source of trade deficits.
Solving (18) recursively from period $t$ (the current period) forward under the assumption that $Z$ cannot grow indefinitely at a rate greater than $i$ yields the intertemporal constraint on the accumulation of net foreign wealth:

$$-Z_t = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} B_s \Pi_s \frac{1}{1+i_s}.$$

Equation (19) states that the present value of a nation's current and prospective trade balances must equal its net foreign indebtedness, that is, the negative of its net foreign wealth.

9.4.2 Policy Initiatives

To examine the effects of permanent and temporary import surcharges, we introduce the policy shocks at a point along the revised baseline path. The
surcharges considered are across-the-board increases in U.S. tariffs on imported intermediate and consumer goods. In the original data set, tariffs are modeled on an ad valorem basis; the surcharges raise the ad valorem rates by ten percentage points.

We impose the policy shocks in the eighth year of the baseline. The first year of the baseline corresponds to the benchmark year 1983. The policy shocks therefore occur in the period corresponding to 1990. We assume no foreign tariff retaliation at any time. This assumption should be kept in mind when interpreting the effects of these policies on domestic welfare.

In these first experiments, the path of real government expenditure is the same under each policy change as in the baseline. Government revenues are kept in balance with expenditures through lump-sum reductions in personal income taxes that compensate for any revenue effects from the import surcharges. An alternative government financing scheme, which allows us to consider the trade balance effects of budget deficits, is introduced in section 9.5.3 below.

9.5 Simulation Results

9.5.1 Permanent Import Surcharge

Table 9.3 summarizes the aggregate effects of a permanent import surcharge. The surcharge leads to an improvement in the U.S. terms of trade as the nation exploits more fully its monopsony power. (The assumption of no retaliation is crucial here.) The surcharge expands the wedge between the resource cost of imported goods—the world price—and the price to domestic purchasers of imports. Although this has adverse effects on resource allocation, the beneficial terms-of-trade effect more than compensates, and U.S. permanent real income and consumption rise. Correspondingly, U.S. welfare rises, by 0.59 percent. These results indicate that preexisting tariff rates are below optimal tariff levels.

16. This facilitates welfare evaluation. Since the contribution to individual utility of government expenditure on public goods is not known, changes in government expenditure on these goods would introduce effects on individual welfare that are not captured in the model's utility calculations. On the assumption that public and private goods are separable in utility, holding government expenditure constant permits a rigorous assessment of welfare effects based on the changes in consumption of private goods.

17. Although the largest revenue effects are experienced by the domestic government, the policy changes also the affect revenues of the foreign government. Lump-sum adjustments to the foreign household's individual income taxes maintain the desired revenue yield for the foreign government.

18. Percentage changes in welfare are the dynamic equivalent variation as a percentage of household wealth in the revised baseline. A welfare change of 0.59 percent therefore means that the policy change raises the household's utility by the same amount as a one-time lump-sum payment equal in value to 0.59 percent of its total (human and financial) wealth.

19. Optimum ad valorem tariffs in our model are about 30 percent.
### Table 9.3 Aggregate Effects of Import Surcharges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permanent Surcharge</th>
<th>Temporary Surcharge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Years after Policy Shock -</td>
<td>— Years after Policy Shock —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (1990)</td>
<td>0 (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5 (Removal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>Inf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average import price (net of tariff)</td>
<td>-3.778 - 3.987 - 4.114 - 4.093</td>
<td>-3.400 - 3.411 - 0.578 - 0.122 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of trade</td>
<td>3.696 4.035 4.232 4.246</td>
<td>3.436 3.459 0.568 0.165 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real consumption rate of interest</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>0.067 0.029 -0.017 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>-0.064 -0.061 -0.053 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. economy</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>0.156 0.338 0.638 0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0.357 0.486 0.680 0.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal saving</td>
<td>1.811 1.368 0.809 0.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Household wealth</td>
<td>1.099 1.341 1.681 0.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign economy</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>-0.269 -0.320 -0.343 -0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0.198 0.201 0.297 -0.421</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal saving</td>
<td>-0.271 -0.028 0.294 -0.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Household wealth</td>
<td>0.115 0.066 0.076 -0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic households</td>
<td>Foreign households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of imports (net of tariff)</td>
<td>-10.94  -10.80  -10.57  -10.56  -11.09  -11.04  0.45  0.29  0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of exports</td>
<td>-10.20  -10.53  -11.11  -11.30  -9.15  -9.15  -1.54  -0.33  0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>0.067  0.011  -0.010  -0.080  0.224  0.212  -0.228  -0.072  0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net interest income</td>
<td>0.018  0.024  0.014  0.124  0.049  0.123  0.242  0.028  0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account</td>
<td>-0.073  -0.035  -0.004  -0.040  -0.271  -0.334  -0.015  0.044  0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset position</td>
<td>0.237  0.303  0.154  1.310  0.265  0.454  0.323  0.031  0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: All figures express percentage changes from the baseline path, except for those corresponding to consumption rates of interest (which are in changes from the baseline, in basis points) and balance of payments accounts (which are in changes from the baseline path, divided by baseline GNP).

*Weighted-average dollar price of imports divided by U.S. producer price index. Weights are baseline import shares.

*Computed as the export-weighted index of domestic prices divided by the import-weighted index of net-of-tariff foreign prices.

*Financed in part by retained earnings.

*Welfare gain is the dynamic equivalent variation as a percentage of baseline wealth. The dynamic equivalent variation is the level of compensation which, if provided as a lump sum to a household facing baseline prices and policies, would enable the household to enjoy the same level of intertemporal utility as is enjoyed under the policy change. Hence a positive equivalent variation implies that the policy change is welfare-improving. The welfare measure is dynamic in that the utility levels which underlie it reflect consumption during the transition as well as in the study state.
Significant changes occur over time. Following the introduction of the surcharge, the beneficial terms of trade effects grow as the U.S. shifts additional capital and labor into the importables sector. World import prices fall over time, but because of the surcharge, prices to domestic purchasers of imports remain above the levels for corresponding years in the baseline scenario. Consistent with the continued improvement in the terms of trade, U.S. wealth and consumption increase over time (relative to the baseline path), while foreign wealth and consumption decline.

U.S. investment also rises following the imposition of the surcharge. The terms of trade improvement increases the profitability of domestic production (for most industries), thereby raising the shadow value of new capital (tax-adjusted $q$) and encouraging a higher rate of investment. Domestic saving also increases, reflecting the higher incomes made possible by the terms-of-trade improvement.

