Before considering the impact of the “Asian Miracle” on growth theory, I need to consider when the term Asian Miracle became common among economists and what ideas preceded it. I also need to review the concept of growth theory, tracing its origins and its evolution. This is not an easy task because of the complex way that theory, measurement, and the needs of economic policy have interacted in the work of growth economists since World War II.

Nevertheless, I believe there is widespread agreement that two papers by Robert M. Solow, both published in the second half of the 1950s are nodal points in the huge literature on the theory and measurement of long-term economic growth.1 They became nodal points despite the fact that similar growth models by others had been published about the same time. Solow (2007) has recently singled out a paper by the Australian economist Trevor Swan (1956) that embodied all of the elements of his model, but that had little impact on subsequent research.

10.1 Aggregate Production Functions, Total Factor Productivity, and Exogenous Technological Change

In his 2007 paper, Solow mused on this discrepancy. Why, he asked, did his paper become so influential? The way to do it, he said, was:

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1. See also Solow (1958).
In Europe, Jan Tinbergen, in a 1942 paper published in German, used a Cobb-Douglas function with an exponential time trend, which he interpreted as a measure of changes in efficiency for Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States. But Tinbergen's paper did not become known in the United States until much later.

(i) Keep it simple; (ii) get it right; and (iii) make it plausible. (By getting it right, I mean finding a clear, intuitive formulation, not merely avoiding algebraic errors.) I suspect that all three of these maxims were working for the 1956 paper. It was certainly simple; it didn't get lost in the complications and blind alleys that beset Trevor Swan's attempt; and it was plausible in the sense that it fitted the stylized facts, offered opportunities to test and calibrate, and didn't require you to believe in something unbelievable. (Solow 2007, 4)

In his 1957 paper, Solow applied a Cobb-Douglas production function to the explanation of the growth of U.S. output, with the astounding result that increases in the inputs of labor and capital explained only about 13 percent of the increase in output between 1909 and 1949. Eighty-seven percent was unexplained. Solow attributed this unexplained portion to improvements in technology, which he treated as being outside of the model; hence the term exogenous technological change.

From an empirical standpoint, perhaps the most important consequence of the Solow papers was to shift the attention of economists from labor productivity to total factor productivity as the principal measure of changes in economic efficiency or technological change. However, Solow’s analysis did not emerge, like Athena, fully grown from the head of Zeus.

Economists had been struggling with the concept of total factor productivity for several decades. Some such measure was, as pointed out by Griliches in 1996, much discussed in the 1930s, especially in connection with the National Bureau of Economic Research programs on developing time series in national income. This concern led the Bureau to launch projects that produced long-term time series on the measurement of capital formation in various sectors and in the economy as a whole. An interim report on the progress of this work was published by Goldsmith (1952). Bureau economists were constructing indexes of output divided by total input in the late 1930s, the 1940s, and the 1950s, and they identified such indexes as measures of the efficiency of the economy (see, for example, Copeland and Martin 1938, Stigler 1947, Fabricant 1954, Kendrick 1955).

Perhaps the most important Bureau paper on total factor productivity prior to Solow’s work was published by Moses Abramovitz in 1956 under the title, “Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870.” Making use of Simon Kuznets’s data on real national income, he estimated that real net product per capita had increased at an annual rate of 1.9 percent, quadrupling over the seventy-five years between 1869 to 1878 and 1944 to 1953. He also computed an index of all resources, labor, and various forms of property, weighted by their shares in national income. To his surprise,

2. In Europe, Jan Tinbergen, in a 1942 paper published in German, used a Cobb-Douglas function with an exponential time trend, which he interpreted as a measure of changes in efficiency for Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States. But Tinbergen’s paper did not become known in the United States until much later.
The Impact of the Asian Miracle on the Theory of Economic Growth

3. As used in this chapter, the term Southeast Asia applies to the first group of eight nations in table 10.2.

this index of inputs explained only 14 percent of the increase in output over the seventy-five years. The remaining 86 percent was due to an unexplained increase in productivity.

The results were not only surprising to Abramovitz, but also defied adequate explanation. He called the unexplained rise in total factor productivity “the residual,” and also a “measure of our ignorance.” He attributed much of the residual to errors in the measurement of the inputs. With respect to labor, he singled out changes in the age structure of the labor force, which concentrated hours of work at the most productive ages. He also noted the neglect of increases in skills and of investments in health and education and in on-the-job training of labor. On the side of capital, he emphasized the failure to measure the increased stock of knowledge, improvements in the organization and technique of production, and greater investments in research and development. He also pointed to, but did not attempt to measure, the contributions of increasing returns to scale, which Edward Denison later put at 10 percent of the increase in total factor productivity (Denison 1962).

10.2 Convergence and Divergence

In 1945, the idea of high-performing Asian economies was not in the mind of American or European economists. In the United States, economists worried about the problems created by the demobilization of over 20 million people (half from military ranks and half from war industries) and their integration into the civilian labor force. There were widespread fears that America might slide into a severe new depression. In Europe, the central issues turned around the Allied occupation of Germany and Italy and the restoration of the war-devastated economies. In Asia, the central issues were the demilitarization of Japan and the restoration of the nations that had been occupied by Japan. On the horizon were problems related to the dismantling of the colonial empires of Britain, France, and other European powers.

Several events between 1945 and 1950 set the stage for the political economy of the remainder of the twentieth century. One was the outbreak of the Cold War and the strategy of containing the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. Another was the rapid recovery of Western Europe and the transformation of West Germany into an ally in the anticommunist coalition. A third was the communist victory in the Chinese civil war that followed the defeat of Japan. Still another important event was the partition of India into independent Hindu and Muslim nations. There was also the emergence of newly independent governments throughout South and Southeast Asia that were each struggling to find its road to rapid economic growth.
As table 10.1 shows, the countries of South and Southeast Asia were at different economic levels in 1950, at the beginning of this quest. Japan, an occupied nation, had suffered severe reversals in fortune and had slipped to a level of per capita income characteristic of a low middle-income economy. Even the more prosperous Asian nations shown in table 10.1 had per capita incomes that were less than a quarter of that of the United States. In contrast, the war-ravaged economies of Europe were by 1950 already on their way to a quarter century of unprecedented economic growth that would raise standards of living, health, and life expectancy for ordinary people to levels that few would have predicted (Crafts and Toniolo 1996). Thus the stage was set for intense debates among economists and policymakers about the way to deal with global disparities. Among the points at issue were the virtues of centralized and decentralized planning and whether international trade was a handmaiden of domestic economic growth or an obstacle to it.

When Western economists began talking and writing about convergence in the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of their conversation was not convergence between the West and the East, but convergence between Western Europe and the United States. Immediately after World War II, the United States was by far the richest country in the world, not only by per capita income but also by total income. With just 7 percent of the world’s population, the United States accounted for a quarter of global gross domestic product (GDP) (Nelson 1991).

This does not mean that Western economists lost sight of the rest of the world. During the 1950s and 1960s, they developed an increasing interest in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita Income (1950)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>439*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2,218**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>840**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
<td>770**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1,559**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2,219**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>936**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>817**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>619*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,926**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,270***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,881***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,502**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6,907***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9,561***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Rank by World Bank standards of 1990: *low-income; **lower-middle income; ***upper-middle income.
the progress of the ex-colonies of Asia, particularly India and China. The political leadership of both countries was heavily influenced by the Soviet model of centralized planning. Both countries developed successive five-year plans for the economic growth of their countries. These plans sought rapid economic growth by placing special emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry. Both taxed rural areas to subsidize cities and urban industries.

However, India sought to achieve its objectives under a political democracy, in which some industries would have government backing but the bulk of economic production and distribution would be left to the private sector. It also embarked on a protectionist policy aimed at promoting infant industries. New financial institutions were set up that placed the supply of capital largely under the control of the government, which directed investment into sectors given prominence by the plan. The first five-year plan, which ran from 1951 to 1956, was successful in meeting its goals, and private enterprise expanded. As indicated by table 10.2, the annual rate of growth in per capita income during the plan was in the neighborhood of 2 percent. However, annual net investment was in the neighborhood of just 6 or 7 percent (Pepelases, Mears, and Adelman 1961; Malenbaum 1959, 1982).

