Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy

Eduardo Levy Yeyati

6.1 Introduction

While the foreign currency denomination (dollarization, for short) of external liabilities typical of most financially integrated developing economies has been the subject of a vast body of academic work, the dollarization of domestic financial assets has received comparatively less attention until very recently, when it has been increasingly seen as a key source of real exchange rate exposure and banking (and macroeconomic) fragility. There is, however, an angle of domestic financial dollarization (FD) that, while intuitive, has been somewhat overlooked: the limit it imposes on the central bank as domestic lender of last resort (LLR) and the resulting exposure to dollar liquidity runs à la Diamond and Dyvbig (1983). Thus, the growing literature on balance-sheet effects and dedollarization con-

1. Examples include the literature on “original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005), “liability dollarization cum sudden stop” (Calvo 2005), and “dollar shortages” (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003; Rajan 2004).
2. Domestic FD introduces a hidden short position in the foreign currency (either at the bank or at the debtor level) exposing the economy as a whole to sudden real exchange rate depreciations. See De Nicolò, Honohan, and Ize (2005), and Levy Yeyati (2005) for empirical analyses along these lines. Armas, Ize, and Levy Yeyati (forthcoming) provide a compendium on this relatively new literature.
3. By contrast, this issue has been often highlighted in the official dollarization debate (Broda and Levy Yeyati 2003a).
trasts with the less-developed literature on how to manage liquidity in the (potentially long) interim period when FD remains high. This is the subject of the present paper.

The analysis of dollar liquidity runs in FD economies has often centered on the economy as a whole, stressing the need for “insurance” mechanisms and the limitations of the available options.\(^4\) While most of this debate also pertains to the analysis of banking crises, there are some important specificities that the macroeconomic focus has tended to leave in the dark.

In particular, once one considers the banking sector as the object of insurance, a number of questions arise. Are the central bank’s (centralized) and the individual banks’ (decentralized) hoarding of reserves equivalent? How can the costs of self-insurance be reduced in the absence of an external alternative? Can a suspension of a convertibility clause (often applied ex post, too late, when the bank run is well underway) be used ex ante to supplement self-insurance?

To address these questions, I proceed in four steps. First, I revisit the evidence on the incidence of FD on the propensity to suffer bank runs and document the positive link between FD and reserve accumulation. I show that FD has been a motive for this form of self-insurance—in addition to the capital account reversal often noted in the literature.

Next, I analyze and compare available insurance options and explore the incentive problems associated with centralized holdings of reserves at the central bank, when the latter, among other uses, are expected to provide dollar liquidity insurance to individual banks. In particular, I show that centralized reserves can deepen the moral hazard problem within the banking industry and induce further dollarization.

Then I illustrate the authorities’ decision to suspend convertibility in the context of a run with the story of two recent banking crises: Argentina 2001 and Uruguay 2002.

Finally, I argue in favor of a combined scheme of decentralized liquid asset requirement (LAR) to limit moral hazard, and an ex ante suspension-of-convertibility clause or “circuit breaker” (CBR) that mitigates the costs of belated action while limiting the need for costly self-insurance.\(^5\)

The logic behind this combination is simple. Exposure to runs is an inevitable consequence of a banking system that transforms short-run savings into long-run investments. In the absence of an LLR that can produce liquidity on demand, the bank supervisor faces two options to reduce this

\(^4\) Thus, Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) discuss the optimal level of self-insurance through reserve accumulation, Aizenman and Lee (2005) show that reserve hoarding provides welfare gains, Caballero and Panageas (2004) propose the use of derivatives to maximize the insurance value of reserves, whereas Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005a) argue in favor of external insurance, and Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005b) stress the drawbacks of private external insurance and current International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led packages and point to the convenience of ad hoc multilateral official agreements to reduce the costs of self-insurance.

\(^5\) See Ize, Kiguel, and Levy Yeyati (2005), where this scheme was first outlined.
maturity mismatch: (a) liquid reserves, which reduce the average length of bank assets (in the limit, “narrow banking” eliminates both bank runs and bank financing), and (b) CBRs, which increase the average length (reduce the effective liquidity) of bank deposits (in the limit, approaching illiquid corporate debt). If the opportunity cost of reserve hoarding (proportional to the marginal productivity of capital) increases with the volume of reserves, and the liquidity premium (proportional to the marginal utility of consumption) increases as the CBR gets more restrictive, the optimal solution is a combination of LAR and CBR.  

6.2 FD, Bank Runs, and Reserves

Deposit dollarization is not only the most amply documented aspect of de facto dollarization but also (and for the same reason) the subject of most of the early FD literature. Despite the recent focus on external (official and unofficial) debt, domestic FD remains a widespread, persistent, and economically significant phenomenon, with distinct prudential implications. A quick look at the map of domestic FD confirms that it is not a localized phenomenon (figure 6.1) and that it has been remarkably stable in recent years (table 6.1). On the other hand, most recent systemic banking crises has taken place in domestically dollarized economies (table 6.2), a link already highlighted in the literature.  

Not surprisingly, then, domestically dollarized economies have tended to “insure” themselves through the hoarding of liquid foreign assets, much in the same way as countries experiencing sudden capital account reversals have revealed a preference for a high stock of international reserves. In this particular case, reserves holdings can be centralized at the central bank or decentralized at individual banks (in the form of reserve money or liquid asset requirements). Table 6.3 reports the summary statistics for both types. In addition, it shows that they are highly correlated with the degree of deposit dollarization, and between themselves.

This first impression is confirmed by more rigorous empirical testing.

6. In a sense, this analysis moves a step back from Diamond and Dyvbig’s own argument. If dollar deposit insurance cannot be tax- or debt-financed on demand and needs to be funded in advance, the amount of insured deposits (but not insurance coverage) is predetermined, and suspension of convertibility (too rigid relative to a deposit insurance à la Diamond and Dyvbig) looks again as a viable second-best alternative.

7. By contrast, comprehensive data on the currency composition of sovereign debt can be found only for a limited group of middle- to high-income countries (see Cowan et al. 2006).

8. De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2005) report that FD increases banks risk and deposit volatility, and Levy Yeyati (2006) shows that a devaluation raises the banking crisis propensity (only) in the presence of FD. Domestic FD in figure 6.1 is computed as the ratio of onshore dollar deposits over total onshore dollar deposits. With the exception of FD, all ratios in the paper are normalized by GDP. It is important to note that FD refers to the use of a currency other than the domestic legal tender. Hence, the very low levels of FD in officially dollarized Panama, Ecuador, and El Salvador.
Table 6.4 reports within and between estimates from panel regressions of different types of reserve holdings (including banks’ holdings of foreign assets outside the central bank) on deposit dollarization. All within regressions include a time trend to capture the noted trend toward reserve accumulation.

Fig. 6.1 Deposit dollarization around the world

Table 6.1 Deposit dollarization over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa and Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max.</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max.</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Balanced sample. Deposit dollarization is computed as the stock of dollar deposits over total deposits.

9. Bank foreign assets are included here for completeness. It should be noted, however, that should not be interpreted as reflection of self-insurance for at least two reasons. First, they are
mulation due to increased financial integration (irrespective of the degree of FD). All results convey the same message: deposit dollarization is strongly related with the holding of foreign assets, both across countries and dynamically for each country. (In passing, note also that there seems to be indeed a significant upward trend in reserve holdings.)

Table 6.5, in turn, indicates that this association between FD and reserves applies primarily to economies where FD is economically important. Splitting the sample into two groups, according to whether average

Table 6.2 Systemic banking crises and deposit dollarization ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Philippines, The</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2002).

