The common perspective of this conference, in my view, has been the “global public goods debate.” Four papers were presented on trade and three papers covered structural macroissues, such as financial regulation, the environment, and so forth, all of which form part of this debate. The most recent and topical aspect of global public goods is crisis management. Before that, however, there had been plenty of talk about the positive consequences of globalization in the last twenty to thirty years. Economic integration, free trade, export growth, and so forth, have all been seen as unambiguously beneficial for countries like my own. In India, we quickly bought into the globalization story and it paid off. In the last couple of years, however, we entered a different phase of the debate. Increasingly, the emphasis is on trade-offs, negative externalities, conflicts, crises, and so forth that we can collectively label the “dark face of globalization.” The most important single question today is how to deal with this “dark face.” More specifically, the issue of governance arises over and over again: how are we going to create mechanisms that help us offset these negative externalities while preserving the benefits? This is the broad perspective I have taken away from this conference. I would now like to make a few comments on four issues that have been raised during the discussion.

First, on crisis management, there has been a visible shift since 2008, when everyone was affected more or less evenly by the crisis, to more recent times, when fragmentation—some countries are recovering while others are not—is obvious. As currency wars and other frictions have emerged, the pendulum

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swung from the language of cooperation to one of open conflict. Even more moderate sources of concerns are important, such as the impact of liquidity on assets, in particular commodity prices, something that we have been particularly conscious of in India. Today, many of us have adopted an “us versus them” perspective. The single most important lesson is that cooperation is very difficult to achieve unless the shock is commonly felt. Another, more positive lesson, is that the G20 is a fairly effective forum for crisis management in the context of global crisis. We must recognize, however, that these global groups have limited purposes and they function effectively only within these constraints. After a while, they tend to get overly ambitious and finding a common ground gets increasingly difficult.

Secondly, on financial regulation, the general tone of the conference has been a glass “half full.” We have, after all, moved toward a common standard on disclosure practices and risk management. I generally agree with this view and in the current context we should be fairly satisfied with a glass half full because we are dealing with very different environments and capabilities. The Indian experience is illustrative: we have a large number of foreign banks alongside local ones expanding abroad. One of these large local banks without an obvious government guarantee suffered a minor run when its exposure to subprime assets became known. A large bank with a high degree of visibility and a relatively small exposure to toxic assets was sufficient to trigger nervousness. Overall, the shared risk in global exposure is driving the search for a new common standard where the same information can be obtained objectively by everyone and a sufficient capital buffer is built up to ensure sufficient liquidity when such a shock hits. But there are also important differences, particularly in a growth environment, when macroindicators, such as credit-to-GDP ratios, can become misleading. An overly rigid approach can hurt our stability objective despite safeguards and escape clauses. Nevertheless, the broad sense of shared risk and a common need for buffers is quite visible. The lesson, perhaps, is a minimalist or incrementalist approach: it is important to recognize that only those rules should be imposed on different countries that they can accommodate, rather than looking at an “ideal state” situation where the same standards are appropriate for everyone. Despite the relatively long time frame that the Basel III approach allows, incrementalism is the only way this process can move forward.

As for the papers on the global trading regime, I was quite struck by Kyle’s and Robert’s proposition on the relatively small benefits that the WTO has offered. This contrasts with Pravin’s argument on revealed preferences according to which countries seem to want to join trade agreements, whether multilateral or preferential ones. I had a bureaucratic hypothesis in mind to account for this observation, but there is perhaps a larger motivation. There is a sense of comfort with fairly objective, technically enforced sets of rules among the business community and governments alike. Based on the Indian
perspective, I wouldn’t agree that the WTO had any negative impact on us. In the last fifteen years since the WTO was born, trade has become a much larger share of our economy. Admittedly, the biggest benefits accrued from non-WTO-regulated trade in services, software, and so forth. Even more important has been the increase in labor mobility, allowing people to move to other parts of the world. Even so, the general understanding in India is that joining the WTO yielded substantial economic benefits. Charlene’s point on how quickly the US politics of trade can turn against globalization is very important. India has experienced quite the reverse: people see opportunities everywhere; Thomas Friedman is celebrated as a guru, and when John Kerry spoke against outsourcing in the 2004 campaign, public opinion quickly swung toward George W. Bush.

Finally, on the environmental debate, I agree with Lee’s and William’s point that it is highly difficult to get a mainstream political movement or even a platform around it. The leadership in the climate change process has shifted from well-known academics like Nick Stern and Joe Stiglitz to a group of more technical experts, putting technology at the center stage. The disadvantage of this, of course, is that it makes it more difficult to communicate the importance of climate change to larger constituencies. What is unique about the Indian context is that the high visibility of the consequences of climate change (deforestation, increasingly hot summers, changing patterns of rainfall, worries about water supply, etc.) have shaped the debate in a constructive way. It is very easy to attribute these phenomena to climate change, generating an increasing consciousness of the issue. Students, for instance, have completely bought the climate change agenda and they are the very people who may suffer the most from its consequences in the future.