By the early 1960s, the Indian economy began to stumble. Not all of the problems were due to errors by policymakers. Some problems arose from border clashes with Pakistan and China. Some of the food shortages were due to droughts. But the main pressure on the food supply was due to explosive growth of population as mortality rates fell sharply. As a result of the successful public health measures undertaken during the 1950s and 1960s, such killer diseases as cholera, malaria, and smallpox were brought under control, helping life expectancy at birth to rise from thirty-two to fifty-one years between 1950 and 1968 (Chandrasekhar 1968). Moreover, growth of per capita income also raised the demand for food, putting upward pressure on food prices that pinched both the urban and rural poor. Government efforts at land reform may actually have increased rural inequality (Mellor et al. 1968; Blyn 1971). Attempts at government-controlled industrialization thwarted private investment and promoted uncompetitive enterprises (Shenoy 1968; Sklaeiwitz 1966; Healy 1972; Bhagwati and Chakravarty 1969). As a result, Indian growth slipped badly during the first half of the 1960s (see table 10.2).

Although India and China were the cases most frequently discussed by economists, attention was also paid to other nations in Southeast Asia. During the 1960s, there was considerable pessimism about Indonesia’s future. Although there was a spurt of economic growth immediately after independence, during which the nation recovered from the setbacks associated with the Japanese occupation, the economy stagnated between 1955 and 1965, a period long enough to make economists wonder if Indonesia could overcome its problems (Mears 1961). Beginning with the mid-1960s, how-
ever, the country began vigorous growth that lasted for three decades (see table 10.2). Malaysia and Singapore also stagnated during the decade of the 1950s, contributing to the sense among some Western economists that adverse institutional factors might thwart their development. But in these countries, fortunes changed decisively in the 1960s.

Table 10.2 shows that eight Southeast Asian nations all grew vigorously from 1965 on, and that several of them (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand) had vigorous economic growth throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, their growth rates far exceeded the previous growth rates of the industrialized countries. Few American or European economists anticipated growth rates that would double, triple, or quadruple the long-term rates of the industrial leaders between 1820 and 1950.

The most startling change of fortune was in Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War, United Nations forces placed large orders with Japan, greatly stimulating its industrial growth. Even after the end of fighting, Japan's economy benefited from large orders for the buildup of the U.S. military establishment in the Pacific region. The Japanese export boom powered the dramatic rise in the Japanese economy. In one industry after another, including scientific instruments, cameras, sewing machines, and shipbuilding, Japanese firms displayed their command of the latest technology. During the 1960s, Japan moved from producing under a half million cars to becoming the world's second-largest supplier, displacing Germany and France, among others. The rise of auto production helped promote the expansion of steel and moved the country toward world preeminence in that basic product (Allen 1972). As table 10.2 shows, from 1950 through 1970, the growth of Japanese per capita income exceeded that of all the other high-performing economies. In the space of two decades, Japanese per capita income increased more than fivefold, a feat that had required more than a century for the nations that led the industrial revolution (Kuznets 1971a; Maddison 1995). Although the growth of Japanese per capita income slowed after 1970, it still increased by about 40 percent between 1970 and 1980, making it the second largest economy in the world, bigger than France and the United Kingdom combined (Maddison 1995).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many analysts became alarmed at what appeared to be the unchecked growth of population in Asia. It was widely predicted that such growth would not only swamp the capacity of South and Southeast Asia to feed itself, but would also smother the tenuous economic growth of the region. In the 1950s, many demographers had predicted that population growth would moderate because a decline in fertility would soon follow the decline in the death rate, which had caused the Asian population explosion. That view was called the theory of the demographic transition. But fertility rates remained high through the end of the 1960s, causing some demographers to declare that the theory of the demographic transition was dead (Coale 1975). As it turned out, that gloomy forecast was
Table 10.2  Average annual percentage rates of growth in per capita income 10 HPAEs compared with 5 rich nations by quinquenna, 1950–2005

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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>–1.3</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>–0.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


incorrect. As Table 10.3 shows, between 1970 and 1980, total fertility rates fell sharply in all Southeast Asian nations. Today all of these nations, except for Malaysia and Indonesia, have total fertility rates below replacement. Indeed, fertility rates in most of these nations are below the fertility rates of three of the five rich nations shown in Table 10.3.

The forecast that Southeast Asia would be unable to feed itself because of the unbridled growth of population also turned out to be erroneous. Table 10.4 shows the food situation throughout South and Southeast Asia in 1961. Per capita consumption of calories in China, even after the famine, was at or below the level of consumption in England and France toward the end of the eighteenth century (Floud et al., forthcoming). The same desperate situation prevailed in India, Thailand, and Korea. By 2000, the food situation had changed dramatically. Despite the erroneous agricultural policies that precipitated the famine of 1960 and 1961, and again slowed agriculture during the “Cultural Revolution” of 1966 to 1967, China’s progress in agriculture between 1962 and 2000 has been remarkable (Clark 1976; Lin 1998). China not only found a way to feed itself, but did so well enough to increase its average daily consumption of calories by 73 percent, despite the near doubling of its population. Although not as dramatic, there were also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.3</th>
<th>Secular trends in total fertility rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.08</td>
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Sources: Keyfitz and Flieger (1990); Population Reference Bureau (see http://www.prb.org/datafinder/datfinder.htm; World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (see http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm); CIA World Factbook (see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).

a1951
b1961
c1962
d1981
substantial gains in caloric consumption in the rest of South and Southeast Asia, ranging from 12 to 68 percent. Another point worth noting is the improvement in the quality of the diet, as indicated by the increase in the proportion of nutrients coming from animals. In China, the rise was from under 4 to over 19 percent of total caloric consumption. Only Indonesia and India still have levels of the consumption of animal products that hearken back to eighteenth-century conditions in England and France (Floud et al., forthcoming). Still another problem is the unequal distribution of food in many of the nations of South and Southeast Asia. In these countries, the proportion of low birth weights is still high, which implies the early onset of chronic disabilities at middle and late ages, a problem that will contribute to the high cost of medical care for the elderly in future years (Barker 1998; Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001; Fogel 2003, 2004b).

Let us now consider expectations of economic growth right after World War II, viewing them from the standpoint of the present. At the close of World War II, there were wide-ranging debates about the future of capitalist economies that pivoted on the Keynesian proposition that a macroeconomic equilibrium is possible at less than full employment and, in particular, the interpretation of that proposition by Alvin Hansen in his 1938 presidential address to the American Economic Association (Hansen 1939). Hansen argued that secular stagnation was likely because of: (1) the end of the frontier, (2) the end of rapid population increase, and (3) the end of capital-

### Table 10.4 Trends in caloric consumption

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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>2,940</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td>17.9</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>2,473</td>
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<td>19.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3,194</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>3,623</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>3,663</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,883</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>3,754</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>2,809</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*1962
intensive technological change. The key issue, as the stagnationists defined it, was not whether the growth of the GDP would come to an end, but whether a high level of government spending was necessary to prevent a high level of permanent unemployment, even if GDP did grow.

That such a debate would erupt in anticipation of peace is not surprising. The alarm about massive unemployment was widespread in 1943 and 1944 because the country was demobilizing over 11 million soldiers from the armed forces and there were some 9 million or more workers in defense industries that were simultaneously being let go. So there were about 21 million people thrown on a job market of about 60 million, including the armed forces and the defense establishment (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1955, table 220). But as it turned out, the recession of 1945 only lasted eight months and was followed by a robust expansion that lasted thirty-seven months. Moreover, the recession of 1949 and 1950 lasted eleven months and was followed by another robust expansion that lasted forty-five months (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003, table 771). The peak came in 1953 after the economy had already absorbed 20 million potentially unemployed workers, and unemployment was below 3 percent by 1953. Total civilian employment was up by 15 percent over the wartime peak (Bratt 1953).