Note: Deposit dollarization is computed as the stock of dollar deposits over total deposits.

likely to reflect standard prudential limits on the banks’ open foreign currency position. Second, they are likely to be longer, less-liquid assets that offer returns above that paid by liquid reserves and thus may simply be the reflection of the bank’s portfolio choice.
dollar deposit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio for the country is below or above the sample mean (roughly 10 percent), shows that link is strong and significant only for the latter. (Interestingly, this appears to be the case also for the time trend.) Figure 6.2 further illustrates this point. The results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of financial depth: broad money over GDP (m2_gdp) to control for the fact that the accumulation of reserves may be simply reflecting financial development. While this prior seems to be right (financial depth does seem to be positively related with the stock of liquid reserves), the results concerning FD remain virtually unchanged. Finally, this specification may be too imprecise should the surge in reserve holding be attributed not to a steady trend but to a response to specific events in the recent past. For this reason, in the last two columns I replace the time trend for individual year dummies. While these time effects seem to exhibit an upward trend in the recent period (coinciding but not necessarily due to the Mexican and Asian episodes, as shown in figure 6.2), their inclusion has no visible effect on the coefficient of interest.

Table 6.6 presents several robustness checks. Columns (1) and (2) replicate the specification of table 6.5, column (5), for the Latin American and nonindustrial subsamples, while columns (3) and (4) add the change in the nominal exchange rate (dler) to control for the mercantilist motivation for reserve hoarding and the external debt ratio (ext_debt_gdp) to capture another source of dollar exposure often highlighted in the literature. With the

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**Table 6.3** Deposit dollarization and reserves: Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CB reserves (i)</th>
<th>Comm. bank reserves in CB (ii)</th>
<th>Total reserves in CB (iii) = (i) + (ii)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of observations</strong></td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>1,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min.</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max.</strong></td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>183.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlations**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deposit dollarization</td>
<td>0.2945 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.3316 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.3615 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total reserves in CB</td>
<td>0.9404 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.6497 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm. bank reserves in CB</td>
<td>0.3524 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Balanced sample. Dollar deposit and reserves ratios are computed over GDP. P-values are in parentheses.

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10. For example, Aizenman and Lee test the hypothesis of precautionary reserves by regressing reserves holdings on a dummy that is equal to one in the years following the Asian and Mexican crises.
### Table 6.4 Deposit dollarization and reserves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CB reserves</th>
<th>Comm. bank reserves</th>
<th>Total reserves</th>
<th>Comm. bank other foreign assets</th>
<th>Comm. bank total foreign assets</th>
<th>Total foreign assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within (1)</td>
<td>Between (2)</td>
<td>Within (3)</td>
<td>Between (4)</td>
<td>Within (5)</td>
<td>Between (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar</td>
<td>0.172***</td>
<td>0.241**</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
<td>0.489***</td>
<td>0.383**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>–0.001***</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
<td>–0.010**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–6.658***</td>
<td>0.120**</td>
<td>1.310***</td>
<td>–5.343***</td>
<td>-5.871***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.672)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.461)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(1.147)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.820)</td>
<td>(7.997)</td>
<td>(1.380)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of observations</th>
<th>1.797</th>
<th>1.797</th>
<th>1.822</th>
<th>1.822</th>
<th>1.781</th>
<th>1.781</th>
<th>1.749</th>
<th>1.749</th>
<th>1.730</th>
<th>1.730</th>
<th>1.719</th>
<th>1.719</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Dollar deposit and reserves ratios are computed over GDP. All regressions include country-fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.5</th>
<th>High and low deposit dollarization and reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CB reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low FD (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m2_gdp</td>
<td>0.218***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>1,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dollar deposit and reserves ratios are computed over GDP. All regressions include country-fixed effects. Low FD denotes observations for which the deposit dollarization ratio of the preceding year is less than 10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
exception of a slightly lower coefficient when debt is included (due to the smaller sample size), the results are unaltered. In turn, columns (5) and (6) revisit the prudential view of high reserves as a response to the vulnerability revealed by recent crisis, by including a systemic banking crisis dummy (crisis), and its first ten lags. While crises do not seem to exert any contemporary influence (indeed, one would expect that reserves go down as a result), the cumulative effect of a crisis is positive and significant, either when estimated as the sum of the lags (column [5]) or by means of an independent dummy (past_crisis_10) that indicates that the country has suffered a crisis in the preceding ten years (column [6]). The same result, stronger, is found when we add banks’ foreign assets to the reserve stock.

In sum, there is a strong indication that countries with high FD tend to hold a larger stock of reserves, and tend to adjust it as FD evolves, besides the upward trend associated with recent episodes of global financial turmoil and the country’s own history of systemic crises. This liquidity

11. Note that the negative correlation with the nominal devaluations is in line with the mercantilist view of reserve accumulation as a buffer against the appreciation of the local currency.
12. An index of exchange rate regime failed to be significant, contradicting the conventional view that pegs induce further reserve accumulation. Results, omitted here, are available upon request.
13. As I will argue in the following, the link between FD and reserves can be bidirectional.
## Table 6.6  Deposit dollarization and reserves: Robustness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total reserves</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total foreign assets</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dollar</td>
<td>Latin America (1)</td>
<td>0.335***</td>
<td>0.294***</td>
<td>0.299***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonindustrial (2)</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m2_gdp</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dler</td>
<td>−0.019***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>−0.014***</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ext_debt_gdp</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.113**</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sum_{i=0}^{10} \text{crisis}_i )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past_crisis_10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.010*</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.393)</td>
<td>(0.991)</td>
<td>(1.009)</td>
<td>(1.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* See table 6.4 notes.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

**Significant at the 5 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
buffer, while useful as a natural deterrent against liquidity runs, has proved to be inadequate in practice when a bank runs in FD economies finally materializes, leaving open the door for an undue loss of reserves that may ultimately compromise the payment system.

6.3 Insurance Options

With all its limitations, self-insurance makes perfect sense as the preferred response to the risk of dollar shortages in light of the (lack of) alternative insurance options, namely, *external insurance* through a contract with private providers of dollar liquidity (typically, a consortium of financial institutions).  

Privately provided contingent credit lines (or, more generally, the international outsourcing of the LLR function for small open economies) have been advocated in the context of the official dollarization debate, spurring two experiments in Argentina and, partly as a spin off of the latter, in Mexico. In the first case, the Argentine central bank and a consortium of foreign banks subscribed a contingent credit line in the late 1990s, whereby the central bank—as well as participating local banks—had the option to enter a repurchase agreement against Argentine sovereign securities. Despite the fact that the coverage of this contract was relatively limited given the size of the Argentine banking sector, its execution was delayed until August 2001, when the bank run has already eroded the existing liquidity buffer and was executed only up to one fourth of the original limit. The second case also included a contingent credit line between Mexico and international banks, which was withdrawn in its entirety by the Mexican government on September 30, 1998, after a decline in oil prices that reduced Mexican fiscal resources combined with a temporary increase in the country’s external borrowing costs. However, as to a lesser degree in Argentina, insuring banks were reluctant to disburse the loan and, after releasing the funds, they refused to renew the agreement.

The numbers of the private external insurance contract looked attractive on paper: the Argentine deal, for example, stipulated an annual commitment fee of 32 basis points for a contingent line at the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 205 basis points, at a time where the spread over the average return on reserves reported by the central bank (a reasonable proxy for the cost of carry of liquidity) was about 570 basis points. The result, however, was in both cases rather disappointing.

