The attitude of economists toward population growth is curiously ambivalent. The effects of population growth are accepted as important and have been accorded considerable analytical attention. One need only recall the prominent role played by declining population growth in the secular stagnation thesis of the late 'thirties and early 'forties [19] [20] [24]. With regard to the causes of population growth, however, the attitude of economists can best be characterized as laissez-faire. At the risk of generalizing too freely, it would probably be fair to say that the typical treatment of population growth in economic theories is as an exogenous variable, whose movement is given by demographers. One purpose of the present paper is to suggest that there is scope for fruitful research into the causes of population change compatible with economists' training and experience. The vehicle for this

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1 For an excellent analysis of the consequences of the rise in the rate of population growth associated with the baby boom, see Joseph S. Davis [10] and, more recently, [8].

2 It is encouraging to be able to note some significant recent exceptions provided by the work of Gary S. Becker [70, pp. 209-31], Everett E. Hagen [18], Harvey Leibenstein [32], and Bernard Okun [36].
discussion is the recent baby boom. We first take a fresh look at the historical record in the light of the Kuznets-cycle conception of economic change, taking care to distinguish the experience of three population groups with significantly different patterns—foreign-born, native-born urban, and native-born rural. Then some possible reasons for the patterns observed are explored. The analysis is confined to the white population because of the greater reliability of the data for this group and its predominant influence in determining the pattern for the total.

I. Kuznets Cycles in U.S. Population Growth and Fertility

A. The Rate of Total Increase

We start with the rate of population growth. Since we are interested in focusing on major movements, we employ five-year averages of the basic data, a choice governed partly by preference—to eliminate or at least reduce the shorter-term changes associated with the ordinary business cycle—and partly by necessity—because of the initial mold in which some of the basic data are cast, particularly those relating to fertility.

Figure 1 shows the average rate of increase of the U.S. white population in successive quinquennia from 1870-75 to 1955-59. The familiar downward drift through the 1930's and the recent increase are immediately apparent. Less familiar, but equally obtrusive, are significant fluctuations in the rate of change. The duration of the fluctuations has run from 10 to 35 years and their average magnitude has amounted to about one-quarter of the mean rate of change over the period as a whole. In a recent article [27] these fluctuations were subjected to analysis by Simon Kuznets, who found that while all three components of population change—fertility, mortality, and immigration—showed evidence of these swings, either in level or rate of change, major surges and relapses in immigration typically accounted for the

3See the studies by Simon Kuznets [26]-[29], Moses Abramovitz [1] [3] [4], and Arthur F. Burns [7]. Among recent contributions are Brinley Thomas [42], R. C. O. Matthews [35, Ch. 12], and P. J. O'Leary and W. Arthur Lewis [37]. The name "Kuznets cycle" is suggested by O'Leary and Lewis and is adopted here because it is a more distinctive designation of these (typically) 15- to 20-year movements than are terms such as "long swings" or "long waves," which may be confused with the much longer Kondratieff. It is somewhat regrettable that O'Leary and Lewis used the term "cycle," with its inevitable implications of a self-generating process, rather than a more neutral word such as "movement." Use of the designation here is not intended to imply commitment to a self-generating view of these fluctuations.

4For the rate of total increase, the average is implicit. The rate, which is actually calculated from observations on the population stock separated by five years, yields a time pattern equivalent to that of a geometric average of the annual rates of change within the successive quinquennia.