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New Tools for the Analysis of Political Power in Africa

Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi

5.1 Introduction

The study of autocratic and weakly institutionalized regimes has long been plagued by scarcity of reliable information useful for furthering their understanding (Tullock 1987). Lewis (1978, 622) appropriately states that “It is more difficult to study dictatorships than democracies because the internal politics of the former are deliberately hidden from the public view.” This chapter identifies in the ethnic composition of the executive branch an important and systematic source of information on the dynamics of power sharing within a sample of fifteen sub-Saharan African countries. Since independence from European colonization, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,¹ Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Kenya, and Uganda have all experienced widely different political dynamics and often deep political crises. They have also been characterized by the constant presence of some form of ruling elite, either military or civil, which we study.

The chapter discusses how the study of the ethnic composition of the

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1. Liberia was an American protectorate, but never formally a colony.

executive branch is at the same time a transparent, exhaustive, and informative snapshot of the power-sharing conditions of each specific country. We discuss how other institutional features of the country, for instance its de jure political form or the structure of the legislative branch, would be less reliable or informative in the case of Africa. We also discuss the appropriateness of focusing on ethnic diversity—as opposed to political party structures—as the unit of analysis for our sample. Finally, we carefully document the specific complications of the analysis and data construction for each specific country in order to provide an ordinate discussion of the available information.

Theories of autocratic regimes and rationalizations of specific case studies have proven to be informative (on the origin and leadership transitions in dictatorships, see Acemoglu and Robinson [2001, 2005]; Wintrobe [1990, 1998]; Bueno de Mesquita et al. [2003] on the role of minimum winning coalitions; and Tullock [1987]). However, what seems lacking is systematic evidence of how autocracies operate internally and why certain public policy outcomes are observed. Few recent studies have explicitly set this goal empirically, or at least anecdotally (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s [2003] work on the selectorate and Mulligan and Tsui [2008] and Svobik [2009] on contestable authoritarian states; also Boix and Svobik [2010]; Arriola [2009]; Geddes [2003]; Gandhi [2008]; Magaloni [2010]), but they have been somewhat limited by scarcity of information and methodological limitations (Clarke and Stone 2008).

Ours is not the only attempt at capturing power-sharing relations in Africa. Recent noticeable advancements on the empirical front have been made. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set by Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) is a prominent example. Relative to this recently available resource on ethnic groups' participation to power, our work presents advantages and disadvantages. *In primis*, we do not rely on experts' assessments, but on hard information to measure the participation to higher government of each ethnic group. This is arguably more objective, but probably misses nuances that experts may pick up in terms of weak versus strong participation. We also dispose of artificial clustering of the data into coarse subdivisions (e.g., EPR codes access to power as a seven-point categorical variable: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, etc.). We present a lower coverage of fifteen versus thirty-five sub-Saharan EPR countries, but our information is at the individual minister level and not just at the ethnic group level, a dimension suitable to answering different questions (e.g., the strategic role of political turnover even within ethnic groups). Finally, we present a much finer ethnic classification relative to Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and much closer to the standard ethnolinguistic classifications in the political economy of development (Alessina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003). We believe this is more apt at capturing the finer details of ethnic coalition building and shifting typical of postcolonial

Africa. Another related empirical contribution is the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project by Gurr (1993), studying the politicoeconomic conditions of 233 communal groups in ninety-three countries. The drawback of MAR is that it only focuses on a very selected subset of ethnic groups. For instance, relative to the thirty-seven ethnic groups we identify for Tanzania, only one, the Zanzibaris, appears in MAR.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly discusses the main features of the African political systems included in our analysis. Section 5.3 discusses the role of the executive branch in African countries and its usefulness as a tool for the measurement of power-sharing agreements in African polities. Section 5.4 focuses on the role of ethnicity and political parties. Section 5.5 presents our main protocol for data collection and describes the ministerial data and the process of compilation of ethnic information based on main ethnic subdivisions in the literature. Section 5.6 presents our conclusions.

5.2 Political Systems in Africa: A Brief Overview

An appealing feature of executive cabinets, which we discuss in detail below, is that they appear to play a relevant role both in democracies and autocracies. This is particularly relevant for the African case. In our sample of fifteen countries, each observed for about forty-five years, less than 14 percent of all country-year observations belong to the democratic classification of Polity IV. As of 2011, after a durable and stable wave of democratization in the 1990s, according to the African Elections Database (africanelections.tripod.com) only Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania can be considered functioning electoral democracies, while Guinea, Kenya, and Nigeria better satisfy the condition of emerging democracy, with free but tainted elections and persistent lack of competition in the political process. In 2011 Freedom House classifies as “not politically free” Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and as “partly free” Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. In essence, across both space and time, nondemocracies constitute most of our sample. This automatically rules out the use of electoral results as a way of assessing relative strength of political blocs in such countries.

Other *de jure* features of the political systems, such as the form of government (presidential, parliamentary, or hybrid regimes) or the role of electoral rules (majoritarian or proportional representation) may also be relevant to the analysis of power sharing in Africa (see Persson and Tabellini [2007], and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi [2004] for a broad analysis), but we will not consider them here. Our sample is, in fact, almost completely dominated by presidential and semipresidential regimes with first-past-the-post (simple or runoff) electoral rules and very little time variation.

5.3 Government Power in Africa

Autocratic personal rule, with accentration of power in the leader's position, is a common feature of African politics. The roles of Head of State and Head of Government often coincide in the same, leading, individual. Examples of leaders with substantial tenure are also frequent in Africa. Uganda's president Museveni has been ruling the country for two decades. President Mubutu ruled what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo for thirty-two years. Omar Bongo of oil-rich Gabon maintained a tight grip on power for four decades. President Mugabe has maintained control over Zimbabwe since the early 1980s. Presidents in Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea have also ruled for two decades. These patterns identify in the eyes of many observers the executive branch as the single-most powerful branch of government, in fact, the only one to really matter (Barkan 2008). The analysis of the role of African leaders in distributive politics (Franck and Rainer 2012; Diamond 2008; Kudamatsu 2009) has also emphasized this feature.

However, the executive branch is something more than the leader alone. In the words of Lewis (1978, 622), discussing the ministerial appointments of Portugal's dictator of thirty-six years, Antonio Salazar: "Regardless of how powerful dictators are, the complexities of modern society and government make it impossible for them to rule alone" and "the recruitment of personnel into top political positions" allows "to chart the evolution of a dictatorship." We address this issue below. A discussion of the legislative branch as an alternative is also provided.

5.3.1 The Role of the Executive Branch in Africa

While the study of the allocation of government posts in parliamentary democracies appears relatively mature (Merlo 1997; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo 2003; Diermeier and Merlo 2004; Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere 2005, and citations therein), less is known about the role of members of the executive branch in nondemocracies. African studies detailing specific instances of cabinet ethnic composition in commentaries about dynamics of power sharing abound. Khapoya (1980) focuses on the Moi transition in Kenya, Horowitz (1985) on Congo and Uganda, Langer (2004) on Côte d'Ivoire, Kifordu (2010) and Osaghae (1989) focus on Nigeria, Posner (2005) on Zambia, but systematic evidence is not available. This seems unfortunate, as cabinet appointments appear informative on many fronts.

One can begin from the observation that ministerial cabinets are a common feature of both autocratic and democratic regimes,² reducing sample selection and censoring issues. This is an important feature for countries that experience frequent transitions in and out of democracy.

2. Cabinet allocation is also common in military juntas, even if the formal title "minister" may not be employed.

Second, in both autocracies and democracies, ministers are responsible for implementing some form of government policy, albeit not necessarily in the public interest. In both institutional instances, ministerial cabinets may be employed to reward with powerful positions political allies of the leader, but are also a potential source of checks and balances or rivalry for the leader (see Myerson [2008] for an interesting model in the case of autocracies; Egorov and Sonin [2011] for a theoretical model of autocratic cabinets' loyalty/competence makeup). Even very recently, it is reported in Uganda³ that:

After coming to power, Museveni needed to demonstrate that his was an inclusive, coalition government, not one run exclusively by his small circle of his kith and kin. Had he given top positions exclusively to his fellow westerners, he would have isolated himself and become vulnerable to attempts to grab power by those groups who were marginalized. The potential threat from Buganda was particularly strong. As the largest ethnic group in Uganda and one located at the political and financial heart of the country, the Baganda were not a group Museveni could afford to exclude. As a token of goodwill, he restored kingdoms and appointed Baganda to some of the top government positions.

This quote illustrates well the balancing of power achieved through the allocation of cabinet posts. Even in the case of the most monolithic and powerful autocratic regimes (e.g., Zaire's feared regime of Mobutu Sese Seko), cabinet posts are not entirely absent and the role of cabinet appointments in the redistribution of political spoils seems systematic. In his study of cabinet expansion as a tool of patronage distribution in sub-Saharan Africa, Arriola (2009, 1347) underscores that: "All African leaders have used ministerial appointments to the cabinet as an instrument for managing elite relations."

The makeup of the executive matters for patronage allocation.⁴ Rents are attached to cabinet positions, rents that can be either appropriated by the ethnic elites themselves (Kasara 2007) or redistributed to the general population in each ethnic group. For instance, Thomson (2010, 115) states of the Côte d'Ivoire: "for a local community to really benefit, they had to promote one of their own into the cabinet itself. Ministers of construction and town planning, for example, frequently awarded their home towns lucrative development schemes." Tangri (1999, 26) argues that the primary means through which governments deliver patronage in Africa is through "parastatal," or state-owned enterprises. Tangri also argues that the most important positions of delivering patronage are the government economic ministries and the heads of key parastatals (e.g., government oil companies), although these positions may be occupied by the same individual. He goes

3. Platas (2011).

4. Arriola (2009) offers a discussion.

on to state: “Ministers, military leaders, and senior civil servants have all intervened in the affairs of public enterprises, usually without having to account for their actions.” Burgess et al. (2010) present complementary evidence of the role of cabinet ethnic allocation for infrastructure transportation projects in Kenya.

There is a general sense in the literature that the allocation of cabinet seats to various groups matters for the actual allocation of power in Africa and it is not simply “window dressing.” First, even when the ethnic makeup of the government is not interpreted under a purely clientelistic view, the allocation is rarely seen as *pro forma*. For instance, Roessler (2011, 309) asserts that: “To boost their national legitimacy, subdue growing ethnoregionalism, and extend the regime’s societal control, rulers sought to build ethnically inclusive governments in which appointees from rival ethnic groups would play a role similar to that played by tribal chiefs during colonialism, acting as intermediaries between regime and society to facilitate the transfer of local information and mobilize support for the regime.” Second, it is hard to reconcile the large value attributed to some of these posts in the literature with a view of pure window dressing in the allocation of cabinet positions. Window dressing would not explain why ministers are such powerful gate keepers *vis-à-vis* both domestic and international players. For instance, Moody-Stuart (1997) reports that all players in African politics are available to be bought, with cabinet ministers being the first tier below the head of state in terms of influence, and roughly ten times as expensive as the next highest level, permanent secretaries. Third, window dressing is starkly in contrast with the role of insiders in providing a large share of the threats to leadership stability (see Myerson [2008] for a theoretical interpretation; for empirical evidence using data of conspirators in coups and rebellions in Africa, see Roessler [2011]). Indeed, the problem does not seem to be that cabinet appointments carry too little power, but too much. For instance Roessler ([2011], 309, and citations therein) reports that “Two of Africa’s longest-serving leaders, Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Zaire between 1965 and 1997, and Hastings Banda, the president of Malawi from 1964 to 1994, created ‘atmosphere[s] of perpetual musical chairs’ by their frequent reshuffling of ministers in and out of the government [. . .] as it prevents clients from amassing too much power within their respective ministries.”

Finally, cabinet appointments cover a vast variety of issues and are suited to describing how the loci of power differ across countries or shift within countries. Certain African countries rely on natural resources, others more on agriculture, and so on. One could choose to consider the full set of ministerial posts available or only a subset of commonly selected “top” portfolios, such as the Ministry of Finance, Interior, or Defence. The African continent is so heterogenous that information as comprehensive as possible is necessary. The Ministry of Tourism is considered powerful in Kenya, but not so in the vast majority of our sample. The Ministry of Natural Resources plays

an important role in the Democratic Republic of Congo, but a much lesser one in The Gambia.

5.3.2 The Role of the Legislative Branch in Africa

A critical point of discussion is why we focus on the executive versus the legislative branch of government in Africa. There are several reasons for this choice.

A first and unambiguous response, as simply stated in Barkan's (2008) analysis of recent strengthening of legislatures in certain Africa polities, is that "African legislatures legislated only in the narrow sense—passing into law proposals prescribed by the executive, but not meaningfully participating in the creation of these proposals. Nor did lawmakers engage in oversight of the executive branch." In essence, legislatures in African countries have historically engaged mostly in rubber-stamping activity, playing distant second fiddle to the executive branch and mostly providing an eager cadre of backbenchers competing for the patronage associated to ministerial appointments. This is evident from the weakness associated to legislative bodies in our sample of African countries, as reported by surveys of experts. Fish and Kroenig (2009), for instance, construct a parliamentary powers index (PPI) score by country aimed at assessing the overall institutional strength of the national assembly. Relative to the sample of parliamentary democracies considered in Ansolabehere et al. (2005), reporting an average PPI score in 2007 of 0.73,⁵ African countries in our sample present national assemblies with almost half the strength (mean PPI 0.38). In particular, the legislative branch's influence over the executive (Inflexec) is measured at an average of 2.1 out of 9 possible points of strength in our sample of fifteen African countries, or very low, making the executive branch the fulcrum of political power.

Second, especially in Africa, the focus on the executive does not fail to capture the typical interpretation of the legislator as representative of specific constituent interests. In fact, Arriola (2009) reports that "A cabinet minister in Africa is considered 'a kind of superrepresentative' who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well as channel resources to them."

A third reason for why legislatures may be less useful to the analysis of power sharing in Africa is that the legislative body is not typically present under military rule. Parliaments are typically disbanded, censoring the type of information available in such instances. Military councils and juntas are often present in Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana), making this censoring issue a potentially severe limitation.

Fourth, it would also be important to notice the issue of feasibility. Even

5. Iceland and Luxembourg do not have a Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) falling below the PPI sampling threshold of a population of at least a half million inhabitants.

in the restricted set of available legislatures, the amount of biographical information to collect concerning individual ethnicity of national assembly members (usually numbering in the hundreds) would be daunting.

5.4 The Role of Ethnicity and Political Parties in Africa

It is hard to understate the role that ethnicity plays in African politics (Bayart 1993) and its effects on a vast set of socioeconomic outcomes. The detrimental role of ethnic fragmentation on African economic performance has been amply documented (Bates 1981; Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Similarly well documented is the role of ethnic diversity in fostering clientelism, corruption, and nepotism (Berman 1998; Posner 2005; Kasara 2007; Franck and Rainer 2012; Burgess et al. 2010), and civil conflict (Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Given that such a large share of relevant political, economic, and social outcomes has been associated to ethnic diversity in postcolonial Africa, it appears natural to center any attempt at measuring distribution of power around this dimension.

However, such choice requires further discussion. The standard unit of observation in the study of cabinet formation pivots around the concept of political party (Ansolabehere et al. 2005). In fact, much of the analysis of coalition formation in parliamentary democracies, which explicitly studies the allocation of government posts, employs a political party as the unit of observation. In addition, there is also interesting research on the unconventional role of political parties in autocracies (Geddes [2003]; Gandhi [2008]; Magaloni [2010] for a discussion), which bears the question of why not focusing on political parties in our sample as well.

There are three main reasons for the choice of studying ethnic and linguistic groups in cabinets relative to party affiliation.

First, in all our sampled countries but Tanzania, other scholars have clearly recognized “political objectives, alliances, or disputes” to be “framed in ethnic terms” (see Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). For large part, African politics, more or less directly, can be parceled into ethnic issues and demands.