14. A third option would be a contract with multilateral financial institutions that may offer the central bank (or individual banks) access to dollar liquidity at a reasonable cost, perhaps the most economically efficient and a constant topic for discussion. The current IMF facilities, contingent and backloaded, are far from being a substitute dollar LLR.


16. See Ize, Kiguel, and Levy Yeyati (2005) for a more detailed analysis of these experiences.
Was it surprising? Are private partners better positioned to provide LLR services at low cost, as the contract seemed to suggest ex ante, or are the convenient terms the reflection of mispricing or unreliable commitment? We can shed some light on this issue by means of a simple analytical example.

Assume that, with probability \( \pi \), the country faces a systemic liquidity run that leads to an increase in the sovereign spread to the (unsustainably high) \( \rho_H \) whereas, with probability \( 1 - \pi \), the country can access international markets at the low sovereign spread \( \rho_L \). In the absence of liquidity insurance, a liquidity run leads to financial collapse. For the purpose of the example, it suffices to assume that the country has strong incentives to avoid this situation, which carries a substantial real cost \( K \). Assuming that the country’s obligations maturing during the period are equal to \( R \), the authorities have two options to fully insure against the liquidity run (alternatively, against validating unsustainably high rollover costs):

- **Self-insurance:** Hold liquid reserves \( R \), at a cost of carry \( \rho = r - r_f \), where \( r_f \) is the risk-free rate, and \( \rho \) is the expected sovereign spread \( (1 - \pi)\rho_L + \pi\rho_H \), the risk premium on the country’s debt demanded in international markets. In this context, the ex ante cost of holding reserves is equal to the precrisis sovereign spread \( \rho \) at the corresponding maturity.\(^{17}\)

- **External (interest rate) insurance:** A fair insurance contract with international financial institutions that allows the country to draw down from a credit line up to a given amount \( R \) at a predetermined spread \( \bar{\rho} \) at a fair (unit) premium \( \gamma = c - \pi\bar{\rho} \), where \( c \) is the insurer’s own cost of carrying liquid assets.

Setting \( \bar{\rho} = \rho - \gamma \) (so that the country pays the same under both insurance options), we obtain

\[
\gamma = c - \pi(\rho - \gamma) = \frac{c}{1 - \pi} - \frac{\pi}{(1 - \pi)} \rho.
\]

Note that, from the insured country’s perspective, the cost of carry of self-insurance in good states is replaced by the fair insurance premium. Thus, the cost of self-insurance exceeds that of external insurance due to the lower carrying cost born by the insurer if, and only if \( \rho > c \), since the *sole advantage of external insurance relative to self-insurance is precisely the insurer’s lower cost of carry*. In other words, they would be equally costly

\(^{17}\) Alternatively, we could assume that, beyond a certain level of spreads, the country is simply rationed from international markets (market closure).

\(^{18}\) Note that reserves can take the form of liquid long-term foreign assets (e.g., ten-year U.S. Treasuries) so that no maturity mismatch needs to be incurred.
unless the intermediation of the insurer reduces the credit risk faced by the
investor that ultimately finances either alternative.

The relevant question is, then, under what circumstances and to what ex-
tent is this the case in practice? The insurer’s cost of carry (the difference
between the return from the contract and the opportunity cost of hoarding
liquidity) may be below that of the country for two reasons. First is en-
hanced market access: the fact that the insurer can tap international mar-
kets on demand so the stock of liquidity that needs to be hoarded is mini-
mal. In addition, the sovereign spread may (and typically does) capture
risks not directly associated with the market closure event. Thus, even if the
contract increases the exposure of the insurer to the insured country, it
does not expose the insurer to all risks affecting sovereign debt (and the
country’s cost of carry). In particular, an insurance contract aimed at pro-
tecting the domestic banking sector from liquidity runs would shield the in-
surer (at least partially) from debt sustainability problems (whereas the
bondholder that helps finance self-insurance will be directly affected by a
debt crisis).

The extent to which all these factors combined reduce the costs of carry
and whether this reduction justifies external insurance (including the mar-
gins charged by the insurer) are difficult to assess. In practice, the two pre-
vious experiences with those types of contracts amounted to a rather di-
luted version of insurance and were subject to serious caveats. Moreover,
the low cost of these contracts may have also been reflecting market im-
perfections that detract from the benefits of external insurance as dis-
cussed in the preceding.

The first imperfection relates to what could be called inverse moral haz-
ard, or, more generally, the inability of the insurer to commit the resources
when the option of borrowing is exercised (a weakness that was at play in
the Argentine and Mexican experiments). A second imperfection, perhaps
the most determinant, is the capacity of the insurer to dilute its exposure at
the expense of the coinsurers by shorting the country’s assets.

It has been noted before that these two aspects only enhance the advan-
tages of official agencies to provide international LLR coverage: much in
the same way as a domestic central bank, an international financial insti-
tution (IFI) may commit the resources without the need to accumulate re-
serves ex ante, free from the agency problems that undermined the private
contract. In the context of the present paper, it is enough to stress that,

19. A consortium of insurer banks exposed to the country through the insurance contract
may still be able to borrow at reasonable rates while the country cannot, thanks to a more di-
versified asset portfolio, a higher creditworthiness, and even the presence of explicit or im-
licit guarantees from their home countries. Note that this is essentially the main argument
for a centralized LLR in the domestic currency, except that in that case the advantage is
rooted in the central bank’s capacity to print liquidity on demand.
while no official version of the LLR is in sight, it is not surprising that governments in FD economies have chosen to self-insure.

6.3.1 The Problem with Self-Insurance

Self-insurance in its most commonly found form of centralized reserve accumulation may have at least two undesired incentives effects. A stylized example may help illustrate the point.

Consider an economy populated by a continuum of $D$ risk-neutral depositors with one unit of cash savings, where atomistic banks collect short-term deposits at a rate $r_D$ and invest them in long-term investments $L$ (loans, for short) with certain returns $r_D$ and liquid reserves $R_B$ that pay the risk-free rate $r_f$. Assume for the moment that banks are always solvent (there is no default risk). Let the size of the systemic deposit run $x$ be distributed according to cumulative distribution function $F(x)$, monotonically increasing and convex over the range $[0,1]$ and, given its systemic nature, independent from bank-specific characteristics.\(^{21}\)

In the absence of default, a bank facing a liquidity shortage is forced to liquidate its assets at a constant (unit) discount $\theta$.\(^{22}\) At the beginning of the period, the bank chooses the liquidity buffer $R_B$ to optimize the tradeoff between the cost of hoarding liquidity and the probability of incurring liquidation costs. For expositional simplicity, all variables are expressed as a share of deposits $D$.

Replacing $L = 1 - R_B$, bank profits (per unit of deposit) in the absence of centralized reserves can be characterized as\(^{23}\)

$$
\max_{\{R_B\}} \pi^r = (1 + r_L)(1 - R_B) + \int_0^{R_B} (1 + r_L)(R_B - x)dF(x) \\
- \int_{R_B}^1 (1 + r_L)(1 + \theta)(x - R_B)dF(x) \\
- \int_0^1 (1 + r_D)(1 - x)dF(x)
$$

or, alternatively, as

$$
\max_{\{R_B\}} \pi^r = r_L - r_D - C_{LAR},
$$

where the costs associated with liquidity runs $C$ can be expressed as

21. The example focuses on pure liquidity runs and deliberately abstracts from currency mismatches and currency risk; hence, it is independent of the evolution of the exchange rate. Naturally, if—as is often the case—the dollar deposit run is accompanied by a currency run, the resulting real depreciation would only add to the banks’ problems via losses on its currency position or—if the dollar deposits are onlent in the same currency—a lower recovery value of dollar loans to nondollar earners.

