Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets

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2.1 Introduction

The federal government is the largest single lender in the country. As of the end of 1988, direct loans outstanding exceeded $222 billion, while outstanding loan guarantees were approximately $550 billion (Office of Management and Budget 1989). Federal credit assists borrowers across a wide variety of sectors, including housing, agriculture, small business, and education, in a bewildering array of over 100 programs.¹

In order to analyze the effects of these policies, this paper focuses on two salient characteristics of virtually all credit programs. First, federal credit is usually intended for those who could not obtain private financing. For example, “a direct loan is best justified when the federal objective could not be met with financing from private sources” (Office of Management and Budget, 1988, F-15). Other programs, such as Small Business Administration loan guarantees, require applicants to prove that they could not obtain private financing.

Second, federal credit is provided on easier terms than comparable private credit. These terms can include reduced interest or collateral, longer maturities, grace periods, and so on. These provisions are estimated to reduce the discounted value of borrower payments by amounts that vary widely across programs, but typically range between 10% and 25% (Office of Management and Budget 1989).

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This paper analyzes the effects of policies with these characteristics in a model where rationing arises endogenously. The underlying model is described in Section 2.2 and is closely related to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Besanko and Thakor (1987). Investors are divided into two groups, high risk and low risk, and have a choice between investing in a safe project or borrowing to invest in a risky project. For each group, lenders specify a probability of issuing a loan, an interest rate, and a collateral requirement.

Any given amount of collateral is assumed to be worth less to lenders than to borrowers. This feature implies that the use of collateral will generate an efficiency loss. In addition, all projects have expected gross returns greater than their social opportunity cost. Therefore, any amount of rationing represents an additional efficiency loss. The full information equilibrium arises when borrower type is known ex ante, implies no rationing and no collateral, and is thus efficient.

Section 2.3 analyzes situations where each borrower's type is private information. Now, lenders must collectively offer sets of contracts that induce borrowers to self-select into the appropriate contract. In equilibrium, high risks choose a contract with a relatively high interest rate and a zero collateral requirement. Low risks signal their type by choosing to pay high collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate. As long as low risks have sufficient wealth to post as collateral, the equilibrium involves no rationing. Nevertheless, because of the efficiency loss created by the use of collateral, there is a potential role for government.

The principal result of this section is to show that credit policies operate through their effects on the incentive-compatibility constraint, which limits the set of admissible contracts such that high-risk borrowers do not apply for the low-risk contract. For example, a guarantee to low-risk borrowers reduces their interest rate. Since the high-risk contract has not changed, the low-risk collateral requirement must rise in order to restore incentive compatibility. The increase in collateral means that guarantees to low risks reduce efficiency.

In contrast, a guarantee to high-risk borrowers makes the high-risk loan more attractive, thereby allowing lenders to reduce the collateral requirement on low-risk loans. Consequently, guarantees to high-risks raise efficiency. Equal guarantees to both groups have similar negative effects on the collateral requirement and positive effects on efficiency.

The major results of the paper are presented in Section 2.4, where it is assumed that borrower wealth is too low to support the collateral requirement outlined in Section 2.3. Because the high-risk contract involves no collateral, it does not change. However, since low-risks can only post a small amount of collateral, the low-risk contract must somehow be made less desirable in order to restore incentive compatibility. The only option is to reduce the probability of granting a low-risk loan; that is, to introduce rationing of low-risk borrowers.

With the existence of rationing, it is now possible to analyze credit policies
with the two salient features described above. Suppose the government agrees
to offer subsidized credit (either direct or guaranteed loans) to some propor-
tion of the (low-risk) borrowers who are turned down by the private market.
The key point is that in the absence of any further changes, these subsidies
make the low-risk contract more attractive to high-risk borrowers. Therefore,
some other aspect of the low-risk contract must become less desirable in order
to restore incentive compatibility. Since the collateral requirement cannot rise,
the only alternative is for the overall (public and private) probability of obtain-
ing a loan to fall. That is, increased subsidies to the rationed borrowers raise
the extent of rationing. Private lending is crowded out on a more than one-to-
one basis. It should be emphasized that this is an equilibrium response and is
due to the existence of the incentive-compatibility constraint.

Although the subsidies increase the extent of rationing, they raise the ex
ante expected utility of low-risk borrowers. This occurs because the benefits
of the added cheap government loans outweigh the costs of the increased
probability of being rationed. Thus, subsidies to low risks make the represent-
ative low-risk borrower better off ex ante but actually reduce the utility of
some low-risk borrowers ex post. Since they increase the extent of rationing,
the subsidies to low-risk borrowers reduce overall efficiency.

In contrast, subsidies to high-risk borrowers loosen the incentive-compati-
bility constraint. As a consequence, the extent of rationing of low-risk bor-
rowers falls and efficiency rises.

Section 2.5 offers a short conclusion. The Appendix provides derivations
of the various equilibria and proofs of the propositions.

2.2 The Basic Model

2.2.1 Description

The model describes a competitive credit market with many investors, but
even more lenders. All agents are assumed to be risk neutral, thus eliminating
any insurance role for federal credit, and there is no aggregate risk.