Second, ethnic diversity allows for a more fine-grained analysis of power-sharing dynamics in conditions of single-party rule or dominant-party systems, a frequent feature of African politics. In such cases, focusing on parties would be too coarse. For instance, in our sample Benin experienced single-party rule between 1975 to 1990 (People’s Revolutionary Party of Benin), the Republic of the Congo between 1969 and 1990 (Congolese Party of Labour), Gabon between 1969 and 1990 (Gabonese Democratic Party), Guinea between 1958 and 1984 (Democratic Party of Guinea–African Democratic Rally), Kenya between 1982 and 1991 (Kenya African National Union), Liberia between 1878 and 1990 (True Whig Party), Sierra

Leone between 1978 and 1991 (All People's Congress), and Togo during 1962–1963 (Party of Togolese Unity) and 1969–1991 (Rally of the Togolese People). According to Salih (2003), also within our sample, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Uganda exhibited a single major party dominating the political scene for a prolonged period of time.

Third, even when multiparty systems are present, ethnic groups appear to be the relevant political unit of observation, with political parties often representing single- or multiple-allied blocs. Parties cutting across ethnic lines and national political parties are rare, although some exceptions exist such as the now defunct KANU in Kenya. Norris and Mattes (2003, 16) report that, based on data from Afrobarometer in twelve sub-Saharan African countries, “the results in the analysis of systematic survey evidence serves to confirm the common assumption that ethnic-linguistic cleavages do indeed structure party identification in many, although not all, of the African societies under comparison.” Southall (2005) reports similar considerations. So does the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's report on political parties in Africa (IDEA 2007). With respect to the case of Nigeria, Kifordu (2010) notices that “ethnic elite notables across regions continued to dominate political party structures and access political office with relative autonomy.”

5.5 The Ethnic and Political Information

This section illustrates the information available, along both the ethnic and the political dimensions relevant to our study, for each country in our sample.

5.5.1 Benin

Governments

Our data for Benin contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in May 1960 headed by Hubert Maga and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Mathieu Kerekou. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1969 and 1975. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1968 it includes the lists of governments in both April and August, while in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both March and November. The two 1968 governments are headed by different leaders—Alphonse Alley and Emile Derlin Zinsou, respectively. The two 1970 governments are also headed by different leaders—Paul Emile de Souza and Hubert Maga. The ministerial composition of these governments is also quite different. Thus, in these particular cases, using two lists of governments per year does not create a duplication problem. Overall, our data for Benin contains information about the govern-

ments that were headed by ten out of fifteen leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004.⁶ Only the short-term governments of Christophe Soglo in 1963–1964, Tahirou Congacou in 1965, Maurice Kouandete in 1967 and 1969, and Justin Ahomadegbe in 1972 are not represented.

Ministers

In addition to the country's presidents (and occasional vice presidents, prime ministers, or deputy prime ministers), the vast majority of Benin's ministers in our data set are literally listed with the title of "minister." In some years, the Europa publications also list one or two secretaries of state (in 1962 and 1963) or a secretary-general to the president (in 1995) as members of government. These individuals are also included in our data. A very special case is the list of government in March 1970, which includes only three individuals: Paul-Emile de Souza (president of the directory), and Maurice Kouandete and Benoit Sinzogan (members of the directory). This military triumvirate ruled Benin between December 1969 and May 1970, and its members divided among themselves all the ministerial portfolios such as Interior, Security, Defense, Information and Planning, Foreign Affairs Justice, National Education, Economy, and Finance and Cooperation.

Even putting this special case aside, the total number of ministers in Benin's governments varies over time. It fluctuates between ten and sixteen during the 1960s and the 1970s, rises to about twenty-two in the early 1980s, drops back to about sixteen in the late 1980s, and fluctuates again between eighteen and twenty-two during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century.

Overall, our data for Benin contains 730 records of government ministers with the average of 16.22 ministers per government. Our data has information for 209 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.49 lists of governments.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of Benin's ethnic groups consists of fifteen ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.1 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. The ethnic categories that we use in Benin are more disaggregated than those used by Alesina et al. (2003), who list eight ethnic groups, or Fearon (2003) who lists only five ethnic groups.

With respect to the southern groups, we follow Alesina et al. (2003) and create separate categories for Fon, Adja, and Aizo, rather than putting them in a single Fon category as in Fearon (2003). We then separate Goun (with the related groups of southeastern Benin) from Alesina et al.'s Fon category, and Mina (with the related groups of southwestern Benin) from their Adja and Aizo categories. Both Goun and Mina (also called Popo) are often

6. We count a new nonconsecutive term in office of the same leader as a new leader.

Table 5.1 Ethnic groups in Benin

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Fon-Maxi	Fon	21.1	Fon, Maxi (= Mahi)
Goun	Goun	12.9	Goun (with Torri and Seto), Tofinu, Wemenu, Def
Adja	Adja	8.7	Adja
Aizo	Aizo	4.3	Aizo
Mina-Xwla-Xwela-Saxwe-Kotafon-Watch	Mina	7.8	Mina (= Gen = Guin), Xwla (= Pla), Xwela (= Peda), Saxwe (= Sahoue), Kotafon, Watch
Yoruba-Nagot-Idatcha	Yoruba	12.3	Nagot, Yoruba, Idaasha, Ije (= Dje), Ife, Mokole, Cabe (= Chabe), Idaca (= Idatcha), Ica (= Itch)
Bariba	Bariba	8.3	Bariba (= Batombou)
Boko	Boko	0.9	Boko
Fulani	Fulani	6.9	Fulani (= Peulh), Gando
Somba	Somba	6.2	Ditamari, Berba, Waama (= Wao), Mbelime, Otamari, Gourmantche, Natemba, Miyobe, Ngangam
Yom	Yom	1.8	Yoa, Taneka
Lukpa-Tem-Kabye-Lama	Lukpa	2	Lukpa, Tem (= Kotokoli), Kabye, Lama
Anii-Foodo	Anii	0.8	Anii (= Basila = Widji-Widji), Foodo (= Bazentche
Dendi-Djerma-Songha	Dendi	2.6	Dendi, Djerma, Songha
Other	Other	3.4	Hausa, Malian, French, Italian
		100	

considered to be distinct ethnic groups (e.g., see Murdock 1959), and we therefore prefer to present them as such.

With respect to the northern ethnic groups, we follow Alesina et al. (2003) and create separate categories for Bariba and Somba instead of putting them in the same Bargu category as in Fearon (2003). In addition, we list several smaller northern groups, such as Yom, Lukpa, Dendi, Boko, and Anii, which are probably subsumed into the “other” category under Alesina et al.’s classification. These groups are all reasonably large as a percent of Benin’s population, and they are presented as distinct ethnic groups in Benin’s 2002 population census.

As a result of the classification strategy that we use, our residual “other” category is significantly smaller than the corresponding categories of Alesina et al. and Fearon (3.4 percent of population versus 7.7 percent and 6 percent, respectively).

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the World Biographical Information System (WBIS) and a variety of Internet sources, major sources that helped us identify the ethnic origin of Beninese ministers included Agossou (2002), Amoussou-Yeye (1999), Hazoumé (1972), and République du Bénin (2008). We also employed two local consultants with expertise on Benin’s political history. In the end, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 729 of 730 government ministers in our data.

Our discussions with the consultants raised several general issues. First, a number of ministers in our data set were described as “Afro-Brazilians” by some sources, but as having a different ethnicity (Fon, Yoruba, Mina, or Goun) by other sources. Our consultants agreed that the Afro-Brazilians in Benin tend to have two ethnic identities. They also agreed that since the Afro-Brazilian category does not appear in Benin’s 2002 population census, we should not use this category either, and should instead classify all the Afro-Brazilians in our data according to their other ethnic identity (i.e., as Fon, Yoruba, Mina, or Goun). We followed this advice.

Second, several ministers on our list were alternatively described as either Bariba or Dendi by different sources. Our consultants explained that these ministers belong to families who were originally Bariba, but moved to the Dendi-populated areas. As a result, these ministers now speak Dendi and are sometimes considered Dendi. We decided to classify these ministers as Bariba based on their original ethnicity.

Third, as discussed above, some ethnic classifications define the Fon category very broadly so that it includes not only Fon (in the narrow sense), but also smaller southern groups such as Adja, Aizo, Goun, or Mina. Therefore, we were a bit concerned that some of the ministers described as Fon by our sources could have actually belonged to these smaller ethnic groups. To address this issue, we asked our consultants to verify the ethnic identity of

all ministers described as Fon by our sources. In most cases, the consultants agreed with our original Fon classification, but in one case we needed to reclassify a minister as Aizo.

5.5.2 Cameroon

Governments

Our data for Cameroon contains information from forty-four lists of governments starting from the government in May 1960 headed by Ahmadou Ahidjo and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Paul Biya. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1969 and 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1968 it includes the lists of governments in both April and August.

Since the list of government in August 1968 is fully identical (in terms of the ministers' names and titles) to the list of government in March 1970, it is reasonable to assume that in 1969 the government also had the same ministerial composition. Therefore, it may be possible to use the list of August 1968 as a substitute for the missing list of 1969. By doing so, one can avoid using two similar (albeit not identical) lists of governments in 1968 and at the same time impute a list of government for 1969.

Cameroon had only two leaders between 1960 and 2004, and the governments of both leaders are included in our data. Specifically, we have twenty-two lists of governments headed by Ahmadou Ahidjo (between 1960 and 1982) and twenty-two lists of government headed by Paul Biya (between 1983 and 2004).

Ministers

The lists of Cameroonian governments between 1960 and 1992 have very similar structure. They typically consist of a president, a vice president or a prime minister, a large group of regular ministers, and a smaller group of junior ministers. The regular ministers usually have the titles of "ministers," while the junior ministers are alternatively called deputy ministers, vice ministers, or secretaries of state. During these years, the Europa publications also list some deputy prime ministers, directors of the cabinet, ministers-delegate, general commissioners, and deputy secretaries-general to the presidency as members of the government. We include individuals with all these different titles in our data set of ministers.⁷

Despite their structural similarity, the size of Cameroonian governments

7. Our data only includes members of Cameroon's federal governments. During the 1960s, the Europa publications also list regional cabinets of Eastern Cameroon and Western Cameroon. We do not include regional ministers in our data set unless they also hold positions in the federal government. Provincial governors, who are also listed in some years, are likewise excluded from our data.

gradually increases from fifteen to twenty-two ministers between 1960 and 1971 to thirty to thirty-six ministers between 1972 and 1985, and to more than forty ministers in 1986 and 1987. It then briefly drops to thirty-two to thirty-five ministers between 1988 and 1991, but rises back to forty in 1992.

In 1993 the Europa publications stopped reporting the names of the junior ministers, now called secretaries of state, probably due to the continuing increase in the number of regular ministers that they had to list. As a result, for the years between 1993 and 1997, we no longer include the secretaries of state in our data set of ministers. Yet, even without the secretaries of state, the number of ministers in our list remains quite high, between thirty-two and thirty-five ministers per government.

The year 1998 saw a big change in the structure of the Cameroonian governments and the way that they are presented in the Europa publications. Specifically, for the years between 1998 and 2004, the Europa publications always list a president, a prime minister, a group of ministers of state, a group of ministers, a group of ministers-delegate, a group of secretaries of state, and a group of other appointees with the rank of minister. Thus, the lists of governments for these years become very long and consist of more than fifty people per government. Nevertheless, since all these title holders are considered members of government and since their names are fully reported, we include all of them in our data set of ministers.

Overall, our data for Cameroon contains 1,445 records of government ministers with the average of 32.84 ministers per government. Our data has information for 262 individual ministers with each minister appearing on average in 5.52 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of Cameroon's ethnic groups consists of twenty-one ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.2 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

Our ethnic classification for Cameroon is in many ways similar to that of Alesina et al. (2003), and includes the same major ethnic categories such as Beti-Fang, Fulani, Bassa-Koko-Doula-Lundu, Maka-Dzem-Kaka, Tikar, and Mandara-Matakam. However, we follow Fearon (2003) and list Bamileke and Bamum as separate ethnic groups instead of using the aggregate Bamileke-Bamum category as in Alesina et al. Moreover, we disaggregate Alesina et al.'s large "other" category, which constitutes 14.5 percent of Cameroon's population in their data, into ten or so ethnic groups such as Widekum, Kotoko, Masa-Musgum, Mambila-Vute, Kanuri, Gbaya, Tiv, Mbam, Banyang-Ekoi, and so forth.

During the process of disaggregation, we sometimes chose to combine several related ethnic groups into a single ethnic category in order to avoid

Table 5.2 Ethnic groups in Cameroon

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Fulani	Fulani	9	Fulani = Fulbe = Peul = Peuhl = Fulbe = Foulan
Beti-Fang	Fang	19	Beti, Boulou, Fang, Eton, Ewondo, Mvel
Bamileke	Bamileke	15.5	Bamileke, people from Nde Division: Bamena, Medumba (= Bangangte)
Bamum	Bamum	3	Bamum = Bamoun = Bamoum
Bassa-Koko-Douala-Lundu	Bassa	14	Bassa, Koko, Douala, Kundu, Kossi, Mbo, Bakweri (= Bakwar = Kpe), Sawa, Babimbi, Ngolo, Oroko, Bafo (= Bafaw), Balo
Maka-Dzem-Kaka	Maka	5	Maka, Dzem, Kaka, Bangangtu
Tikar	Tikar	7	Nsaw (= Nso), Kom, Fut, Ndob, Fungom, Nsungli (= Wimbum), Ngemba, Awing, Babanki, Mendankwe, Oku (but not Wideku)
Widekum	Widekum	2	Widekum, Momo (incl. Metta), people from Santa subdivision of Mezam division
Mbum-Mundang-Tupuri-Fali-Duru-Vere-Chamba	Mbum	5	Mbum, Mundang, Tupuri, Fali, Duru, Vere, Chamba
Mandara-Matakam	Mandara Kotoko	6	Mandara, Matakam (= Mafa), Margi, Daba, Guidar, Bata, Zoulgo (= Mineo) Kotoko
Masa-Musgum	Masa	2	Masa, Musgum
Shuwa Arabs	Shuwa Arabs	1	Shuwa Arabs
Hausa	Hausa	1	Hausa
Kanuri	Kanuri	1	Kanuri
Gbaya	Gbaya	1.7	Gbaya
Mambila-Vute	Mambila	1	Mambila, Vute
Tiv	Tiv	1	Tiv
Mbam	Mbam	2.5	Mbam, Bafia, Banen, Yambassa
Banyang-Ekoi	Banyang	1.3	Banyang, Ekoi (= Ejagham), Anyang, people from Manyu division
Other	Other	1	
		100	

dealing with a very large number of small groups. Thus, we created single ethnic categories for Mbum-Mundang-Tupuri-Fali-Duru-Vere-Chamba, Masa-Musgum, Mambila-Vute, or Banyang-Ekoi. To decide which groups may be related, we consulted the detailed ethnic and linguistic classifications provided by Murdock (1959, 1967) and ethnologue.com.

We end up with more ethnic categories than either Alesina et al., who list twelve ethnic groups, or Fearon, who lists ten ethnic groups.⁸ In addition, our residual “other” category is much smaller than in these alternative classifications, representing only 1 percent of Cameroon’s population.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the more important sources that we used to determine the ethnicity of ministers in Cameroon included Anyangwe (2009), Menthong (1998), Olson (1996), ethnonet-africa.org, and peoplesawa.com.

In some cases we could not find explicit information about the minister’s ethnicity, but were nevertheless able to assign the minister to an ethnic group based on other available information. For example, we know that Joseph Yunga Teghen (secretary of state for education during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century) is a politician from Momo division of the North-West province. We also know that he served as the president of Metta Cultural and Development Association. Since Metta is a Widekum subgroup, and since Momo division is predominantly populated by Widekum, we classify this minister as Widekum.

Likewise, we know that Boniface Tata Sakah (deputy minister of public health in the early 1960s) was born in Bui division of the North-West province. In addition, we know that he was a prominent anthropologist who extensively studied the Nso people. Since Bui division is also populated by Nso and other Tikar subgroups, we classify Sakah as Tikar.

In the case of Nana Aboubakar Djalloh (secretary of state for transport between 1998 and 2004), we know that he was born in Ngaoundere, the capital of the Adamawa region. This fact by itself does not provide a clear indication of Djalloh’s ethnicity because Ngaoundere is populated by several ethnic groups such as Fulani, Mbum, Duru, and Gbaya. However, Djalloh is a very common Fulani last name (both in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa), which allows us to classify this minister as Fulani.

Overall, using both explicit ethnicity information and other evidence, we were able to establish the ethnic identity of 1,395 of 1,445 government ministers in our data.