22. Letting the discount increase with $x$ does not alter the implications of this example.

23. In what follows, under the assumption of no default risk, the deposit rate is equal to the risk-free rate $r_f$. However, the current notation is kept for expositional purposes.
\[ C_{\text{LAR}} = [(r_L - r_f)F(R_B)] - [(1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) - r_L][1 - F(R_B)]R_B \]
\[ - \int_0^{R_B} (r_D - r_f)xdF(x) + \int_{R_B}^{1} [(1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) - r_D]xdF(x) \]

and associated first order condition is given by
\[ - \frac{\partial C_{\text{LAR}}}{\partial R_B} = -(r_L - r_f)F(R_B) + (1 + r_L)\theta[1 - F(R_B)] = 0. \]

Thus, the optimal liquidity buffer is the one that equals the expected carrying costs (the left-hand-side term) to the expected savings in liquidation costs from holding additional reserves (the right-hand side). In turn, the optimal amount of bank reserves \( R_B \) is given by
\[ R_B = F^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{[1 + (r_L - r_f)/(1 + r_L)\theta]}\right) \]
from which
\[ \frac{\partial R_B}{\partial \theta} > 0; \quad \frac{\partial R_B}{\partial r_L} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial R_B}{\partial r_f} > 0. \]

Consider now the influence of centralized reserves. Assume that the central bank assist banks through a liquidity window that commands a penalty rate \( r_{LLR} \) such that \( 1 + r_L < 1 + r_{LLR} < (1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) \) so that the penalty does not exceed the liquidation cost. Then, if access to the LLR is unlimited, the problem is similar to the previous one with the facility rate substituting the liquidation cost so that the cost of liquidity runs are now
\[ C_{\text{LLR}} = [(r_L - r_f)F(R_B)] - (r_{LLR} - r_L)[1 - F(R_B)]R_B - \int_0^{R_B} (r_D - r_f)xdF(x) \]
\[ + \int_{R_B}^{1} (r_{LLR} - r_D)xdF(x), \]
from which
\[ - \frac{\partial C_{\text{LLR}}}{\partial R_B} = -(r_L - r_f)F(R_B) + (r_{LLR} - r_L)[1 - F(R_B)] = 0. \]

Or
\[ R_{B,\text{LLR}} = F^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{1 + \frac{(r_L - r_f)}{(r_{LLR} - r_L)}}\right) \]
So that cheaper centralized reserves substitute for decentralized reserves.

Under the more general (and realistic) assumption that the facility is limited and that this limit is binding \( (R_{LLR} < R_{\text{LLR}} < 1) \), the amount available to assist each individual bank would be insufficient in the event of a

24. Note that the latter compounds the liquidation discount and the interest that the bank loses on the liquidated loans.
large enough systemic event, and some liquidation costs should be factored back into the problem:

\[
C_{LLR} = \{ (r_L - r_f)F(R_B) - (r_{LLR} - r_L)[F(R_B + R_{LLR}) - F(R_B)] \\
- [(1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) - (1 + r_L)](1 - F(R_B + R_{LLR})) \} R_B \\
- \int_{0}^{R_B} (r_D - r_L) xdF(x) + \int_{R_B}^{R_B+R_{LLR}} (r_{LLR} - r_D) xdF(x) \\
+ \int_{R_B+R_{LLR}}^{1} [(1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) - (1 + r_D)] xdF(x) \\
- [(1 + r_L)(1 + \theta) - (1 + r_{LLR})][1 - F(R_B + R_{LLR})] R_{LLR}
\]

for which the first order condition reads

\[
- \frac{\partial C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B} = -(r_L - r_f)F(R_B) + (r_{LLR} - r_L)[F(R_B + R_{LLR}) - F(R_B)] \\
+ (1 + r_L)\theta[1 - F(R_B + R_{LLR})] = 0,
\]

which tells us, again, that the larger the stock of decentralized reserves \( R_{LLR} \) or the lower the interest rate charged by the LLR, the weaker the incentives to hold liquidity at the individual bank level (\( \partial R_B/\partial R_{LLR} < 0, \partial R_B/\partial r_{LLR} < 0 \)).

In this light, what is the optimal (centralized-decentralized) composition of reserves? Intuitively, the answer depends on the carrying costs for each of the players involved. To examine that, we need to be more precise about these costs: It is there that the currency of denomination matters.

When the run is on short-term peso liabilities, the central bank can produce the peso liquidity on demand at a limited cost: Absent solvency concerns, it can borrow directly in the local market at the risk-free rate (or, if needed, finance the assistance through the inflation tax). At any rate, when bank deposits are denominated in pesos, the central bank has a clear advantage because, unlike the commercial banks, it does not need to accumulate reserves in advance. In particular, it can offer centralized reserves at the risk-free rate, bringing the optimal level of decentralized reserves to zero (because \( r_{LLR} - r_f = 0 \Rightarrow \partial R_B/\partial R_{LLR} = -1 \), so that both sources of insurance are perfect substitutes). In turn, a centralized LLR in pesos entails an efficiency gain for the whole system, as it eliminates the costs associated with hoarding liquidity and (because no resource needs to be invested in

25. Also, as before, 
\[
\frac{\partial R_B}{\partial \theta} > 0; \frac{\partial R_B}{\partial r_L} < 0; \text{ and } \frac{\partial R_B}{\partial r_f} > 0.
\]
liquid assets in advance) enhances the maturity transformation role of the financial sector.\(^{26}\)

By contrast, when bank liabilities are denominated in dollars, and under the assumption that systemic banking and currency runs coincide cutting the country’s access to international markets, dollar liquidity has to be ensured in advance. Therefore, centralized reserves merely substitute for decentralized reserves, and any potential efficiency gains hinges only the relative cost of carry that, in principle, should not differ.\(^{27}\) In this case, to the extent that the penalty rate charged to the bank underprice the effective cost to the LLR (alternatively, to the extent that the bank prefers insurance with the central bank than self-insurance), the latter would introduce a subsidy to dollar intermediation that may foster FD beyond the level that banks would choose individually should they have to pay for the required liquidity. However, this is not the only distortion that centralized reserves may introduce, as I show next.

### 6.3.2 Default Risk and Moral Hazard

If there is a positive probability of default, limited liability matters.\(^{28}\) The simplest way to see this is by assuming that, with probability \(1 - p\), the investment of the bank goes sour and returns drop to zero. Moral hazard implicitly assumes that the bank has some degree of control over this risk. Here, I simply assume that there is a continuum of investment projects (borrowers) with identical expected returns \(\tilde{r} \leq r\), so that \(r_L(p) = \tilde{r}/p\). Then, if the probability of a systemic run is uncorrelated with the bank’s idiosyncratic credit risk, the bank’s problem can be written as

\[
\max_{R_B, p} \pi_c^{LLR} = p(r_L - r_D - C_{LLR}),
\]

where the first order conditions are

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_c^{LLR}}{\partial R_B} = -p \frac{\partial C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_c^{LLR}}{\partial p} = r_L - r_D - C_{LLR} + p \left(1 - \frac{\partial C_{LLR}}{\partial r_L}\right) \frac{\partial r_L}{\partial p} = 0.
\]

\(^{26}\) In a competitive banking sector, liquidity costs would reflect directly in the intermediation spread and that a LLR at the risk-free rate brings these costs from \(C_{LLR}(R^*_B) > 0\) to \(C_{LLR}(R^*_B) = 0\). Note that I am deliberately abstracting from diversification gains, as the focus of the paper is on systemic (rather than bank-specific) runs.

