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Volume Title: International Economic Policy Coordination

Volume Author/Editor: Buiter, Willem H. and Richard C. Marston, eds.

Volume Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Volume ISBN: 0-521-33780-1

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/buit85-1>

Publication Date: 1985

Chapter Title: Front matter to "International Economic Policy Coordination"

Chapter Author: Willem H. Buiter, Richard C. Marston

Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4129>

Chapter pages in book: (p. -15 - 0)

20579/5

International economic policy coordination

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
International economic policy coordination

Edited by

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge

London New York New Rochelle

Melbourne Sydney

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1985

First published 1985

Printed in Great Britain by the
University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress catalogue card number: 84-29246

British Library cataloguing in publication data

International economic policy coordination.

1. International economic relations 2. World
politics – 1975–1985

I. Buiters, Willem H. II. Marston, Richard C.
337 HF1411

ISBN 0 521 30554 3

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Preface

In this volume we are publishing the proceedings of the conference 'International Economic Policy Coordination', sponsored by the Centre for Economic Policy Research and the National Bureau of Economic Research, and held in London on June 28th–29th, 1984.

We would like to express our appreciation to the authors and discussants whose contributions are published here for their participation in the conference and readiness to help in the preparation of this volume. In addition to the authors and discussants, all those listed below also participated in the conference. Their great interest in the subject and lively contributions to the discussion added much to its value.

We would like to thank the Ford Foundation for providing financial support for the conference, and Thomas Bayard of the Foundation's staff for expressing interest in the project at an early stage in its planning. We are also grateful for financial support from the United Kingdom clearing banks and the Bank of England. The quality of this manuscript and the speed with which it was published owe much to the efforts of the technical editor, John Black of the University of Exeter. Stephen Yeo, Research and Publications Director of the CEPR, made sure that the authors, discussants and editors lived up to the commitments they had made at the conference. That the conference ran smoothly and efficiently was due in no small part to Monica Allen and Wendy Thompson of the CEPR, and we are most grateful to them. Finally, we would like to thank the Director of the CEPR, Richard Portes, and the Director of the International Studies Program of the NBER, William Branson, for first suggesting that a conference on international coordination should be coordinated internationally by the CEPR and NBER.

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