Although unemployment remained over 5 percent during some of the years of the long 106-month Kennedy-Johnson expansion, it dropped to 3.5 percent in 1969. So even a quarter of a century after the war, there were still economists who believed that the United States could not have an economy with both growth and low unemployment unless there was a very big government sector. By the late 1950s, the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were well into the post–World War II expansion, now called “the Golden Age,” with growth rates twice the long-term average of the world leaders during 1840 to 1940. Measured by per capita income, the long-term average growth rate of the leaders prior to 1940 was about 1.9 percent per annum and the growth rate during the Golden Age was, for Western Europe, about 3.8 percent (Kuznets 1971a; Maddison 1995; Crafts and Toniolo 1996). Over the whole period from 1950 to 1999, expansion multiples for GDP averaged about fivefold in Western Europe and the United States (see table 10.5). The wide-ranging debates over the causes for the accelerated growth rates of the Golden Age suggested some points of consensus. These included the reduction of barriers to international trade, successful macroeconomic policies, and opportunities for catch-up growth following the end of World War II, especially in France, Germany, and Italy. The destruction of much of the prewar capital stock, the reconstruction aid that rebuilt industry with a more advanced technology, the successes of macroeconomic policy, the elasticity of the labor supply, high levels of education, and the weakness of vested interests have all been advanced as explanatory factors (Abramovitz 1990;
The eventual fading away of the stagnation thesis, of the notion that there was something in the operation of capitalistic economies that made them inherently unstable, brought to the fore several new concerns. These included the growing gap in income between developed and less developed nations, and a new emphasis on cultural and ideological barriers to economic growth in poor countries. In contrast to some of the early theories associated with the Harrod-Domar model, which suggested that poor countries would grow rapidly if there were large injections of capital from rich countries, by the 1960s the emphasis was that the export of capital would fail to promote growth unless the deep cultural barriers that made these countries unreceptive to the conditions needed for economic growth were somehow overcome. Some commentators, most notably Gunnar Myrdal, in his three-volume work on the Asian economies, said that India would have difficulty in sustaining high growth because it promoted asceticism and thus undermined the acquisitive culture that spurred Western Europe (Myrdal 1968; Lau 1969).

There was also a shift from worries about oversaving, which I must say,

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**Table 10.5 Expansion multiples of GDP for 15 economies 1950–1999 (ratio of GDP in 1999 to GDP in 1950, international dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 European Nations</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>25.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>28.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>9.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>38.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>36.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>46.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>23.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td>24.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* Maddison (2001); World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (see [http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm)).

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4. When the value of increased longevity and improved health are added to GDP, growth rates increase significantly (Fogel 1989b, 2000, 2004a; Murphy and Topel 2005).
never caught on at certain universities. It did not catch on at Chicago or at Columbia. Nor did it catch on at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Analysts such as Simon Kuznets, Arthur Burns, and others thought that savings were not a threat to economic growth, but were a necessary condition for economic growth because you needed the savings to build both infrastructure in developing countries and also to get a thriving public sector growing (Kuznets 1961; Colm 1962; interview with P. A. Samuelson, conducted by Robert W. Fogel and Enid Fogel, taped recording, 1992).

There was, about this time, a new emphasis on export-led growth. The practice of poor countries selling their exports to rich countries got a bad name during the interwar period and was widely viewed as exploitation of these countries by imperial powers. The later view, looking at the Canadian and American experiences, was quite the contrary (North 1966; Kravis 1970). Selling raw materials and other labor-intensive products to the rest of the world is a way to get capital and entrepreneurship from the developed countries to provide those same talents and qualities to the less-developed countries. One of the great discoveries of economic historians during the 1960s and confirmed in the 1980s and 1990s was that the Hobson-Hilferding-Lenin thesis that English coupon-clippers got rich from investments in poor countries such as India, and then withdrew large sums of annual earnings, was wrong. After the computer revolution, it was possible to put the whole late nineteenth-century portfolio of British overseas investments into machine-readable form (Simon 1970; Davis and Huttenback 1986; Stone 1999). Lo and behold, it turned out that there was a strong correlation between a country’s per capita income and the share of the British overseas portfolio invested in it. The United States received the largest share, followed by Canada and Argentina (which at the turn of the twentieth century had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world). Of course, that did not stop diehard critics of Western imperialism, who then denounced Britain for failing to have invested in underdeveloped nations (Davis and Huttenback 1986).

10.3 The Asian Miracle

As remarkable as what was widely forecast in the post–World War II debates were the things not foreseen in the 1940s, 1950s, or even the early 1960s. One of these was the extraordinary economic growth in Southeast and East Asia, beginning first with Japan, which in four decades went from a poor, defeated country to the second largest economy in the world, increasing per capita income tenfold. This was a feat that took leaders of the industrial revolution about 150 years to accomplish (Kuznets 1971a). The economic miracle of the high-performing Asian economies other than Japan was also unforeseen, and that state of mind persisted into the 1970s. It was not that economists did not know that per capita income was rising,
but there was a widespread opinion that it could not last, that somehow it was a fluke. That view was based on the uneven economic performances of several of the Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia, for example, had some catch-up growth during the first half of the 1950s but faltered in the 1960s. Of the “Four Asian Dragons,” only Taiwan did better than Italy or Germany between 1950 and 1970 (see table 10.2). The idea that all of the Southeast Asian nations, including China, were in the midst of an unprecedented expansion that might affect the global economic balance did not emerge until the early 1990s.

So, except for Japan, there was little excitement about the growth rates elsewhere in East Asia until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when some analysts began taking note of the Korean economic miracle (gross national product [GNP] per capita tripled in less than two decades) (Krishnan 1982) and comparable accelerations in the growth rates of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. These four economies began to be called the “Four Asian Dragons” or the “Four Asian Tigers” (Hicks 1989).

The phrase “Southeast/East Asian Economic Miracle” and the acronym HPAE (for high-performing Asian economies) were added to the economic lexicon by the World Bank when it published a book, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, in 1993. The term was almost immediately embraced by economists, some of whom felt it neatly summarized a new phase of global economic development, and by a few, such as Paul Krugman, who wrote a paper titled “The Myth of the Asian Miracle” (1994), arguing that the marginal productivity of capital would soon decline because the miracle depended mainly on investment in capital and not on efficiency growth. In later work, Krugman modified his predictions (1998, Krugman and Wells 2005), allowing for a longer period of growth, but still maintaining his earlier skepticism.

However, Chinese economic growth did not slow down for reasons delineated by Abramovitz in his 1956 paper. The new investments embodied new technologies that greatly improved the efficiency of the productive process. Moreover, China invested heavily in raising the educational level of the population, concentrating first on primary education. As early as 1980, the gross enrollment ratio of primary schools reached 113 (see table 10.6). The extension of secondary school has also been impressive, with the enrollment ratio rising from 46 in 1980 to 76 in 2006. The sharpest rate of increase has been at the tertiary level (colleges and universities), where the enrollment ratio tripled between 1980 and 1997, and tripled again between 1997 and 2004, reaching 19 in the latter year. This rapid increase in educational levels was promoted both by business and political leaders who recognized not only that they had to expand the supply of highly trained technicians, but that the demand for high-tech consumer products required well-educated consumers.

5. Persons in school × 100 ÷ persons of school age.
Hence, the marginal productivity of physical capital has risen, not only because of the advanced technology embodied in new physical investment, but also because of the greater investment in raising the quality of labor. The quality of labor has risen, not only because of formal education, but also because of on-the-job training, increased experience, improved health, and increased longevity. Rather than declining, the rate of increase in Chinese per capita income rose to 9.2 percent per year between 1990 and 2005, which is more than a third higher than the growth rate during the previous fifteen years. Indeed, there is no convincing evidence that long-term Chinese economic growth is faltering (Fogel 2007).

10.4 Endogenous Economic Growth

To those who know the nonmathematical literature of the pre-1975 growth theorists, the belief that endogenous theories of economic growth are an invention of the late 1980s is surprising. While it is true that Solow and some other modelers treated technological change as exogenous in papers
written in the 1950s and 1960s, verbal theorists such as Simon Kuznets, Moses Abramowitz, Theodore W. Schultz, and Douglass C. North paid a great deal of attention to endogenous technological change, emphasizing the synergies between improvements in the quality and quantity of labor and of physical capital.

Kuznets (1966, 1971a, 1971b), for example, stressed that economic growth both required and produced major changes in the structure of the economy (defined as the distribution of inputs or output among the major sectors of the economy). Not only were increases in agricultural productivity a condition for the rapid growth of manufacturing, but new manufacturing technologies, which produced more efficient agricultural equipment or new varieties of seeds and fertilizer, were major factors in the growth of agricultural productivity and stimulated changes in agricultural technology.

According to Kuznets, many current economic opportunities and problems were determined by economic conditions and relationships that evolved slowly, often taking many decades to work out. At a time when Keynes declared that “in the long run we are all dead,” an aphorism reiterated by many economists not only during the 1930s but during the 1940s and 1950s, Kuznets continued to call attention to the role of long-term factors that had to be taken into account by policymakers, factors that led him to conclude that the opportunities for returning to high employment levels and rapid economic growth were greater than generally believed in the decades immediately following World War II.