\(^{27}\) In equilibrium, the lending rate should equal the marginal return to capital that, in the absence of financial constraints, in turn determines the government’s discount rate (and the marginal borrowing cost it is willing to pay).

\(^{28}\) The only exception in which the previous results are not altered is under perfect information and no LLR (assuming further that the costs of liquidation of an insolvent bank do not exceed those associated with the fire sale of assets by the bank itself), as the expected return on deposits demanded by depositors (and faced by banks) is independent of the incidence of default. A case along these lines is discussed in Aizenman and Lee (2005).
It follows that
\[ \frac{\partial p}{\partial R_B} \bigg|_{R_B = R_a^*} = \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B^2} \left[ \left( \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B \partial r_L} \right) \frac{\partial r_L}{\partial p} \right] \geq 0 \]
as \( \frac{\partial r_L}{\partial p} < 0 \), \( -\frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B^2} \leq 0 \), and
\[ \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B \partial r_L} = F(R_B + R_{LLR}) - \theta[1 - F(R_B + R_{LLR})] > 0. \]

Thus, riskier banks choose to hoard a lower level of reserves. The reason is clear: the opportunity cost is higher for a riskier bank that invests in high-return projects (note that both the returns on investment and the costs of hoarding liquidity are relevant only in the event that the bank does not go bankrupt). Moreover,
\[ \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B \partial R_{LLR}} = [(1 + r_L)\theta - (r_{LLR} - r_L)]F'(R_B + R_{LLR}) > 0 \]
implies that
\[ \frac{\partial p}{\partial R_{LLR}} \bigg|_{R_B = R_a^*} = -p \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B \partial R_{LLR}} \left[ \left( \frac{\partial^2 C_{LLR}}{\partial R_B \partial r_L} \right) \frac{\partial r_L}{\partial p} \right] \geq 0, \]
which tells us that centralized reserves induce more risk-taking (and, in turn, a lower level of reserves).\(^{29}\)

In sum, centralized reserves not only partially transfer the cost of the liquidity buffer to the central bank; in addition, it induces more risk-taking overall (relative to the case of no LLR).

6.3.3 Liquid Asset Requirements (LARs)

Naturally, there are ways in which the undesired effects of centralized reserve holdings (or a dollar LLR) described above can be addressed, at least in theory. The central bank can (and usually does) restrict its liquidity assistance to limited temporary shortfalls that, if persistent, may lead to intervention and, ultimately, closure. Moreover, the incentive problem can

\(^{29}\) Ize, Kiguel, and Levy Yeyati (2005) present an alternative illustration of the moral hazard implication of centralized reserves, arguing that, in a world with risky and safer types, centralized reserves entail a cross subsidy from the latter to the former. More precisely, they lead risky types to choose a lower \( R_a \) than safer types, crowding out the use of the LLR assistance, thereby forcing safer banks to hoard an additional amount of reserves. Similarly, in a bicurrency economy with currency risk, it can be shown that a dollar LLR lead banks to incur more risk fostering financial dollarization (Broda and Levy Yeyati, forthcoming).
be addressed by conditioning the access to and cost of the liquidity facility on the degree of risk much in the same way as a risk-based deposit insurance scheme.\textsuperscript{30}

However, as the examples of Argentina and Uruguay discussed in the preceding illustrate, when left to the discretion of the supervisor, limits, and conditions on LLR access in the midst of a systemic run are difficult to enforce. The costs of bank closures (economic contraction, possible domino effects in the banking sector, and even personal costs to the supervisor due to potential litigation) create a serious problem of time inconsistency that, often, results in undue delays or forbearance.

In this context, the most sensible avenue to circumvent the banking sector’s free riding on central bank reserves appears to be the requirement of a high liquid asset ratio for banks with dollarized liabilities, as most financially dollarized economies have introduced in the late 90s.

What is the optimal LAR? It is easy to show that, even in the absence of market imperfections, a central planner would not choose the same reserves-to-deposits ratio as the individual bank in the absence of a LLR. Following Aizenman and Lee (2005), assume a Cobb-Douglass technology \(y(K) = K^{\alpha}\), where \(K\) denotes the stock of capital. A central planner choosing the optimal allocation between investment and the liquidity buffer \(R\) in order to optimize returns would solve

\[
\max_{(R)} W_{LLR}^C = \int_0^R (1 - R)^\alpha dF(x) + \int_R^1 [1 - R - (1 + \theta)(x - R)]^\alpha dF(x)
+ \int_0^R (1 + r_{f})(R - x)dF(x) - \int_0^1 (1 + r_{f} + \rho)(1 - x)dF(x),
\]

from which

\[
\frac{\partial W_{LLR}^C}{\partial R} = -[\alpha(1 - R)^{\alpha - 1} - (1 + r_{f})]F(R)
+ \theta \int_R^1 \alpha[1 - R - (1 + \theta)(x - R)]^{\alpha - 1} dF(x) = 0.
\]

A simple comparison reveals that the optimal level of reserves for the planner exceeds that for the individual bank.\textsuperscript{31} In addition, in the presence of externalities (e.g., the social costs of a financial collapse, reflected in a

\textsuperscript{30} See Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003b) for an argument along these lines.

\textsuperscript{31} Note that, under the assumption of a competitive banking sector, in both cases the first term equals the marginal productivity of capital. However, in the second term, the central planner not only considers the liquidation cost but also the positive impact of the reduced stock of capital on the marginal returns to investment in the event of early liquidation (which a price-taking bank does not internalize) increasing the marginal cost of a run.
larger discount factor $\theta$), the planner would prefer a still higher level of coverage. This is yet another reason to imposing LAR.

Liquid asset requirements, however, represent a suboptimal self-insurance response to systemic runs. Recall that, in equilibrium,

$$\pi'(R_B) = 0 \Rightarrow r_L - r_D = \alpha(1 - R_B)^{\alpha-1} - r_f = C(R_B) > 0$$

So that borrowing costs (and, in turn, the cost stock of capital and the level of income) depend negatively on the degree of self insurance—irrespective of whether this level is voluntary or mandatory.

In the limit, they approach a narrow banking structure that makes the banking sector safer at the expense of its financing clout. As such, self-insurance is no panacea: there is, indeed, a tradeoff between insurance and intermediation costs, as liquid reserves detract from the level of productive investment and, at the optimum, still leave room for liquidation losses if the run is deep enough.

6.3.4 Circuit Breakers (CBRs)

Can we improve upon this result (that is, reduce $R_B$ and increase total output $[1 - R]^\alpha$ without raising the exposure to a liquidity run; in other words, reducing the optimal amount of self-insurance $R_B^*$) by limiting the convertibility once the run exceeds certain predetermined threshold? Can we use such a limit to deal with large dollar liquidity runs that exceed the optimal amount of liquid reserves? In this section, I argue that we can.

In the absence of a liquidity premium, a suspension of convertibility clause that works as a CBR for the dollar hemorrhage, is a trivial solution to the problem because it eliminates the need for costly liquidation at no cost. In reality, a CBR would amount to limiting ex ante the liquidity of deposits (and the maturity transformation role of banks) and would be therefore penalized by a liquidity premium $\rho(x)$, with $\rho' < 0$, $\rho'' > 0$, and $\rho(0) = \rho'(0) = 0$, on the banks’ borrowing costs, where $x$ is the parameter that characterizes the CBR policy: the threshold beyond which the run is short-circuited by the CBR. The tradeoff between borrowing costs and liquidation costs is what would determine the optimal LAR-CBR mix.