Investors can invest their initial endowment in a safe project that yields a
gross return of $Z$. Alternatively, each investor can borrow $1 and invest that
and the initial endowment in a risky project. Investors fall into two categories,
which differ according to the probability of having a risky project succeed, $\pi$,
and the gross return to that project, if it is successful, $R$. I assume $\pi_1 > \pi_2$,
so that type 1's are low-risk borrowers. Projects that do not succeed yield a
gross return of zero. The expected gross return to all projects are equal: $p_i R_i$
= $k$, $i = 1, 2$, where $k$ is a constant. Investors have a certain end-of-period
endowment, $W$. I assume the existence of a sufficient enforcement technology
such that $W$ is acceptable to lenders as collateral. The proportion of borrowers
that are low risk is given by $\phi$.

Lenders have an alternative safe investment that earns $p$. They offer loans
characterized by an interest rate ($r$), a collateral requirement ($c$), and a probability of issuing the loan to any particular applicant ($p$). Following several authors, I assume there is a cost to collateralization. Specifically, the lenders' valuation of $1 in collateral is given by $\beta, 0 \leq \beta < 1$. Therefore, $1 - \beta > 0$ represents the social cost of transferring the collateral or realizing its value.

Competition among lenders generates the following zero-profit condition on loans to each group:

$$p = \pi_i r_i + (1 - \pi_i)\beta c_i, \quad i = 1, 2.$$  

Investors are assumed to be able to apply for only one loan. The expected utility of an investor in group $i$ applying for a loan contract meant for group $j$ is

$$U_{ij} = p_j \pi_i (R_j - r_j) - (1 - \pi_j)c_j - Z, \quad i, j = 1, 2.$$  

Lenders always know the value of $\phi$. In the full information equilibrium described below, lenders also know each borrower's type. In the asymmetric information equilibria, information on borrower type is unavailable to banks on an ex ante basis.

The Nash equilibrium concept is used throughout this paper. A set of contracts is a Nash equilibrium if, holding the current set of contracts fixed, no contract in the set earns negative profits and there is no additional contract which, if offered, would make positive profits (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).

### 2.2.2 Full Information Equilibrium

Although subsequent analysis will focus on markets with asymmetric information, the full information equilibrium is presented first as a benchmark. Because the types are identifiable ex ante, lenders face two distinct loan markets. In each submarket, optimal contracts maximize expected borrower utility $U_{ij}$, given in (2) subject to (1).

**EQUILIBRIUM I.** The full information equilibrium is characterized by

$$p^i_j = 1, \quad i = 1, 2, \quad \text{(no rationing)}$$

$$c^i_j = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \quad \text{(no collateral)}$$

and

$$r^i_j = \frac{p}{\pi_i}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$  

With full information, all borrowers receive loans. In addition, since borrowers are indifferent between committing to a dollar of expected interest payments and a dollar of expected collateral, while lenders prefer the former, equilibrium involves complete elimination of collateral. Formally, from (1), the slope of isoprofit curves is
\[
\frac{dr_i}{dc_i} = \frac{- (1 - \pi_i) \beta}{\pi_i},
\]
while the marginal rate of substitution for borrowers of type \(i\) is
\[
\frac{dr_i}{dc_i} = \frac{- (1 - \pi_i)}{\pi_i}.
\]

Indifference curves \((U_1^i\) and \(U_2^i\)) and zero-profit curves \((l_1\) and \(l_2\)) for each group are shown in figure 2.1 below. For each group, \(\beta < 1\) implies that the isoprotic curve is flatter than the indifference curve. Curves for high-risk borrowers are steeper than those for low-risk borrowers. The full information equilibrium is given by contracts \(\alpha_1^i\) and \(\alpha_2^i\), along with \(p^i_1 = 1\).

Substituting (3a)-(3c) into (2) yields
\[
U_i = \pi_i R_i - \rho - Z, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]
Since \(\rho + Z\) is the social opportunity cost of investment, (4) shows that investments are made \((U_i > 0)\) if and only if the expected total return exceeds the expected social cost. Therefore, equilibrium is efficient.

2.3 Asymmetric Information and Unconstrained Collateral

2.3.1 Private Equilibrium

When individual investors' types are private information, lenders must design sets of loan contracts that generate self-selection of each borrower type into the appropriate contract. Thus, lenders operate subject to (1) and a pair of incentive-compatibility constraints:
\[
U_{11} \geq U_{12},
\]
and
\[
U_{22} \geq U_{21},
\]
where \(U_{ij}\) is defined in (2). It can be directly verified that the full information equilibrium is not incentive compatible because both types would prefer the low-risk contract.

Instead, with asymmetric information, collateral is used as a sorting device. High-risk borrowers have a stronger preference not to post collateral because they have a larger probability of having to pay it.

Whether collateral can induce complete separation depends crucially on \(W\), the level of borrower wealth. This section examines equilibria and government policy when borrower wealth is sufficiently large to allow complete separation. Section 2.4 examines markets characterized by insufficient wealth.
EQUILIBRIUM II. When borrower type is private information, and borrower wealth is sufficiently large, equilibrium is characterized by:

\[(6a) \quad p_1^u = 1, \quad p_2^u = 1, \]
\[(6b) \quad c_1^u = \frac{(\pi_1 - \pi_2)\rho}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2) - \pi_2(1 - \pi_1)\beta}, \quad c_2^u = 0, \]
\[(6c) \quad r_1^u = \frac{\rho}{\pi_1} - \frac{1 - \pi_1}{\pi_1} \beta c_1^u, \quad r_2^u = \frac{\rho}{\pi_2}. \]

With imperfect information, high-risk borrowers obtain the same loan contract, and therefore the same utility, as in the full information equilibrium. Low-risk borrowers are not rationed, but their loan terms have changed. Specifically, low-risk borrowers indicate their type by posting collateral. In return, they pay a lower interest rate than in the full information equilibrium.