The policy change causes the domestic household's consumption rate of interest (and other domestic interest rates) to rise relative to corresponding foreign rates. Higher relative rates are necessary to induce portfolio investors to hold the stock of U.S.-located financial wealth, which increases in value considerably relative to foreign-located financial wealth. The higher rates reinforce the positive effect of higher domestic incomes on domestic saving. As a result, the increase in domestic saving exceeds the increase in domestic investment initially. Thus, in the short run, imports of foreign capital decline, net borrowing falls, and the trade balance improves. This is shown in figure 9.2a, where the solid curve is the trade balance path under the surcharge and the dashed curve is the path under the baseline. (The two curves coincide

20. The time profile of the terms of trade depends on supply as well as demand considerations. With different parameters (more elastic investment responses, for example), the terms of trade could worsen, rather than improve, over time. This is the case because the surcharge raises U.S. investment relative to investment by foreign producers and ultimately lowers the foreign capital stock relative to the U.S. stock of capital. This exerts a negative influence on the U.S. terms of trade by reducing the supply of foreign goods relative to U.S. goods. In our simulations, however, this supply-side effect is more than offset by demand-side effects.

21. The revaluation of U.S. assets reflects the increased profitability of producing in the United States as a result of the improvement in the terms of trade. As mentioned in sec. 9.3, the model treats domestic and foreign assets as imperfect substitutes in portfolios. The significant increase in U.S. asset prices occasioned by the permanent surcharge causes the shares of U.S. assets in portfolios to rise. Without adjustment in relative rates of return, domestic and foreign households would not wish to maintain such shares; they would wish to hold less than the total value of U.S.-located assets and more than the total value of foreign-located assets. The required increase in U.S. rates relative to foreign rates is inversely related to the degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign assets in portfolios.

The reduction in foreign interest rates occasioned by these asset valuation effects explains why the surcharge induces an increase in foreign investment, despite the adverse effects on foreign income and wealth.

22. If costs of adjusting the capital stock were reduced or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption was raised, the short-run investment response would rise relative to saving, attenuating and conceivably reversing the improvement in the trade balance. See sec. 9.5.5 below.
Fig. 9.2 Effects of import surcharges on the trade balance

Note: Trade balance as percentage of baseline GNP.

in the first seven years, since the policy shock, introduced in year 8, is unanticipated.)

Subsequent changes in the trade balance depend on how the surcharge affects the U.S. net foreign asset position. Equation (19) indicates that the change in the present value of prospective trade balances must equal the change in the nation's net foreign indebtedness. Table 9.3 shows that the policy improves slightly the U.S. net foreign asset position on implementation.23

23. The U.S. net foreign asset position is the difference in the value of U.S.-owned nonhuman wealth located abroad and foreign-owned nonhuman wealth in the U.S. One might expect the surcharge to raise the value of foreign-owned (as well as domestically owned) nonhuman wealth in the United States and thus to worsen the net foreign asset position. However, this does not occur, mainly because of portfolio responses. By reducing U.S. demands for foreign imports, the surcharge strengthens the dollar. This increases the value in foreign currency of foreigners' holdings of U.S. assets. Foreigners prefer not to devote such a large share of their portfolios to U.S. assets and consequently they reduce their holdings of U.S. assets. The reduced holdings of U.S.
Thus, while the surcharge may improve the trade balance initially, these smaller short-run deficits must at least be matched (in present value) by larger long-run deficits (smaller long-run surpluses). The results in figure 9.2 confirm this requirement. The figure shows that the direction of the influence of the surcharge on the trade balance is reversed starting about five years after the policy is introduced, when the trade balance falls below the baseline path.

In light of the budget constraints implicitly faced by each nation, it should not be surprising that the surcharge fails to generate a permanent improvement in the trade balance. The only way policies can permanently improve the trade balance (in the sense of raising the present value of the stream of future trade balances) is to induce an immediate worsening of the current net foreign asset position. When the net foreign asset position falls, higher net exports are required to service indebtedness to foreigners. However, increases in foreign indebtedness, ceteris paribus, imply reduced national wealth and welfare. This illustrates the illegitimacy of using changes in the trade balance as indicators of national well-being. In the policy examined here, the welfare gains generated by the surcharge are attributable to an expanded use of monopsony power, not to changes in the trade balance per se.

Our findings that a permanent import surcharge raises domestic welfare and improves the trade balance in the short run parallel the results obtained by Iishi, McKibbin, and Sachs (1985) in the only other intertemporal empirical study of an import surcharge of which we are aware. The model used in their analysis divides the world into five regions but does not contain the sector disaggregation of our model. They consider a 30 percent U.S. tariff on imports from Japan (but not on imports from the rest of the world), finding that the U.S. trade balance improves by (1984) $3.8 billion in the first year, consistent with our results. Other studies of import surcharges have employed static models. In such studies, it is difficult to ascertain the aggregate trade balance effects, since important connections between import surcharges, saving and investment decisions, and the capital account are left out.24

9.5.2 Temporary Import Surcharge

In our second experiment, we introduce a temporary 10 percent surcharge. The surcharge is imposed in the eighth period (1990) and removed five periods later.

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24. Many static models assume flexible exchange rates and a capital account balance of zero. Although such models may provide insight into the sectoral effects of import surcharges, they cannot capture aggregate trade balance effects, since the assumptions guarantee a zero trade balance at all times.

Deardoff, Stern, and Abraham (1987) employ a highly disaggregated static general equilibrium model.
Import Surcharges and the U.S. Trade Deficit

ods later (1995). We model the surcharge as unanticipated; upon implement-
ation, however, households are fully aware of the temporary nature of the
policy and plan accordingly.

The analytical model of section 9.2 yielded ambiguous results for the ef-
effects of a temporary tariff on the trade balance. In that model, the temporary
surcharge gives rise to two additional effects beyond those produced by a per-
manent surcharge: it increases the cost of current imports relative to future
imports, shifting expenditure toward the future; at the same time it depresses
world interest rates (a consequence of reduced current expenditure), which
reduces debt service costs and encourages absorption. Results from the simu-
lation model (fig. 9.2b) indicate that the first effect dominates, since the im-
pact of the temporary surcharge on the trade balance is positive and larger
than the impact of its permanent counterpart. Figure 9.2b reveals that, in the
short term, the temporary surcharge produces much larger positive effects on
the trade balance than does the permanent surcharge. This is an indication that
the expenditure effect is substantial, a result that is evidenced by the pro-
nounced decline in domestic consumption following the introduction of the
temporary surcharge (table 9.3).