More formally, under a LAR/CBR policy $x > R$, (where $x$ is the CBR threshold and $R$ the level of LAR), the central planner’s problem can be written as

$$\max_{\{x,R\}} W_{LLR} = \int_0^R \left( (1 - R)^\alpha + (1 + r_f)R - (1 + r_f + \rho) + \rho x \right) dF(x)$$

$$+ \int_x^\infty \left[ (1 - R - (1 + \theta)(x - R)^\alpha - (1 + r_f + \rho)(1 - x) \right] dF(x)$$

$$+ \int_0^1 \left[ (1 - R - (1 + \theta)(\bar{x} - R)^\alpha - (1 + r_f + \rho)(1 - \bar{x}) \right] dF(x)$$

from which the first order conditions are
\[
\frac{\partial W_{LLR}}{\partial R} = [-\alpha(1 - R)^{\alpha-1} + (1 + r_j)]{\int_0^R} dF(x) \\
+ \int_R^{\hat{x}} \{\alpha\theta[1 - R - (1 + \theta)(\hat{x} - R)]^{\alpha-1}\} dF(x) \\
+ \alpha\theta[1 - R - (1 + \theta)(\hat{x} - R)]^{\alpha-1} [1 - f(\hat{x})]
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial W_{LLR}}{\partial \hat{x}} = -\{\alpha(1 + \theta)[1 - R - (1 + \theta)(\hat{x} - R)]^{\alpha-1} - (1 + r_f + \rho)\} [1 - F(\hat{x})] \\
- \rho' \{\int_0^{\hat{x}} (1 - x) dF(x) + (1 - \hat{x})[1 - F(\hat{x})]\} = 0.
\]

As expected, a tighter CBR avoids liquidation costs at the expense of higher borrowing costs. A second thing to note is the fact that LAR and CBR are substitutes (differentiating implicitly, we obtain \(\partial R^o/\partial \hat{x} > 0\)). Thus, a stricter CBR (a lower threshold \(\hat{x}\)) is associated with a lower optimal level of reserves. The optimal mix between the two will depend on the liquidity premium charged by depositors.

6.4 Two Banking Crises: Argentina and Uruguay

Two recent systemic banking crises (Argentina 2001 and Uruguay 2002) provide the best illustration of the link between FD and banking fragility and the limits to crisis management faced by the supervisor in the midst of a crisis—the perfect motivation for the use of a CBR as described in the preceding. In both episodes, sudden and devastating runs on dollar deposits crippled banks irrespective of their idiosyncratic fundamentals which, judging from the standard prudential indicators, were a priori in excellent shape. In both cases, the supervisor intervened belatedly and only after losing most of the (at the time, important) stock of liquid foreign assets, contaminating the payments system.

32. It can be shown that, when \(\rho'(0)\) is sufficiently high, the solution is interior. Note that a similar tradeoff applies to the analysis of sovereign debt policies (sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, collective action clauses) aimed at lowering the incidence of contractionary adjustments in the event of a capital account reversal, at the expense of a liquidity premium that makes up for the limited liquidity of financial claims.

33. An interesting (albeit lateral) aspect of this discussion relates to the fact that this tradeoff entails a sequence of costs: since the CBR eliminates liquidation costs associated with large runs at the expense of higher borrowing costs in good times, a myopic planner may have a preference for partial self-insurance through LAR.

34. In particular, the average capital-to-asset ratio was approximately 20 percent in Argentina and 14 percent in Uruguay, above the 13 percent in Chile, Peru, and Mexico and the 11 percent in Colombia.

By late 1999, due to a combination of external factors (the devaluation of the Brazilian real, a strong dollar, and high international interest rates) and internal vulnerabilities (most notably, the presence of substantial private and public dollar liabilities), the Argentine economy was caught in a currency-growth-debt (CGD) trap, whereby the peso was perceived as overvalued, limiting investment and growth, and raising the costs of debt service that in turn induced a reversal of capital flows feed bank into the perceived overvaluation. Still, even by end-2000, judging from standard prudential indicators, Argentina could have been characterized as having a well-capitalized, liquid, and strongly provisioned banking resilient banking sector (in no small part due to the regulatory reform prompted by a previous banking crisis in 1995). 36

Doubts about the peg to the U.S. dollar built up with the announcement of a plan to peg of the peso to an equally weighted dollar-euro basket (viewed as a disguised devaluation), the resignation of the governor of the central bank (viewed as a guarantor of the peg), and a reform of the central bank charter that blurred the limits on money issuance that underpinned the currency board. As a result, between January 2001 and December 2001, time deposits fell by almost 50 percent (figure 6.3). The pattern by currency suggests that deposit dollarization within the system—the depositors' first reaction—turn into a run on dollar deposits as depositors gradually realized that, in a context of dwindling dollar liquidity, a devaluation would inevitably result in bank failures or a forcible currency conversion (figure 6.4). By mid-November, with dollar liquidity rapidly running out, the central bank attempted a partial suspension of deposit convertibility with the so-called corralito (or little fence), which imposed limits on cash withdrawals out of the banking system, but did not restrict transfers between bank accounts. 37 Thus, the corralito only spread the virus within the banking system, compromising the payments system by failing to isolate stable transactional peso deposits from free-falling dollar saving deposits and dragging down the real sector by creating a liquidity crush.

Only after civil riots prompted the resignations of two presidents, a sovereign default, the exit of the currency board, a predictable conversion of dollar financial assets into pesos at the below-market 1.4 ARS/US$ exchange rate, and the additional loss of some US$2 billion in dollar reserves (all of which happened between December 2001 and late-January 2002) did the government proceed to suspend convertibility of time and (most of) saving deposits in full, by reprogramming them into longer inflation-


37. The name “corralito” (little fence) was initially adopted because deposits could be used freely inside the financial system but could not leave the system.
indexed deposits (the so-called corralón, or large fence). Ultimately, these new securities were partially exchanged for dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in what amounted to tax-financed exchange rate insurance.

The Uruguayan crisis followed a very similar pattern: Uruguay’s economy fell into recession in 1999 due to the same set of international factors (plus two idiosyncratic shocks: a severe drought with strong effects on the agricultural sector and the Argentine recession), public-sector finances deteriorated and concerns about the crawling exchange rate band started to increase (which the authorities validated with a forced adjustment of the prefixed devaluation rate from 0.6 to 1.2 percent per month in June 2001).

However, there is an important difference with the Argentine episode that helps illustrate the nature of liquidity runs in dollarized economies.
Unlike Argentina, Uruguay (helped both by its track record and its advocacy of bank secrecy) has been long considered a regional safe haven. Year 2001 was no exception: despite the recession, total deposits increased by 12 percent, fueled by dollar deposits by nonresidents, primarily Argentines. It was precisely the reversal of this “good” Argentine contagion, however, that triggered the bank run in 2002. Argentines trapped in the corralito started to withdraw from their Uruguayan accounts, initially from the country’s two largest private banks, Banco Galicia Uruguay (BGU) and Banco Comercial (both affiliated with Argentine banks).

The overdue intervention of the latter, and the government’s apparent lack of dollar liquidity to cope with a sustained run (and honor the implicit 100 percent deposit guarantee under which the system had historically worked) increased the distrust in the Uruguayan banking system and fueled a generalized run. Between January 2002 and July 2002, dollar time deposits in Uruguay fell by about 50 percent (figure 6.5). The resulting decline in international reserves led to the abandonment of the crawling bank on June 19—and to the resignation of the minister of economy on July 22. Only on July 30 did the government declared a four-day bank holiday, at the end of which the maturity of dollar time deposits in state-owned (or intervened) banks were extended by law.

