Wage and Labor Mobility in Denmark, 1980–2000

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3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, we give a brief description of some key features of the labor market in Denmark, some of which we argue contribute to the Danish labor markets behaving quite differently from those in many other European countries. Second, we document in some detail an important aspect of the functioning and flexibility of the labor markets in Denmark: the high level of worker mobility.\(^1\) Third, we describe and examine the wage structure between and within firms and changes therein since 1980, especially with an eye on possible impacts of the trend toward a more decentralized wage determination.

3.2 The Institutional Setting

Although the Danish labor market in many respects resembles other labor markets in Europe, and Scandinavia in particular, it has a number of distinguishing features of its own. In the following, we briefly discuss some
of them. More precisely, we look at ten features of the labor market in Denmark. These are:

1. The high female labor force participation rate, which is among the highest in the world.
2. The retirement age, which used to be relatively high, but has during relatively few years fallen substantially.
3. The replacement ratio of unemployment benefits for low-wage earners, which to the best of our knowledge is the highest in the world. The replacement ratio is considerably lower for high-wage earners, but due to the compressed wage structure, a nonnegligible portion of the employees has a very high replacement ratio.
4. The relatively widespread eligibility for unemployment benefit.
5. Voluntary membership of unemployment insurance funds.
6. Wage bargaining that used to be highly centralized, but has gradually become more decentralized.
7. Trade union membership and the coverage of unions are both high by international standards.
8. Weak job protection for blue-collar workers and only a modest protection for white-collar workers.
9. Indirect wage costs are internationally very low in Denmark, whereas the rate of direct taxation of wage income is among the highest in the world.
10. Compared to many other countries, agreements between employers and trade unions constitute a more important regulatory mechanism than legislation and government interventions. This is one of the key elements in “the Danish mode.”

Each of these aspects has consequences for the behavior of people, firms and their employees, and for the functioning of the Danish labor market.

3.2.1 Female Labor Force Participation

The high female participation is a well-known characteristic feature of the Danish labor market. The growing female share of employment has been facilitated by a massive growth in child care facilities. Child care is to a large extent provided by the public sector; six out of ten children in the age group one to six years are in publicly provided daycare. Daycare used to be highly subsidized but is now less so. Female participation started to grow in the 1970s in close connection to the growth of the public sector and the creation of the welfare state. Many of the jobs held by women, particularly in the public sector, were originally part-time jobs. Today only about 8 to 9 percent of women in the age range twenty-five to fifty-five work part time.
time. The increase in female labor force participation has occurred in parallel with a shift from part-time to full-time work. In recent years, part-time work is common among young women and older women and sectoral differences with respect to the part-time work are small.

3.2.2 Pension Systems and Retirement

Denmark has for many years had a pension system that provides the entire population (and not only the working population) with old age pension, for men from the age of sixty-seven and for women from the age of sixty-five (recently the old age retirement has gradually been lowered to sixty-five also for men). This is a pay-as-you-go system, where benefits are regulated by the parliament and are paid out of current tax revenue. In 1979 an early retirement program was introduced. All members of the unemployment insurance (UI) system could from the age of sixty receive a benefit corresponding to the UI until the recipient is entitled to normal pension. In addition, a publicly provided disability pension is available for all age groups, where eligibility is determined on health grounds. The proportion of the labor force receiving disability pension was in 2000 about 10 percent. Especially as a consequence of the early retirement program, the average retirement age has been falling over time. Thus, in 2004, only a third of the age group sixty to sixty-six were in the labor force.

The early retirement program has been particularly important for older workers because employers are reluctant to hire unemployed workers in their late or mid-fifties because they expect that they will go on early retirement as they become eligible. Bingley and Lanot (2004) have shown that there is no firm effect with respect to the use of the program, indicating that employers are not systematically pushing elderly employees into early retirement. Rather, it is other factors, such as the work situation of the spouse that are important.