Other aggregate effects are displayed in the right-hand set of columns of
table 9.3. The U.S. terms of trade improve with implementation of the sur-
charge. With its removal, the improvement in the terms of trade nearly van-
ishes as import prices move back toward baseline levels. However, because of
costs of adjustment, the reduced import dependency attained during the im-
position of the temporary tariff lingers after its removal. Because of adjust-
ment costs, the capital stock is only gradually redeployed to the exportables
sector, and import demands return gradually to baseline levels (for corre-
sponding years). Hence import prices and the terms of trade return to baseline
levels only asymptotically.

In table 9.3, the personal saving figures for the period when the temporary
surcharge is removed are dramatically different from the figures for prior pe-
riods. Savings rates of both domestic and foreign households jump discretely
when the surcharge is lifted. These swings in savings rates are necessary to
maintain smooth paths of consumption despite the abrupt changes in incomes
(reductions for U.S. households, increases for foreign households) that come
about at the moment the surcharge is removed.

model to investigate the effects of a 20 percent import surcharge. In their model, the capital
account balance is usually exogenous. However, in one experiment they fix the exchange rate and
assume that the capital account adjusts to bring about balance-of-payments equilibrium. In this
simulation the surcharge improves the trade balance and reduces the capital account balance; the
magnitude of these effects is not reported.

Rousslang and Suomela (1985) apply a static partial equilibrium model to examine the conse-
quences of a 20 percent import surcharge. To allow for effects on the capital account balance, the
authors assume that each dollar of revenue from the surcharge reduces capital inflows and the
trade deficit by 40 cents. This investigation indicates that an import surcharge introduced in 1985
would improve the trade balance by $22 billion, or about 0.5 percent of 1985 GNP.
All quantities ultimately approach the baseline levels after the temporary surcharge is withdrawn. Domestic consumption and wealth, in particular, fall back to baseline levels as the United States relinquishes monopsony power gains. U.S. households enjoy smaller welfare gains under the temporary surcharge. This reflects the relatively limited exercise of monopsony power under this policy as well as the intertemporal distortions initiated by the temporary tariff.

For many variables, the return to baseline levels is gradual, however. In the first ten years after the surcharge’s removal, the trade balance is considerably weaker than in corresponding periods for the baseline. So long as the temporary surcharge was in effect, it switched expenditure away from imports and shifted the trade balance from deficit to surplus. This moderated the accumulation of foreign debt, reducing the trade surpluses that are required subsequently to service debt to foreigners. Since the need to run trade surpluses to service foreign debt is attenuated, the date at which deficits finally give way to surpluses is considerably delayed.

The policy implication is that a temporary import surcharge, even if it succeeds in reducing the trade deficit in the short run, may have important, and, from the perspective of policymakers, undesirable longer-run effects. In our simulations, the imposition of a temporary import surcharge causes an even larger trade deficit to emerge following the policy’s removal. Interposition of the surcharge delays quite significantly the date at which trade deficits are finally eliminated.

9.5.3 Significance of Initial Conditions

Baseline with Historical Public Sector Dissaving

To gauge the robustness of these results, we perform additional experiments, altering either baseline conditions or the timing of the policy shock. We first consider an alternative baseline that incorporates not only the shift in household saving behavior of the previous baseline but also historical changes in public sector saving.

In the baseline considered previously, levels of real government purchases, government transfers, and inframarginal tax collections all increased exogenously at the steady-state rate given by the growth of the labor force. In this alternative baseline, in the first six periods (corresponding to the interval 1983–88) we set government purchases and transfers at levels corresponding to their recent historical values. In these same periods we adjust inframarginal taxes so that total tax revenues correspond to recent experience.

The government budget constraint requires us to specify future financing

25. We impose levels that yield ratios of spending to GNP and transfers to GNP that match recent historical ratios. This adjusts for minor differences between levels of GNP in the model and the real world.
Import Surcharges and the U.S. Trade Deficit

rules as well as the historical tax and spending levels. We assume that purchases and transfers as percentages of GNP remain at the same levels as in the last year for which we have data, namely, 1989. Inframarginal taxes then adjust gradually to return the government debt–capital ratio to the benchmark ratio in the new steady state.

While this alternative baseline accounts for changes in government saving, it does not purport to capture the details of fiscal policy changes. Although we adjust overall government expenditure, we make no changes to government expenditure shares and thus do not capture historical changes in the composition of government spending across commodities. Similarly, we introduce changes in overall tax revenues through changes in inframarginal taxes: we do not endeavor to replicate the numerous specific changes in particular tax rates that took place in the 1980s.

In figure 9.3a, the dashed curve traces the new baseline path. Combining the rise in households' time preference with the rise in government budget

![Graph](image)

**Fig. 9.3 Effects of permanent surcharge on trade balance**

*Note:* Trade balance as percentage of baseline GNP.
Barry Eichengreen and Lawrence H. Goulder

deficits nearly doubles the magnitude of the trade deficit. The duration of the baseline trade deficit is essentially unchanged: along the new baseline path the trade deficit converts to surplus in the thirteenth period (1995).

The solid curve in the figure indicates the path generated by the introduction of a permanent import surcharge. As before, the surcharge is imposed in the eighth period (1990).

Although the addition of government budget deficits nearly doubles the magnitude of the trade deficits that emerge in the first few years following the shock, the swing from trade balance to a deficit of 0.25 percent of GNP is only about 15 percent of the swing observed in the data. The implication is that other factors (such as investment-promoting changes in tax policy, as analyzed in Goulder and Eichengreen (1989a), the effects on the exchange rate and international competitiveness of disinflationary U.S. monetary policies at the beginning of the 1980s, complementary changes in monetary and fiscal policies abroad) were responsible for the largest part of the trade deficits of the 1980s.

The effects of the permanent import surcharge on the trade balance are broadly similar to those under the previous baseline. The similarities extend to other variables, as indicated by the results in table 9.4. But where previously the permanent import surcharge reduced the magnitude of the trade deficit on impact without eliminating it entirely, now the trade balance swings from deficit to surplus when the surcharge is imposed. In addition, when the decline in domestic savings propensities was the sole source of the deficit, a permanent surcharge considerably delayed the date at which deficits ultimately gave way to surpluses; now, when increased government spending also contributes to the trade deficit, the imposition of the surcharge does not significantly shift the date at which deficits give way to surpluses. The changes in government spending and, consequently, their trade-balance effects are front-loaded; hence most of the additional foreign debt is already accumulated by the date at which the surcharge is imposed. The date of the switch from trade deficit to surplus is largely regulated by the amount of foreign debt that must be serviced; since most of this debt has already accumulated by the time the surcharge is imposed, the switch from trade deficit to surplus occurs at roughly the same time whether or not the surcharge is applied.