8. Unlike Alesina et al. or us, Fearon creates some of his ethnic categories based on very broad geographic or linguistic aggregations of smaller groups. For example, his ethnic classification includes Northwest, Southwest, Kirdi, and Eastern Nigrific categories.

5.5.3 Congo-Brazzaville

Governments

Our data for Congo-Brazzaville contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in May 1960 headed by Fulbert Youlou and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Denis Sassou Nguesso. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1969 and 1975. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1968 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December, while in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both January and November.

The government of December 1968 is the first government headed by Marien Ngouabi. Although the Europa publication formally dates this government by December 31, 1968, Ngouabi himself only became president on January 1, 1969. It can therefore make sense to redefine this government as the government of January 1969 and only use the April government (still headed by Alphonse Massamba-Debat) for 1968. Although the two 1970 governments are both headed by Marien Ngouabi, their ministerial composition is quite different. Thus, using both of these governments in the analysis should not create much duplication.

Overall, our data for Congo-Brazzaville includes governments headed by seven out of eight leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004. Only the short-lived government of Alfred Raoul, who served as acting head of state after the 1968 coup d'état (and before Ngouabi's assumption of the presidency), is not represented.

Ministers

Between 1960 and April 1968, the Congolese governments have a simple structure. They consist of a president, a group of ministers (most senior of which sometimes also bear the titles of vice president, premier, or vice premier), and a few occasional secretaries of state and ministers-delegate. The holders of all these titles are included in our data set of ministers. During this period, the size of government varies between eight and seventeen ministers per government.

In the first decade after the 1968 coup (between December 1968 and 1978), the structure of the government becomes more complex and typically includes two governing bodies. The smaller of the two bodies is alternatively called the "Executive of the National Council of the Revolution," the "Political Bureau of the Congolese Workers' Party," or the "Military Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party." In some years, the members of this body hold specific ministerial portfolios and have the titles of secretaries or commissioners. In other years, they are simply listed as members of that body. The larger of the two bodies is alternatively called the "Council

of Ministers” or the “Council of State.” Most of the members of this body have the titles of ministers, but there are also a few deputy ministers or secretaries of state.

We include members of both governing bodies (which sometimes overlap) in our data set of ministers, and the size of government during this period is typically about twenty ministers per government. However, the government has only twelve ministers in 1972 and as many as twenty-six ministers in 1974 (when it actually consists of three distinct bodies—the Political Bureau, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers).

Between 1979 and 2004, the structure of the Congolese governments is again rather simple. In these years, the Europa publications typically list a president, a prime minister, and a large group of ministers. More junior secretaries of state or ministers-delegate, and an occasional “head of president’s office,” are also listed in some years. All these listed titleholders are included in our data set of ministers. The size of government varies between eighteen and twenty-eight in 1979–1991, briefly drops to twelve in 1992, and varies again between twenty-one and thirty-three in 1993–2004.

Overall, our data for Congo-Brazzaville contains 918 records of government ministers with the average of 20.4 ministers per government. Our data has information for 240 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.83 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Congo-Brazzaville consists of ten ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.3 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

The southern part of Congo-Brazzaville is inhabited by ten ethnic groups, all of which belong to the large Kongo ethnic cluster and together constitute half of the country’s population. Some ethnic and linguistic classifications, such as Alesina et al. (2003) and Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), subsume all these groups under a single Kongo ethnic category. Other classifications, such as Fearon (2003), use a more disaggregated approach and create several ethnic categories where each category incorporates only some of the ethnic groups involved.

Based on our reading of Congolese history and the discussions that we have had with a prominent Congolese political historian whom we hired as our consultant, we also decided to follow the more disaggregated approach. Specifically, we divide all the groups of the Kongo cluster into three ethnic categories: Vili-Yombe-Kabinda, Lari-Kongo-Sundi (where the name “Kongo” is used in the narrow sense and refers to one of the constituent subgroups of the bigger cluster) and Bembe-Dondo-Kamba-Kugni. Our Vili-Yombe-Kabinda category is the same as Fearon’s Vili category. However, unlike Fearon, we prefer to group Kongo and Sundi with Lari rather than with Bembe, Dondo, Kamba, and Kugni.

Table 5.3 Ethnic groups in Congo-Brazzaville

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Lari-Kongo-Sundi	Lari	28	Lari, Kongo (proper), Sundi
Bembe-Dondo-Kamba-Kugn	Bembe	15	Bembe, Dondo, Kamba, Kugn
Vili-Yombe-Kabinda	Vili	7	Vili, Yombe, Kabinda. Excludes Lumb
Teke	Teke	17	Ngangoulou, Yaka, Lali, Kukuya
Mbochi-Kouyou-Bobangu	Mbochi	14	Mbochi, Kouyou, Bobangui, Likwala, Moyi, Makou
Punu-Lumbu-Duma	Punu	4.5	Punu (with Bwisi and Lumbu) and Duma (with Bandzabi and Tsangui)
Mbete-Kota	Mbete	4.5	Mbete (with Obamba, Ndasa) and Kota (Kele)
Sanga	Sanga	5	Bondjo, Bunguili, Munzombo, people from Likouala Province (Impfondo, Enyelle, Betou, etc.)
Maka	Maka	2	Bomwali, Maka, Dzem, Kwele, Fang
	Other	3	Pygmies, West African, Malian, French
		100	

With respect to the non-Kongo ethnic groups, our ethnic classification is very similar to that of Alesina et al. and includes Teke, Mbochi, Punu, Mbete, Sanga, and Maka categories. However, since all of our ethnic categories incorporate many small groups, we depart from Alesina et al. by bringing the small Bobangui group into the Mbochi category and the small Kota group into the Mbete category instead of listing them separately.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS and various online sources, some of the more important sources that helped us to determine the ethnicity of ministers in Congo-Brazzaville were Bazenguissa-Ganga (1997), Clark (2008), Gauze, Thompson, and Adloff (1973), Missié (2008), and Rupture-Solidarité (1999). As mentioned above, we also employed an expert on Congo's political history as our consultant. Overall, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 909 of 918 government ministers in our data.

As we explained above, the word Kongo has two possible meanings. It can be either used broadly as a name of the entire Kongo cluster, or narrowly as a name of only one of the constituent ethnic groups. Therefore, it was difficult for us to know whether a minister described as Kongo by our sources should be assigned to the Lari-Kongo-Sundi ethnic category (based on the narrow definition) or to one of the other two categories that also include groups of the Kongo cluster (based on the broad definition). To address this issue, we asked our consultant to provide us with more detailed ethnicity information for all ministers described as Kongo by our sources.

5.4 Côte d'Ivoire

Governments

Our data for Côte d'Ivoire contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in May 1960 headed by Felix Houphouët-Boigny and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Laurent Gbagbo. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and October. The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Felix Houphouët-Boigny. They also have exactly the same ministerial composition, both in terms of the ministers' names and the portfolios they hold. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Côte d'Ivoire had four leaders between 1960 and 2004, and the governments headed by each of these leaders are represented in our data.

Ministers

In addition to the country's presidents (and some prime ministers), most of Côte d'Ivoire's ministers in our data set are listed with the title of minister. Some (usually more senior) ministers are listed as ministers of state, while other (usually more junior) ministers have the titles of ministers-delegate, secretaries of state (in 1972–1974), or high commissioners (in 1996–1998). Occasionally, the Europa publications also list a director of the presidential cabinet (in 1994–1995) or a resident minister for the autonomous district of Yamoussoukro (in 1996–1998) as members of the government. When it happens, the holders of these titles are also included in our data.

The size of Ivorian governments in our data varies quite a lot over time. It fluctuates between twelve and twenty-three ministers in 1960–1971, between twenty-nine and forty-one ministers in 1972–1989, between twenty-one and thirty-six ministers in 1990–2001, and between thirty-seven and forty-three ministers in 2002–2004. These fluctuations seem to be driven by true changes in the size of Ivorian governments rather than by differences in Europa's reporting of junior ministers from year to year.

Overall, our data for Côte d'Ivoire contains 1,256 records of government ministers with the average of 27.91 ministers per government. Our data has information for 235 individual ministers with each minister appearing on average in 5.34 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire consists of seventeen ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.4 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. The ethnic categories that we

Table 5.4 Ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Baule	Baule	21	Baule
Agni	Agni	9	Agni (= Anyi)
Attie	Attie	4	Attie
Abron	Abron	1	Abron
Lagoon	Lagoon	6	Abe, Abidji, Adioukrou, Avikam, Alladian, Ebrie, Nzema (= Nzima = Apollo), Abure, Mbato, Krob
Bete-Dida	Bete	8	Bete, Dida, Godie, Neyo, Bakw
Ngere-Wobe	Ngere	5	Ngere (= Guere), Wobe, Nyabwa together = We
Kru-Grebo-Krahn	Kru	1	Kru, Grebo, and Krahn
Lobi	Lobi	2	Lobi
Kulango	Kulango	2.5	Kulango
Senufo	Senufo	12	Djimini and Tagwana
Dan	Dan	6.5	Dan (= Yakuba)
Kweni	Kweni	3	Kweni (= Guro)
Gagu	Gagu	1	Beng, Mwan, Wan
Malinke-Diula	Malinke	16	Mahou (and people in Bafing Region), Bambara, Koyaka (people from Mankono), Diul
Lebanese	Lebanese	1	Lebanese
Other	Other	1	Senegalese, Antillean, Mossi, French, Italian, Peul, Nigeria
		100	

use in Côte d'Ivoire are more disaggregated than those used by Alesina et al. (2003), who list ten ethnic groups, or Fearon (2003), who lists only eight ethnic groups.

With respect to the groups in the southeast of the country, we decompose Alesina et al.'s Akan category into Baule, Agni, Attie, and Abron ethnic groups. This strategy is somewhat similar to that of Fearon, who also creates a separate Baule category, but groups Agni together with Attie and does not explicitly mention Abron. In any case, all four groups are relatively large and are often considered to be distinct (see, for example, Murdock 1959). We therefore prefer to present them as such. On the other hand, we follow both Alesina et al. and Fearon by having a single Lagoon category that brings together many of the small and related groups of the southeast.

With respect to the groups in the southwest of the country, we disaggregated the broad Kru category of Alesina et al. and Fearon into three ethnic categories: Bete-Dida, Ngere-Wobe, and Kru-Grebo-Krahn (where Kru is used in the narrow sense). This is similar to what is done by Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and Murdock (1959).

Following Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and Murdock (1959), we also disaggregated Alesina et al.'s Voltaic category into Senufo, Lobi, and Kulango

ethnic groups. This approach is partially consistent with that of Fearon, who likewise splits Senufo from Lobi and Kulango. However, rather than listing them separately, Fearon puts Senufo together with Mande ethnic groups into his northerner category, and classifies both Lobi and Kulango as part of his broad Lobi category.

With respect to the groups of Mande language family, our ethnic classification is very similar to that of Alesina et al. In particular, it includes Malinke-Diula (called Mande by Alesina et al.), Dan, Kweni, and Gagu ethnic categories. Following both Alesina et al. and Fearon, we list a small Lebanese category.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the more important sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Côte d'Ivoire included Toungara (1995), ethnonet-africa.org, macotedivoire.info, and abidjan.net. We also employed two Ivorian consultants with expertise on the country's politics: a veteran political journalist and a prominent political historian. With the help of our consultants, we were able to establish the ethnicity of all 1,256 government ministers in our data.

It was sometimes difficult for us to identify the ethnicity of ministers from the north of the country. In particular, members of the Malinke, Senufo, and Dan ethnic groups often live in the same geographic areas and have similar last names. As a result, for some northern ministers, our sources provided inconsistent ethnicity information. For example, Kone is a very common last name among both Malinke and Senufo. Thus, Ibrahima Kone (minister of tourism between 1976 and 1980) was described as Malinke by some sources and as Senufo by other sources. This was also the problem in the case of Bangali Kone (minister of posts and telecommunication between 1974 and 1980).

In these and similar cases, we asked our consultants to verify the ethnicity of the ministers in question, and they provided us with more precise information. In fact, Ibrahima Kone is apparently a Senufo, and we classify him as such. In contrast, Bangali Kone actually has a Dan mother and a Malinke father. We therefore classify him as "one-half Dan, one-half Malinke."

5.5.5 Democratic Republic of Congo

Governments

Our data for the Democratic Republic of Congo contains information from forty-four lists of governments starting from the government in May 1961 headed by Joseph Kasavubu and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Joseph Kabila. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1961 and 2004, except for 1972

and 1974. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both March and November, while in 1973 it includes the lists of governments in both January and October.

Although the two 1970 governments are both headed by Joseph Desire Mobutu, their ministerial composition is quite different. Thus, using both of these governments in the analysis should not create much duplication. The two governments in 1973 are also headed by Mobutu. Moreover, the ministerial composition of these two governments is almost identical. In this case, in order to avoid using two similar lists of governments for the same year, one could use the list of January 1973 as a substitute for the missing list of 1972 (effectively assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1972 was the same as in January 1973).

Overall, our data for the Democratic Republic of Congo contains information about the governments that were headed by four of the six leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004. Only the short-lived government of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 and the one-week rule of Joseph Desire Mobutu in September of the same year are not represented.

Ministers

Between 1961 and 1966, the Congolese governments consist of a president, a prime minister, occasional deputy prime ministers or vice prime ministers, and a group of ministers. The 1966 government also includes one commissioner. The holders of all these titles are included in our data set of ministers. In some years between 1961 and 1966, the Europa publications also list a large number of secretaries of state. Due to the irregular reporting of these junior ministers, we exclude them from our data. Even so, the size of government during this period varies between only twelve ministers in 1965 and twenty-eight ministers in 1962.

Between 1967 and March 1970, the governments headed by President Mobutu consist of two governing bodies: Mobutu's Presidential Office (sometimes also called Presidential Secretariat) and the usual Council of Ministers. The Presidential Office includes a secretary and three or four chief counselors (sometimes called directors-general). The Council of Ministers typically includes ministers (with the most senior of them bearing the title of minister of state) and sometimes high commissioners with ministerial rank. The holders of all these titles are included in our data set, making the size of government in this period between twenty-four and twenty-six ministers per government. However, in November 1970 and in 1971, members of Mobutu's Presidential Office are no longer listed as part of the government. As a result, the size of government in these years drops to nineteen and twenty-one ministers, respectively.

Between 1973 and 1980, the Congolese governments have a more complex

structure and include two main governing bodies: the National Executive Council and the Political Bureau of the Popular Movement of the Revolution. Members of the National Executive Council typically have the titles of state commissioners and assistant state commissioners (alternatively called councilors and assistant councilors in 1973). Members of the Political Bureau of the Popular Movement of the Revolution are simply known as such. We include members of both governing bodies (which sometimes overlap) in our data set of ministers. In some years, the Europa publications also list members of the National Security Council as belonging to the government. In 1979 the names of all these members are reported, while in 1980 and 1981 we only know the name of the Council's secretary general. These individuals are also included in our data.

Due their complex structure, the governments between 1973 and 1980 are very large in size. They count between thirty-six and forty-nine ministers in 1973–1977, and then expand to fifty-six to sixty ministers per government in 1978–1980. As a result of the rapid increase in the size of the Political Bureau of the Popular Movement of Revolution (with thirty-seven members in 1980), in 1981 the Europa publications stopped reporting the names of its members (with the exception of the Politbureau's permanent secretary). Therefore, the size of government in our data drops to twenty-nine ministers in 1981.

Between 1981 and 1992, the Congolese governments are again rather simple. In addition to a president, they typically include a first state commissioner, several deputy first state commissioners, a large number of state commissioners, and occasional general commissioners. Between 1993 and 1996, the structure of the government remains very similar, but the ministerial titles change to prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and ministers. In 1981–1996, the size of government varies between twenty-one and thirty-one ministers per government.

Between 1997 and 2004, most of the Congolese ministers in our data set have the title of minister, although there are also several vice presidents (in 2003 and 2004), a group of deputy ministers (in 1998 and 1999), and a minister-delegate (in 2001–2002). During this period, the number of ministers in a government ranges from twenty-one in 1997 to forty in 2004.