3.2.3 Unemployment Benefits

The unemployment benefit system is still partly organized according to “Bismarckian principles.” Thus, workers can voluntarily choose to become members of more than thirty different occupational unemployment insurance funds. Membership and eligibility for unemployment benefits are both conditional on the person having had a job for at least one year. The unemployment benefit is 90 percent of the previous wage but with a maximum of 1,800€ per month. Consequently, the replacement ratio for low-wage workers is 90 percent, but is lower for higher-income earners. Unemployment benefits are taxed, but a special tax rate of 8 percent on all earned income does not apply to unemployment benefits. Together, the high replacement ratio and the asymmetric tax treatment create an incentive problem for low-wage workers, as they earn little by working compared to being unemployed. It has been shown that 23 percent of all employed
women and 12 percent of all employed men actually earn 80€ less per week by working relative to what would have received as unemployment benefit claimants; see Smith (1998).

Unemployment benefits are obtained from the first day of unemployment and are paid for one year without any obligations other than seeking work. After one year of unemployment, the UI recipient has to take part in an active labor market policy program. A high replacement ratio, coupled with the fact that there is almost no experience rating for either employers or workers, implies that there are many short spells of unemployment. Even in years of low unemployment, more than 20 percent of all wage earners have experienced at least one spell of unemployment. A high proportion of these spells are concentrated around Christmas, New Year, and other vacations. As a result, for low-pay workers, total working hours are about 80 percent of the total normal hours (to be explained in the following).

The UI system is financed by general tax revenue but operated by the private UI funds. The UI funds are formally unrelated to the trade unions, but membership in the UI system is typically considered as part of a package, which also includes union membership. As a consequence, about 80 percent of the wage earners are members of the UI system, and about 85 percent are members of trade unions (Neumann, Pederson, and Westergaard-Nielsen 1991).

3.2.4 The Danish Model for Cooperation

The overall labor market model in Denmark is often called “The Danish Model.” The key ingredient in the Danish model is that the trade unions’ and the employers’ federation (the social partners) make agreements on most regulatory issues, and the role of the government is to “pick up and pay the bill.” The social partners take responsibility for wage bargaining and wage setting. They also make agreements concerning normal working hours and set rules for labor protection with respect to overtime and work environment. As a consequence, there is no minimum wage legislation in Denmark. Nevertheless, the social partners have agreed that no member firm will pay less than 89.50 DKK per hour plus 15 percent vacation pay, that is, altogether 13.8€. Although the employers’ organizations do not have full coverage, the unions are very keen on identifying workplaces paying less. According to anecdotal evidence, workers are being paid less in the unorganized parts of the retail sector and in the hotels and restaurant industries.

The role of the government in Denmark is to provide unemployment

3. When the current Liberal/Conservative government has made several propositions regarding the work environment, both employers’ and workers’ organizations have been critical of state intervention into the area.
benefits and to retrain workers who have lost their jobs because their productivity in their current job is too low. The government also provides health care and disability pensions. In other words, the government provides the safety net. This is also the case with respect to those who are not covered by unemployment insurance. These workers are in general eligible for social assistance, which is of the same size as the UI benefit. The main difference is that all payments are means tested.

The Danish labor market model has many features in common with the Swedish model, and because of the similarities, they are sometimes grouped together under the label of “the Nordic Labor Market Model.” The main idea is that whenever a firm cannot keep workers productive in their current job, the government should take responsibility and retrain workers. After retraining, the workers should now be more productive and can, therefore, be hired in a new firm and thereby increase overall productivity.

There are, however, distinct differences between the Danish and Swedish models. One of these is that the Danish model does not prohibit layoffs, whereas the Swedish model is considerably more restrictive in this respect. The idea behind the Danish model is that firms should not be forced to maintain a large workforce if it is no longer profitable to do so. In such a situation, it is better for society that firms can rehire workers where these workers’ labor is more productive. This increases overall flexibility and productivity. Of course, it also puts a burden on the workers, and that is probably the main reason for the relatively high unemployment benefit in Denmark (at least for low-wage earners). Another difference is that the Swedish model builds heavily on a tripartite cooperation between government, unions, and employers. So in Denmark, the government provides income security, while the labor market organizations deliver flexibility. Hence, the system is called “flexicurity.”