Current social problems in the late 1960s and 1970s, Kuznets emphasized, were often the result of past growth—the consequence of past desirable attainments, which at a later time produce socially undesirable consequences that require remedial policy action. Of his numerous illustrations of this principle, one is particularly cogent: the explosion of population growth in the less developed nations of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America in the quarter century following World War II. This population explosion threatened to thwart efforts to raise per capita incomes from their dismally low levels because birth rates remained traditionally high, while public health policies and improved nutrition cut death rates in these regions by more than 50 percent in less than a generation. One obvious solution to the problem was to reduce fertility, yet there was a web of traditional patterns of behavior and belief that tended to keep fertility high. Nevertheless, Kuznets believed that properly designed public policies could hasten the social and ideological changes required to reduce fertility and to lead these societies to prefer a greater investment in a fewer number of children (Becker 1960, 1981; Becker and Lewis 1973). Such a program required not only government and private campaigns to disseminate the technology of birth control but a restructuring of social and economic incentives that would provide rewards for families with fewer children.

Yet, as the experience of the United States and other developed nations has
shown, the success of the program to curtail fertility is bound, much further down the line, to create a new set of issues, similar to those that have become the center of the modern women’s movement: the restructuring of society in such a way as to promote equal opportunity for women in all occupational markets. The rapid economic growth of 1945 to 1970 also produced new concerns about equity issues, particularly between whites, blacks, and Hispanics, and gave momentum to the movement for equal rights for women.6

Economic growth creates social problems because it is profoundly disruptive to traditional values and religious beliefs, to long-standing social and family patterns of organization, and to numerous monopolies of privilege. Despite the fact that modern economic growth has brought with it tremendous increases in longevity and good health, has brought to the lower classes standards of living as well as social and economic opportunities previously available only to a tiny minority, and has greatly reduced the inequality in the income distribution of developed nations, the social restructuring of society required by modern economic growth has been fiercely resisted—sometimes because of an unwillingness to give up traditional values and ways of life, sometimes by entrenched classes determined to protect their ancient privileges. Because of the complex responses to change and because the epoch of modern economic growth was still unfolding, many aspects of the social restructuring that were underway were still obscure and difficult to predict (Kuznets 1966, 15). As late as 1972, Kuznets felt compelled to point out that despite the multitude of tentative partial generalizations, cross-sectional studies, and econometric exercises, there was as yet no “tested generalization, significantly specific to permit the quantitative prediction of aggregate growth, or even of changes in the structural parameters in the course of growth” (Kuznets 1972, 58).

Kuznets was particularly concerned with longitudinal issues, such as the length of the period of observation that was needed to identify the underlying process at work in any specific aspect of economic growth. How, he asked, can one determine whether such a process, once identified, is sufficiently stable to provide a reliable basis for prediction? These problems are illustrated by an issue on which Kuznets was the preeminent investigator of his age: the interrelationship between demographic processes and modern economic growth.

A particularly important aspect of the issue was the concentration of the decline of death rates at early ages, which contributed to the reduction in fertility rates. The reduced fertility rate released a large proportion of the female labor force to gainful occupations, accelerated the transition to modern families, mobile and responsive to economic incentives, and promoted new ideologies conducive to economic growth (1966, 56–62). In subsequent

6. Further down the line, the drop in fertility rates creates new problems as the population ages. See Fogel (2003, 2004b), Floud et al. (forthcoming).
work, Kuznets noted the increase in the share of women in the U.S. labor force from 17 percent in 1890 to nearly half in the 1980s, which he attributed to the lower fertility rates, the shift in employment opportunities from manual to service sector positions, and urbanization, which made organized labor markets more accessible to women (Kuznets 1989; Fogel 1989a). He also called attention to the fact that the most rapidly growing occupations—those in the professional, technical, clerical, sales, and other services—were the ones in which women had made the greatest inroads. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the new women’s movement was still incipient, Kuznets did not anticipate fully the explosive entry of women into the labor force during the next quarter century, nor the new ideology that would facilitate that development (1966, 193–95).

Ideas of endogenous technological change were also deeply embedded in the work of economists who studied the diffusion of new technologies. Among the earliest of these studies was the dissertation of Zvi Griliches (1956) and papers based on it (particularly in 1957 and 1960), which analyzed the factors affecting the rate of diffusion of hybrid corn. Griliches traced that process from the early scientific research of agricultural experimental stations to the sequential adoption of various strains of these seeds by commercial producers. He also analyzed the rate of spread of this type of seed by farmers, looking at the difference in the characteristics of early and late adopters within and across states. Indeed, it took more than half a century for hybrid corn to displace its rivals everywhere.

Consequently, at any point in time, the existing average technology was a weighted average of technologies of different vintages, not merely of the prehybrid seeds per se. Seed manufacturers produced new vintages of hybrid seeds as technology adapted to the climate and soil types of particular regions and subregions. Griliches also related the educational level, institutional connections, and income of individual farmers to the rate at which they changed over to the new strains of corn.

What Griliches did for the diffusion of new technologies in agriculture, Edwin Mansfield did for diffusion of industrial technologies. Mansfield (1971) measured the lag between invention and innovation for forty-six inventions. The lag varied from one year for Freon refrigerants to seventy-nine years for fluorescent lamps. The lag for some other notable inventions was twenty-four years for the distillation of hydrocarbons with heat and pressure, twenty-two years for television, twenty-seven years for zippers, thirteen years for radar, and fourteen years for jet engines.

He then turned to the factors that influence the decision to innovate. After emphasizing the risks associated with innovation (only two out of ten new products that emerge from research and development become commercial successes), he set forth the costs and benefits of both leading and waiting for others to lead. The investment needed to bring a new innovation to market is usually in the range of ten to twenty times the original research costs.
Mansfield then analyzed the rates of diffusion of twelve innovations in four industries (coal, iron and steel, brewing, and railroads). He found that the diffusion of a new technique was generally a slow process. Among the factors that affected the rate of diffusion were the size of the firm, the expected rate of profit from investing in the innovation, the growth rate of the firm, the overall profit level of the firm, and the liquidity of the firm.\footnote{See Perkins 2006a and Maddison 1998 for discussions of the lag of China and India in adapting modern technology.}

It was not only characteristics of the firms but also characteristics of the managers that influenced rates of diffusion of new technologies. Presidents of early adopters of complex new technologies were younger and better educated than heads of firms that were late adopters.

In subsequent studies, Mansfield (1980) found that both firm and industry expenditures on research and development had a substantial impact on firm and industry rates of growth in productivity. Both basic and applied research, individually and in conjunction, increased productivity growth. With respect to interfirm, interindustry, and international transfers of technology, Mansfield (1975) delineated among material, design, and capacity transfers. Capacity transfers often involved the transfers of people, since there was often “no substitute for person to person training and assistance” (373). That was especially the case when the transferred technology had to be adapted to take account of local conditions, including differences in relative costs, abilities, cultures, and climates (Mansfield 1972).

The notion of endogenous technological change did not begin with the cohort of Griliches and Mansfield. Walt W. Rostow (1990, especially chapters 15 through 17 and 20) has summarized the known theories of technological change, endogenous and exogenous, going back several centuries. More relevant to the issues in this chapter is the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who was the most important growth theorist between the deaths of Smith and Malthus and his own death in 1950. His earlier work focused on long cycles in economic output, which he attributed to fluctuations in the rate of inventions and innovations (Schumpeter 1934). His analysis led him to single out entrepreneurs as the dynamic agents of change, to point to the equity effects of economic growth (embodied in his concept of “creative destruction”), and to make the creative clusters of innovations inherently inflationary. Later in his career, Schumpeter focused on the conflict between economic concentration and competitive markets, and between the capitalist system of economic organization and the political, social, and intellectual movements that were hostile to capitalism for ideological reasons. It was these conflicts, he argued, rather than the secular diminution of investment opportunities, which threatened the continuation of economic growth under a system of political democracy (Rostow 1990, especially 233–42).

Theodore W. Schultz was another major motivator of the theory of endog-
enous technological change. He received the most acclaim for his contributions to the theory of human capital (Schultz 1962, 1971). But that was only one aspect of his broader concern with economic growth and the elimination of poverty. These broader concerns led him to examine closely the impact of government fiscal policies and specific interventions into agriculture in both developed and developing countries, policies that distorted agricultural production and had perverse effects on the distribution of income. Like Schumpeter, Schultz was concerned about new sources of future income growth, and this concern led him to recognize that in the twentieth century, human capital had become more important than physical capital in explaining both economic growth and the inequality of the income distribution. His theory of human capital led him to conclude that unregulated high fertility was a major factor in destabilizing an agricultural sector. Such considerations also caused him to emphasize the importance of the investment in improving nutrition and health as a key to economic growth in poor nations and to identify investment in “allocative skills” as a key to dealing with problems of disequilibria (Bowman 1980).