Substituting (6a)-(6c) into (2) for type 1's yields

\[(7) \quad U_{11}^u = \pi_1 R_1 - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta)c_1^u. \]

Comparing (4) and (7), low-risk borrowers are worse off relative to the full information equilibrium by \((1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta)c_1^u\). The magnitude of the welfare loss increases with \(c_1\).

The equilibrium with asymmetric information and unconstrained collateral is shown in figure 2.1 as \((\alpha_1, \alpha_2)\). High risks obtain \(\alpha_2\), as before. However, any contract offered to low risks must be incentive compatible with \(\alpha_2\). Of all such contracts, \(\alpha_1\) is the most desirable contract for type 1's that also earns nonnegative profits when extended to type 1's. The reduction in low-risk borrowers' utility to \(U_{11}^u\) from \(U_1^u\) is shown by the shift from \(\alpha_2^u\) to \(\alpha_1\). Note that (5b) is binding in this equilibrium.

2.3.2 Government Credit

Although there is no rationing in the above model, there is still a role for government policy due to the efficiency losses created by the use of collateral. Because all investors receive loans in the private equilibrium, it seems natural to focus on loan guarantees (rather than direct loans) in this context.\(^9\)

Loan guarantees ensure the lender of receiving an amount \(\gamma_i\), where \(0 \leq \gamma_i \leq \rho\). The government can set \(\gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = \gamma\), or choose the \(\gamma_i\) separately. In return for the guarantee, the lender passes on any collateral collected to the government. The net cost to the government of a defaulted loan is \(\gamma_i - \beta c_i^u\), where \(c_i^u\) is the collateral requirement in the presence of the guarantee and is discussed further below. The government is subject to the same information constraints that private lenders face.

With the guarantees in place, expected borrower utility is still given by (2), but the zero-profit condition for lenders is now given by
Equilibrium with unconstrained collateral

\[ \rho = \pi_i r_i + (1 - \pi_i) \gamma_i, \quad i = 1, 2. \]

**EQUILIBRIUM III.** When borrower type is private information and \( W > C^u \), equilibrium with loan guarantees is characterized by

\[ p^u_i = 1, \quad p^u_2 = 1, \]

\[ c^u_1 = \frac{(\pi_1 - \pi_2)p}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2)} + \gamma_2 + \frac{\pi_2(1 - \pi_1)}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2)} \gamma_1, \quad c^u_2 = 0, \]

\[ r^u_1 = \frac{\rho}{\pi_1} - \frac{1 - \pi_1}{\pi_1} \gamma_1, \quad r^u_2 = \frac{\rho}{\pi_2} - \frac{1 - \pi_2}{\pi_2} \gamma_2. \]

In the preceding private Equilibrium II, banks received \( \beta c^u_1 \) and 0 in collateral on loans to type 1 and 2 borrowers, respectively. It is easy to verify that if \( \gamma_1 = \beta c^u_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 = 0 \), (9a)-(9c) reduce to the private equilibrium (6a)-(6c). Only higher guarantee rates have real effects.

Using (9b), increases in \( \gamma_1 \) cause \( c^u_1 \) to rise in equilibrium. This result is contrary to standard intuition, which would suggest that as \( \gamma_1 \) rises, the necessary collateral should fall. However, as \( \gamma_1 \) rises, \( r_1 \) falls and the low-risk contract becomes more desirable to high-risk borrowers. Since (5b) binds, \( c_1 \) must rise to eliminate the possibility of having high risks masquerade as low risks.

This situation is depicted in figure 2.2. Increases in \( \gamma_1 \) shift the zero-profit line for low-risk lending from \( I_1 \) to \( I'_1 \). Equilibrium contracts, which are con-
Fig. 2.2 Guarantees to low-risk borrowers

strained by (5a) and (5b), shift from \((\alpha_1, \alpha_2)\) to \((\alpha'_1, \alpha'_2)\). The collateral required at \(\alpha'_1\) is greater than that required at \(\alpha_1\). Therefore, the existence of imperfect information reverses the usual intuition concerning the effect of \(\gamma_1\) on \(c_1\).

Any guarantee to low risks that reduced the collateral requirement would make them worse off and thus would be rejected in favor of \(\alpha_1\). This is illustrated by a guarantee that shifts the zero-profit curve to \(l'_1\) from \(l_1\) and the low-risk contract to \(\alpha''_1\). It is easy to show that all such guarantees correspond to \(\gamma_1 < \beta c_1\).