Overall, our data for the Democratic Republic of Congo contains 1,354 records of government ministers with the average of 30.77 ministers per government. Our data has information for 515 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 2.63 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo consists of thirty ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.5 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. In

Table 5.5 Ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Kongo	Kongo	16	Kongo (speaking either Kongo or Kituba), Yombe, Woyo, Ntandu (= Tandu), Nianga, Ndibu, Besi-Ngombe, Mbom
Yaka-Pende-Mbala-Sonde-Suku-Kwese	Yaka	4	Yaka, Sonde, Suku, Pelende, Ngongo (with Songo), Pende, Kwese, Holu, Samba, Mbala (with Hungan)
Chokwe	Chokwe	1.4	Chokwe
Lunda	Lunda	0.8	Lunda, Salampasu (with Luntu = Konji), Ndembo (= Ndembu)
Luba	Luba	17	Luba-Kasai, Lulua, Luba-Katanga, Mulubakat, Sanga (with Yeke), Hemba, Kamyok, Tshiband
Songe	Songe	3	Songe, Binji, Kuba, Kete, Bindji (= Mbagani)
Bemba-Aushi-Tabwa-Seba-Lamba	Bemba	2.8	Bemba, Aushi, Tabwa, Seba, Lamba, Lala-Bisa
Rega-Bembe-Zimba-Bangu bangu	Rega	2.8	Rega (= Lega), Bembe, Buyu, Zimba (incl. Kwange), Bangubangu (incl. Kasenga), Holoho
Komo-Budju-Bira	Komo	2.3	Komo (= Kumu), Budju, Bira, Plains Bira, Ndaaka, Amba, Bhele, Mbo, Nyali, Bali, Lik
Teke	Teke	1	Teke
Yanzi-Dzing-Mpuono-Sakata	Yanzi	1.7	Yanzi, Dzing, Mpuono (= Bunda = Mbunda = Mbun), Boma, Mfin, Tiene (= Tende), Sakat
Bushoong-Lele-Songomeno	Bushoong	0.7	Bushoong (= Kuba), Lele, Wongo, Songomeno, Denges
Mongo	Mongo	7.5	Mongo, Nkundu, Ekonda, Ngando, Lalia, Ntomba, Bolia, Sengel
Tetela-Kusu-Kela-Nkutu	Tetela	3.2	Tetela, Kusu, Kela, Yela, Nkut
Ngala-Ngombe-Budja-Bangi-Ngiri	Ngala	7.8	Ngala, Ngombe, Budja, Lusengo, Ngiri (with Baloi, Libimza, Likila, Ndoboo), Bangi, Balob
Ngbandi	Ngbandi	0.8	Ngbandi, Yakoma
Ngbaka	Ngbaka	2.1	Ngbaka, Nzili (= Gbanziri)
Mbandja-Banda	Mbandja	1	Mbandja, Banda, Mono
Azande	Azande	2.4	Azande, Nzakara, Barambo, Pambia
Mangbetu	Mangbetu	2.7	Mangbetu, Asoa, Lombi, Efe, Lese, Mamvu, Mangbutu, Mvuba, Mayogo, Bangb
Lendu	Lendu	2	Lendu, Bendi, Ngiti (= Bindji)
Lugbara	Lugbara	2	Lugbara, Ngo, Logo, Avokaya, Keliko, Omo
Alur	Alur	1.4	Alur
Shi-Havu-Fuliru-Hunde-Nyanga	Shi	4.8	Shi, Havu, Fuliru, Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Joba (= Vira), Kabwari, Nyind
Rwanda	Rwanda	1	Rwandese Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, Mulenge
Nande	Nande	2.3	Nande (= Konjo)
Babwa	Babwa	0.8	Babwa, Ligenza, Ngelima, Pagibete, Kango, Bwela
Lokele-Topoke	Lokele	0.9	Lokele, Topoke, Foma, Lombo, Mbesa, Sok
Enya-Lengola-Mbole-Mituku	Enya	0.8	Enya (= Genya), Lengola, Mbole, Mituku
Other	Other	3	Jews, Hema, Zela, Senegalese, Portuguese, Tanzanian, Kaonde, Indian, Mba (= Manga), Kakwa, Kino
		100	

general, our classification is more detailed than the classifications of Alesina et al. (2003) or Fearon (2003), who list thirteen and fifteen ethnic categories, respectively. Since neither Alesina et al. nor Fearon name the specific subgroups that they include in each ethnic category, it is difficult to establish the exact correspondence between their classifications and our own. Nevertheless, we will now briefly discuss how our approach may relate to theirs.

Twelve of our ethnic categories have the same names as the categories used by Alesina et al. Some of these categories, such as Luba, Kongo, Chokwe, and Lugbara appear to be very similar across the two classifications. In other cases, Alesina et al.'s categories are more aggregated and include two or more of our categories. For example, Alesina et al.'s Mongo category seems to include our Mongo category as well as our Tetela category. Likewise, their Azande category probably includes our Azande and Mangbetu categories, and their Rwanda category may include our Rwanda, Shi, and Nande categories.

We also disaggregate Alesina et al.'s large "other" category, which constitutes 16.6 percent of the country's population in their data, into ten or so explicit ethnic categories such as Yaka, Bemba, Rega, Komo, Ngbandi, Ngbaka, Yanzi, and so forth. Each of these ethnic categories brings together several small and related subgroups based on the information in Murdock (1959, 1967) and ethnologue.com.

With respect to Fearon's classification, his Bakongo, Mbandja, Ngandi, and Ngbaka categories seem to be similar to the corresponding categories in our list. Like us (and unlike Alesina et al.), Fearon also creates separate categories for Mongo and Tetela-Kusu, although each of these categories appears to be more inclusive in his classification than it is in our data. Interestingly, Fearon decomposes Luba into the regionally based Luba Kasai, Lulua, and Luba Shaba ethnic categories. Yet, in this case, we prefer to follow the more traditional approach of Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and Alesina et al., and present Luba as a single ethnic group. Fearon also uses two other regionally based categories. His Kwilu Region category seems to include parts of our Yaka and Yanzi categories, while his Kivu Province category is probably related to our Shi category. Finally, with 17.1 percent of the country's population, Fearon's "other" category is even larger than that of Alesina et al. As explained above, under our classification it is effectively disaggregated into several explicit ethnic categories.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS and various online sources, the sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in the Democratic Republic of Congo included Artigue (1961), De Villers and Willame (1999), International Crisis Group (2000), MacGaffey (1987), Omasombo and Kennes (2006), Turner (2007), Young (1968, 1979), and different volumes of *Études*

Congolaises and *Études Africaines* du C.R.I.S.P. We also employed three Congolese consultants with expertise on the country's politics: a former minister, a prominent political historian, and a political journalist. Furthermore, we contacted several other ministers on our list and asked them about their own ethnicity. Overall, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 1,349 of 1,354 government ministers in our data.

Many of the Congolese ministers on our list have different European and African names, and we had to be especially careful in identifying these individuals and searching for their ethnicity. This issue was particularly common among the ministers of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, who were strongly encouraged to indigenize their names during Mobutu's Africanization campaign. For example, Edouard Bulundwe became Bulundwe Kitongo Pengemali, Jean Nguza became Nguza Karl-i-Bond, and Etienne Ndongala became Ndongala Tadi Lewa.

There is also some controversy about the ethnic origin of two of the country's presidents. With respect to President Mobutu, several of the sources in the 1960s erroneously described him as either Mongo or Ngala. Yet, there is now an agreement that Mobutu was an ethnic Ngbandi, and we therefore classify him as such. The case of President Joseph Kabila is even more ambiguous. Officially, his father is the former president Laurent-Desire Kabila (who himself had a Luba father and a Lunda mother, and is therefore defined as "one-half Luba, one-half Lunda" in our data) and his mother is a woman named Sifa Mahanya, who is reportedly a Bangubangu (a subgroup of Rega). However, there are plenty of rumors that Joseph Kabila is, at least partially, a Rwandese Tutsi. For example, some people claim that his actual biological mother is not Sifa Mahanya, but a Tutsi woman. Others accept that Sifa Mahanya may be his real mother, but insist that she herself is a Tutsi. Still others say that Joseph Kabila is an adopted son of Laurent-Desire Kabila and that both of his biological parents may be Tutsi. (We ultimately decided to rely on the official information about Joseph Kabila's ethnicity and code him as "one-fourth Luba, one-fourth Lunda, and one-half Rega.")

Sometimes, our consultants disagreed about the ethnicity of lesser known ministers. When two of the three consultants provided the same ethnicity, we usually classified a minister based on this information, ignoring the information given us by the third consultant. For example, we classified Kparagume Atoloyo (State Commissioner of Social Affairs in 1973) as Azande, even though one of our consultants suggested that he was a Ngombe. Only in very rare cases did all three consultants disagree about a minister's ethnicity. We then assigned the minister to each of the three ethnic categories involved. For example, Ngole Iliki (State Commissioner for Finance and Budget in 1983) was alternatively described as Mongo, Teke, or Sakata (which is a subgroup of Yanzi in our classification) by our consultants. We therefore

coded him as “one-third Mongo, one-third Teke, and one-third Yanzi” in our data.

5.5.6 Gabon

Governments

Our data for Gabon contains information from forty-four lists of governments starting from the government in May 1960 headed by Leon Mba and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Omar Bongo. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975.

Gabon had four leaders between 1960 and 2004. Both the first and the second terms in office of Leon Mba as well as the long rule of Omar Bongo are represented by the inclusion of their governments in our data.⁹ On the other hand, we do not have information about the government of Jean-Hilaire Aubame, who was the country’s president for two days after the 1964 coup.

Ministers

Over the years, the lists of Gabonese governments have very similar structure. They typically consist of a president, a vice president and/or a prime minister, a small group of senior ministers, a large group of regular ministers, and (in some years) a group of junior ministers. The senior ministers usually have the titles of ministers of state, although there are also some deputy prime ministers or vice prime ministers. Most of the regular ministers are simply called ministers, with occasional secretaries general to the presidency, personal advisors to the president, directors of the presidential cabinet, and so forth. The junior ministers bear the titles of ministers-delegate or secretaries of state. We include listed individuals with all these titles in our data set of ministers.

The size of Gabon’s governments varies between nine and fifteen ministers in 1960–1967, but rises to twenty ministers when Bongo comes to power in 1968. Under the rule of Bongo, the size of government continues to rise from twenty to twenty-five ministers in 1968–1974 to twenty-six to thirty-four ministers in 1976–1983 to thirty-six to forty-three ministers in 1984–1989. In the early 1990s, Bongo’s governments become smaller and have less than thirty ministers each. However, in the early twenty-first century, the size of government rises back to thirty-two to thirty-three ministers. Most of these annual fluctuations in the number of ministers in our data seem to reflect true changes in the size of Gabonese governments rather than differences in Europa’s reporting of junior ministers from year to year.

Overall, our data for Gabon contains 1,173 records of government minis-

9. Remember again that we count a new nonconsecutive term in office of the same leader as a new leader.

Table 5.6 Ethnic groups in Gabon

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Fang	Fang	30	Fang
Mbete	Mbete	6	Mbete, Obamba, Ndumu
Kota-Kele	Kota	8	Kota, Kele, Wumbvu
Njebi-Duma	Njebi	13	Njebi, Duma, Tsangi
Shira-Punu-Lumbu	Shira	24	Shira, Punu, Lumbu, Massango
Teke	Teke	4	Teke
Myene	Myene	5	Mpongwe, Orungu, Nkomi, Galoa
Tsogo-Kande	Tsogo	3	Tsogo, Bubi, Kande, Pinj
Vili	Vili	0.4	Vili
Other	Other	6.6	French, Maka, Benga, Senegales
		100	

ters with an average of 26.66 ministers per government. Our data has information for 185 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 6.34 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Gabon consists of ten ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.6 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

Our ethnic classification for Gabon is very similar to the classification used by the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) for this country. In particular, our Fang, Kota-Kele, Njebi-Duma, Shira-Punu-Lumbu, Myene, and Tsogo-Kande ethnic categories closely correspond to the similarly named categories of the DHS. However, following Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), we list Mbete and Teke as separate ethnic groups instead of using the aggregated Mbete-Teke category of the DHS. In addition, unlike the DHS, we split the small Vili group from the groups of the Shira-Punu category, which are usually considered to be quite different (e.g., see Murdock 1959).

Our ethnic classification for Gabon is much more detailed than that of Alesina et al., who list only five ethnic categories (including a large “other” category that accounts for 18.3 percent of the country’s population in their data). In contrast, our classification is a bit more aggregated than that of Fearon, who lists fifteen ethnic groups. Specifically, we differ from Fearon in that we: (a) unite his Mpongwe, Nkomi, and Orungu groups into a single Myene category; (b) unite his Njebi and Duma groups into a single Njebi-Duma category; and (c) unite his Shira, Punu, and Lumbu categories into a single Shira-Punu-Lumbu category. As explained above, our approach with respect to these groups is consistent with that of the DHS. It is also in line

with the approach of Murdock (1959), who uses relatively broad definitions of ethnic groups in this part of Africa.¹⁰

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, among the sources that we used to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Gabon were Lexis-Nexis, Ndombet (2009a, 2009b), *bdpgabon.com*, and various issues of *La Lettre du Continent* published by Africa Intelligence. We also employed a Gabonese consultant with expertise on his country's politics. Overall, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 1,167 of 1,173 government ministers in our data.

Given our decision to use separate ethnic categories for Teke and Mbembe, it was sometimes difficult for us to distinguish between the Teke ministers and those belonging to one of the Mbembe subgroups, especially the Obamba. For example, in the case of Jean-Pierre Lemboumba-Lepandou (Minister of Economy and Finance between 1980 and 1989), one source refers to him as Teke. But since the majority of our sources describe Lemboumba-Lepandou as Obamba, we assign him to Mbembe ethnic category. In contrast, in the case of Jacques Libizagomo Joumas (Minister of Public Works and Construction in 1977–79, and Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research, and Environment in 1980–81), we were not able to determine whether he was a Teke or an Obamba and as a result had to code him as “one-half Mbete, one-half Teke” in our data.

There is also a related ambiguity with respect to the ethnicity of President Omar Bongo. The vast majority of sources identify Bongo as Teke. However, some say that although his mother was a Teke, his father may have been an Obamba. Again, we chose to side with the majority and defined Omar Bongo (as well as his son, daughter, and nephews) as Teke, rather than as “one-half Mbete, one-half Teke.”

5.5.7 Ghana

Governments

Our data for Ghana contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in July 1960 headed by Kwame Nkrumah and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by John Kufuor. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and October. Both of the governments in 1970 are headed by K.A. Busia. They also have quite similar (although

10. Defining Mpongwe, Nkomi, Orungu, and other Myene subgroups as separate ethnic groups would also make it more difficult for us to determine the ethnic identity of the ministers who are described as Myene by our sources.

not identical) ministerial composition. Thus, researchers who wish to avoid duplication may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Overall, our data for Ghana contains information about the governments headed by nine of the ten leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004. Only the short-lived government of Fred Akuffo, who was in power from July 1978 to June 1979, is not represented.

Ministers

The structure of the Ghanaian governments and the official titles held by their members vary a lot during the forty-five years covered by our data. The governments in 1960 and 1961 consist of Nkrumah as a president and a group of ministers, counting fifteen and seventeen members in total. Between 1962 and 1964, deputy ministers are also added to the Europa's lists, raising the total size of government to between thirty-one and thirty-four ministers. In 1965, the last year of Nkrumah's rule, the deputy ministers are replaced by the ministers not in cabinet, which include two parliamentary secretaries with rank of minister, a special commissioner for Greater Accra, and an executive chairman of Accra-Tema City Council, among others. We include the holders of all these titles in our data set of ministers.¹¹

Following the February 1966 coup d'état, Ghanaian governments change their form. In 1966 and 1967, they consist of members of the National Liberation Committee (which include the president and the vice president) and members of the National Economic Council (which include the council's chairman). In 1968 and 1969, the National Liberation Committee is renamed as National Liberation Council, while the titles of president and vice president are replaced by those of the NLC's chairman and vice chairman. During this period, the size of Ghanaian governments rises from fifteen ministers in 1966–1967 to between nineteen and twenty-three in 1968–1969.