Schultz was influenced in his thinking about human capital by his experiences with postwar reconstruction. Despite the devastation of Europe, all of the war-ravaged countries experienced rapid economic growth in the 1950s, quickly exceeding their prewar levels. This led Schultz to dwell on the central role of human capital in modern economic growth, to consider the possibility that a significant share of the so-called residual factor in economic growth was due to improvements in the quality of the inputs, particularly in the quantity of capital embodied in human labor. Although his empirical work on this question focused on education, Schultz recognized that improvements in health, in the capacity to process information, in the development of allocative skills, and in on-the-job training might be more important than the effects of formal education per se.

Abramovitz was another of the nonmathematical theorists who grappled with issues of endogenous technological change throughout his career. In papers published in 1972 and 1993, he called attention to the shifting bias of technological change, which was intensive in physical capital between 1850 and 1950 (the era of the building of railroads and the electrical grid) but became human capital-intensive thereafter (Abramovitz 1972). Since 1950, “technological change tended to raise the marginal productivity of capital in the form of education and training of the labor force at all levels; in the form of practical knowledge acquired by deliberate investment of resources in research and development; and in other forms of intangible capital, such as the creation and support of corporate structures and cultures and the development of product markets, which are the infrastructure of economies of scale and scope” (Abramovitz 1993, 229).

Abramovitz also stressed the interdependence of technological progress and both tangible and human capital accumulation. He noted both tangible
and intangible capital formation influenced the pattern of technological progress. But he cautioned Lucas, Romer, and other contributors to the “new growth theory” from overemphasizing the impact of capital accumulation on the direction of technological change. Although the bias of technological change was influenced by capital accumulation, it was also influenced by the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge that was “quite unrelated to the terms of factor supply,” including the influence of relative factor costs, the evolution of science and technology, and the “impact of political and economic institutions and modes of organization on which the discovery and acquisition of new knowledge depend” (Abramovitz 1993, 237).

10.5 Bridges between Two Cohorts of Theorists on Technological Change

This section compares the work of Zvi Griliches, Richard Nelson, and Dale W. Jorgenson, whose research on technological change spanned the period from the mid-1950s to the present. All of these investigators focused on the difficulties of measuring technological change. All three were concerned with endogenous as well as exogenous sources of technological change. All three were deeply involved in problems of the identification and measurement of endogenous technological change. Although they dealt with national patterns of change, much of their research was focused at the level of industries and on the characteristics of the firms that comprised the industries. All three welcomed the new enthusiasm brought to the studies of technological change and economic growth by a younger cohort of investigators led by Romer, Lucas, Helpman, Barro, Acemoglu, Aghion, Howitt, Krugman, and Young, among others.8

Griliches’s studies were notable for their display of statistical skills. He made important contributions to econometric modeling of specification biases, to models of distributed lags, and to models that dealt with “unobserved” or “omitted” variables, such as ability. He also developed the hedonic technique for separating changes in the prices of complex products into components due to improvement in qualities of such products (such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals) and to inflation. He was also one of the pioneers in the study of the impact of investments in research and development on productivity at the firm, industry, and aggregate levels. He emphasized that much of the unmeasured residual in productivity gains was due to the “spillover” effects in one firm or industry on the inputs and outputs of other firms and industries (Heckman 2006; Trajtenberg and Berndt 2001; David 2003). These are all key points in the explanation of the Asian Miracle (see section 10.7).

Richard Nelson has been a thoughtful analyst of the economics of inven-

tion and the processes by which inventions become incorporated in the process of production and marketing. In the late 1950s, he critically surveyed the economic literature on these topics and pointed to numerous unresolved issues. Among the points he stressed were the high risks in research and development, and the few initiatives launched by firms that ever got to the point of yielding commercially viable projects (1959). He also delved into the problem of explaining changes in total factor productivity and attributed much of the difference between Solow and Denison to such issues as the rate of improvement in the quality of labor and capital and the average age of the capital stock. But he also emphasized that interactions between these variables had not been sufficiently explored, and he also stressed the need to focus on the processes, which differed among firms, that affected incentives and their feedback (1964). In later papers (1981, 1988; Nelson and Wright 1992), Nelson stressed the need to focus on the processes that generate, screen, and spread new technology at the firm, interfirm, and interindustry levels. Along with Stanley Fischer (1993) and others, Nelson placed much emphasis on the role of macroeconomic policy in creating favorable contexts for rapid technological progress. Nelson collaborated with Harold Pack (1999) on an insightful discussion of the interrelationship of the Asian Miracle and Modern Growth Theory with a paper of the same title (see section 10.7).

Jorgenson has been at the forefront of the elaboration of the theory of production and in the measurement of the improvements in the quality of inputs, the improvements in the economic and social organization of production, and the identification of spillover effects that account for a significant part of unmeasured inputs. Jorgenson’s early work made important contributions to the theory of economic growth in dual economies: two-sector models with an advanced and a backward sector (1961a, 1961b). Indeed, much of his work has focused on the movement from a highly aggregated level of analysis to disaggregated levels.

Thus, he has placed a great deal of emphasis on moving to the industry and firm levels for purposes of both analysis and measurement, demonstrating that in so doing, one could explain much of Solow and Denison’s unmeasured residual. In this connection, he pointed to the need to recognize that much of the change in total factor productivity was explained by measuring the substitution of higher qualities of labor for lower ones as well as the substitution of improved vintages of capital for earlier ones. He also sought to measure unmeasured spillover effects from one industry or one firm to another (1967, with Griliches; 1969, with Christenson; 1980 and 1986, with Fraumeni; and 1980, with Gollup). Jorgenson also called attention to the need to take account of changes in the quality of intermediate goods at the sectoral level, estimating that these changes explained more of the change in sectoral output than improvements in the quality of labor and capital (1990, with Kuroda).
Jorgenson has led the way in explaining the sharp increase in U.S. productivity growth that began in the 1990s. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association (2001) and in papers with Stiroh (1999, 2000), he attributed the rapid diffusion of information technology (IT) between 1990 and 2000 to the decline in IT prices, which he said was triggered by an earlier and even sharper decline in the prices of semiconductors. Moreover, all of the increase in U.S. total factor productivity during 1990 and 1995 and two-thirds of the increase during 1995 and 2000 was due to improvements in IT.

In several of his recent papers (e.g., 2001, 2005; Jorgenson and Nomura), he found that in the United States, IT-using industries were leading economic growth, and through wage effects, were promoting improvements in labor quality, and that IT was having a similar effect on other G7 countries (Crafts 2004). Improvements in the quality of inputs, best measured at the industry level, were major factors in output growth (e.g., 1992, with Gollop; 1999 and 2000, with Stiroh; 2005, with Nomura; 2005).

In a paper with Dougherty (1996), Jorgenson characterized the recent work on endogenous economic growth as an effort to account for spillover effects. He linked unexplained productivity to spillover effects that increase output in unrelated firms and industries but were normally unmeasured. Jorgenson provided a direct accounting of the benefits of such spillovers. In his most recent paper with Vu, Jorgenson finds that the accelerated pace of globalization and IT penetration between 1989 and 2006 may be important factors in explaining the jump in output productivity. He estimates that developing Asia accounted for 40 percent of global economic growth during this period (Jorgenson and Vu 2009).

10.6 The Economic Historians

No students of economic growth have been more absorbed in issues of endogenous technological change than economic historians. Their interest in these issues is as old as the concept of the Industrial Revolution of the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. They traced out the succession of inventions in textiles and iron that transformed these industries, as well as successive improvements in steam engines going back to the early seventeenth century, that made it possible to substitute mechanical power for human power in mining and manufacturing and animal power in transportation.

This progress turned partly on accidents, but mainly on the creation of an economic, social, and political environment that encouraged and supported new technologies, by ethical and religious dictums and by progrowth ideologies. As David Landes put it, Britain’s large lead in technology over France (citing Joel Mokyr [1985] and Walt Rostow [1979]), was no accident. With
one innovation after another, repeatedly England was the leader, and France and others were followers.