Similar arguments show that \(c_1^{\text{ui}}\) falls with increases in \(\gamma_2\). As shown in figure 2.3, a rise in \(\gamma_2\) shifts the zero-profit line for lending to high-risk borrowers from \(l_2\) to \(l'_2\), which raises low-risk utility to \(U'_2\) from \(U_2\). The equilibrium thus shifts from \((\alpha_1, \alpha_2)\) to \((\alpha'_1, \alpha'_2)\). At the latter points, both groups are better off and the collateral requirement has fallen.

Since the use of collateral creates efficiency losses, these results will have important welfare implications. Substituting (9a)–(9c) into (2) yields expected utilities:

\[
U_{11}^{\text{ui}} = \pi_1 R_1 - \rho - Z - \frac{(1 - \pi_1)(\pi_1 - \pi_2)}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2)} (\rho - \gamma_1) + (1 - \pi_1)\gamma_2,
\]

and

\[
U_{22}^{\text{ui}} = \pi_2 R_2 - \rho - Z + (1 - \pi_2)\gamma_2.
\]
Increases in $\gamma_1$ raise $U_{11}$, even though they also raise $c_1$. For any $\gamma_1 > \beta c_1^u$, low-risk borrowers are better off than in private equilibrium. Increases in $\gamma_2$ raise both $U_{11}$ and $U_{22}$. Thus, both types of borrowers are better off with guarantees.

Welfare calculations are based on total expected borrowers' utility minus expected government costs of funding the guarantees. Define overall welfare as

$$ V = \varphi U_{11} + (1 - \varphi)U_{22} - \varphi(1 - \pi_1)(\gamma_1 - \beta c_1) - (1 - \varphi)(1 - \pi_2)(\gamma_2 - \beta c_2). $$

The first two terms represent utility of each borrower type, weighted by their population proportion; the last two terms represent net expected government costs of providing guarantees to low risks and high risks, respectively.\textsuperscript{10}

**PROPOSITION 1.** When borrower type is private information, and $W > c_1^u$, the welfare effects of loan guarantees are as follows:

\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \gamma_1} &\bigg|_{\gamma_1} = 0 \quad \text{if } \gamma_1 < \beta c_1^u, \\
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \gamma_1} &\bigg|_{\gamma_1} < 0 \quad \text{if } \gamma_1 \geq \beta c_1^u, \\
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \gamma_2} &\bigg|_{\gamma_1} > 0,
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \gamma} &\bigg|_{\gamma = \gamma_1 = \gamma_2} > 0.
\end{align*}

---

Fig. 2.3 Guarantees to high-risk borrowers
The main result from proposition 1 is that the effects of government intervention depend on how the incentive-compatibility constraint, and in particular the collateral requirement, is affected.

Equation (13) states that increases in $\gamma_1$, holding $\gamma_2$ constant, reduce welfare. From (10), the guarantee raises $U_n$ by $[(1 - \pi)(\pi_1 - \pi_2)]/[\pi_1(1 - \pi_2)]$. However, from (12), the marginal cost, per low-risk borrower, of raising $\gamma_1$ is $(1 - \pi)$. It is easy to show that the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits. This occurs because the rise in $\gamma_1$ raises $c_1$, which creates an efficiency loss.

The second result states that subsidizing the high-risk group is welfare improving. Using (11) and (12), the government's costs equal the benefits to high-risk borrowers. Since low-risk borrowers are also made better off, there is a welfare gain. The rise in $\gamma_2$ increases the attractiveness of the high-risk contract, so that low-risk borrowers can be offered more attractive terms. The fall in $c_1$ allows for an efficiency gain.

Equation (15) states that raising the guarantee rate on all loans is welfare improving. From (9b), setting $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = \gamma$ yields $c_{1l}/\partial \gamma < 0$, so that collateral falls as the overall guarantee rate rises. Therefore, the net effect of universal guarantees is to weaken the incentive-compatibility constraint and raise welfare.

2.4 Asymmetric Information and Constrained Collateral

2.4.1 Private Equilibrium

The effectiveness of collateral as a sorting device is crucially dependent on the existence of sufficient end-of-period borrower wealth. For example, if $W = 0$, collateral cannot be used as a sorting device. More generally, suppose $W < c_{1l}$, given in (6b); then the low-risk contract offered in Equilibrium II cannot be fulfilled by borrowers. Lenders, knowing this, will not offer the contract. Moreover, because (5b) is binding in equilibrium, if lenders simply reduced $c_1$ to $W$, the contracts offered would not be incentive compatible; both groups would prefer the contract meant for low-risk borrowers.

Lenders can resolve this problem by making the low-risk contract less attractive to high-risk borrowers. Raising $r_1$ would discourage low-risk borrowers more than high-risk borrowers, since the latter have a smaller probability of actually having to pay the higher rate. The only alternative is to reduce $p_1$. This adjustment will discourage high-risks more and restore incentive compatibility. Therefore, when borrower wealth is insufficient to permit collateral alone to act as a sorting device, rationing of low-risk borrowers ($p_1 < 1$) is required to restore equilibrium. The intuition presented above is summarized in

EQUILIBRIUM IV. When borrower type is characterized by private information and $W < c_{1l}$, the private equilibrium is characterized by$^{12}$
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(16) \[ p^{IV}_1 = \frac{U^{IV}_1}{\pi_2(R_2 - r_1) - (1 - \pi_2)W - Z} < 1, \quad p^{IV}_2 = 1, \]