6.5 LAR + CBR: A Prototype

The LAR/CBR scheme described in the preceding intends to implement in a predictable way the limits that a supervisor typically introduces at a late stage of a crisis once (centralized and decentralized) dollar liquidity is about to run out, in an improvised way that magnify existing uncertainties and pave the way for endless litigation and ultimately fiscally costly settlements.

However, the main advantage of such an explicit scheme is also its main drawback: if correctly publicized, they force to fully internalized the hidden costs of dollar intermediation that are largely socialize during a systemic crisis—which could only result in higher dollar funding costs in non-crisis times.

As usual, there are a number of questions that need to be answered before a LAR/CBR scheme is put in place in practice. What deposits should be affected by the scheme? When and how should the CBR be activated?


39. The CBRs resemble the suspension-of-convertibility clause included in bank contracts in Scotland and other European countries during the free banking era (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), and in the United States during the national banking period (1863–1914). See Shah (1997) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for evidence in favor of using some form of CBR.
How should the level of LAR and the CBR threshold be chosen? How should they be applied selectively in a way that prevents arbitrage between deposit types?

While the preferred combination may depend on a number of case-specific aspects, the previous discussion implicitly suggests a standard prototype of the scheme that may serve as a concrete starting point. First, given that the specific liquidity problem in domestically dollarized economies concerns bank dollar deposits, it is on those deposits that the CBR
needs to be applied. However, extending the restriction to dollar demand deposits would be at odds with the objective of preserving the payments system that is built precisely on these transactional accounts. Leaving them CBR-free would, in turn, call for a (substantially) higher LAR on these deposits.\footnote{Whether the LAR should be close to, or exactly equal to, 100 percent of deposits is debatable. What is important is that the level should be significantly higher than encountered in real life cases.}

If the aim is to fully rule out the need for costly assets fire sales, a natural choice would be to set the CBR threshold as a function of the bank’s stock of liquid reserves. More precisely, once the LAR earmarked to meet withdrawals of fully convertible demand deposits is determined, the CBR clause would automatically kick in once the liquidity in excess of those LAR is exhausted. However, even if the CBR is explicitly written in the deposit contract, its recurrent application may create undesired costs for the supervisor and incentives for banks and depositors to misprice liquidity risk in anticipation of a bailout. Thus, the supervisor should require a LAR specific to dollar time deposits so as to reduce the incidence of a CBR application—leaving to the bank the option to hold additional liquidity or to attract new capital in the event of a run, to avoid the reputation costs of resorting to the CBR scheme. In this way, the CBR, by protecting the backing of transactional deposits, is activated automatically while preserving the bank’s incentives to seek a less disruptive solution.\footnote{There is an interesting parallel between this scheme and the final approach adopted in Uruguay in 2002: banks that could not meet deposit withdrawals were intervened by the central bank, in which case their deposits were reprogrammed.}

Finally, in an uncertain world where liquidity and solvency issues are intimately intertwined, the effectiveness of a CBR in preventing liquidity runs would ultimately depend on depositors’ perception of the length of the freeze and the value of the bank (and, in turn, of their claims) once the freeze is lifted. While the final toll of the run on the market value of individual banks will certainly depend on the broader prudential framework and the macroeconomic context in general, a well-designed LBR/CBR should prevent losses associated with early liquidation and, in the limit, help avoid avoidable runs altogether.

References


Comment Marco Bonomo

As the paper documents, deposit dollarization is a widespread phenomenon in the world. Because the central bank has limits in acting as a lender of last resort for foreign currency, a financial dollarized economy would be vulnerable to liquidity runs in foreign currency a la Diamond and Dybvig. With this motivation, Eduardo Levy Yeyati studies alternative mechanisms of liquidity management in a financial dollarized economy.

The analysis, which has a simple and convincing economic intuition, suggests that a combination of liquidity asset requirements and limits to convertibility should be optimal in terms of social welfare. The main point of my comment is that this analysis is limited to dollarization experiences in fixed exchange rate regimes. I start by questioning whether the increase of dollar deposit renders the financial system more fragile, once the possibility of exchange rate fluctuations is taken into account. I first analyze the empirical evidence, then I turn to theoretical arguments. In doing so, we assess whether the mechanisms of liquidity management proposed in the paper are still appropriate in a floating exchange rate regime.

Dollarization is increasing in the world, despite decreasing inflation rates. This fact suggests that deposits in dollars are desired for reasons other than hedging against macroeconomic risk. Therefore, there is no indication that dollarization will disappear or even reduce substantially, despite the widespread view among analysts that it makes the financial and economic system more prone to risk. The increased trade and financial openness of national economies, as measured by trade ratios and foreign exchange deregulation, is possibly the main driver of the recent growth trend of local dollar deposits, which in part replaces the “capital flight” dollars previously held abroad.

The underlying view in the paper that dollarization increases the financial fragility of the system is apparently supported by table 6.2, which shows that systemic banking crises have occurred mostly in countries with relatively high dollarization ratios and also by the more formal evidence provided by De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2005). However, most of the evidence that dollarization of deposits increases the probability or the cost of a banking crisis or a currency crash could be biased because it does not control for the exchange rate disequilibrium (which is correlated with the deposit dollarization ratio). The work of Arteta (2003) indicates that, once a control for the exchange rate disequilibrium is introduced, deposit dollarization has no effect on the probability of a banking crisis or a currency...

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crash. Someone could argue that even if dollarization does not affect the probability of a crisis it does increase its costs. Again, this view is not supported by the empirical evidence in Arteta (2003). On the contrary, deposit dollarization is found to lower the cost of both banking crises and currency crashes.¹

My reading of this evidence is that it reinforces my earlier impression that one cannot analyze dollarization in isolation. One context is deposit dollarization in a fixed exchange rate regime, which is prone to attacks, and this is, in my opinion, the environment where the paper’s analysis applies.² However, in the same way as the fixed exchange regime tends to disappear, so does this pattern of dollarization. Dollarization of deposits in an open economy with low inflation and a floating exchange rate regime is a different situation and one that is becoming more common in the world. There is no convincing evidence up to now that in this type of regime countries with higher deposit dollarization ratios are more likely to suffer bank runs.

One can dismiss the empirical evidence as insufficient if forceful theoretical results are available that higher deposit dollarization ratios make the system more prone to bank runs. Despite the substantial progress represented by Chang and Velasco (2000) work on dollarization and financial fragility, one cannot find such an answer in the theoretical literature.³

Dollarization of demand deposits is usually partial when the exchange rate is floating. In this case, we can separate the problem in two. One is the problem of banks’ liquidity, and the other is their balance sheet. The central bank can always act as a lender of last resort in pesos, solving the problem of liquidity in pesos. The depositors in pesos, knowing this, will not make a run on their deposits.⁴ Thus, the run should be only in dollar deposits.

Usually economies with a relatively high proportion of dollar deposits have also a relatively high proportion of dollar loans. A bank must deliver the called dollarized deposit in dollars. Then it should buy dollars or

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¹ This is once one controls for the exchange rate regime. In the case of an exchange rate devaluation, it is possible that the positive income effect due to the dollarization of households or firms assets counteract the negative effect of dollar debts. A higher dollarization ratio may be related to better integration with international financial markets and better management skills. Both of those attributes could result in a better ability from domestic banks to deal with banking crises, lowering their negative impact.

