
Contributors

William A. Brock
Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 73706

Dennis W. Carlton
Law School
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Peter Diamond
Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Jerry R. Green
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Sanford J. Grossman
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Oliver D. Hart
Churchill College
Cambridge, England

Richard E. Kihlstrom
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

David M. Kreps
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Jean-Jacques Laffont
Université des Sciences Sociales de
Toulouse
Place Anatole France, 31042
Toulouse, France

Hayne E. Leland
School of Business Administration
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

David Levhari
Department of Economics
Hebrew University
Jerusalem, Israel

Steven A. Lippman
Graduate School of Management
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

John J. McCall
Department of Economics
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

Dale T. Mortensen
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois 60201

Joseph M. Ostroy
Department of Economics
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

Michael E. Porter
Graduate School of Business
Administration
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Andrew Postlewaite
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Edward C. Prescott
Department of Economics
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

John G. Riley
Department of Economics
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

A. Michael Spence
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Sidney G. Winter
School of Organization and
Management
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

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