(16b) \[ c^{IV}_1 = W, \quad c^{IV}_2 = 0, \]

(16c) \[ r^{IV}_1 = \frac{p}{\pi_1} - \frac{1 - \pi_1}{\pi_1} \beta W, \quad r^{IV}_2 = \frac{p}{\pi_2}. \]

High-risk borrowers receive the same contract and utility as in Equilibrium II, when \( W > c^I_1 \). In contrast, because they cannot post \( c^I_1 \) in collateral, low-risk borrowers are rationed. Their expected utility is given by

(17) \[ U^{IV}_{11} = p^{IV}_1[\pi_1 R_1 - p - Z - (1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta)W]. \]

2.4.2 Government Credit

In the presence of rationing, the natural government policy to analyze is characterized by \( p_G \), the probability of obtaining a government-guaranteed loan given (1) the borrower cannot obtain private credit and (2) \( \gamma_1 \), defined as before. Although the analysis will focus on subsidized loan guarantees, analogous results can be shown to hold for subsidized direct loans as well.

The interest rate charged on guaranteed loans gives lenders zero profits and is given by

(18) \[ r_G = \frac{p}{\pi_1} - \frac{1}{\pi_1} \gamma_1. \]

It is assumed that government charges \( W \) as collateral.

With this policy, low-risk utility is given by

(19) \[ U_{11} = p_1 X_{11} + (1 - p_1)p_G X_{1G}. \]

The first term on the right-hand side of (19) represents the probability of obtaining a private loan, \( p_G \), multiplied by \( X_{11} \), the expected payoff to low-risk borrowers of obtaining a private loan meant for low-risk borrowers. The second term represents the probability of obtaining a government-guaranteed loan, \((1 - p_1)p_G \), multiplied by \( X_{1G} \), the expected payoff to low-risk borrowers from that loan. If \( \gamma_1 = \beta W \), then \( X_{11} = X_{1G} \) and there is no gain to obtaining a government rather than a private loan. If \( \gamma_1 > \beta W, X_{11} > X_{1G} \).

The incentive compatibility constraint (5b) is now given by

(20) \[ U_{22} \geq p_1 X_{21} + (1 - p_1)p_G X_{2G}, \]

where \( X_{21} \) is the expected payoff to high risks of taking a private loan meant for low risks, and \( X_{2G} \) is the expected payoff to high risks of taking a government loan meant for low-risks. (These are given in more detail in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 in the Appendix.)

Equilibrium V. When borrower type is private information, and \( W < c^I_1 \), the equilibrium with loan guarantees is characterized by
These private loans are, of course, supplemented by government-guaranteed loans to some low-risk borrowers described by \((p_G, r_G, W)\). High-risk borrowers obtain the same contract and utility as in Equilibria II and IV. Low-risk utility is given by (19) with appropriate substitutions for \(X_{11}\) and \(X_{1G}\).

Define the probability of low risks obtaining any loan as

\[
(22) \quad p^* = p_1 + (1 - p_1)p_G.
\]

Then a proportion \(1 - p^*\) of low risks will be rationed.

**Proposition 2.** When the initial allocation is given by Equilibrium V, increases in \(p_G\) or \(\gamma_i\) increase the extent of rationing (reduce \(p^*\)).

Proposition 2 establishes that government subsidies to borrowers who cannot obtain private financing increases the number of borrowers who cannot obtain any financing, public or private. That is, private credit is crowded out on a more than one-to-one basis. Although this result may appear surprising, it is based on the equilibrium response of lenders to the shift in the incentive-compatibility constraint.

For example, in the equilibrium with \(W > c_{1i}\), an increase in \(\gamma_i\) raised \(c_i\) in order to restore incentive compatibility. Now, however, collateral is constrained to equal \(W\), which is assumed to be less than \(c_{1i}\). As a consequence, increases in \(\gamma_i\) (which reduce \(r_i\)) require that \(p_i\) fall. From (22), a reduction in \(p_i\), holding \(p_G\) constant, reduces \(p^*\). Therefore, raising the guarantee rate to low-risk borrowers increases the extent of rationing.

Similarly, consider a small increase in \(p_G\), holding \(\gamma_i\) constant. If \(p_i\) were held constant, all borrowers would have an increased chance of obtaining a cheap government loan, which would induce high risks to masquerade as low risks. If \(p_i\) fell such that \(p^*\) were unchanged from its previous level, high risks would still prefer masquerading as low risks to taking the high-risk contract. To show this, rewrite (20) as

\[
(23) \quad U_{22} \geq p^*X_{21} + (1 - p_1)p_G(X_{2G} - X_{21}).
\]

Recall that this constraint is binding in Equilibrium V. If \(p_G\) rises and \(p^*\) is held constant, (23) is violated. Therefore, in equilibrium, incentive compatibility requires \(p_i\) to fall enough to make \(p^*\) fall in response to the rise in \(p_G\). That is, increases in \(p_G\) raise the extent of rationing.