British inventors, Landes said, were responding to the high cost of labor (in the case of textile inventions) and the vicissitudes of deep coal mines (in the case of steam engines). Moreover, the British pool of skills in such areas as millwork and machine building was apparently larger than in Continental countries. It was not that Britain had a large monopoly of skills, but “the size of the pool, its free, noncorporate character, and direction (provenance) of its efforts and experience. These seem to have made a difference” (Landes 1994, 650; Crafts 1997, 1995; see also Harley 1992 and Temin 1997).

Landes (1994) continued:

The key invention falls within the Smithian paradigm: the adoption of rural putting-out. This goes back to the middle ages and represents a crucial departure from the town-based, corporate (guild) mode of production. The key is the division of labour and the recruitment into the production process of women and children. Say no more: the effect is to reduce costs and prices, increase demand, widen the market, promote further division of labour, lay the basis in specialization for small but cumulative improvements in technique . . . The effect of this fall in prices and increase in markets at home and abroad was to turn Britain into the workshop of the world. (651)

Among economic historians writing about changes in patterns of U.S. economic growth, no one has done more to emphasize the critical role of institutions in affecting economic growth than Douglass C. North. In an article published in 1968, North estimated the substantial increases in the total factor productivity, on the order of 300 percent, in ocean shipping between 1600 and 1850. The principal technological change was the increase in payload capacity brought about by the changes in the design of the ships, which became larger and swifter. The more efficient ships (called flutes) had been in use in the Baltic trade since the early seventeenth century. Why did it take so long for ships of this design to become dominant in the Atlantic trade? The answer, said North, was the threat of piracy located in the Caribbean. As long as the pirate threat existed, freighters had to be armed, and arming required smaller, sturdier ships that could withstand the recoil of the canons. It was not until the elimination of pirates from their shelters in the Caribbean that the faster, longer, lower-cost ships became dominant in the transatlantic trade.

Two years later, together with Robert Paul Thomas, North published an “Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World” (1970). In that essay, they argued that changes in product and factor prices, promoted by population growth and the increased size of markets, led to a set of institutional changes that channeled incentives toward “productivity-raising types
of economic activity. . . . These institutional innovations and accompanying changes in property rights built productivity into the system, enabling Western man to finally escape the Malthusian cycle” (1). North and Thomas collaborated again on articles explaining the rise and fall of the manorial system (1971) and on the substitution of settled agriculture for hunting and gathering (1977).

In a highly influential paper with Barry R. Weingast, a political scientist, North (1989) investigated the impact of the English Glorious Revolution of 1688, which “fundamentally redesigned” fiscal and governmental institutions to limit the confiscatory power of the crown. The elevation of the role of Parliament and introduction of an independent judiciary “produced a marked increase in the security of private rights” (804). As a result, private capital markets flourished and the government was able, within a decade, to increase borrowing by an order of magnitude. The institution also created more favorable conditions for economic growth, including the growth and development of banks, the creation of new instruments of private credit, and the promotion of a wide array of businesses (North 2005).

Several other economic historians have had a substantial influence on the recent wave of growth theory. Papers by Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff called attention to the importance of distant history in establishing institutions and pathways that influence patterns of current economic growth (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). This theme has resonated with growth theorists such as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000, 2001) and Ray (2008). Paul David’s emphasis on the impact of path dependency, which links particular inventions and the large investments by their users to explain the difficulty of getting users to switch to more efficient substitutes for the original innovation, has also been influential (David 1985).

In another important paper, David (1990) explained the long lag between the invention of new technologies and their impact on economic growth using the electrical dynamo as a case in point. Even when engineers correctly foresaw the potential usefulness of electricity, a wide range of businesses were still based on mechanical power, and numerous details had to be addressed to make the new type of power advantageous for many different products and in various locales. Moreover, architects, engineers, and managers had to be trained to design, install, and operate the new systems. The risks perceived by capitalists were large enough to cause many to hesitate to invest. These problems were worked on slowly. It took about four decades to go from the construction of the first generating stations to the 50 percent point in the diffusion of electricity to users.

Economic historians have also made major contributions to the study of industrial organization and its synergy with economic growth. Carefully tracing the growth of big business in the United States, Alfred Chandler Jr., the doyen of managerial history, laid out the circumstances that led to the
rise of large-scale enterprises led by professional managerial hierarchies. He also compared the U.S. corporate structure with large enterprises in England and Germany (Chandler 1977, 1990). Chandler had a strong influence on the theory of industrial organization as it was developing during the last third of the twentieth century (Teece 1993; Caves 1990). Efforts to reassess Chandler’s legacy began to appear in the late 1990s and have continued, aimed at taking account of new industrial structures brought on by changes in technology, markets, business strategy, and communications (Galambos 1997; Ghemawat 2002).

It remained for Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin (2003) to provide a new synthesis of the evolution of industrial organization as it stood at the beginning of the new millennium. Their aim was not only to take account of the changed circumstances that led the classical Chandlerian firm—vertically integrated and diversified—to be outperformed by more specialized and vertically disintegrated firms, but to also provide a theory of the new tendencies in firms and markets. They developed a dual perspective that brought to the fore the economic logic behind business choices. Changes in industrial structures and markets reflected the vast increases in per capita income, the huge declines in the cost of processing information, and the large decrease in transportation costs that altered spatial maps and permitted products to be designed again for individual needs.

10.7 The Impact of the Asian Miracle on Growth Theory

The Asian Miracle began to have a profound impact on growth theory well before the full scope of that miracle was apparent. The early papers in the new wave of theoretical work, those that appeared between 1986 and 1990, were responding mainly to European and U.S. developments in the period between 1950 and 1980. When theorists shifted some of their focus to Asia during the first half of the 1990s, they concentrated mainly on the Four Little Dragons, sometimes adding such new contenders for the title of “miracle” as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. China and India did not move to center stage until the second half of the 1990s.

The extraordinarily high growth rates of China since 1980 and of India since the middle of the 1990s have profoundly challenged the discussion of theorists and policymakers. These extraordinary growth rates, if they persist for two or three decades, will radically alter the global economic playing field, transforming China and India from merely “newly industrializing countries” to titans of the global economy.

Tables 10.7 and 10.8 compare the global economy in 2000 with a possible, perhaps probable, restructuring less than a generation from now. In the year 2000, the global economy was dominated by six groupings of countries: the United States; the European Union (which then consisted of fifteen countries [EU15]); India; China; Japan; and a group of six Southeast Asian
countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan [SE6]). As measured by GDP, these six groupings accounted for 73 percent of the world’s economic output and 57 percent of the global population (see table 10.7). The balance of the world (including Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe) accounted for about 28 percent of GDP and 42 percent of the global population.

Table 10.8 presents a not improbable set of forecasts for 2040. The population forecasts are those of the United Nations. The economic forecasts are mine but were influenced by the forecasts of the CIA and The Economist. To my mind, the most unsettling of the forecasts in table 10.8 is the relative decline of the European Union implied by its stagnation in population and its modest growth in GDP.

Although the EU population in 2000 exceeded that of the United States by about a third, by 2040 the EU population will be somewhat smaller than that of the United States. The projected stagnation of the EU15 population is based primarily on the persistence of extremely low fertility rates. The total fertility rate (roughly the average number of children a woman is expected to have during the course of her childbearing years) has fallen far below the level required for the reproduction of the population (2.1 children) in most EU15 countries, and has been below reproduction for several decades.

One implication of the low fertility rate is that the population of the EU15 is aging rapidly. In the year 2000, the median age in Italy and Germany, for example, was about forty, which is a decade higher than in China and half a decade higher than in the United States. By 2040, the median age in Italy and Germany is predicted to be about fifty. This rapid aging of many EU15 countries means that their dependency ratios (the ratio of economically inactive to economically active persons) will soar. These demographic factors will, by themselves, significantly curtail the capacity for economic growth. However,
The Impact of the Asian Miracle on the Theory of Economic Growth

9. The expansion of the EU15 to EU27 will help to invigorate the EU15 through increased cross-country migration. However, it is unlikely that the migration rate will be large enough to offset the low fertility rates in Italy, France, and other EU15 countries. Moreover, resistance to immigration is likely to increase in low-fertility countries as fears of loss of national identity increase.

Table 10.8 The global distribution of GDP in 2040, by grouping of nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping</th>
<th>Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>GDP in billions of $ (PPP)</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41,944</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU15)</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15,040</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36,528</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>123,675</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 South East Asian Countries (SE6)</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35,604</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotals</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>258,083</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>4,332</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49,774</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>8,701</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>307,857</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Political and cultural factors appear to be reinforcing the impediments to economic growth. These include limitations on the length of the work week and increasingly heavy taxes on businesses to support large social welfare programs (that are nevertheless facing bankruptcy) and are threatening to make EU15 firms uncompetitive in the global market.  