3.2.5 Working Hours

In Denmark so-called normal working hours are determined as the outcome of the general wage bargaining between the trade unions’ and the employers’ federation. As elsewhere, the normal working times have been gradually shortened in Denmark, too. The reduction has on average been about 0.7 percent per year (Andersen et al. 2001). Its sources have changed over time. In the late 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, the reduction was in weekly hours, followed by a period when the annual vacation was increased from four to five weeks. In the 1990s, the reduction was again implemented as a reduction in the number of weekly hours; from forty to thirty-seven hours. Recently, a gradual expansion of vacation weeks from five to six weeks has begun.

Annual normal working hours in Denmark are among the lowest in the world. Only the Germans work less than the 1,690 hours per year worked on average by the Danes. However, far from all work that much, especially
the low-wage earners. The average for low-wage earners is only about 1,140 hours in Denmark, while it was about 1,700 hours in the United States in the same period. The main reason is, no doubt, that the Danish UI system is not only subsidizing the search between two jobs but also temporary layoffs.

3.2.6 Wage Bargaining

Collective bargaining in Denmark has a long history—in fact, the first general collective wage agreement was settled as early as 1889—and for almost a century, this was the predominant mode of wage determination. In recent years, Danish wage setting has undergone large changes, which are briefly described in this chapter's sequel.

Until the beginning of the 1980s, wages were set in biannual national wage negotiations. A key feature of wage determination was an automatic wage indexation system, which linked hourly wages to the consumer price index (CPI) net of indirect taxes and subsidies. Twice per year, hourly wage increases were triggered by each three-point change in the net CPI. Although the indexation was not complete, it accounted for a large share of wage increases.

General wage negotiations took place between the Danish Federation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Danish Employers’ Federation (DA), typically every second year. The LO and DA set the pattern for the entire manual workers’ labor market. Although only about 40 percent of the private-sector labor force was employed in firms where both the employees and the employer were organized, the great majority of employers and, hence, also of all workplaces, applied the results of the general agreement. The negotiations and the general agreement were split into general and specific issues such as working hours, vacations, and minimum-wage tariffs. For the vast majority of white-collar workers and public-sector employees, the wage-setting mechanism is quite similar regarding negotiations, timing, and so on to that for blue-collar workers. The difference has been that these groups have never received as much in terms of wage drift between the general contracts as blue-collar workers, but have been compensated for the wage drift in the form of larger wage increases in the central bargainings.

From the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a tendency toward more and more decentralization of wage bargaining and wage setting. A first step was the abolishment of wage indexation in 1982. From 1987 to 1993, negotiations concerning wages were done at the industry level. From 1993 onward, the general wage negotiations have mainly focused on working hours, pensions, sickness pay, and vacation. At the same time, wage bar-

4. As mentioned in the preceding, Denmark does not have a legally set minimum wage. However, the lowest tariff wage agreed upon in the wage negotiations sets a floor for wages, and changes in the minimum-wage tariff shift the entire wage rate distribution.
gaining proper has moved down to the industry or firm levels, and an increasing share of wage agreements have been made at the individual employee level. In 1993, 71 percent of all agreements in the market for manual labor were of this type.

While wage setting has been decentralized in the private-labor market, wage bargaining in the public sector is still highly centralized, with biannual national-level negotiations. However, a new wage system, called “Ny-lon” (New-wage), has considerably fewer wage tariffs than before, and in the public sector also the intention is to move toward more individualized pay according to qualifications, job functions, and individual performance. The performance pay element in public-sector wages remains rather small, however.

3.2.7 The Labor Market and the Macroeconomy

Figure 3.1 describes the development of unemployment and annual percentage changes in real gross domestic product (GDP) since 1980. As can be seen from the figure, the time series changes in unemployment are chiefly driven by changes in GDP. From the mid-nineties there has been a long period of continuous decline in open unemployment, and so at the end of the period, Denmark is one of the not-so-numerous European countries that have succeeded in lowering their unemployment rates to levels not experienced since the seventies.

It should be noted, however, that as active labor market policies have played an increasingly important role, and as participants in active labor
market programs are not counted as unemployed, open unemployment has become a more and more dubious measure of the state of the labor market. We have, therefore, in figure 3.1 also included an adjusted unemployment rate that includes individuals in active labor market programs among the unemployed and, consequently, also in the labor force. The main difference is in the levels, while the peaks and troughs are the same. It is worth noting that whereas the rate of unemployment during business cycle upturns is lower at the end of the period than in the mid-eighties, this is not true for the adjusted unemployment rate.