Although they increase the likelihood of any given low-risk borrower being rationed, guarantees raise the ex post utility of those who do obtain government credit; this is caused by the reduced interest rate \(r_G\) on guaranteed loans.
The effects of these guarantees on the ex ante expected utility of low-risk borrowers and on welfare is given in

**Proposition 3.** When the initial allocation is given by Equilibrium V, the welfare effects of government intervention are

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial U_{ii}}{\partial \gamma_i} & > 0, \\
\frac{\partial U_{ii}^V}{\partial p_G} & > 0, \\
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \gamma_i} & < 0, \\
\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_G} & < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Equations (24a) and (24b) show that guaranteed loans raise the ex ante expected utility of the targeted group. This occurs even though the overall probability of obtaining a loan falls. Therefore, the targeted group prefers to have the policy, even though fewer lower-risk borrowers obtain credit when the subsidy is in place.

Equations (25a) and (25b) show that, as in Proposition 1, guarantees to low-risk borrowers reduce overall welfare. This occurs because the increase in rationing represents an overall efficiency loss. Following the approach taken in Section 2.3 it is straightforward to show that guarantees to the high-risk group reduce the extent of rationing. Intuitively, these guarantees make the high-risk contract \((U_{22})\) more attractive and, through (21a), raise \(\gamma_1\). Because of the reduction in rationing, these guarantees raise efficiency.

**2.5 Conclusion**

This paper analyzes the effects of credit subsidies in markets characterized by adverse selection. The principal result is that the effects of credit subsidies depend on how eligibility is determined. Programs that subsidize the unrationed contract will reduce the extent of rationing and raise overall efficiency. In contrast, programs that target borrowers who cannot obtain private financing raise the extent of rationing and reduce efficiency. The distinction is important precisely because most government credit is designed to provide funds to those who do not receive private loans. In the model presented here, such policies raise the extent of rationing and create inherent tradeoffs among members of the same target group: fewer of them obtain any type of credit, but those that receive government loans are better off.

Two concluding comments should be made. First, the effects described above represent equilibrium responses. In particular, they take into account the need to deter high risks from pretending to be low risks. As a consequence
of this incentive-compatibility constraint, whenever the government eases some of the terms on low-risk contracts, the others must be adversely affected in equilibrium.

Second, the paper has focused on a fairly standard adverse selection model, based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Numerous extensions of that and other models have shown that the nature of equilibrium can be affected by incentive effects (Stiglitz and Weiss 1986), project characteristics, the set of available financial instruments (de Meza and Webb 1987), alternative projects (Chan and Thakor 1987), information sharing (Yotsuzuka 1987), the shape of the production function (Milde and Riley 1988), and other characteristics. The effects of credit policies in such alternative models deserve further exploration.

Appendix

EQUILIBRIUM I. In each submarket, equilibrium contracts maximize expected borrower utility, $U_u$, given in (2) subject to (1). Substitution of (1) into (2) for each $U_u$ yields

$$\max_{p, c_i} L^i = p_i [\pi_i R_i - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_i)(1 - \pi_i) c_i].$$

Taking derivatives yields:

$$\frac{\partial L^i}{\partial c_i} = -p_i (1 - \pi_i)(1 - \pi_i) c_i < 0,$$

so that $c_i^* = 0$, which implies through (1) that $r_i^* = \rho/\pi_i$. In addition,

$$\frac{\partial L^i}{\partial p_i} \bigg|_{c_i^*} = \pi_i R_i - \rho - Z,$$

which is positive if type $i$ investors are applying for loans, implying that $p_i^* = 1$.

EQUILIBRIUM II. The remaining equilibria follow a common pattern. Therefore, Equilibrium II is derived in some detail, while the derivations of Equilibria III–V are shorter.

With asymmetric information, equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the population-weighted average of borrowers’ expected utility, given by

$$(A1) \quad \varphi U_{11} + (1 - \varphi) U_{22},$$

subject to (1), (5a), and (5b). Following Besanko and Thakor (1987), the strategy employed is initially to ignore (5a) and assume $p_i = 1$. Later it will
be shown that the optimal solution does satisfy (5a) and \( p_1 = 1 \). Substituting (1) into (A1) and maximizing (A1) subject to (5b) yields the problem:

\[
\max L^u = \varphi p_1 [\pi_1 R_1 - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta) c_1] + (1 - \varphi)p_2 [\pi_2 R_2 - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_2)(1 - \beta) c_2] + \lambda \{ p_2 [\pi_2 R_2 - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_2)(1 - \beta) c_2] - p_1 [\pi_2 R_2 - \pi_2 \rho - \pi_1 (1 - \pi_2) - \pi_2 (1 - \pi_1) \beta \} c_1 - Z \},
\]

where \( \lambda \) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (5b). Setting \( p_1 = 1 \) and setting \( \partial L^u / \partial c_1 = 0 \) implies

\[
\lambda = \frac{\varphi (1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta) \pi_1}{\pi_1 (1 - \pi_2) - \pi_2 (1 - \pi_1) \beta} > 0,
\]

which implies that (5b) is binding. Using (A3), it is easy to show that \( \partial L^u / \partial c_2 < 0 \), which implies \( c_2^u = 0 \). Substituting for \( c_2^u \) in (5b) and solving (5b) for \( c_1^u \) yields the expression in (6b). Given \( c_1^u \), \( r_2^u \) can be found using (1).