The governments headed by Prime Minister Busia in 1970 and 1971, in addition to himself, also include a large group of ministers (with an attorney general and a few ministers of state) and the country's president (or the three members of the presidential commission in March 1970). The size of government in these years ranges from eighteen to twenty-one ministers.

During the rule of Ignatius Acheampong between 1972 and 1978, the governments typically consist of two governing bodies: the Supreme Military Council and the National Redemption Council (with Acheampong himself chairing both councils). Members of the Supreme Military Council hold the military titles of chief of defense staff, army commander, navy commander, and the like. In contrast, members of the National Redemption Council are simply called commissioners, and they hold more traditional ministerial

11. In contrast, we always exclude Ghana's regional commissioners, regional secretaries or regional ministers from our data set.

portfolios. We include the members of both councils in our data set of ministers. During this period, the size of government rises from fourteen ministers in 1972 to nineteen ministers in 1974, and to twenty-five ministers in 1978.

The government in 1979 consists of two groups of people. The first group is members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, with Jerry Rawlings serving as the council's chairman and the head of state. The second group are commissioners of state appointed by the AFRC. The governments in 1980 and 1981 also consist of two groups of people: members of the Council of State and members of the Cabinet. Members of the Cabinet include President Limann, his vice president, and a large group of ministers. The total size of government is twenty-five ministers in 1979, but forty and forty-three ministers in 1980 and 1981, respectively.

Between 1982 and 1987, the governments consist of two governing bodies: the Provisional National Defense Council and the Cabinet. Most members of the PNDC do not hold any title (except for Chairman Jerry Rawlings), while the members of the Cabinet are formally called secretaries. In 1988 a third governing body, the Provisional National Defense Council Secretariat, is added to the government. Its members are also called secretaries. In the same year, the Cabinet is renamed as the Committee of Secretaries. As a result of this expansion, the total number of ministers in a government increases from twenty-five to thirty ministers between 1982 and 1987 to thirty-three to thirty-seven ministers between 1988 and 1992.

After the transition to a multiparty political system, the structure of the Ghanaian governments becomes much simpler. Between 1993 and 2004, the governments include a president, a vice president, and members of the Council of Ministers, most of whom have the titles of ministers (with a few senior ministers, chiefs of staff, and presidential staffers). Although the size of government in this period is relatively small, it gradually rises from seventeen to nineteen ministers between 1993 and 1996, twenty-two to twenty-six ministers between 1997 and 2002, and twenty-nine ministers in 2003 and 2004.

On the whole, our data for Ghana contains 1,140 records of government ministers with the average of 25.33 ministers per government. Our data has information for 362 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.15 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Ghana consists of twenty-two ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.7 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. The ethnic categories that we use in Ghana are more disaggregated than those used by Fearon (2003), who lists thirteen ethnic groups or Alesina et al. (2003), who list only eight ethnic groups. Since our ethnic classification is quite detailed, it relies on

Table 5.7 Ethnic groups in Ghana

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Ashanti	Ashanti	15	Ashanti (= Asante), Adansi
Fanti	Fanti	11.5	Fanti, Agona
Akyem-Akwapim-Kwah	Akyem	8.8	Akyem, Akwapim, Kwahu (= Kwawu), Akwam
Anyi-Sefwi	Anyi	2	Anyi, Aowin, Sefwi
Brong	Brong	5.7	Brong (= Abron = Bono) (with Banda), Ahafo
Nzema-Evalue-Ahanta	Nzema	2.8	Nzema (= Apollo = Assini), Evalue, Ahanta
Wasa	Wasa	1.4	Wasa
Asen-Denkyira-Twifo	Asen	1.3	Asen, Denkyira, Twifo
Guang	Guang	4.4	Akpafu, Lolobi, Likpe, Avatime, Nyingbo, Tafi, Awutu, Efutu, Senya, Cherepong, Larteh, Anum, Gonja, Nkonya, Yefi, Nchumuru, Krac
Ga	Ga	3.5	Ga
Adangme	Adangme	4.4	Adangme, Kroba
Ewe	Ewe	12.7	Ewe
Dagari	Dagari	4.7	Dagari, Birifor, Wali (= Wala), Lob
Dagomba	Dagomba	4.8	Dagomba (= Dagbani), Nanumba
Nankanse-Gurense-Tallens	Nankanse	2.9	Nannam, Nankanse (= Farefare = Frafra), Gurense, Tallens
Kusasi	Kusasi	2.2	Kusasi
Mamprusi	Mamprusi	1.1	Mamprusi
Bulsa	Bulsa	0.7	Bulsa (= Buli)
Sisala-Kasena-Other Grusi	Sisala	2.8	Sisala (= Isala), Kasena, Mo, Vagala, other groups of Grusi cluster
Konkomba-Moba-Basari	Konkomba	3.9	Konkomba, Moba (= Bimoba), Basari (= Nicham). Together these groups constitute Gurma cluster
Bissa	Bissa	1.2	Bissa (= Busansi), other Mande (incl. Bambara, Mandingo)
Other	Other	2.2	Scottish, Chokossi (= Anufo), Yoruba, Mossi, Hausa, Bowir
		100	

the information provided by Murdock (1959) and Ghana's 2000 population and housing census.

In the south of the country, we decompose Alesina et al.'s large Akan category into Ashanti, Fanti, Akyem, Anyi, Brong, Nzema Wasa, and Asen ethnic groups. This strategy is somewhat similar to that of Fearon, who also creates separate Fanti, Anyi, and Nzema categories, but unites the other five Akan groups into a single Ashanti category. Following Fearon, we also split Alesina et al.'s joint Ga-Adangme category into separate Ga and Adangme ethnic groups.

In the north of the country, we disaggregate the broad Mossi-Dagomba category of Alesina et al. and Fearon into Dagari, Dagomba, Nankanse, Kusasi, and Mamprusi and Builsa ethnic groups. Our Konkomba and Bissa categories are quite similar to Fearon's Konkomba and Mande categories, while the Sisala-Kasena-Grusi category that we use is not explicitly listed by either Fearon or Alesina et al.

In the east of the country, we list Ewe ethnic group and Guang ethnic category (which unites many small and related groups). This is similar to what is done by Fearon. Finally, both Alesina et al. and Fearon list Yoruba as one of Ghana's ethnic groups. However, since Yoruba is not mentioned in Ghana's 2000 population and housing census, we exclude this group from our ethnic classification.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Ghana were Adjei (1994), Allman (1993), Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh (2001), Baynham (1985, 1988), Bennett (1973), Kennedy (2009), Ladouceur (1979), Nugent (1995), ghanaweb.com, and modern ghana.com. We also employed three Ghanaian consultants (among them a former minister) with expertise on the country's politics. With the help of our consultants, we were able to establish the ethnicity of all 1,140 government ministers in our data.

We sometimes needed to make an extra effort in order to determine whether a minister was an Ashanti or whether he belonged to another ethnic group of the Akan cluster. For example, one of our sources erroneously described Prime Minister K. A. Busia as Ashanti, and we initially classified him as such. However, further search and the discussions that we had with our consultants convinced us that Busia was a Brong, and we consequently updated his ethnic classification.

In a few cases, our sources disagreed about the ethnicity of a minister, while looking equally reliable. In these situations, we split the minister's ethnic assignment among the two ethnic groups involved. For example, Erasmus Isaac Preko (deputy minister of communications and work in 1962–1964, minister of fuel and power in 1965) was a member of parliament for Kwahu North and was described as ethnic Kwahu (subgroup of Akyem)

by some of our sources. One of our consultants, however, insisted that Preko was a typical Ashanti last name, and that E. I. Preko himself was an ethnic Ashanti assimilated in the Kwahu area. We, therefore, chose to define E. I. Preko as “one-half Akyem, one-half Ashanti” in our data.

Another interesting feature of the Ghanaian data is a relatively large number of ministers with mixed ethnic background. When we found that a minister had parents of different ethnicity, we assigned him to both ethnic groups. For example, Alan Kyerematen (minister of trade in 2003–2004) has a Fanti mother and an Ashanti father; he is therefore defined as “one-half Ashanti, one-half Fanti” in our data. Likewise, President Rawlings is well known to have a Ewe mother and a Scottish father. We therefore code him as “one-half Ewe, one-half other.”

5.5.8 Guinea

Governments

Our data for Guinea contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in April 1960 headed by Ahmed Sekou Toure and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Lansana Conte. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1969 it includes the lists of governments in both January and October. Although the two 1969 governments are both headed by Ahmed Sekou Toure, their ministerial composition is quite different. Thus, using both of these governments in the analysis should not create much duplication.

Guinea had three leaders between 1960 and 2004. The governments of Ahmed Sekou Toure and Lansana Conte are extensively covered by our data. However, we do not have information about the short-lived government of Louis Lansana Beavogui, who was the interim president of the country between March 27 and April 3 of 1984.

Ministers

Between 1960 and 1968, the Guinean governments always include a president and a group of ministers. In some of these years they also include a group of secretaries of state, a group of ministers resident, and an occasional high commissioner. The holders of all these titles are included in our data set of ministers. In this period, the size of government in our data varies from only ten ministers in 1960 to as many as twenty-five ministers in 1962 and 1967.

Between 1969 and 1978, the governments take a slightly different form. They typically consist of a president, a prime minister (since 1972), a group of senior ministers, and a group of junior ministers each attached to one of their senior colleagues. Between 1969 and 1971, the senior ministers have

the titles of ministers, while the junior ministers are called secretaries of state. After 1972 the junior ministers also get the titles of ministers (with occasional minister-delegates to the presidency, secretaries-general at the presidency, and governors of banks), while the senior ministers become heads of their ministerial domains. All the governments between 1969 and 1978 also include a group of ministers in charge of Guinean regions. These ministers are alternatively called ministers-delegate to the regions (in 1969–1971), ministers of local development (in 1972–1976), or ministers of rural development (in 1977–1978). We include the holders of all these titles in our data. The size of government varies between thirty-three and thirty-seven ministers in 1969–1976, but rises to forty-one and forty-two ministers in 1977 and 1978.

Between 1979 and 1984, the Guinean governments are smaller, ranging from thirty to thirty-two ministers. They include a president, a prime minister, and a large group of ministers (with an occasional minister-delegate, secretary of state, governor of banks, or chief of staff of the armed forces).

In 1985, one year after coming to power, Lansana Conte eliminated the post of prime minister. Between 1985 and 1995, his Councils of Ministers tend to include himself as a president, a small number of ministers of state or ministers delegated to the presidency, a large number of ministers, and a few secretaries of state or high commissioners. Between 1986 and 1991, the Council of Ministers also includes four resident ministers for Guinean regions. In addition, in 1987 and 1988 the Europa publications list members of the Military Committee for National Recovery as belonging to the government. These individuals are also included in our data set of ministers. Partially due to the changing inclusion criteria, in 1985–1995 the size of Guinean governments in our data fluctuates between only eighteen ministers in 1992 and as many as thirty ministers in 1988.

Between 1996 and 2004, the governments typically consist of a president, a prime minister, and a large group of ministers. In some of these years there are also occasional ministers at the presidency (alternatively called general secretaries to the presidency or advisors to the presidency), minister-delegates to the prime minister (alternatively called secretaries-general of the government), and secretaries of state. In this period the size of government varies between twenty-two and twenty-eight ministers.

Overall, our data for Guinea contains 1,213 records of government ministers with the average of 26.96 ministers per government. Our data has information for 244 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 4.97 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Guinea consists of nine ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.8 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and

Table 5.8 Ethnic groups in Guinea

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Fulani	Fulani	39	Fulani, Futa Jalon, Fulakunda, Tukolor, Wassulu
Malinke	Malinke	29	Malinke, Maninka, Konyanka, Sankaran, Wassulu, Manya, Jahanka, Koranko, Lel
Susu	Susu	12	Susu, Baga, Landoma
Yalunka	Yalunka	1	Yalunka
Kissi	Kissi	5	Kissi
Kpelle	Kpelle	6.5	Kpelle (= Guerze), Kono
Toma	Toma	2.5	Toma
Mano	Mano	1	Mano
Other	Other	4	French, Lebanese, Koniagi, Sarakole, Wolof, Serer, Senegalais, foreigners from Benin, Gabo
		100	

some of the subgroups that they include. Our classification is slightly more detailed than the classifications of Alesina et al. (2003) or Fearon (2003), who list six and five ethnic categories, respectively.

Our ethnic classification for Guinea is in many ways similar to that of Alesina et al., and includes the same major ethnic categories such as Fulani, Malinke, Susu, Kissi, and Kpelle. It is possible, however, that some of these categories are a bit more inclusive in our data. For example, our Malinke category includes not only the main Malinke group but also the smaller kindred groups such as Sankaran, Konyanka, and Koranko. Likewise, our Susu category includes the small Baga and Landoma ethnic groups, which are largely assimilated into the dominant Susu population.

Furthermore, we disaggregate Alesina et al.'s large "other" category, which constitutes 11.6 percent of Guinea's population in their data, by explicitly listing three additional ethnic groups: Yalunka, Toma, and Mano. As a result, our own "other" category is much smaller, representing only 4 percent of Guinea's population.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the more important sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Guinea included Bah (1996), O'Toole and Baker (2005), webguinee.net, campboiro.org, guineepress.info, and various issues of Africa Confidential. We also employed a Guinean political historian as our consultant. Overall, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 1,209 of 1,213 government ministers in our data.

Some ministers in our list have the last names (e.g., Camara, Keita, or Toure) and the first names (e.g., Ibrahima, Mamadou, Sekou) that are very common throughout the region and can be borne by people of different ethnicity. In these cases, we had to be especially careful in our search in order

to make sure that our sources referred to the ministers in question and not to their namesakes. In other cases, the last names of ministers actually helped us to determine their ethnicity because these names were quite specific to a particular ethnic group. For example, Bah, Balde, and Diallo are typical Fulani last names, and our search indeed identified all the ministers with these names as ethnic Fulani.

Several ministers in our data have the last names of Diakite, Sidibe, and Sangare. Our consultant explained to us that people with these names come from the Wassulu region of eastern Guinea. They are ethnic Fulani who integrated into the indigenous Malinke people and adopted their language and customs. This explains why our online sources sometimes describe these ministers as Fulani and sometimes as Malinke. For example, one of our sources for Abdel Kader Sangare (minister of youth, sports, and culture in 2000–2003 and minister of the environment in 2004) describes him as a Was-sulu Fulani who is Malinke by culture and often considered to be a Malinke. Given this ambiguity, we chose to code all the Diakite, Sidibe, and Sangare in our data as “one-half Malinke, one-half Fulani.”

5.5.9 Kenya

Governments

Our data for Kenya contains information from forty-one lists of governments starting from the government in April 1964 headed by Jomo Kenyatta and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Mwai Kibaki. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1964 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December. The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Jomo Kenyatta. Their ministerial composition is also quite similar (although not identical). Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Kenya had three leaders between 1964 and 2004, and the governments headed by each of these leaders are represented in our data.

Ministers

The Kenyan governments tend to have a simple structure. They usually include a president (a prime minister in 1964), a vice president, a large group of ministers, and an attorney general (between 1965 and 1997). In most years the governments also include a small number of ministers of state in the president’s office and/or other ministers of state. In 1980 and 1981 one assistant minister is also listed as a member of the government. We include all these titleholders in our data set of ministers.

During the first twenty-five years of independence the size of Kenyan

governments rises over time from sixteen and nineteen ministers in 1964 and 1965, to twenty to twenty-two ministers between 1966 and 1979, twenty-four to twenty-nine ministers between 1980 and 1987, and thirty-three to thirty-four ministers between 1988 and 1992. The size of government then falls to twenty-three to twenty-six ministers between 1993 and 2003, but rises again to thirty ministers in 2004.

In total, our data for Kenya contains 1,010 records of government ministers, with the average of 24.63 ministers per government. Our data has information for 156 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 6.47 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Kenya consists of sixteen ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.9 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. Our ethnic classification is significantly more detailed than the classification of Alesina et al. (2003), who list only nine ethnic groups. On the other hand, our classification is quite similar to that of Fearon (2003), who lists thirteen ethnic groups.