Altered Timing of the Permanent Surcharge

We also perform an experiment that employs the original revised baseline but introduces the permanent surcharge earlier—in the first period. This experiment helps reveal the significance of initial conditions at the time of the policy shock. Along the baseline path, the United States runs a capital account surplus. Hence, the earlier the introduction of the surcharge, the lower is U.S. net indebtedness at the time it is imposed.

Figure 9.3b indicates that in this scenario the surcharge generates a similar pattern for the trade balance but initiates it earlier in time. Since the earlier
Table 9.4  Effects under Alternative Baseline and Timing Assumptions (percentage changes from corresponding baseline)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms of trade</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Inf.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>3.696</td>
<td>4.035</td>
<td>4.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household wealth</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td>0.663</td>
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<td>Balance of payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net interest income</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset position</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>1.310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic welfare</td>
<td>0.587</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline with Govt. Deficits—Shock in Period 8—Years after Policy Shock—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net interest income</td>
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<td>-0.040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset position</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>1.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic welfare</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>1.310</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inf.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terms of trade</td>
<td>3.711</td>
<td>4.003</td>
<td>4.246</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. economy</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household wealth</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net interest income</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset position</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic welfare</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.612</td>
</tr>
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</table>
imposition of the surcharge reduces the magnitude of the trade deficits in the
first few periods, it slows the accumulation of foreign debt and moderates the
trade surpluses required in the long run to finance debt service. For these same
reasons it delays the date at which deficits give way permanently to surpluses.
Thus, earlier surcharges reduce short-run trade deficits but delay their elimi-
nation. Table 9.4 shows that the effects on many other variables of the period
1 surcharge are broadly similar to the effects when the surcharge is introduced
in period 8. The improvement in welfare is larger when the surcharge is intro-
duced earlier. In part this reflects the differences in net foreign indebtedness
when the shock is initiated. The earlier the introduction of the surcharge, the
larger the fraction of U.S.-located capital that is owned by domestic residents.
Hence these residents capture a larger share of the gains associated with posi-
tive terms-of-trade effects and related increases in the equity values of U.S.
firms.

9.5.4 Industry Effects

Table 9.5 contrasts the effects of the surcharges on the exportables, import-
able, and nontradables sectors. The trade protection afforded by the sur-
charge raises profits to import-competing industries, stimulating higher in-
vestment and increased output. Nontradable-goods industries also benefit,

| Table 9.5 Intersectoral Effects (percentage changes from initial baseline path) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
|                                 | Permanent Surcharge  | Temporary Surcharge |
|                                 | —Years after Policy Shock— | —Years after Policy Shock— |
|                                 | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| **Sector**                      | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| Exportables                     | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| Gross output                    | -0.216 | -0.210 | -0.253 | -0.234 | 0.039 | 0.000 |
| Profits after tax               | -0.934 | -0.725 | -0.571 | -0.825 | 0.661 | 0.000 |
| Gross investment                | -0.155 | -0.028 | -0.330 | 0.266 | 0.556 | 0.000 |
| Importables                     | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| Gross output                    | 1.366 | 1.347 | 1.374 | 1.466 | -0.098 | 0.000 |
| Profits after tax               | 1.756 | 1.528 | 1.076 | 2.001 | -0.039 | 0.000 |
| Gross investment                | 1.399 | 1.509 | 1.238 | 0.951 | 0.612 | 0.000 |
| Nontradables                    | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| Gross output                    | 0.024 | 0.211 | 0.723 | 0.069 | 0.215 | 0.000 |
| Profits after tax               | 0.983 | 1.263 | 0.843 | 0.728 | 1.357 | 0.000 |
| Gross investment                | 0.604 | 0.822 | 1.100 | 0.453 | 0.538 | 0.000 |
| Total domestic                  | 0 | 5 | Inf. | 0 | 5 | Inf. |
| Gross output                    | 0.070 | 0.103 | 0.163 | 0.081 | 0.047 | 0.000 |
| Profits after tax               | 0.242 | 0.442 | 0.264 | 0.191 | 0.922 | 0.000 |
| Gross investment                | 0.334 | 0.503 | 0.480 | 0.411 | 0.550 | 0.000 |
since the improvement in the terms of trade increases domestic incomes and stimulates the demand at home for nontraded as well as traded goods. Expectations of higher incomes and output encourage investment by nontradables industries. The exportables sector does not benefit, since the changes in the terms of trade discourage purchases of U.S. exportable goods.

In the case of the permanent surcharge, the effects are surprisingly uniform over time. This is in contrast to the very uneven pattern of the trade balance. It is consistent, however, with the flat profile of the terms of trade following the policy shock.

Note that the short-run impact on the output of nontraded goods is not a simple increasing function of the duration of the import surcharge. When the import surcharge is known to be temporary, production of nontradables rises by more in the first period following the surcharge—this despite the fact that domestic real incomes rise by more when the surcharge is permanent. Output rises by less initially when the import surcharge is permanent because more of the resources of this sector are devoted to building up the permanent productive capacity of industries producing nontraded goods. (The short-run investment response is 33 percent larger.) When the surcharge is temporary, a greater proportion of the resources of the nontradables sector are devoted to current production rather than investment in future capacity.

9.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis

Table 9.6 summarizes the results under alternative parameter assumptions. The table shows the effects of a permanent surcharge introduced in the eighth period (1990). The baseline employed here is the first revised baseline (incorporating a shift in private savings propensities but not historical public dissaving).

The Armington elasticities are elasticities of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in U.S. production and consumption. Larger Armington elasticities (more price elastic demands) in the United States imply larger terms-of-trade effects and more substantial increases in the real incomes and wealth of domestic residents. This implies larger domestic welfare gains and larger effects on the trade balance. Welfare gains are approximately 40 percent larger when Armington elasticities are doubled than in the central case.

Higher adjustment costs slow the (positive) investment response to the increase in domestic wealth and profitability generated by the surcharge. Hence they make for a longer transition to the steady state. The slower investment response leads to lower domestic absorption in the short run under the high adjustment-cost scenario. The rise in investment is smaller relative to the rise in saving; hence the improvement in the trade balance is greater.