It remains to be shown that (5a) is satisfied at the solution presented above and that \( p_1 = 1 \) is optimal. To show that (5a) is satisfied, note that

\[
\pi_1 (R_1 - r_1^u) - (1 - \pi_1) c_1^u \geq \pi_1 (R_1 - r_2^u), \quad \text{or} \quad \pi_1 (r_2^u - r_1^u) \geq (1 - \pi_1) c_1^u.
\]

Using (1) and (6b) and some algebra, it can be shown that (A4) holds for the values given in proposition 2 above. By examining figure 2.1, \( U_{11} > U_{12} \) can also be seen.

It is also straightforward to show that \( \partial L^u / \partial p_2 > 0 \), which implies \( p_2^u = 1 \). Finally,

\[
\frac{\partial L^u}{\partial p_1} = \varphi [\pi_1 R_1 - \rho - Z - (1 - \pi_1)(1 - \beta) c_1^u] - \lambda \left\{ \pi_2 R_2 - \pi_2 \rho - \pi_1 (1 - \pi_2) - \pi_2 (1 - \pi_1) \beta \right\} c_1^u - Z \}
\]

This can be shown to be positive provided that \( k - r_1 - Z > 0 \). This condition captures the idea that high risks have a higher aversion to posting collateral because they have a larger probability of having to pay it. That is, the same condition implies, from (2), that \( dc/\partial p \) rises with \( \pi \).

**Equilibrium III.** Guarantees shift the zero-profit condition to (8) from (1). Otherwise, the maximization follows as in Equilibrium II. That is, substitute (8) into (2) for (A1) and maximize subject to (5a), ignoring (5b) and setting \( p_1 = 1 \) for now. The problem is to
\[
\max_{c_1, c_2} L_{ii} = \varphi p_i [\pi_i R_i - \rho - Z + (1 - \pi_i)(\gamma_i - c_i)] \\
+ (1 - \varphi)p_2 [\pi_2 R_2 - \rho - Z + (1 - \pi_2)(\gamma_2 - c_2)] \\
+ \lambda \{p_2 [\pi_2 R_2 - \rho - Z + (1 - \pi_2)(\gamma_2 - c_2)] \\
- p_1 \{\pi_2 R_2 - \frac{\pi_2 \rho}{\pi_1} + \frac{\pi_2 (1 - \pi_i)}{\pi_1} \gamma_1 - (1 - \pi_2)c_1 - Z\}\}.
\]

Setting \(\partial L_{ii}/\partial c_1 = 0\) implies that \(\lambda > 0\), which implies that (5b) binds. Given \(\lambda > 0\), it is easy to show that \(c_{1 ii} = 0\). Solving (5b) for \(c_{1 ii}\) yields the expression in (9b). Showing that (5a) is satisfied and that \(p_{1 ii} = 1\) follow in the same way as Equilibrium II.

**Proposition 1.** Expected borrower utilities are given in (10) and (11). The government cost of providing guarantee \(\gamma_i\) is \((1 - \pi_2)(\gamma_i - \beta c_{1 ii})\) for each borrower in group \(i\). The effects of raising \(\gamma_i\) only or \(\gamma_2\) only are described in the text. The effects of raising \(\gamma\) are as follows.

If \(\gamma < \beta c_{1 ii}\), the only effect of raising \(\gamma\) occurs through raising \(\gamma_2\), so the increase in \(\gamma\) is welfare improving. When \(\gamma \geq \beta c_{1 ii}\), further increases introduce opposing welfare effects. However, the net effect is always welfare improving. Note that, for each high-risk borrower, the benefits of raising \(\gamma\) equal \((1 - \pi_2)\delta \gamma_2\), which equals the cost of providing guarantees for high-risk borrowers. The welfare effects thus depend on comparing \(\partial U_{ii}/\partial \gamma\) and the cost of providing guarantees to low risks, \((1 - \pi_1)\). From (10),

\[
\partial U_{ii}/\partial \gamma = \frac{(1 - \pi_1)(\pi_1 - \gamma_2)}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2)} + (1 - \pi_1) > (1 - \pi_1).
\]

Therefore, increases in \(\gamma\) are welfare-improving.

**Equilibrium IV.** The problem is now to maximize (A2) subject to (1), (5b), and a wealth constraint, \(W < c_1^i\). As before, taking derivatives with respect to \(c_2\) and \(p_2\) yields \(p_{2ii} = 0\) and \(c_{2ii} = 0\), and the latter result implies \(r_{2ii} = \rho/\pi_2\). The wealth constraint implies that \(c_{1ii} = W\). The zero-profits condition determines \(r_{1ii}\). Only \(p_1\) remains to be determined. Optimizing with respect to \(p_1\) implies that \(\lambda > 0\) so that (5b) is binding. Solving (5b) for \(p_1\) yields the expression in (16a).

**Equilibrium V.** The problem is now to maximize (A2) subject to (1), (5a), \(W < c_1^i\), and (20), and where \(U_{ii}\) is given by (19). Values for \(c_{1 ii}, p_{1 ii}, r_{1 ii}, \gamma_1,\) and \(r_{1 ii}\) as derived as in Equilibrium IV. The equilibrium \(p_1\) is determined by solving (20) for \(p_1\).