3.2.8 Flexibility

The institutional framework of the Danish labor market implies that there are few barriers to mobility between firms. For employers, the costs of laying off workers are low because of the absence of severance pay legislation and experience rating in the unemployment insurance system, as well as weak job security, particularly of blue-collar workers. For the employees, costs of changing employer or experiencing unemployment spells are reduced by generous unemployment benefits, which are readily available to insured employees, and by the fact that many social benefits, pensions, and vacation are independent of the individual’s current employer and are, hence, transferable. As a consequence, the Danish labor market is characterized by both high job mobility and high wage mobility.

3.3 Data Sources

The main data source used in the following empirical analyses is the so-called IDA-database (*Integreert Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning*) kept by Statistics Denmark. The IDA is a longitudinal database that contains information about all individuals aged fifteen to seventy-four (demographic characteristics, education, labor market experience, tenure, and earnings) and employees in all plants in Denmark during the period 1980 to 2001. This information has been collected by merging information from several registers in Statistics Denmark with the help of unique identification numbers for individuals and plants. The persons and plants are matched at the end of November in each year. Consequently, only changes between ends-of-Novembers are accounted for (not intermittent changes). Statistics Denmark has aggregated the plant-level information to the level of firms for the first time in the late nineties for the Pay and Performance project at Aarhus School of Business and continues to do so for the Center for Corporate Performance with the help of the unique identification numbers of individuals and plants (firms), additional information from other registers, as well as surveys of firms or individuals that have information about the same identification numbers.

The background data for the IDA consists of various registers, supple-
mented with data from the latest census in 1970. Thus, data on education come from the Census in 1970 and from reports from all educational institutions on their current population of students and their completion. This means that the educational register contains status and all upgrades after the census.

The wage information is constructed as follows. The point of departure is register data containing tax-based information on the total earnings paid to each individual worker during the year. Earnings may consist of earnings from several employers. The data are considered to be of high quality because the tax authorities use them to assess each employee’s earnings. At the same time, the wage records constitute deductible labor costs for the employers.

The number of working hours is estimated as follows. The employers’ contributions to a comprehensive pension scheme are determined by the number of hours worked as a fraction of normal annual working hours. Thus, for hourly paid workers—that is, all blue-collar workers—pension contributions up to 1993 were proportional to the number of hours worked. For monthly paid salaried employees, the supplementary pension is computed based on the normal length of the working day according to a three-step scale. The IDA makes use of information about the employers’ contributions to the pension schemes to compute the annual number of working hours for each individual. It should be noted that these are estimates. One problem is that the supplementary pay for overtime hours does not yield additional points for the pension schemes. Hence, overtime hours are not properly accounted for.

Hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing the earnings at a particular employer with the estimated annual working hours at that employer. The estimated hourly wage rates are most reliable for the hourly paid workers. However, after 1993, pension contributions have gradually also been paid during sickness and unemployment spells. Consequently, as from the mid-nineties, the hourly wage information is likely to be of poorer quality.

### 3.4 Worker Mobility

This section looks into worker mobility in somewhat more detail. We start by considering the frequently used measures, entry and exit rates, calculated in the case of entry rates as the proportion of new employees in the firm in end-of-November year \( t \) as compared to end-of-November year \( t - 1 \) and for exit rates the proportion of employees who have exited from the firm since end-of-November in year \( t - 1 \).\(^5\) Entry and exit rates to and from Danish private-sector firms during 1981 to 2001 are shown in figure

\(^5\) Because the comparisons are between end-of-Novembers, and thus neglect mobility between intermittent short-term jobs, the entry and exit rates are downward biased.
3.2. We can see that the entry and exit rates show no trend and fluctuate around 26 percent. The variations in the entry rate are clearly larger than for exits. The fluctuations appear to be procyclical for both entry and exit rates. Thus, hires and separations both increase in upturns and decrease in downturns. On average, about one third of all annual job exits are to non-employment states; see Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007).