The portfolio substitution elasticity $\xi$ regulates the extent to which households adjust the shares of their portfolios devoted to domestic and foreign assets in response to rate of return differentials. The central case value of $\xi$ is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.6 Sensitivity Analysis</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armington elasticities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. values doubled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. values halved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. values doubled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ξ = 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ξ = 2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All figures express percentage changes from the first revised baseline except for trade balance figures, which are changes as a percentage of baseline GDP. "SR" and "LR" refer to effects in the year of the policy change and in the new steady state. The low and high adjustment cost simulations halve and double the parameter β of the adjustment cost function $θ(i/K) = [(β/2) (i/K - γ)^2] (i/K)^{-1}$ with compensating changes in γ that leave the value of θ unchanged at the benchmark value for i/K. Central case values for β and γ are 19.607 and 0.076. The central case value for the portfolio substitution elasticity ξ is 1.0 for both domestic and foreign households.
Import Surcharges and the U.S. Trade Deficit

unity for both domestic and foreign households. As discussed in section 9.5.1 and 9.5.2, the import surcharge raises the market value of U.S.-located capital. With a higher value for $\xi$, the U.S. rate of return does not have to rise as much in the short run to induce households to hold the higher-valued U.S. assets. For this reason, domestic consumption and investment increase by more in the short run than in the central case, and the short-run improvement in the trade balance is smaller. Trade balance effects are fairly sensitive to values of this parameter.

9.6 Conclusions

In this paper we have considered the impact of permanent and temporary import surcharges on the magnitude and time profile of the U.S. trade deficit. To do this we have employed analytical and numerical models which highlight opportunities for intertemporal as well as intersectoral substitution and which trace their implications for the trade balance and other economic variables.

Our simulation experiments indicate that both temporary and permanent import surcharges improve the trade balance in the short run. While static analyses have suggested positive trade balance effects from import surcharges (because of the familiar expenditure-switching effect), our dynamic analysis reveals a number of other, less easily anticipated consequences. For example, a temporary surcharge has a larger short-run impact on the trade balance, but a permanent one has a larger impact on welfare. This points up the danger of drawing inferences about the desirability of alternative policies from the behavior of a few highly visible magnitudes (such as the trade balance) that are linked only indirectly to the ultimate determinants of welfare.

The alternative policies also have very different effects across sectors. Import surcharges naturally benefit domestic import-competing industries. But improvements in the terms of trade lead to higher real incomes and also indirectly stimulate activity in the nontradables sector. The stimulus to the production of nontradables is not, however, a simple increasing function of the duration of the surcharge.

While both policies reduce the trade deficit initially, both produce larger deficits (smaller surpluses) in the longer term. The magnitude of the trade balance effects is fairly sensitive to assumptions about household portfolio behavior. Welfare effects are sensitive to the timing of the policy initiative and the extent of U.S. indebtedness at the time import surcharges are introduced. Under certain assumptions about the source of the deficit, both policies delay the date by which the initial deficits are finally eliminated.

These differing short- and long-run effects underscore the usefulness of analyzing the trade balance effects of commercial policies with a dynamic framework that incorporates intertemporal balance of payments constraints.
Appendix

Modeling of Government Expenditure and Finance

In each period $t$, the government must satisfy the cash-flow equation

$$(A1) \quad G_t + r_t b_t = T_t + b_{t+1} - b_t,$$

where $b_t$ is the stock of debt outstanding at the beginning of period $t$, $G_t$ is the value of government expenditure (purchases of goods and services plus transfers) in period $t$, $r_t$ is the gross rate of interest paid on government debt in period $t$, and $T_t$ is tax revenue in period $t$.

Applying (A1) recursively from time periods 1 to $T$ yields

$$(A2) \quad b_{T+1} \left[ \prod_{t=1}^{T} (1 + r_t) \right]^{-1} = b_1 + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[ \prod_{t=1}^{T} (1 + r_t) \right]^{-1} (G_t - T_t).$$

If debt cannot indefinitely increase at a rate greater than the interest rate, then

$$(A3) \quad \lim_{r \to r^*} b_{T+1} \left[ \prod_{t=1}^{T} (1 + r_t) \right]^{-1} = 0.$$

Applying (A3) to (A2) yields

$$(A4) \quad b_t = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \left[ \prod_{t=1}^{\infty} (1 + r_t) \right]^{-1} (T_t - G_t).$$

Equation (A4) is the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It states that the present value of future tax revenues must exceed the present value of government expenditure (net of interest payments) by an amount equal to the level of government debt outstanding at the beginning of the current period.

The Base Case Path

The model exhibits steady-state growth along the equilibrium path of the base case, or original baseline. Thus $r$ is constant, and $G_t$, $T_t$, and $b_t$ all grow at the steady-state nominal growth rate, $n$. The rate $n$ is equal to $(1 + g)(1 + \pi_0) - 1$, where $g$ is the exogenous growth rate of effective labor services and $\pi_0$ is the exogenous growth rate of nominal wages (equal to the inflation rate in the steady state). The deficit, $G_t + r_t b_t - T_t$ (or $b_{t+1} - b_t$), also grows at the rate $n$, and the deficit-GNP ratio remains constant.

Specifications for Alternative Baseline or for Policy Changes

In simulating a new baseline or a policy change, it is necessary to specify certain terminal conditions as well as the marginal source of government revenue during the transition.

Steady-State Requirements

In the model, agents face infinite horizons. Yet it is only possible to perform actual simulations over a finite number of periods. To be able to account for
the performance of the economy after the last simulation period, the economy must achieve some regularity—steady-state growth—by the final simulation period. In particular, $b$, $T$, and $G$ must ultimately grow at the steady-state nominal growth rate, $n$, although they may temporarily grow at other rates during the transition. Rewriting equation (A1) under steady-state conditions yields

$$
\bar{T} - \bar{G} = (r_{ss} - n)\bar{b},
$$

where $\bar{T}$, $\bar{G}$, and $\bar{b}$ denote tax revenues, government expenditure, and debt relative to GNP, and $r_{ss}$ is the steady-state rate of interest on government debt. Equation (A5) shows that alternative debt-GNP ratios are consistent with steady-state growth; for a given $r_{ss}$, a higher $\bar{b}$ in the steady state requires that $\bar{T}$ exceed $\bar{G}$ by a greater amount.

In simulating the effects of parameter or policy changes, we specify a long-run value for $\bar{b}$; in most cases we select the benchmark debt-GNP ratio.

Debt and Taxes during the Transition

In all simulations, real government expenditure is exogenous, as discussed below. The particular way the government's cash-flow constraint (eq. [A1]) is satisfied during the transition depends on the specification for the marginal source of government revenue.

**Marginal Finance with Taxes**

This is the specification employed in all simulations in the paper except for those in the historical deficits experiment in section 9.5.3. With marginal financing through taxes, the path of $b$ is exogenous: in each year, $b$ is set at the level that maintains $\bar{b}$ at the benchmark debt-GNP ratio. The government's cash-flow constraint is satisfied through adjustments in taxes. The model allows the necessary tax revenues to be obtained either through lump-sum adjustments in personal taxes or through changes in marginal income tax rates. In this paper, only lump-sum tax adjustments were employed.