Eleven of the ethnic categories in our list are exactly the same as those used by Fearon. In fact, we depart from Fearon in only two respects. First, we list Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu as separate ethnic groups instead of merging them into a single ethnic category. Second, we separate the relatively large Taita group (which represents 1 percent of Kenya’s population) from other

Table 5.9 Ethnic groups in Kenya

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Kikuyu	Kikuyu	22	Kikuyu
Meru	Meru	4.5	Meru
Embu	Embu	1.5	Embu
Luhya	Luhya	14	Luhya, Kakamega, Bukusu
Luo	Luo	14	Luo
Kamba	Kamba	11	Kamba
Kalenjin	Kalenjin	10	Nandi, Kipsigis, Keyu, Tugen, Poko
Kisii	Kisii	6.6	Kisii (= Gusii)
Mijikenda	Mijikenda	5	Giriama, Duruma, Digo
Turkana	Turkana	2	Turkana
Somali	Somali	2	Somali
Masai	Masai	2	Masai
Boran	Boran	1	Boran
Rendille	Rendille	1	Rendille
Taita	Taita	1	Taita
Other	Other	2.4	Kenyan Arabs, White, Goan

groups of the residual “other” category. These modifications are consistent with the ethnic definitions of Kenya’s Demographic and Health Surveys and Murdock (1959).

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the more important sources that we used to determine the ethnicity of ministers in Kenya were Ahluwalia (1996), International Crisis Group (2008), Khapoya (1980), Lafargue (2009), Throup and Hornsby (1998), mashada.com, and various issues of *Africa Confidential*. In the end, we were able to establish the ethnic origin of 1,007 of 1,010 government ministers in our data.

There is an ambiguity regarding the ethnicity of George Saitoti (minister of finance in 1984–1988, vice president in 1989–1997 and 1999–2002, minister of planning and national development in 1998, and minister of education in 2003–2004). Different sources describe Saitoti as either Kikuyu, Masai, or mixed Kikuyu-Masai. One of our sources is more specific and says that Saitoti has a Masai father and a Kikuyu mother. Other sources, however, maintain that Saitoti is a full-blooded Kikuyu who claims to be a Masai for political reasons. Given this ambiguity, in our data we code Saitoti as “one-half Kikuyu, one-half Masai.”

5.5.10 Liberia

Governments

Our data for Liberia contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in 1960 headed by William Tubman and ending with the government in 2004 headed by Gyude Bryant. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December. The two governments in 1970 are both headed by William Tubman. Their ministerial composition is also nearly identical. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Our data includes governments headed by all ten leaders who ruled Liberia between 1960 and 2004. In particular, even the short-lived governments of David Kpormakpor, Wilton Sankawulo, Ruth Perry, and Moses Blah are represented.

Ministers

Between 1960 and 1971, the Liberian governments typically include a president, a vice president, a large number of secretaries, an attorney-general, a postmaster general, and one or more directors-general or directors (e.g., a director-general of the national public health service). Between 1969 and 1971, they also include a chairman of special commission on govern-

ment operations. We include the holders of all these titles in our data set of ministers. Between 1960 and 1971, the size of government rises from twelve to thirteen ministers in 1960–1963 to fifteen to seventeen ministers in 1964–1971.

In 1972 the titles of secretaries are replaced by those of ministers. Thus, between 1972 and 1979 the governments usually include a president, a vice president (except in 1972 and 1973), and a large group of ministers. In some years, they also include one or two ministers of state, a chairman of public utilities authority, a director of the cabinet, and a general secretary of the True Whig Party. Before 1976 the ministers of justice and postal affairs are still called an attorney general and a postmaster general, respectively. As before, the holders of all these titles are included in our data. Between 1972 and 1979, the size of government continues to rise from seventeen to eighteen ministers in 1972–1973 to twenty to twenty-two ministers in 1974–1979.

In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, Liberian governments change their form. Between 1980 and 1984, they consist of two governing bodies: the People's Redemption Council and the Cabinet. Some members of the People's Redemption Council hold official titles such as chairman (Samuel Doe), co-chairman, speaker, commanding general of the armed forces, and so forth, while other members of the PRC are simply known as such. Most of the members of the Cabinet have the titles of ministers, although there are also a few directors-general (or directors). We include members of both governing bodies in our data set. Due to their dual structure, the governments in this period are quite large, ranging from thirty-one to forty-two ministers per government.

In 1985 the People's Redemption Council is dissolved, and the structure of the Liberian governments becomes simpler. Between 1985 and 1990, the governments include a president (a president of interim national assembly in 1985), a vice president (in 1989 and 1990), a large group of ministers, a minister of state for presidential affairs, and a director-general of the cabinet." In this period, the size of government varies between twenty and twenty-four ministers.

Between 1991 and 1993, the governments are much smaller and have only thirteen ministers each. They now include an interim president (Amos Sawyer), a group of ministers, and two ministers of state (for presidential affairs and without portfolio).

Between 1994 and 1996, the country is ruled by the Liberian National Transitional Governments. These governments consist of two bodies: the Council of State and the Cabinet. The Council of State has five or six members, including a chairman who is also the country's leader. The Cabinet includes a large number of ministers and a minister of state for presidential affairs. Members of both governing bodies are included in our data set. The transitional governments have between twenty-three and twenty-five ministers per government.

Between 1997 and 2004, the structure of Liberian governments is again rather simple. They include a president (an interim president in 2003 or a chairman of the national transitional government in 2004), a vice president (a vice chairman in 2004), a large number of ministers, and one to three ministers of state. The size of government is eighteen ministers in 1997 and twenty-one to twenty-four ministers in 1998–2004.

Overall, our data for Liberia contains 938 records of government ministers, with the average of 20.84 ministers per government. Our data has information for 272 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.45 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Liberia consists of fifteen ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.10 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

The ethnic categories that we use for Liberia are exactly the same as those used by Fearon (2003). Our ethnic classification is also very similar to the classification of Alesina et al. (2003), with the only difference that we list Mandingo and Vai as separate ethnic groups instead of uniting them into a single ethnic category.

Notice that our Americo-Liberian category is rather broad and includes not only the descendants of African American settlers but also those of re-

Table 5.10 Ethnic groups in Liberia

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Kpelle	Kpelle	19	Kpelle (= Guerze)
Bassa	Bassa	13.5	Bassa
Grebo	Grebo	8	Grebo
Dan	Dan	8.5	Dan (= Gio = Yakuba)
Mano	Mano	7	Mano
Loma	Loma	5	Loma (= Toma)
Kru	Kru	7	Kru (= Klao)
Krahn	Krahn	4.5	Krahn (= Guere), Sarpo
Kissi	Kissi	4	Kissi
Gola	Gola	4.5	Gola
Vai	Vai	3.5	Vai (= Gallinas)
Gbandi	Gbandi	3	Gbandi (= Bandi)
Americo-Liberians	Americo-Liberians	5	Americo-Liberians (incl. settlers from the Caribbeans, “Congo”)
Mandingo	Mandingo	3	Mandingo, Manya, Konya, Manink
Other	Other	4.5	Mende, Lebanese, Namibian, Nigerian, Ghanaian

patriated Afro-Caribbean and Congo slaves. Nowadays, the term “Congo” is sometimes applied to all these groups of people.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, some of the more important sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Liberia were Aboagye (1999), Ellis (2001), Kappel, Korte, and Mascher (1986), Lowenkopf (1976), Osaghae (1996), and theperspective.org. We also employed a prominent Liberian historian (and a former minister himself) as our consultant. With his help, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 929 of 938 government ministers in our data.

Before the 1980 military coup, Liberian politics was dominated by the Americo-Liberian political elite. However, some members of this elite had mixed ethnic origin, and we tried to reflect it in our data. For example, we found that both Joseph Rudolph Grimes (secretary of state in 1960–1971) and Charles Dunbar Sherman (secretary of treasury in 1960–1966) had an Americo-Liberian father and a Vai mother. As a result, we coded these ministers as “one-half Americo-Liberian, one-half Vai.”

The case of Gyude Bryant (chairman of the National Transitional Government in 2004) was in some sense the opposite. While the online sources described Bryant as Grebo, our consultant informed us that he actually had a Grebo father and a Congo mother. We therefore classified Bryant as “one-half Americo-Liberian, one-half Grebo.”

It was sometimes difficult for us to know whether a minister was an ethnic Gio (a group also known as Dan) or whether he was a member of the neighboring Mano group. For example, with respect to Roberts Norwann (member of People’s Redemption Council in 1980) and Losay Kendor (minister of national security in 2004), our consultant was able to tell us that they belonged to one of these groups, but could not provide us with more detailed ethnicity information. We therefore coded both of these ministers as “one-half Dan, one-half Mano.”

5.5.11 Nigeria

Governments

Our data for Nigeria contains information from forty-four lists of governments starting from the government in May 1961 headed by Abubakar Tafawa Bolewa and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Olusegun Obasanjo. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1961 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December. The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Yakubu Gowon. Their ministerial composition is also quite similar. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication,

researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Overall, our data for Nigeria includes the governments headed by eleven of the twelve leaders who ruled the country between 1961 and 2004. Only the short-term government of Murtala Ramat Mohammed, who ruled the country in late 1975 and early 1976, is not represented.

Ministers

Between 1961 and 1965, the Nigerian governments include a prime minister (who is the country's main political leader), a governor-general and commander-in-chief (in 1961–1963) or a president (in 1964–1965), a large group of ministers and a smaller group of ministers of state. The size of government in this period varies between twenty-five and thirty-three ministers.

In 1966 and 1967, the first two years of the military rule, the governments consist of: (a) members of the Supreme Military Council, (b) members of the Federal Executive Council, and (c) permanent secretaries of the various ministries. The head of state presides over both Councils and their membership significantly overlaps. In total, each of these two governments has twenty-nine members.

Between 1968 and 1979, the Nigerian governments continue to include the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council. As before, the Supreme Military Council has a president (called chairman in some years) and a group of regular members. During the rule of Obasanjo in the late 1970s, it also has a vice president. The Federal Executive Council, on the other hand, consists of a large number of commissioners. Members of both Councils are included in our data set of ministers. The size of government ranges between nineteen and twenty-one ministers in 1968–1974, but rises to thirty-eight to forty-three ministers during the Obasanjo's years in power.

Between 1980 and 1983, the governments have a simpler structure. They include a president, a vice president, and a group of ministers, with a total of twenty-six to twenty-seven government members each year. Between 1984 and 1992, the Nigerian governments again consist of two governing bodies: the Armed Forces Ruling Council (called the Supreme Military Council before 1996) and the National Council of Ministers (called the Federal Executive Council before 1996). The Armed Forces Ruling Council has a large number of members, including the country's president. The Federal Executive Council includes a president, a vice president (called chief of general staff in 1986–1989), and a group of ministers. As before, we include members of both governing bodies in our data. The governments have thirty-three ministers in 1984–1985 and between forty and forty-seven ministers in 1986–1992.

The Interim National Government of 1993 has thirty-two ministers, including the head of the government, a large number of secretaries and secre-

taries of state, an administrator of the Federal Capital Territory, a chairman of the National Planning Commission, and three National Assembly liaison officers. Between 1994 and 1998, the governments have a dual structure again. They consist of the Provisional Ruling Council (with chairman, vice chairman and ordinary members) and the Federal Executive Council (with a large number of ministers and ministers of state, and an occasional secretary to the government). The governments in this period are very large, ranging between forty-seven and sixty ministers in size.

Between 1999 and 2004, the Nigerian governments always include a president, a vice president, and a large number of ministers. A small number of ministers in the presidency and/or ministers of state are also listed as part of the government in some of these years. The size of government in this period varies between twenty-nine and thirty-four ministers.

Overall, our data for Nigeria contains 1,499 records of government ministers, with the average of 34.07 ministers per government. We have information for 473 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.17 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Nigeria consists of seventeen ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.11 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

We often needed to combine several related ethnic groups into a single ethnic category in order to avoid dealing with a very large number of small groups. To decide which groups may be related, we consulted the detailed ethnic and linguistic classifications provided by Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1989), Murdock (1959), and ethnologue.com. Despite our rather aggregate approach, our ethnic classification for Nigeria is more detailed than the classifications of Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), who list twelve and seven ethnic categories, respectively.

Eleven of our ethnic categories are very similar to the corresponding categories used by Alesina et al. Among them are such major ethnic groups as Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Fulani, Ibibio, Kanuri, Edo, and Tiv. We, however, depart from Alesina et al. by disaggregating their large “other” category (with 8.1 percent of population in their data) into separate Idoma, Igbirra, Gbari, Chamba, and Angas ethnic groups, each of which represents more than 1 percent of Nigeria’s population.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, we used a large number of sources to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Nigeria. These sources included Falola and Genova (2009), Nigeria (1967), Ogbontiba (1997), Siollun (2009), Sklar (1963), wikipedia.org, and allafrica.com. We also employed two Nigerian consultants

Table 5.11 Ethnic groups in Nigeria

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Yoruba	Yoruba	20	Yoruba (with Ekiti, Akoko), Itsekeri, Egba, Okun (with Bunu, Yagba, Owe, Ijumu, Kabba)
Igbo	Igbo	17	Igbo, Anioma, Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni, Ikwer
Hausa	Hausa	21.3	Hausa, Butawa (= Kudawa), Dakarkari, Dukkawa (= Zuru), Gerawa, Kambari, Ninzo, Shangawa, Jarawa, Jerawa (= Gusum, Guzu, Jerew
Fulani	Fulani	11.2	Fulani
Ibibio-Efik-Ejaghham	Ibibio	6.5	Ibibio, Efik (with Oron), Ejaghham (= Yako, Boki, Ekoi, Atam), Annang, Adoni, Ogoni, Mbembe, Agbo, Bendi (with Utugwan)
Ijaw	Ijaw	1.5	Ijaw, Kalabari, Okrika
Edo	Edo	3	Edo, Isoko, Urhobo (with Okpe), Esan, Afemai, Etsako (= Kukuruku)
Idoma-Igala	Idoma	1.9	Idoma, Alago, Yalla, Igala (= Igala), Afo
Igbirra	Igbirra	1.1	Igbirra
Gbari	Gbari	1.1	Gbari
Nupe	Nupe	1.2	Nupe, Kakanda
Kanuri	Kanuri	5	Kanuri, Bolewa (with Wurrkum), Bachama, Dera (= Kanakuru), Karekare, Ngamo, Ngizim, Bade, Tera, Tanga
Tiv-Jukun-Tigon-Mambila	Tiv	2.5	Tiv, Jukun (with Kuteb), Tigon, Kaka, Mambila
Bura-Bata-Margi-Matakam-Kapsiki-Gude	Bura	1.8	Bura (with Babur), Bata (with N'jai), Margi (with Kilba), Matakam, Kapsiki (= Higgr), Gude, Fale, Gwoz
Chamba-Daka-Vere-Mumuye-Yungur-Longuda-Jen-Waja	Chamba	1.5	Chamba, Daka (= Dangsa), Vere, Mumuye (with Bali), Yungur, Waja (with Awak), Jen (with Bambuka, Munga)
Angas-Katab-Birom-Borrom-Yergum-Mada-Koro-Gwandar	Angas	2.2	Angas (with Ron), Katab, Birom, Borrom, Yergum (= Tarok), Mada (with Eggon, Bijim), Koro (with Yeskwa), Gwandara, Jaba (= Hyam), Gomai (= Ankwai), Irigwe, Kagom
Other	Other	1.2	Shuwa Arabs, German expatriate
		100	

with expertise on the country's politics: a political historian and a veteran political journalist. Overall, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 1,486 of 1,499 government ministers in our data.

The Hausa and Fulani people of northern Nigeria are sometimes collectively referred to as Hausa-Fulani. We therefore had to be particularly careful in order to distinguish between the ministers from these two groups. For example, Muhammadu Buhari (Chairman of the Supreme Military Council in 1984–1985) is sometimes described as a Hausa-Fulani, and some sources even call him a Hausa. Yet the vast majority of sources indicate that Buhari is actually a Fulani, and we classify him as such in our data.

In a small number of cases, we knew that a minister was a Hausa-Fulani, but could not clearly determine whether he was a Hausa or a Fulani. In these circumstances, we defined the minister as “one-half Hausa, one-half Hausa Fulani.” For example, this was the case with Ishaya Audu (minister of external affairs in 1980–1983) and Usumani Maitamari (minister of state in 1963–1965).