**Proposition 2.** Note that \(X_{21} = \pi_2 R_2 - \pi_2 \rho/\pi_1 - \{\pi_1(1 - \pi_2) - \pi_2(1 - \pi_1)\beta/\pi_1\}W - Z\), and \(X_{21} = X_{21} + \{\pi_2(1 - \pi_1)/\pi_1\}(\gamma_1 - \beta W)\), where these terms are derived by substituting for \(r\) using (1) and (18). Thus \(X_{11}\) and \(X_{12}\) are derived analogously. From (22)

\[
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \gamma} (1 - p_0) = \frac{p_0 \pi_2(1 - \pi_1)(U_{22} - X_{21})}{\pi_1(X_{21} - p_0 x_{22})^2} (1 - p_0) < 0,
\]
because from (21a), \( U_{22} < X_{21} \). Similarly

\[
\frac{\partial p^*}{\partial p_G} = \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial p_G} (1 - p_G) + (1 - p_1) = \frac{(U_{22} - X_{21})(X_{2G} - X_{21})}{(X_{21} - p_G X_{2G})^2} < 0,
\]

using (21a) and some algebra.

**Proposition 3.** Taking derivatives of (19) yields

\[
\frac{\partial U_{11}^V}{\partial \gamma_1} = \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \gamma_1} (X_{11} - p_G X_{1G}) + (1 - p_1) p_G \frac{\partial X_{1G}}{\partial \gamma_1} = p_G (1 - \pi_1)(1 - p_1) \left\{ 1 - \frac{\pi_2(x_{11} - p_G X_{2G})}{\pi_1(X_{21} - p_G X_{2G})} \right\},
\]

using (21a). The expression in brackets can be shown to be positive, so that (A6) is positive. In addition,

\[
\frac{\partial U_{11}^V}{\partial p_G} = \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial p_G} (X_{11} - p_G X_{1G}) + (1 + p_1) X_{1G} = \frac{(X_{21} - U_{22})(X_{21} X_{1G} - X_{2G} X_{11})}{(X_{21} - p_G X_{2G})^2} > 0,
\]

because the term in brackets can be shown to be positive.

To show the welfare effects of changing \( \gamma_1 \), note that the expression in (A6) is less than \((1 - \pi_1)\), the marginal costs of raising \( \gamma_1 \) per low-risk borrower. Thus, increases in \( \gamma_1 \) reduce efficiency. Similar results hold for \( p_G \).

**Notes**

1. For discussions of the features and overall effects of federal credit, see Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987), Gale (1988a), or Office of Management and Budget (1989).

2. Previous research on federal credit in markets with imperfect information includes Mankiw (1986) and Gale (1988b), who study models with a continuum of borrower types, and Gale (1987) and Smith and Stutzer (1989) who examine models with two types of borrowers. The current paper is based on Gale (1987, app. C). Some of the results are closely related to independent work by Smith and Stutzer (1989).

3. As described in Section 2.4 below, raising the interest rate on the low-risk loan cannot restore incentive compatibility, because low risks are more averse to accepting a higher interest rate than high risks are.

4. The initial endowment could also represent a unit of labor supply, in which case \( Z \) would be interpretable as the value of leisure forgone by investing.


6. In order to focus on the role of collateral and rationing as sorting devices, the paper focuses on separating equilibria. See nn. 8 and 13 below for a discussion of potential pooling equilibria.

8. The existence of a separating equilibrium can be ensured by assuming that there is a sufficiently large proportion of high-risk borrowers or that the difference between \( \pi_1 - \pi_2 \) is large enough. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Besanko and Thakor (1987). There are no pooling equilibria under the assumptions in this section.

9. Gale (1987) also examines government policies in which low-risk loans are taxed and high-risk loans are subsidized. These policies operate through the same channels as guarantees and will be ignored here.

10. Therefore, the welfare criterion is total surplus, rather than a Pareto measure. In addition, (12) assumes that taxes are raised in a lump-sum manner.

11. It is impossible to make the high-risk contract more attractive to high-risk borrowers without losing money on high-risk contracts. Because of the Nash assumption, cross-subsidization of contracts will not occur in this model, although it could in other contexts. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1989).

12. Besanko and Thakor (1987) show that, under these circumstances, (5a) requires that \( W \geq \frac{Z}{\pi_1 - \pi_2} \left\{ \pi_1 (\pi_2 R - \rho) - Z \pi_2 (1 - \pi_1) + \beta \pi_1 \right\} \). Loosely speaking, this requires that \( Z \) is small relative to \( W \). In order to rule out a pooling equilibrium at \( p = 1, c = W \), it is necessary to assume that \( \beta < \frac{(1 - \pi_1)}{(1 - \pi_2)} \). It may be thought that the allocation in Equilibrium V could be broken by an offer that raises \( p_1 \) and \( r_1 \), holding \( c_1 \) at \( W \). Such an offer would earn positive profits if it attracted only low risks. However, from (2), \( dr_1/dp = \frac{c - Z}{p \pi_1 - (r - c)/p} \). Since this expression is decreasing in \( \pi_1 \), any offer that raised \( p_1 \) and \( r_1 \) relative to Equilibrium V would attract both types and thus would not be offered.

13. Reducing the collateral requirement on government loans has the same qualitative effects as raising \( p_G \) or \( \gamma_1 \).

14. In order to avoid the prospect of borrowers turning down private loans to accept public ones, I assume \( X_{11} > p_G X_{1C} \).

References


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