**Marginal Finance with Debt Issue**

An alternative specification employs new debt issue as the marginal source of government revenue during a specified finite interval, $[t_a, t_b]$, with $t_a \geq 1$ and $t_b < t_a$, where $t_a$ is the last period for which simulations are actually carried out. During the interval $[t_a, t_b]$, there are no revenue-maintaining tax adjustments. Instead, $b$ adjusts in each period to ensure that the cash-flow equation is satisfied. Hence the debt-GNP ratio can depart from the benchmark value and from whatever value is imposed for the steady state.

26. We generally employ $t_a = 75$. Under usual parameters the economy is very close to the new steady state by the 75th period.

27. This specification applied in the revised baseline described in section 9.5.3, where the exogenously imposed historical values for taxes and government spending give rise to debt-GNP ratios above the benchmark value.
ever, it is ultimately necessary that the debt-GNP ratio approach the specified steady-state value. Hence, subsequent to period $t_b$, the debt-GNP ratio $b$ is exogenous. Taxes then become the marginal source of revenue and adjust in each period to assure that the government satisfies equation (A1). During the interval $[t_b, t_n]$, we require that $b$ approach its specified long-run value in a smooth fashion, according to the relationship

$$b_t = b_{ss} + (b_{ss}^0 - b_{ss}) (1 + v)^{n-t},$$

(A6)

where $v$ is a positive constant chosen such that equation (A6) yields $b_t = b_{ss}$ for $t = t_n$.

**The Components of $G$**

Government expenditure, $G$, divides into nominal purchases of nondurable goods and services ($GP$), nominal government investment ($GI$), and nominal transfers ($GT$):

$$G_t = GP_t + GI_t + GT_t$$

(A7)

Baseline Values

In the base case (original baseline) and in the first revised baseline, the paths of real government purchases and transfers grow at the steady-state real growth rate, $g$.

In the baseline discussed in section 9.5.3, values for $GP$ and $GT$ for the first eight periods are based on historical values for 1983–89; for subsequent periods, the values of $GP$ and $GT$ are set so that their ratios to GNP gradually converge to the benchmark ratios by the 25th period.

In all baseline simulations, the path of real $GI$ grows at the steady-state real growth rate, $g$.28

Values under Policy Changes

In simulating policy changes we fix the paths of $GP$, $GI$, and $GT$ so that real government purchases, investment, and transfers are the same as in corresponding years of the baseline scenario.29 This procedure is expressed by

$$\frac{GP^R_t}{P^R_{GP,t}} = \frac{GP^R_1}{P^R_{GP,1}} = t = 1, t_n,$$

(A8a)

$$\frac{GI^R_t}{P^R_{GI,t}} = \frac{GI^R_1}{P^R_{GI,1}} = t = 1, t_n,$$

(A8b)

28. Thus, in contrast with investment by private firms, government investment does not stem from optimizing considerations.

29. Maintaining the same real government purchases between the baseline and policy change simulations facilitates welfare assessments. Since the contribution to individual utility of changes in real government purchases is difficult to establish, welfare evaluations would be problematic if policy changes involved changes in government purchases.
(A8c) \[
\frac{GT_i^R}{P_{GT,i}^R} = \frac{GT_i^B}{P_{GT,i}^B} \quad t = 1, \ldots, n,
\]

The superscripts $R$ and $B$ denote revised case (policy change) and baseline magnitudes, while $P_{GP}, P_{GI},$ and $P_{GT}$ are price indices for $GP,$ $GI,$ and $GT.$ The price index for government investment, $P_{GI},$ is the purchase price of the representative capital good. The price index for transfers, $P_{GT},$ is the consumer price index. The index for government purchases, $P_{GP},$ is defined below.

Elements of $GP$

$GP$ divides into purchases of particular outputs of the $ns$ domestic sectors according to fixed expenditure shares:

\[(A9) \quad \alpha_i GP = GPX_i p_i \quad i = 1, \ldots, ns.\]

$GPX_i$ and $p_i$ are the quantity demanded and price of output from domestic sector $i,$ and $\alpha_i$ is the corresponding expenditure share. In this paper, $ns = 3.$ The ideal price index for government purchases, $P_{GP},$ is given by

\[(A10) \quad P_{GP} = \Pi_{i=1}^{ns} P_i^{p_i}.\]

**Benchmark Values**

Table 9A.1 provides benchmark values for the components of government expenditure and revenue. Calibrating the model requires that the benchmark equilibrium result from optimizing behavior and lie on a steady-state growth path. These requirements force some adjustments to actual historical (1983) values; hence it is not possible to generate a benchmark that perfectly coincides with history. However, we consider the benchmark values to be a reasonably close approximation to the actual 1983 figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9A.1</th>
<th>Benchmark Values for Government Expenditure and Revenue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level</td>
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<td>$G$</td>
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<td>$GP$</td>
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<td>$GT$</td>
<td>294.59</td>
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<td>$rb,$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>994.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
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<td>$T$</td>
<td>915.50</td>
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<td>$b_{t+1} - b_t$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>.0977</td>
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<td>$b_t$</td>
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References


Comment       David G. Tarr

This is a very innovative model in its dynamic characteristics with a great deal of potential for interesting policy conclusions. In general it is a well written paper that takes pains to provide intuition for the results it finds. I’ll return to the additional interesting applications for this model in my conclusion; I turn now to the results.

David G. Tarr is a senior economist at the World Bank in Washington, D.C.
The paper's results regarding the impact on the deficit on the temporary and permanent tariff surcharge make a great deal of sense. I believe there is a problem, however, regarding the result in the paper that the tariff surcharge results in an improvement in welfare. First consider the trade deficit results.

The authors postulate a very sensible balance of trade constraint. Without initial foreign asset holdings, it would reduce in a two-period model to a situation where any first-period trade deficit requires a surplus in the second period, exactly offsetting in present value. The rest of the world doesn't provide a free lunch, nor can it receive one. Any foreign assets held initially will allow the present value of imports to exceed the present value of exports by the amount of these assets. Or any debt initially allows a claim by foreigners on domestic output. The many-period generalization is that the present value of the trade deficit over the infinite horizon is zero (differing only by the initial holdings of foreign assets), that is, no permanent free lunch, deficits must be repaid, and surpluses are reclaimed later. This is clear and intuitive.

What does it mean in this model to "improve the trade deficit," since its present value cannot change. This is interpreted in the paper as twisting the path of the balance of trade toward more net exports (exports minus imports) in the early years. Given any policy change, agents reoptimize subject to the constraint that the present value of the balance of trade cannot change. A new optimal path of the balance of trade is traced out, where if the policy is successful, there is an increase in net exports in the early years that must be exactly offset in present value by a decrease in net exports in later years.