Looking beyond the average entry and exit rates reveals that they differ considerably between different parts of firms’ wage distributions. Figure 3.3 shows the entry and exit rates in the top and bottom quartiles of the wage distribution in each firm. Not surprisingly, mobility is substantially higher in the lowest quartile. In the lowest quartile, entry rates exceed exit rates with a wide margin, whereas the relative magnitudes are reversed in the top quartile. Naturally, this reflects the fact that people tend to get hired at the bottom and leave from positions further up in the wage distribution. Mobility out of low-paid work is, in general, high, although it should be noted that a third of transitions out of low-wage jobs is out of the labor force; see Bolvig (2004). The two other thirds are to higher-paid employment within the same firm and to jobs in other firms, respectively. Notably, Bolvig also finds that firms with a higher-than-average share of low-wage workers have a lower workforce turnover than other firms. The entry rates in the bottom quartile vary procyclically and are quite volatile. Entry into the top quartile displays the same pattern, but the variation is less pronounced.

Table 3.1 paints a picture of the composition and development of job
spells and their duration. The numbers refer to the year 2000. We can see that in that year, out of 1.6 million employees, almost half a million had separated from a job since the previous year. Nearly one third of all employees (a little over half a million) were in another job (actually, at another employer) compared to the previous year. From the third column, it can be seen that in a cross-section, most people employed in Danish private-sector firms—63.2 percent—are in jobs that have lasted less than five years. Less than 10 percent are in jobs that have lasted more than fifteen years. This does not, however, mean that merely about 10 percent of employees end up in jobs lasting fifteen years or more.

The high turnover rates do not necessarily imply that all employees in the firms leave with the same frequency and that, as a consequence, long-tenured jobs are thin on the ground. There are a number of reasons why the cross-sectional picture is misleading (see Hall 1982). First, and obviously, in order to have been in a job lasting for fifteen years or longer the employee has to have been in the labor force for at least fifteen years. Second, an additional reason why the “population at risk” is considerably less than the total workforce is that most of job changes occur in the beginning of workers’ labor market careers. Therefore, one should not expect to find many long-term employment relationships before the employees have turned forty. As can be seen from the last three columns in the table, the probability of staying in the same firm for one, five, or ten additional years increases with tenure. Thus, for instance, the probability that a person with ten years of tenure will remain with the same employer for five (ten) addi-

![Figure 3.3 Exit and entry rates for workers from different positions of firms' wage distributions](image_url)
tional years is 51 (27) percent. Taking these features into account leads, as has been shown by Hall (1982) for the United States, to a completely different picture of the prevalence of long-term jobs: despite high worker turnover, long job spells can still be common. Does the same apply also to the Danish labor market?

Table 3.2 gives the proportion of five-year age groups with five years of current tenure who go on to reach tenure for twenty years or more. These are calculated using the so-called contemporaneous retention method of Hall (1982). We have computed these shares for two years: 1990 and 2000, respectively. Moreover, for comparison purposes, we include Hall’s estimates from the United States in 1978. Three features of the table are worth noting. First, the proportion of individuals whose eventual tenure will exceed twenty years was higher in 1990 than ten years later, and this was true for all age groups. Of course, this difference may simply reflect the fact that 1990 was a business cycle downturn year, whereas 2000 was an upturn year. As we saw earlier, mobility is procyclical. Second, considerably higher proportions of the employees are in lifetime jobs than what is observed in cross sections. Thus, the high annual turnover rates, hovering between 25 and 30 percent, are consistent with the observation that a considerable portion—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure (in years)</th>
<th>Movers</th>
<th>Stayers</th>
<th>Staying 1 additional year</th>
<th>Staying 5 more years</th>
<th>Staying 10 more years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>215,638</td>
<td>292,641</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>169,124</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>73,264</td>
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<td>52,413</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>10,274</td>
<td>44,692</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>35,145</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>5,849</td>
<td>32,988</td>
<td>0.85</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>11,934</td>
<td>35,854</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,312</td>
<td>26,475</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,194</td>
<td>22,083</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>18,671</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>2,888</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,094</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>7,612</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>6,666</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>10,253</td>
<td>66,655</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
between 25 and 35 percent of prime age workers—land jobs in which they stay for substantial parts of their working lives. Third, the percentages for Denmark appear to be somewhat lower than those for the United States. One should be cautious here, as the age structures of the U.S. and Danish labor forces differ somewhat. Still, it is clearly the case that the proportion staying on longer is not larger, but rather smaller, in Denmark than in the United States. This accords with our preceding arguments—that the institutional setup of the Danish labor market strongly facilitates mobility.