We had similar difficulties with a few ministers from Kwara State, who were described as Yoruba by some sources but as Fulani by other sources. Again, we chose to classify these ministers as “one-half Yoruba, one-half Fulani.” We followed this approach with Ibrahim Gambari (minister of foreign affairs in 1984–1985) and Tunde Idiagbon (member of the Supreme Military Council in 1984–1985).

In some cases we could not find explicit information about a minister's ethnicity, but were nevertheless able to assign the minister to an ethnic group based on other available information. For example, we know that Alhaji Hashim Adaji (minister of state in 1963–1965) is a politician from the Igala area. We also know that he attended elementary school in the area and later worked for the Igala Native Authority. Furthermore, Adaji appears to be a common Igala last name. Thus, it seems safe to assume that Hashim Adaji is an ethnic Igala, and we assign him to the Idoma-Igala ethnic category.

5.5.12 Sierra Leone

Governments

Our data for Sierra Leone contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in 1960 headed by Milton Margai and ending with the government in 2004 headed by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1972 and 1975. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and November, while in 1973 it includes the lists of governments in both January and December.

The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Siaka Stevens. Their ministerial composition is also quite similar (albeit not identical). Therefore,

in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis. The two governments in 1973 are also headed by Stevens. The ministerial composition of these two governments is also somewhat similar (many of the same ministers are included, but they often hold different portfolios). In this case, in order to avoid using two similar lists of governments for the same year, one could use the list of January 1973 as a substitute for the missing list of 1972 (effectively assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1972 was the same as in January 1973).

Overall, our data for Sierra Leone contains information about the governments headed by nine of the twelve leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004. Only the few days in power of David Lansana and Ambrose Patrick Genda (both in March 1967) and the three-month rule of Julius Maada Bio (in early 1996) are not represented by their governments.

Ministers

Between 1960 and 1970, the governments of Sierra Leone tend to include a prime minister (with a deputy prime minister in 1961 and 1962), a governor-general (or an officer administering for governor-general in 1968), a large number of regular ministers, a few ministers or resident ministers for provinces, two paramount chiefs (sometimes with the titles of ministers without portfolio or ministers of state), and a leader of the House and government business (also as a minister of state). We include the holders of all these titles in our data set.¹² The short-lived 1967 government of Andrew Juxon Smith has a very different structure. It includes a chairman, a deputy chairman, ordinary members and a secretary-general of the National Reformation Council as well as a group of secretaries in charge of governmental departments. The total size of government is only twelve ministers in 1960, but ranges between sixteen and twenty-one ministers in 1961–1970.

Between 1971 and 1991, the governments typically include a president, a vice president (a first vice president and a second vice president after 1977), an attorney general, and a large group of ministers. In some of these years, they also include three resident ministers (alternatively called regional ministers or ministers of states for provinces), several ministers of state and an occasional leader of the House, or secretary-general of the APC. In 1971–1991, the size of government fluctuates between twenty and thirty-three ministers per government.

The governments of Valentine Strasser in 1992–1995 and Johnny Paul Koroma in 1997 consist of two governing bodies. The first governing body is called the Supreme Council of State under Strasser and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under Koroma. It includes a chairman, a vice chair-

12. One exception to this rule is Sir Maurice Dorman, the governor-general of Sierra Leone in 1960 and 1961. We exclude Dorman from our data set because he was a British colonial official.

man (or a deputy chairman), and regular members (with occasional principal liaison officers and a secretary general). The second governing body is called the Council of Secretaries. It includes a chief secretary of state and a group of secretaries of state. We include members of both governing bodies (which sometimes overlap) in our data set of ministers. In these years, the total size of government varies between thirty-one and forty ministers.

The governments of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1996 and in 1998–2004 have a simpler structure. They typically include a president, a vice president (except in 1996), a large number of ministers, two to three ministers of the regions, and a few occasional ministers of state. In total, these governments have as few as seventeen ministers in 1998–1999 and as many as twenty-eight ministers in 2002 and 2004.

Taken as a whole, our data for Sierra Leone contains 1,109 records of government ministers, with the average of 24.64 ministers per government. We have information for 288 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.85 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Sierra Leone consists of fourteen ethnic categories, including the residual “other” category. Table 5.12 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country’s population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. Our ethnic classification is very similar to the classifications of Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), who list thirteen and eleven ethnic groups respectively.

We use exactly the same ethnic categories as Alesina et al., but add a small Yalunka ethnic group to our list. As compared to the classification of

Table 5.12 Ethnic groups in Sierra Leone

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Temne	Temne	30.5	Temne
Mende-Vai	Mende	30.5	Mende, Vai (= Gallinas)
Limba	Limba	8	Limba
Creole	Creole	6	Creole (= Krio), Aku (= Muslim Krio)
Kuranko	Kuranko	5	Kuranko
Kono	Kono	3.7	Kono
Sherbro-Bullom	Sherbro	3	Sherbro, Bullom, Krim, and Bom
Fulani	Fulani	3	Fulani
Susu	Susu	2.2	Susu
Kissi	Kissi	2.5	Kissi
Loko	Loko	2.3	Loko
Mandingo	Mandingo	2	Mandingo
Yalunka	Yalunka	0.5	Yalunka
Other	Other	0.8	Afro-Lebanese, Bandi (from Liberia), Kro

Fearon, eleven of our ethnic categories are similar to his. However, we list three additional ethnic groups: Fulani, Mandingo, and Yalunka.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, the sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Sierra Leone included Ayissi and Poulton (2006), Cartwright (1970, 1978), Cox (1976), Fyle (2006), wikipedia.org, thepatrioticvanguard.com, news.sl, and apctimes.com. We also employed a former Sierra Leonean minister as our consultant. With his help, we were able to establish the ethnicity of all 1,109 government ministers in our data.

Many ministers in Sierra Leone (including several of the country's main political leaders) have mixed ethnic backgrounds, and we tried to reflect this fact in our data whenever we had the relevant information. For example, our sources indicated that Andrew Juxon-Smith (chairman of the National Reformation Council in 1967) had Creole, Sherbro, and Mende ancestry, and we coded him as "one-third Creole, one-third Sherbro, one-third Mende." Likewise, Siaka Stevens (prime minister and president in 1968–1985) had a Limba father and a Vai mother, while Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (president in 1996 and 1998–2004) had a Mandingo father and a Mende mother. We therefore defined Stevens and Kabbah as "one-half Limba, one-half Mende" and "one-half Mandingo, one-half Mende," respectively.

5.5.13 Tanzania

Governments

Our data for Tanzania contains information from forty lists of governments starting from the government in April 1965 headed by Julius Nyerere and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Benjamin Mkapa.¹³ Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1965 and 2004, except for 1972 and 1974. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and November, while in 1973 it includes the lists of governments in both January and December.

The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Julius Nyerere. Although the November government has five more ministers, a large number of ministers appear in both governments. Thus, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only the November government in the analysis. The two governments in 1973 are also headed by Nyerere. The ministerial composition of these two governments is also quite similar. In this case,

13. We also collected data about the ethnicity of ministers in Tanganyika before its unification with Zanzibar in 1964. However, since the ethnic composition of the Tanganyika's and the Tanzania's governments is not directly comparable, we exclude the Tanganyika's governments from our data set.

in order to avoid using two similar lists of governments for the same year, one could use the list of January 1973 as a substitute for the missing list of 1972 (assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1972 was the same as in January 1973) or the list of December 1973 as a substitute for the missing list of 1974 (assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1973 was the same as in January 1974).

Tanzania had three leaders between 1965 and 2004, and the governments headed by each of these leaders are represented in our data.

Ministers

In addition to the country's presidents, first and second vice presidents, prime ministers and deputy prime ministers, most members of the Tanzania's governments throughout the years have the titles of ministers. In some years, there are also several ministers of state or junior ministers. All these individuals are included in our data.

The size of Tanzania's governments varies between sixteen and twenty-two ministers in 1965–1971, and between twenty-four and thirty-two ministers in 1972 and 1991. It then briefly falls to twenty to twenty-two ministers in 1992–1995, before rising back to twenty-six to twenty-seven ministers in 1996–1998 and twenty-nine to thirty ministers in 1999–2004.

Overall, our data for Tanzania contains 1,016 records of government ministers, with the average of 25.4 ministers per government. We have information for 158 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 6.43 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of ethnic groups in Tanzania consists of thirty-seven ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.13 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. Our ethnic classification is significantly more detailed than the classifications of Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003), who list eighteen and twenty-three ethnic groups, respectively.

Some of our ethnic categories are very similar to those used by both Alesina et al. and Fearon. These categories include Ha, Haya, Yao, Gogo, Iramba, Masai, and Luo. Following Fearon, we list Nyamwezi and Sukuma, and Chagga and Pare as separate ethnic groups instead of uniting them into Nyamwezi-Sukuma and Chagga-Pare categories as in Alesina et al. We also split Alesina et al.'s inclusive Hehe and Nyakyusa categories into separate Hehe and Bena, and Nyakyusa and Kinga ethnic groups, respectively. In contrast, we follow Alesina et al. and list the Swahili ethnic group instead of using Fearon's narrower regional categories such as Zanzibar Island and Pemba Island.

Table 5.13 Ethnic groups in Tanzania

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Sukuma	Sukuma	14.4	Sukuma
Nyamwezi	Nyamwezi	5.2	Nyamwezi, Sumbwa, Konongo, Kimbu, Bungu
Ha	Ha	3.5	Ha
Rundi-Shubi-Hangaza-Rwanda	Rundi	3.2	Rundi, Shubi, Hangaza, Rwanda
Haya	Haya	5.9	Haya, Nyambo, Zinza
Kuria-Jita	Kuria	4	Ikizu, Ikoma, Kuria, Ngoreme, Suba-Simbiti, Temo, Zanaki, Jita, Kwaya, Kara, Kerew
Zigula	Zigula	2.2	Zigula, Ngulu, Kwere, Do
Luguru	Luguru	2.2	Luguru, Kami, Kutu
Shambala	Shambala	2.2	Shambala, Bondei
Swahili	Swahili	3	Swahili, Shirazi, Tumbatu, Hadimu, Pemba
Zaramo	Zaramo	3	Zaramo, Ndengereko, Rufij
Yao	Yao	2.8	Yao, Mwera
Makua	Makua	1.2	Makua
Makonde	Makonde	3	Makonde, Machinga
Gogo	Gogo	4	Gogo, excluding Kagulu
Iramba	Iramba	2	Iramba, Isanzu
Turu	Turu	2	Turu (= Nyaturu)
Rangi	Rangi	1.1	Rangi
Hehe	Hehe	2.7	Hehe
Bena	Bena	1.9	Bena
Sagara-Kaguru	Sagara	1.4	Sagara, Kaguru, Vidunda
Ngindo-Matumbi-Ndendeule	Ngindo	1.6	Ngindo, Matumbi, Ndendeule
Pogoro-Ndamba-Mbunga	Pogoro	1.1	Pogoro, Ndamba, Mbunga, Mbanda
Nyakyusa	Nyakyusa	3	Nyakyusa
Kinga-Matengo	Kinga	2	Kinga, Matengo, Pangwa, Wanjj
Lambya-Nyiha-Nyamwang	Nyiha	3	Lambya, Malila, Ndali, Wandya, Nyiha, Safwa, Nyamwang
Fipa-Mambwe	Fipa	1.5	Fipa, Mambwe-Lungu, Pimbwe, Rungwe, Tongwe, Bend
Chagga	Chagga	3.8	Chagga, Mochi, Machame, Vunjo, Rombo, Rwa (= Meru)
Pare	Pare	1.3	Pare (= Asu)
Iraqw	Iraqw	2	Iraqw (= Mbulu), Kyomi, Gorowa, Burunge, Alagw
Masai	Masai	1.3	Masai
Ngoni	Ngoni	1	Ngoni (= Magwangara)
Nyasa	Nyasa	0.5	Nyasa
Asians	Asians	1	Indians (Gujarati, Punjabi, Hindi)
Luo	Luo	0.8	Luo
Arabs	Arabs	0.7	Arabs
Other	Other	4.5	Tatoga, Digo, Bemba, Sandawe, Sangu, Manyema, English, Soma

An important advantage of our ethnic classification is that we disaggregate the large “other” categories of Alesina et al. and Fearon, which constitute 15 and 20 percent of Tanzania’s population in their respective data sets. As a result, we explicitly list several ethnic groups, which are absent from at least one of these alternative classifications. These ethnic groups include Rundi, Kuria, Zigula, Luguru, Zaramo, Shambala, Makonde, Makua, Turu, Rangì, Sagara, Ngindo, Pogora, Nyiha, Fipa, Iraqw, and Arabs. Some of these ethnic categories themselves combine a number of even smaller groups based on the information provided by Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1989), Murdock (1959, 1967), and ethnologue.com.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, the sources that we used to determine the ethnicity of ministers in Tanzania included Bakari (2001), Cliffe (1967), Iliffe (1979), Lawrence (2009), Mwakikagile (2006), Nyang’oro (2004), and wikipedia.org. We also employed two Tanzanian consultants with expertise on their country’s political history. With the help of our consultants, we were able to establish the ethnicity of all 1,016 government ministers in our data.

The ethnic origin of Tanzania’s third president, Benjamin Mkapa, is quite ambiguous. Some of our sources describe Mkapa as ethnic Ngoni. Other sources indicate that he is a Makua. Still other sources claim that Mkapa is actually a Machinga (a subgroup of Makonde). Given this ambiguity, we asked our consultants to use their political contacts in Tanzania and verify Mkapa’s ethnicity. In the end of their research, both consultants independently concluded that Mkapa was an ethnic Makua, and we therefore coded him as such in our data.

We classify the vast majority of ministers from Zanzibar as ethnic Swahili. We mean this term to include the indigenous population of Zanzibar and Pemba islands as well as the descendants of former slaves (regardless of their ethnic origin). All these people sometimes call themselves Shirazi and together constitute the bulk of Zanzibar’s population. They also tend to have some Arab blood due to their intermingling with members of the ruling Arab elite before the Zanzibar revolution of 1964. In contrast, our Swahili category is meant to exclude more recent immigrants from mainland Tanzania to Zanzibar and the small groups of pure Arab or Indian descent.

For example, Abeid Karume (president of Zanzibar and first vice president of Tanzania in 1965–1971) was the son of a slave woman from Ruanda-Urundi. We therefore classify him as Swahili. In contrast, Tanzania’s second president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, is an ethnic Zaramo who was born in the mainland but moved to Zanzibar in his youth and made his political career there. As a recent immigrant from mainland Tanzania, Karume is coded as Zaramo in our data. Similarly, we classify two Zanzibari politicians as ethnic Nyamwezi: Omar Ramadhan Mapuri (minister of state in the prime minister’s office in 2001–2003, minister of home affairs in 2004) and Abubaker

Yusuf Mgumia (minister of tourism in 1991–1992). Both Mapuri and Mgu-mia have Nyamwezi parents, but lived and worked in Zanzibar.

5.5.14 Togo

Governments

Our data for Togo contains information from forty-five lists of governments starting from the government in June 1960 headed by Sylvanus Olympio and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Gnassingbe Eyadema. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1960 and 2004, except for 1975. In one calendar year the data includes more than one list of government: in 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December. The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Gnassingbe Eyadema. They also have exactly the same ministerial composition, both in terms of the ministers' names and the portfolios they hold. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis.

Our data for Togo includes the governments headed by three of the four leaders who ruled the country between 1960 and 2004. Only the government of Kleber Dadjo who served as an interim president of Togo in early 1967 is not represented.

Ministers

Between 1960 and 2004, the governments of Togo always include a president and a group of ministers. In some years, they also include a vice president (in 1966) or a prime minister (in 1992–2004), one or two ministers of state (in 1960–1962 and 1996–1998), and an occasional secretary of state, minister-delegate, high commissioner or special advisor to the president. The holders of all these titles are included in our data set of ministers.

The Togolese governments grow in size over time. They have between eight and twelve ministers in 1960–1971, between thirteen and fifteen ministers in 1972–1977, between fifteen and nineteen ministers in 1978–1991, between nineteen and twenty-two ministers in 1992–1997, and between twenty-one and twenty-seven ministers in 1998–2004.