The numerical model finds that an unanticipated temporary tariff surcharge of 10 percent on all imports for five years increases net exports for five years. After five years, the tariff is eliminated and next exports fall over time to make up (in present value) for the trade surplus during the high-tariff years. The tariff increases the price of current imports relative to the price of future imports, and the results are dominated by this substitution effect. We are told that from theory there is also an income effect that could reverse this substitution effect, but the substitution effect is overwhelming in the numerical results. This is a very intuitive result.

The paper also simulates a permanent tariff surcharge of 10 percent. In this scenario, there is no change in the relative price of imports between periods, and no theoretical prediction of the effect of the surcharge on the trade deficit in any year. The numerical model, however, finds a reduction in the trade deficit in the early years but a much smaller effect than the impact of the temporary surcharge. Given the absence of any significant theory predicting this result, I would like to see whether there are parameters that would affect the result. Overall, however, the results on the twisting of the trade deficits make sense.

I now turn to the estimates of how welfare changes as a result of the tariff. For the permanent tariff, welfare is estimated to increase by 0.73 percent of initial wealth. As I recall, in 1984, the value of the capital stock was about $9 trillion including private housing. This means that, in present value, the
United States gains $66 billion from the 10 percent tariff. This suggests extremely strong terms-of-trade effects. The temporary tariff results in less welfare gain because the United States doesn't get the "benefits" of the tariff for as long a period of time.

The authors are very careful to impose caveats regarding this result, most notably regarding the fact that retaliation would negate these results. Nonetheless, the paper provides the result that unilateral tariff increases are substantially welfare augmenting. I believe that one should consider quite seriously the results of models such as this that may provide policymakers with advice that protection is beneficial. This issue needs to be addressed directly because Eichengreen and Goulder are certainly not alone in producing such results.¹

One possibility is that monopoly and monopsony power in international trade is much stronger than we may have previously believed, and we must adapt our thinking to the fact that terms-of-trade effects dominate unilateral tariff reductions. Another possibility is that there is something about the structure of these models that builds in terms-of-trade effects that are stronger than anyone believes. Strong evidence for the latter hypothesis comes from the fact that analogous models have found welfare losses from tariff reductions due to terms-of-trade effects for very small countries (e.g., Israel) that could not possibly possess monopoly power in trade.² Moreover, we are told that the optimal tariff in this model is 35 percent. This is more than 10 percent above the Smoot-Hawley level tariff, and must cast serious doubts on the optimal tariff of this model. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the structure of this model regarding the terms-of-trade effect.

Terms-of-trade benefits from import protection derive from monopsony power in importing or monopoly power in exporting.³ Let us focus on monopsony power in importing. By monopsony power in importing we mean that the importing country is large in relation to world markets, and a reduction in its quantity of imports will reduce the price at which foreigners supply the product to the importing country.

Conceptually, there is a supply function of imports from the rest of the world in each sector. For a "small" country, it would be of infinite elasticity at the world price. Trade policy couldn't affect the price of imports or terms-of-trade. If the country is a large buyer on world markets, we could postulate a

¹ For example, see John Whalley, *Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), table 10.2, and Alan Deardorf and Robert Stern, *The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), table 4.6, where the terms-of-trade effects are not as strong. These authors have expressed their concern regarding excessive terms-of-trade effects.


³ Due to the Lerner symmetry theorem, a tax on imports is equivalent to a tax on exports. Thus, an import tariff can be utilized to exploit monopoly power in exporting, albeit inefficiently compared to an export tax. See Jaime de Melo and David Tarr, *A General Equilibrium Analysis of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
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constant elasticity of supply of imports, that is, \( M = Ap^n \), with elasticity \( \pi \), where \( M \) is imports in a sector and \( p \) is the price of imports. A \( \pi \) percent reduction in quantity will reduce the world price by 1 percent.

Our empirical task would be to obtain information by sector on the extent of monopsony power—on \( \pi \) by sector. For example, in the United States, from a study by Dinopulos and Kreinin, there is a suggestion of monopsony power in autos, say, \( \pi = 5 \). For steel with large world excess capacity, or textiles and apparel with suppliers in all the developing world, \( \pi \) would be more closely approximated as infinite. There is an analogue, which I don’t discuss, for simulating monopoly power in exports. The key point is that what is desired is to incorporate monopoly or monopsony power by sector according to econometric evidence. The interaction of the rest of the world’s supply function of imports, with the demand function of the home country for imports, will determine the extent of the benefits from an optimal tariff to reduce imports.5

In single-country computable general equilibrium models for trade policy, the rest of the world is treated parametrically. This means that \( \pi \) may simply be selected parametrically by sector to simulate the extent of monopsony power that is obtained from econometric or other evidence.6 In the Eichengreen-Goulder model, however, the rest of the world is treated as an agent with all the same optimization procedures that exist in the home country. In particular, the rest of the world’s supply of exports in each sector is determined through optimization and cannot be selected parametrically. This provides a certain theoretical elegance over single-country models. The problem with this approach is that the supply function is not derived explicitly. More problematical, we are not told the elasticity of that supply function or how we can change parameters in the model to simulate an elasticity of supply consistent with evidence for each sector. The implication of all this lack of information on the supply elasticity is that even if we have precise information on monopoly power in, say, eight of the ten sectors in the Eichengreen-Goulder model, we do not know how to choose parameters in the model to simulate this.

Conventional wisdom has been that increasing the Armington elasticity will reduce the terms-of-trade effects; Goulder and Eichengreen, however, obtain opposite results in their sensitivity analysis: the United States gains even more from the tariff if the Armington elasticities are increased. The problem can be understood from Drusilla Brown’s (1988) paper. She explains that in-

5. This model imposes the usual Armington assumption that imports and domestic commodities in all sectors combine in a CES composite commodity, with composite price. There is an implied derived demand for imports, which could be graphed as a function of the import price, with the composite quantity and price as parameters.
6. de Melo and Tarr, A General Equilibrium Analysis.
creasing the Armington elasticity reduces monopsony power but simulta-
neously increases monopoly power. She argues that simply changing the Ar-
mington elasticity cannot expunge the terms-of-trade effects. The combined
modeling features of national product differentiation (the Armington assump-
tion) and a single rest of the world as an optimizing agent has entrapped the
authors into very strong terms-of-trade effects.