### 3.5 The Changing Wage Structure

Next, we briefly consider some changes in the wage structure and, in particular, changes in the dispersion of wages. The wage concept used is real monthly wages (expressed in 1990 prices), calculated by multiplying each individual’s hourly wage rate by the number of a full-time employee’s monthly working hours. The population studied is, unless otherwise stated, the private-sector firms with a minimum of twenty employees. In order to reduce measurement errors in the monthly wages, employees who have been in their current jobs for less than one year are omitted.

Figures 3.4 and 3.5 document changes in the distribution of individuals’ wages. We may note a clear, albeit not strong, increase in wage dispersion during the twenty-year period. The increase has been about the same magnitude during both the eighties and the nineties. The period when wage differentials widened the most is 1987 to 1994; that is, the first period of a shift toward decentralized wage bargaining. In fact, the changes during the second half of the nineties are relatively small, especially in view of the changes in both wage setting and the increased adoption of new pay practices in firms (Eriksson 2003a). There has been an increase on both sides of the median, but during the nineties, wage dispersion below the median has

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Denmark 1990</th>
<th>Denmark 2000</th>
<th>United States 1978 (Hall, 1982)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The numbers show the proportion of those in each age group with five years of tenure who go on to reach tenure of twenty years or more.
been flat, whereas above the median there is a noteworthy jump in the mid-
nineties, leading to a stronger increase during that decade; see figure 3.5.

Changes in the dispersion of firm wages have followed a slightly different pattern: from being virtually flat in the eighties, the distribution of firm wages has widened during the second half of the period; see figure 3.6.

Turning next to a decomposition of the wage dispersion into within- and between-firm components, we restrict the sample to firms with fifty or
more employees in order to make the within-firm dispersion concept meaningful. Two points emerge from figure 3.7. There has been a trendwise increase in between-firm variance in wages, whereas wage dispersion within firms fell during the eighties up to 1990, from which time on it has been increasing in tandem with that of between-firm wages. By 2000, within-firm wage dispersion has not reached the level of the early eighties. Thus, the observed increase in overall wage dispersion is predominantly due to increasing wage differentials between firms.

3.6 Changes in Wage Setting in Larger Danish Firms, 1980 to 2000

As was discussed in the preceding, Denmark has, during the two most recent decades, experienced a shift in wage bargaining from a highly centralized system to a considerably more decentralized wage setting. The end of the era of centralized wage bargaining came in two steps: first in 1987, when bargaining moved down to the level of industries, and second, and more importantly, involving a larger share of wage setting actually being done at the level of firms, in 1994 to 1995. It seems plausible to assume that as a consequence of the decentralization of the wage-bargaining and wage-setting processes, the relative weights of employer and employee effects for the resulting wage structure may have changed. The aim of this section is to describe and analyze these changes.6

A shift to more decentralized wage setting is, however, not the only possible cause of changes in firms’ internal wage structure. The much-discussed skill-biased technological change suggests that not only do returns to observable skills increase, but the returns to unobservable skills as picked up

6. This section draws heavily on Eriksson (2003b).
by the firm effects in a standard cross-sectional earnings equation may increase as well (Katz and Autor 1999). Thus, inequality among employers should rise in tandem with rising returns to observable skills. Another source of changes in firms’ wage structures is changes in firms’ local monopoly power. Deregulation of several markets and increasing international competition, due to the implementation of the European Single Market Program in 1988 to 1992, and steadily falling transportation and information transmission costs have eroded firms’ product market rents. When this is the case, we would expect, over time, that inequality among employers declined.7

How could decentralization contribute to changes? One way of thinking about it is that under centralized wage setting, firm-specific bargaining is constrained and, hence, local bargaining power is in general low and varies little across firms. With weakening centralized wage-setting institutions, local bargaining power rises and, consequently, we would expect to see an increase in the variability of the firm-specific component of wages.