² Note that, even in this situation, one interpretation of the evidence in Arteta (2003) is that it is not the dollarization that increases the probability of banking crisis, but the fixed exchange rate regime.

³ Although they conclude that dollarization does make a flexible exchange rate regime prone to bank runs, their special setup has some important shortcomings, which could alter their results. One of them is that there are no goods in the home country. Thus, the exchange rate is not a relative price that equilibrates demand and supply for goods but only a mechanism that distributes income among owners of assets and liabilities in pesos and in dollars. Another is that they do not consider a system where part of the deposits are denominated in dollars and part in pesos.

⁴ Chang and Velasco (2000) argue that the threat of devaluation will deter the run on peso deposits.
liquidate assets in dollars. Assuming that its assets in dollars are illiquid, it should buy dollars. In a systemic run, all banks are doing it at the same time, and the exchange rate should depreciate. Differently from a fixed exchange rate regime, where the excess demand for dollars would persist, the depreciation should make demand and supply of dollars equal. It may also make the liquidity shortage worse, but this can be solved by central bank loans. The crucial issue is whether it will lead to the bank’s insolvency. The potential loss of the bank will depend on the ratio between the bank’s dollar assets (adjusted by the probability of default that increases with the devaluation) to its dollar liabilities. Then the effect will depend on the bank’s balance sheet mismatch of risks and currencies.

The runners could make money with the devaluation, justifying the run. But this is not different than a speculative attack in a flexible exchange rate regime. The equilibrium exchange rate ex ante should reflect the probability of runs (a “peso problem” valuation, reflected in the exchange rate, not only in the local interest rate) and maybe could prevent runs from happening. If the resulting equilibrium exchange rate is higher because of the threat of devaluation represented by dollar deposits, then the flow-supply of dollars from the trade account will also become higher in this economy.

All this should be analyzed in a rigorous model. The bottom line is that the situation is complex, and one cannot guarantee that dollar deposits will make the economy prone to bank runs in a flexible exchange rate system. If there is a run on the dollar deposits, the result should be banks losses if the matching of dollar assets and liabilities is poor. Then the mechanism to prevent bank failures could be the monitoring of the banks’ risk positions, as it is currently made.

The analytical framework in the paper is not in any case appropriate to answer those questions. First, bank runs are exogenous. Second, there is no exchange rate in the models, and deposits have all the same denomination (which is in dollars for the authors). When banks’ assets enter the analysis, they are always in the same denomination. Thus, there is no explicit exchange rate on the banks’ balance sheet problem. There is no definition of exchange rate regime either. The only implicit system consistent with the models is a fixed exchange rate regime, as argued above. In fact, the only assumption made by the authors that renders the dollarized banking system different from a banking system entirely in pesos is that the central bank cannot lend to the banks without limit. This should not cause problems if the exchange rate is free to float and the banks are well covered against devaluation-related risks in their portfolio.

References
Arteta, C. 2003. Are financially dollarized countries more prone to costly crises? Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Dis-
The paper's objective is to study the implications for liquidity runs in an economy where domestic financial assets are dollarized. As a result, the paper proposes a scheme to manage liquidity in an “interim period” in which financial dollarization is still high.

According to the paper, this is an important topic given the extent of dollarization (or some type of indexation) around the world as shown in figure 6.1 in the paper and the correlation that exists between this variable and the propensity that an economy has to suffer a bank run. However, as I will argue in these comments, the relative importance of this topic could be put into question with alternative data.

Although the paper stresses that this is a transitional issue and the instrument it proposes to deal with it should be transitory, an important shortcoming is the absence of a discussion on what the long-term structure of banking liabilities should be and how the implementation of the proposed mechanism helps or hinders the transition toward that equilibrium.

In this discussion, the key question is whether it is desirable to have financial intermediation in foreign currency by domestic financial institutions. The alternative could be to leave this business to foreign banks abroad or to allow branching at home. I think that depending on how this question is answered, the mechanisms to handle the transition should be different.

Another key comment is related to the proposal to use clauses for ex-ante suspensions of convertibility clauses to minimize the probability of a liquidity run and to manage one once it happens. I am very skeptical that an instrument such as this could be beneficial for the following reasons:

1. Once this mechanism is announced, there is a very high probability that foreign currencies depositors will take their money out of the country toward a system in which there are “real dollar deposits.” Therefore, the announcement, or even the rumors of this measure, could trigger the crisis that is supposed to avoid. Therefore, given the high degree of capital mobility, this scheme could be very difficult to implement.

2. Given that most of the time a banking system liquidity crisis happens...
together with recessions, devaluations, and so on, domestic depositors have the rest of their portfolio (real estate, human capital, other investments) exhibiting a high correlation with the ex post nonconvertibility of their dollar deposits. Therefore they will be asking for a very high premium, or they will be rushing for the exit. In this case, it seems that the likelihood of finding an external lender of last resort is higher than successfully implementing an ex ante suspension of convertibility.

In the empirical section, a correlation between deposit dollarization and international reserves is established. However, the role that the exchange rate regime plays in explaining both of these phenomena is not explored. Obviously, the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime has promoted the accumulation of international reserves and the dollarization of liabilities in many countries.

Regarding the differences between self-insurance and external insurance, the paper claims that the sole advantage of the latter is that the external insurance has a lower cost than the cost of funding that the government faces when accumulating reserves for self-insurance. This seems to be an odd conclusion because the investors who end up financing both alternatives are foreign (sometimes they are even the same) with similar funding opportunities and portfolio. The only difference is that the investors financing the self-insurance option also face some “country risk” during good times that the external insurer does not face. On the other hand, while paying for this “extra risk,” the country guarantees that the money will be there if the liquidity run scenario materializes, while under the external insurance option there is always the risk of noncompliance by the insurer. I think this is the key issue between the two options. The other shortcoming of external insurance is the dynamic hedging through which the insurer unloads his position. Although important, I think that there are two objections to this argument:

1. First, through the external insurance contract and dynamic hedging the borrowing country can accomplish a desirable result to smooth capital flows through different states of nature, reducing them in good times and increasing them during bad times.
2. Dynamic hedging will be imperfect because of a lack of instruments to short the country.

Regarding the widespread nature of dollarization that is shown in figure 6.1, the paper does not provide the definition used to construct the dollarization ratio. This is important to the extent that maybe some of the dollar liabilities that are included are not covered by the domestic lender of last resort, are not held by domestic agents, or not all the dollars liabilities covered by the LLR are included in the measure and, therefore, this indicator might be a misleading indicator of the problem addressed in the paper.
When analyzing dollarization ratios of deposits, it is also important to know the domestic regulation to understand the nature of this deposit. In the case of Mexico, foreign deposits are only available for foreign companies and border residents: therefore, they respond to real transactional factors more than speculative issues. In addition, the regulation obliges the banks to hold liquid dollar denominated assets to hedge these deposits, therefore, eliminating any possible mismatch. Additionally, the presence of a floating exchange rate regime suggests that if depositors want to shift from peso to dollar deposits the banks should buy dollar assets to cover these deposits increasing the price of this transaction and, therefore, reducing the incentive to undertake it.

Finally, I think that the relevant measure should not be the dollarization ratio of deposits but rather the dollarization ratio of foreign currency liabilities of the banking system that are insured by the government. When we do this calculation (table 6C.1) for the case of Mexico, the dollarization ratio falls below 10 percent (table 6C.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In checking accounts(^a)</th>
<th>In checking accounts(^a) + other deposits(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2006</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Banco de México.

\(^a\)The amount per checking account is limited to that insured by the deposit insurance.

\(^b\)“Other Deposits” include savings accounts.