This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America

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Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Volume ISBN: 0-226-15374-6 (cloth); 0-226-79185-8 (paper)

Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/dite09-1

Conference Date: November 29-30, 2007

Publication Date: July 2010

Chapter Title: Comment on "Does Arrest Deter Violence? Comparing Experimental and Nonexperimental Evidence on Mandatory Arrest Laws"

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Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11852

Chapter pages in book: (453 - 456)
This interesting chapter can be read as making two main points. First, it shows that mandatory arrest laws (MAL) in cases of domestic violence have been counterproductive on at least one dimension, namely the frequency of serious abuse cases. Second, it shows that the method used for evaluating alternative policies against crime that has become the golden standard in criminology (and economics), namely randomized evaluation, can be seriously misleading. While I appreciate that the first contribution is a good complement to other cautionary notes already raised regarding the correct interpretation of the Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment (see, for example, Schmidt and Sherman 1993), I believe the second point could have important consequences for the way we approach the policy evaluation more generally.

Let me start with the first point raised in the chapter. It establishes that the moment when laws requesting the arrest of those accused of participating in domestic abuse is passed, average intimate homicides in the state (per capita) increases while that of family-member homicide falls. The effect is very large. And the difference-in-difference approach helps considerably in establishing the causal connection between the laws and the separation in the frequency of the two types of domestic abuse. Figure 12.1 illustrates well the main empirical result.

The suggested interpretation is this: mandatory arrest laws reduce reporting by the victim (because it is more “costly”), so it escalates to homicide more often. Familial homicide drops because there is more reporting. The difference is presumed to occur because reporting of familial violence is made by nonvictims (e.g., teachers, for whom the “cost” is lower, as they do not know—or are not attached to—the victimizer). This puts the focus on reporting, something for which we unfortunately get no data. One approach to investigate the proposed channel further would be to see if the response is particularly large in states with harsher punishments. There are differences in the severity of sentencing across states and over time (one example, of course, is the death penalty). This is particularly important with the appearance of three-strikes-and-you-are-out laws. A similar point suggests that groups that are incarcerated at higher rates might be more inclined to reduce reporting in response to MAL. Incidentally, the similarity in response rates across racial groups is perhaps troubling for those who believe both in the results of this paper and the presence of racial bias in the legal system. But these are relatively minor issues compared to the fact that the paper asks...
us to think harder about theories of reporting, which is an important and understudied topic.

My second point is that the chapter raises an issue that far exceeds the issue of mandatory arrest laws. Indeed, I think it shows that randomized experiments, often by construction, can be misleading in the analysis of a large class of policies against crime because we can’t be sure about the quantity of information in the hands of the public. For example, we typically want to look at incentives to reduce crime. But in order to study them, people must know about the different penalties they are faced with. But if the criminals know, then the public will know. And they may not be keen on allowing randomization of penalties. Thus, the paper suggests that there are limits to the use of randomized experiments in at least some important areas of crime.

As the author reminds us, mandatory arrest laws were passed in the United States in response to the results of the influential Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE). In it, the type of police intervention following the report of an incident was randomized (there were three groups: arrest for at least one night, arrest and immediate release, and simple warning plus reading of the rights of the victim). The study revealed large drops in domestic violence following arrest. Now, Iyengar’s paper shows that it is wrong to extrapolate these results to justify MAL because they were obtained conditional on reporting. The public in general, and women in particular, were not informed of this experiment. A key point of the chapter is that this difference is significant because of behavioral differences that may arise in the relationship between the battered women and their abuser that may lead them to reduce reporting following an increase in punishment.

Now the question is whether we can avoid this problem in the future by designing better studies. I am pessimistic for one simple reason: I do not think that the lack of external validity in this dimension of the Minnesota experiment was the result of an avoidable mistake. It seems to me that it would have been impossible to communicate widely to women and other potential victims about the random nature of the program. And without such communication, incentives cannot really be studied. I know that randomization of the treatment is standard in the scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of medicines and that patients fully accept this. But it is also true that they voluntarily sign in to participate in such clinical trials. More important, we currently do not know much about the settings where the public will allow randomization of policies.

**Public Reaction to Randomized Experiments**

It is, of course, hard to know if the public holds such heterogeneous preferences over the domain over which it is appropriate to conduct scientific evaluation of policies through randomized trials. But given that it seems important for us to know where people actually accept randomization and where they do not, I have run a small scale survey asking high school students (fifteen to sixteen year olds) in Argentina the following two questions:
1. In the United States, there have been two recent studies. In one, in order to find out if a certain medicine was appropriate in fighting cancer, it had to be administered to only half of a group of patients (the other half receiving a placebo). In order to decide which half, the researchers threw a coin. Do you find this procedure acceptable?

Yes

No

2. In the other study (also in the United States), in order to find out if a certain punishment was appropriate in fighting crime, it had to be given to only half of a group of criminals (while the other half received a lower sentence as punishment). In order to decide which half, the researchers threw a coin. Do you find this procedure acceptable?

Yes

No

A sample of eighteen high school students were interviewed (one on one). The results are as follows:

Question 1: Yes = 14, No = 4
Question 2: Yes = 0, No = 18

Given the cheap design, the results are obviously just suggestive. Still, they show that it is indeed possible that the public supports the use of randomized experiments in some areas but not in others. One possible explanation for the differences observed here is that in the medical context it is a single agent decision problem. There is a procedure being considered and the person making the decision to engage in the trial bears all the potential costs. In the crime context, there are also victims (and these need to be consulted if their victimizers will be given less than fair sentences).¹

In brief, my point is that the chapter shows that one of the most interesting and influential randomized experiments that we have available to inform the design of policy in the area of crime fails in some important way. And that the reason it fails is not because of a mistake that can easily be avoided in the future, but rather because experiments are not particularly useful in at least some areas in crime.² Indeed, it is useful to remember that experiments in medicine hope to uncover the effect of a medicine on a person. In contrast, in economics (and in criminology), we are often interested in the effect of affecting one person on the incentives that other people have for engaging in specific behaviors. And it is precisely the study of that “external” aspect that the public might refuse to study using randomized experiments.

¹. Incidentally, this would favor retribution versus deterrence as positive theories of punishment, as in Di Tella and Dubra (2008).
². For a good description of several important experimental projects in criminology, see Lawrence Sherman’s Web page at the University of Pennsylvania.
References