Next we examine changes in wage setting in Danish firms from the perspective of eventual changes in their internal labor markets. For this reason, the analysis is restricted to a subsample from the IDA database consisting of larger private-sector firms. More precisely, the sample we henceforth ex-

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7. The prediction concerning the impact of increased competition on within-firm inequality is ambiguous; see, for example, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006).
amine consists of 222 firms that have been above the size of 200 employees in each year during the period 1980 to 2000. The number of observations on individuals varied between 457,821 in 1990 and 417,267 in 1995.

Wage equations, with hourly wage rates as the dependent variable and observable individual characteristics of age, education, gender, and tenure plus employer-specific intercepts as explanatory variables, are estimated. The estimations are carried out for five different cross-sections: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. In closing, we briefly present and discuss some of the results obtained.

It should be emphasized that not only does the population of firms differ from the one examined in the previous section, but also the wage concept—the hourly wage rate—is different. This explains why we observe from table 3.3 a somewhat different picture of changes in the wage structure: wage dispersion first decreased during the eighties and then increased during the nineties. In 2000, between-persons wage inequality was still smaller than twenty years ago, but had almost returned to its 1985 level. As we will come back to later, during the same period, between-firm wage inequality has grown considerably.

From table 3.4, where the estimates of the returns to the skill variables and gender are collected, we can first of all observe that including the firm fixed effects into the estimating equations does very little to change the estimates to the human capital variables. On the other hand, we can see that some of the estimated returns to skill have changed over time. Thus, during the eighties, the age-earnings profiles became successively steeper but have not changed much since. Returns to tenure have also increased, although it should be noted that their magnitude is relatively small: less than 1 percent per year.

The largest changes have occurred with respect to returns to education. The estimated return to one additional year of education has almost doubled during the twenty-year period. The return started to grow from a very low level indeed and has at the end of the period reached about the same magnitude as one additional year of labor market experience. All in all, the estimates indicate that there has been an increase in the returns to observable skills according to several dimensions during the period under study.

For the gender-differential estimates, it makes a difference whether the...
firm effects are included, as entering them leads to a drop in the differential by about one third. During the two decades there was first a decrease in the male-female wage differential, but this decline seems to have leveled off during the nineties. This corroborates what has been found in the gender gap studies. Most of that literature does not, however, account for the demand site. The results in table 3.4 demonstrate that this can be misleading. Moreover, there is an interesting pattern insofar that the gender gap reduction is much larger when firm-fixed effects are controlled for.

Table 3.5 displays the adjusted $R^2$ statistics from estimations with the firm effects only and with firm-fixed effects and human capital, respectively. We may observe first that on their own the firm-fixed effects explain an increasing portion of differences in individual wage differentials. Second, the “full” model’s explanatory power has also increased over time.

The dispersion of “raw” firm-fixed effects has increased; in fact, it has more than doubled; see table 3.6. The increase has been especially pronounced in the nineties. Together with increases in returns to observable

9. Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) is an exception, using Danish data.
individual characteristics, this is consistent with firm-fixed effects picking up sorting according to unobservable skills.\textsuperscript{10}

Although part of the increase goes away when observables are controlled for, a considerable portion remains. Thus, changes in observable skills are not able to explain the whole observed increase in between-firm inequality. The observed pattern is, however, also consistent with an increasing dispersion of bargaining power as a result of weakening of centralized bargaining institutions. In contrast to the changes mentioned in the preceding, the dispersion of the residuals of the wage equations displays no trend, but varies around a stable mean. The fact that the dispersion of fixed effects has not decreased, but rather increased, indicates that increasing competition has not lead to the predicted decline in between-employer inequality.

Let us now consider what has happened to the persistence of firm effects over time. The top panel of table 3.7 answers that question by measuring the “persistence” by means of autocorrelations: \(\text{corr} [\text{FE}(f,t), \text{FE}(f,t-T)]\) for different time gaps \(T\) (five, ten, and fifteen years, respectively).\textsuperscript{11} The fixed effects are taken from the wage regressions that include human capital controls.\textsuperscript{12} The key message from the table is that there have been no major changes in the persistence in firm-fixed effects over time. There is a slight decline in the five-year correlations, but this provides only limited evidence of a weakening importance of internal labor markets. The persistence is fairly strong and does not decay rapidly as the time gap is widened. The same exercise was also carried out for rank correlations in the bottom

\textsuperscript{10} Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) have found a similar pattern for U.S. manufacturing during the sixties, seventies, and eighties.