In total, our data for Togo contains 757 records of government ministers, with the average of 16.82 ministers per government. We have information for 199 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 3.8 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of Togo's ethnic groups consists of twenty ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.14 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include. We list more ethnic groups than

Table 5.14 Ethnic groups in Togo

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Ewe	Ewe	22	Ewe (Adan, Agu, Anlo, Aveno, Be, Gbin, Ho, Kpelen, Togo, Vlin, Vo), Igo (= Ahlo)
Ouatchi	Ouatchi	10.5	Ouatchi
Mina-Xwla-Pedah	Mina	6.5	Mina, Xwla, Pedah
Aja	Aja	3	Aja
Fon-Mahi	Fon	1.5	Fon, Mahi
Tem	Tem	6	Tem (= Kotokoli)
Kabre-Lugba	Kabre	14.5	Kabre (= Kabye), Lugba (= Lokpa)
Lama	Lama	3	Lama (= Lamba)
Nawdm	Nawdm	4	Nawdm (= Losso)
Moba	Moba	5.4	Moba
Basari	Basari	3.2	Basari (= Ntcham), Akasele (= Tchamba)
Gurma	Gurma	3.5	Gurma
Konkomba	Konkomba	1.2	Konkomba
Ngangam	Ngangam	0.9	Ngangam
Ana-Nago-Yoruba	Ana	3	Ana (= Ife), Nago (= Kambole), Yoruba
Akposso	Akposso	3	Akposso, Adangbe
Akebu	Akebu	1	Akebu
Anufo	Anufo	1	Anufo (= Chakossi)
Fulani	Fulani	1.3	Fulani (= Peulh)
Other	Other	5.5	Agnagan, Adele, Polish, Gabones
		100	

either Fearon (2003) or Alesina et al. (2003), who list twelve and six ethnic groups, respectively.

Even so, our ethnic classification for Togo is quite similar to the classification of Fearon and includes the same major categories such as Ewe, Kabre, Tem, Moba, Gurma, Basari, Nawdm (also called Losso), Aja, Akposso, and Konkomba. We depart from Fearon in only two respects. First, we split his Ouatchi-Mina category into separate Ouatchi and Mina ethnic groups, which are often considered to be distinct (see, e.g., Murdock 1959). Second, we significantly reduce the size of Fearon's residual "other" category (from 19.5 percent of the country's population in his data to 5.5 percent in our data) by explicitly listing the following seven ethnic groups: Fon, Lama, Ana, Fulani, Akebu, Anufo, and Ngangam.

Ethnicity of Ministers

Besides the WBIS, the main sources that helped us to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Togo were Brown (1980), Marguerat (2001, 2003), diastode.org, iciLome.com, and various issues of Africa Confidential and La Lettre du Continent. In addition, we employed two Togolese consultants: a former minister and a veteran political journalist. With the help of our consultants,

we were able to establish the ethnicity of all 757 government ministers in our data.

There is some controversy about the ethnic origin of two of the country's presidents. With respect to Nicolas Grunitzky, it is well known that his father was Polish, but the ethnicity of his mother remains ambiguous. Some sources say that Grunitzky's mother came from Ana (Yoruba) royal family in Atakpame, while other sources claim that she was a Kabre or even an Ewe. We asked the opinion of our consultants on this issue and both of them indicated that Grunitzky's mother was an Ana. Therefore, we coded Grunitzky as "one-half Ana, one-half Other." In the case of Sylvanus Olympio, some sources misleadingly describe him as Ewe, because he led a pan-Ewe political movement that aimed at uniting the main Ewe group with the related Ouatchi, Mina, Fon, and Aja peoples. Yet, Olympio is known to be an ethnic Mina, and we classify him as such in our data.

Olympio's example raised a more general concern that some of our sources could have used the term Ewe too broadly to describe the ministers who were actually ethnic Ouatchi, Mina, Fon, or Adja. To address this issue, we asked our consultants to verify the ethnic identity of all ministers described as Ewe by our other sources. In most cases, the consultants agreed with our original Ewe classification, but a few ministers had to be reclassified as either Ouatchi or Mina. In a small number of cases, our consultants disagreed whether a minister was a Ewe or a Ouatchi. We coded these ministers as "one-half Ewe, one-half Ouatchi" in our data.

5.5.15 Uganda

Governments

Our data for Uganda contains information from forty-two lists of governments starting from the government in May 1963 headed by Milton Obote and ending with the government in August 2004 headed by Yoweri Museveni. Our data includes at least one list of government for every calendar year between 1963 and 2004, except for 1972 and 1974. In two calendar years the data includes more than one list of government. In 1970 it includes the lists of governments in both April and December, while in 1973 it includes the lists of governments in both January and December.

The two governments in 1970 are both headed by Milton Obote. They also have exactly the same ministerial composition, both in terms of the ministers' names and the portfolios they hold. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, researchers may want to use only one of these two lists of governments in the analysis. The two governments in 1973 are both headed by Idi Amin. However, the ministerial composition of these two governments is very different, and using both of them in the analysis will not create much duplication. Still, in order to avoid using two lists of governments for the same year, one could use the list of January 1973 as a substitute for the

missing list of 1972 (assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1972 was the same as in January 1973) or the list of December 1973 as a substitute for the missing list of 1974 (assuming that the ministerial composition in December 1973 was the same as in January 1974).

Overall, our data for Uganda contains information about the governments headed by six of the seven leaders who ruled the country between 1963 and 2004. Only the government of Tito Okello, who was in power in late 1985 and early 1986, is not represented.

Ministers

Besides the country's presidents, vice presidents, prime ministers and deputy prime ministers, most members of Uganda's governments throughout the years have the titles of ministers. In some years, the governments also include several ministers of state, an attorney general, a secretary to the treasury or a deputy minister. The 1980 government headed by Paulo Muwanga is slightly different from the rest. In addition to the usual Cabinet of Ministers, it includes the Military Commission of the Uganda National Liberation Front with its chairman (Muwanga himself), vice chairman, and three ordinary members.

The size of Uganda's governments varies between fourteen and twenty-one ministers in 1963–1978, but then rises to twenty-three ministers in 1979, twenty-nine ministers in 1980, thirty-three to thirty-seven ministers in 1981–1987, and forty-three to forty-four ministers in 1988–1990. It then drops to between twenty and twenty-two ministers in 1991–1998, before rising again to between twenty-four and thirty ministers in 1999–2004.

On the whole, our data for Uganda contains 1,037 records of government ministers, with the average of 24.69 ministers per government. We have information for 205 individual ministers, with each minister appearing on average in 5.06 lists of government.

Ethnic Groups

Our list of Uganda's ethnic groups consists of twenty-six ethnic categories, including the residual "other" category. Table 5.15 shows the names of these groups, the percent of the country's population that they represent, and some of the subgroups that they include.

Our ethnic classification for Uganda is almost identical to the linguistic classification of Alesina et al. (2003), who list twenty-eight linguistic categories.¹⁴ Twenty-five of the categories that we use are exactly the same as those listed by Alesina et al., but we prefer to include the small Amba and Ruli groups into the "other" category instead of listing them separately. Our

14. Unlike their linguistic classification, Alesina et al.'s ethnic classification for Uganda is not very useful. It has only nine ethnic categories, including a very large (30 percent of population) "other" category.

Table 5.15 Ethnic groups in Uganda

Long name of ethnic group	Short name of ethnic group	Percent of population	Included subgroups
Ganda	Ganda	18.1	Ganda
Ankole-Hororo	Ankole	10.7	Ankole, Hororo
Kiga	Kiga	8.4	Kiga
Soga	Soga	8.2	Soga
Teso	Teso	6.0	Teso
Lango	Lango	5.9	Lango
Lugbara-Aringa	Lugbara	4.7	Lugbara, Aringa
Gisu	Gisu	4.5	Gisu (= Masaba)
Acholi	Acholi	4.4	Acholi
Rwanda	Rwanda	3.2	Rwanda, Bafumbira
Nyoro	Nyoro	3.0	Nyoro
Toro	Toro	2.9	Toro
Alur	Alur	2.4	Alur, Jonam
Konjo	Konjo	2.2	Konjo
Karamojong	Karamojong	2.1	Karamojong
Gwere	Gwere	1.6	Gwere
Padhola	Padhola	1.5	Padhola
Nyole	Nyole	1.4	Nyole
Samia	Samia	1.3	Samia
Ndo	Ndo	1.0	Ndo
Madi	Madi	0.8	Madi
Kumam	Kumam	0.7	Kumam
Sebei	Sebei	0.6	Sebei (= Kupsabiny)
Rundi	Rundi	0.6	Rundi
Kakwa	Kakwa	0.5	Kakwa, Bari
Other	Other	3.3	Indians, Ruli, Amba, English, Nubians, Avukaya, Mor

100

classification is also similar to (and slightly more detailed than) the ethnic classification of Fearon, who lists twenty ethnic groups. We include all the groups used by Fearon, but in addition also list several smaller groups such as Gwere, Nyole, Samia, Ndo, Kumam, and Rundi.

Ethnicity of Ministers

In addition to the WBIS, we used a large number of sources to identify the ethnicity of ministers in Uganda. Among the more important of them were Hooper and Pirouet (1989), Jørgensen (1981), Kahigiriza (2001), Kasfir (1976), Kiwanuka (1979), Mutibwa (1992), *allafrica.com*, *observer.ug*, *ugandansatheart.org*, and various issues of *Africa Confidential*. In the end, we were able to establish the ethnicity of 1,034 of the 1,037 government ministers in our data.

For a small number of ministers, our sources disagreed about their ethnic-

ity. For example, Juma Abdalla Oris (who held several ministerial positions between 1975 and 1978) was alternatively described by our sources as either an Aringa (a subgroup of Lugbara) or a Madi. In this case, the preponderance of the evidence convinced us that Oris was a Madim and we coded him as such in our data. When the conflicting sources appeared to be equally reliable, we chose to split the minister's ethnic assignment between the two ethnic groups involved. Thus, we coded Raphael Nshekanabo (minister of public service and cabinet affairs in 1975–1978) as “one-half Ankole, one-half Kiga” and Barnabas Kili (minister of education in 1973–1978) as “one-half Kakwa, one-half Lugbara..

To conclude, table 5.16 contains the set of summary statistics for all countries.

5.6 Implications and Conclusions

A substantial body of research, in particular the influential work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, 2012), has been emphasizing the importance of political and institutional constraints in the process of economic development. One of the main contributions of this stream of research has been to highlight how an approach solely focused on economic constraints has proven insufficient to the study of economic development. Instead, understanding political institutions and equilibria has proven an extremely useful complement to the economic analysis.

Our work follows this direction. Fewer regions of the world have experienced deeper political and economic failures than sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly and Levine 1997). Yet our understanding of African politics and political bargaining processes remains an issue still impervious to academic researchers and policymakers alike. This is mostly due to the natural opacity of political systems relying on “extractive” institutions and secretive elites. Autocracies are not governments notorious for their transparency. At the opposite, autocracies thrive in the secrecy of their inner operations. This means, for example, that international organizations or donor countries often negotiate with political counterparties obeying to incentives and operating within political environments that those international organizations or donor countries only partially understand. A usable mapping of power relations within African countries would allow a better delineation of the political fault lines across ethnicities. This would also help in predicting what type of political equilibria and alliances one may expect in the future. For these predictive exercises, however, we need data. Ours is an attempt at providing hard information useful in opening the black box of ethnic politics in Africa.

The open research questions for which these data may be relevant are aplenty.

Table 5.16 New data set of African ministers (the summary statistics)

Country	Period covered	Years missing	Years with two governments	Number of governments	Number of leaders in power	Number of government ministers	Average size of government	Number of ministers	Average number of governments per minister	Number of ethnic groups	Number of government ministers with missing ethnicity	Percent of government ministers with missing ethnicity
Benin	1960-2004	1969, 1975	1968, 1970	45	10	730	16.22	209	3.49	15	1	0.14
Cameroon	1960-2004	1969, 1975	1968	44	2	1,445	32.84	262	5.52	21	50	3.46
Congo-Brazzaville	1960-2004	1969, 1975	1968, 1970	45	7	918	20.40	240	3.83	10	9	0.98
Côte d'Ivoire	1960-2004	1975	1970	45	4	1,256	27.91	235	5.34	17	0	0
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1961-2004	1972, 1974	1970, 1973	44	4	1,354	30.77	515	2.63	30	5	0.37
Gabon	1960-2004	1975	—	44	3	1,173	26.66	185	6.34	10	6	0.51
Ghana	1960-2004	1975	1970	45	9	1,140	25.33	362	3.15	22	0	0
Guinea	1960-2004	1975	1969	45	2	1,213	26.96	244	4.97	9	4	0.33
Kenya	1964-2004	1975	1970	41	3	1,010	24.63	156	6.47	16	3	0.30
Liberia	1960-2004	1975	1970	45	10	938	20.84	272	3.45	15	9	0.96
Nigeria	1961-2004	1975	1970	44	11	1,499	34.07	473	3.17	17	13	0.87
Sierra Leone	1960-2004	1972, 1975	1970, 1973	45	9	1,109	24.64	288	3.85	14	0	0
Tanzania	1965-2004	1972, 1974	1970, 1973	40	3	1,016	25.40	158	6.43	37	0	0
Togo	1960-2004	1975	1970	45	3	757	16.82	199	3.80	20	0	0
Uganda	1963-2004	1972, 1974	1970, 1973	42	6	1,037	24.69	205	5.06	26	3	0.29

- Is the nature of African political failures a result of systematic exclusion of specific ethnic enclaves in the population? Or is extractive African politics the result of skewed redistributions of rents within ethnic groups (say, between the elite and the rank-and-file within each group)?
- Is personalistic autocracy the root cause of many African political failures or there is something more subtle than sheer ethnic clientelism at play in the tug of war between ethnic constituencies in government and in the opposition?
- What are the political constraints that autocratic leaders face in their bargaining process vis-à-vis coalition members and/or vis-à-vis opposition groups in Africa?
- What types of dynamics are systematically predictive of political collapses or transitions in African politics? What type of shocks bring down leaders and their ruling co-elites? Can the telltale signs be detected by changes in power sharing within cabinets beforehand?

There are also more direct policy questions of relevance for those interested in the process of economic development that we can begin to study with this data.

- Which specific ethnic groups are disproportionately more affected by political marginalization and exclusion in African countries?
- What types of political deals are usually struck between any given set of African ethnic elites? How can that be of guidance in hindering or favoring specific policy interventions in the field?
- What are the economic consequences for the population of political exclusion at the top?
- What really happens and what changes in the process of political bargaining within an African polity when its institutions become more democratic and inclusive? Can one detect pro forma changes versus real changes in the process of democratic power sharing?

The goal of the chapter is to provide a complete description and critical discussion of novel information, which might be useful for future research on the internal political organization of African emerging democracies, autocracies, and anocracies. Without systematic empirical evidence it is hard to fathom what exactly concepts like “extractive” or “inclusive” institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) really mean or imply.

More specifically, this chapter presents novel information useful to the analysis of power sharing among African ethnic elites based on the ethnic composition of ministerial cabinets since postcolonial independence. We first document the relevance of the executive government and its ministers. We discuss the cabinet’s role as a source of patronage and political rents for its members within African polities, but also as a potential source of internal instability for national leaders. We critically debate the relative weight of window dressing versus actual delegation of power in interpreting the cabi-

net data. We further discuss in detail the process of ethnic subdivision of the ministerial posts and the complexity of constructing accurate measurements of the ethnic membership of cabinets in each country in our sample.

Future research should emphasize the process of power sharing and its consequences on political stability for Africa. For instance, Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1989, 124) underline the role of power sharing and civil unrest by stating “often a response on the part of communal groups in national populations to elite instability which either fails to bring about a reapportionment of ethnic representation in government or a redistribution of other goods,” but systematic empirical evidence remains scant.

Although by far not a perfect proxy, we believe the use of government posts may provide useful insights in the inner mechanisms of otherwise relatively opaque political systems. We plan to present our first insights in Franco, Rainer, and Trebbi (2012a, 2012b), which this article complements. Franco, Rainer, and Trebbi (2012b) presents an analysis of the main patterns of allocation of cabinet positions to the various ethnic groups and offers a theory of the main constraints in the allocation of political influence based the threats facing the autocratic leader. Franco, Rainer, and Trebbi (2012a) focus instead on the process of political transitions and succession in Africa.

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