I do not mean to imply that labor productivity and per capita income in the EU15 will not grow. They will grow at a rate that, by past standards, was not bad (about 1.8 percent per annum), but they will not be able to match the surge in growth that will prevail in South and East Asia. The European market will be about 60 percent larger in 2040 than it was in 2000. But the U.S. market will be over 300 percent larger, India’s will be over 1,400 percent larger, and China’s will be 2,400 percent larger. Indeed, the Chinese market in 2040 by itself will probably be larger than the combined markets of the United States, the EU15, India, and Japan. It may well be the case that English will survive as the principal commercial language beyond 2040, but I suspect that there will be an explosion of business managers in the West who also speak Mandarin.

The possibility of such a massive restructuring of the global economy has substantially changed the conversation of growth theorists of the late 1980s. The debates of those years were aimed at altering the canon of growth models to allow for slighted variables (such as knowledge and experience), changed parameters (such as large capital shares and different elasticities), to rethink the implications of returns to scale and externalities in different contexts suggested by new analyses of available empirical information, and
to introduce such new terminology as “absolute” and “conditional” convergences.\(^\text{10}\) The old set of issues has not been abandoned, but the locus has shifted, and a number of new issues have emerged.

One of the central issues among growth theorists is whether increases in factor inputs or in total factor productivity has been the main source of economic growth in the surging Asian economies (Perkins and Rawski 2008). A companion issue is the role of governments and of macroeconomic policy in encouraging, permitting, and sustaining economic growth (Young 1995; Krugman 1994; 1998; Stiglitz 1996, 2001; Kim and Lau 1994; Park 2002). Growth theorists are also grappling with the implications of uneven economic growth across the provinces and socioeconomic groupings of both China and India, for the long-run economic and political stability of both countries (Chaudhuri and Ravallion 2006; Zakaria 2005, 2006; Pei 2006; 2007, Lopez 2004).

Jere Berhman, an old hand in the study of economic growth among developing nations, surveyed the literature (2001) on growth in Asia and elsewhere, pointing out changing viewpoints since the end of World War II. In the 1950s, he wrote, the key issues raised by growth economists were (1) the need to raise capital-to-labor ratios; (2) the problem of overcoming the inefficiency of markets; (3) the key role of industrialization in overcoming low growth rates; (4) the belief that international trade was harmful to developing countries because the benefits of trade were siphoned off by monopolistic producers in rich countries; and (5) the belief that governments were unbiased, had good information, and pursued policies appropriate to promoting growth. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, most of these ideas had been jettisoned. Among the ideas that replaced them were the proposition that merely throwing capital at the problems was not enough, that markets are better than bureaucrats (many of whom were rent-seekers) in allotting resources, and that international trade stimulated rather than retarded growth.

Dwight H. Perkins, who has been studying economic, social, and political developments in China and other Southeast Asian nations for more than half a century, recently put the accelerated growth in Chinese per capita income since 1978 in perspective (2006a). The available evidence suggests that China’s decline from relative prosperity in the thirteenth century to relative poverty at the end of World War II was due partly to its lag in applying science to the development of modern technology, partly to destructive invasions, and partly to civil wars that prevented the emergence of a strong central government needed to provide the institutional foundation for modern economic growth. While some of these problems were solved after the

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\(^{10}\) See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for an excellent review of growth theory and its empirical findings. For the foundational basis of the new work, see Romer (1986); Lucas (1988); and Barro (1991); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). See also Jones (1997). For a critique of the empirical underpinning of this work, see Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001).
accession of Mao Zedong, mistakes in economic policy, combined with Mao’s desire to launch a cultural revolution that would transform Chinese values, led to nearly two decades of sluggish growth and to various economic and social calamities.

Perkins attributes the high rate of growth in Chinese per capita income during the past three decades to reforms that began in 1978. As a result of these reforms, the government was able to generate a high internal rate of investment, promote foreign trade, open China to foreign investment (with its accompanying advanced technology and know-how), and transform China into a market economy. However, these processes of transformation are not complete, and the future rate of growth will depend on success in completing the necessary reforms. The main future challenge, he argues, will be “to maintain a stable environment” for economic growth while the Chinese “political system evolves to one more suitable for an educated, increasingly high income country” (Perkins 2006b, 263).

Perkins’s historical perspective helps to inform recent efforts to resolve the conflicting views of growth theorists (Maddison 1998). In a 1999 paper, Nelson and Pack stressed that it was not merely the introduction of advanced technology into East and South Asia that accounted for their rapid growth. More crucial was the restructuring of the economy to effectively absorb the new technologies. Such absorption required a policy regime that encouraged the development not only of an educational system that helped entrepreneurs and technicians to begin the process of mastering and deploying the new technologies, but also of an industrial structure that permitted this new cadre to gain the experience needed to effectively exploit the new technologies. “To learn to use new technologies,” they wrote, “and to function effectively in new sectors required the development of new sets of skills, new ways of organizing activities, and becoming familiar and competent in new markets” (Nelson and Pack, 418). They also stressed that “only a small portion of what one needs to know . . . is codified in machine manuals, textbooks, and blueprints; much of it is tacit and learning is as much by doing and using as by reading and studying” (418; see also Nelson and Winter 1982; Rosenberg 1994). The usual growth accounting procedures, they argued, “would attribute the major share of growth simply to the growth of capital,” when assimilation and industrial restructuring were the main forces driving growth (426).

Beyond these technical issues about how to interpret the available information, there is a lively debate about how long China can continue growth at rates greater than ever before achieved for long periods of time. China has emerged as a major global factor in an array of product markets. Now second only to the United States in oil consumption, and accounting for 40 percent of all the growth in global oil consumption in recent years, China has also become the world’s largest consumer of steel, cement, and copper (OECD 2005; Kato 2004; Morrison 2006).
Most of China’s growth in terms of per capita income (69 percent between 1978 and 2002) is due to increases in labor productivity. Within industry, the increase in labor productivity was 6.2 percent per annum and 5.7 percent per annum in agriculture. About 30 percent of China’s growth rate is likely to continue to come from modest increases in the labor force participation rate and interindustry shifts. Much of China’s labor force is still in agriculture, so there is substantial potential for growth through a shift to industry and services as it moves toward the current technological frontier.

Investment in capital—especially human capital—is capable of rapid development in the next several decades. The increases in enrollment ratios outlined in table 10.6, combined with the knowledge that a college-educated worker is 3.1 times as productive (and a high-school graduate is 1.8 times as productive), as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education, underlie the potential for growth (Fogel 2006).

As a result of its rapid growth in per capita income, China has also emerged as a major player in the production and sale of manufacturing products. As indicated by table 10.9, Chinese production of autos in 2007 exceeded all of the major national producers except the United States and Japan. Moreover, given the current rates of increase in the auto production of all the nations, it is likely that China will be the global leader in auto production by 2010 or 2011.\footnote{Despite the slowdown in the production of China’s automobile industry in 2008, it has been estimated by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) that annual production will increase by 5 percent in 2009 (Li 2009). In February 2009, new car sales increased by 25 percent in China, partially due to reduced sales taxes on small passenger cars (Ying 2009).}

Ownership of other major consumer durable products has also been increasing at spectacular rates. Between 1990 and 2007, Chinese households have increased ownership of air conditioners annually by 15 percent, computers by 32 percent, and cell phones by 48 percent (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2008).

The rapidly expanding economies of China and India have led many analysts to speculate on the reemergence of these two economic giants as global political players. The most recent assessment of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (2008) conjectures that, by 2025, U.S. political dominance will be replaced by what it calls “multipolarity.” This multipolarity it predicts is “unlikely to produce a single dominant nation-state with the overwhelming power and legitimacy to act as an agent of institutional overhaul” (81).