\textsuperscript{11} The abbreviation FE denotes the firm-fixed effects.

\textsuperscript{12} Excluding controls leads to somewhat higher correlations, but the pattern observed in the top panel of table 3.7 remains intact.
The pattern with respect to changes over time is the same, except that the decay associated with lengthening the time differences becomes stronger. At any rate, the results of both tables indicate that firms that pay above (below) the average also are very likely to continue doing that five or ten years later.

Eriksson (2003b) also estimated the wage equations separately for each firm and year and retained the coefficient estimates from each regression and used them as data. The first thing looked at is the changes in their between-firm spread over time. The mean across firms estimates of the return to schooling, say, differs somewhat from those reported in table 3.4, which were based on estimating the equation on all firms. The dispersion of the coefficients for age, schooling, tenure, and gender is set out in table 3.8. From this it can be seen that not only has the mean returns to schooling increased, but its dispersion has, too. The development of the age coefficients is different; they first increase and then decline. The gender wage gap coefficient, which, on average, has first declined and then has stayed flat, displays an increasing dispersion across firms over time. Hence, overall there appears to have been a tendency toward an increase in the spread, not only in firm-fixed effects, but also in how firms reward different observable individual traits of their employees.

A second thing the estimated firmwise coefficients are used for is to look at their persistence, again by means of computed autocorrelations. The five-year autocorrelations for age, schooling, tenure, and gender are collected in table 3.9. Strong internal labor markets would imply highly persistent firm-specific returns. This is also what is found, although the correlations are somewhat lower than for firm-fixed effects. Moreover, for schooling and gender, a decline in the persistence can be observed. Consequently, there is some indication that internal structures have become more flexible. The changes do not appear to be large, however.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>–5 years</th>
<th>–10 years</th>
<th>–15 years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>0.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**A. Firm fixed effects persistence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.403</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.486</td>
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**B. Firm fixed effects persistence—rank correlations**

*Note:* Autocorrelations of fixed effects estimated from wage equations including controls.
Summarizing the analysis of the larger firms, it was found that there has been a clear increase in between-firm wage inequality. This is not consistent with the notion that increased competition in the product markets erodes firm-specific rents. Between-employee wage inequality first decreased but increased during the nineties, and at the same time, returns to human capital, in particular schooling, have increased. The dispersion in firm-specific fixed effects has increased over time, which is consistent with both skill-biased technological change and weakened centralized wage bargaining. The employer effects are relatively persistent, and there are no traces of significant changes in this. The same holds for returns to human capital at the level of the firm. Both the observable and the time-invariant unobservable worker and employer characteristics, respectively, have become more important in explaining wage inequality.

### 3.7 Concluding Remarks

The key messages of this chapter are two. First, the institutional setup of the Danish labor market differs not only from that found in most other European countries but also from that in the neighboring Nordic countries. A main difference is the absence of barriers to mobility. In a sense, this is only natural, as for almost a century Danish wage setting was highly centralized and characterized by a very compressed wage structure that left only limited scope for employers to adjust to changing labor market conditions through wage adjustment. Worker mobility is indeed high. We show that mobility is about as high, or even higher, as in the highly fluid U.S. labor market. But we also document that although labor turnover rates

<table>
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<th>βschooling</th>
<th>βtenure</th>
<th>βgender</th>
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<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.110</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.168</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Schooling</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Gender</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.579</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.730</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.737</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8 Dispersion (standard deviation) of regression coefficients across firms

Table 3.9 The persistence of βs over time (5-year autocorrelations)
are high, a considerable portion of workers are in long-term employment relationships.

Second, the ongoing process toward increasingly decentralized wage setting, which began in the second half of the eighties, has given rise to an increase, albeit of relatively modest magnitude, in the dispersion of wages. The widening wage distribution seems to be predominantly due to increased wage differentials between firms, and considerably less due to growing within-firm wage dispersion. In parallel, the level and between-firm variance in returns to human capital have increased. The shift toward decentralized wage bargaining has coincided with deregulation and increased product market competition. The evidence appears not to be consistent with stronger competition in product markets eroding firm-specific rents. Hence, the prime suspect is the change in wage-setting institutions.

References