I conclude on an optimistic note for this model and work. Clearly one of
the most, if not the most interesting and exciting areas of research in trade
policy in the 1990s will be the dynamic gains from trade liberalization. Al-
though economists have often claimed that the dynamic gains from trade lib-
eralization may exceed the static gains, there has been, until recently, no
quantification of these effects. The new work by Romer, Krugman, Richard
Baldwin, Grossman and Helpman and Dinopoulous and Segerstrom is estab-
lishing the theoretical relationship between trade liberalization and growth.
This work will need to be implemented in a dynamic multisector model for
effective quantification. By developing a dynamic multicountry model, Ei-
chengreen and Goulder are well ahead in the game of being equipped to
handle these exciting issues.

Comment

Drusilla K. Brown

Those who work with CGE models often begin with an analytical model that
generates ambiguous conclusions. The computer work is then represented as
an attempt to resolve the competing influences of two or more economic
forces on the variables in question. More often than not, however, we see
something completely unexpected. The empirical results reveal heretofore un-
known or underappreciated economic mechanics that strongly alter our view
of the world. While theoretical ambiguity may remain, it pales in comparison
to other powerful economic forces at work determining the outcome.

Such is the case with Eichengreen and Goulder’s study of the impact of an
import surcharge on the trade balance. Their model is quite an elegant piece
of work and nicely illustrates the power of CGE models to contribute to our
understanding of economic theory and its application to real world prob-
lems. Eichengreen and Goulder bring together two distinct paradigms: the
Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade and the intertemporal optimi-
zation model. The international allocation of capital is central to the predic-
tions of the H-O model, but we have little intuition concerning the interaction

7. She offers some solutions to reducing excessive terms-of-trade effects. One solution is to nest
imports into imports from different countries, providing another parameter. The additional param-
eter will allow the reduction of terms-of-trade effects to be consistent with econometric estimates.

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between trade policy and the savings-investment behavior that ultimately determines capital formation. The computer results presented here advance our understanding considerably.

Let us look first at the permanent import surcharge. Trade economists, thinking in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, would normally be skeptical of the notion that import protection could improve the current account. Yet contrary evidence from the Eichengreen-Goulder model is quite compelling. A 10 percent import surcharge practically eliminates the U.S. current account deficit within one year.

We can determine the impact of a surcharge on the current account by analyzing the capital account. Consider savings behavior first. The tariff has the expected effect of improving the U.S. terms of trade and raising permanent income in the United States. As long as household savings is positive in the current period, the volume of savings will rise. The opposite occurs in the rest of the world. Terms of trade deteriorate, permanent income falls, and the volume of savings declines.

The key question is, Will investment in the United States rise by more or less than U.S. savings? Two sources of capital misallocation drive investment. First, the country that has relatively capital-intensive imports must ultimately attract capital. That is, the tariff will narrow the difference in relative factor abundance between the two countries. It appears from table 9.3 as if the capital stock in the United States grows relative to the rest of the world in the long run. Thus, during some period of the adjustment, the tariff must contribute to a capital account surplus as capital is effectively transferred to the United States from the foreign economy.

However, immediately following the imposition of the tariff and for at least fourteen years thereafter, investment in both countries rises above the baseline. The reason is that there is also intersectoral capital misallocation. Both countries must reallocate capital from their respective export sector to the import-competing sector. Capital leaves the export sector through depreciation and enters the import-competing sector through investment. Firms in the expanding sector find it profitable to raise their capital stock at a rate that exceeds the rate of capital depreciation. Consequently, the total capital stock in each country rises in the initial transition to the long run.

We thus have a situation in which both countries require considerable new investment but foreign savings has declined relative to U.S. savings. The end result is that U.S. savings partially finances intersectoral capital reallocation in the rest of the world. Immediately following the import surcharge, the U.S. current account improves as a result of increased capital exports. This is the case even though the United States must eventually become a capital importer.

The fundamental lesson here is that due to the process by which capital moves from one sector to another, the rate of depreciation in the contracting sector can easily (and is, indeed, likely to) be slower than the investment in the expanding sector. Consequently, the capital stock rises in both countries
during the medium run, even though in the long run the foreign economy will lose capital.

Similar forces are at work in the case of the temporary import surcharge. The impact on savings is enhanced because, unlike the permanent tax, the temporary import surcharge alters the relationship between current and future income.

Interestingly, the temporary surcharge also causes a greater disturbance in the optimal capital stock path, particularly in the case of the foreign economy. Apparently, the "temporary" surcharge remains in place long enough to alter the profit-maximizing intersectoral capital allocation. In both countries, capital appears to migrate from the export sector to the import-competing sector while the surcharge is in place. Then, in the years following removal, investment remains elevated in the foreign country as capital is returned to the export sector.

There are a couple of lessons that we can draw from this work. From a theoretical perspective, the Eichengreen-Goulder results ought to leave us somewhat dissatisfied with traditional tariff analysis. Both our textbook models and empirical models typically treat factors of production as facing severe barriers to international mobility. This would be a reasonable assumption if the time horizon for intersectoral capital flows were shorter than that for international flows. However, this is clearly not a reasonable assumption particularly when analyzing trade among industrialized countries. In most cases, the process by which capital moves intersectorally is basically the same as that for international capital mobility. Our reference model for trade policy analysis should be adjusted accordingly.

I would like to turn now to an alternative policy application of the Eichengreen-Goulder results. Their theoretical insights can provide us with a sensible reinterpretation of recent events surrounding the implementation of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. During the negotiation there was considerable concern in Canada that U.S. firms would repatriate capital that had previously been installed in Canada for the purpose of jumping Canada's tariff wall. However, shortly after the 1987 parliamentary elections which ensured approval of the agreement in Canada, Canada began experiencing a considerable capital inflow and an appreciating Canadian dollar. A popular explanation for this phenomenon was that Japanese firms were entering Canada in order to take advantage of new access to the large U.S. markets. While this argument seemed intuitively appealing, it did not explain why Japanese firms did not install their capital in the United States directly. To further confuse the issue, around the middle of 1989, we increasingly heard stories of plant closings as production moved south of the border. The Canadian dollar has since began to slide and a recession is impending.

These curious events conform well to the predictions that we might expect from the Eichengreen-Goulder model. We can understand the initial capital inflow and currency appreciation as part of the intersectoral reallocation that
is expected to be considerable in Canada (but not in the United States). However, the initial capital inflow does not give us any information concerning the long-run equilibrium Canada-U.S. capital allocation. Indeed, it appears likely that we will observe considerable repatriation of U.S. capital in the long run, despite the initial investment surge in Canada.

There is a wealth of other important trade issues which can be usefully analyzed by combining the H-O and intertemporal maximization models. Some obvious examples are the determination of foreign direct investment and the long-run effectiveness and efficiency consequence of international trade barriers. Initially, the Eichengreen-Goulder model may seem unnecessarily complex and forbidding, but their work is readily accessible and provides us with a rich understanding of current trade policy problems.