However, we are already in a multipolar world, which the United States helped to create. Our ability to influence international affairs is already constrained by the desires of Europe, Russia, India, and China. Diplomacy under the Clinton and Bush administrations was shaped by such recognition.\footnote{See Zakaria (2006) and Morrison (2006).}
My own view of future U.S. global influence is more conditional. A lot depends on the future rate of growth in U.S. labor productivity. If that continues at the annual rate of 2 to 4 percent, then it is possible that the United States will remain well ahead of its competitors in economic and political influence down to 2025 and beyond. Much will depend on the willingness of the United States to invest heavily in scientific research and development, and to increase the share of the population educated in the sciences. I am optimistic on both of these counts. Unlike China, whose past growth has depended on its ability to adapt to the existing technology of the United States and other OECD nations to its conditions, the United States is at the current production frontier. Hence, its continued growth depends on the rate at which it can develop new technologies, which requires a plentiful supply of engineers to design new systems of production and distribution, and new science on which these new systems will depend. Industry will respond to the new technologies, as they have in the past, because they will increase labor productivity and raise profits.

### 10.8 Nota Bene

Three key issues have been raised by readers of the original version of this chapter (as previously noted).
1. Why do I predict that the growth rate of GDP for the EU15 will be only 1.2 percent per annum between 2000 and 2040?
2. Why do I believe that U.S. GDP between the same years will grow at 3.7 percent per annum?
3. Why am I so optimistic about China’s future growth rate, which I put at 8.0 percent per annum between 2000 and 2040?

Let me deal first with my optimistic estimate for China. How and why China will become an economic colossus has to do not only with the country’s economics, but also with its politics. To begin with, it helps to divide China’s economy into three major components: agriculture, services, and industry. Over the twenty-five years between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity has been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent each year. At the national level, however, output per worker grew by 9 percent annually over the same period. The national growth exceeded the sectoral growth rates because output per worker was much higher in industry and services than it was in agriculture. So as millions shifted from agriculture—where the bulk of China’s labor has been concentrated—to industry or services, the country’s annual growth rate rose by an additional 3 percentage points. Between 1978 and 2005, about 195 million workers shifted from agriculture to industry and services. In other words, internal migration accounted for about 47 percent of the labor force in industry and services in 2005. I expect such shifts between sectors to continue to be an important element in China’s overall economic growth over the next generation (Fogel 2007).

Many observers believe that social unrest, both active and latent, will retard China’s rate of economic growth. Potential pitfalls include the shaky state of the banking system. They also include income disparities between the rapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces, between urban and rural labor, and between highly skilled and manual labor. Other potential flashpoints arise from pressures on fuel supplies and electrical power, the growth of environmental pollution, and the adequacy of water supplies. These problems are well understood by China’s leaders and solutions are being actively pursued. So far, the government has managed to head off potential crises.

As a consequence, the polls conducted by reliable agencies reveal a widespread belief among the Chinese that their living conditions have improved and will continue to improve in the future. This optimism reflects the rapid increases in income experienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century.

Still another possibility is that internal growth will be derailed by international conflicts such as the border disputes over Kashmir with India and Pakistan and disputes over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. But these issues are being treated
diplomatically rather than militarily. The most tumultuous dispute, over the sovereignty of Taiwan, now appears to be headed toward a resolution, tentatively endorsed by both China and the incoming KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) government in Taiwan.

An important factor in sustaining China’s high growth rate will be its investments in expanding secondary and tertiary education—another key shift likely to boost labor productivity growth. In a 2006 study, I reported that high school graduates in the United States were 1.8 times as productive, and college-educated workers 3.1 times as productive, as their peers with less than a ninth-grade education. Extrapolating these findings to China, and estimating that the enrollment ratio in high school will grow to about 100 percent and in college to about 50 percent over the next generation, would, in and of itself, add over 6 percentage points to the annual growth rate (Fogel 2006).

These targets for higher education are not out of reach. As recently as 1980, Western European nations had tertiary enrollment ratios (the ratio of the number of students in colleges and universities to the total number of persons at college ages, usually eighteen to twenty-two years old) of about 25 percent; only in the United States was that figure above 50. The movement to from 25 to 50 in Western Europe took place over just two decades at the end of the twentieth century. In the case of Britain, two-thirds of the increase from 19 to 52 percent took place between 1990 and 1997.

The significance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic growth has not eluded the State Council in China. In 1998, Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollments in higher education, and the response was swift. Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education increased by 165 percent (from 3.4 million to 9.0 million), and the number of students studying abroad rose by 152 percent. Given that the tertiary enrollment ratio increased by about 50 percent between 2000 and 2004 (from 12.5 to 19.0 percent), my projection for 2040 is not overly optimistic. China is already on track to reach it (Fogel 2007).

Next, my forecast for the EU15. Here, demography is the key issue. What is worrisome is not just the zero rate of population growth (the demographic forecasts are not mine but those of the United Nations population division) but the changes in the age structure of the population.

The population of OECD nations has been aging rapidly, and that trend is likely to continue over the next several decades. Columns (1) and (2) of table 10.10 present the forecast of the Population Division of the United Nations on the change in the median age of the five largest West European nations. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, the predicted increases range between eleven and fourteen years. In France and the United Kingdom, the median age increases by six and five years, respectively.

Columns (3) and (4) forecast the change in percentage of the population that will be over sixty-five. For Germany and Italy, the elderly will increase
to nearly one-third of the population. Only in the United Kingdom will the elderly be less than one-quarter of the population.

The basic reason for the rapid aging of the population has been the low level of fertility. In all of these countries, the total fertility rate has been below the level needed to replace their populations for several decades. As a result, the percentage of women in the childbearing ages has declined from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was also about 50 percent in 1950) and is projected to be about 35 percent in 2040. So we have a double whammy (to use American slang): not only will women in the reproductive ages have sharply reduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in the childbearing ages will also have declined sharply (see table 10.11).

Attitudes toward sex have evolved sharply. One-hundred and fifty years ago, it was considered a sin to enjoy sex, the only legitimate purpose for which was procreation. But today, even in Rome, young women respond that sex is mainly a recreational activity. Behind the statistics on trends in fertility is a vast change in ethics embodied in a culture that is much different from that embraced by the generation that fought in World War II, which married early and produced the great baby boom between 1945 and 1965.

The widespread embrace of the ethic that celebrates sex as recreation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Median age</th>
<th>Percentage age 65 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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means that the rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is likely to decline in the principal EU15 nations. Indeed, even in 2000, the natural rate of increase was negative in Germany and Italy. By 2040, it is likely that natural increase will be negative in all of the designated nations except the United Kingdom (see table 10.12).

Although the twentieth century increase in the share of the population that is elderly is a tribute to the great advances in economic performance, biomedical sciences, and environmental improvements, there is no automatic guarantee of equitable balance between the generations in the future. Indeed, there are new problems that will have to be solved if a third of population in 2040 is over age sixty-five.

Moreover, since younger workers are a major source of new ideas, slowing down the ascendency of the next generation may retard the pace of technological change. The solution to such problems will not be easy. The elderly should not be shunted aside as if they were rotten tomatoes. To force their premature retirement will undermine not only their morale, but also the morale of those who expect to replace them.

As a result of the demographic trends, the dependency ratio is expected to rise sharply in four of the five largest EU15 nations between the years 2000 and 2040, as shown by table 10.13.

The inverse of one plus the dependency rates is a reasonable proxy for the labor force participation rate (which I designate by $\rho$). Hence, table 10.13 suggests an annual rate of decline of 0.4 percent in the labor force participa-

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<th>Table 10.12 Predicted changes in the natural rate of increase (per thousand)</th>
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tion rate due purely to changes in the age structure of the population. I allow $\phi$ to decline by an additional 0.2 percent per annum because of a reduction in the length of the work year over the period 2000 to 2040. This allowance raises the annual rate of decline in $\phi$ to 0.6 percent per annum. Since I expect the annual rate of growth in labor productivity of the five nations to average about 1.8 percent, it follows that their annual rate of growth in both per capita income and GDP will average 1.2 percent.

Now let me turn to my forecast for the United States. Although the United States and EU15 growth rates were the same during 1975 to 2005, I do not believe that to be an overriding consideration. The key issue is the slowness of the European Union relative to the United States in adopting the new information technology. Other issues are the greater EU preference for leisure than commodities when compared with the United States, and the decline of the EU’s annual rate of growth in labor productivity from 2.4 percent during 1980 to 1995 to 1.5 percent during 1995 to 2004. By comparison, U.S. labor productivity growth increased from 1.5 percent per annum during 1980 to 1995 to 3.0 percent during 1995 to 2004 (van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008).

During 1995 to 2004, U.S. GDP grew at 3.7 percent per annum. I believe that this high rate will persist down to 2040 because of continuing technological advances in genetic engineering, health care, information technology, transportation, energy production and consumption, and education (van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 2008).

References


———. 2004a. “Changes in the Process of Aging during the Twentieth Century:


